




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HISTORICAL VALUE**Do Not Destroy**

ANNEX: MAO'S CHINA, 1962-71

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS

This paper -- designed to be an Annex to an on-going study of recent developments in China, 'Mao's China, 1971-72' -- was originally completed in July 1971. While it was in the coordination process, it was overtaken by the spectacular events of September and October 1971. The study has profited from the views of China specialists in a number of CIA offices, but it remains an uncoordinated paper, offered only as a survey of the background of those still hazy events -- as that background appeared to one analyst in mid-summer 1971. It is being disseminated, in advance of the paper to which it is to be an Annex, to a few colleagues in the community who have asked to see it now rather than later.

The paper has been left essentially as drafted, apart from a change in the tenses of the verbs. At a few points, sentences have been added to relate the developments discussed to later developments, but, where a judgment is made with benefit of hindsight, it is so indicated.

Although the paper does not add up the factors it considers into a prophesy of what was soon to occur -- the decapitation of the PLA -- it is believed that the paper is of some value in its presentation of some of those factors: the continued dominance of Mao Tse tung in the central leadership (so that even the powerful leaders of the PLA could be purged), the accretion of power to Lin Biao in the process of Party-rebuilding, the enhanced role of Chou En-lai as a credible alternative successor, the curious mixture of policies pursued by

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those three top leaders and the curious mixture of leaders below their level, and the unprecedented degree of domination of the governing apparatus (below the topmost level) by career military men. It now (in December 1971) appears that the very features of the Chinese scene which seemed in summer 1971 to testify to Lin Piao's increasing strength -- his domination of the central and regional military leadership through his proteges, the domination of the re-emerging Party apparatus by these and other PLA leaders, and the apparent absence of effective civilian control of this military-political leadership -- were taking shape in Mao's mind as evidence that yet another designated successor had over-reached himself and "failed the test."

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ANNEX: MAO'S CHINA, 1962-1971

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MAO'S CHINA, 1962-1971**Summary and Conclusions**

As of summer 1971, Mao Tse-tung's China was composed of a complex mix of leaders at all levels, pursuing a complex mix of policies. It seemed to be Mao's mix -- or, at least, a mix approved by Mao. But it was not a smooth mix, and it was not the mix that Mao had had in mind when he had launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution more than five years earlier. Some of the most fervent radicals had been casualties, the leadership below Mao's level was dominated by military figures and included few "revolutionary" young people, and some of Peking's current policies were such as would have been denounced as "revisionist" a few years earlier by Mao himself.

The curious mixture in the leadership began at the very top, where since 1966 Mao, Lin Piao and Chou En-lai had been stable as the Big Three. Mao as chairman of the Party had remained the dominant figure, the prime mover -- a man himself predisposed to a generally radical and militant course but demonstrably willing (as in 1971) to change course when the realities of the world forced a retreat or offered new opportunities. He was a leader who had set out to produce a radically new Communist man but had come to rely primarily on professional and relatively conservative military men to govern China -- a situation unique among Communist regimes, and one about which Mao himself had shown some embarrassment. Lin as the Party's only vice-chairman remained Mao's designated successor but also remained an enigma, a career soldier who had professed allegiance at the top of his voice to Maoist dogmas but had clashed with Mao's civilian radical proteges -- and a watcher in the shadows whose influence on policy was impossible to calculate but who had seemed to be the

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main beneficiary of the course of Party-rebuilding in recent years. And Chou as the Premier and more recently the Party's de facto secretary-general was Mao's principal executive and a credible alternative successor -- a man who for many years had been the symbol of comparatively "moderate" policies and was now presiding over the implementation of both "radical" and "moderate" policies and building a new Party apparatus designed to be responsive to himself as well as to Lin.

Immediately below this top level, in the Politburo and in the other central organs of the Party, the mixture was one of proteges of Mao, Lin, and Chou, men who had long served with these three principals and had been given preferment by them in the Cultural Revolution. Although Lin and Chou were themselves Mao's longtime proteges, below that level those regarded as "Mao's men" had often been and perhaps still were in destructive conflict with Lin and his group and with Chou and his group -- a conflict representing the convolutions of Mao's own "thought," his mixed and sometimes incompatible intentions. "Mao's men" (including his wife) were a group of radically-inclined civilians like Mao himself, a group temperamentally better suited to the "destructive" than to the "constructive" stage of the Cultural Revolution. This group had recently been diminished by the purge or demotion of the two most important of them -- Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng -- who until 1970 had been the fourth-and-fifth-ranking Party leaders. Lin's proteges (including his wife) were the military leaders, men who in general were much less radically-inclined than Mao and less than Lin himself: men who had been under heavy pressure in the "destructive" stage of the Cultural Revolution but who now constituted the strongest group in the Party Politburo, who surrounded Lin in the Party organ next in importance (the powerful Military Affairs Committee, which controlled and directed the entire military establishment), and who dominated most of the other leading bodies of the re-emerging Party apparatus and government machinery in Peking and through-

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out China. Chou's proteges were fewer -- appearing in some of the central Party organs which he was assembling and in the government machinery which he headed, especially in Party and government bodies concerned with foreign affairs; but Chou had visible influence with Mao and seemed also to get on very well with the military leaders of Lin's group.

At the provincial level and below, the leading Party and government organs were composed of a mixture -- a "three-way alliance" -- of military figures, old Party cadres, and representatives of mass organizations such as the notorious Red Guards. The leadership in Peking had had and still was having a very hard time trying to induce these components to work together. Mao himself had expressed only qualified satisfaction with the leadership down through the provincial level, describing the military dominance as "temporary" and stating that the true "revolutionary successors" he had sought to produce were to be found at the county level and below, a generation away from leadership of the regime.

The domestic policies pursued by these ill-matched assortments were carried out under the equally ill-matched rubrics of "struggle" and "revolutionization" on one hand and of "unity" on the other, as Mao insisted on having it both ways. These policies included on one hand a continued disruptive purge of the Party at all levels and of society as a whole, the Maoist indoctrination of all Party cadres and the sending-down of tens of millions of people to the countryside, the radical transformation of the educational system on Mao's lines, and a continued Maoist emphasis on ideological incentive in production. But on the other hand they included the rebuilding of the Party around military men (rather than rehabilitated Party cadres, as Mao originally intended) and the downgrading of the revolutionary mass organizations from which Mao had expected so much, a return to law-and-order and the reorganization of Chinese society as a whole on military lines, the indoctrination

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of everyone with Victorian as well as Maoist virtues, and a retreat from the most extreme economic experiments together with an attempt to strengthen the economic base by rational measures.

Similarly, foreign policy was still conducted under the rubric of "struggle" against the "social imperialist" USSR and "imperialist" US, and was still called "revolutionary"; Peking had made no important concession to either of the two principal powers on any disputed matter, and Chinese support of guerrilla wars and revolutionary forces was still an important component of policy. But Mao and Chou had downgraded the counter-productive "revolutionary" diplomacy of the Cultural Revolution period in favor of building an international anti-American united front and had given new importance to "people's" diplomacy, had entered into talks with the Russians to reduce the threat of a Soviet military attack, had welcomed "friendly" Americans to China and had gone so far as to invite President Nixon to visit.

The most critical of those policies, both for China and the outside world -- those which had determined the character of the Party leadership (apparently for years to come), and those adopted toward the USSR and the US -- were impelled by events which Mao had not foreseen. And they took some years to mix in Mao's mind as a coherent set of policies. Mao had surely not anticipated the enormous role -- as of summer 1971 -- of the PLA and its leaders. He had heavily purged the military leadership -- as well as destroying the Party in 1966-67, but by August 1967 had been forced to recognize the extent of his dependence on the PLA as an alternative governing apparatus, and -- perhaps influenced by Lin Piao -- had rejected an effort by some of his lieutenants to conduct another large-scale purge of the PLA. Also by late summer 1967, Mao had been forced to recognize the losses inflicted by his "revolutionary" diplomacy, and -- probably influenced

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by Chou En-lai -- had downgraded it sharply. In consequence, in autumn 1967 and early 1968 several secondary leaders of the Cultural Revolution Group -- a special organ which had been set up to give guidance to mass organizations and to conduct the purge of the Party and the PLA -- were purged for their association with these repudiated initiatives and policies, both domestic and foreign. Mao did not admit, however, that these things had been done in the spirit of his own "thought"; and the primary leaders of the CRG, all of them his own proteges, remained in his favor.

The change in Mao's attitude toward the CRG -- in which his wife was a leading figure -- proved to be gradual and reluctant. When in March 1968 a small group of PLA leaders offended Madame Mao and the CRG, Mao did not hesitate to purge them. Moreover, while he supported Lin and Chou in successfully resisting a call from the leaders of the CRG for a larger purge of the military leadership at that time, he gave those same CRG leaders the principal roles in Party rebuilding. The first substantial change in his attitude may have come in July 1968, when he made clear his severe disappointment with the misbehavior of mass organizations -- guided by the CRG -- in what was by then the "constructive" stage of the Cultural Revolution. He indicated at the same time his general satisfaction with the performance of PLA leaders as the heads of provisional organs of government, and may already have been thinking about naming these military men concurrently -- as was done in 1970-71 -- to the leading posts in the new Party apparatus then being rebuilt.

A large new factor came into the picture in August 1968, when Mao was clearly shocked by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. He had now to consider the possibility of a Soviet attack on China. By November 1968 Mao was ready to make a small overture to the incoming US administration.

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The bloody Sino-Soviet military clashes of March 1969 greatly stimulated each of these trends in Mao's thinking -- his disfavor for the violently disruptive young revolutionaries and their sponsors, his regard for the well-disciplined PLA, and his hatred and fear of the USSR. His felt need to avert a Soviet attack and to prevent the formation of any Soviet-American alliance against China became the strongest element in his policy. He was to define the USSR -- not the US -- as his "principal" enemy, and to justify both his talks with the Russians and his overtures to the US as a means of containing this enemy.

Lin Piao was chosen in the spring of 1969 to reaffirm Peking's support of revolutionary forces but at the same time to profess Peking's return to a more flexible foreign policy -- including "peaceful coexistence" -- and Peking's favor for negotiations. In September Peking agreed to begin talks with Moscow about the border, and in December agreed to resume the Sino-American talks (and, for the first time, in its Warsaw Embassy). In the same period Lin's PLA was directed to restore public order in China -- which meant the further suppression of unruly mass organizations.

The related decision to rebuild the Party apparatus around PLA leaders -- on whom Mao was now doubly dependent, both for the governing of China and for repelling any Soviet attack -- was apparently made final at about this time, autumn 1969. This decision to concentrate power throughout China in the hands of military leaders was probably resisted by the leaders of the CRG, who stood to lose the most from it. In late 1969 and early 1970 the Central Committee launched an "investigation" of an extremist mass organization close to the CRG (an investigation which was to lead to primary officers of the CRG); the CRG itself was put out of business altogether; and Mao took Party-building out of the hands of certain officers of the CRG and placed it in the hands of Lin Piao and Chou En-lai. Lin's role was apparently to be supervisory, while Chou as de facto secretary-general was to put together a new Party apparatus for Mao's and Lin's approval.

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The fragile trend toward improving Sino-American relations was interrupted in May 1970, when Mao felt compelled to denounce new US initiatives in the Indochina war. He called publicly for a united front of the world's people -- including the American people -- against the US government. This concept did not exclude the possibility of dealing directly with the US on such matters as Taiwan, and Mao soon reaffirmed his willingness to do this.

This range of Mao's policies was ratified by a Party plenum of August and September 1970. That is, the plenum criticized and demoted those CRG leaders who symbolized repudiated domestic and foreign policies, it (apparently) approved the enhanced roles of Lin and Chou at the expense of the CRG leaders, and it endorsed the initiation of "people's diplomacy" against the US -- the mobilization of American popular opinion against the Administration.

The veteran China-watcher Edgar Snow, interviewing Chinese leaders in late 1970 and early 1971, found Mao to be the man "in overall charge," playing his preferred role as the formulator of basic policies, withdrawn from the day-to-day administration. Snow found Chou to have greatly enhanced status as Mao's chief executive, "running the country" on a day-to-day basis. Snow was impressed -- rightly so -- by Mao's dependence on Chou and the military-dominated apparatus. But there was a striking lack of reference to Lin Piao in Mao's remarks to Snow -- an omission which, in retrospect, may have meant that Mao even then was beginning to think about Lin in a new way.

In talking with Snow, Mao stated clearly, and Chou confirmed, that it was Peking's policy to continue to explore the possibilities for an improvement in Sino-American relations (Mao said he would be happy to receive President Nixon), but that Peking expected such improvement to derive from popular pressure on the US Government

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to make concessions to Peking. Both Mao and Chou emphasized the issue of Taiwan, demanding US abandonment of Taiwan as the price for a substantial improvement in state relations.

After the time of the Snow interviews, Peking continued to carry out a mixed bag of domestic policies, radical and moderate, doctrinaire and pragmatic, deriving from Mao's earlier pronouncements or attributed to new directives from him. Party relations with Moscow remained broken and the Sino-Soviet border talks remained substantively deadlocked, but relations between the two governments improved a bit and the border itself remained quiet. In spring 1971, Peking made a striking initiative in "people's diplomacy" toward the US with the invitation to the US pingpong team and several journalists to visit China, and in then inviting President Nixon to visit China. Peking clearly saw new opportunities either for early gains at the government-to-government level or for mobilizing popular pressure on the US Administration later if no gains were made at the government level. In all of this, Peking seemed much more confident of its position than it had seemed even a year earlier -- confident that its domestic situation was in hand, confident that a Soviet attack had been averted, and confident that it stood to benefit greatly from current international trends even without making substantial concessions.


In many of Peking's policies, and particularly in the skillful conduct of foreign policy, the influence of Chou En-lai on Mao was apparent. Lin Piao remained in the background, and the degree of his influence on Mao was quite uncertain. Lin's strength had to be inferred -- from the media's treatment of him and especially from the course of Party re-building, in which professional military men long indoctrinated by Lin, many of them his longtime proteges and friends, had come to occupy most of the important posts. This new apparatus, however, looked to be equally responsive to Chou.

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As of summer 1971, Mao's Cult continued to flourish in China, and he visibly dominated gatherings of Party leaders. All basic policies were still being attributed to him, and he was reliably reported to have over-ruled some recent decisions made by his lieutenants in carrying them out. He was thought to remain capable of purging any other Party leader or small group of leaders, and of putting an end to any given "moderate" policy -- such as current foreign policy -- should he decide that it was no longer productive. But it seemed doubtful that Mao could successfully conduct another Cultural Revolution, another great purge of the governing apparatus -- which by this time consisted largely of PLA officers. Mao seemed to recognize the importance of retaining the good will of the military leaders, in order to remain in power and to get his policies carried out.



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As of summer 1971, Lin Piao was expected to succeed Mao, if Lin's precarious health did not fail beforehand. While it had long been recognized that Mao was unstable and that none of his lieutenants was truly secure, it was thought probable that Mao would not change his mind about Lin without good cause and that Lin would be careful not to give him cause.

Chou En-lai, by summer 1971, seemed organizationally and personally in a good position to succeed Mao if Lin were to predecease Chou. However, Lin and Chou appeared to be working well together, and it was thought probable that, if Lin were to succeed, they would continue to do so. Chou was expected to have a very strong influence on Lin, holding Lin to a generally moderate course.

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Mao, Lin, and Chou were expected to continue to use the Politburo Standing Committee, the organizational core of power, to reach collective decisions and to supervise the Party apparatus. It was thought that if Chief-of-Staff Huang Yung-sheng, Lin's longtime protege and Chou's apparent friend as well, were not already a de facto member, he would probably be added to replace the demoted CRG leaders. The full Politburo was expected to remain less important than the Standing Committee, but to continue to be used for discussions and perhaps even as a voting body. Proteges and friends of Lin and Chou were expected to continue to dominate the Politburo.

As of summer 1971, the strongest known component of the central Party apparatus was Lin Piao's Military Affairs Committee, composed almost entirely of his proteges. It was thought possible, however, that Chou En-lai was putting together a de facto Party secretariat at the same level to help him to coordinate the political and economic work of the apparatus and to work with the MAC. Any such secretariat was expected to include some onetime CRG leaders still in favor, some military men, and some of Chou's deputies in the governmental structure, and, under Chou's leadership, to prove more responsive to the Politburo Standing Committee than did the old secretariat.

The visible portion of the central Party apparatus below the level of the Politburo Standing Committee, the MAC, and any new secretariat -- that is, the network of central departments -- was dominated by military men, and most of the rest of it was expected to be. The same trend of military staffing was evident in the central government machinery, although Chou's proteges were running the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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The provincial Party apparatus showed the same pattern of domination by military leaders, apparently reflecting Mao's concern for an effective governing apparatus and his decision to put Party-building in the hands of Lin and Chou. Twenty of the 29 provincial and major municipal committees were headed by career PLA officers, and Lin's proteges either headed or were among the leaders of all of the most important of them -- those that contained military region headquarters.

In sum, as of summer 1971 Lin and Chou seemed to be working together, under Mao's leadership and with Mao's blessing, to build a new Party which would be responsive to them both as the leaders of a post-Mao team or to either one as the principal survivor.

