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Weekly Review


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The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents.

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
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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Review

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Ode to Detente



The Soviet "peace offensive" came in for fresh attention in Kremlin pronouncements over the past week. Moscow is saying that the road to international detente is littered with obstacles, but that patient pursuit of Soviet policies will lead to new successes. The defensive quality of some of these statements suggests, however, that the Soviet leaders are concerned that the near-term outlook is not so bright.

In a speech delivered earlier this week on the occasion of the anniversary of Lenin's birth, candidate Politburo member Ponomarev paid customary tribute to Moscow's foreign policy and to Brezhnev's personal role in formulating it. Moscow's globalist policies, according to Ponomarev, have produced concrete results, with the Kremlin's voice now being listened to with "massive attention" everywhere. Ponomarev noted that further "stubborn efforts" will be required if the "systematic provocations" against Moscow's peace offensive are to be overcome, and detente is to become irreversible. In a defensive aside, Ponomarev asserted that there was no reason to change Soviet foreign policy merely because of "temporary political situations." Moscow, he said, will continue to implement the "peace policies" adopted at the 24th CPSU Congress.

Party leader Brezhnev also found an occasion this week to speak out in behalf of detente. Addressing the Soviet Communist youth congress

in Moscow, Brezhnev said that the words "peace offensive" indeed aptly describe the Soviet foreign policy line, which is progressing steadfastly though not without certain difficulties. Brezhnev blamed the Maoists in Peking and imperialist circles elsewhere for attempting to undermine Soviet detente policies, but the Soviet leader maintained that his gradualist, step-by-step approach would produce positive results.

A more-qualified assessment of the prospects for detente was offered by Moscow's leading Washingtonologist, Yury Arbatov, in a recent article written especially for United Press International. Addressing US-Soviet relations, Arbatov said that the improvement so far in bilateral relations may not prove to be lasting if steps are not taken soon to give it more substance. Arbatov argued that Soviet students of American affairs regard the present US commitment to detente as "very complicated and contradictory." He singled out alleged US efforts to interfere in Soviet internal affairs as endangering mutual trust and confidence. If obstacles to trade and other economic matters are not removed, Arbatov professed, there may be a serious setback in relations. In a possible allusion to Soviet preferences regarding arms control issues that might be raised at the forthcoming summit in Moscow, Arbatov warned that the arms race may step up unless measures are taken soon to go beyond the provisions of the ARM treaty concluded in May 1972.

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Egypt-USSR: Adjusting Relations

President Sadat publicly softened his tone toward the Soviets last week, after several weeks of belaboring them in speeches and interviews. At the same time, however, he served notice on Moscow that he wants to reduce the leverage it has on him, by virtue of Egypt's dependence on Soviet military supplies. He is seeking, he said, to diversify Egypt's source of arms.

Sadat's assertions of continued friendship with Moscow, which have been absent in recent months, raised the temperature of the relationship only slightly above the frigid level. He continued to harp on points of difference, chiefly over Soviet failure to deliver the arms Egypt expects, although he termed these differences "misunderstandings" between friends.

He made something of an attempt to mollify Soviet misgivings over his new foreign policy orientation, noting that he seeks "positive neutrality" between the US and the USSR and does not intend to maintain ties with one at the expense of the other. He reasserted, however, his categorical rejection of any Soviet attempt to dictate his domestic policy; Egypt's policies are Egypt's business, he said, and outside comment—a reference to the criticism of Soviet propagandists—is in "bad taste."

Sadat's emphasis on Moscow's alleged failure to meet Egypt's arms demands is more an excuse for his carping than the real reason for it, which runs deeper. Sadat has always chafed at Egypt's position as a Soviet client state. Egyptian military achievements during the war have given Sadat a sense of freedom from Soviet tutelage that he could never before justify or successfully assert; the role of the US in the negotiations since the war has convinced him that Soviet political support is at present not necessary to reach a settlement.

Sadat's continuing criticism of the Soviets is also in part a reaction to charges from some Egyptians and other Arabs that he has transferred Egypt's dependence to the US. By characterizing

the Soviets as unreliable allies and the US as a new but still not fully tested friend, he justifies his turn toward Washington without seeming to place too much reliance on the US.


Finally, Sadat's portrayal of Moscow as a friend that cannot be depended upon militarily is designed to convince Syria, and other Arabs as well, that political dependence on the Soviets also does not pay off. Sadat suspects Moscow of encouraging Syrian intransigence in disengagement negotiations, and he is seeking to persuade the Syrians they will achieve nothing by heeding Moscow's advice.

The Soviets are not likely to take much comfort from Sadat's most recent expressions of guarded friendship, although they might hope that he is prepared to tone down the anti-Soviet rhetoric. Moscow will interpret Sadat's reference to weapons diversification, as Sadat intends, as a signal that he will not be blackmailed into changing his policies in exchange for Soviet hardware. Sadat's assertion of Egyptian neutrality and his positive references to the US will be seen, moreover, as evidence that he has no present intention of arresting Cairo's move toward a more balanced foreign policy.

The Soviets are continuing their indirect—but nevertheless barbed—campaign to discredit Sadat both within Egypt and among other Arabs. Last week, for example, the Soviets apparently were behind the publication in Beirut of "documents" defending the USSR against Sadat's charges of lukewarm support during the October war.

