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SECRET/NF/CD/BUO-THE SOUTH ASIAN MILITARY  
HANDBOOK


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# The South Asian Military Handbook

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August 1973

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NOTE

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It is anticipated that the Handbook will be updated, when necessary, by issuing only relevant sections rather than re-issuing the entire publication. For this reason, the Handbook has been punched for insertion in a three-ring binder.

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SOUTH ASIAN MILITARY HANDBOOK

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I. BACKGROUND 1947-1973

A. India vs. Pakistan: An Historical Summary

Partition and Kashmir

In August 1947, following years of agitation by the predominantly Hindu Congress Party, Great Britain gave up its Indian Empire. At the same time, as a result of Muslim agitation, Britain partitioned India, creating Pakistan from the two largest predominantly Muslim areas.

The two wings of Pakistan had little in common other than religion and were separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Even before partition became official, millions of Hindus had moved from Pakistan to India and millions of Muslims had migrated in the opposite direction. Violence on both sides encouraged the exodus. Nevertheless, some 10 percent of India's population remained Muslim, and several million Hindus stayed in Pakistan—almost all in East Pakistan.

Large parts of the British Indian Empire had been ruled by theoretically sovereign native princes. The British left to them the decision as to whether their states would join Pakistan or India, or remain independent. In instances where the religion of the prince and his subjects was the same, accession did not become a problem in Indo-Pakistani relations. A few Muslim princes ruled predominantly Hindu populations in states not contiguous to Pakistan. Although several of these princes either acceded to Pakistan or decided to remain independent, all of their states were eventually incorporated into India.

In Jammu and Kashmir, a Hindu Maharajah ruled a population that was mostly Muslim. When he delayed making a decision, some of his Muslim subjects rebelled, receiving assistance from some Pakistani tribesmen. At this point—on 27 October—the Maharajah opted for India in return for Indian military assistance. Indian troops arrived in the state the same day. The Indians and the Pakistanis fought in Kashmir for over a year, and in the end India held most of the state, including the strategically important Vale.

Pakistan annexed part of northern Kashmir and gained control of a small part of western Kashmir, the theoretically independent state of Azad Kashmir. The UN Security Council called for a plebiscite to determine the future status of Kashmir, but the plebiscite was never held. A cease-fire line was delineated in the summer of 1949, under UN auspices, and served as the de facto boundary until 1971.

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**Kutch and Kashmir**

For over 15 years, despite continuing hostility, open fighting between India and Pakistan was limited to border incidents. In the spring of 1965, however, serious clashes broke out in a desolate area along the shore of the Arabian Sea known as the Rann of Kutch, where India and Pakistan had conflicting claims. Both sides eventually agreed to arbitration, and in 1968 a decision was announced that was generally regarded as favorable to Pakistan.

In August 1965, Pakistan began sending "freedom fighters" into Indian-held Kashmir. India moved quickly to seal off the access routes, making incursions into Azad Kashmir in the process. In any case, no enthusiasm for rebellion developed among the Kashmiris. On 1 September, Pakistan launched an attack against extreme southern Kashmir in hopes of cutting India's communications with its forces farther north in the state. Five days later, India began a full-scale attack in the Lahore area of West Pakistan. The Pakistanis held the Indians outside of Lahore, and with little or no resistance captured extensive desert area in Rajasthan, but were unable to advance farther into Kashmir. By mutual agreement there was virtually no fighting along the border between India and East Pakistan. After three weeks of fighting in the West, both sides agreed to a UN-sponsored cease-fire. The Pakistanis were running critically short of military supplies, while the Indians believed that their gains would not be worth the considerable cost of protracting the war. Under Soviet sponsorship, the two countries reached an agreement in January 1966 at Tashkent that restored the border to that existing before the war.

**Bangladesh and Kashmir**

In Pakistan's general elections in December 1970, the Awami League, which advocated provincial autonomy, won enough seats in East Pakistan to ensure an absolute majority in the projected Pakistan National Assembly. The assembly was to write a new constitution, and the leaders of the league refused to compromise on principles many West Pakistanis felt would eventually dissolve the union. In early March 1971, the Awami League in effect took over the administration of the province, and on 25 March, the army moved to restore central authority. The Bengalees then proclaimed their independence.

The Indian Government felt threatened by events in East Pakistan. About 10 million Bengalees eventually fled to India, creating major economic problems and potentially serious political and social ones.

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Inside East Pakistan, extreme leftists became stronger, although they never became more than a long-term potential threat to the moderates in the freedom movement.

India supported the Bengali guerrillas, hoping to force Islamabad to grant the Bengalees' political demands. By fall, the Indians were clearly willing to risk war, and by late November regular Indian forces, in brigade strength, were conducting raids into East Pakistan.

On 3 December, Pakistan launched air strikes at air bases in western India, and full-scale war on two fronts began. In the East, on 4 December, India invaded East Pakistan. Pakistani forces surrendered after two weeks of fighting, and Bangladesh became independent. In the West, the main Pakistani attack into Kashmir stalled, but both sides seized some territory along the cease-fire line. In the strategic Lahore sector, there was relatively little fighting, but in the Sind, the Indians seized over 5,000 square miles of territory. The Indians proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire along the western border effective as of 17 December, and the Pakistanis concurred.

In July 1972, at Simla, the two sides agreed to withdraw their troops from occupied territory, except in Kashmir, where a new "line of control" was established. The agreement was implemented in December.



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**B. South Asia and the Great Powers**

Relations between the Great Powers have important repercussions in South Asia. In the 1950s US-Soviet tensions played an important part in determining not only the relations of South Asian nations with the Great Powers, but relations among the South Asian nations themselves. The emergence of China in the 1960s and the detente in Sino-US and US-Soviet relations in the 1970s have also had a significant impact.

**The 1950s**

Washington's policy of containment during the 1950s put the US at odds with India and led to a military alliance with Pakistan:

—India's policies, such as its ambiguous stand during the Korean conflict and its abstention on the UN vote to condemn the Soviet intervention in Hungary, led to serious strains between Washington and New Delhi;

—US efforts to contain the USSR resulted in the inclusion of Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO, and in bilateral defense agreements with the US in 1954 and 1959.

Moscow, after Stalin's death in 1953, placed a high priority on developing close relations with India as a large new nation advocating socialism.

In South Asia, while India bought arms from Western Europe, principally Britain, a major US military supply program, including grant aid, enabled Pakistan to challenge Indian dominance. Nehru claimed the military assistance agreement prevented further progress on resolving the Kashmir dispute.

China, not yet a Great Power, chose the Third World as its forum for international expression and also developed close ties with India. At the same time, India emphasized its own non-alignment and acted as a leader of the Third World.

**The 1960s**

Beginning in the late 1950s, the growing power of China began to change relationships in the sub-continent:

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- China and India began to see each other as rivals for leadership in Asia and in the Third World;
- Sino-Soviet rivalry encouraged close Indo-Soviet relations;
- Pakistan began to see China as a potential ally against India and, as early as 1961, entered into negotiations with Peking for a border agreement, which was finally signed in 1963;
- The US, desiring both to offset growing Soviet influence in New Delhi and to contain China, took some tentative steps toward improving relations with New Delhi.

The war in the Himalayas in late 1962 brought most of these trends to a head. The US and UK rushed arms to India to demonstrate their support for New Delhi. Pakistani faith in the US as a protector against India was badly shaken by these actions. The war also pointed up the mutual hostility of Pakistan and China toward India. The USSR, forced to choose between a Communist and a non-Communist country, opted for India. Soviet arms shipments began arriving the following year.

The US continued to be the major arms supplier to Pakistan, but, when the US imposed an embargo during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, it was replaced by China.

Decreasing strains in US-Soviet relations during the 1960s were both reflected and encouraged by the parallel policies of the two countries in South Asia:

- Both sought to contain China;
- Both worked for stability in the sub-continent;
- In late 1965, US efforts with India and Pakistan undoubtedly contributed to the receptivity of each country to the eventual Soviet mediation at Tashkent;
- Both sought to increase their influence in India and Pakistan. Following the 1965 war, the USSR improved its relations with Pakistan slightly, at minor cost to its relations with India.

**The 1970s**

In the early 1970s, there has been some swing back toward the relations existing in the 1950s. The Sino-US detente obviated Washington's interest in

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India as a vehicle for containing China. The detente also eliminated a major complication in Pakistan's foreign policy, allowing Islamabad to maintain relations with one of its Great-Power allies without offending the other. US and Chinese policy toward the sub-continent began to coincide. For example, the policies of the two countries during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war were roughly parallel. Finally, the detente and the continuing Sino-Soviet rivalry, together with Indo-Pakistani hostility, resulted in closer relations between New Delhi and Moscow—symbolized by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty.

The independence of Bangladesh injected a new factor into the South Asian equation. Dacca's relations with the Great Powers tended to parallel India's. Bangladesh, however, stood in much greater need of economic aid from the US. Its relations with the USSR were limited to some extent by Soviet reluctance to undercut New Delhi's influence in Dacca. China—with an eye toward Islamabad—refused to have any dealings with the new nation.

**The Future**

The beginnings of further shifts in the Great Power - South Asian relationship are already visible. China and India appear to be moving toward rapprochement, while Indo-US relations, badly hurt during the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, appear to be improving. The USSR is once again seeking better relations with Pakistan, and Pakistan for its part, now seems to want a more amicable relationship with Moscow.

**Regional Relations**

Relations between India and Pakistan have influenced and been influenced by the policies of the smaller nations of the area.

Iran has consistently supported Pakistan, providing limited quantities of military supplies and sanctuary for Pakistani civil aircraft during Pakistan's wars with India and using its diplomatic influence on Islamabad's behalf. The Iranian interest is in maintaining a stable and independent nation on its eastern border and in limiting Soviet, Chinese, and Indian influence both in South Asia and farther west. Iran has never, however, pressed its support of Pakistan to the point of actual involvement in combat operations.

Afghanistan has long-standing differences with Pakistan over the status of the two Pakistani frontier provinces—Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier. India's cordial relations with Afghanistan are partly a function of

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their respective problems with Pakistan. Afghanistan's military and economic vulnerability, a latent fear of Indian encroachment, and sympathy for fellow Muslims have all tended to limit Afghan-Indian cooperation.

Sri Lanka and Nepal have pursued a policy of preserving their independence and freedom of action by playing not only India against Pakistan, but the Great Powers against each other. India seeks, at a minimum, to have no other power dominant in these two countries, and—especially in Nepal—has made special efforts to increase Indian influence.

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## II. RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The 1971 war with Pakistan demonstrated India's pre-eminence as a military power in South Asia. Although Pakistan's military capability remained largely intact following the conflict, the country's leaders recognize that their armed forces are no match for India's. There is little difference between the two forces in terms of leadership, morale and logistic capability, but the Indian armed forces are much larger and better equipped, and would ultimately overwhelm their foe. India's military strength has, in fact, evolved to the point where it could probably defend itself successfully against a conventional attack by China or a combined Chinese-Pakistani attack.

The key to India's strong position is the massive military expansion program, including the development of a domestic armaments industry, begun after the 1962 hostilities with China. India is continuing to purchase sophisticated military equipment from the Soviet Union as well as Eastern European and Free World countries, and is arranging for production of such items whenever feasible. Pakistan has increased its efforts to acquire weaponry, primarily from France and the Peoples Republic of China, but has been unable to match India's military buildup. It is doubtful that military parity will ever be restored.

The Bangladesh armed forces, in their present embryonic stage, have no offensive, and only a limited defensive, capability.

### A. India

**Ground:** The Indian Army is capable of successful offensive and defensive operations within South Asia. It could also constitute an effective expeditionary force within the region, using its own resources, or elsewhere in combination with a major power. The Indian Army, in conjunction with the paramilitary forces, is capable of maintaining internal security and of meeting any civil emergency. The army has a personnel strength of about 1,092,000. There is no compulsory service. Enlistment is permitted between the ages of 17 and 24 for 10, 12, or 15 years of active service. Based on the availability of organized reserves, arms and equipment, training facilities and cadres, administrative machinery, and economic considerations, but without additional logistic support, maximum mobilization could be reached on M-plus-90 with 1,175,000 troops. The manpower would come from the Reserve Force (a pool of men who have completed active duty service), from the Territorial Army, and from the National Cadet Corps. Among the principal weaknesses of the army are logistics problems stemming from a diversity of equipment and a shortage of platoon and company officers.