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ANNEX: MAO'S CHINA, 1962-71**Preparations for the Cultural Revolution, 1962-65**

In the period 1962-65, Mao Tse-tung became convinced of the need to make the Chinese Communist Party apparatus more responsive to his policies, and to design a program to produce "revolutionary successors" in the Party leadership and to reinitiate "revolutionary spirit" in the masses. He took several steps in that period to prepare for a Cultural Revolution -- that is, for a purge and reconstruction of the Party, and a reindoctrination of everyone.

By January 1965 Mao had decided to replace Liu Shao-chi, the Party's senior vice-chairman and Mao's designated successor, with Lin Piao, long Mao's favorite military leader and the chief of the military establishment (PLA) -- which Mao and Lin had been developing as an alternative power structure to the Party apparatus. By the end of 1965, Mao had apparently decided which of his lieutenants he was going to purge in addition to Liu (including the two ranking officers of the Party secretariat, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen), and which other of his lieutenants he was going to elevate in addition to Lin (including Chou En-lai, long the regime's premier, Chen Po-ta, long a factotum for Mao, Kang Sheng, the head of Mao's personal political security force, and Madame Mao, a specialist in "culture").

The First Steps: As is now well known, Maoist sources assert that Mao began to think about his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution -- and the great purge which was to be central to it -- as early as January 1962. At that time, Liu Shao-chi, the Party's senior vice-chairman and long Mao's designated successor, is

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said to have criticized (at a Party conference) some of Mao's policies which had suffered disaster in the Great Leap Forward and "people's communes" programs. Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai are said to have stood together at that conference in opposition to Liu and others, including Teng Hsiao-ping, the Party's secretary-general.

That Mao at least by mid-1962 had begun to think about Liu and Teng in a new way -- that is, as his opponents, not his lieutenants -- is suggested by the apparently authentic text of a Mao speech to a group of Party leaders in August 1962. He expressed bitter resentment of the "revisionist" domestic policies forced on him by the collapse of the Leap Forward (policies which he was later to attribute to Liu and Teng). He was also strongly critical of the way the Party apparatus in general had been conducting its work, in contrast to the good work of Lin Piao's Military Affairs Committee (MAC). At this meeting Mao indicated that he had special trust in Kang Sheng and Chen Po-ta -- two longtime proteges to whom he had given many special jobs -- as well as in Lin.*

At a Party plenum the following month, Mao ended the period of retreats in domestic policy. He also discussed the threat of "revisionism," and called on senior comrades to admit their "mistakes" (admissions which were later to prove the key to survival for many leaders). He also called for the formation of two "special examination" groups -- apparently for the investigation and evaluation of Party leaders, an operation which may have been assigned to Kang Sheng but remained

*Kang had been Mao's foremost specialist in political security work, and was also a longtime friend of Madame Mao's. Chen had been Mao's foremost "theorist" and writer, and had prepared the ground for some of Mao's policies and investigated the implementation of them.

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obscure. Mao also revealed his awareness that the arts in China had been used to state the positions of his opponents.

In the early months of 1963, Mao drafted a ten-point program designed to restore collective controls in rural areas and initiated other campaigns to correct the "revisionist" policies of recent years. Later in 1963, in an unmistakable expression of his distrust of the Party apparatus, Mao issued his call to "learn from the PLA," and PLA officers soon began to take over the agitprop function in government organs.

The Promise of a Purge: In June 1964 Mao made known his concern about the problem of developing "revolutionary successors," and is said to have asserted that there were "conspirators" in all of the departments and provincial committees of the Party.* In July, the Party set forth a 15-point program to cleanse itself of revisionism, and pointed publicly to the threat from the top level of the Party. The Party newspaper, People's Daily, soon called for a purge of the Party.

At about the same time, Mao named Peng Chen -- second-ranking to Teng Hsiao-ping in the Party secretariat -- to look into the condition of Chinese "culture" -- meaning the threat posed by writers critical of Mao's policies and by their high-level sponsors. Kang Sheng was named to Peng's five-man group.

The Party issued in September 1964 a revised draft of Mao's ten-point program of spring 1963, a revision

*There were hints in the press at this time of increased favor for Chou En-lai, and of some tension between Chou and the Liu-Teng partnership, although all three were still officially Mao's "close comrades."

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which was pessimistic about China's situation and which blamed basic-level cadres (not the leaders whom Mao was concerned about). At the same time, the Party journal Red Flag spelled out in ominous terms Mao's principles for judging "revolutionary successors."

Mao is said to have denounced Liu's "bourgeois reactionary line" at a working conference late in 1964.

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By January 1965, Mao had decided to replace Liu with Lin Piao. A Party work conference at that time sharply criticized positions Liu had taken in Party meetings, and promised action against those "in authority" in top Party posts. By this same time, both Mao and Lin had apparently come to distrust also Lo Jui-ching, the chief-of-staff, who had been their joint protege.

Peng Chen apparently fell from favor in or about mid-July 1965. The operations of Peng's five-man group reportedly gave Kang Sheng an opportunity to discredit him to Mao -- with good reason -- as a protector of Mao's critics and opponents.* By this time, Kang had apparently become the principal figure in Mao's personal political security apparatus, working outside the regular Party apparatus, perhaps through the "special investigation groups" forecast by Mao in 1962.

*Later in 1965, Chou En-lai, whose relations with Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were already unfriendly, was reported to have quarreled publicly with Peng Chen. Chou seems to have read Mao's mind wonderfully well.

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The Beginning of the Purge: The Cultural Revolution began unofficially in September 1965 at a Party conference where Mao called for an investigation of a playwright whose work had implicitly criticized Mao's policies; Mao again, as in 1964, pointed to "revisionism" in the Party apparatus, including the Central Committee. Then in early November Mao planted in the Shanghai press an article by Yao Wen-yuan (a young man who was to rise high on the Revolution) attacking the playwright-critic who was to serve as the symbol of all opposition to Mao. Lin Piao's Liberation Army Daily immediately endorsed the line taken in the article. Lin, Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng and Madame Mao were all apparently apprised of Mao's intention to conduct a large-scale purge of the Party.

Leaving Peking together in late November, Mao and Lin took sanctuary in or near Shanghai, under the protection of a Military Region Commander (Hsu Shih-yu) in whom they had confidence. They began the great purge in the next month, by summoning to their retreat and arresting Lo Jui-ching, the second-ranking leader of the PLA, and Yang Shang-kun, director of the Central Committee's staff office, two of the men best qualified to lead a potential resistance group.

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The First Stage of the Cultural Revolution, 1966

The first year of the Cultural Revolution saw several spectacular developments: the rise of a special Cultural Revolution Group, outside the Party apparatus, to conduct the great purge that lay ahead; the entrapment and subsequent purge of the principal leaders of the Party apparatus, including Mao's then-designated successor; the rearrangement of the Party hierarchy and the installation of Lin Piao as the Party's only vice-chairman and Mao's newly-designated successor; the explosive appearance of the Red Guards, as the instrument to attack the Party; Mao's first call for "revolutionary" diplomacy; and the starring role of Madame Mao in the first large-scale purge of the PLA.

The Entrapment of Party Leaders: By January 1966 Mao had selected the core of what was to become the central Cultural Revolution Group. He called together Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, and Madame Mao (Chiang Ching) -- who were to become the three ranking officers of the central CRG -- together with a fourth favorite who soon died. In February, Mao, Lin and Madame Mao set in motion an investigation of the PLA that was to lead to the formation of a special Cultural Revolution Group for the PLA, a group which was to be dominated by Madame Mao for most of its life.

In the same month (February 1966), Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, in Mao's absence, approved for distribution an "outline report" by Peng Chen's five-man group which had been working since 1964. This report minimized "class struggle" -- contrary to Mao's own emphasis since 1962 -- and the offenses of right-wing writers of the type denounced by Mao. Thus Liu, Teng and Peng -- the three principal leaders of the Party apparatus -- all fell into Mao's trap. Peng was arrested in late March, while Liu was out of the country (sent on a tour of Asian capitals, under the guard of

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another of Mao's personal security men, Wang Tung-hsing).^{*} Soon thereafter, an enlarged meeting of the Politburo convened by Mao "took the initiative in the solution of the Peng Chen problem." Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng -- who were to be closely if unhappily associated throughout the Cultural Revolution -- were sent to inform the existing Party secretariat under Teng Hsiao-ping of Mao's "instructions" and of Peng's "crimes."

The Formation of the Cultural Revolution Group:

Before officially launching the Cultural Revolution, Mao sent Lin Piao a letter (the official date is 7 May) which was to explain -- or at least justify -- much that was to happen in the next five years. This letter called for the PLA to be turned into a "great school" in which the PLA would master its military speciality but would also study government and education and would become involved in agriculture and industry and mass work. It seems doubtful, however, that Mao foresaw that within the next year the PLA would become the de facto government of China, almost overwhelmed by this range of extra-military activity. Neither, presumably, did he foresee the extent to which the PLA would come into destructive conflict with the leaders of the central CRG.

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**Several other important figures -- mainly propaganda and political security specialists -- were seized at about the same time, but they are not essential to this story.*

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
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
The Rise of Lin Piao:



Lin Piao, ^{25X1}
in the main speech at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo, denounced several arrested Party leaders by name, spoke at great length of the importance of preventing a coup, called for resolute support of Chairman Mao and permanent adherence to Mao's thought, and promised harsh punishment to all of Mao's identifiable opponents.

In late May and June, Liu and Teng fell deeper into Mao's trap. When Party committees in cultural and educational institutions were reviled and physically attacked by revolutionary students and teachers -- presumably primed by the new CRG leaders -- the Party apparatus under Liu and Teng sent work-teams to the campuses to restore Party control. Mao then sprang the trap: in mid-July he personally criticized the operations of the work-teams, and on 5 August, in a personal poster, he told the young militants to "bombard the headquarters,"

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the Party apparatus itself. At that time, "bombardment" was apparently meant to lead to radical reform, not destruction.

While Mao was preparing to unveil the Red Guards as the main instrument to attack the Party, the Central Committee met in early August to approve Mao's design for the Revolution and his rearrangement of the Party hierarchy. Lin Piao told the plenum candidly that the Cultural Revolution was conceived as a "general examination...and general reorganization" of Party cadres. With PLA and Red Guard units in attendance to enforce Mao's will, the Central Committee issued a 16-point decision giving official form to Mao's 5 August poster -- that is, an authorization for the young revolutionaries to attack Party leaders throughout China, attacks which in the next year were to bring down most of the members of the Central Committee itself.

This August plenum named Lin Piao as the sole vice-chairman of the Party and thus the designated successor to Mao, and confirmed Chou En-lai as the third-ranking leader. Three Party leaders were added to the powerful standing committee of the Politburo: Tao Chu, a regional leader brought in to take over the propaganda apparatus, and Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng. Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were demoted and effectually removed from power.

The Red Guards: The Red Guards made their public appearance in mid-August, and began to "bombard" the Party apparatus and everything else that displeased them. Their general directive -- to "bombard" whatever they liked -- came from Mao and Lin, but their continuing guidance came from Chou En-lai and the officers of the Central CRG, i.e. the three new members of the Politburo Standing Committee and Madame Mao. Chou was never an officer of the CRG, but he appeared frequently with those officers and -- as befitted his Party rank -- was the most authoritative spokesman for the Party leadership

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below the level of Mao and Lin. The Red Guards were not always responsive to Chou, however, and in the months to come some of them were to attack many of Chou's proteges and friends and were to aim at Chou himself.*

The normal procedure for the Red Guard groups which fanned out over China in the late summer and early autumn of 1966 was to demand that Party leaders everywhere appear before the masses to admit their errors and rededicate themselves to Mao. These demands were often effectively resisted by local leaders with local forces, and there was much conflict among and within Red Guard organizations (all operating in Mao's name).

"Revolutionization" in Foreign Affairs: The Red Guards from the start (mid-August) were largely concerned with the domestic scene. However, Mao himself in early September foreshadowed the extension of the Cultural Revolution into foreign affairs by calling for the "revolutionization" of Chinese missions abroad and of Peking's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There were occasional reports of attacks on foreigners, including diplomatic personnel, and attacks on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its minister (Chen Yi) began in October.

The extent of resistance to, and conflict among, Red Guard organizations apparently disconcerted the leaders in Peking during the early autumn of 1966. While they were deciding what to do about it, they set up another

**The Red Guards were rarely given (so far as is known) specific targets. They were told repeatedly to "investigate" and evaluate. When in doubt, they were to submit their problem to a Red Guard reception center in Peking, which might pass it to the central CRG, which might pass it to the Big Three of Mao, Lin, and Chou. The final decision on a critical matter -- e.g. the removal of a provincial first secretary -- was reportedly reserved to Mao.*

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Cultural Revolution Group for the PLA alone. Madame Mao, later identified as the PLA/CRG's "advisor," may have been its dominant figure from the start.

During October, regional and provincial Party leaders were summoned to another Central Committee work conference to hear self-criticisms by Liu and Teng (rejected as unsatisfactory), and, more importantly, to learn directly from Mao and Lin that they would be subjected to another wave of Red Guard attacks and must try to "pass the test." The test was to include an abasing self-criticism, correction of past mistakes, and support of the revolutionary masses. That is, they would have to persuade Mao and Lin, through this process, that they were loyal to them.

The Cultural Revolution moved farther into foreign affairs in December. Diplomatic personnel began to be recalled for reindoctrination, and Mao-books and Mao-buttons soon began to be distributed through Chinese missions abroad. The thrust of the Red Guard movement, however, was overwhelmingly against the Party apparatus.

The Widening Purge of the PLA: During the early winter of 1966-67, Madame Mao -- in Mao's absence -- had the starring role in the Cultural Revolution. In a single incendiary speech in mid-December, the Madame denounced the second-ranking officer of the Military Affairs Committee (Ho Lung, who was genuinely in Mao's and Lin's disfavor), marked several second-level Party leaders for "rebel" attacks, and called for the destruction of the regime's entire public security apparatus (although exempting Minister of Public Security Hsieh Fu-chih). The Madame's speech was soon followed by the purge -- almost certainly approved by Mao and Lin -- of Ho Lung and many other central and regional military leaders, enough to qualify as a large-scale purge of the PLA in the space of a few weeks. At the same time, the PLA took over the public security apparatus.

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Most of the other top leaders of the Party -- that is, Lin (who was out of sight), Chou, and the other officers (besides Madame Mao) of the central CRG -- either approved of the full range of the Madame's activity or were afraid to interfere with Mao's wife, in the probably sound belief that she had Mao's approval. However, one top leader, Tao Chu of the CRG, who had apparently been the de facto secretary-general of the Party as well as its propaganda chief since August, was soon purged for attempting to "restrict the scope" of the Revolution. From that time on, the central CRG as a whole appeared to be the de facto secretariat of the Party, and Kang Sheng reportedly replaced Tao as the de facto secretary-general.

Madame Mao's mid-December speech set off the movement to "seize power" from below. This call, continuing into January, apparently represented the leadership's decision to destroy the existing Party and government structures rather than to reform them. The violent assault on these structures led to their rapid collapse and to anarchy and chaos. Thus in mid-January Mao personally directed Lin Piao to order the PLA into action to "support the Left" -- which, at first, meant to restore order and to be a de facto military government in the name of the Left.

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The Zigs and Zags of 1967

The Cultural Revolution, on a comparatively rightist course in early 1967 with the intervention of the PLA, turned left in March as restrictions were imposed on the PLA in dealing with refractory mass organizations. It turned right again in June, with renewed calls for order, and then ultraleft in late July, as officers of the CRG tried to initiate another large-scale purge of the PLA leadership.

In foreign affairs, the movement in this period -- into August -- was steadily to the left. It began with heavy criticism [redacted] of proteges and friends of Chou En-lai's, and with "rebel" supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the months to follow, Chinese missions abroad were turned into centers for the propagation of extreme features of Mao's thought, leading to the international isolation of Mao's regime. This trend reached its peak in August with a "rebel" attempt to seize control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the burning of the British mission.

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Although Mao himself had provided the atmosphere in which "revolutionary" excesses in both domestic and foreign policy were committed, in August and September 1967 he acted together with Lin Piao and Chou En-lai to repudiate the ultraleft -- withdrawing the threat to the PLA, and putting an end to the highly counter-productive period of "revolutionary" diplomacy. In the final months of 1967, several secondary leaders of the CRG were purged for their offenses against Lin and the PLA and against Chou and the Foreign Ministry; but the ranking figures of the CRG, who had probably encouraged the secondary leaders in the excesses of July and August, remained in Mao's favor.

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The "Revolutionary Committees": In January 1967, while the PLA was restoring order, Peking called for the formation of "revolutionary committees" as provisional organs of power.* To function while the Party was being slowly rebuilt, these were to be composed of PLA officers, old Party cadres, and representatives of mass organizations. Party "core groups" were to be formed within these.**

The period from late January through March 1967 was almost too complicated to discuss. While the PLA was taking the Cultural Revolution on a rightist course by intervening to restore order, and the first of the new revolutionary committees appeared as early as February, one group in the leadership tried to turn the Revolution even further to the right by restoring old Party cadres to their positions. This was the "February countercurrent," later denounced as

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The Liberation Army Daily also stopped stating publicly that a further purge of the PLA was necessary, even though the purge continued in an orderly way throughout the period of dependence on the PLA. At the same time (January 1967) the PLA/CRG was reorganized, and a prestigious old commander was named to head it; however, Madame Mao was now its official "advisor" and effectual chief, and in a position to remain the PLA's worst friend.