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EC Foreign Ministers *

EC: TENSIONS EASING

At an informal meeting in West Germany last weekend, the EC foreign ministers seemed to make some headway toward easing tensions within the community. The complexion of this meeting was in sharp contrast to the EC Council session earlier this month, which had dwelled on the potential crisis over British demands for "renegotiation" of its membership.

The improved atmosphere among the eight ministers—the caretaker Belgian Government was not represented—was most obvious in the dialogue on "European union." British Foreign Secretary Callaghan, far from refusing to discuss the goal, said he was not opposed in principle to European union but really did not know what it meant.

The response of the other foreign ministers was vague. The notion was raised of retaining national states and borders while, above the national level, there would be a "federal or confederal level." Mention was made of a European government with independent powers having a parliament composed of a house of states and a house of the peoples. EC Commission President Ortoli, who was present, argued that these concepts would tend to substitute intergovernmental cooperation for integration.

Callaghan proposed that EC officials should, without prior commitment, examine the various

meanings of European union and prepare a paper for public debate. This proposal was not accepted, but the fact that it was made suggests that the West Germans were successful last weekend in their basic purpose of getting Callaghan to think in terms of the community. The ministers agreed that work would resume on the Political Committee's report on European Union. Callaghan may now realize the UK is in as good a position to influence this report as any other country.

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With respect to EC consultations with the US, the French apparently gave way on their previous insistence that the Nine consult only after unanimous agreement among themselves. They agreed that the Nine should use bilateral channels fully and multilateral channels on occasion. A senior British official cautioned, however, that the new EC attitude has not yet been tested

* (from left: Jobert, France; Callaghan, UK; Thorn, Luxembourg; Ortoli, EC president; Vanderstoel, Netherlands; Scheel, W. Germany; Moro, Italy; Guldberg, Denmark)

[REDACTED]

in action, and he believes it might be reversed if the US should press for a more explicit commitment. The EC members rejected the "organic" link to the US suggested by Washington, but remain divided on whether a requirement for consultation should be incorporated into a US-European declaration in the NATO context.

Little was said about EC cooperation with the Arabs, reportedly because of the continued Arab oil embargo against the Netherlands and Denmark. Both Scheel and Callaghan told their colleagues of increasing US interest in a European role in support of Egyptian President Sadat's constructive positions.

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The next steps in the European-Arab dialogue are likely to depend on an analysis of Chancellor Brandt's recent visits to Algiers and Cairo. Brandt publicly stated during his trip that the organized dialogue will begin in the course of the year, but there is still no clear picture as to what the form and content of that dialogue will be.

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poll that showed Giscard more likely than Chaban to defeat Mitterrand in a run-off second round on May 19.

Interim President Alain Pcher also is helping Giscard. Pcher, who is president of the Senate, shares that body's sense of gratitude for Giscard's opposition in 1969 to De Gaulle's referendum proposal, which would have taken away most of the Senate's powers.

Prime Minister Messmer on April 21 gave Chaban a lukewarm endorsement but added that he would not campaign for him before the first round of the election. The Prime Minister, who joined Chirac in two well-publicized efforts to force Chaban to withdraw from the race, 25X1 warned Chaban not to attack Giscard in the campaign.

The continued Gaullist dissidence—as well as his own problems as a campaigner—precipitated Chaban's slippage to several percentage points behind Giscard in the latest series of public opinion polls. Giscard's advisers expect Chaban's well-organized campaign machinery to enable him to pull ahead again in the polls, but they are confident Giscard will beat him in the first round on May 5. Giscard's improved performance in the polls has stimulated contributions that have begun to ease his campaign's financial problems.

On the left, Mitterrand's campaign is advancing smoothly, but the Communists are irritated over his efforts to appear more moderate. Mitterrand had not consulted with the Communists on his platform, and they were particularly unhappy about his announced intention to name a fellow Socialist as prime minister.

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FRANCE: PARTY DISSENSION

Jacques Chaban-Delmas, the official Gaullist presidential candidate, still has not gained his party's full support and continues to slip further behind Valery Giscard d'Estaing as well as Socialist Francois Mitterrand in public opinion polls.

Staunch Gaullists who support Chaban have threatened the dissidents, led by Interior Minister Chirac, with expulsion from the party if they explicitly endorse Giscard. Chirac is determined, however, to continue meeting with the group of about 40 Gaullist members of the legislature and cabinet to plan behind-the-scenes support for Giscard. He is personally funneling to Giscard official ministry reports on the campaign. Last weekend, Chirac leaked to the press a confidential

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WARSAW PACT SUMMIT: NO CHANGE

The Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee met in Warsaw on April 17-18 and reiterated its support for detente, but the gathering of party first secretaries and top government officials did not signal any change in the pact's position on the European security or the force reduction talks. Instead, the participants called for a summit-level finale to the CSCE and once again suggested that the conference establish a "permanent organization" to oversee European security. They also agreed to observe the pact's 20th anniversary in Warsaw in 1975.