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Combat and support units are divided into five geographic (territorial) commands, with the majority of troops concentrated either on the western border with Pakistan or in northeastern India. Major tactical units include:

- 7 Corps Headquarters
- 15 Infantry Divisions
- 10 Mountain Divisions
  - 1 Armored Division
  - 8 (Independent) Infantry Brigades
  - 2 (Independent) Parachute Brigades
  - 7 (Independent) Artillery Brigades
  - 7 Corps Artillery Brigades
  - 5 (Independent) Armored Brigades
  - 7 (Independent) Air Defense Brigades

Twelve infantry divisions and several independent brigades are deployed against Pakistan, while six mountain divisions (in northeastern India) and one infantry division (in Ladakh) are stationed across the border from Chinese forces in Tibet and Sinkiang.\*

Arms and equipment are a mixture of imported and indigenously produced or assembled equipment. The USSR supplanted the UK and the US as the principal provider of military equipment after 1965. Foreign technical assistance is minimal; the quality of maintenance is good. A small number of personnel is sent abroad for staff or advanced technical training, but the Indian Army itself conducts a program covering all requirements from basic individual through advanced unit and high-level command and staff training. Many of the Indian Army schools accept students from less-developed countries.\*\* On occasion, Indian training missions are sent out of the country.

The Indian Army logistic system, despite problems stemming from a diversity of equipment, is capable of maintaining the forces. Vulnerable lines of communication, however, could jeopardize Indian forces in Kashmir and

*\*Chinese forces along the borders with India include three infantry divisions, one independent infantry regiment, one independent artillery regiment and seven border defense regiments. No combat aircraft are permanently stationed at airfields in Tibet.*

*\*\*Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ghana, Kenya, Iraq, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Zambia send students.*

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northeastern India. The Banihal Road is the only major land communications link in Kashmir, and its severance would seriously hamper any operations in the area. An alternate, but less satisfactory, route is available. The reliance on one single-track railroad from West Bengal to Arunchal Pradesh opposite China has also been a significant logistic weakness, but this problem has recently been alleviated by the emergence of a friendly Bangladesh that would probably give transit rights to Indian forces. An extensive system of depots is maintained throughout India; stocks of ammunition, POL, and other stores are considered sufficient to support a maximum combat effort of at least 45 days.

**Air:** The Indian Air Force is capable of providing air defense and engaging in strategic and tactical operations within South Asia, as well as assisting in civil emergencies. Its main strengths are:

- the availability of ample manpower;
- the high morale and individual capabilities of personnel;
- and the ongoing program to acquire modern aircraft from outside sources, while at the same time developing a local manufacture/assembly capability.

The principal weakness is the diversity of aircraft (over 35 types). With such variety, there is considerable difficulty in resupply, in procurement of spare parts, and in training qualified pilots and maintenance personnel. Other weaknesses are lack of an effective strategic strike force, poor communications in the air defense system, and the lack of an all-weather air-to-air missile.

There are 104,000 men in the air force, of whom 2,300 are pilots. The aircraft inventory totals 1,415, including 354 supersonic and 261 subsonic fighters, 39 light bombers, 240 transports, 8 reconnaissance aircraft, 211 helicopters, and 302 other aircraft. The air force is organized into 95 units: 8 day fighter, 9 fighter/interceptor, 15 fighter-bomber, 3 light bomber, 1 strategic reconnaissance, 1 maritime reconnaissance, 13 transport, 14 helicopter, 1 VIP, and 30 miscellaneous training and utility. Most of the major combat units are strategically located along the border areas. More than half of the flying units are based in the western portion of the country. Prior to any hostilities, a wide dispersal of forces and aircraft to numerous forward locations could be expected.

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The air defense system has a good capability against a conventional medium-to-high altitude attack by either China or Pakistan. MIG-21 FL/Fishbeds are used in the interceptor or ground-support role, depending on priority. Effectiveness of the early warning/ground-controlled interception system is limited by the number of available radars and by the masking effect of the Himalayas. Siting is largely oriented toward the north and northwest. Contiguous coverage is provided along the northern border and along the western border south to the Bombay area. Coverage does not exist along the eastern border, except for the Madras and Calcutta areas. The SA-2 SAM system, used in defense of significant military/industrial targets, includes five main complexes consisting of 19 active sites (squadrons). The Fan Song F radar has been identified with the system, enhancing its electronic counter-countermeasure and low-altitude capability. Indian Army AAA weapons proved to be the most effective defense against low-level ground attacks and strikes on airfields during the 1971 war. The air force has a minor strategic bombing capability that would permit it to strike all targets in Pakistan. Fifteen fighter-bomber squadrons (SU-7/Fitter, HF-24 Marut, and F-56 Hawker Hunter day fighters) are available for tactical operations. Transport capability is built around 13 squadrons of medium and light transports, including aging C-47 and C-119G Packets, DHC-4 Caribous, AN-12 Cubs, and MI-4 Hound and MI-8 Hip helicopters. It is estimated that the air force is capable of transporting one of the army's parachute brigades on a single lift under optimum conditions. Inadequate logistic support would preclude sustained operations on this scale. Pilots are well-trained and effective in aerial resupply under visual conditions.

The air force sends students to the USSR for training on the various pieces of Soviet-provided equipment, and Soviet technical specialists in India provide guidance in specialized fields. Students also attend staff colleges in the UK and Australia, on an exchange basis, while Egypt and France have conducted training programs for air and ground crews. The air force also trains a few students from underdeveloped countries.

Air force logistics are hampered by the multiplicity of aircraft types. Maintenance is further complicated by lack of trained personnel, shortages of test equipment, insufficient spare parts, and lengthy lead-times in the procurement of spare parts for foreign aircraft. The air force normally has an operationally ready rate of 70 percent. During the December 1971 war, this rate dropped to 60 percent. The air force usually keeps a 30-45 day POL supply at principal operating bases.

Navy: The Indian Navy, with 33,000 men (including air arm) and the largest, most potent fleet in South Asia, is capable of successful offensive or defensive operations in the region.

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The navy has 1 antisubmarine warfare support aircraft carrier, 2 light cruisers, 4 submarines (Foxtrot-class), 2 destroyers, 16 destroyer escorts (including 8 Petya-class and 1 indigenously produced Leander-class), 26 coastal patrol ships/craft (including 8 Osa-class large guided-missile boats), 8 mine warfare ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 19 auxiliaries. The Styx missile-equipped Osa boats are unmatched in the area and were a decisive factor in the naval engagements of the 1971 conflict.

While the antisubmarine warfare capability of the Indian Navy is effective within confined areas, the small number of antisubmarine warfare ships and aircraft precludes simultaneous patrol of all coastal waters. Another serious shortcoming is the paucity of minesweepers.

The main operating bases and the principal activities of the Indian Navy are in the ports of Bombay on the west coast, Cochin in the south, and Vishakhapatnam on the east coast. About two thirds of the total ships and craft are based at Bombay, with approximately one third at Vishakhapatnam and a few at Cochin. The Western Fleet operating out of Bombay consists of the aircraft carrier, the light cruisers, 1 destroyer, 11 destroyer escorts (including 3 Petyas), 17 coastal patrol ships/craft (including the 8 Osas), all 8 of the minesweepers, and the majority of the auxiliaries. The Eastern Fleet, working out at Vishakhapatnam, consists of 1 destroyer, 5 destroyer escorts (Petyas), all 4 Foxtrot-class submarines, 6 coastal patrol ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 5 auxiliaries. In addition to operating along the east coast, some of these ships are temporarily based at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands. Ships and craft based in southern India report to the Southern Naval Command at Cochin. These include 3 coastal patrol ships and 1 auxiliary. The Indian Navy sends a small number of personnel to the UK, US, and USSR for training, while at the same time training naval personnel from several Mid-East, African, and Asian-Pacific nations.

The logistic system of the Indian Navy is beset by two major problems. First, the navy must depend upon outside sources for most of its ships and craft, supplies, and modern equipment. Second, Bombay is the only base capable of undertaking major repair and resupply of the forces afloat. In spite of these difficulties, ship production capabilities are increasing.

Modest facilities at Cochin and the east coast ports of Calcutta and Vishakhapatnam are being expanded in an effort to decrease reliance upon outside sources for logistic needs. The Mazagon Docks at Bombay has successfully undertaken the Leander project, and the Garden Reach Workshops at Calcutta is building a number of small naval ships. Stocks of

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fuel and ammunition could probably support a maximum combat effort for two months.

The Indian Naval Air Arm has 1,500 men and 90 aircraft. During the December war, Alize and Sea Hawk aircraft, in conjunction with the surface blockade, effectively ensured the isolation of East Pakistan from both resupply by, and escape to, the sea.

The Naval Aircraft Repair Organization at Cochin is responsible for depot-level aircraft maintenance. Maintenance procedures are inadequate and must be supplemented by technical teams from Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. Domestic refineries are capable of producing enough POL to satisfy Indian Naval Air Arm needs.

**Paramilitary:** India's paramilitary forces, with occasional assistance from the army, are capable of maintaining law and order, conducting counterinsurgency operations, and functioning as light infantry under army control during wartime situations. The principal organizations are:

State Armed Police (AP) (150 Battalions/242,000 men)  
Central Reserve Police (CRP) (63 Battalions/57,000 men)  
Border Security Force (BSF) (80 Battalions/76,000 men)

The AP units are controlled by the individual Indian states; the BSF and CRP are normally controlled by the central Ministry of Home Affairs. The armed police battalions are equipped with bolt-action rifles and a minimum amount of signal equipment and transport, while the BSF and CRP battalions are equipped with standard infantry weapons and equipment. The Border Security Force now has indigenous artillery units, a small naval force (two tugs, three small patrol boats), and a small air wing (four Dakota transport planes).

#### **B. Pakistan**

**Ground:** In the event of full-scale war, the 390,000-man Pakistan Army could initially conduct a successful defense of Pakistan; however, it would ultimately succumb to India's military superiority. Pakistan's offensive capabilities were relatively unaffected by the 1971 war, but the army could not mount an attack against India with any real expectancy of success. Augmented by the paramilitary Civilian Armed Forces, the army can maintain Pakistan's internal security. The 1971 war caused a morale problem within the ranks. There was a general belief that senior military officialdom

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rather than the army was responsible for the defeat and also for the loss of East Pakistan. President Bhutto retired several military officials and replaced them with generals loyal to him. He has also sought to shift the responsibility away from the army by focusing the blame on Yahya Khan and his supporters.

There is a selective service system; however, voluntary enlistments are more than sufficient to meet the army's manpower requirement. Enlistment is permitted from age 17 for a seven-year first term to be followed with re-enlistments of three-year increments. Reserve units do not exist, but personnel completing regular enlistment serve eight years on the reserve rolls. Pakistan is in the process of creating a national guard under army control to assist in internal defense and civic action tasks during periods of stress. Its eventual strength is unknown. In the event of war, reservists and the national guard would be called up, and should additional manpower be required, conscription could be implemented. Also available for integration into the regular forces is the paramilitary Civil Armed Force composed of the Pakistan Rangers, the Frontier Corps, and the Frontier Constabulary, with an estimated combined strength of 35,500. No significant expansion of the army would be possible without substantial outside assistance. At present, with outside materiel assistance, the army mobilization capacity at M-plus-90 is estimated at 453,000 personnel.

The Pakistan Army has deployed the majority of its fighting force opposing India. Ten infantry divisions and two armored divisions are based in permanent cantonments or in field locations from the Rann of Kutch northward into the disputed Jammu and Kashmir state. One infantry division is near Karachi to defend against an Indian attack through the southern portion of the Rann of Kutch. Infantry divisions are stationed near Peshawar and Quetta to meet any possible threat from Afghanistan through the Khyber or Khojak passes, respectively.

Major tactical units include:

- 5 Corps Headquarters
- 13 Infantry Divisions
- 2 Armored Divisions
- 1 Independent Armored Brigade
- 5 Corps Artillery Brigades
- 5 Corps Armored Recon Regiments
- 1 Special Services Group (Special Forces/brigade equivalent)
- 2 Antiaircraft Artillery Brigades
- 3 Independent Infantry Brigade

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The army is equipped with an assortment of arms from Free World and Communist nations. Because of inadequate inventories of spare parts and a lack of trained logistic personnel, this diversity of equipment is the source of the army's major weakness. Small arms and ammunition requirements are currently satisfied through Chinese, Middle Eastern, and European sources and by limited indigenous production. Only a small number of military personnel is sent out of country for specialized training or attendance at senior military schools. The Pakistan Army has provided, and is continuing to provide, limited training assistance to several Middle Eastern and African nations, including Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, and Nigeria. Most of this training is conducted at the combat arms centers of the respective nations or at their senior service schools.