**One Party "core group" -- in Shansi, headed by old Party cadre Liu Ko-ping -- was identified as early as February 1967; the head of another, a PLA figure, was identified later in 1967. Mao's intention through 1967, to judge both from appointments made in 1967 and from Mao's remarks of late 1967, was to have most of these core groups -- and therefore most of the Party committees eventually to be rebuilt -- headed by old Party cadres.

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the model of an ultra-right initiative. At the same time there was an important leftist initiative -- heavy criticism of several government leaders, most of them regarded as proteges and friends of Chou En-lai. Members of militant mass organizations which later merged with the extremely militant 5/16 Group -- the leader of the attacks on Chou in summer 1967 -- were active in these first attacks on Chou's circle and in such related initiatives as the siege of the Soviet embassy. 25X1

At the same time, a "revolutionary rebel" group in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to "supervise" and evaluate -- that is, disrupt -- the work of that Ministry. In the months to follow, Chinese missions abroad (even in Communist states) were to be turned into centers for the propagation of various extreme features of Mao's "thought," leading to counter-action by local governments, retaliation by Peking, and the international isolation of Mao's regime. Foreign Minister Chen Yi -- who objected strongly to all this -- was to be a casualty of the period, and not even Chou En-lai could restore him to favor.*

Restrictions on the PLA: By mid-March, the Great Helmsman had concluded that the Revolution as a whole was veering too far to the right. The PLA, he decided, had made many "mistakes" in sorting out the true Left, had acted too vigorously against mass organizations and had suppressed too many obstreperous ones. As a related

**Mao in March again contributed to the atmosphere in which these things were done; he was quoted as calling for Red Guards to be "international" as well as internal revolutionaries. He made other such remarks in subsequent months, encouraging the whole spectrum of "Red Guard diplomacy."*

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trend, too many old cadres given preferment by generally conservative PLA leaders were showing up in the new revolutionary committees. Lin Piao in a 30 March speech told PLA leaders that they would henceforth be restricted in their use of coercion against mass organizations and that PLA units would not be permitted to take any important action as regards these organizations without first getting instructions from Peking. In April, Mao himself told a Party work conference that there should be more young people in the new revolutionary organs, and introduced a new kind of three-way alliance: along with the existing alliance of the PLA, old cadres, and the revolutionary masses, there was to be an alliance of the old and middle-aged and young.

With this turn to the left, Peking initiated a new stage of "criticism and repudiation" of Liu Shao-chi (i.e. of the policies attributed to him), and together with this a massive campaign of "struggle-criticism-transformation" of all organizations in China. All of these things -- Mao's and Lin's directives and the new campaigns -- combined to encourage the mass organizations to unprecedented violence in the months ahead.

Troubles with Mass Organizations: In May and early June there were renewed calls for order, and on 6 June a CCP Central Committee directive called officially for an end to various offenses by mass organizations (assaults, destruction of property, looting, unauthorized arrests), and gave the PLA the responsibility for enforcing the order. Mao did not yet, however, authorize the PLA to use the necessary force, so mass violence of course continued. A decision was soon made to send delegations around China to negotiate agreements between contending mass organizations.

Hsieh Fu-chih (still Minister of Public Security, although the PLA had taken over his apparatus) was chosen to lead the first of these touring delegations, accompanied inter alia by a secondary leader of the central CRG. Soon thereafter, Mao himself -- accompanied by C/S Yang Cheng-

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wu and others, including his personal security man Wang Tung-hsing -- began a tour of several provinces of eastern and central China. Mao was to remain out of Peking for the entire summer, and thus in a position to disavow later some of the extreme actions taken by some leaders in Peking in the period -- even though these things were done in the spirit of Mao's directives.

The CRG's New Initiative Against the PLA: The already agitated situation in China as of July 1967 -- with Red Guard organizations attacking anything they chose, and proving in general unresponsive to calls for order from Peking -- was brought to a boil in mid-July by the Wuhan Incident. This was the failure of the Wuhan Military Region commander to protect Hsieh Fu-chih's delegation against local Red Guard organizations which had refused to accept a ruling against them made by the central CRG [redacted] and which roughed up the delegation and kidnapped one of its members. Mao, out of Peking at the time, very probably approved the swift and harsh counter-action taken by other leaders, but may not have expressly approved the threat -- developing at the end of July -- to conduct a larger purge of the PLA, and he subsequently treated this threat as if it had been made entirely on the initiative of certain leaders of the central CRG.

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The Wuhan commander was brought to Peking in the week of the Wuhan Incident and was broken. At the same time, Madame Mao -- possibly on Mao's explicit order -- turned up the fire by calling for mass organizations to be given arms (by the PLA) for action against their enemies (whom they often regarded as including the PLA). Lin Piao and Chou En-lai were both associated with this new order [redacted]

[redacted] although Chou attempted to place restrictions on the use of these arms. In late July, many regional leaders and commanders of armies were summoned to Peking to be warned in strong

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terms about disobedience to and evasion of orders from Peking -- admonitions which were also to be expected. But at the end of July Red Flag (the Party theoretical journal supervised by Chen Po-ta and edited by two other CRG officers) called unmistakably for another substantial purge of the PLA. Whereas previous commentaries (in Red Flag, People's Daily, and the Liberation Army Daily) had condemned a bad "handful" of military leaders in the Wuhan area and had argued that they were not representative of the PLA as a whole, the Red Flag editorial broadcast on 30 July called for the purge of a "handful" still in power in the PLA leadership. People's Daily, Liberation Army Daily, and Peking Radio in the next 10 days -- as late as 8 August -- repeated the Red Flag call for a purge of the existing PLA leadership.

The Repulsion of the CRG's Initiative: Lin Piao did not associate himself with the late July and early August call for a larger purge. Lin set forth his own position on 9 August in some tough "instructions" to a number of central and regional military leaders, in the presence of senior officers of the central CRG. His emphasis was very strong on the need for avoiding mistakes by seeking guidance from the Party center, in particular from Chou En-lai and the senior officers of the CRG, but he did not speak of any concomitant need for any purge of the PLA leadership beyond the Wuhan group.

Lin may have played an important role in getting that line withdrawn. The original threat to the PLA may have been in accord both with Mao's sentiments and his own at the time, but Lin, after consulting his proteges and friends among the military leaders and examining the

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reports of Red Guard excesses in late July and early August, may then have taken the initiative to ask Mao to make clear that the menacing line was not approved.* Whether as a result of Lin's initiative or not, the decision to retreat from that line was apparently made within a day either way of Lin's 9 August speech. The line last appeared on 8 August. It did not appear thereafter even in contexts in which it would be expected; for example, in subsequent discussions of disgraced military leaders such as Peng Te-huai and Lo Jui-ching, the call for further action against such scoundrels was confined to Party leaders.

In any case, whether on Mao's initiative or on Lin's, the line was clearly withdrawn by 11 August. Chen Po-ta and Madame Mao, speaking to Red Guard groups on that date, both backed away from the 5/16 Group and from the call for another purge of the PLA. Possibly because the new line -- forbidding threats against and attacks on the PLA -- was not known to come from Mao himself, it was not immediately effective; it proved necessary to reiterate it in stronger terms on

**Mao himself might have taken the initiative. He had access to the same alarming reports that Lin had, and may have seen some alarming developments on the spot. For example, it may have been at just this time that Hsu Shih-yu, the commander of the military region in which Mao was staying, was forced to flee for his life, first to Shanghai where Mao was, then to Peking with Mao. There is a smaller possibility that Lin took action to end the threat to the PLA without consulting Mao at all, and presented the chairman with an accomplished fact.*

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1 September.* During the last three weeks of August, the incendiary remarks made by Madame Mao in late July and by Red Flag and other media before 9 August continued to be taken by militant mass organizations as an authorization for renewed violent attacks on one another, on the PLA, and on government organs. Moreover, the secondary leaders of the central CRG who were later purged were charged with having continued -- in their own persons -- to organize and incite attacks on the PLA and on government organs. The PLA, in Mao's absence, was not yet given the authority it needed to restore order.

The Apogee and Plummet of the 'Ultraleft' 5/16 Group:
Among the prime targets of violence by mass organizations in August were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chou's protegee Chen Yi, the foreign minister.

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demonstrations against foreign missions and the invasions of some of them continued through August, actions in which the 5/16 Group was prominent. The most spectacular such

**Mao did not go on the public record until 21 August, when a statement was posted in which he spoke of the Wuhan affair as "settled" and did not call for any further action against the PLA. However, Lin had almost certainly been in touch with Mao by 9 or 10 August, had probably been directed by him -- whether on Mao's initiative or Lin's -- to withdraw the CRG's threat to the PLA, and (one supposes) had obtained his approval to drop Madame Mao from the PLA's own Cultural Revolution Group when it was reorganized in mid-August.*

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exploit was the burning of the British mission and the beating of British officials on 23 August. A demonstration against this mission had been authorized, in fact desired; but these specific acts were not.

This last venture apparently sealed the fate of the 5/16 Group,* and the behavior of mass organizations in general made necessary the formulation of a new hard line toward them. Hsieh Fu-chih (who had led the mission attempting to reconcile mass organizations) and a secondary leader of the CRG (later to be purged himself) were both harsh in their talks with mass organizations on the day following the burning, and on 3 September People's Daily stated that the 5/16 Group had been denounced by Party leaders

on 1 September as counter-revolutionary.** On the same day, Chou -- who had apparently intervened with Mao after the British incident -- prohibited violence against foreign missions. (Mao was soon to say in his own person that he was -- now, and belatedly -- opposed to Red Guard diplomacy.) Then on 5 September Madame Mao -- by this time clearly speaking for Mao -- publicly reversed and strongly repudiated the line toward the PLA which had been taken in late July and early August; and she expressly condemned the 5/16 Group.

After another denunciation

**The editor of the Liberation Army Daily was reportedly dismissed on this same day for offenses committed as a 5/16 leader -- presumably including his reiteration of the Red Flag call for a purge of the PLA. He was succeeded by the Maos' daughter, Hsiao Li.*

***Lin Piao reportedly criticized the 5/16 Group at about the same time, but defended the PLA members of it as true "leftists" who had made a mistake.*

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of the 5/16 Group by another CRG leader (Yao Wen-yuan, in People's Daily) on 7 September, official media were to remain silent about the 5/16 Group.

The 5/16 Group was now the symbol of two repudiated policies -- Red Guard diplomacy, and violence and threats against the PLA -- and it was necessary to make clear the absolute repudiation of these policies by purging leaders associated with them. Although Chen Po-ta, Madame Mao and Kang Sheng were all on record with denunciations of the 5/16 Group, it seemed apparent that the secondary figures associated with -- and reportedly directing -- the Group would not have gone so far without some high-level encouragement.* As Mao and Madame Mao were sacrosanct, Chen and Kang were left for possible sacrifice if Mao thought it necessary to strike at the top level. But he did not. Later in September, three secondary leaders of the central CRG (including a deputy editor of Red Flag), were purged for their offenses against the PLA and Lin Piao personally and against the Foreign Ministry and Chou En-lai personally, and officially-inspired Red Guard materials rejected the claims of these secondary figures that their actions had been authorized by Chen and Kang. In the same month, Kang was reportedly given additional responsibilities -- to those already exercised by the central CRG headed by Chen Po-ta and himself -- in the rebuilding of the Party. In the following month, an important spokesman (Hsieh Fu-chih) reassured a group of young revolutionaries, that, below the level of the Big Three of Mao, Lin, and Chou, the three ranking figures of the central CRG -- Chen, Kang, and Madame Mao -- were the most powerful Party leaders.

**Defensive speeches by the three primary CRG leaders in the fall of 1967 made it evident that they were blamed in some quarters for the excesses of the 5/16 Group.*

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The "Constructive" Stage and the Soviet Threat, 1968

In early 1968, by which time Mao's emphasis was on "constructive" features of the Cultural Revolution, the central CRG -- at its peak in the earlier, largely destructive stages of 1966-67 -- was on the defensive. It was given a blood-transfusion in March, however, when a small group of PLA officers fell into disfavor, in part for offending Madame Mao personally. The remaining leaders of the CRG took advantage of this to call again for a larger purge of the PLA. Lin Piao, backed by Chou En-lai, again successfully resisted this.

The March 1968 case was followed by a national campaign -- initiated by Mao -- against a "rightist resurgence," and there was a new emphasis on the importance of mass organizations. However, these organizations fought so violently among themselves throughout the spring and early summer -- even disrupting Chinese shipments to North Vietnam -- that in July Mao and Lin cracked down hard. A Mao directive of late July seemed to bring to an end the era of revolutionary mass movements.

In August 1968 the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia. By September, Chou En-lai was beginning to talk about "social imperialism," and to complain about the Soviet military build-up on the Sino-Soviet border. By November, Peking was ready to make a tentative effort to break out of its isolation. Calling again for "peaceful coexistence" between China and the United States, Peking suggested to the incoming Administration that the Warsaw talks be resumed.

By this time -- late 1968 -- several strands of Mao's "thought" seemed to be weaving themselves together, although they were not to be fully meshed for another year or so. One was his disappointment -- made emphatic

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in July -- with the persistent misbehavior of mass organizations in the present "constructive" stage of the Cultural Revolution. Another (apparently) was his general satisfaction with the performance of the PLA, leaders of which had increasingly in 1968 been placed at the head of the provincial "revolutionary committees," the provisional organs of power while the Party was being rebuilt. A third (clearly) was his apprehension about Soviet intentions, impelling him to an added reliance upon the PLA's leaders and to overtures to the United States. And a fourth -- reflecting the first and second -- may have been a suspicion that he had been badly served by the CRG (which was still the main organ charged with Party-rebuilding), although this feeling may not have developed until 1969.

Mao's "Great Strategic Plan" and the CRG: By January 1968, Mao had issued several directives proclaimed as a "great strategic plan" for the Cultural Revolution.

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Despite the close ties between the young revolutionaries and the CRG, and the continued high standing of most of the primary leaders of the central CRG, the CRG by January 1968 was beginning to lose stature and power as a body. In or about January 1968, the PLA's CRG (from which Madame Mao had already been dropped), an organ which had been responsible in part to the central CRG, was dissolved. It was replaced by a "political work

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group" which was made responsible to the secretary-general of the MAC and (reportedly) to Kang Sheng personally, perhaps in his role as the overall chief of political security work.* In or about February 1968, another secondary leader of the CRG and a senior editor of Red Flag, Chi Pen-yu, who was very close to Madame Mao, was purged for offenses of the same sort that had led to the downfall of the other three CRG figures in September (including offenses against Lin Piao and Chou En-lai personally); and he was accused of having been all along the principal leader of the 5/16 Group (thus making it unnecessary to look further for the principal). Madame Mao, who had protected Chi in September, was unwilling or unable to do so this time, and was even given credit for exposing him. 25X1

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As of March 1968, the central CRG as a body seemed notably on the defensive, unpopular with almost everybody and in only qualified favor with Mao, Lin, and Chou. If the CRG was wobbling and about to go down at that time, however, it got a life-saving blood transfusion from a mistake made by a small group of central military leaders -- a miscalculation taken as a direct challenge to Madame Mao.

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Another Rejection of a Larger Purge: The Yang Cheng-wu case of March 1968 remains puzzling even years later. Yang, a longtime protege of Lin Piao and since late 1965 the secretary-general of the MAC and acting C/S, was also the MAC's principal supervisor of political security work in the PLA. In this role, he presumably had the authority to order arrests of PLA personnel, but perhaps not without the agreement of Kang Sheng of the central CRG, who (reportedly) was jointly responsible for the political security of the PLA. Yang is said to have sent the Peking Garrison commander with an armed PLA unit to the CRG's premises to make arrests of CRG staff members. These staffers may well have been PLA officers (known to be assigned to the CRG), but Yang seems to have failed to clear the operation with Kang Sheng or any other of the CRG's officers. The CRG officer-of-the-day appealed to Madame Mao, who refused to permit the arrests.

