



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

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


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**DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE**

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Intelligence Report

MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ITS LEADERSHIP,
ITS STRATEGY, ITS INSTRUMENTS, AND ITS CASUALTIES
(REFERENCE TITLE: POLO XXII)



Top Secret

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18 February 1967

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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ITS LEADERSHIP,
ITS STRATEGY, ITS INSTRUMENTS, AND ITS CASUALTIES

This is a working paper of the DD/I Research Staff. It offers a fairly detailed narrative account of Mao Tse-tung's "cultural revolution" as it has developed since September 1965, a summary of that account, and some speculation on prospects.

This study presents what has been and remains in most respects a minority view, the view of one "school." It finds the evidence persuasive for the propositions that (a) Mao has taken the initiative at each stage, (b) he has been conducting a massive "test" of party leaders and the party apparatus, (c) changes in the leadership have represented primarily a purge directed by Mao, and only secondarily a "power struggle," (d) the entire effort has developed coherently, given its irrational base in dogma, and (e) Mao is now carrying out methodically and in general successfully a scheme for the reorganization of the party which he outlined last autumn.

Because a great deal of the most valuable material [redacted] on each stage of the revolution to date came to hand well after the fact, the study presents developments both as they appeared at the time and as they looked when further illuminated. Not all of the facts are in yet, and material still to be received may compel a change in some of the present conclusions.

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The DDI/RS would welcome further comment on this working paper, addressed to either the Chief or the Deputy Chief of the Staff [redacted]

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For when you defeat me in an election
simply because you were, as I was not, born
and bred in a log cabin, it is only a ques-
tion of time until you are beaten by someone
whom the pigs brought up out in the yard.

-- Randall Jarrell

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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ITS LEADERSHIP,
ITS STRATEGY, ITS INSTRUMENTS, AND ITS CASUALTIES

Summary

The "great proletarian cultural revolution" is said by Peking to have derived from a number of specific initiatives taken by Mao Tse-tung between autumn 1962 and autumn 1965. While most of these cannot be confirmed, the "revolution" from the start has obviously been Mao's. It has grown out of concepts evident as far back as 1958, and in particular out of Mao's conviction--stated publicly and emphatically in mid-1964--of the urgency of the need for revolutionary successors whom he could trust to carry out his will.

Mao's obsession with this need--and his consequent insistence on conducting a massive "test" and thorough purge of the Chinese party--has been the central fact of the "revolution." The revolution has not seemed to represent a "power struggle" in the sense of a struggle for dominance in the leadership; the group around Mao, and in particular Mao himself, has been dominant in the leadership in all stages. Mao's initiative in each of these stages has been confirmed by both open and clandestine materials.

Changes in the composition of the group around Mao--changes coming sometimes thick and fast--have seemed to represent primarily changes in Mao's own evaluation of his lieutenants. Some of the changes probably also reflect a contest for position, below Mao, among his lieutenants, looking toward an early succession. While the purge did not begin with such a contest, and the contest has been secondary all along to Mao's initiatives, this maneuvering for position is probably an increasingly important factor.

Moreover, there has clearly been a struggle--which continues--against resistance to Mao's will on the part of the vast apparatus of the party, the government and the military establishment, from the top level down. While there is no declared opposition, this is a struggle to make the apparatus, both in the center and in the provinces, fully responsive to Mao's new team.

The First Test: The "Poisonous Weed"

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The opening gun of the "revolution" was fired, [redacted] in early November 1965, in an article attacking a playwright whose earlier work was genuinely critical of Mao. Mao apparently did not tell other party leaders--with a few exceptions--that he intended a particular anti-Mao play to serve as a test of ideology and loyalty for his entire "cultural" apparatus and for the highest leaders of the party machine which supervised it. In other words, Mao was making a major

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initiative without providing clear guidance as to what response was desired, with the intention of punishing those who made the wrong response. He was probably determined from the start to purge Peng Chen, who had already failed him as director of the "cultural" purge, and whose own Peking committee sheltered the attacked playwright and itself contained some writers who had bitterly criticized Mao.