The army's logistic system is its weakest link. Logistic support in West Pakistan in 1971 appeared adequate, but toward the end of the fighting the army suffered ammunition and POL shortages. Depots for all classes of supplies are located near troop concentrations, and the army has sought to maintain a 30-day level. Present supply levels are unknown, but it is anticipated, considering difficulties encountered during the war, that if the country is once again blockaded and fails to maintain air supremacy, the army would be unable to carry on sustained combat operations for more than 30 days.

**Air:** The Pakistani Air Force has the capability to perform air defense, ground support, and other tactical support tasks. These capabilities, however, were not fully tested in operations against the Indian Air Force during the December 1971 conflict. In general, dependence on multiple foreign supply sources, lack of replacements for pilots and technicians, and shortage of spare parts tend to impair effectiveness.

The air force numbers 17,100, of whom 500 are pilots. The aircraft inventory totals over 500, including 17 light bombers, 170-192 supersonic fighters, 134 subsonic fighters, 9 transports, 5 reconnaissance aircraft, 53 helicopters, and 137 utility/trainers. The air force consists of the following units: 2 light bomber, 14-16 fighter, 1 reconnaissance, 1 transport, 1 search and rescue, and 6 training and miscellaneous.

Contiguous radar coverage is provided along most of the Indian border except the Bahawalpur area of central Pakistan. Air transport consists of eight C-130 transports, two of them on loan from civil airlines. The fleet of C-130s has a potential capability of lifting about a battalion (800 men) on a single lift under optimum conditions. Pakistan International Airline's 16 civil

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transport aircraft, including Boeing 707s and some 13,000 personnel, can readily be mobilized in an emergency situation. Many of the airline pilots are air force reservists. Prior to and during hostilities with India, PIA aircraft were used extensively to ferry troops from West to East Pakistan.

How well PAF aircraft are serviced is not known. Although the quality of maintenance is generally good, the ability to ensure the operational readiness of aircraft is plagued by a severe spare-parts shortage, the diversity of sources of supply, and insufficient maintenance personnel. POL stocks are believed to be geared to a 30-day period at each base.

There are currently no known aviation trainees in foreign countries. A considerable number of air force personnel was trained in the US prior to 1965. A limited number of pilots and ground-crew personnel have also received training in France and the Peoples Republic of China. Recently, sixty men from the air force completed TU-16 training in China, and crews may return for periodic re-training there. No TU-16s are currently expected to be sent to Pakistan, but they would be available in the event of a war with India. An undetermined number of Chinese military personnel, believed to be associated with the Pakistani Air Force, could be serving in a training as well as logistic capacity. Pakistan has provided aviation training to several Middle East and African countries, and air force personnel are now abroad in training/technical roles in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya, and Abu Dhabi.

**Navy:** The 9,900-man Pakistan Navy is incapable of effectively performing its missions. It could not conduct sustained antisubmarine, escort, or mine-sweeping operations, and its amphibious lift capability is negligible. The navy is composed of 1 antiaircraft light cruiser, 3 submarines, 4 destroyers, 2 destroyer escorts, 13 coastal patrol ships/craft, 7 mine warfare ships, and 3 auxiliaries.

Salient strengths include a small but modern minesweeping and submarine force, good individual training, and the military traditions of its personnel. The Pakistan Navy sends some personnel to the UK and US for training. Weaknesses include the age of major surface combatants, inability to defend against high-speed aircraft or cruise missiles, inadequate shore-based air support for naval operations, vulnerability to Indian blockades, dependence upon outside assistance for materiel and logistic support, and an austere budget. The navy relies entirely upon the air force for air support, and although cooperation in routine peacetime operations is satisfactory, the air force was not able to render more than token support during the December 1971 hostilities.

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As a result of the 1971 conflict with India, Pakistan is seeking a variety of weapons platforms to offset the striking power of the Indian Navy. Eight Shanghai II - class patrol boats and four Huchwan - class hydrofoil motor torpedo boats have been acquired from China. Exocet cruise missiles for these, as well as an additional Daphne-class submarine, may be provided by France. The UK has agreed to provide Sea King helicopters, and Pakistan also hopes to acquire two frigates from Britain. Further plans include the acquisition of aircraft for maritime reconnaissance.

The principal logistic facilities are located in the Karachi area. Although progress is being made in the areas of repair, supply, and maintenance, the logistic system still depends on foreign sources for most equipment and supplies. Ships up to destroyer size can be overhauled or repaired at the Naval Dockyard, Karachi. A joint naval and commercial facility is under construction ten miles southeast of Karachi. When completed, it is expected to accommodate ships up to 50,000 tons, larger than any ship the Pakistan Navy is expected to acquire.

**Paramilitary:** Pakistan's paramilitary forces, with the backing of the army, are capable of maintaining internal security, conducting counter-guerrilla operations, and, during wartime, acting as light infantry. The principal paramilitary units are:

Civil Armed Forces

Pakistan Rangers (8,000 men)  
Frontier Corps (21,000 men)  
Frontier Constabulary (6,500 men)

Federal Security Force (13,000 men)

Under normal conditions, the paramilitary units are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. The Civil Armed Forces are organized into battalions and company units. The complete breakdown of units is not available because of the expansion of the forces, on the one hand, and the loss or capture of personnel during the war, on the other. In time of emergency or war, the Pakistan Rangers and Frontier Corps are controlled by the Ministry of Defense, but the Frontier Constabulary remains subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. The Civil Armed Forces units use standard light infantry weapons, primarily British WW II models; however, there is a deficiency in signal and transport equipment. The Frontier Corps also has some light artillery and armored cars. The newly revised Federal Security Force units

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are supplied with small arms, riot-control equipment, and sufficient motor transport to ensure mobility.

**C. Bangladesh**

**Ground:** The Bangladesh Army is not capable of waging successful offensive or conventional defensive operations against neighboring countries. In conjunction with paramilitary forces, however, it could wage an extensive guerrilla campaign in defense of the country. It is also capable of maintaining internal security in urban areas. The army has an estimated strength of 20,000. Information on enlistment and terms of service is sparse. Mobilization plans are unknown, but the potential for augmentation of ground forces is good. A large number of former guerrillas constitute a source of troops.

Combat and support units are subordinated to five brigade headquarters, which have both administrative and tactical functions. The heaviest concentration of troops is in the Dacca area. Major tactical units include:

- 5 Brigade Headquarters
- 16 Infantry Battalions
- 2 Artillery Regiments
- 1 Heavy Mortar Regiment
- 1 Armored Squadron

Arms and equipment inventories contain a mixture of equipment provided by India or captured from Pakistan. The principal weaknesses of the army are a lack of modern equipment, a shortage of technically trained personnel, an inadequate logistic system, and a low state of combat readiness. The Bangladesh Government is interested in obtaining modern military equipment for its army, but no aid or sales agreements are known to exist. Specialized military schooling is being made available in India, but the government is interested in training students elsewhere as well. In-country training courses are few in number and poor in quality.

**Air and Air Defense:** The nascent Bangladesh Air Force includes 8 F-86s, 1 T-33, 1 Otter, and 1 Alouette III, most of which were captured from the Pakistan Air Force. It is in the process of receiving at least 18 MIG-21 fighters, 16 MI-8 helicopters, and AN-24/26 transports from the Soviet Union. Two British Westland Wessex helicopters were recently delivered. All aircraft are believed to be based at Dacca/Tezgaon. It is not known how many of the captured Pakistani aircraft are operational, but the Otter, the

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Alouette, and three F-86s have been observed airborne. Personnel is estimated to be 750-1,000, including as many as 40 pilots. Some 300 personnel have gone to the USSR for training.

The air force, in its embryonic stage, has no combat capability. It is totally reliant on outside sources for equipment and logistic support. There are no indigenous maintenance facilities, and POL supplies are very limited.

**Navy:** The Bangladesh Navy is developing into a river patrol/coast guard - type organization. At present, the navy consists of four indigenously produced river patrol boats and one coastal patrol boat received from India.

Naval headquarters is at Dacca, with additional bases at Chittagong and Chalna. One hundred officers and enlisted men have been sent to India for training. They are stationed in Bombay and Cochin, where they will receive instruction in sonar, radar, and telecommunications equipment.

**Paramilitary:** Bangladesh's paramilitary forces are capable of coping with sporadic cases of internal unrest, but not with widespread organized dissidence. They are not capable of policing the country's borders. In wartime, they could function effectively as light infantry or guerrillas. The Bangladesh Rifles (13,000) and the National Defense Force (16,000) are equipped with small arms, mostly bolt-action rifles, and some signal equipment. National Defense Force personnel have received some training from members of the Indian Military Assistance Mission.



## SECRET

Table 1

Selected Armaments and Forces<sup>1/</sup>

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh
<b>ARMY</b>			
Personnel	1,092,000	390,000	20,000
Combat <sup>2/</sup>	612,000	253,000	13,100
<b>Tanks</b>			
AMX-13 (France)	60		
M24 Chaffe (US)		45	15
PT-76 (USSR)	150		
<b>TOTAL LIGHT</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>15</b>
Centurion (UK)	180		
M-4 Sherman (US)		300 <sup>3/</sup>	
M47/48 Patton (US)		340 <sup>3/</sup>	
T-34 (PRC)		50	
T-54 (Czech)	225		
T-54 (USSR)		10	
T-55 (Poland)	200		
T-55 (USSR)	410	50	
T-59 (PRC)		700	
Vickers (UK)	40		
Vijayanta (India)	380		
Other <sup>4/</sup>	205	70	
<b>TOTAL MEDIUM</b>	<b>1,640</b>	<b>1,520</b>	
<b>Artillery</b>			
100-mm. and over	840	700	0
Up to 100-mm.	1,850	450	36
<b>Mortars</b>			
100-mm. and over	720	275	18
Up to 100-mm.	8,810	4,000	400
<b>AAA</b>			
57-mm. and over	0	0	0
Up to 57-mm.	1,200	615	0
<b>APC</b>			
	400	105 <sup>5/</sup>	0

<sup>1/</sup>All figures are estimates; it should be noted that the Pakistani Army is undergoing rapid expansion; inventories include major items of equipment either in the hands of troops or serviceable in depot.

<sup>2/</sup>Combat personnel are defined as either combat, combat support, or combat service support troops serving with division or independent brigade formations.

<sup>3/</sup>Approximately 50 percent of the Pakistani tanks of US origin are believed to be non-operational due to the lack of spare parts.

<sup>4/</sup>Figure includes tanks outfitted with bridge-laying, dozer, or mine-flailing equipment, and recovery vehicles.

<sup>5/</sup>Does not include the 300 M-113s on order from the US.

## SECRET

Table 1 (continued)

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh
<b>NAVY</b>			
Personnel	33,000	9,900	400 <sup>1/</sup>
<b>Ships</b>			
Carriers	1	0	0
Cruisers	2 <sup>2/</sup>	1 <sup>3/</sup>	0
Destroyers	2	4	0
Destroyer Escorts	16 <sup>4/</sup>	2	0
Submarines	4	3 <sup>5/</sup>	0
Missile Patrol	8	0	0
Other Coastal Patrol	18	13	5 <sup>6/</sup>
Aircraft	90	0	0
<b>AIR DEFENSE</b>			
Personnel	Unknown	Unknown	0
<b>Missiles</b>			
Surface-to-Air SA-2	est. 480	0	0
No. Launchers SA-2	est. 126	0	0
No. Sites SA-2	est. 19	0	0
<b>AIR FORCE</b>			
Personnel	104,000	17,100	750-1,000
<b>Aircraft</b>			
Jet Bombers (light Canberra B (I) 58 (UK, New Zealand)	39	0	0
Canberra B-57B (UK)	0	13	0
IL-28/Beagle (PRC)	0	4	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>0</b>

<sup>1/</sup>Estimated force of 2,000-2,500 planned.

<sup>2/</sup>Both over 30 years old; one used as training ship.

<sup>3/</sup>1944 vintage.

<sup>4/</sup>Includes the Leander-class DEH and 8 Petyas.

<sup>5/</sup>Not included are 6 SXs.

<sup>6/</sup>At least two more are under construction. In addition, Bangladesh may have captured or salvaged some former Pakistan Navy boats.