The leaders repeated the support for force reductions in Europe that they had first jointly expressed at their January 1972 meeting in Czechoslovakia, and said that successful conclusion of the talks would be a "significant contribution to detente." While not formally endorsing the Soviet force reductions proposal, the communique summarizing the meeting claimed that a "constructive agreement" was possible without damaging the security of "either side."

The session also renewed an old propaganda gesture by again offering to abolish the Warsaw Pact in conjunction with the liquidation of NATO. The communique added, however, that as long as NATO existed and no effective disarmament measures were taken, the Warsaw Pact states would continue to strengthen their military potential.

For the first time since 1969, the commander of the Warsaw Pact's Joint Forces, Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky, briefed the Consultative Committee, reporting on the activity of the pact's Joint Command. He may also have given a review of the activities of the pact's military organization since it was restructured in 1969.

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Brezhnev used the occasion to hold separate meetings with the East European party chiefs. The official characterization of his session with Romanian leader Ceausescu suggested that relations between Moscow and Bucharest are still cool.



Marshal Yakubovsky and Pact
Chief of Staff Shtemenko

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ROMANIA: WRESTLING WITH THE ECONOMY

President Ceausescu, already faced with hard-currency deficits and bureaucratic inability to cope with high-pressure growth policies, is additionally confronted with a drought and with shortfalls in the output of major industries. Partially in an effort to find solutions, he is shifting personnel and further centralizing policy-making.

The ambitious agricultural plan is in serious trouble. Ceausescu, hoping to make up last year's 5-percent drop in production and expand export earnings this year, called for a record 22-percent increase in output. Low soil moisture—about half of normal levels—threatens a further fall in crop production. The drought is causing problems all over Eastern Europe, and if it continues, grain imports to Eastern Europe will rise. As a hedge, the Romanians are seeking a preliminary commitment from the US for a million tons of grain.

Some key industrial sectors—especially steel, textiles, and chemicals—have failed to meet either the January or the February plan. The call for completion of the 1971-1975 plan in four and a half years has apparently been quietly dropped by all regions, except that of Bucharest. Ceausescu, however, remains committed to plan “prefulfillment.”

Ceausescu is not yet ready to downgrade this year's economic plan. Instead, he has launched a strong attack against the bureaucracy, arguing that the practice among middle-level managers of passing the buck is a prime cause of the present difficulties. He has taken more responsibility on himself and his few close economic advisers.

If the drought and the problems with industry continue, the heaviest impact will be felt on exports and the balance of payments. Ceausescu had hoped to expand the value of exports to the West by 76 percent this year. Although much of the increase was to come from higher prices for petroleum and agricultural products,



exports of industrial products, particularly machinery, were slated to rise sharply. Now, petroleum is the only sure prospect.

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Bucharest shows no sign of cutting back its buying spree in the West. Decreased export earnings would add to its burdensome debt service, already about 40 percent of its hard-currency exports. Ceausescu would then be forced to appeal to his major creditors—most likely the West Germans—for rescheduling assistance.

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PORTUGAL: MILITARY UPRISING

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By noon on April 25, dissidents calling themselves the "Armed Forces Movement" announced the formation of a provisional government and claimed to have captured the Portuguese Legion headquarters, major radio stations, the Ministry of Army headquarters in Lisbon, and a few military installations outside the capital. They also reported that President Thomaz, Prime Minister Caetano, and some other ministers were surrounded by rebel forces at National Republican Guard headquarters, and that they had been given an ultimatum to surrender.

ernment or to support the dissenters.

At this time, there is no evidence that civilian opposition groups are involved in the revolt.

**Portuguese Africa:
LISBON'S BLACK JANISSARIES**

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The popular image of the Portuguese African insurgencies as struggles of native blacks against a white minority government has tended to obscure the fact that significant numbers of black Africans are fighting for Lisbon. Some of these Africans are better armed, better trained, and better paid than rank-and-file white Portuguese troops.

Africans in all three Portuguese territories are subject to conscription into the regular army. They receive the same pay and allowances as soldiers from Portugal, although very few have risen above the enlisted ranks. At present, almost a third of the 150,000 regular Portuguese Army

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Earlier this month in the wake of the military unrest over Portugal's overseas policy, the government arrested nearly 80 leftists and appeared determined to discourage political demonstrations, especially on May Day. Lisbon also cracked down on some clergymen who were advocating a less repressive overseas policy.


So far, there has been no response from Portugal's African territories, although the military there will be watching the situation very closely. Support for Spínola and Costa Gomes is sizable in the territories, particularly among junior officers, but it has been held in check by strong conservative elements in the military, civilian, and security structures. The Rhodesian and South African governments also are watching the situation closely since events in Lisbon will have a strong bearing on their support for Portuguese counter-insurgency efforts in Mozambique, where fighting has been on an upswing since the first of the year.

The outcome of the current situation will depend primarily on the military—whether most choose to remain loyal to the Caetano gov-



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African Troops in the Portuguese Territories



Many Flechas are recruited from tribes hostile to the insurgents, but at least half are rebel defectors whose guerrilla expertise has been ably exploited by the service. They enjoy an elite reputation and are paid almost twice as much as regular soldiers. At present, there are some 1,200 Flechas in Angola and about 300 in Mozambique.