Immediately after the attack on the playwright appeared, Minister of Defense Lin Piao, who was being rapidly built up as the foremost and ideal student of Mao's thought, issued a directive on the work of the PLA which stated the general criterion for the testing of party officials as well--whether they regarded the works of Mao as the "highest instructions" for their own work. Soon thereafter, in late November 1965, Mao left Peking, to sketch or observe the development of the "cultural revolution," and possibly to undergo medical treatment. Lo Jui-ching and Yang Shang-kun, both in posts that made them dangerous, disappeared at this time, probably arrested. At the same time, Lin Piao's PLA newspaper took the lead in defining the immediate "cultural" issue and forcing others to declare themselves--the question of whether the attacked playwright's work was a "poisonous weed" (the Maoist position) or a matter for debate (the "enemy" position).

In mid-January 1966, Mao called together a few party leaders and his own wife (then a minor figure)--a group which later emerged as the "cultural revolution group" directing the campaign--to discuss the unsatisfactory situation, but he did not immediately replace the original group then operating under Peng Chen. In February, Peng issued a self-serving report on the cultural revolution in the name of the politburo--possibly approved by Liu Shao-chi, in Mao's absence from Peking--and he and Lu Ting-i did not act to bring the party press into line with the PLA newspaper on the issue of the "poisonous weed." Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, the supervisors of both Peng and Lu, also failed to take this action. Unlike Peng and Lu, who could not afford to uncover a trail leading to themselves, Liu and Teng need not have

been consciously resisting what they took to be Mao's will in that period; while they may have been (if the charges of opposition to Mao in September 1965 are true), they may instead simply have failed to understand what he wanted, have lacked the illumination of his already-revealed "thought" and the revolutionary ardor which (in Mao's view) would have shown them the "correct" line without specific guidance. While neither Liu nor Teng fell entirely out of Mao's favor at this time, and Teng may have gone on to play an important role in the purge of Peng Chen, the poor performance of the party press during the winter apparently created or strengthened Mao's reservations about Liu, and perhaps about Teng as well. Wall-poster assertions that some of Mao's lieutenants (not Liu and Teng) were plotting a "rebellion" or "coup" in February (during his absence) seem to be a deliberate corruption of a still-obscure but apparently minor incident of that month. In fact, there is no evidence of any important initiative by any of his lieutenants during that winter.

In March, still in Mao's absence, Mao's wife began her spectacular rise to the top, working then--with Lin Piao--on the problem of the political reliability of the PLA. Later in March, Peking announced that Mao was not ill--meaning, perhaps, that he had recovered, possibly from an operation in February. On the same day, Liu Shao-chi--who knew or suspected that his own status was now in question, as (it was later learned) he told someone so at the time--was sent abroad for a month.

By the end of March, Mao was back in action, clearly in command. He intervened in the Chinese party's negotiations with the Japanese party, peremptorily rejecting their draft communique and thus reversing several of his top lieutenants. Peng Chen disappeared from sight at that time, and the party press very quickly discovered that the work of the anti-Mao playwright was indeed a "poisonous weed." The party's Peking committee under Peng Chen tried to protect its own leaders by joining the attack on lesser figures, but Mao's spokesmen carried the attack in their direction.

[Redacted]

Preparing the Ground: The Conventional Apparatus

In early April, the PLA newspaper publicly forecast the course of the next several months--a wide-scale if not high-reaching purge. The "cultural revolution" then began for the public in late April and May, with meetings and rallies of all elements of the population to denounce the "black gang" uncovered in Peking (the attacked playwright and his friends on the Peking committee), and to swear allegiance to Mao's thought. Throughout this April-May period, the conventional party apparatus under Liu and Teng, using conventional methods, was in charge of the conduct of the "cultural revolution". Liu and Teng, given in effect another chance, seemed to be doing a good, routine job; there was nothing in the materials of the period to suggest that the party apparatus itself would be displaced by extraordinary vehicles in later stages.