## SECRET

Table 1 (continued)

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh
<b>Jet Fighters</b>			
<b>Supersonic</b>			
SU-7/Fitter (USSR)	88	0	0
MIG-21/Fishbed (USSR)	201*	0	10
HF-24 Marut (Indigenous)	65	0	0
F-104 A and B (US)	0	5**	0
MIG-19/Farmer D (PRC)	0	123-145	0
Mirage III-E (France)	0	21	0
Mirage 5 (France)	0	21	0
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>354</b>	<b>170-192</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Subsonic</b>			
Gnat I (UK, Indigenous)	176	0	0
Hawker Hunter F-56 (UK)	65	0	0
Vampire FB-52 (UK)	20	0	0
F-86F Sabre (US)	0	51	8 (Pak)
Sabre MK-6 (F-86) (West Germany)	0	83	0
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>615</b>	<b>304-326</b>	<b>18</b>

\*Includes both MIG-21M (Fishbed J) and MIG-21 FL aircraft.

\*\*In storage.

<b>Reconnaissance</b>			
Canberra PR-57 (UK)	8	0	0
Mirage III-R (France)	0	3	0
RT-33A (US)	0	2	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Transports</b>			
<b>Medium</b>			
TU-124/Cookpot (USSR)	3	0	0
C-119G Packet (US)	54	0	0
AN-12/Cub (USSR)	38	0	0
L 1049 Super Constellation (US)	8		
C-130B Hercules (US, Iran)	0	8*	0
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>0</b>

\*Two additional C-130s reportedly are on short-term loan from Saudi Arabia.

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Table 1 (continued)

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh
<b>Light</b>			
HS (Avro) 748 (UK, Indigenous)	25	0	0
C-47A Skytrain (US, UK)	80	0	0
DHC-4 Caribou (Canada)	14	0	0
IL-14/Crate (USSR)	18	0	0
F-27 (Netherlands)	0	1	0
AN-24/Coke (USSR)	0	0	1
AN-26/Curl (USSR)	0	0	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Helicopters-Transport</b>			
MI-4/Hound (USSR)	82	0	0
Sikorsky S-62B (US)	1	0	0
MI-8/Hip (USSR)	33	9	4
HH-43B Huskie (US)	0	6	0
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Helicopters-Utility</b>			
Alouette III	80 (France)	10 (France, Saudi Arabia)	1
Alouette II (France)	0	2	0
OH-13H (US)	10	0	0
OH-13S (US)	0	18	0
Sikorsky S-55 (US)	5	6	0
UH-19D (US)	0	2	0
Westland Wessex (UK)	0	0	2
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Trainers</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Utility</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>TOTAL INVENTORY</b>	<b>1,415</b>	<b>508-530</b>	<b>29</b>

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Table 2

## FORCES ON INDO-PAKISTANI BORDER (estimated)

GROUND	India		Pakistan	
	Current	M+15 days	Current	M+15 days
<b>Combat effective personnel</b>				
Army	302,000	452,000+	224,000	253,000
Paramilitary				
Border Security Force	34,000	34,000		
Central Reserve Force	3,000	8,000		
Civilian Armed Forces			6,000	20,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>339,000</b>	<b>494,000</b>	<b>232,000</b>	<b>273,000</b>
<b>Units</b>				
Army				
Corps Hqs.	4	5	5	5
Divisions				
Infantry	12	14+	11	13
Mountain	0	2	0	0
Armored	0	1	2	2
<b>Independent Brigades</b>				
Armored	5	5	1*	1
Artillery	6	12	5	5
Infantry	5	8	3	3
Sp Svc Gp (Bde) (Abn)	0	0	1	1
Parachute	0	1	0	0
Air Defense	2	6	2	2
<b>Paramilitary (Bns)</b>				
Border Security Force	36	36	---	---
Central Reserve Police	4	10	---	---
Civilian Armed Forces	---	---	10	25

## AIRCRAFT

Current deployment of aircraft in both India and Pakistan (see OB map) precludes the necessity to transfer combat units to the border areas.

*\*In addition, each army corps headquarters has one armored reconnaissance regiment (battalion equivalent) assigned to it.*

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Table 3

INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR LOSSES, 1971

	India	Pakistan
<b>Personnel:</b>		
KIA	3,691	5,000 (est.)
WIA	8,650 <sup>1/</sup>	11,000 (est.)
MIA	275	1,000 (est.)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12,616</b>	<b>17,000</b>
<b>Equipment:</b>		
Tanks <sup>2/</sup>	125	187
Naval Ships	1	6
Aircraft <sup>3/</sup>	71	43
	Canberra B(1)58	10
	SU-7/Fitter	20
	Hawker Hunter F-56	20
	MIG-21/Fishbed	5
	Gnat I	5
	Mystere IV A	5
	HF-24 Marut	5
	Breguet 1050 Alize	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>71</b>	
	F-86F	20
	Sabre Mk-6 (F-86)	4
	Canberra B-57B	4
	F-104A	3
	MIG-19/Farmer D	7
	T-33A	2
	UH-19D	2
	Beech Queen (U8F)	1
<b>TOTAL<sup>4/</sup></b>		<b>43</b>

<sup>1/</sup>Approximately 1,100 personnel received disabling wounds.

<sup>2/</sup>Some tanks listed as "losses" were subsequently returned to service after repair at depots.

<sup>3/</sup>Air-to-air combat operations were relatively few during the 1971 conflict and most aircraft losses on both sides resulted from ground fire.

<sup>4/</sup>Includes an estimated eight F-86F and one T-33 captured and now in the Bangladesh Air Force.

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Table 4

MILITARY ADVISERS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (estimated)


Country	Army	Navy	Air Force
<b>Pakistanis in:</b>			
Abu Dhabi	40	14	20
Oman	5	12	
Kuwait			200
Saudi Arabia	232	15	431
Iraq			5
Jordan	2		
Syria			8
Libya		29	168
Maldives		1	
Nigeria	3		
Iran			70
Qatar	1		
<b>Indians in:</b>			
Bhutan*	3,400		
Bangladesh**	na	na	na
Nigeria	12	7	
Oman	4		
Iraq			28

\*Does not include several thousand personnel with the Border Roads Organization.

\*\*Approximateiy 40 Indian military personnel serve as advisers in Bangladesh; breakdown by service is unavailable.

# India


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1 August 1973



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Map 1




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Map 2

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
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Map 3

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Map 4

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
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Map 5

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Map 6


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# Pakistan

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— Province boundary



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Map 7

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Map 8

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Map 9

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**PAKISTAN**  
Naval Order of Battle  
1 AUGUST 1973


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Map 10

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
# Bangladesh

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Map 11

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Map 12

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### III. MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Military expenditures in India and Pakistan have grown substantially since 1960 and are absorbing a larger share of domestic economic resources. The outflow of foreign exchange for military purposes has increased and constitutes a significant portion of export earnings; military aid has deferred or eliminated only a portion of foreign exchange payments for imports.

In both countries, higher military spending reflects increased personnel strength, qualitative upgrading of weapons systems, increases in equipment inventories and maintenance requirements, expansion of domestic military production, and rising costs for military items at home and abroad. The expenditures are given in "current" prices and cannot be adjusted satisfactorily to reflect the impact of inflation. The available price information indicates, however, that most of the increase in military spending in South Asia since 1960 reflects a real growth in military strength.

#### A. India

Indian defense expenditures rose sharply following the Chinese border incursions in 1962, increased more slowly through FY 1970,\* then rose abruptly in 1971. This second heavy buildup followed the outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in March 1971, and continued through the December war with Pakistan. Defense spending for FY 1971 was more than \$2.1 billion,\*\* exceeding the previous year's spending by 25 percent, and the original budget by 22 percent. Procurement expenditures alone increased by more than 40 percent, reflecting accelerated deliveries of foreign military equipment. Army procurement increased by 64 percent, primarily as a result of large receipts of major combat equipment from the USSR and Eastern Europe. By contrast, pay and allowances—the largest component of the Indian military budget—increased by only 4 percent. The impact of these changes on the distribution of expenditures is shown in Tables 2 and 3.

India's revised defense budget for FY 1972 and the budget estimate for FY 1973 are about 10 percent higher than actual expenditures incurred in

*\*Fiscal year beginning 1 April of stated year.*

*\*\*This and other dollar values are computed at the exchange rate of 7.5 rupees/1 US\$. Data are gross expenditures unless otherwise stated.*

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1971 civil war in its former East Wing and the December war with India, actual defense spending increased 16 percent over the previous year in terms of rupees. Much of this rise represented construction of defenses, repairs to war-damaged defense property, increased salaries and other personnel expenditures, and increased demands on the civilian sector to supply items such as fuels and transportation. Imports were limited by foreign arms embargoes, the short Indian blockade of Karachi harbor, and the inability of foreign suppliers to complete deliveries of new orders by 30 June 1972. Actual foreign exchange outlays probably were between \$115 and \$145 million.

Pakistan's defense spending in FY 1973 was 19 percent higher in terms of rupees than the previous year. This reflected little change in real terms because most of the increase was used to cover the higher cost of military imports following the rupee devaluation in May 1972, and increased local costs resulting from domestic inflation. Pakistan's population was reduced by more than half when it lost the East Wing, so this is a considerable financial burden—roughly 8 percent of gross national product. There are no indications that Pakistan intends to reduce its armed forces or its military spending abroad soon.

Scheduled equipment deliveries from foreign arms suppliers probably boosted foreign exchange defense outlays beyond the planned figure of \$115 million for FY 1973. Military aid down payments and repayments to France alone were scheduled to increase, as were cash payments to several Western arms suppliers, including the US. Pakistan evidently has experienced difficulties in financing some of its arms procurement. It deferred taking delivery on French Mirage aircraft for about six months, and reportedly delayed its scheduled payments to France. The burden of Pakistan's foreign defense procurement can be seen in the ratio of foreign-exchange outlays to export earnings—about 17 percent through FY 1971, and more than 20 percent in FY 1972. This ratio may have declined to 15 percent in FY 1973 as a result of greatly increased export performance. Pakistan may have received some financial assistance for arms purchases from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya, but the amounts are not known; \$18 million was transferred to Pakistan from Abu Dhabi in late June 1972.

**C. Bangladesh**

Bangladesh's military expenditures from 16 December 1971 to 30 June 1972 were announced by the government as \$18 million, with an additional \$53 million budgeted for 1972/73. These expenditures are classified as recurring expenses, which suggests that they are primarily for salaries and other personnel expenses.


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### INDIA: Net Defense Expenditures \*

Figure 1

(Fiscal Year begins 1 April of stated year)

BILLION RUPEES  
(Current Prices)



\*After deducting the value of receipts and recoveries of the Ministry of Defense from gross expenditures.

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
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Figure 2

**INDIA: Gross Defense Expenditures**

(Fiscal Year begins 1 April of stated year)

MILLION US \$



516225 8-73 CIA


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Figure 3

### INDIA: Distribution of Defense Expenditures

(In Percent)



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
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Figure 4

**INDIA: Estimated Defense Foreign Exchange Costs \***

(Fiscal Year begins 1 April of stated year)

MILLION US \$



**FINANCING MILITARY IMPORTS**

1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	
294	324	432	515	526	TOTAL IMPORTS
-90	-92	-191	-130	N.A.	FINANCED BY MILITARY AID
100	113	120	150	N.A.	MILITARY DEBT REPAYMENTS
304	345	361	535	N.A.	TOTAL ESTIMATED FOREIGN EXCHANGE OUTFLOW**

\*Computed at the exchange rate of 7.5 rupees/1 US\$.

\*\*Indian exports from defense industries, which totaled about \$13 million in FY 1972, are not taken into account.

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
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Figure 5

### INDIA: Military Expenditures and Total Central Government Budget

(Fiscal Year begins 1 April of stated year)



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
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Figure 6

### INDIA: Military Foreign Exchange Outlays and Export Earnings

(Fiscal Year begins 1 April of stated year)



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
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Figure 7

### PAKISTAN: Net Defense Expenditures\*

(Fiscal Year ends 30 June of stated year)



\*After deducting the value of revenue of the Ministry of Defense from gross expenditures.

518230 8-73 CIA


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Figure 8

### PAKISTAN: Military Expenditures and Total Central Government Budget

(Fiscal Year ends 30 June of stated year)



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
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Figure 9

### PAKISTAN: Military Foreign Exchange Outlays and Export Earnings

(Fiscal Year ends 30 June of stated year)

MILLION US \$



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IV. DOMESTIC MILITARY PRODUCTION

A. India

For more than a decade, New Delhi has tried to develop an arms industry that would enable it to be less dependent on foreign suppliers and thereby save foreign exchange. The industry's output already includes a wide range of defense equipment: small arms, artillery, tanks, several types of aircraft, frigates, and small tactical missiles. Although considerable progress has been made, particularly in small arms production, India still relies heavily on imports of raw materials, components, and technology for the manufacture of more sophisticated weapons systems, such as aircraft and naval ships. Domestic military procurement now constitutes about 70 percent of total military purchases. Public and private enterprises in the civilian sector furnish about 60 percent of military supplies obtained in India, including petroleum products and foodstuffs. Ordnance factories and enterprises under the Ministry of Defense Production provide the balance, including most military hardware.