The other bush force is the army's Special Group, which numbers about 9,000 men, most of whom are in Angola. It also includes many former insurgents, although the army has not exploited their potential as well. Because Special Group units are attached to the army, they have less flexibility than the Flechas. Special Group troops are assigned to defend a specific locality, where they also engage in civic action projects.

Additional tens of thousands of Africans serve in militia units in all three territories. These units play a more limited role; probably no more than a third of the militiamen have even rudimentary military training or modern weapons. They are charged with defending their villages, serve as guides and sources of intelligence for the regulars, and perform local administrative duties.

Lisbon believes that the benefits of using African troops outweigh the potential dangers. Through their security role, a large number of Africans have acquired an interest in preserving the status quo in the territories, for they have a position they could not attain through the limited economic and educational openings available to them. Moreover, Lisbon is able to advertise the African troops as evidence of the multi-racialism of Lusitanian society.

Many white settlers in the territories are not enthusiastic, however. They fear that the Africans whom Portugal has armed and trained may eventually turn against them. The settlers' apprehension is aggravated by a shortage of arms for civilian use in the territories, which makes it difficult for whites to defend themselves against terrorist attacks.

forces in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea are Africans.

The regular army units operate from fixed positions in cleared areas and along well-established routes of communication. In addition, the Portuguese have developed two special counter-guerrilla forces that work effectively in the "bush." Both are made up almost exclusively of African volunteers.

First in the field were the "Flechas" (Arrows) of the Directorate General of Security. Created in 1965 as a corps of bodyguards for agents of the security service, the force was later expanded into a paracommando force led by African officers and directed by a regional security agent.

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FIGHTING FLUCTUATES ON THE GOLAN

Fighting between Syrian and Israeli forces on the Golan front over the past week flared, then abated, and then flared up again at mid-week. The Syrians are likely to keep tensions high on the front through Secretary Kissinger's visit next week, but neither side is expected to take any military action that would endanger the chances of concluding a disengagement accord. Most of the fighting centered around Mount Hermon, where both sides appear bent on controlling the dominant peaks. In the process, the scope of the fighting has grown from small commando actions to clashes involving large ground units as well as substantial numbers of aircraft and surface-to-air missiles.

The level of the fighting on April 19 was the most intense since the cease-fire went into effect last October. Israeli aircraft struck Syrian targets both on Mount Hermon and opposite the Israeli-held salient. Damascus claimed to have downed 17 Israeli aircraft, but Tel Aviv admitted to the loss of only two. One Israeli helicopter was destroyed in a mid-air collision. Two Syrian


MIG-21s apparently were shot down during the day's fighting.



After the intense exchanges on April 19, the level of the fighting tapered off over the weekend and into the early part of the week. The conflict was basically confined to tank, artillery, and mortar fire, although Tel Aviv conducted limited air strikes against Mount Hermon on April 21 and 23.

Fighting flared again, however, on April 24. Intense artillery fire occurred along several sectors of the front, and Israeli aircraft struck positions on Mount Hermon. Both Israeli and Syrian aircraft attacked targets in the southern sector of the front.

Israeli tank on newly built Mt. Hermon road



The Israelis apparently occupy most of the main peaks on Mount Hermon—including the highest one. These positions afford excellent observation into Syria, southern Lebanon, and the northern portion of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The Israelis have already constructed a road up the southwestern ridge of Mount Hermon, facilitating the resupply of their forces. The Syrians also are attempting to build a road to the top, and much of the action has resulted from Israeli efforts to prevent its completion.

Israeli military authorities have officially denied a story in a Lebanese newspaper that Israeli forces are occupying a hill on the Lebanese side of Mount Hermon.

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
USSR OFFERS MORE AID TO SYRIA

President Asad apparently returned from his visit to Moscow with commitments of new economic aid and promises of continuing military support. The new economic credits could total as much as several hundred million dollars.

Beyond any political motivation that can be read into Moscow's gesture, the new assistance is needed for several major Soviet projects, including ancillary facilities for the nearly completed Euphrates dam. Credits are required to finance irrigation systems and transmission lines connected with the dam, for oil exploration, and for railroad construction, a long-standing Soviet aid undertaking. The USSR may also assist in the construction of a small dam and a steel mill.

Soviet officials may have renewed their pledge to aid Syria's war-reconstruction effort. Any new undertakings, however, would depend on extensive feasibility studies.

Between 1957 and 1973, Moscow extended Syria more than \$315 million in economic aid and was Damascus' principal source of foreign capital. Western bilateral aid deliveries were only half the



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Soviet level during this period. Today, however, Moscow is facing increasing competition from Western and Arab states. Syrian interest in expanding ties with the West reflects President Asad's continuing efforts to balance Moscow's economic presence.

Soviet economic aid is already being dwarfed by the large amounts of money transferred to Syria since the October war by rich Arab oil states. Kuwait recently pledged \$500 million to the confrontation states; Syria will receive a major share of this pledge. This aid is advantageous to Syria because it is not tied to specific projects and can be used where needed. In addition, the World Bank and its affiliate, the International Development Association, have committed \$98-million worth of credits this year to finance irrigation and electric power projects.