Yang and two high-ranking colleagues were arrested on 7 March. Even before their case was surfaced, Madame Mao, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng and others (including Chou En-lai and Madame Lin Piao) were pointing to the danger of a new "rightist" effort to reverse the Cultural Revolution. On 24 or 25 March, the Yang case was revealed

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to a PLA audience in speeches by Lin, Chou, Madame Mao, Chen and Kang, apparently speaking in that order.*

Lin's speech (the main one) was remarkable for its deference to Madame Mao, the principal offended party. Lin accused Yang of offenses against Madame Mao personally, against the central CRG as a group, and against some of the central and regional military leaders attacked from the left in 1967.** But in one sense, the most striking feature of his speech was his stand -- supported by Chou En-lai -- against the effort of CRG leaders to conduct a larger purge. 25X1

**Lin in this speech announced the appointment of another of his longtime proteges, Huang Yung-sheng, as the new C/S, and of a joint Lin/Huang protege, Wen Yu-cheng, as the new commander of the Peking Garrison. Chou En-lai, presumably speaking for Lin, had strongly defended Huang against Red Guard attacks in 1967, emphasizing that Huang was Lin's close comrade. Madame Mao had also praised Huang.*

***Spokesmen for the regime were later -- and not very credibly -- to link these three purged military leaders with the disgraced and ultra-left 5/16 Group which had made some of the worst of these attacks. In 1971, incredibly, they were to link Lin Piao himself.*

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More Violence, and Mao's Crackdown: In the national campaign -- initiated by Mao himself -- against a "rightist resurgence," in the wake of the Yang case, Peking's coverage of the Chinese leadership showed the resurgence in fact of the leftist CRG. Peking's lists invariably displayed -- following the Big Three of Mao, Lin and Chou -- the three ranking leaders of the central CRG (Chen, Kang, Madame Mao) and two other CRG officers, and only then the military leaders (apart from Lin).*

As would be expected in such a period, there was a fresh emphasis on the importance of mass organizations. PLA leaders and old Party cadres in the revolutionary committees throughout China -- the provisional organs of power -- were subjected to official criticism and were

**The CRG leaders may conceivably have followed up their call to find the "black backers" of Yang Cheng-wu with a more direct attack on Lin Piao. There was a rumor at this time that Chen and Kang contended at a Party meeting that Lin was unfit to be Mao's successor, and that Chou defended Lin. This was a credible breakdown of opposing "alliances," but it seemed unlikely that Mao would permit this kind of direct attack on his most favored lieutenant.*

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told to engage in further self-criticism, and representatives of mass organizations were promised more of the leading places. Moreover, proletarian "factionalism" was officially proclaimed to be a good thing. Further, a mass movement for the "purification of class ranks" -- another purge of all kinds of institutions -- was launched at the same time.

The consequences were predictable. Throughout the spring of 1968, the mass organizations fought violently among themselves (stealing weapons from the PLA for this purpose), and made fresh poster attacks on PLA leaders.

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in late July Mao, Lin Piao and several other leaders met in Peking with leaders of revolutionary mass organizations. Mao and Lin both warned in strong terms of the consequences of continued misbehavior, and Mao at once issued a nation-wide order forbidding armed struggle, attacks on the PLA and other offenses. Mao's order seemed to bring to an end the era of revolutionary mass movements.

The PLA acted immediately and aggressively on Mao's order, suppressing and dismantling many mass organizations. The central CRG apparently remained, however, in qualified favor; one of its officers (Yao Wen-yuan) was chosen to inform the revolutionary young (in a long article) that they were being replaced by worker/PLA teams -- dominated by the PLA members -- as the vanguard of the Revolution. And the CRG continued to be reported as the Party's de facto secretariat, and thus the main organ charged with Party-rebuilding.

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Military Domination of the Revolutionary Committees: By September 1968, the lengthy process of setting up revolutionary committees (provisional organs of power) in the provinces had been completed in orderly conditions. Looking back, there had been since early February two striking trends in the staffing of these committees. Up to that time, more than half of the 13 provincial-level (meaning provincial and major municipal) committees which had been formed had been placed under the chairmanship of old Party cadres, and none of the three committees set up in the most important provinces -- those containing the headquarters of the powerful military region commands -- was headed by a figure close to Lin Piao.* Of the 16 provincial-level committees formed between early February and September, however, only two were given to old Party cadres, the remaining 14 were given to career military men (including nine commanders), and proteges of Lin Piao were tapped for all except one of the provinces with MR headquarters. These trends had begun in a "rightist" period in the Revolution and had continued unchecked through the leftist resurgence of spring 1968, despite the emphasis in that period on the role of mass organizations. Thus in September 1968 it appeared that Mao, Lin, and Chou had made early in the year -- and had reaffirmed -- a decision to place most of the committees under military leadership, whatever the balance among the three elements of the committees as a whole, and to give the most important of these posts to men in Lin's high favor.

The task of highest priority as of September 1968 was to reconstruct the Party apparatus to provide a "hard

**It will be recalled that one part of Mao's "great strategic plan" of autumn 1967 had called for old Party cadres to be the leading element in the revolutionary committees; the selection of committee chairman primarily from the ranks of the old cadres had been consistent with this.*

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core" of leadership within the revolutionary committee structure. Mao's instructions to "eliminate waste and take in new blood" did not make clear whether Mao and Lin meant to have the military leaders dominate the provincial-level Party committees as well as the revolutionary committees. This decision may have been made tentatively this soon, but it seems likely that it was not firmly fixed until 1969.

What was clear at the time -- autumn 1968 -- was that the reconstruction of the Party apparatus would take a long time. This was because at this time the three-way alliance principle (combining PLA men, old Party cadres, and representatives of mass organizations) which had governed the composition of the revolutionary committees was extended to apply to the rebuilding of the Party. This meant that selection of new Party members and leaders at all levels would entail the same prolonged process of examination and deliberation and disputation -- leading to higher levels -- that characterized the earlier formation of revolutionary committees.*

Some Radical Policies As Well: The second urgent task was to "transform" the superstructure -- the

**The central CCG was reportedly given the responsibility for reorganizing the Party and preparing for the Ninth Party Congress. Outside Peking, the leadership in putting together Party committees was generally in the hands of military men, but the "agreements" worked out or imposed by them reportedly had to be approved by the central CCG. The competition for place on the new Party committee was to lead to factional struggle on the part of representatives of mass organizations -- some of whom were to be taken into the revolutionary committees -- but not again to mass violence on anything like the scale prior to the crackdown of July 1968.*

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institutional framework -- and once again mobilize the masses for a new advance toward Mao's abiding goal of a selfless, egalitarian, truly Communist society. The "new period .. of struggle-criticism-transformation" was in fact to entail a violent, nation-wide purge of the basic levels of society. Moreover, as a part of radically reforming education on Mao's lines (eliminating bourgeois influence and combining mental and physical labor), students and teachers were assigned by the millions to work in factories and communes. Other Mao "instructions," reflecting his long-held attitudes toward bureaucracies and cities, drastically simplified administrative structures and sent huge numbers of urban cadres and urban unemployed to work in the countryside with the intellectuals.

In addition to these large-scale, centrally-directed radical programs, several radical social and economic initiatives reminiscent of the Leap Forward and "people's communes" period were undertaken on an experimental basis. In several rural areas, production units were combined to make larger units, and there was a higher degree of socialization in production and distribution relationships. Reflecting Mao's emphasis on politics and on moral incentive, there was a campaign to emulate the model Tachai production brigade -- meaning that pay was to be based on political attitude and on need as well as work, and steps were to be taken toward elimination of private plots.

By the end of 1968, Peking's radical, disruptive domestic policies -- under the rubric of "struggle-criticism-transformation" -- had produced much disorder and confusion. The New Year's Day 1969 editorial made clear that the theme for 1969 was to be "unity" -- meaning both coherence and cooperation.

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The Ninth Party Congress and the Rise of Chou En-lai, 1969:

Mao's team held to several of its radical policies in the early months of 1969, but moderated others. The latter trend was encouraged by the Sino-Soviet military clashes in March, which led to a new emphasis on domestic "unity" and stability. At the Ninth Party Congress in April, Mao and Lin Piao both spoke to this end, and Lin professed Peking's return to a more flexible foreign policy, including "peaceful coexistence" and negotiations with its antagonists. This Congress formalized Mao's choice of Lin as his successor, and named a new Politburo consisting of mismatched groups, the largest of them composed of Lin's military proteges.

Throughout the spring and summer, Chinese concern about the Soviet threat visibly increased. The Chinese moved to mobilize international opinion against the USSR and agreed to border talks with the Russians, and at the same time took action against domestic "anarchism" which might encourage Soviet aggression. As part of this, the decision was apparently made at this time to concentrate power throughout China in the hands of the military leaders.

Chou En-lai's increased weight in the decision-making process seemed apparent throughout 1969, and his hand seemed especially evident in the December overtures to the US to resume the Sino-Soviet talks in the Chinese Embassy in Poland. At the same time, there were indications that Chou had gained increased power in the Party apparatus itself, at the expense of the more radical CRG leaders.

Moderation of Some Radical Policies: In the early months of 1969, Mao's team held to several -- and perhaps the most important -- of its radical domestic policies: the ongoing purge of social institutions, the revolutionizing of education, the assignment of hundreds of thousands of cadres to the '7 May' schools, and the sending-down

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to rural areas of tens of millions. However, new directives from Mao moderated the "class struggle" (narrowing the target and emphasizing re-education) and held out greater hope of redemption to the intellectuals. Then in February, under Mao's latest pronouncements that "serious attention should be paid to policy" and that "leeway" should be allowed, the regime began to discourage the Leap Forward psychology and to call for "planned and systematic development" under a "unified national plan." In March, these guidelines were extended to cover agriculture, and the regime retreated from its unpopular experimental programs in the countryside.

The Sino-Soviet Military Clashes: In the early months of 1969, while Chinese leaders were preparing for the long-delayed Ninth Party Congress, Peking decided that it had "two number one enemies" -- the USSR as well as the US. However, Peking did not move as rapidly as it might have done to neutralize either one of them. First, Peking concluded that the new US administration would not make major concessions, and in mid-February cancelled the scheduled resumption of the Warsaw talks. Then on 2 March Chinese forces ambushed a Soviet border guard detachment on a disputed island (Chen Pao, in the Ussuri), and on 15 March Soviet forces struck back hard, killing hundreds of Chinese. Peking's concern -- knowing its overall forces to be grossly inferior to the USSR's -- was immediately evident. Fortunately for Mao, the Russians also preferred a political solution.

The Ninth Party Congress:

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Lin Piao made the main report, reaffirming Peking's intention to continue with "struggle-criticism-transformation" of Chinese institutions, but at the same time setting forth Mao's various "instructions" of early 1969 -- all directed at restoring minimum levels of social, political and economic stability in the name of "unity" -- as equally

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the policies of the Party. These were: to re-educate the intellectuals, to rehabilitate and reassign as many cadres as possible, to offer leniency to offenders who confessed (but to be vigilant against "bad people"), to continue methodically with the work of "purifying class ranks," and to promote production to bring about "new leaps forward" (not one Great Leap again).

In discussing Party-building, Lin's emphasis was on the need to ensure that Party leadership at all levels was in the hands of true Maoists. In this connection, the new Party constitution provided for the leaders of Party organs at all levels to be "produced" (named or approved by higher levels) rather than genuinely elected.*

Lin in this report, in his review of foreign policy, was harshly anti-American and anti-Soviet, describing both countries as "paper tigers," denouncing their leaders by name, and calling for China to prepare against a war launched by either or both. However, Lin professed Peking's return to a more flexible foreign policy, including its renewed favor for the principle of "peaceful coexistence," and expressly stated Peking's favor for negotiations.

This Ninth Party Congress adopted a new Party constitution which provided for Lin to be Mao's successor without an election (Mao was rightly afraid that the more popular Chou En-lai would win any election),

*Lin was less anxious to please Madame Mao on this occasion. In discussing "her" field of culture and education, he did not mention any contribution made by the Madame. Moreover, Lin in this report associated himself with Mao's general exoneration of PLA leaders who had made "mistakes" in dealing with mass organizations.

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and for the Politburo standing committee to reconstruct whatever central Party apparatus it needed. The constitution did not provide for a new Party secretariat or secretary-general, a post to which Chou as the third-ranking Party leader would have been entitled.* The Congress went on to name a new Central Committee: The new Central Committee broke down into about 40 percent PLA, 30 percent old cadres, and 30 percent mass representatives.

This Central Committee then named its officers -- Mao and Lin only -- and its Politburo standing committee. The Politburo standing committee was to continue to consist -- as it had since 1966 -- of Mao, Lin, Chou, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng.

The Politburo as a whole -- with 21 full (voting) members and four alternate (non-voting) members -- included a large group of Mao's proteges, a large group of Lin's, and a few people close to Chou.

Those named to the new Politburo included 13 of the 14 key figures who had been presented for almost a year before the Party Congress as Mao's elite central

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team.* These 13 -- who had constituted a remarkably narrow base for Mao and Lin in the central leadership -- were now augmented by some other active military leaders (including two of the most important military region commanders), some inactive Party elders (for continuity), and two provincial leaders who had done well in the Cultural Revolution.

The most striking feature of the new Politburo -- as it had been of Mao's 14-man elite team -- was its division largely into two groups, proteges respectively of Mao and Lin, which had had a very uneasy relationship during the Cultural Revolution. The strong group of Mao's proteges consisted of the five officers of the central CRG -- Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Madame Mao, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan -- plus Chi Teng-kuei, a provincial leader. The even stronger group of military leaders, Lin's longtime proteges (with one exception), consisted of Madame Lin, Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-peng, and Chiu Hui-tso (the five on the record closest to him), Hsu Shih-yu and Chen Hsi-lien (the somewhat less close regional leaders), Yeh Chien-ying (generally regarded as closer personally to Chou En-lai), and Li Te-sheng (the exception).** The potential for further

**The 14 had been: Mao, Lin, and Chou, the Big Three; Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Madame Mao, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan, the ranking officers of the central CRG; Huang Yung-cheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh Chun (Madame Lin), and Wen Yu-cheng of the MAC; and Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Tung-hsing of the political security apparatus. The one who was not named to the Politburo in April 1969 was Wen Yu-cheng, the Peking Garrison Commander; this was the first indication of Wen's decline, which was to become his disappearance after June 1970.*

***It was possible to compose a third -- hypothetical -- group surmised to be generally responsive to Chou En-lai by drawing on Party elders (e.g. Yeh Chien-ying) and*
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conflict between these groups -- within the Politburo and outside of it -- was apparent.

In Mao's speech to this first plenum (28 April 1969) of the new Central Committee, he again yoked "unity" and "struggle." The "unity" he was principally interested in was among the three elements of the revolutionary committees and their Party cores. In view, however, of the vagueness of Mao's and Lin's policy guidance, the inherent instability of the "three-way alliance," and the history of conflict and competition among the elements of that alliance, the prospects for "unity" seemed poor. Moreover, Mao seemed to subvert his own call for "unity" by calling at the same time for an upgrading of the role of mass organizations in these committees and Party cores (despite all the trouble they had caused him), and by telling the military to treat them gently (despite the likelihood of future trouble).*

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Chou's close associates in the government structure (e.g., Li Hsien-nien), but the only strong figure in such a group would be Chou himself. The interesting question was how Chou would use his great personal influence with Mao and Lin.*

**At various points in this speech, Mao enjoined the PLA to "work carefully," to avoid complacency about individual achievements (even if members of the Politburo), and to proceed with particular care in its leading role in rebuilding the Party (at provincial levels). By Army Day (1 August) 1969, as made clear in the joint editorial commemorating that day, these admonitions had risen to the level of a campaign to ensure that the PLA would work carefully and modestly, and under "party" leadership. This campaign was to continue into 1971, but it was never of such intensity as to explain in itself the purge of the PLA's central leadership in autumn 1971.*

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The Soviet Threat and Domestic "Anarchy": Throughout the spring and summer of 1969, the Soviets were establishing a credible possibility of a large-scale military attack on China, in the form of a sweep of ground forces through the Northeast and/or a pre-emptive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities in the Northwest. After the Chen Pao island incident in March, Lin Piao in April had called on the Chinese to take the Soviet "tactical" threat seriously. In May and June, Chinese spokesmen complained (rightly) that China was being threatened with nuclear weapons. In August, the Soviets reinforced their warnings by wiping out a Chinese unit which crossed the border from Sinkiang (in the far Northwest). In early September, the Soviet chief-of-staff himself publicly suggested the possibility of another Soviet strike through the Northeast (as in 1945).

The Chinese leaders began to mobilize international opinion against the USSR before undertaking to deal with Moscow directly. In the early summer, some 17 ambassadors were sent abroad, returning first to the friendliest countries. But Peking clearly lacked confidence that world opinion would deter the Russians (as it had not, for example, in Czechoslovakia), and in August and September Chinese anxiety visibly increased. On 11 September, responding to a Soviet initiative, Chou En-lai met with Kosygin at a Peking airport, and agreed to begin talks about the border.* Lin Piao in his National Day (1 October)

**The Chou-Kosygin meeting was a retreat for Mao, who had rejected leader-to-leader exchanges since 1965. Moreover, Chou made a concession in agreeing to talk without the precondition that Moscow "recognize" the unequal nature of the old treaties. However, the circumstances of the Chou-Kosygin meeting -- at an airport, rather than in a more dignified setting in the city -- were a typical Mao touch.*

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speech was notably milder toward the USSR than he had been in April, and reaffirmed that the Chinese "will not attack." The talks got underway three weeks later.