**Management and Scope:** India's defense industries are managed primarily by the Department of Defense Production, which owns and operates 28 ordnance factories, a tank factory, and a freeze-dried meat factory. The Government of India also has either majority or total ownership of eight public enterprises, which are controlled by the Department of Defense Production.

Production in these industries increased at an average annual rate of 12 percent from April 1964 to March 1971. Concomitant with India's military build-up beginning in spring 1971, defense production was accelerated and output increased by 29 percent during FY 1971\* (see Table 1). Production is estimated to have increased an additional 10 percent to almost \$520 million in FY 1972. Approximately 80 percent of defense production was for the Indian military, with the balance for the civilian market and exports. Defense plants provide transport aircraft for India's civil airlines, small commercial ships, trucks, tractors, railroad coaches, and communications equipment. Exports of products and services—about \$13 million in FY 1972—include goods for both military and civilian end-use and repairs to foreign ships and aircraft.

**Ground Armaments:** India is self-sufficient in small arms, light artillery and antiaircraft weapons, and related ammunition. Weapons production includes rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, 3.5-inch rocket launchers,

*\*Fiscal year beginning 1 April of the stated year.*

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57-mm. and 106-mm. recoilless rifles, 2-inch, 81-mm., and 120-mm. mortars, 40-mm. antiaircraft guns, and 75-mm. pack howitzers. A prototype 105-mm. field gun has been developed, is scheduled to enter limited production by 1974, and to reach full production by 1976. An agreement for licensed production of the Soviet 130-mm. field gun was reached early in 1972, but production is not likely to begin soon.

India already has produced about 400 "Vijayanta" (Vickers) medium tanks with a 105-mm. gun under British license at the Avadi heavy-vehicle factory. Almost 70 percent of the components currently are produced in India, but some major parts still must be imported. The factory also is producing armored recovery vehicles. The Ministry of Defense Production is developing an armored personnel carrier—a modified version of the Czech OT-62—as well as 105-mm. and 130-mm. self-propelled guns. Trucks and jeeps for the military are built under West German and Japanese licenses.

**Naval Construction:** India produces Leander-class frigates equipped with antiaircraft missiles under British license at the Mazagon Docks in Bombay. These are the first large modern combatants constructed in the country, and the project is several years behind schedule. Of the six frigates currently under order, one has been commissioned, and two are fitting out. The locally produced content of the first unit is only about 50 percent, but is expected to increase to almost 80 percent by the end of the program. India also has constructed inshore minesweepers, patrol boats, landing craft, and dredgers; it eventually plans to expand production to include submarines and missile-equipped frigates.

**Aircraft Construction:** Despite the fact that India has been engaged in military aircraft production for over a decade, the industry still relies extensively on imported raw materials and components, and on the use of foreign production licenses. To utilize domestic sources to the fullest, the Indians are attempting to substitute components manufactured indigenously for foreign-built ones.

The difficulties in such a substitution of components and raw materials include the lack of suitable raw materials—steel alloys—and the stringent manufacturing specifications of most aircraft components. In addition, the unit cost of producing many aircraft parts domestically would be high because of the limited quantities required. Some items involving essentially unsophisticated technology—such as tires, hydraulic seals, filters, electrical components, electrical cable, and batteries—have been successfully developed by the Indians for their aircraft industry. The Indians also have been able to



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produce some aluminum alloy sheets. These efforts have increased the domestic content, by value, of the various aircraft under production. They have not, however, created a great degree of Indian self-sufficiency.

A plant for the manufacture of accessories for the Indian aircraft industry is under construction at Lucknow, and New Delhi hopes that it will result in a significant reduction of foreign contributions to the manufacture of some aircraft. The plant is scheduled to produce items such as wheels and brake systems, undercarriages, powered flying controls, fuel, hydraulic and instrument systems, and aircraft ejection seats—all under license from several British firms and the Soviet Union. Initially, all components will have to be imported, but the Indians plan eventually to substitute locally manufactured components.

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., which is responsible for virtually all aircraft manufacture in India, produces six types of military aircraft with major assistance from various countries. The Soviet MIG-21, the British Gnat, the British HS-748 light transport, and the French Alouette III light helicopter are produced under license. The domestically designed HF-24 jet fighter and HJT-16 jet trainer also are in production.

Production of the Soviet MIG-21 jet fighter is likely to continue through much of the 1970s, as Moscow has agreed to license follow-on production of the improved MIG-21M to replace the MIG-21FL. The scheduled production of 196 MIG-21FLs should be completed in 1974, and the improved version should then be in full production. The first MIG-21M assembled in India was completed in early 1973, and less than 100 reportedly will be produced. Final assembly and production of air frames for the MIG-21 take place at Nasik, engines are produced at Koraput, and avionics at Hyderabad.

The Bangalore Division of Hindustan Aeronautics originally scheduled the production of 215 subsonic Gnat jet fighters. More than 200 already have been built. The program, employing an improved version, is likely to be extended as a result of the fighter's excellent performance in the 1971 conflict with Pakistan. India also is considering the manufacture of Gnat fighters for export.

The HF-24 jet fighter program, intended to provide India with an indigenous Mach 2 interceptor, has not been very successful. The key problem has been matching the aircraft to a suitable engine. The current Mach 1 version, with a British engine, had some success in the ground-attack

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role, and an improved version and a trainer model are under development. Production is likely to continue well into the 1970s, and more than 150 Mach 1 aircraft may be built.

India plans to produce a new generation supersonic fighter aircraft in the next decade as a follow-on to the HF-24 program. The shortcomings of the HF-24, however, suggest that the program is likely to encounter difficulties, particularly in engine development. India will require considerable foreign assistance to ensure the success of the project.

Production of the HS-748 medium transport for the military is also likely to continue into the late 1970s. Some 45 have been ordered by the air force, and freighter/airdrop and maritime reconnaissance versions are under development. The HJT-16 jet trainer is likely to continue in production at least until 1975. More than 65 of the aircraft have been ordered.

The Alouette III helicopter production program was to end by late 1974 after some 145 aircraft had been built. India recently was seeking to extend the Alouette III licensing agreement with France to 1977. Agreement has been reached with the French for production of the SA-315 for use as an observation helicopter and the first prototype has been assembled. At least 140 are scheduled to be built. The Indians hope to develop their own helicopter by the end of the decade.

**Missile Production:** In July 1971, Bharat Dynamics Ltd. began production, under license, of the French SS-11 anti-tank missile. India has secured options to produce other types of French missiles. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. manufactures the Soviet K-13 Atoll air-to-air missile for the MIG-21 aircraft. A project was begun in 1972 to produce surface-to-air missiles based on the Soviet SA-2 design. Production is probably years away because the Indians are attempting to manufacture most of the components themselves. Development work also is under way on a launch vehicle for the country's space program, but the project is not likely to have any military applications until at least the 1980s.

**Assessment:** India has developed a significant industrial base for military production and except for Israel, which it rivals, has the largest defense output of any developing country in the non-communist world. But it has not yet achieved over-all self-sufficiency, nor has it reduced annual foreign-exchange outlays for military imports. Its requirements for substantial quantities of sophisticated weaponry and support equipment necessitate large-scale procurement from abroad of finished defense stores. During the

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past few years, imports of finished military equipment from foreign suppliers accounted for about a fourth of total defense procurement. This proportion increased during the buildup in 1971 to about 30 percent, and totaled almost \$350 million in FY 1972.\* Domestic procurement,\*\* which totaled about \$880 million in FY 1972, made up the remaining 70 percent. The indirect import content—the value of foreign raw material and component inputs into domestic military production—increased in absolute terms from \$95 million to \$168 million from FY 1967 to FY 1972. The introduction of more advanced and costly production lines has prevented a reduction in the indirect import content as a share of domestic procurement; the share was 19 percent in FY 1972 compared with 18 percent in FY 1967. Domestic production does provide a foreign-exchange saving over the cost of importing finished military equipment, but these savings have been minimal.

India has relied on foreign collaboration to build its defense industries, and most military equipment is still produced under foreign license agreements. The UK and several West European countries supply most of this assistance. The Soviet role in domestic production has increased, but remains comparatively small in relation to total defense output. In contrast, the USSR and Eastern Europe are the principal suppliers of finished military equipment to India.

New Delhi plans to limit further foreign participation in the manufacture of military equipment. In 1973, the government reaffirmed its policy of not entering into new foreign license agreements for production of military commodities. New Delhi will endeavor to design and produce military equipment domestically but will still depend considerably on foreign technology. Existing licensing agreements will not be renewed automatically, and all defense plants have been instructed to develop indigenous versions of equipment now produced under license. These measures probably will have

*\*Derived from outlays of the Defense Ministry as contained in the armed forces budget. Only a portion of these total direct imports can be accounted for by known deliveries under military arms agreements detailed in this handbook, indicating that a substantial amount of unidentified ammunition, vehicles, spare parts, and other finished military equipment is entering India each year.*

*\*\*From ordnance factories and public and private enterprises, which supply finished military hardware items, petroleum products, and other goods such as medical and veterinary stores, food, and clothing.*

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little immediate impact on foreign-exchange outlays. They do, however, add to the cost of India's military program and will delay new weapons systems.

The arms industry has failed to meet production targets on many occasions. The main constraints have been unreliable conditions of plant and machinery, the failure of Indian industry to provide the necessary components and raw materials, and delays in the receipt of imports, caused, in part, by the failure to place orders on time. Output has been significantly below plant capacity, particularly in the production of major weapons such as tanks and MIG-21 jet fighters. India did manage to step up production of small arms, mortars, and ammunition during the 1971 buildup against Pakistan. The Ministry of Defense Production is engaged in civilian production and military exports to reduce excess plant capacity and increase government earnings.

**B. Pakistan**

Domestic military production will continue to account for a minor share of total Pakistani acquisitions for some time. Islamabad is not self-sufficient in any major category of arms production. Pakistan produces only a portion of its small-arms and ammunition requirements; production of more sophisticated weapons is limited, and requires a large import content. The value of domestic production and the indirect foreign costs for defense—the value of foreign raw material and component inputs into domestic military production—cannot be ascertained.

Most domestic defense production takes place at the Wah ordnance facilities, which manufacture G-3 rifles of West German design; Cobra wire-guided antitank missiles and other antitank weapons; small-arms, mortar, and artillery ammunition; air force ordnance; and spare parts for Chinese tanks. Islamabad suffered a setback in its domestic program when it lost to Bangladesh the ordnance facilities near Dacca that produced the Type-56 rifle, a Chinese version of the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle, and ammunition for a variety of Communist small arms. The types and quantities of ammunition produced in Pakistan will increase with the eventual completion of four new ordnance facilities currently under construction.

Islamabad plans to assemble, and eventually manufacture under license, Chinese T-59 medium tanks at the Taxila heavy-mechanical complex, which was built in the 1960s with Chinese economic aid and is now being expanded. Pakistan expects to produce about 50 tanks annually, with the first scheduled for completion by 1975. Problems reportedly have arisen in the

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domestic fabrication of some components. Moreover, full-scale indigenous tank production is tied to the completion of the heavy forge and foundry at Taxila, which is under construction.

Pakistan is presently exploring the possibilities of producing its own aircraft. China has agreed to study the feasibility of establishing repair and overhaul facilities for the MIG-19 jet fighter in Pakistan. The Chinese also are evaluating the feasibility of producing aircraft spare parts in Pakistan. Islamabad was negotiating with France in mid-1973 to acquire facilities for the assembly and eventual production of Mirage jet fighters.

**C. Bangladesh**

The only ordnance facility in Bangladesh is a rifle factory and small-arms ammunition plant near Dacca, built in the late 1960s with Chinese assistance. The facility was opened in 1970 and was operated by the Pakistani Army through much of 1971, with production dependent on imports of raw material from West Pakistan and foreign countries. The present production status of the facility is not known. The Pakistani Army may have removed or destroyed much of the equipment in December 1971. The only military production of any consequence by Bangladesh is the construction of small patrol boats for the navy.