More offerings are expected from a variety of donors. Japanese official and private sources already have offered a \$100-million aid package to build an oil refinery, with promises of additional aid for port and railroad construction. Other Western nations are investigating economic arrangements with Damascus as part of their over-all effort to curry favor with the Arabs and assure a continuing supply of oil, even though Syria is still a minor oil producer.

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
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IRAQ: FIGHTING THE KURDS

Fighting between government forces and Kurdish rebels led by Mulla Mustafa Barzani is intensifying in northern Iraq. So far, however, the government has not launched a general offensive against the Kurds.


Iraqi forces appear to be concentrating on a few key targets such as the rebel-held town of Zakhu, which controls the main route into Turkey, and strategic mountain passes in the east through which supplies flow to the Kurds from Iran. Baghdad is also trying to relieve several of its beleaguered garrisons. Air strikes have been particularly heavy against both Zakhu and the Rawanduz area, where Barzani has his headquarters.

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The government continues to reinforce its already substantial military force in the north, and is committing more armor, heavy artillery, and aircraft.

The government apparently still hopes to control the situation by measures short of full-scale military operations. Baghdad is trying to




Kurdish tribesmen


maintain a posture of calm confidence while implementing the limited autonomy plan for the Kurdish minority that Barzani has rejected. Government propaganda claims that all is quiet in the north except for a few areas of what it terms "mutiny."

Along with its military measures, Baghdad is continuing to press political efforts aimed at isolating Barzani and splitting the Kurds. Having earlier replaced several Kurdish provincial governors and cabinet ministers—who had already defected to Barzani—with Kurds loyal to the government, Baghdad this week named Taha Moheddin Maaruf, a Kurd who has recently been the Iraqi ambassador to Italy, to fill the vacant vice presidency of Iraq. The clandestine Kurdish radio immediately attacked the move as part of the government's facade of Kurdish autonomy and branded Maaruf a traitor.

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The Kurds, for their part, have declared "all-out war" against the central government



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ETHIOPIA: TAKING A STAND

Prime Minister Endalkatchew's government this week made its most vigorous attempt to end two months of turmoil that has partially paralyzed central and local government and threatens to cause serious damage to the economy. The government's threat to use force if necessary against strikers and demonstrators poses a major test of its ability to survive.

On April 23, the government banned unauthorized demonstrations, threatened striking government employees with prosecution, and directed the armed forces and police to take "all necessary steps" to maintain law and order. So far, however, the strikers have not complied; indeed, additional private and public employees are threatening to go out. Students in Addis Ababa took to the streets on April 24 in a direct challenge to the government's announcement.

Endalkatchew's move was prompted by the continued spread of labor unrest despite the mixture of concessions and promises that have been offered by the government in recent weeks. Particularly disruptive have been strikes by civil servants in some provincial capitals, by railway workers in the eastern town of Dire Dawa, and by dockworkers in the Red Sea ports of Assab and Massawa.

Police in Asmara and in some other towns in Eritrea Province are continuing to demand the ouster of the national police commander, General Yilma Shibeshi. The government has decided for the time being to keep Yilma as commander, since he is supported by police units outside Eritrea.

Widespread unrest continues in rural areas. Townspeople are demanding the removal of corrupt officials, and farmers are demonstrating for land reform. In some areas, district officials have abandoned their posts under this pressure.

Public secondary schooling in much of the country is apparently finished for the remainder of this school year. University students decided on April 22 to withdraw from school, and the

faculty council has recommended the closing of Haile Selassie I University in Addis Ababa.

A huge but peaceful demonstration on April 20 by the country's sizable Muslim community, and attempts to organize a Christian counter-demonstration have contributed to unease in the capital. The Muslims, who feel they have been relegated to second-class citizenship by Ethiopia's Christian rulers, abandoned their usual submissiveness to march in support of equal rights for their community, separation of church and state, and an end to religious discrimination.

Muslim leaders attempted to forestall a Christian backlash by avoiding overtly political demands and by emphasizing their loyalty to Ethiopia. Many leaders of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, however, view the Muslims' action as a direct challenge. They want to organize a counterdemonstration, but most Christians are evidently heeding Prime Minister Endalkatchew's recommendation against such a move.

Endalkatchew probably decided he had little to lose by adopting a tough posture. He and other ministers can shift responsibility to the police and military. The government can claim that it is doing about all it or any other civilian administration could do under the circumstances, and that the reforms demanded by the military can only be carried out if the disorders end.

Most elements of the security forces will probably attempt to carry out the government's orders. Such action, however, will put moderates within the military in the difficult position of opposing civilians whose interests they claim to champion and on whose behalf the army is pressing for broader reforms. The military moderates had hoped that their influence would be decisive in bringing about step-by-step change in Ethiopia's feudalistic society, but they have been unable to control events in the face of the continuing agitation.

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SRI LANKA: MUZZLING THE OPPOSITION

Prime Minister Bandaranaike clamped down hard on the major opposition party last week. Her action apparently reflects a decision to try to silence her opponents before they can capitalize politically on the country's bleak economic prospects.

In a public address on April 20, the Prime Minister denounced the activities of the United National Party—a generally moderate opposition group. She claimed to perceive a direct threat to law and order in the party's announced plan to hold 150 public rallies on April 21 to protest the government's handling of economic policies and to call for its resignation.