Mac reappeared near Shanghai in early May, looking good.

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[Redacted]

At a party meeting later in May, Mao gave some further guidance--but again, apparently, unclear guidance--on the conduct of the "revolution".

Failure of the Apparatus: The Work-Teams

With the ground prepared in April and May, on 1 June the party began to move against the range of cultural and educational organizations and in particular against the educators, the most important of whom were concurrently secretaries of the party committees in their institutions. Liu and Teng, presumably on the basis of a

good performance in April and May, were still in charge of implementing the "revolution." The instrument of the "revolution" in June--almost certainly approved by Mao in the May meeting--was the "work-team." These small teams, which had been used before in the countryside, were named by higher party bodies and assigned to investigate and reorganize educational and cultural bodies; the teams commonly followed or effected the removal of the principal administrators and party secretaries, and took charge.

With a few exceptions, the work-teams failed to back the most militant elements on the campuses (and elsewhere), and in many cases suppressed them in the same ways as had the local party leaders whom the work-teams had dislodged. The work-teams clearly did not have a directive to support such elements, and Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping have been principally blamed for this. While Mao's spokesmen have encouraged the view that Liu and Teng were consciously sabotaging Mao's policy, and this may be true, the evidence is good that again they did not have a clear directive from Mao himself. In other words, Mao had again set them a test, and again--whether deliberately, or from lack of understanding--they had failed to do what he wished, together with much of the party apparatus.

Beginning at the end of June, probably on Mao's initiative, there was intervention on the campuses by officers--including Mme. Mao--of what was soon to be revealed as the "group in charge of the cultural revolution," plus the more prestigious and adroit Chou En-lai. These leaders apologized to the "revolutionary students" for the "mistakes" of the work-teams, and backed the militants against the teams, which were withdrawn in the next month.

The New Directorate and the New Directive

For the rest of the summer, Mao and the new figures in his favor were improvising. The new central "cultural

revolution group" under Chen Po-ta (Mao's long-time writer) was surfaced in early July. The new instruments of the revolution, immediately formed, were to be "revolutionary committees" responsive to the central group, chosen by election and directed to "give a free rein to the masses" (meaning the militants). On the campuses, these committees initiated another and longer period of at least partially directed violence, against "enemies" identified in the earlier stages. Off the campuses, the "revolution" was also proceeding turbulently, although with less violence and disruption of normal activity.

In early August, Mao reportedly declared his favor directly--in a wall-poster--for the militant students. At the same time Chou En-lai and Mme. Mao both began to prepare the students--some already organized as Red Guards--for large-scale action against the party apparatus, telling them not to dissipate their forces by fighting among themselves, but to concentrate them against enemies in the party. Then on 8 August the party central committee--then in plenum--issued a 16-point directive for the conduct of the "revolution" in which militant exhortations were foremost and which served to encourage the militant students who were soon to be turned loose on the party apparatus.

The 8 August directive--the main lines of which were credibly attributed to Mao personally--stated the party's aim of bringing down the opponents of Mao's line in the party, praised the revolutionary young, predicted "fairly strong" resistance, called for this to be attacked with "daring...above everything else," told the party not to fear "disorder," and stated that "all forces must be concentrated to strike" against the "main target...in the party." It went on to classify all party officials according to their attitudes toward the revolution, warned them against counter-attacking the revolutionaries, and reassured them that they would not be criticized by name in the press (i.e. officially condemned) without higher-level approval. In sum, the directive incited the revolutionary young against the party apparatus without providing them with any clear criterion for distinguishing between those loyal to Mao's thought and those disloyal,

while keeping in the party leadership's hands the later decision as to whom actually to purge.