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Table 1

INDIA: DEFENSE PRODUCTION<sup>1/</sup>  
(Million US \$)

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971 <sup>2/</sup>	1972 <sup>3/</sup>
Arms, Ammunition, and Vehicles	105.7	123.1	118.1	124.8	191.4	NA
Clothing and General Stores	23.8	29.6	26.7	24.9	45.3	53.3
Ordnance Factories	129.5	152.7	144.8	149.7	236.7	NA
Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. <sup>4/</sup>	62	71.9	102.9	98.7	92.8	114.6
Bharat Electronics, Ltd. <sup>5/</sup>	21	27.6	32.2	39.2	43.8	53.0
Mazagon Dock, Ltd. <sup>6/</sup>	9	14.3	18.3	21.8	28.1	36.0
Garden Reach Workshops, Ltd. <sup>7/</sup>	8	9.0	11.5	20.0	22.7	22.7
Praga Tools, Ltd. <sup>8/</sup>	2	2.3	2.5	3.5	3.2	3.3
Bharat Earth Movers, Ltd. <sup>9/</sup>	16	22.3	26.6	30.1	38.0	NA
Goa Shipyard, Ltd. <sup>10/</sup>	1	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.6	1.8
Bharat Dynamics, Ltd. <sup>11/</sup>	---	---	---	---	1.4	3.2
Public Sector Undertakings	119	148.4	195.0	214.6	231.6	NA
<b>TOTAL PRODUCTION</b>	<b>248.5</b>	<b>301.1</b>	<b>339.8</b>	<b>364.3</b>	<b>468.3</b>	<b>508.0</b>

1. 7.5 rupees equal US \$1; fiscal years begin 1 April of stated year.

2. Provisional

3. Estimated

4. Incorporated as a public enterprise in October 1964, combining the various Indian aircraft companies. Almost all production—including air-to-air missiles and radar—is for the military.

5. Manufactures various sophisticated and specialized transmitters, receivers, trans-receivers, and radars for both military and civilian use; also transmitting and x-ray tubes, crystals, ceramic and mica capacitors, and radio and TV receiving valves and transistors. An additional factory is being established, primarily to meet defense needs.

6. Performs ship repair and construction (including harbor craft, minesweepers, dredges, and frigates).

7. Designs and constructs shallow-draft vessels including tugs, light naval craft, river steamers, flags, water boats, barges, pontoons, etc.; also, repairs sea-going, harbor, and inland craft. The company has begun production of diesel engines.

8. Produces drilling machines, tools and cutter grinders, surface grinders, milling machines, and machine tool accessories such as chucks, railroad screw couplings, crankshafts, and other diesel engine parts.

9. Became a public enterprise in May 1964 and produces heavy earth-moving equipment, crawler tractors, and railroad coaches.

10. Originally Portuguese-owned, it became a public enterprise in October 1967. The yard constructs and repairs barges and other small craft.

11. Began production of SS-11 antitank missiles in mid-1971.

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Table 2

## INDIA: AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION

Type	Hindustan Aeronautics Division	Current Production Order	Total Output Estimates Through 1972	Current Annual Rate <sup>1/</sup>
MIG-21FL	Nasik	196 <sup>2/</sup>	175	25
HF-24	Bangalore	129 <sup>3/</sup>	75	15
Gnat	Bangalore	215 <sup>4/</sup>	205	15
HS-748	Kanpur	89 <sup>5/</sup>	45	10
HJT-16	Bangalore	67	40	15
Alouette III <sup>6/</sup>	Bangalore	143	100	25

1. Based on aircraft completed during first ten months of 1972.

2. MIG-21Ms to follow the MIG-21FL; production is in initial stages; less than 100 MIG-21Ms are currently scheduled.

3. An order also has been placed for 29 trainer versions now under development.

4. An order for an additional 65 Gnats may have been placed by the air force.

5. Including 24 ordered by Indian Airlines for commercial use.

6. Production of the French SA-315 helicopter is in the initial stages; at least 140 are scheduled.

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V. FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY

The countries of the subcontinent have imported almost \$4 billion worth of military equipment since 1954. Over half has been delivered since the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. India has received some 58 percent; Pakistan about 42 percent, and Bangladesh, less than 1 percent.

The pattern of arms flow to the area shifted sharply after 1965 as a result of a US-UK arms embargo designed to halt the war. The loss of these traditional suppliers compelled India and Pakistan to turn elsewhere for large supplies of equipment. New Delhi found the USSR a willing source capable of meeting many of its requirements. India also rapidly expanded its own manufacture of arms and now fills more than half of its requirements from domestic production.

China is filling a large part of Islamabad's requirements, but has not made available the range of sophisticated weaponry that the USSR is exporting to India. Pakistan is buying some modern weapons systems from France, but they are expensive and delivery is slow. Presently, Pakistan's facilities to produce military equipment are limited.

A. India

**The Changing Pattern:** Indian procurement of large quantities of Western and Communist weapons over the past two decades was spurred by the continued tension with Pakistan and China that periodically erupted into hostilities. Between early 1954 and mid-1973, India imported more than \$2.2 billion worth of arms through foreign military aid programs and cash purchases (Table 1). The USSR has provided more than half the total and nearly two thirds of India's weapons imports since 1965.

Prior to 1966, the USSR, the UK, the US, and France were India's primary foreign sources of military equipment. Following the outbreak of the September 1965 war, the UK and the US suspended major arms deliveries to the subcontinent. Although both countries later resumed arms shipments to India, US deliveries through mid-1973 totaled only \$41 million of equipment, spare parts, and ammunition. UK deliveries subsequently were resumed at about their annual pre-war level; from 1966 to June 1973, they totaled an estimated \$260 million and included jet fighters and the Tigercat surface-to-air missile system. New Delhi recently has ordered three Sea King ASW helicopters, support equipment, and spare parts. In addition, India is constructing Leander-class frigates, medium tanks, the Gnat fighter aircraft, and transport aircraft under British licenses, necessitating machinery, raw material, and component imports.



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India has received only \$23 million worth of arms from France since 1965, but is considering Paris as a future source of fighters and other equipment. New Delhi also is producing Alouette III and SA-315 helicopters and SS-11 antitank missiles under French licenses. Other Western countries have delivered at least \$41 million worth of equipment since 1965, mostly ordnance and support equipment, but also ten Canberra jet light bombers.

In contrast to the earlier grants of arms to India, most of the procurement from the West since 1965 has involved hard-currency outlays. European suppliers, particularly the UK, usually have extended five-year credits at 4-6 percent interest. Indian purchases of Western machinery and equipment for its arms industry generally have been financed through commercial credits or paid for on current account. India also has had to pay licensing fees and royalties estimated at 5 percent of the value of each item produced.

**Moscow's Dominant Role:** Perhaps the most important consequence of the US-UK embargo on arms deliveries was the shift in Indian arms procurement to the Soviet Union. Although India already was obtaining a significant amount of military equipment from the USSR, only Moscow was willing after 1965 to continue to provide India with large quantities of sophisticated equipment on attractive terms. Since then, the USSR has become India's sole source of high-performance jet aircraft, submarines, and guided-missile patrol boats.

Since November 1960, Moscow has delivered more than \$1.2 billion worth of military aid to India (Table 2). Soviet deliveries have averaged over \$130 million annually since 1965. Most Indian arms purchases from the Soviet Union require a 10 percent down payment on delivery, with the balance covered by nine or ten year credits at 2 percent interest. Repayments are in nonconvertible Indian rupees rather than in the hard currency generally required by Western countries.

More than half of the value of Soviet deliveries to India has consisted of aircraft and related production facilities. New Delhi initially purchased a small number of transport aircraft in 1960. By December 1972, the Soviets had delivered over 200 jet fighters and trainers,\* 65 transport aircraft, and over 100 helicopters. A contract for four squadrons (probably 64 planes) of MIG-21M jet fighters worth \$65 million was signed in July 1972 to replace Indian losses sustained in the war with Pakistan. India received its first MI-8 helicopters during 1972-33 ordered in 1971 and 1972—and deliveries of additional MI-8s have begun under a new contract.

*\*Excluding 175 MIG-21 aircraft assembled and produced domestically.*

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India signed its first agreement to purchase several battalions of the Soviet SA-2 missile system in 1963. Since then, it has obtained at least \$90 million of SA-2 equipment. In 1970, India started to fabricate its own spare parts for the SA-2 system and in 1972 began developing a domestic variant of this system.

Soviet military deliveries to the Indian Army have been confined primarily to tanks and artillery. Moscow has provided over 400 T-55 medium and 176 light amphibious tanks, about 400 130-mm. field guns, and 180 100-mm. field guns. The USSR also has agreed to supply India with an undetermined number of radar-controlled, self-propelled ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns and multiple rocket launchers, and New Delhi has obtained a Soviet license to manufacture the 130-mm. field gun. Moscow also was to provide 200 T-62 medium tanks but the agreement was in jeopardy in late 1972 because of the concern of Indian defense officials over the high cost of the tank.

India's determination to establish a larger presence in the Indian Ocean has resulted in increased purchases of naval equipment. Moscow is the primary source of this equipment. It has supplied eight Petya-class escorts, four F-class submarines, eight Osa-class guided-missile boats, a submarine tender and rescue ship, and several smaller units. An additional eight Osas, four submarines, and two Petyas have been purchased but not yet delivered, and negotiations are under way for minesweepers, escort ships, and ASW aircraft.

Moscow also has provided over \$200 million in plant, machinery, and raw materials to help expand India's arms industry. The bulk has been used to develop facilities to produce MIG-21 jet fighters and Atoll air-to-air missiles and to build naval facilities at Vishakhapatnam. In addition, India produces some ammunition and a wide range of spare parts under Soviet licenses.

The USSR has provided a substantial amount of military technical assistance to supplement its arms-supply program. At least 1,600 Indian military personnel, mostly from the navy and air force, have trained in the USSR since 1961. An estimated 210 Soviet military technicians were in India during 1972. Soviet military technicians generally are employed to assemble Soviet equipment shipped to India and to train Indian personnel in its use and maintenance. In recent years, New Delhi has required that most of the training be conducted in India to reduce the cost of sending personnel to the USSR, which was estimated to have been more than \$1 million annually during the late 1960s.

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East European countries have delivered over \$100 million worth of military equipment to India since 1965. Czechoslovakia has supplied about two thirds, mostly tanks and APCs. Poland has delivered at least 200 T-55 tanks, and Bulgaria has supplied some \$12 million worth of ammunition and explosives.

**Modernization Plans:** India's projected defense requirements are aimed at a rapid improvement in weapons technology, which is likely to perpetuate dependence on foreign suppliers. The USSR probably will remain India's major foreign source of sophisticated arms through the 1970s; the West has proven to be an unreliable source in time of crisis and has not offered repayment terms as liberal as the Soviets. The British probably will provide primarily spare parts and replacements for equipment already in Indian inventories as well as furnishing technical assistance and some components under expanding licensed-production programs.

Indian plans for the late 1970s call for the replacement of many of its jet fighters with more sophisticated models. Difficulties with domestic aircraft-development programs will necessitate continued sizable imports of foreign aircraft. New Delhi has thus far shown interest only in replacement aircraft of Western origin, but procurement of updated models of the Soviet MIG-21 jet fighter—fly-aways as well as components—probably will continue to supplement India's domestic MIG production.

India has considered importing substantial numbers of jet bombers in order to expand and modernize its bomber inventory by the late 1970s. Should India be unable to acquire bombers in the West, it might accept a Soviet offer of either the TU-16 or TU-22 jet medium bomber, which until now it has rejected. New Delhi has felt that the TU-16 was not a significant improvement over the Canberras that now make up the Indian bomber force. India was also dissatisfied with the electronics package offered on the TU-22.

India appears to be placing increasing emphasis on the modernization of its naval forces. During the 1970s, domestic production will satisfy only a minor portion of its naval requirements and the Indian Navy will have to rely heavily on foreign acquisitions. India plans to continue construction of additional coastal minesweepers, patrol boats, and various auxiliary vessels but, as in the past, will purchase abroad such naval equipment as guided-missile patrol boats and submarines. Recent attempts to secure a guided-missile cruiser or destroyer from the Soviets have failed. India also is looking for a replacement for its aging Sea Hawk carrier-based jet fighter aircraft. The search has been confined to Western suppliers because Moscow has stated that it has no suitable aircraft.