Mrs. Bandaranaike accompanied her charges with stern measures to meet the alleged threat. These included:

- a curfew enforced by the army, from midnight Saturday to 4:00 a.m. Monday;
- an indefinite ban on all United National Party public meetings;
- imposition of press censorship and closure of the only remaining anti-government newspaper chain.

To provide legal justification for the measures, two emergency regulations were promulgated. One gave the Prime Minister the power to prohibit political meetings and the other made incitement to violence or disobedience of the law punishable by confiscation of property. Earlier last week, Mrs. Bandaranaike had pushed through a law under which anyone making statements "likely to cause public alarm or public disorder" could be detained without bail for up to 20 years. The various measures invoked by the Prime Minister accomplished their immediate purpose: the opposition rallies were not held.

The moves against the opposition indicate that Mrs. Bandaranaike is presently being heavily influenced by the radical wing of her party—including influential members of her immediate



Mrs. Bandaranaike

family—and to a lesser extent her Trotskyite coalition partners. These groups apparently have convinced the Prime Minister that opposition forces are indeed conspiring to foment disorders. There is no evidence to support such a charge, although tension and dissatisfaction with the government over economic issues are reportedly rife throughout the country.

It is not yet clear whether the United National Party will proceed with a planned civil disobedience movement, scheduled to begin May 1. Should the party decide to follow through, attempts by the government to suppress the activity would greatly increase the likelihood of violence.

Although security forces could probably maintain order, the army commander has expressed concern over the ability of his troops to contain widespread and simultaneous outbursts. He is also worried about the possible reluctance of his troops to move against countrymen with whose grievances they may well sympathize.

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SOUTH VIETNAM: KEEPING THE LID ON

Both the South Vietnamese and Viet Cong are making the same assessment of what the fighting will be like in the next several months: continued military activity, but nothing that will get out of hand. President Thieu stated unequivocally at a National Security Council meeting on April 19 that he would not authorize any large-scale increase in the fighting by government forces. For the Communists, new orders on strategy from COSVN contain the most specific evidence to date that they do not plan to launch a country-wide offensive for some time to come.

The Communists' latest instructions give a sober view of their near-term prospects. COSVN noted that while some improvement in the Communist military position had occurred since the cease-fire, it had not been enough to guarantee that an offensive would be successful. In addition, COSVN saw little if any near-term improvement in the Communists' political position. Thus, they could not now "destroy" their opponents and would have to defer an all-out effort until "certain of victory," a point COSVN estimated would

be reached in "about two years." For the foreseeable future, however, COSVN envisions a series of limited military campaigns designed to test the South Vietnamese Army and put political pressures on Saigon.


The South Vietnamese are currently reading Communist intentions in this same vein. Saigon does not expect the Viet Cong to launch an offensive anytime soon, despite the fact that the Communists now have a greater military capability than they had in 1972. President Thieu anticipates military pressure, sometimes intense, in all regions of the country, and he is directing his commanders to hold their present positions, ensure the security of the population, and prevent further economic deterioration in areas under their command.

The Mini-War


The type of military pressure that each side envisions was reflected in last week's action in Military Region 3, where the Communists continued their pressure on South Vietnamese forces following the capture of the Tonle Cham Ranger base northwest of Saigon.

Present attention is focused on Hau Nghia Province and the besieged Duc Hue Ranger base. All regiments of the North Vietnamese 5th Division are committed to forcing the Rangers to withdraw from Duc Hue, which is astride a major infiltration corridor to Saigon and the Delta. In a successful effort to prevent the ARVN 18th Division from moving to Hau Nghia, two North Vietnamese regiments have stepped up attacks near Xuan Loc along the border of Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy provinces; the Communists have also cut Route 2 in this area and appear to be trying to connect two of their base areas.

Government forces in the central highlands met little opposition when they reoccupied the Ranger fire-support base southwest of Pleiku City, which had been overrun last week. Communist units remain in the area, however, and more fighting is expected. To the north, reinforced government units are planning to step up pressure on Communist units northeast of Kontum City.



Similar attacks last month precipitated a sharp response by the Communists.




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CAMBODIA: THE RURAL CAMPAIGN

Khmer Communist units northwest of Phnom Penh have followed up last month's success at Oudong by forcing a 1,900-man Cambodian Army force from beachhead positions on the Tonle Sap River at the town of Kompong Luong. At mid-week, 1,300 of these troops had reached government lines around the nearby base at Lovek. Many of the missing may still be working their way south toward Phnom Penh.

The setback at Kompong Luong was more the result of familiar Cambodian Army shortcomings than overwhelming Communist pressure. In an effort first to relieve and then to retake the former royal capital of Oudong, the high command poured men and equipment into the beachhead at Kompong Luong. But the operation was plagued from the beginning by the lack of any clear-cut tactical plan and by poor field leadership compounded by shifting and confusing command responsibilities. In addition, Phnom Penh's increasing preoccupation with the defense of Kampot resulted in the diversion of vital air support. Having lost the initiative by default, the government force retreated to the beachhead, where the Communists harassed it with steady shellings and ground probes.