The New Team and the Red Guards

This party plenum which had produced the 16-point directive lasted through 12 August. There is some evidence that a minority showed resistance in this plenum to Mao's plans for the further conduct of the revolution, in particular the plan for the further subordination of the conventional party apparatus and for attacks on it by the Red Guards about to emerge. Party spokesmen have implied that Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping led the resistance forces at the plenum, but it is not clear whether they were in open opposition to Mao or (in defending themselves against charges) simply said things that were taken as open opposition because Mao was already determined to break them. In any case, Liu and Teng were demoted by the plenum (Teng, the junior, was not held responsible to the same degree for the pair's "errors"), and Lin Piao was "unanimously" elected as the party's (sole) vice chairman. Lin addressed the plenum, identifying himself completely with Mao, stating his favor for the militants, announcing the new team's plans for reorganizing the party according to Mao's principles for the cultivation of revolutionary successors, reiterating the team's intention to purge those who proved to be hard-case incorrigibles among party officials, and confiding his expectation of a long and hard struggle.

On 13 August the central committee issued a communique on the plenum. While certain differences between the party and the PLA press in commenting on the 8 August directive had suggested possible differences in degrees of militancy among members of the new team, the communique itself was thoroughly militant, reiterating the need for "daring" and for turning the masses loose. Soon thereafter, on 18 August, the Red Guards made their first appearance at a rally which displayed Lin Piao publicly as Mao's new anointed successor. The rally also displayed the rest of the new team (less Mme. Mao): Chou En-lai

as still third-ranking, Tao Chu (the new propaganda chief) and Chen Po-ta of the "cultural revolution group" newly risen to fourth and fifth, Teng Hsiao-ping sixth but demoted among active leaders, Kang Sheng (the old police figure) risen to seventh, and Liu Shao-chi down all the way from second to eighth. Commentaries immediately following the 18 August rally suggested strongly that a number of other party leaders would be brought down, including any who resisted the attacks of the Red Guards.

The Unleashing of the Red Guards

In the days following the rally, Chou En-lai and officers of the central "cultural revolution group" gave a number of interviews to the Red Guards, bypassing the conventional party apparatus which was about to be attacked. The Guards were told that they were free to organize themselves any way they liked, and to say in their posters anything they liked. They were expressly incited against the party apparatus, but--as confirmed in many accounts of these briefings--they were not given specific targets, and were told repeatedly to solve their problems (whom to attack, and how hard to attack) for themselves. In other words, once again the instruments of the revolution were set in motion without clear guidance. (This feature of the revolution--incredible to most Western observers--derives from Mao's conception of the process as a test of both the party officials being attacked and the attacking forces, a revolutionary "storm" in which potential revolutionary successors--both senior and junior--would prove themselves. The concept, to an outsider, is basically irrational; but it is clearly Mao's concept, and Mao in important respects is irrational).

In the last ten days of August the Red Guards burst out in the streets of Chinese cities. Their actions were first reported as directed against the visible signs of traditional, Western and Soviet influence, but a picture later emerged of violence from the start, with beatings, torture, forced labor, pressured suicides, and murder (all of this against a defenseless populace), attacks on party

headquarters and party officials, and clashes between visiting Red Guards and local forces (including Red Guards) organized by local officials. Later information also showed that the Red Guards even in this first stage of their activity began to split into hostile and competing factions, possibly reflecting differences in the new team itself.

The Subsidence of the Red Guards

The violence of the Red Guards began to subside in Peking--the pilot area for the country--at the end of August, at which time Lin Piao and Chou En-lai made the first of a series of speeches in which the two leaders were to take somewhat different lines, leading to speculation about critical differences between them. In this case, while both called for better discipline on the part of the Red Guards ("Don't hit people"), Lin again incited them against party leaders while Chou did not. However, in briefing Red Guards going out to the provinces, Chou also encouraged the Red Guards to move aggressively against local party leaders despite anticipated resistance. Chou again refused--at this stage--to specify targets or to state the new team's favor for one wing of the Red Guards over others, although both of these things were done at a later stage. There is no evidence that Lin Piao or any other leader was giving the Guards contrary instructions privately.