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**B. Pakistan**

**The Changing Pattern:** Pakistan's foreign military acquisitions from 1954 until June 1973 totaled more than \$1.6 billion (Table 3). Pakistan joined the US-sponsored Baghdad Pact (subsequently renamed the Central Treaty Organization—CENTO) and the South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the mid-1950s.\* Pakistan received almost all of its arms and training from its allies, the US and UK, until 1966. Most of the arms came from the US and were provided essentially as grants; the UK, also a member of CENTO and SEATO, provided some additional military hardware. When the US and UK restricted arms shipments, Islamabad turned to other sources to replace the equipment lost during the Indo-Pakistani war of September 1965. Since that war, the Peoples Republic of China has supplied some 40 percent of Pakistan's equipment imports and France another 20 percent.

**Traditional Suppliers:** The US has delivered more than \$80 million of materiel since 1965, mostly nonlethal equipment—trucks, spare parts, communications and electronic equipment, and some ammunition. These purchases have been cash sales.

The US lifted its restrictions in 1970, as a one-time exception, and Pakistan purchased 300 armored personnel carriers, valued at \$13 million, plus another \$1 million in support equipment and spare parts. Deliveries scheduled to begin in 1972 were suspended in March 1971, when the civil war broke out in East Pakistan.

Pakistan revived its efforts to procure the 300 APCs early in 1972 and also pressed the US to lift its restrictions on the sale of aircraft, artillery, and anti-aircraft guns, ground-to-ground and surface-to-air missile systems, missile boats, and submarines. Islamabad specifically requested 100 M47/48 tanks, four submarines, 12 B-57 bombers, 25 F-5 fighters, and various ground-force weapons and support equipment at discount prices and on deferred repayment terms. The US agreed in March 1973 to deliver by year's end only the \$14 million of equipment purchased in 1970 and to resume sales on a cash basis of nonlethal equipment and spare parts for previously supplied equipment.

Although the UK was a major arms supplier prior to the 1965 war, only \$9 million worth of spare parts, electronics, and ammunition has been delivered since 1965. The hiatus in major arms transactions with London lasted until 1972 when an agreement for four Sea King helicopters was signed. Delivery is slated for 1973.

*\*In November 1972, Pakistan announced its withdrawal from SEATO.*

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**Soviet and East European Programs:** In the mid-1960s, the USSR signed arms contracts of \$65 million with Pakistan. Moscow believed that an arms aid program eventually might undercut Chinese and Western influence in Pakistan and lessen Islamabad's hostility toward India. Pakistan, however, did not moderate its position toward India and continued to maintain close relations with China. Moreover, New Delhi objected to the Soviet sales to Pakistan. Moscow succumbed to these pressures and in mid-1969 stopped shipments after delivering only \$22 million worth of equipment, including 60 medium tanks, 60 artillery pieces, ten helicopters, ammunition, airport lighting equipment, and radar. In 1972, Moscow sold some \$2 million worth of military trucks, but it is not expected to resume shipments of lethal items.

Czechoslovakia, following the Soviet lead, also resumed military sales to Pakistan in 1972 after a two-year hiatus. Prague agreed to supply \$16-17 million of military vehicles and ammunition. During 1968-69, it sold about \$16 million in military support equipment, principally trucks, cranes, bridging equipment and spare parts.

**China:** Since 1965, China has emerged as Pakistan's most important foreign source of arms. Peking has agreed to provide Islamabad with at least \$335 million in military aid (Table 4); about 60 percent is in grants, and the balance financed under long-term credits with repayments scheduled to begin in 1974.

Discussions with the Chinese were initiated some six months prior to the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. Apparently concerned over Pakistan's dependence on US arms, President Ayub Khan visited China in March 1965 and presented Peking with a list of required ground-force equipment. Negotiations over this equipment dragged on through the summer, but after the outbreak of the war, China immediately agreed to provide an estimated \$75 million in grant aid. This included MIG-19 jet fighters, U-MIG-15 jet trainers, IL-28 jet light bombers, aircraft ground-support materiel, and equipment for three infantry divisions and four tank regiments. Some 250 anti-aircraft guns and recoilless rifles were airlifted to Pakistan at once, and deliveries of all equipment were completed before the end of 1966.

By the end of 1972, Peking had supplied Islamabad with about 160 MIG-19 jet fighters, four IL-28 jet light bombers, about 765 medium tanks, over 1,000 artillery and anti-aircraft guns, more than 100,000 individual and other infantry weapons, large quantities of ammunition, and support equipment. Thirty of the MIG-19s were turned over to the Pakistan Air Force during the first two months of 1972 to replace most of the fighters lost

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during the 1971 war. Pakistan also received minor repair facilities for the MIG-19 as grant aid and was permitted to use parts of two economic aid credits to construct an ordnance facility at Dacca (now in Bangladesh), to expand existing facilities at Wah, and to import a tank-repair workshop and a tank-production facility. In early 1973, Chinese technicians were studying the feasibility of Pakistan manufacturing spare parts for the MIG-19 and expanding its limited maintenance facilities. At present, major overhauls are done by the Chinese.

During President Bhutto's trip to Peking in February 1972, China agreed to supply ground-force equipment for two new army divisions—100-140 T-59 medium tanks and some 250 artillery pieces. During 1972, some \$50 million in ground-force equipment arrived in Karachi, as well as six Shanghai II - class motor gunboats contracted for in 1971. Two more Shanghais and four Huchwan-class hydrofoil motor torpedo boats were delivered in early 1973, and deliveries of ground-force equipment are continuing.

Bhutto also apparently received a Chinese commitment for additional fighter and bomber aircraft. Reports indicate that China is willing to supply the F-9 fighter bomber once its own requirements are met. The F-9—not yet exported by Peking—is the most advanced fighter bomber produced in China and would be a logical progression in Pakistani acquisitions. Pakistani personnel received training in China on the TU-16 jet medium bomber from late summer 1972 through early 1973. Islamabad is believed to have contracted for a squadron of these bombers, but they are to remain in China to avoid alarming India. Pakistani air crews are prepared to fly them to Pakistan in the event of hostilities.

**France:** Since the end of 1965, Paris has provided some \$150 million in military equipment. Almost all French equipment is sophisticated and expensive; most is financed under seven to ten year credits. Deliveries have included 27 Mirage III jet fighters, at least 20 Mirage 5s, three Daphne-class submarines, and about 20 Alouette III helicopters.

In April 1972, Islamabad presented Paris with an extensive military shopping list, reportedly valued at more than \$150 million. The request included 18 Mirage III jet fighters, four Breguet Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft, 14 helicopters, a Daphne-class submarine, air-to-surface missiles, the Exocet anti-ship missile, electronic and radar equipment, and a small quantity of ground-force weapons. Negotiations are under way, and may have been expanded to include the assembly and eventual manufacture of

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Mirage aircraft in Pakistan. Contracts known to have been concluded cover the delivery of six Alouette helicopters and a \$3-million Mirage flight-simulator unit.

**Other Sources:** Pakistan has received some \$155 million worth of military equipment from a variety of secondary sources. About 80 percent of this materiel was delivered after 1965. West German, Canadian, Iranian, Turkish, and Spanish suppliers have provided Pakistan with the badly needed spare parts for aging US equipment that Islamabad was not able to procure directly because of US restrictions. In addition, these countries have acted as a channel for US equipment sold as surplus by NATO countries and for weapons produced in Europe under US licenses. West European suppliers also have provided Pakistan with licenses to manufacture such items as G-3 rifles and Cobra wire-guided missiles.

In recent years, Pakistan has approached private arms dealers in the West to purchase arms estimated at over \$100 million. Signed agreements are likely to be considerably less, however, because some requests are duplicative. Practically all these purchases will be paid for on current account in hard currency. Equipment being sought ranges from ammunition and spare parts to the sophisticated Tigercat surface-to-air missile system.

In July 1972 Pakistan concluded a \$25-million military agreement with North Korea for 60 130-mm. field guns, 100 14.5-mm. antiaircraft machine guns, ammunition, and ancillary equipment. Delivery was scheduled to begin in September 1972 and to be completed in 1974 with payment in hard currency and on commercial terms. The ammunition being procured for the 130-mm. guns is estimated to be excessive, indicating that Pakistan may be attempting to stockpile ammunition for the Soviet-supplied 130-mm. guns already in its inventory. Contracts also have been signed for some \$16 million of ground-force weapons.

**C. Bangladesh**

**Soviet Involvement:** When the state of Bangladesh was formed in late 1971, it inherited some of the military equipment left behind by Pakistan. This equipment—which included an assortment of infantry weapons, some artillery, armored vehicles, eight F-86 jet fighters, and a few utility aircraft—constitutes the major share of military equipment in the Bangladesh inventory in mid-1973.

The USSR was quick to offer assistance to Dacca in establishing an air force. In April 1972 an agreement was reached for 18 MIG-21 jet fighters, 12

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MI-8 helicopters, and a number of AN-24/26 transport aircraft. The Soviets also agreed to train Bangladesh Air Force personnel in the operation and maintenance of the aircraft. From August 1972 through April 1973, over 250 Bengalees received training in the USSR. An AN-24 was turned over to Bangladesh in February and deliveries of MIG-21s, MI-8s, and AN-26s have begun. About 100 Soviet technical and advisory personnel are in Bangladesh to further assist Dacca's fledgling air force. Forty Bangladesh personnel remain in the USSR for air cadet training.

**Indian Support:** India, Bangladesh's primary source of ground-force and naval equipment, has provided an estimated \$15 million worth of materiel. Prior to independence, Bengalee rebels received small arms, mortars, recoil-less rifles, and vehicles from India. This support has continued, and in early 1973 India provided its first naval equipment—a small patrol craft. India has also assumed the major role in the training of Bangladesh army and navy personnel.

**Other:** The UK has sold the Bangladesh Air Force at least two Wessex helicopters and will provide technical assistance in their use. A British firm is supplying vehicles to the Bangladesh military, and Dacca has requested additional officer training in the UK. Some small arms and mortars may also have been obtained from Israel with New Delhi acting as an intermediary.



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Table 1  
INDIA: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS  
(Million US \$)

	1954-June 1973	1954-65	1966-June 1973	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973*
<b>Free World Countries</b>											
Belgium	9	1	8	--	--	3	4	--	Negl.	1	Negl.
France	91	68	23	2	3	5	2	3	3	3	2
West Germany	20	9	11	1	1	2	--	7	--	--	--
UK	514	255	259	14	29	29	36	48	35	48	20
US	201	160	41	10	8	4	4	4	3	8	Negl.
Yugoslavia	22	8	14	4	--	9	--	--	--	1	--
Other**	87	79	8	1	--	3	1	1	1	1	Negl.
Subtotal	944	580	364	32	41	55	47	63	42	62	22
<b>Communist Countries</b>											
USSR	1,254	266	988	213	86	134	127	81	180	111	56
Eastern Europe	110	--	110	37	--	--	5	11	47	6	4
Subtotal	1,364	266	1,098	250	86	134	132	92	227	117	60
TOTAL	2,308	846	1,462	282	127	189	179	155	269	179	82

\*January-June

\*\*Includes Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland

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Table 2

## SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLY AGREEMENTS WITH INDIA

*(Million US \$)*

Date	Value	Selected Types of Equipment Ordered	Status*
Nov 1960	21	Eight AN-12 heavy transports	(C)
Mar 1961	6	24 IL-14 medium transports	(C)
May 1961	2	Eight MI-4 helicopters	(C)
Jan 1962	2	11 MI-4 helicopters	(C)
Aug 1962	46	18 AN-12 heavy transports	(C)
Aug 1962	170	Plant facilities and license for production of 196 MIG-21 FL jet fighters; subsequent contracts were for importation of raw material and components for production. (Value given represents total projected foreign-exchange cost of program.)	(U)
Aug 1962	12	12 MIG-21 jet fighters	(C)
Jan 1963	6	22 MI-4 helicopters	(C)
Apr 1963	16	Six AN-12 heavy transports	(C)
Aug 1963	38	Eight SA-2 missile-firing battalions	(C)
Apr 1964	40	Nine SA-2 missile-firing battalions	(C)
Sep 1964	197	38 MIG-21 jet fighters, six U-MIG-21 jet trainers, 389 130-mm. field guns, 225 T-55 medium tanks, 176 light tanks, and nine AN-12 heavy transports	(C)
Sep 1965	106	Four F-class submarines, five Petya-class escorts, five patrol boats, two landing craft, and one Ugra-class submarine tender	(C)
Jan 1966	11	Three TU-124 passenger aircraft, 40 MI-4 helicopters	(C)
Oct 1966	153	139 SU-7 jet fighter-bombers and jet trainers	(C)
1st half 1968	33	Naval dock-yard project at Vishakhapatnam	(U)
Aug 1968	42	25 MIG-21s, 75 medium tanks, and ammunition	(C)
Feb 1969	62	Eight Osa-class missile patrol boats, one submarine rescue ship, other naval equipment, and \$17 million worth of spare parts	(C)
Jun 1969	10	SA-2 equipment	(C)
Oct 1969	120	Licensed production of 150-170 MIG-21M (PFM) jet fighters**	(U)
2nd half 1969	10	Vehicles	(C)
1st half 1970	56	27 MIG-21s, 15 SU-7s	(U)
1st half 1970	28	Spare parts	(C)
Jul 1971	33	Artillery	(C)
Dec 1971	127	Five Petya-class patrol boats, four F-class submarines	(U)
Summer-Fall 1971	50	Ground forces equipment	(C)
2nd half 1971	18	MI-8 helicopter	(C)
Feb 1972	2	License production of 130-mm. guns	(U)
Mar 1972	35	Eight Osa-class large guided-missile craft	(U)
May 1972	4	Radar	(U)
1st half 1972	N.A.	Ground forces equipment	(U)
Jul 1972	65	Replace aircraft lost in December 1971 war	(U)
Aug 1972	8	MI-8 helicopters	(C)
1st half 1973	N.A.	MI-8 helicopters	(U)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,529</b>		

\*(C) Completed; (U) In process of delivery

\*\*India subsequently decided to produce fewer than 100 of these aircraft.