In the same period of spring and summer 1969, the disruptive behavior of representatives of mass organizations -- in, or seeking places in, revolutionary committees and new Party committees throughout China -- was once again disappointing the expressed hopes of Mao and Lin Piao for "unity" among the elements of the "three-way alliances" in the constructive stage of the Cultural Revolution. Throughout this period, Peking's pronouncements showed a renewed strong concern over the problem of factionalism in the revolutionary committees from which the new Party committees were to be drawn -- and especially over "anarchism" on the part of the mass organizations which were supposed to supply much of the "new blood." That Chinese leaders related this problem to the threat of a Soviet attack was made clear in Chou En-lai's denunciation of factional violence in one province as an indicator of "internal weakness" which could only encourage Soviet aggression. Thus, as a part of the "prepare against war" campaign (a theme introduced by Mao at the Ninth Party Congress), the PLA was authorized to use whatever degree of force was required to restore public order. The young revolutionaries, whom Mao had again and again offered an opportunity to shape up and contribute their share of "revolutionary successors," had once again too sorely tried his patience.

It seems doubtful that any of the Chinese leaders resisted in itself the decision to try to reduce the danger of a Soviet attack. But some of them stood to lose from the consequent actions taken against mass organizations, and both decisions apparently led to another in the latter months of 1969 which greatly shifted the balance of power in the leadership below the level of the Big Three -- the decision to give PLA leaders, already in power in the provisional governing structure throughout China, the key posts in the reemerging Party

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apparatus as well. As noted previously, Mao -- and Lin and Chou -- may have been thinking along these lines a year earlier, and may even have made a tentative decision as early as that, but it seemed likely that the final decision was not made until autumn 1969, and that it was made in large part because of the increased threat of a Soviet attack and the consequent need to put China in as a strong a position as possible to meet that threat. The subsequent fate of the central CRG -- which had played the central role in Party-rebuilding -- and of its two principal leaders made it seem further likely that it was those leaders who resisted the decision to concentrate power throughout China in the hands of the military leaders.

A Larger Role for Chou En-lai: Chou En-lai's increased weight in the decisions made by China's Big Three seemed apparent in the policies adopted in autumn 1969, and by this time there were the first indications that Chou was gaining power in the Party apparatus itself, particularly at the expense of Kang Sheng of the central CRG. Chou was playing some new role -- impossible to define clearly -- in the supervision of political security work in the PLA, which would have diluted Kang's role in that same concern. The fragmentary evidence on the point suggested too that Chou may have been given more direct supervisory authority than he already had (as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee) over the entire political security apparatus, which would again have diluted Kang's role.* It is conceivable that

**Chou was reported again in 1970-71 to have an increased role in political security work; specifically, he was said to be supervising the investigation and evaluation of Chen Po-ta, the fourth-ranking Party leader then out of favor. This would be an appropriate task for the supervisor of a political security directorate if the chief of that directorate -- Kang Sheng -- were out of favor too, as indeed he was.*

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- Chou's role as de facto secretary-general of the Party -- not reported until 1971 -- dated back this far, and that it was in this role that Chou acquired his increased authority over political security work. (This had been the case with Teng Hsiao-ping, the purged secretary-general.)
-

Chou's hand again seemed visible in a policy initiative of December 1969. In an obvious effort to deflect one enemy while vitally concerned with another, and in a forthcoming response to the US withdrawal of naval patrols from the Taiwan Strait in November, Peking in December stated for the first time its willingness to receive the US representative in the Chinese embassy in Poland in order to resume the Sino-American talks. The talks were in fact resumed the following month.

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[REDACTED]

Party Rebuilding and the Demise of the CRG, 1970

It has been argued that in the autumn of 1969 the Big Three in the Chinese leadership -- Mao, Lin, and Chou -- made at least three interrelated decisions. Two of them were visible at the time: first, to take action to avert the threat of a Soviet military attack; and, second, to crack down once again on mass organizations and to restore public order, in the interest of supporting the first decision and of getting on with Party-rebuilding. A third decision, not visible at the time, was that of giving preferment to PLA leaders for the leading posts in the Party apparatus then being rebuilt. There was an apparent fourth decision made at that time or soon thereafter, likewise not visible until later: to reduce the stature and influence of those party leaders who opposed or were thought to oppose any or all of the first three decisions. This last decision was to affect principally the officers of the central CRG, Mao's own proteges.

The Pursuit of the 5/16 Group: It became known in 1971 that an all-out "investigation" of the remains of the 5/16 Group began in or about December 1969. This was the "ultraleft" group which in 1967 had undertaken extreme ventures aimed principally at bringing down Chou En-lai and his proteges and secondarily at purging Lin Piao's proteges (if not Lin himself). The new investigation which began in late 1969

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[REDACTED] and the intensity of the subsequent prosecution of this one mass organization makes it seem highly probable that the Party leaders who set the pursuit in motion knew at the time that the thread would lead to at least some of the remaining officers of the central CRG. In other words, it looks as though Mao, Lin and Chou decided no later than December 1969 to take action against some of these officers -- whether on grounds of their earlier responsibility for the 5/16 Group's

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outrageous behavior, or for their opposition to certain current policies, or -- most likely -- both.

The Disappearance of the CRG: As suggested previously, the central CRG, in its work of Party-rebuilding, may have been supervised by Chou En-lai as de facto secretary-general as early as autumn 1969. The CRG was still playing some role in this work -- approving or disapproving appointments to re-emerging Party committees at every level [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] perhaps subject to Chou's veto -- as late as November 1969. In December, however, the CRG, which had been out of sight for some months, made what turned out to be its last public appearance. Moreover, there was no further reference to it in Chinese media until 1 July 1971 (when it was cited in a historical context as having performed creditably in the Cultural Revolution), [REDACTED]

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The central CRG may well have lost all of its power in and over the Party apparatus as early as December 1969, roughly coinciding with the group's disappearance from the public scene. But the process may have been more gradual, not completed until the early summer of 1970. If there was a transition period of this kind, the CRG was probably strictly subordinated to Chou, and perhaps also to Lin Piao, who like Chou was later reported to be playing a much larger role

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in the rebuilding of the Party and to have dislodged the CRG leaders from this function.*

^a [redacted] *Inferential evidence as to the time at which the CRG lost its authority over Party-rebuilding -- inferred, that is, from the character of the men appointed to head the Party core groups at particular times -- is suggestive but not conclusive. The first of these appointments to be surfaced (since the two in 1967), which came in February 1970, was of Yang Te-ohi, the commander of the Tsinan MR and a protege of Lin Piao. Yang appeared as the leading figure of the Party core group of the Shantung provincial revolutionary committee, and thus the leading candidate for the post of first secretary of the new provincial Party committee when it was formed. As it turned out, in almost all cases the head of the Party core group was named the first secretary of the new Party committee. The appointment of this military leader -- like other military leaders, a natural and cultivated enemy of the officers of the central CRG -- to the top Party post in his area might have signalled the demise of the central CRG, the transfer of Party affairs into the hands of Lin and Chou, and a decision or reaffirmation of a decision of great importance: to place the great majority of the new Party committees under the leadership of military figures, and the most important of them (containing MR headquarters) in the hands of Lin's proteges. This was indeed the pattern that emerged in 1970-71. The time cannot be fixed precisely, however, because the time of Yang's actual appointment is not known and because the pattern of appointments of military leaders to these Party posts was not clearly established until the late months of 1970. Two additional heads of Party core groups were surfaced in the early summer of 1970: Pan Fu-sheng in Heilungkiang and Wei Kuo-ching in Kwangsi, both old Party cadres serving concurrently as first political officers in their provinces. That these identifications followed (continued on page A-48)*

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Mao's Call for an Anti-US United Front: US initiatives in the Indochina war in April and May 1970 -- the operation in Cambodia, and the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam -- led Peking to call off the next-scheduled round of Sino-American talks and provoked a rare personal statement by Mao on 20 May. The massively-publicized statement celebrated a "new upsurge in the struggle against US imperialism," hailed the contribution of the "American people" to the defeat of their government's policies, and called on the people of the world (including the US) to "unite and defeat the US aggressors and their running dogs."

Mao's massively-publicized words could be taken as signalling the "return" of Mao to dominance -- and the "decline" of Chou -- after this vindication of Mao's intransigently anti-American position. However, Mao and

(continued from page A-47) a period of four months in which no such appointments had been surfaced could be taken as indicating that the central CRG figures and other Party leaders below Mao's level were locked in an inconclusive struggle -- with Mao above the battle -- as late as the first half of 1970; and the identities of these two Party core heads -- both primarily Party cadres, not military men -- could be interpreted, with strain, as meaning that the central CRG was still strong enough to impose at least some of its own choices as late as June-July 1970. But neither was really a credible CRG candidate. Both were criticized severely by spokesmen for the CRG. Wei Kuo-ching was later vindicated and named chairman of the revolutionary committee in Kwangsi after Mao himself had taken action against the excesses of the Red Guard groups there which had been, among other things, harassing Wei; he was subsequently named as first secretary of the new Party committee. The military commander in Heilungkiang, Wang Chia-tao, was eventually (August 1971) named to head the Party committee there.

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Chou had both contributed to the fragile trend toward improving Sino-American relations, and the statement did not illuminate anything in the leadership except Mao's continued pre-eminence -- the biggest gun that could be brought to bear. Mao's statement did briefly restore the United States to its onetime position as the principal enemy of Mao's China, but the U.S.S.R. soon resumed its place as the main threat, and the trend toward at least some small improvement in Sino-American relations was visible again by autumn 1970.

Other Interesting Developments: There were several developments in the first half of 1970 which could be taken as reflecting shifts of power in the leadership, but none of them could support a strong argument.

One of these was the very tough law-and-order campaign ("one blow -three anti's") initiated in January and persisted in through 1970. This entailed mass trials of "counter-revolutionaries" and other offenders, including many members of mass organizations engaged in factional violence during the Cultural Revolution, and the execution or (more often) dispatch to labor-camps of some tens of thousands of them. The role of PLA figures in conducting these trials, and the prominence of young factionalists among the victims, might be taken as additional evidence of the demise of the central CRG. However, the campaign seemed to be managed by a mixture of organs concerned with political and public security, and did not seem to be aimed primarily at violent youth.

Another interesting development was the disappearance of Hsieh Fu-chih, the last-known Minister of Public Security and believed to be still a key figure in the political security apparatus. Hsieh dropped from sight after some months of the intense campaign against the 5/16 Group, and some observers surmised that he was punished for excessive zeal in this pursuit -- in other

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words, was maneuvered out of the leadership by a still-strong central CRG seeking to protect itself against the "investigation." This view was not consonant, however, with directives of Mao and Lin Piao published at the time -- directives perhaps issued originally in autumn 1967 -- calling for a complete purge of 5/16 members and for "letting none escape."


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
Another development in the leadership that permitted various interpretations was the disappearance of Wen Yu-cheng, the Peking Garrison commander, a protege of both Lin Piao and Huang Yung-sheng, the two biggest military guns. It was easy to surmise that Wen's fall was connected in some way with political security affairs. As commander of the Peking Garrison forces (which played several roles in political security work, including the protection of top Party leaders), Wen could have been held responsible in part for the offenses of the 5/16 Group, or for failure to clean up the remnants of this group in Peking, or for an assassination attempt on Hsieh, or whatever. Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the affair was the apparent failure of Lin Piao to replace Wen in this supersensitive post with another of his own proteges. None of the officers of the Peking Garrison then or subsequently identified appeared to be a protege of either Lin or Huang Yung-sheng, and this fact may have proved to be of critical importance in the successful purge of the central military leaders in the autumn of 1971.

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


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The Lin-Chou Takeover of Party-Rebuilding and Some Movement Toward "People's Diplomacy": If, as seems very doubtful, the central CRG was still fairly strong as late as July 1970, that was its last gasp. On 1 August Chen Po-ta, chief of the CRG, made what remained as his last public appearance/




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In mid-November, Kang Sheng made what was to be his last public appearance until June 1971. At the same time posters denounced a prominent Red Guard leader in Peking -- once a favorite of the CRG leaders

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
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and of Mao himself -- as "5/16 squared," and said on Madame Mao's authority that this person had been sponsored by Chen Po-ta.*

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Beginning in November, several heads of provincial Party core groups were identified -- almost all of them military leaders. And beginning in December, new provincial Party committees were surfaced -- the great majority headed by military leaders, and the most important of them headed by proteges of Lin Piao. These same military leaders were on good terms with Chou En-lai as well. While the chairmen of these new Party committees had probably been chosen much earlier, and the delay in surfacing them was probably explained by difficulties in assembling the committees as wholes rather than by disputes about the chairmen, the composition of these groups made clear that the leaders of the CRG had at least temporarily lost, in the contest for Mao's favor and thus for power in the Party, to Lin and Chou and their circles.

*This person was the source of much of the "factionalism" on the Peking revolutionary committee later admitted to Edgar Snow, and was passed over when the new Party committee was named.

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The Snow Interviews, Autumn-Winter 1970-71

Edgar Snow, an American journalist who for 35 years had been presenting Mao and Mao's policies in a sympathetic light, but had sometimes also been a good source of information on the Chinese leadership, made an extended visit to China in the autumn of 1970 and early winter of 1970-71, his first since 1965. Snow had several talks with Mao and a long interview with Chou, and "saw" (without interviewing) Lin. Snow rightly concluded that Mao was the man in overall charge and rightly emphasized the day-to-day managerial role of Chou (who was almost constantly at center stage in Peking). Snow minimized -- probably prematurely -- the importance of Lin (who was then out of public view). In general, the things that Snow was told by Mao, Chou and others were consonant with what had been previously observed and reported, added some light to the picture of the leadership, and graphically illustrated Peking's hope of mobilizing American public opinion against the US Government's China policies.

Mao's Role: Snow agreed with other foreign observers who had seen Mao since mid-1970 that Mao seemed to be in good mental and physical condition for his age, 77. These observers had described Mao as vigorous, alert, lively, quick-witted, and so on; while some persons who subsequently observed Mao suggested some physical deterioration since the time of the Snow interviews, Mao seemed to Snow (and to some later observers too) to be physically fit and mentally sharp.

Snow concluded that as of early 1971 Mao was clearly "in overall charge." Mao himself defined his

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
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
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role to Snow.*




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Snow did not specifically address [redacted] the key question -- in assessing Mao's role -- of whether Mao could alter a given policy whenever he chose or could make or break any given leader. However, developments before, during and after Snow's visit -- for example, the handling of foreign policy and of the cases of Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng -- made it clear that Mao could indeed do so, and that he was indeed, as Snow thought, the man "in charge."

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Lin's Role:

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The absence of a visible role for Lin did not really permit any conclusion as to Lin's status at that time. Lin was supposed to be preparing to succeed Mao, not Chou; that is, his role was not supposed to be that of an administrator but of a designated successor assisting Mao in the formulation of policy and in the supervision of the work of the Party, government, and military structures in carrying out that policy -- a role performed as the Party's only vice-chairman, second-ranking (to Mao) member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and de facto chief of the Military Affairs Committee. In his supervisory role, Lin as well as Mao would be super-

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vising Chou's work in rebuilding the party. [REDACTED]

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Treatment of Lin in Chinese media -- one of the principal means of judging the status of any Chinese leader -- [REDACTED] continued to indicate that Lin was the second-ranking figure. Chinese officials continued to refer to Vice-Chairman Lin's "instructions" and to the "demands" of Lin as well as Mao, to call for the people to rally around Vice-Chairman Lin as "deputy leader" as well as Chairman Mao as "leader," and to hold up "Vice-Chairman Lin as our brilliant example." Apart from Mao, no Chinese leader except Lin was invoked by name, and Mao-Lin badges (in addition to Mao-alone badges) were appearing.

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Nevertheless, in retrospect, it is possible that the lack of reference to Lin, in Mao's talks with Snow, indicated that Mao had begun to think about Lin in a new way, much as he had begun to think about Liu Shao-chi in a new way in 1962 -- four years before he purged Liu -- as a man not qualified to be his successor. This re-evaluation of Lin, if it indeed began this early, would not necessarily have been reflected in the process of party-rebuilding, if Mao were not yet sure of his re-evaluation or did not want it to be known, and it need not have been reflected in the media, as it had not been in Liu Shao-chi's case.

Chou's Role: It was understandable that Snow was especially impressed with Chou. Although 73 or near it (almost ten years older than Lin), Chou was holding to a schedule that would wear out many a younger man, and was performing with his unflinching intelligence and grace, two qualities he possessed in greater measure than any other Chinese leader.

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Moreover, there had been, in the months before Snow's visit, a striking increase in Chou's stature, both organizationally and in terms of his influence on policy. He had apparently become, as previously suggested, the de facto secretary-general of the Party, absorbing the greater part of the roles played previously by Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng.

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Mao had regarded (and spoken of) Chou as "my" premier, the reliable instrument of his will. To keep it this way, Chou very probably was clearing his most important

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decisions with Mao, with respect both to the implementation of policy and the staffing of the Party and government apparatus -- just as Lin had earlier assured Party leaders that he felt free to make minor decisions on his own but always got Mao's approval for the major ones.*

Chou may have been exercising very strong influence on Mao during Snow's visit. Lin's role, after all, was hidden, and it was impossible to judge how much he personally was contributing to Mao's thinking. Chou's hand was readily visible, in several of the domestic policies and foreign policy initiatives developing from the Ninth Party Congress. One could be pretty sure that Chou in general liked the way in which Chinese policy was developing after that Congress, whereas one could only surmise that the same considerations that impelled Mao and Chou to move in that direction moved Lin too, or, at least, that whatever was all right with Mao was all right with his faithful servant Lin.