Besides guaranteeing that the Khmer Communists can move supplies freely across the Tonle Sap in the vicinity of Kompong Luong, the loss of the beachhead will undoubtedly give fresh im-



petus to the insurgents' present strategy of attacking similarly isolated and exposed government enclaves in the countryside. Thus far, this effort has produced only the downfall of one minor provincial capital—Oudong—and a standoff at Kampot.

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The Communists' next target will probably be the provincial capital of Prey Veng, 30 miles east of Phnom Penh.



Government commanders are aware of Communist designs against Prey Veng. The garrison there has been reinforced and the local commander is planning operations to disrupt Communist plans. Government preparations notwithstanding, the terrain around Prey Veng and the city's proximity to insurgent base areas give the Communists some advantage.

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CHINA

A TARGET APPEARS

The anti-Lin/anti-Confucius campaign is no longer the tightly controlled movement it was in its initial stages. The ban on criticism of individuals has either been lifted or is being ignored, resulting in a flurry of personal attacks. In the process, the struggle to control the campaign has intensified factionalism in the provinces. As the campaign enters its ninth month, events in Peking, Fukien, and Kirin illustrate its changing nature.

Peking avoided singling out targets in the early months of the campaign, but now the campaign seems on the verge of claiming a major victim, Politburo member and party vice-chairman Li Te-sheng. Wall posters have appeared throughout the country attacking Li as a follower of disgraced Defense Minister Lin Piao. The charge is hardly credible—Li was praised for his loyalty to Mao during the Lin crisis—but that doesn't change the apparent verdict.

The real reasons for the attacks on Li can probably be found in the factional infighting that has come to characterize the campaign. Fukien Province, where yet-unnamed party leaders have been accused of complicity in the Lin plot, is a good example. The charge appeared in the latest issue of the party's theoretical journal and may have been brought by supporters of Yeh Fei, Fukien's civilian boss before the Cultural Revolution. The targets seem to be supporters of Han Hsien-chu, who headed Fukien until his transfer to Kansu last December. Bad blood has existed between them since Han replaced Yeh during the Cultural Revolution, and Han has reportedly long fought Yeh's return. Factions in other provinces are also using the opportunities afforded by the campaign to try to reopen old cases, settle old scores, and bring back persons of varied ideological hues who were purged during the Cultural Revolution.

The campaign puts all provincial leaders in a difficult position. Peking has ordered them to arouse the masses and accept their criticisms, but

to still maintain order. The leaders in Kirin Province, and in some other provinces, are struggling to maintain complete control over the movement. At a criticism meeting called with their approval, Kirin party leaders submitted to mild mass criticism for going too slow in the campaign to denigrate Lin and Confucius. The speaker, not one of the party's top leaders, then admonished the audience to maintain discipline under the party, to increase production, and to avoid dividing into factions. The whole affair is reminiscent of the "sham power seizures" of the Cultural Revolution, when leaders in the provinces made a show of bowing to sympathetic mass groups in order to pre-empt their real opponents. In the end, that tactic was not particularly successful.

In any event, the campaign seems to be moving rapidly forward. Li Te-sheng is obviously in serious trouble, and others are likely to join him. One group that stands to benefit is the veteran cadre who were purged by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution and were replaced by the military in the aftermath, but who now seem to be regaining some of their lost provincial roles. Military men who hold political positions in the provinces seem headed for a particularly rough time.

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
OAS IN ATLANTA: A POSITIVE MOOD

The positive mood of revived hemispheric partnership still dominates the OAS General Assembly now meeting in Atlanta, but underlying Latin American frustration with the organization as the principal vehicle for inter-American cooperation continues. The open exchanges at earlier meetings of the foreign ministers outside the OAS framework served to highlight the rigidities and slow responses of the more formal structure.

The Latin American and Caribbean foreign ministers reacted favorably to Secretary Kissinger's endorsement of most of their principles and positions regarding the relationships between the US and the less-developed countries of the hemisphere. But they were quick to express their

dissatisfaction with such matters as the restrictive aspects of US trade policy, the lack of real progress on the transfer of technology, and the conduct of large corporations abroad. The ministers also expressed grave concern over the resolution by 34 US senators opposed to ceding control of the Panama Canal. The general feeling among the ministers is that while their talks with the Secretary have been promising, the new spirit of cooperation remains fragile, and the lack of rapid delivery on commitments will reactivate the former adversary relationship with the US.

Division over Cuba remains, but the issue is no longer a burning one. Those countries pressing for Cuban re-entry into the inter-American



OAS General Assembly meets at State Capitol in Atlanta, Georgia

system feel that they won a round when the US relaxed trade restrictions in the Argentine case and are pleased as well by the proposal to invite Cuba to the next foreign ministers meeting at Buenos Aires in March 1975. The countries still hostile toward Cuba, on the other hand, are gratified by the basically unchanged position of the US toward Cuba and are convinced that Washington will not alter its Cuban policy without consulting them.

The OAS meetings, which will continue through the end of April, are characteristically bogged down in a series of issues of concern only to individual countries. Almost no progress has been made in the effort to restructure the organization, and efforts to broaden the membership remain stymied by territorial disputes and other bilateral divisions. [redacted]

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CHILE: ON TRIAL

The first major public trial for leftist prisoners got under way in Santiago last week and is expected to last at least a month. Verdicts and sentences for the 64 defendants will be handed down only after all the individual trials are over.