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Table 3  
PAKISTAN: FOREIGN MILITARY IMPORTS  
(Million US \$)

	1954-June 1973	1954-65	1966-June 1973	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973*
<b>Free World Countries</b>											
Belgium	17	---	17	16	---	1	Negl.	---	---	Negl.	---
Canada	8	Negl.	8	8	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
France	188	39	149	2	2	30	35	38	4	13	25
West Germany	40	8	32	21	1	4	1	1	1	1	2
Iran	8	---	8	---	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Italy	21	---	21	13	7	---	---	---	---	---	---
Turkey	33	17	16	16	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
UK	171	162	9	8	---	---	---	---	Negl.	---	1
US	810	729	81	3	4	9	17	22	22	4	Negl.
Other**	16	7	9	---	---	2	2	2	1	2	Negl.
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1,312</b>	<b>962</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>Communist Countries</b>											
Peoples Republic of China	280	10	270	65	24	21	20	20	43	64	13
Czechoslovakia	17	---	17	---	---	8	7	1	---	---	1
USSR	24	---	24	---	3	4	14	1	---	1	1
North Korea	12	---	12	---	---	---	---	---	---	8	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>333</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>323</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,645</b>	<b>972</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>48</b>

\*January-June  
\*\*Includes Austria, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Sweden.

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Table 4

## CHINESE MILITARY SUPPLY AGREEMENTS WITH PAKISTAN

*(Million US \$)*

Date	Value	Selected Types of Equipment Ordered	Status*
Sep 1965	75	74 MIG-19 jet fighters, 4 IL-28 jet bombers, 192 medium tanks, and artillery	(C)
July 1966	42	110 medium tanks, artillery	(C)
May 1967	50	60 MIG-19s, 252 medium tanks, artillery	(C)
Dec 1967	3	Aircraft engines	(C)
Nov 1970	40	Ground forces equipment for two army divisions	(C)
Nov 1971	60	Ground forces equipment for two army divisions, 30 MIG-19s, 8 Shanghai-IIs, other naval equipment	(U)
Feb 1972	65	Ground forces equipment for two army divisions, TU-16 jet medium bombers, naval craft	(U)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>325</b>		

\*(C) Completed; (U) In process of delivery

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Table 5

**FRENCH MILITARY SUPPLY AGREEMENTS WITH PAKISTAN**  
*(Million US \$)*

Date	Value	Selected Types of Equipment Ordered	Status*
Oct 1966	38	Three Daphne-class submarines	(C)
Late 1966	55	27 Mirage III jet fighters, Alouette helicopters	(C)
Sep 1970	54	30 Mirage 5 jet fighters	(U)
Dec 1970	2	Ten Alouette helicopters	(C)
Mid 1972	4	Mirage flight simulator, six Alouette helicopters	(U)

**TOTAL 153**

*\*(C) Completed; (U) In process of delivery*

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ANNEX A.

South Asian Nuclear Weapons Capabilities

1. India

India has the skills and material to set off a nuclear explosion, probably of low yield. Its civil nuclear program is broadly based and is aimed principally toward the production of electrical power. The total nuclear program, including power applications, has been large; the Department of Atomic Energy has spent about \$1 billion since the program began in 1954. It employs several thousand scientists who have studied in the US and Europe. Other technologies—electronics, metallurgy, computer capabilities, and high explosives—are more than adequate to support an effort to set off a nuclear explosion.

India is capable of detonating a nuclear device within a few days to a year should it make a decision to do so. Actual time required would depend on how far preliminary work had gone.

The nuclear device would have plutonium as its fissionable material. The Indians probably now have enough weapons-grade plutonium to make 10-12 weapons (15-20 kilotons each) and could add about two more each year from new production. The plutonium is being produced and separated at the Bhaba Atomic Research Center near Bombay. The only safeguard on the reactor is a written Indian promise to the Canadians, who designed and helped build the facility, that the reactor and its products will be used only for peaceful purposes. India has not accepted the Canadian and US interpretation that any nuclear explosion is tantamount to a weapons test, regardless of the declared purpose of the test. India has ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the selection and preparation of a suitable underground site for a nuclear test would involve considerable time and expense.

Current Indian delivery capabilities, like the prospective weapons themselves, are modest. A fleet of about 40 Canberra light bombers, with a radius of about 1,000 nautical miles and a payload of 5,000 pounds, could reach India's closer neighbors, including much of western and southwestern China, but not the heavily populated areas farther east. India has no long-range bombers, but could conceivably, with extensive modifications, use some of its civil fleet of Boeing 707s and 747s to carry weapons several thousand miles. All these aircraft would be vulnerable to Chinese air defenses.

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For at least five years, India will be unable to enhance its extremely limited nuclear weapons capability without violating safeguards. A large Indian-built nuclear power plant without international safeguards is scheduled to be in operation sometime after 1977. The plant, at Kalpakkam in south India, will have two natural uranium-fueled reactors. With current and planned separation facilities, the plant eventually could produce enough unsafeguarded plutonium to make 50-70 low-yield bombs a year in the 1980s. A prototype for a new generation of fast-breeder reactors producing U-233 from India's huge supplies of thorium may be ready in the 1980s.

India's planned and slowly expanding capabilities in the nuclear and space-related fields will eventually remove many of the obstacles to a large-scale nuclear weapons program. In the late 1980s, there will be enough plutonium and U-233 to make a number of intermediate-yield weapons. The Indian space program, which is still in its early stages, probably will have borne fruit by then. To date, only sounding rockets have been tested. A small test satellite was scheduled for launch in 1974, but the Indians have been unable to develop a suitable launch vehicle. As a result, the Soviets have agreed to orbit a satellite constructed in India. An Indian satellite launch is still at least five years away, however, and it would then require quite a few additional years and considerable cost to develop an operational missile system.

2. Pakistan

Pakistan is unlikely to have any effective nuclear capability within the current decade. It has only one nuclear power reactor, a heavy-water model built with Canadian assistance and under safeguards. Negotiations reportedly are under way with the French for a chemical separation plant to extract plutonium from the spent fuel elements of the power reactor and for a fuel fabrication facility. Even if this plant is built, the plutonium will remain safeguarded. Moreover, Pakistan has no large domestic sources of exploitable uranium.

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ANNEX C.

Chronology of Major Events in South Asia, 1947-1973

1940		
23 March	All India Muslim League, meeting in Lahore, calls for separation of predominantly Muslim areas from India	
1942		
8 August	All India Congress Committee calls on British to "quit India"	
1947		
14 August	Pakistani independence	
15 August	Indian independence	
27 October	Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir accedes to India; Indian troops enter Kashmir to fight Pakistani-backed tribal invaders	
1948		
30 January	Mahatma Gandhi assassinated	
11 September	Mohammed Ali Jinnah dies	
1949		
1 January	Kashmir cease-fire becomes effective	
26 July	Agreement reached on cease-fire line in Kashmir	
1954		
17 May	US and Pakistan sign Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement	
7 September	Pakistan signs SEATO Treaty	
1955		
1 July	Pakistan joins Baghdad Pact (later CENTO)	

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1958 7 October	President Iskandar Mirza imposes martial law in Pakistan
27 October	Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan seizes power
1959 5 March	Pakistan signs bilateral defense agreement with US
1961 18-20 December	Indian conquest of Goa
1962 20 October	After months of border clashes, heavy fighting breaks out between India and China
28 October	Chinese halt their successful offensive
1962 14 November	US agrees to emergency arms aid for India
21 November	Unilateral Chinese cease-fire goes into effect
1 December	Chinese begin unilateral withdrawal
20 December	US and UK agree to continue arms aid to India
1963 January	Soviets begin shipments of MIG-21s to India
2 March	Pakistan signs border agreement with China
1964 27 May	Jawaharlal Nehru dies
2 June	Lal Bahadur Shastri chosen prime minister of India
1965 April	Fighting breaks out in the Rann of Kutch
30 June	Formal cease-fire signed more than a month after fighting ends in the Rann

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Early August	Pakistan begins infiltrating "freedom fighters" into Kashmir
1 September	Pakistani troops launch major attack into Kashmir
6 September	Indians launch full-scale attack on West Pakistan
8 September	US embargoes all arms to India and Pakistan
22 September	Cease-fire goes into effect
1966	
10 January	At Tashkent, India and Pakistan agree essentially to return to the status quo ante bellum
11 January	Prime Minister Shastri dies
19 January	Indira Gandhi becomes Prime Minister
1967	
February	Congress Party reduced to slim majority in parliament in Indian general elections
April	US modifies arms policy to permit sale of some spares to India and Pakistan
1968	
7 November	Student riot in Rawalpindi; disorders spread to all of Pakistan
1969	
25 March	Ayub resigns and is replaced by General A. M. Yahya Khan
1970	
28 March	President Yahya, in Legal Framework Order, outlines process for establishing a civilian government
October	US announces one-time exception in sale of military equipment to Pakistan

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7 December	Z. A. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party sweeps National Assembly elections in West Pakistan; Mujibur Rahman's Awami League in East Pakistan. Provincial Assembly elections on 17 December follow same pattern
1971	
30 January	Two Kashmiri "freedom fighters" hijack an Indian plane to Lahore
2 February	India bans Pakistani overflights
1 March	East Pakistan Awami League calls for a general strike to protest Yahya's postponement of the convening of the National Assembly
March	Prime Minister Gandhi's Congress Party wins substantial majority in lower house of parliament
15 March	Mujib announces he is taking over administration of East Pakistan; Yahya begins talks with Mujib
25-26 March	Talks break down; Pakistan Army moves to restore central authority in East Pakistan; Mujib arrested; independence of Bangladesh proclaimed
17 April	Bangladesh Republic (in exile) officially established
2 July	US imposes total embargo on arms to Pakistan
9 August	Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed
3 December	After gradually increasing Indian involvement in civil war in East Pakistan and military build-up by both sides in the west, the Pakistan Air Force attacks Indian air bases in the west; full-scale war breaks out on both fronts
16 December	Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrender

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17 December	Cease-fire goes into effect in the west
20 December	Yahya resigns, and Z. A. Bhutto becomes president
1972	
7 January	Mujibur Rahman, released from Pakistani custody, arrives in Dacca on 10 January and becomes Prime Minister
3 July	Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto reach agreement at Simla
29 August	Indian and Pakistani negotiators, in New Delhi, reach accord clarifying Simla Agreement
7 December	Delineation of new "line of control" in Kashmir completed
20 December	Mutual troop withdrawals completed
1973	
14 March	US announces resumption of limited arms supply to Pakistan and India
17 April	India and Bangladesh propose a package deal under which prisoners of war (except those to be tried for war crimes), Bengalees in Pakistan, and Biharis in Bangladesh would be repatriated

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The South Asian  
Military Handbook

GLOSSARY

Performance Characteristics of Selected  
South Asian Military Equipment

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CENTURION MK-VII

India



Characteristics

Weight  
Length  
Width  
Height  
Crew  
Engine

Remarks


Production  
Country

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SECRET

VIJAYANTA TANK



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