* Prior to Snow's visit, there was testimony from Chou himself that he cleared his important decisions with both Mao and Lin, and, in discussions and negotiations with foreign leaders, Chou had sometimes excused himself and left the room to get approval (presumably Mao's, possibly Lin's) of a draft or oral agreement before concluding it.

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Since the time of Snow's visit, Chou has said that certain decisions made by himself and others have been overruled by Mao, and Chou has again been directly observed to refuse to conclude agreements without Mao's approval. It is conceivable, of course, that all this has been a farce, but that has not been the impression of foreign observers on the spot, and it is not the view of this writer.

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
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


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Policy Toward the US: Mao took the lead, in his talks with Snow, in clarifying Peking's policy toward the US: to continue to explore the possibilities for an improvement in Sino-American relations at the government level (as in late 1969), but to emphasize initiatives which would mobilize the American people against their government (as suggested by Mao in his May 1970 statement and reportedly "decided" on by the August-September 1970 Party plenum). Mao made much clearer his view -- almost certainly Chou's too -- that improvement in relations at the government level would be most likely to derive from popular pressure on the US government.

Snow in his published articles reported that Mao "placed high hopes" on the American people (as his May 1970 statement had suggested) but did not expect a revolution in America in the near future. He quoted Mao to the effect that Peking (meanwhile) was considering admitting to China Americans of all political inclinations,

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and that he (Mao) would be happy to receive President Nixon. Mao took note that the Taiwan problem -- the central issue in Sino-American relations -- was not of Mr. Nixon's making but one created by earlier administrations.

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Snow reported publicly Chou En-lai's remarks in extension of Mao's. Chou too expressed "friendly feelings for the American people" (Peking had always professed these), said that American "friends of China" would always be welcome (unlike Mao, he did not suggest that all kinds of Americans would be welcome), and noted the possibility of an American "revolution" without indicating any early expectation of it. Chou too thought that the encouragement of domestic (as well as international) pressure on the US government was the profitable line in the shorter run, and he too emphasized the problem of Taiwan. He was pleased with gains in Peking's international position and with the progressive isolation of Taiwan and of the US and Japan on the Taiwan issue, but recognized that the US position was the crucial one. Chou described the Taiwan problem as the reason

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why Sino-American talks had made so little progress in their 15 years, and insisted that the US recognize Taiwan as an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China and withdraw its forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, after which China and the US could co-exist on the basis of Peking's "five principles."* Chou again insisted (a line from the Bandung period) that the status of Taiwan was not negotiable, being an "internal" affair, but that Peking was willing to negotiate an American withdrawal. He emphasized that any improvement in Sino-American relations at the government level depended on the "earnestness" with which Washington approached the Taiwan problem.

In sum, Snow found Mao to be in pretty good shape and still the dominant figure, Chou to have a much larger and more important role than in 1965, and Mao and Chou to be united in prophesying success for "people's diplomacy" toward the US in the next year or two while setting hard conditions for an improvement in state relations.

*Peking had all along called for a US withdrawal; the point on US recognition of Taiwan as an inalienable part of the PRC had been implied but not made explicit. In effect, thus, Chou was here raising Peking's asking price.

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The Mao-Chou Line, But Lin's Apparatus, Spring 1971

During the spring of 1971, Peking continued to carry out a mixed bag of domestic policies, radical and moderate, doctrinaire and pragmatic, which either derived from Mao's earlier pronouncements or were attributed to new directives from him. Some of these were almost certainly the product of the thought and influence of Chou En-lai. Party rebuilding around PLA leaders proceeded steadily, with the main beneficiary appearing to be Lin Piao. A striking initiative in "people's diplomacy" -- in which Chou's influence seemed especially strong -- raised hopes for an improvement in relations between Peking and Washington, but Chinese conditions for an improvement on the state level remained hard. The status of several Chinese leaders seemed to be clarified in the period, while that of others remained uncertain or became so.

A Domestic Mix and Party Rebuilding: It was possible, as demonstrated in People's Daily on the fifth anniversary of Mao's '7 May directive,' to treat most of the regime's domestic policies under the rubric of "revolutionization" as defined by Mao. The "revolutionization of the PLA" referred mainly to its saturation in Mao's thought, its involvement in all kinds of non-military activity, and its preparations for "people's war." The "educational revolution" included the Maoist content of the courses, the non-intellectual or even anti-intellectual character of teachers and students, the combination of study and labor. The "ideological revolutionization of the people" meant the class struggle, the emphasis on ideological incentives in promoting production, the "struggle-criticism-transformation" with its examinations and purges, and the re-education of cadres and intellectuals in the 7 May schools and the countryside. And in treating Party-

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rebuilding, it was possible to emphasize Mao's standards for "revolutionary successors," the concurrent purging of the Party and the rigorous examination of candidates.

But China's reconstruction could be viewed in less dramatic terms, even by some Chinese officials. The Chinese leaders could be seen as concerned mainly with restoring order (militarizing Chinese society in the process), rebuilding the educational system to reduce the distance between the intellectuals and the masses, indoctrinating everyone with old-fashioned virtues such as hard work and self-reliance and self-sacrifice, steadily strengthening the military establishment, attempting to strengthen the economic base through administrative decentralization and regional self-sufficiency (with "preparations against war" now important chiefly as an ideological incentive to promote production), streamlining and restaffing the central government, and -- most importantly -- rebuilding the Party apparatus around military leaders believed to be loyal but known to be conservative.

Party rebuilding proceeded steadily, if not quite as rapidly as expected (the last four provincial committees were not formed until late August). Whatever the role of Chou En-lai in this process, -- as de facto secretary-general he probably assembled these committees for the approval of Mao and Lin -- the main beneficiary

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still seemed to be Lin Biao.* The trend apparent early in the year -- the naming of military leaders to head the majority of the new provincial and major municipal Party committees, and all of the most important of them -- was strong throughout the spring. The related trend -- of the increasing movement of military figures into key positions in the re-emerging central Party apparatus and central governmental machinery -- also continued through the spring, although the military did not seem to dominate the central structure of power to the degree that they did the structure outside Peking.**

**Chou was the main beneficiary of one important campaign. The investigation, pursuit and extermination of the 5/16 Group -- whether viewed in terms of "class struggle," law-and-order, or revenge taken by Chou and his associates on their tormentors -- continued intensively. It was apparently nation-wide, and reportedly reached from the top of the Party to basic Party and non-Party organizations. Its public culmination seemed to come in early June with the public trial of Yao Teng-chen, an ex-diplomat and 5/16 Group leader who had been praised by Mao prior to playing a prominent role in the disruption of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the burning of the British mission in August 1967. Yao may have been sentenced to death.*

*** [] The regime's media throughout the spring continued to caution PLA officers against "arrogance" in dealing with others and "complacency" in their performance. As OCI noted as early as March, PLA officers were charged with "bureaucratic shortcomings reminiscent of those for which China's former-party officials were censured during the Cultural Revolution." However, the fact of PLA domination of the structure of power below the level of the politburo standing committee was not challenged, and this domination progressed steadily.*

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"People's Diplomacy": In autumn 1967 Mao and Chou had acted together -- probably on Chou's initiative -- to repudiate the highly counter-productive "Red Guard diplomacy" of 1966-67, and, following the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, Peking had returned its ambassadors to their posts, seeking first to enlist international opinion against a Soviet military attack but seeking also to gain further recognition of Peking and support for Peking's claim to position in international bodies. In autumn 1969 Peking had entered into negotiations with the USSR about the dangerous Sino-Soviet border situation and had made conciliatory gestures toward the US as well, but in May 1970 Mao had called for an anti-American united front of the world's people, including the American people. In August-September 1970 a Party plenum had reportedly ratified the leadership's decision (probably a Mao-Chou decision) to give greater attention to "people's diplomacy," and in early 1971 Mao and Chou had both told [redacted] it was their intention to undertake such diplomacy toward the US Government -- that is, to try to get domestic pressures brought to bear on the Administration to make those concessions to Peking which would be necessary for a substantial improvement in relations at the state level. The first such initiative came in early April 1971, with Chou's invitation to a US ping-pong team to visit China -- and its popular success was so striking as to seem to surprise Peking itself.*

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* [redacted] Peking's sharply-altered and much more conventional foreign policy continued, of course, to be presented as Mao's "revolutionary" foreign policy.

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The actual invitation to the US ping-pong team and journalists came three weeks after the US removal of restrictions on US travel to China.

Chou in mid-April put on a good show for the American visitors, forecasting much further traffic and speaking of the visit as opening a "new page" in Sino-American relations. This particular "new page," however, appeared to be one of "people's diplomacy," the exploitation of American public opinion willing and indeed eager to see an improvement in relations at the state level. There was general rejoicing in the Western press, and talk of the early establishment of diplomatic relations. However, Chou had not brought relations between the two governments even to the level enjoyed in the winter of 1969-70, when the Warsaw talks were last underway, and Chinese officials admitted during the April visit that they did not expect an early resumption of the talks. Such officials soon made clear that the fundamental issue between the two governments remained that of the status of Taiwan, and insisted that there had been no change in Peking's position on this issue.

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Whatever Chou's performance presaged for Sino-American relations, there were some obvious immediate gains for Peking's diplomacy. The gesture improved the atmosphere for general recognition of Peking and its admission to the UN, caused additional concern in Moscow about a possible Sino-American rapprochement, put pressure on Japan to be more forthcoming (lest it be left behind), and put additional strain on the already uneasy relationship between Washington and Taipei. Moreover, it was not entirely clear that there had been "no change" in Peking's position on Taiwan, because that position could be interpreted in various ways. For example, Peking might or might not insist on endorsement of its claim to Taiwan, might or might not demand an immediate withdrawal of US forces from the area, might or might not demand abrogation of the American-Nationalist defense treaty, and so on.

During the American visit, the US lifted a long-standing ban on direct trade with China and eased certain other restrictions. Soon thereafter, a major Peking commentary dismissed Washington's "gestures" to improve relations at the state level as a "vain attempt to ... extricate itself from its unprecedentedly isolated position at home and abroad."

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in the same period (early May), Chinese officials confirmed that the April invitation had been a part of Mao's united-front strategy stated publicly in May 1970, minimized the importance of recent US actions, and set forth a very tough interpretation of Peking's position on Taiwan -- including demands for recognition of Peking's sovereignty, for early withdrawal of all US forces, and for abrogation of the defense treaty (so that US forces could not be brought back.)

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On 20 May, a joint editorial on the anniversary of Mao's May 1970 statement instructed the international audience that Chou's performance was part of Mao's overall policy. The editorial took, as expected, a very hard line on the activities of US "imperialism"

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throughout the world, and pronounced Mao's united-front strategy a success, in America as elsewhere. The editorial had high praise for the "revolutionary struggle in various forms waged by the broad masses of the workers, Afro-Americans and other national minorities, students, women, soldiers and people of other strata against the Nixon government's policies..." It did not mention -- even to denounce -- recent US "gestures" (see above) toward China. Another commentary at the same time spelled out an important difference between the Bandung period of Chinese conciliation and the current period of Chinese policy: whereas in the Bandung years Peking had retreated from its policy of giving moral and material support to guerrilla wars in Southeast Asia (except in Vietnam), this 19 May commentary rejoiced at length in the contribution made to the anti-American united front by guerrilla movements in five Southeast Asian countries (Burma, Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia) in addition to Communist successes in the three Indochinese states.*

In late June, Chou En-lai in conversation with American newsmen offered a version of Peking's position on Taiwan which his audience interpreted as softer than that given by lesser spokesmen in May. In reasserting that the American military presence on Taiwan and in the Strait was the central problem and that if American forces were withdrawn and Chiang Kai-shek was no longer regarded as representing "China," all other problems

**The article did not mention the pro-Chinese guerrilla movement in Ceylon, as Ceylon already had a leftist government, with which Peking wanted good relations. Neither did it mention the guerrilla movement in East Pakistan being suppressed by West Pakistan, as the latter was Peking's ally against India.*

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


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could be solved, Chou did not mention the US-Nationalist defense treaty. This was of interest, because there had been speculation on the possibility of a tacit agreement on the treaty: that neither Peking nor Washington would draw attention to it. Other officials questioned about the treaty, however, reaffirmed that its abrogation was still a requirement. And immediately following the Chou talk, Peking publicly demanded the withdrawal from Taiwan and the Strait not simply of US forces but of American "imperialism" -- presumably meaning that the United States must sever all political, economic and military ties with the Nationalists. If that interpretation was correct, Peking was taking as stiff a position as it could possibly take, and was removing the ground for the hopes raised in many quarters in April that Peking itself was willing to make substantial concessions in order to improve relations. As of late June, it was still all "people's diplomacy" -- mobilizing American domestic pressure on the US Government to make the concessions.*




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Lin arrived with Mao for the May Day festivities and left with Mao, staying only a few minutes. He looked much as usual [REDACTED] He reappeared with Mao in June for the Rumanian visitors, and then dropped out, probably going with Mao to one of Mao's summer places. His status as Mao's ranking favorite and designated successor seemed to be confirmed by the regime's pronouncements throughout the spring and into July, and as previously noted, his position seemed to be strengthened by the course of Party rebuilding.

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Chou En-lai remained the featured public performer throughout the spring, handling the American visitors -- including the newsmen -- with great skill and entertaining several official foreign delegations. Presumably under Mao's and Lin's supervision, he almost completed during the spring the formation of the provincial and major municipal Party committees, made considerable

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progress in rebuilding the government, and made preparations for the National People's Congress. Those observers already disposed to see Chou as the dominant figure of the Chinese leadership -- that is, those most impressed by moderate and even anti-radical features of Chinese domestic policies and [redacted] Chou was "running the country" and in charge of rebuilding both the Party and the government, and those inclined to regard the military leaders of the new Party committees primarily as unaligned conservative forces rather than as pupils and proteges of Lin Piao's -- were strengthened in their belief by Chou's high visibility and assured manner. There seemed little doubt that Chou's position, as well as Lin's, was strengthened through the spring, but the regime's media continued to treat Chou as the Party's third-ranking figure (which as its de facto secretary-general he was), and were careful not to make him appear to be enhancing his personal position at the expense of the chairman or vice-chairman.

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Chen Po-ta, the Party's fourth-ranking figure, remained out of sight and almost certainly out of favor; the continued pursuit of the 5/16 Group, for whose outrages he had been held responsible, seemed sufficient testimony to this.* Kang Sheng, the fifth-ranking figure, out of sight since November 1970, returned briefly to view in early June, appearing with Mao, Lin and Chou for the Rumanians. Kang appeared in his proper place (with Chen missing, fourth), but, unlike Chou, he was not identified as a member of the Politburo standing committee and played only a small role with the Rumanians. Kang's return to some favor

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seemed strong evidence of Mao's continued domination of the Party, as Kang had been entirely Mao's man and unpopular with other leaders; nobody in the Party leadership except Mao (and Madame Mao) would seem both to have an interest in restoring him and enough power to do so.*

Madame Mao, the next-ranking leader and after Chen and Kang the ranking figure of the old central CRG, may have continued to run Mao's personal staff office (as she had in 1970) but seemed otherwise inactive.

Huang Yung-sheng, the next-ranking leader and chief-of-staff, remained very active and apparently in high favor, and seemed to move up to fourth place (behind Mao, Lin and Chou) among those leaders both active and in full favor. Huang may have replaced Chen, or both Chen and Kang, in the Politburo standing committee. Lin Biao's other proteges and close associates in the Politburo and the MAC -- Yeh Chien-ying, (Chou's friend), Madame Lin, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-peng, and Chiu Hui-tso (in apparent order of rank among the central military leaders), and the regional leaders Hsu Shih-yu and Chen Hsi-lien -- all apparently continued to prosper.

**As of April-May 1971, Kang had either returned to qualified favor, or had not yet been officially excluded from Mao's inner circle.*

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Further, Kang was included (as Chen Po-ta was not) in a group photograph of Party leaders posted in at least one park in Peking on May Day. And Kang's wife continued to hold important and sensitive posts in the central Party apparatus.

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Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, other active figures among the full members of the Politburo --and of special interest as officers of the old central CRG under Chen, Kang, and Madame Mao -- apparently remained in good favor despite the troubles of Chen and Kang. Chang and Yao moved between assignments in Peking and the Party's new Shanghai committee, which they had been named to head early in the year. The only other active full member, Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien, the Politburo figure closest to Chou En-lai and a credible successor as Premier, was active in various roles for Chou throughout the spring.

Hsieh Fu-chih, the Politburo member and security figure who had disappeared unaccountably in March 1970, reappeared briefly in the spring of 1971 as the first secretary of the Party's new Peking committee, a sensitive post requiring high favor. Hsieh was said by other Chinese officials to be "ill," and the circumstances of his reappearance in public in June indicated that he had indeed been ill. He was given the featured role in a call by Party leaders (several of whom ranked him) on the Rumanian general secretary, shook hands with his Chinese colleagues, was being helped to stand in a photograph appearing the next day, and then dropped out of sight again; his deputy acted for him through the rest of the visit.* As previously suggested, an attempted assassination of Hsieh in spring 1970 best fits the facts.

