


Declassified in Part - 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/07/16 :
CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090

Declassified in Part -
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/07/16 :
CIA-RDP85T00875R001100090

Secret

25X1



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Turkey's Ability to Curb Opium Production

DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH

FILE COPY

DO NOT DESTROY

Secret

21 May 1970
No. 0507/70

89



WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 May 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Turkey's Ability to Curb Opium ProductionIntroduction

Because 80 percent of all heroin smuggled into the US is believed to originate from opium grown in Turkey's Western Anatolia, the subject of narcotics will be high on the agenda when Prime Minister Demirel visits Washington next month. The US has repeatedly urged Demirel to destroy the current opium crop, which is due to be harvested this month and next, and halt further production. Demirel has countered by promising to buy up the entire current crop, to limit production next year sharply, and to ban all poppy cultivation in 1972.

Ankara's ability to eliminate poppy production will be seriously hampered if Demirel appears to be reacting primarily to US pressure; consequently, both Turkey and the US are trying to broaden international pressure on Turkey by introducing the subject of opium control either in NATO or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The June meeting of the NATO committee on "Challenges of Modern Society" provides an opportunity for such a step, but time may be running out because Ankara presumably is required to announce in June its program for 1971 opium plantings.

This memorandum reviews those factors affecting and currently inhibiting Demirel's response to US pressure for elimination of poppy production.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research and the Office of National Estimates.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Political Considerations

1. Demirel's political position, already seriously weakened by dissension within his Justice Party, has further deteriorated in recent weeks. Under present conditions, he probably would be unable to cut off opium production summarily even if he were so inclined. To attempt to railroad special legislation through a Parliament harboring a sharply hostile element could be political suicide; any attempt to destroy the current opium poppy crop or to preclude future cultivation without parliamentary sanction could lead rapidly to a new government crisis.

2. Demirel emerged from the national election in October 1969 apparently in firm control of the incumbent Justice Party and both houses of Parliament. Within four months, however, dissension within his party dissipated his majority in the lower house and brought on a government crisis that has not yet been entirely resolved. To a large extent, possibly as a result of a miscalculation of opposition strength within his party, Demirel forfeited his parliamentary majority and invited the current tenuous stability.

3. Demirel's political stature has been damaged also by persistent allegations of financial corruption involving him and his two brothers. These charges surfaced during the struggle preceding defections from his party on the national budget vote in February that both doomed the budget and seriously damaged the public image of the Demirel government. Over Demirel's opposition, a parliamentary investigating committee was established to look into the corruption charges. Following a preliminary inquiry, Demirel was able to gain an indefinite postponement of further investigation, pending the conclusion of a court case that he had instituted against the newspaper publishing the allegation. Demirel's parliamentary support, however, is less than an ensured majority. He controls a majority in the Senate, but in the National Assembly--the lower house--he probably can count on no more than

SECRET


25X1

SECRET



25X1

220 deputies from his party, especially on controversial issues. This is six short of the bare majority necessary to maintain control of the full assembly. Given the tenor of the present Parliament, the passage of any dramatic or highly restrictive legislation against opium production is, therefore, highly problematical.



25X1



SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

6. Nevertheless, Demirel still remains the best hope of gaining any early eradication of opium poppy cultivation in Turkey, although he believes that there is no practical means whereby his government can destroy this year's crop. He warned that any attempt to do so would result in clashes with the growers and that no government could survive the popular repercussions that would follow. He has made a personal commitment to end opium production by 1972, but this is a verbal commitment only. Parliamentary approval is still required to make it binding on the government. If Demirel's political image is further tarnished by domestic failures or by plausible charges of excessive foreign influence, he might be forced to relinquish leadership of the government, in which case even the prospect of tighter immediate controls and graduated eradication of poppy cultivation would become increasingly dim.

7. Concerning next year's crop, Demirel has gone no further than to promise to study the situation and to do everything possible to limit and control production. He appears to favor a program of stricter licensing and progressive limitation of areas where poppy cultivation will be authorized. Even these restrictions will require new legislation. He has not precluded the possibility of a complete ban on all future opium production in Turkey, however, and apparently is giving serious consideration to such a ban. In any event, no final decision will be made until after his conversations with President Nixon in June.

-4-

25X1

SECRET