Most of the defendants are military men, but socialist civilians Carlos Lazo and Erick Schnake—the latter a senator at the time of the military coup last year—are charged with promoting insubordination in the armed forces and stealing military secrets. The prosecution has requested death sentences for several military defendants, a life sentence for Lazo, and 30 years for Schnake.

Defense attorneys for the first military defendants to be tried argued that the wartime court-martial set up to hear the cases lacks jurisdiction. They claimed that since the alleged offenses were committed prior to the coup and the junta's declarations of states of siege and internal war, the trials should be conducted under peacetime provisions of the military justice code.

Decisions of peacetime military tribunals may be appealed to the civil Supreme Court, but appeals from the judgments of wartime courts-martial may be made only to higher military authorities.

THE JURIDICAL MEASURES CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND PROPER MAY NOT COMPLETELY MEASURE UP TO INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS

The government takes a different view of jurisdiction. Under a decree law issued soon after the coup, it has construed the military justice code to hold that the date of the initiation of judicial proceedings against a defendant, not the date of the alleged offense, is the determining factor. Military prosecutors at the trial added a new wrinkle by arguing that an undeclared state of internal war existed before the coup.

The court refused to declare itself incompetent, but did not allude to the proposition that the state of war began with the organization of extremist paramilitary units and their clandestine procurement of illegal arms. The issue of when and against whom the armed forces were at war is central to charges involving the passing of military secrets to "the enemy."

The government has announced that trials for its most prominent leftist prisoners—including party leaders and cabinet officers in the Allende government—will begin before the end of April. These defendants are also likely to be brought before wartime courts-martial and charged with pre-coup violations of the military justice code. Defense attorneys undoubtedly will raise the jurisdictional issue, but their arguments will probably be in vain. The junta will take international public opinion into account in planning for these trials, but this will not be an overriding consideration. The junta does not appear to be greatly swayed by arguments that the juridical measures it considers necessary and proper under what it sees as a continuing emergency situation may not completely measure up to internationally accepted standards. [redacted]

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COLOMBIA: LIBERAL PARTY SWEEP

Liberal Party candidate Alfonso Lopez Michelsen won a landslide presidential victory in this week's general election, and his party gained control of both houses of congress. Lopez' 55-percent showing exceeded pre-election projections, while Conservative Alvaro Gomez Hurtado polled 32 percent, approximately as expected.



Winner Lopez greets voters

The standard-bearer of the populist National Popular Alliance, Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, fared worse than anticipated, with 10 percent of the vote. Two other candidates split the remainder.

In a victory statement, Lopez pledged to uphold the one remaining provision of the National Front coalition agreement that is applicable to his term in office. According to the agreement, Liberals and Conservatives are obliged to share cabinet, gubernatorial, and mayoral posts in equal numbers until 1978. Nevertheless, his party's absolute legislative majority will give Lopez virtual carte blanche after the inauguration on August 7.

Although Lopez refers to himself and his future government as "center-left," he is ideologically only slightly to the left of the incumbent Conservative government of President Pastrana. In foreign relations, Lopez will continue the policy of "international pluralism" followed by all National Front administrations. He is likely to be somewhat more aggressive than his predecessors in initiating new trade relationships with Communist governments, particularly China, but he will be in no hurry to elevate any new trade missions, or existing ones, to diplomatic status.

Lopez has criticized some aspects of US policy toward Latin America, singling out seeming inconsistencies between friendly overtures by the Department of State and strict enforcement of protective trade regulations by the Department of Commerce. The President-elect has also expressed the view that US policy on Cuba is out of date. Lopez apparently considers his criticism of the US constructive, and certainly his administration will not on the whole be unfriendly toward this country.

Domestically, Lopez will concentrate on the economy. He has announced his intention to "balance" prices and wages to combat inflation, which reached 24 percent last year and will be higher still this year. He will call on industries to reinvest profits to bolster both production and employment. The new President will also seek a

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formula to streamline the country's very expensive but generally unsuccessful agrarian reform program.

Two of the earliest bills Lopez sends to the Liberal-controlled congress will propose lowering the voting age to 18 years and guaranteeing equal rights to women. These were major campaign promises, and their enactment will go far toward counterbalancing possible disappointment with the more cautious pace of economic legislation.

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BOLIVIA: BANZER YIELDS

President Banzer has shelved plans to reorganize his administration in the face of strong opposition from political parties and his own military advisers. His failure to sustain the forceful image he attempted to project earlier this month at a meeting with representatives of the armed forces and various civic groups points up his lack of popular support and his restricted ability to maneuver successfully on controversial issues.

One of the main purposes of the recent meeting was to give Banzer carte blanche authority to revamp his cabinet. Political leaders supporting the administration, however, have subse-

quently learned that the President intends to replace politicians by technical experts and are objecting to his plans.

Banzer's decision to postpone major cabinet changes probably was dictated more by fear of losing military support than by political criticism. While he has managed to stay in office by sending his enemies to prison or into exile, these tactics have weakened his political coalition and forced him to rely increasingly on the armed forces.

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