Two of the four alternate members of the Politburo clearly remained in favor. The provincial leader Chi Teng-kuei (a favorite of Mao's) and Li Te-sheng, director of the General Political Department and concurrently a pro-

*Hsieh in this appearance was given all of his known titles, but was not identified as Minister of Public Security; he may well have been relieved of this post.

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vincial Party chief, both were active and prominent. However, there was a marginal question about another, and a serious question about a fourth. Mao's man Wang Tung-hsing, the last-known director of the Central Committee's staff office, and the only remaining leader of Mao's personal political security group, was not identified in the post and was missing after May, although he may very well have been on special assignment.* Li Hsueh-feng, chairman of the Hopei revolutionary committee but out of sight since October 1970, remained among the missing, was passed over for the Party's new Hopei committee, and was probably in trouble.**

**Wang returned to view in November, after the purge of the central military leaders.*

***Li had been expected to lose his concurrent post of first political officer of the Peking MR, as it was believed that Lin Piao would reorganize this critical MR around people closer to himself; however, if Li were in favor at all, he should have been given the Hopei Party post (even if sick, just as Hsieh Fu-chih was given the Peking Party post when sick). Li could be linked to Chen Po-ta and the 5/16 Group*

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More Purges to Come: On 1 July, the 50th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, the three big journals -- People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily -- published an article on the Party's history which seemed to illustrate pretty well the current state of the leadership, but which also reaffirmed Mao's promise of further purges.

The long article -- probably written under the supervision of Mao's men Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan -- contended of course that Mao had been right at every stage of the Party's history, the source of all correct guidance. The article praised all of Mao's great campaigns of the 1950s, including such disasters as the "hundred flowers," the Great Leap Forward, and the commune program, during which substantial opposition to Mao developed. The article traced the preparations in the early 1960s for the Cultural Revolution, and the course of the Revolution since spring 1966, giving this period in the Party's history a bit more than proportional representation. The article praised the record of the PLA in the Cultural Revolution and its current role in the revolutionary committees, while sliding over the fact of its domination of the new provincial party committees. In a single reference to the Cultural Revolution Group (the first since December 1969), the article also praised the record of this group -- led entirely by Mao's proteges -- in the Cultural Revolution, while at the same time condemning certain extremist policies and actions for which (as the article did not admit) officers of the CRG had been held responsible. The article at several points praised the contributions of Lin Piao, and did not

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mention any other active leader.* The article nevertheless was a vindication of Chou En-lai's record, in that it endorsed those relatively moderate current policies which Chou symbolized.

The 1 July article reiterated Peking's scorn for "sham Marxists" and went on to imply that there were still a few onetime Party leaders left to "expose" -- presumably a reference to Chen Po-ta, whose case had not yet been surfaced -- and, in retrospect, conceivably a reference to Lin Piao and others. Whatever the scale of the purges yet to come in the wake of this first Cultural Revolution, the article reiterated Mao's promise (or hope) of launching additional Cultural Revolutions -- inevitably entailing further purges of those who would fail to "pass the test."

**The article cited Lin's report to the Ninth Party Congress as having "summed up the basic experience of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," and went on to say that this made it unnecessary to discuss the Revolution in further detail in this article. This handling of Lin's report was later taken as possible evidence of a change in Mao's thinking about Lin himself -- a change possibly reflected in certain remarks made by Chou En-lai to a group of visiting American Sinologists soon thereafter.*

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Apparent Prospects, Summer 1971

As of summer 1971, it seemed possible to offer a fairly confident account of the prospects for the Chinese Communist leadership -- that is, for Mao's continued domination, for Lin Piao as the successor, for Chou En-lai as a credible alternative successor to Lin if the latter's health were to prevent his accession, and for the character of the overall decision-making and policy-implementing process. As it was to turn out within just a few months, the assessment of Mao's and Chou's positions proved to be correct, but Lin was removed from the picture for other reasons than health, and the character of the apparatus was to be put into question. (Mao's strength was if anything understated.)

Mao: There was no reasonable doubt as to whether Mao was still the dominant figure. He clearly was.* He had been the dominant figure even in the early 1960s when, by his own account, the Party apparatus was not carrying out his policies in the spirit in which he had conceived them. And the record had shown overwhelmingly that Mao had designed and launched the Cultural Revolution, had purged those whom he wished to purge (no matter how popular), had saved those whom he wished to save (no matter how unpopular), and had rearranged the Party hierarchy to suit himself. Throughout the Cultural Revolution he had indeed been the Great (if incompetent) Helmsman, turning left and right as he thought necessary, often oversteering and forcing a new correction. Over the course of the Cultural Revolution as a whole, and moving from a primarily destructive to a primarily constructive stage, he had begun from extreme

*Cf. Webster's: to be "dominant: means "commanding, controlling, or having supremacy or ascendancy over all others," to be "superior to all others in guiding or directive influence."

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positions and had adjusted them painfully as the real world compelled him to, so that the overall movement from 1966 to 1971 had been from left to right: he had used the Red Guards to destroy the Party apparatus and then sent them to labor camps when they persistently refused to shape up; he had leashed and purged and unleashed and released and repurged the PLA, and had finally used it to restore order and had placed its leaders at the heads of the new Party committees throughout China; he had radically reformed Chinese society, but had called off the most extreme experiments and had kept it stable enough to make impressive gains in military and nuclear development; he had initiated the "revolutionization" of Chinese foreign policy, and had then -- when it proved massively counter-productive -- downgraded it in favor of an international united front; he had ordered the initiation of "people's diplomacy" against Washington, but he had also explored possibilities for improving state relations and had invited President Nixon to visit; and he had manipulated his various lieutenants at his pleasure, finally coming down hard on the side of his two chief lieutenants from the start -- Lin and Chou -- against their ultraleft challengers of the central CRG.

Moreover, the Mao Cult continued to flourish, if not so suffocatingly as the height of the Cultural Revolution. The portraits, the little red books, the quotations and the Mao study groups were everywhere. Mao's pronouncements and infrequent appearances were treated as epiphanies. Mao visibly dominated other Party leaders in talks with foreigners. These were reliable indicators, just as they had been for Stalin.

But it was thought that Mao's domination was not absolute -- was probably something less than Stalin's. And the degree of Mao's domination was debatable.

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In the view of the present writer, Mao remained able to purge any other Party leader or any small group of leaders, or to restore to favor any fallen leader. The fall of Chen Po-ta, the return to qualified favor of the obnoxious Kang Sheng, and the continued prosperity of other CRC leaders who were close only to Mao all seemed to attest to this.*

Similarly, it seemed that Mao could continue to dominate the decision-making process to the degree that he himself could decide when a given "moderate" policy -- current foreign policy, for example -- was no longer productive, and could put an end to it. It seemed possible that there was a limit, in some cases, to the degree that he could go in the opposite -- the radical -- direction. It was possible to imagine certain decisions -- for example, to match the PLA against Soviet military power in the border area or against American military power in the Taiwan Strait, or to return to "revolutionary" diplomacy across the board, or to undertake another Great Leap Forward, or to subordinate PLA leaders to old party cadres or young revolutionaries in the governing apparatus -- which Lin Piao, Chou En-lai and other leaders would resist. It was possible to imagine Mao being faced, in an extreme case of this kind, with a united front against him of such strength that he would be forced to back down. But it seemed likely, to the present writer, that in almost every case Mao would be able to carry other Party leaders with him -- first Lin and Chou, and the others following them.

* The belief in Mao's ability to purge any small group was founded on a simple proposition: that Mao could call a meeting of any such group, and could employ the Peking Garrison command (e.g., its 8341 Unit) to arrest them, before they could bring forces to bear.

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The true limit to Mao's power, with respect to policy, seemed to be this: that he could not turn China as a whole -- the entire ship-of-state -- hard left again, could not undertake another Cultural Revolution, of the kind he had promised (or threatened), another vast purge of the governing apparatus. It seemed very doubtful that even the Great Helmsman was strong enough to do that.

The reason for believing that there was at least this limit to Mao's powers was simply that the apparatus at all levels below the Politburo standing committee and any de facto secretariat was dominated by military men. In 1965, preparing for the great purge of the apparatus, Mao had an alternative system to use both to purge it and (if necessary) to replace it -- the PLA. But as of summer 1971 he had no apparent alternative to the PLA -- nothing, that is, that could purge and replace it against the will of the PLA's leaders. He and Lin Biao had managed to purge the PLA leadership severely in 1966-67 -- removing about half of the ranking hundred central and regional military figures -- but the PLA leaders who had loyally supported Mao and Lin at that time could not be expected to acquiesce now in another large-scale purge. It seemed likely that if the present leaders of the PLA were to see another purge on that scale shaping up, they would make common cause against Mao -- and that they would prevail. Since mid-1967, Mao himself had seemed to show a good sense of his dependence on the PLA, and seemed to have no wish to conduct another large-scale purge of it.

Assuming that Mao did not live long enough to try to carry out his threat of another Cultural Revolution, the prospect seemed to be for Mao to continue as the dominant figure so long as his health held.


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
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While there was no Stalin visible in the current Chinese leadership, a Chinese leadership under a deteriorating Mao could not be expected to behave like the leadership under a healthy and awe-inspiring Mao; various "radical" features of the current scene could be expected to diminish.

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Lin Piao: There was a reasonable doubt as to whether Lin, while second-ranking, was truly second in importance. This doubt derived from Lin's long disappearances, the poor impression he made when he did appear, the possibility that he was seriously ill, and the relative difficulty of demonstrating Lin's influence (as distinct from Mao's) on policy -- whereas Chou En-lai was furiously active and seemed almost tireless, dazzled almost everybody, and, on his record, was easier to associate with the relatively moderate policies since the Ninth Congress than Lin was.

But the disappearances in themselves did not really matter, as that was Lin's style, just as it was Mao's, and Lin was thought to be working with Mao most of the time that he was out of sight. The poor impression did not seem to greatly matter, either (many effective leaders, e.g. Stalin, were not physically or socially impressive), unless it did indeed reflect a serious illness. This seemed the most uncertain factor in the calculations of those observers (including the present writer) who believed that Lin would indeed be Mao's successor.

It had sometimes been possible to see Lin in action -- acting effectively and decisively, even repelling initiatives by other leaders. For example, Lin had given impressive performances at the August 1966 plenum that reorganized the leadership, at the October 1966 work conference that told regional and provincial leaders what would be demanded of them, in the period following the Wuban Incident in which the central CRG had sought a larger purge of the PLA leadership, in the period of the Yang Cheng-wu case in which CRG leaders had again called for a larger purge, in the entire course of reorganizing the PLA, and in the course of Party-rebuilding after Mao had given him (and Chou) this responsibility.

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Lin's influence since 1968 had been more often visible in personnel appointments than in policy. As a result of these appointments, Lin's position in the structure of power seemed to be very strong and growing stronger. As argued in previous papers, Lin overwhelmingly dominated, through his proteges, the central military leadership in Peking and the powerful military region headquarters (the only regional authorities). And he had more recently come to dominate through his proteges the most important of the provincial Party committees and several of the less important, and other proteges and comrades were moving increasingly into key positions in the central Party and government structures. This did not seem to be coincidental. Lin seemed to be working deliberately -- with Chou En-lai's apparent consent and assistance, and with Mao's presumed approval -- toward a position in which he could dominate the decision-making process and policy-implementing machinery after Mao's death.

It was thought that there would be greater limitations on Lin Piao as Mao's successor than there were on Mao. Lacking Mao's charisma, Lin would probably be unable to go as far in a radical direction as Mao had gone and still could go. And there would be the same basic limitation: Lin like Mao would be heavily dependent on his PLA comrades, and in a poor position to undertake any large-scale purge of them in a new Cultural Revolution. Lin's choice of both allies and enemies -- his seemingly good relations with Chou En-lai and conservative military men, and his seemingly poor relations with the radicals of the CRG -- suggested that he was not so predisposed to radical policies as Mao. And he had shown an even stronger sense of his dependence on the PLA -- as witness his behavior in the wake of the Wuhan Incident and the Yang Cheng-wu case. It was thought even possible that Lin had departed from Mao's policy on those occasions -- not in the sense of defying Mao (nobody had got away with

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that), but in heading off two initiatives which Mao did not oppose and would have let develop. If so, Lin's military comrades had additional reason to be loyal to him.*

The prospect for Lin seemed to be the same as for Mao: that he would dominate the Party, within more restricted limits than those on Mao, so long as his health held.

* There had been some development in the present writer's sense of Lin Piao. In the first examination of the record (1969), Lin had looked like a true Maoist in both senses of the term: not only loyal to Mao personally, but predisposed to be radical and militant to the same degree that Mao himself was so predisposed, and seeming to show little concern for his military comrades. In the second examination, looking less at what Lin had said and more at the pattern of his relationships (e.g. his apparently clear preference for Chou and his military comrades over the radicals of the CRG), it had seemed doubtful that Lin was in fact as predisposed to be radical and militant as Mao was. In the third examination, with the benefit of additional materials, the record seemed to support a probability judgment: Lin was not as radical and militant as Mao was. Moreover, Lin's behavior, at those times when the CRG leaders sought a larger purge of the PLA, seemed to give him relatively good marks in protecting his military comrades (those he believed loyal to Mao and to himself) against the initiatives of those more radical and militant than himself.

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Chou En-lai: A good case could be made for Chou rather than Lin as the successor: on the grounds of his intelligence, his wide experience and great ability, his popularity (even with Lin's proteges and comrades), and his strong positions in the Party apparatus and government machinery. But Chou had apparently made the fundamental decision of his life more than 35 years before, at the Tsunyi conference: to support Mao, rather than to bid for first place himself. And he had indeed supported Mao ever since, at every turn. As another observer had said, there had never been, and there was not now, a "Chou faction," in the sense of a Chou-led group seeking Chou's advancement at the expense of Mao.

To judge from his behavior in the Cultural Revolution (especially the course of Party rebuilding), Chou extended that decision to include Lin: to work faithfully for Lin, to do his best for him.

The Lin-Chou relationship had seemed to be a good one. They were temperamentally different types, and there was nothing in the record to indicate a close personal friendship. But the record seemed to show that they had worked well together: that after 1966 (when certain differences had been apparent) they had played mutually supporting roles in the Cultural Revolution, and had cooperated closely in Party-building, giving preferment in general to those with records of successful

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leadership rather than to ideologues and exhorters.* In matters of policy, Lin's predispositions, if less radical than Mao's, seemed more radical than Chou's, but Chou was expected to exert a very strong influence on Lin through the full range of policy, and to have virtually a free hand in the conduct of foreign policy. In other words, Lin appeared to recognize his dependence on Chou for management just as he recognized his dependence on the PLA for power. Chou's influence, like that of Lin's military comrades, seemed likely to move Lin in a moderate direction -- that is, toward the right side of the range of Maoist policies to which Lin had sworn fidelity.

Thus the prospect for Chou seemed what it had always been: to remain the indispensable man, with strong influence on the chairman.

**As noted in earlier papers, if Lin and Chou had been working against each other, there should have been some sign of it in the previous two or three years, when each had had direct access to Mao and thus an opportunity to argue that the other was trying to build an "independent kingdom." But in fact Chou's role had been enhanced, and he had apparently been using this larger role, in Party-building, to put together the kind of Party that would be most useful to Lin as the successor. This could, of course, come to be regarded by Mao as an "independent kingdom" (premature power, in this case), but Mao seemed to want to leave his designated successor in the strongest possible position.*

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The Politburo Standing Committee: As suggested above, Mao had always seemed to be at the center of the decision-making process, as he told Snow: pointing the direction and signing the directives; and with the dominance to carry other Party leaders with him at whatever point he made up his mind. However, Mao had probably not reached his most important decisions in isolation; he had consulted Lin Piao (believed to be almost constantly with him) and Chou En-lai (his principal executive), he had operated through the standing committee of the Politburo, and he had sometimes worked through the full (voting) Politburo.

The organizational core of power in China was the Politburo standing committee, not the full Politburo. This was because the standing committee was empowered to act for the Politburo when the Politburo was not in session, and the Politburo was not often in session. In practice, this meant that the Politburo standing committee made those decisions which the Party's officers (Mao and Lin) had not already made, including the decisions as to which policy matters to pass on to the full (voting) politburo for a vote or for discussion. In other words, the Politburo did not even consider a policy matter unless the Politburo standing committee wanted it to do so. The Politburo standing committee also set up and supervised the entire Party apparatus, including the Military Affairs Committee which for some years had been the most important component of it.

Between the end of 1966 and the winter of 1969-70, the Politburo standing committee had consisted of the Big Three of Mao, Lin and Chou, plus Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, the two ranking leaders of the central CRG. This meant that there were four left-inclined leaders (Mao, Lin, Chen and Kang) and only one right-inclined leader (Chou) in the organizational core of power. As it had turned out, however, Chen and Kang had taken up positions which Mao defined as ultra-left and unacceptable, and their decline was almost certainly due in part to opposition

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which they offered in the meetings of this standing committee to the policies favored by Mao, Lin and Chou. Thus since the winter of 1969-70 or thereabouts the effective standing committee had consisted of Mao, Lin and Chou, whether operating formally as the three remaining active members of the standing committee or just meeting informally as three old comrades who had worked well together for more than 35 years. Chen Po-ta had probably been officially dropped from the standing committee, and Kang Sheng, while perhaps nominally still a member, was probably not active in this role. Chen and Kang probably had been or were soon to be replaced by one or two other figures.

The composition of this standing committee was an important matter, particularly under a leader less personally dominant than Mao. The replacement or replacements for Chen and Kang would presumably be drawn from the four or five next-ranking figures on the Politburo -- that is, from among Madame Mao (of the old central CRG), Huang Yung-sheng (Lin's C/S), Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan (the two officers of the old central CRG next-ranking to Chen, Kang and Madame Mao), and perhaps Li Hsien-nien (Chou's principal vice-premier). The leading candidate looked to be Huang Yung-sheng, a longtime protege and friend of Lin Piao and apparently close to Chou En-lai as well. There seemed better than an even chance that Huang was already a de facto member of the standing committee.

The Full Politburo: The role of the full Politburo, as suggested above, was whatever Mao, Lin and Chou wanted it to be. They did not have to call it into session at all, they did not have to submit policy questions to a vote, and they could probably reverse any vote by making clear their displeasure with it and resubmitting the question. While there was no record that the Politburo had ever actually voted, it may have, and it seemed likely that Mao had sometimes used it as a genuine discussion group and had been influenced by it.

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As previously argued, the Politburo was probably of greater importance as a sounding-board and discussion group than as a voting body. It was well-composed to discuss almost any political or military matter, but only Chou and Li Hsien-nien were qualified to speak to economic matters; it may have been Lin's intention to add some younger economic specialists (ex-PLA leaders).

The Central Party Apparatus: Peking had told the world very little about the re-emerging central Party apparatus below the Politburo level.

The best-known component was the Military Affairs Committee (MAC), which was responsive directly to the Politburo standing committee and which controlled the PLA. Apart from Lin Piao as the de facto chief (Mao was the chairman) and three vice-chairmen (two inactive), the officers of the MAC had not been identified for more than three years. However, the key figures (the MAC standing committee members) were believed to be more or less those reported in 1969, with one dropped and one added. Of the nine in addition to Lin himself, seven were longtime proteges of Lin -- associated with him in their early careers, given preferment by him after he became the military chief in 1959, and chosen for his elite team in the Cultural Revolution. Some of these men had long been close to Huang Yung-sheng as well.

The only Party organ below the level of the Politburo standing committee with the potential to be as powerful as the MAC already was would be a new Party secretariat. As noted previously, the central CRG had reportedly functioned as the de facto secretariat after mid-1966, but the new Party constitution of 1969 had made no provision for a new secretariat and the CRG had gone out of business in or about winter 1969-70.

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There had been no clue to whether Chou En-lai as the de facto secretary-general of the Party was working with another de facto secretariat -- each member of which would have the responsibility for one large area of concern -- or was simply working through the re-emerging central departments of the Party, keeping the work of coordination in his own hands. If a de facto secretariat existed, it was thought to include some of those leaders of the old central CRG still in favor (e.g. Yao Wen-yuan, a propaganda specialist, and Wang Tung-hsing, a political security specialist), some key figures of the MAC (e.g. Yeh Chien-ying, a military-political coordinator and Chou's longtime friend, and Wu Fa-hsien, the head of special organs for political security work in the PLA during the Cultural Revolution), and the longtime economic coordinator Li Hsien-nien (Chou's vice-premier and personal friend).

The only other Party organ regarded as directly responsive to the Politburo standing committee in recent years had been a de facto political security directorate -- never demonstrated to exist -- under Kang Sheng, Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Tung-hsing. With the decline of Kang and incapacitation of Hsieh, and especially if a de facto secretariat existed, this directorate (if it existed at all) may well have gone out of business.

The most important of the central departments -- that is, of those Party organs operating just below the level of those that reported to the Politburo standing committee -- was still the General Political Department, concerned with indoctrination and surveillance of the PLA. Answerable to the MAC administrative unit and to Chou En-lai, its officers -- Director Li Te-sheng and six known or conjectured deputies -- were of course career PLA officers. Li, not a longtime protege of Lin Piao, was apparently chosen to head this very sensitive department on his excellent record in the Cultural Revolution.

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Only a few of the other central departments of the Party had been reported as active again, and only a few of their officers had been identified. However, of the few identified and reported officers and of the many other persons known to be working in the central apparatus in unspecified posts, there was a very high proportion of PLA officers.

The staff office was known to be operating, with broad responsibilities in the Party's administrative and political security work. Its director was perhaps still Wang Tung-hsing, Mao's man, but its only recently-identified officer was a PLA leader, Yang Te-chung.* Another PLA leader might have taken over the section charged with the physical security of Party leaders. The director of the staff office was likely to head concurrently any resurrected Party committee for organs subordinate to the Central Committee.

No new political security department (a current version of the old social affairs department) had been identified, although the "special investigation groups" called for by Mao in 1962 [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] were presumably part of such a department. It might have been formed by degrading the political security directorate discussed above. Wang Tung-hsing may have been heading this department, whether concurrently with the staff office or not. Other possibilities as officers were two of the few security specialists surviving the Cultural Revolution (Yu Sang and Feng Hsuan).

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The once highly important organization department, all of the leaders of which were purged in the Cultural Revolution, had not been surfaced but had been reported in operation. Its director was said to be a little-known PLA officer from the northeast (Kuo Yu-feng, possibly a protegee of a Lin protegee). Another officer was said to be Kang Sheng's wife, Tsao I-ou, who may have headed the Higher Party School concurrently

*Wang was subsequently identified as still the director of the staff office.

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The propaganda department, all of the leaders of which had been purged, was another department which had not been surfaced but seemed to be in operation. Yao Wen-yuan of the old central CRG had been surmised to supervise or head this department; if not Yao, the head was probably a PLA officer. Snow had found PLA men to dominate the propaganda apparatus at every level encountered, and, of a group of six recently-identified directors of central propaganda organs likely to be officers of the propaganda department, four were PLA officers.*

The international liaison department, dealing with foreign Communist Parties and highly important in the conduct of foreign policy, was known to be operating, headed by Keng Piao, a longtime protege of Chou En-lai. Most of the apparent deputies were old cadres, but some were PLA officers.

The relatively unimportant united front department had been the first to be surfaced, but none of its officers had been identified. The likely candidates were mostly old cadres.

None of the departments of the "production" area of the central Party apparatus -- e.g. economic planning, finance and trade, industry and commerce, rural work -- had been identified or reported. The experience of the PLA in supervising and performing such tasks in recent years -- together with the trend in staffing government ministries -- suggested that most of the officers of "production" departments would be military men.

* Chou En-lai was later to say that Yao supervised all propaganda organs; this could have been from above or within this department.

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There were about 150 persons working in the central Party apparatus whose names but not posts had been given by Peking, and whose departments had not been otherwise identified or surmised. Of these, more than half of those whose backgrounds were known were PLA officers.

Thus the visible Party apparatus below the level of the Politburo, the MAC, and any de facto secretariat was dominated by military men, and most of the rest of it was expected to turn out to be. Apart from the officers of the MAC, few of these military men were known to be longtime proteges of Lin Piao. But Lin and Chou seemed to be acting together to assemble a central Party apparatus which would be reliably responsive to Lin as Mao's successor, or, if Lin too were out of the picture, to be responsive to Chou and Huang Yung-sheng as the likely successors.

The Central Government Machinery: The central government machinery showed the same impact of the PLA and seemed headed in the same direction. Here again, Chou En-lai had not used his dominant position as Premier to give the leading positions predominantly to his own proteges or to restore former proteges who fell in the Cultural Revolution, but had assembled a stripped-down machine in which military men held most of the leading posts.

The trend toward military domination of the government machinery had been evident since the start of the Cultural Revolution. The MAC had long had control of the Ministry of National Defense and of the National Defense Scientific & Technological Commission (R & D of advanced weapons), and early in the Cultural Revolution had taken possession of the National Defense Industries Office (production of all advanced weapons), coordinating

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the work of all of the ministries of machine building*; and military control commissions had been given "supervisory" authority over almost all central government organs, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chou En-lai as premier had been hyperactive, without PLA supervision except through Lin Piao on the Politburo standing committee, and with Li Hsien-nien as his principal deputy. None of the old staff offices, coordinating the work of the various kinds of ministries, had been reported as back in business. Many of the ministries had been merged, and some ministries and commissions had been abolished. As things stood in August, some 26 ministries and commissions had been reported by Peking as active again. Of the 26, the leading groups of two, National Defense and Foreign Affairs, were well known. Lin dominated the former directly and through his proteges, and Chou dominated the latter through his proteges, although several PLA figures had been added to the MFA

The heads of 10 others had been identified. Of these, seven were PLA officers, who (judging from the one observed case) retained their PLA affiliation and wore their uniforms. Many other military men appeared in the lists of functionaries of unidentified departments of the State Council (central government), and many of these were expected to appear in key posts in the ministries and commissions thus far surfaced and yet to be surfaced. In sum, as was found to be the case with the central Party apparatus, most of the visible central government machinery below the level of Chou and his vice-premiers was dominated by military men, most of the rest was expected to be, and Chou seemed to be assembling a government machine which would be responsive to Lin as well as to himself.

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**A year later, the ND10 was returned to State Council supervision, but the MAC kept control of the ministry concerned with missiles.*

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The greatest interest in the central government machinery was of course in those key positions which -- it was expected -- would be announced by the NPC in the near future. It was possible that Mao would decide to be chairman of the PRC again (a post which, it was now known, he sought to relinquish before the failure of the Leap Forward, but which many observers had seen as a demotion) or Lin might take it to further ease the transition. Several old-timers were eligible to replace Chu Te as the head of the NPC standing committee. But it did not seem to matter who held these ceremonial posts. It seemed virtually certain that Chou would continue as premier (there was no one else who could do this job -- by far the most important in the government -- anything like as well), and that a protege of Chou's (such as acting minister Chi Peng-fei) would be named Minister of Foreign Affairs, despite rumors that Mao's man Yao Wen-yuan would get this post. (Yao would seem unsuited to flexible diplomacy.) Lin Piao was expected to continue to dominate the Ministry of National Defense, through a protege such as Huang Yung-sheng if Lin did not want to keep the post himself. If the staff offices were resurrected, men close to Lin were expected to appear at the head of at least those concerned with machine-building (weapons) and with internal security. As for specific ministries and commissions, proteges of Lin were expected to head the Scientific & Technological Commission, the Ministry of Seventh Machine-Building (missiles: a Lin protege was already in this post), and the Ministry of Public Security. Aside from this, it seemed that Lin could afford to give Chou a free hand in naming the heads of staff offices and ministries and commissions, secure in the knowledge that Chou would name the best men he could find, whether PLA leaders or old Party and government cadres.

The Provincial Party Apparatus: The provincial Party apparatus -- that is, the new Party committees in the 26 provinces and three major municipalities -- had shown the same pattern of domination by the military that had been seen in the revolutionary committees that pre-

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ceded them and were now subordinate to them, and in the visible portion of the central Party apparatus and central government machinery. Of the 29 committees, 20 were headed by career PLA officers (12 commanders, eight political officers, all of whom had apparently retained their military posts concurrently), seven by old Party cadres (mostly serving as political officers concurrently), and two by men who had devoted much of their careers to security work of various kinds. In most of the provinces in which the first secretary was an old Party cadre rather than a career PLA officer, the next two ranking secretaries were career military men. In only one case was there a representative of mass organizations (revolutionary youth) among the three ranking secretaries of the new committee.

The composition of the secretariats of the new provincial Party committees was not radically different from the composition of the revolutionary committees which they had displaced as the principal governing bodies. In the great majority of cases, the new first secretary had been the chairman of the revolutionary committee, and the other secretaries had been officers of it. In most of the few exceptions to this pattern, the old head of the revolutionary committee had proved unable to deal effectively with factional activity and had been removed from his post some months or even years before the new Party committees were formed.

This question of the composition of the new Party committees was almost certainly one of those that had got Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng into trouble. Whereas Mao had originally envisaged rehabilitated Party cadres as the leading elements of the new Party committees and as late as spring 1969 seemed to be calling for an upgrading of the position of representatives of mass organizations, his main concern had apparently come to be the establishment of an effective governing apparatus at the provincial level, which meant the domination of the new Party committees by military leaders and the

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virtual exclusion of the young revolutionaries who had persisted in "factional" activity. By autumn 1969, the central CRG was being asked to confirm in their leading positions the military men whom they had most offended, and to cut away their own political base. With the assignment of Party-rebuilding to Lin Piao and Chou En-lai in late 1969 or early 1970, Chen and Kang were on the way out, and were finished by mid-1970.

The new Party committees strikingly displayed proteges of Lin Piao in the most important posts. Even more markedly here than in his reconstruction of the central Party apparatus, Chou seemed to be self-abnegating and to be doing his best for the designated successor.

Of the 29 provinces and major municipalities, 11 -- ten provinces and Peking -- contained the headquarters of military regions (MRs). Of these 11 strategic committees, seven were headed by proteges of Lin Piao, and in the other four cases proteges of Lin ranked second or third among the secretaries.* In seven of these most important committees (Kiangsu, Kwangtung, Liaoning, Hupei, Fukien, Shantung, Sinkiang), proteges of Lin headed two (Kiangsi and Tsinghai), old cadres who had worked for Lin in the past and whom he may have sponsored more recently headed two others (Honan and Hopci),

**In one of these four cases -- the Yunnan committee -- a longtime protege of Lin was scheduled to become the first secretary of the new Party committee but died suddenly (possibly by assassination) in December 1970; his deputy was then named first secretary, a protege of a Lin protege was moved in from another area to take the post of second secretary, and an "old friend" of Lin's was named to the third spot.*

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the proteges of Lin proteges headed two (Kweichow and Heilungkiang), and there were Lin proteges among the lesser figures of one of these (Hopei) and four others (Hunan, Kwangsi, Kirin and Tientsin). In eight of the 29 there were no visible proteges of Lin's: Shanghai, Anhwei, Chekiang, Shensi, Shansi, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Ninghsia; in some of these cases, however, the leaders included men singled out by Lin for special favor during the Cultural Revolution. In only one case -- Shanghai -- was the new committee headed by someone who was a protege of another primary leader (Mao), in this instance a person probably uncongenial to Lin (Chang Chun-chiao of the old central CRG), but Shanghai was not a base of significant military power. While there was a striking absence of proteges of Chou En-lai in these provincial and major municipal Party committees, this provincial Party apparatus, like the central Party apparatus and central government machinery, was expected to prove responsive to Chou and others (e.g. Huang Yung-sheng) if Lin were out of the picture.

The chief problem for Peking, with respect to this new provincial Party apparatus, seemed to lie in working out the relationship between the military structure which had been the real governing apparatus outside Peking for the past four years and the Party structure which was eventually to replace it as the primary instrument of command and control. For one thing, there was no known party secretariat equivalent to the MAC to direct the party apparatus. At the provincial level, Peking had of course reduced its problems in one sense by giving the great majority of Party posts to PLA leaders concurrently, but it was uncertain which chain of command-and-control they would obey. Moreover, in the cases of those committees headed by old Party cadres, it was at least questionable whether the military leaders of the area who were in subordinate positions on the Party committees would accept the leadership of the cadres rather than responding only to orders from the MAC and the MR commanders. Further, absence of a

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regional Party apparatus meant that the most important figures outside Peking for some time to come would continue to be the leaders of the MR headquarters, who could not be given orders by any provincial leader and might regard themselves as entitled to give orders to civilian provincial leaders.* However, whatever the problems with chains-of-command and lateral relationships, the provincial Party apparatus seemed to be one which, in general, would work well for Lin and/or Chou.

The Leadership in Sum: As of summer 1971, Mao was expected to continue to dominate the Chinese leadership until his death or disablement, and to be able -- if he so chose -- to reverse any of the current "moderate" policies. He was not expected to attempt to carry out another Cultural Revolution -- the only venture which seemed likely to result in his overthrow. The Party, governmental, and military structures were expected to be generally responsive to him. Lin Piao was expected to succeed, but not to dominate the leadership to the degree that Mao had. Chou En-lai was expected to be even more important to Lin than he had been to Mao, and to have even more influence on Lin than he had had on Mao, holding Lin more to the right than he had been able to hold Mao. While there could be no guarantee that Lin and Chou would work well together, they were expected to do so. The military establishment which Lin had built was expected to

**The composition of the 11 MR headquarters was analyzed in detail in earlier papers. It was concluded that nine of the 11 were dominated by Lin's proteges and seemed secure from Lin's putative point of view, and that of the major MRs only the Peking MR still seemed to require reorganization; since the time of writing, Lin was thought to have taken action on this, but the new leaders had not been identified. In hindsight, it appears that Lin was prevented from naming his proteges to lead the Peking MR.*

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continue to be responsive to him, and the new Party apparatus which he and Chou were building together was expected to be reliably responsive to them both, or to either as the survivor. If these various judgments were correct, it did not seem to make a great deal of practical difference whether the survivor was to be Lin or Chou.

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