While the party leaders in Peking were calling both for militancy and for discipline, and Peking itself was fairly quiet, serious clashes continued elsewhere in China until mid-September. In some of these clashes, thousands of people were engaged, sometimes with hundreds of injuries and dozens of dead. There is excellent evidence of the insolence and brutality of the Red Guards toward party officials and even the PLA. It seems clear that the dominant leaders did not try very hard to hold the Guards within well-defined limits.

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Some observers have held that it was really the objective of the Red Guards in that period to overthrow the first secretaries of the regional, provincial and municipal bodies they "bombarded," and that they therefore failed in their mission: but the evidence is to the contrary. Just as the Guards were not given specific targets, so they were not told how far to go, and the PLA at that stage was not told to help them. Moreover, a survey of the Red Guard action--that is, of the targets of attack, and of the weight of the attacks--shows no pattern. In Peking's eyes the mission of the Red Guards seems to have been, at that stage, not to overthrow but to shock, shake up, test the responses of, the party leaders outside Peking--out of Mao's dogmatic belief that the truth would emerge from such a "storm" and out of the new team's practical desire for additional material on which to base the real purge-list later. The first secretaries outside Peking, however, may well have concluded that most of them would end up on the list no matter what they did.

On 15 September, at a third great rally marking the end of the first period of Red Guard violence, Lin Piao again called for action (by implication, violence) against party leaders, while Chou En-lai chose to emphasize a constructive role for the Red Guards--assisting in production. Again these differences suggested possible policy differences. However, party and PLA journals soon endorsed the positions taken by both leaders, and the Red Guards did in fact help with the harvest.

In briefing the Red Guards in that period for future operations, Chou En-lai and others of Mao's new team emphasized that it was not Mao's intention to destroy the conventional party apparatus, and imposed clear, specific limitations on the Guards (e.g. they were not to seize official media, or imprison people). These spokesmen continued, however, to refuse to provide specific targets or to arbitrate the quarrels among the Red Guards; and the Guards themselves continued to polarize, preparing to set up rival headquarters. At the end of September, it appeared that further and strong action would be taken against important figures in the party, but that there might be some delay.

Waiting, Perhaps Debating

The party's pronouncements in early October were thin and ambiguous: e.g., the party journal in a single editorial called for "striking down" party leaders and for allowing them to correct their errors. However, without publicity, the new team moved to reinstate the most militant students (now Red Guards) who had been denounced and suppressed by the work-teams, and in other ways began at this time to show its favor for this wing. Moreover, also without publicity, self-criticisms by leaders who had made "mistakes" (e.g. Liu Shao-chi's wife) were being offered. Peking continued in this period to make known that Lin Piao was to be Mao's successor and to try to validate his claim to this position.

There is some evidence that in mid-October an important member of the new team submitted to the others a report on the "cultural revolution" which was soon found unsatisfactory, indeed a continuation of the "erroneous line" of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. This report might have been by Tao Chu (who began to be attacked in posters three weeks later), and may have been seen as an effort by Tao to protect the party apparatus (including Tao's own assets in the Central-South, where he had been the regional first secretary), against the plans of more militant members of the new team.

On 18 October, there was another mass rally which was confined to a drive-by and seemed aborted. The reason apparently lay in a dispute among the Red Guards about posting public criticism of Liu Shao-chi, a dispute which may, again, have reflected disagreement in the new team as to how to handle Liu. The Guards were told, in effect, that the time was not ripe, which led to such large-scale fighting among them that the plans for a conventional rally were changed. At about this time, rival Red Guard headquarters began to appear.

Immediately thereafter, the party press began a series of extremely militant commentaries which suggested that the dominant figures of the new team were trying to

persuade some others that the time was at hand for decisive action against some of the party leaders in disfavor. In the same period, the recently-rehabilitated militants of the Red Guards smashed up some government offices in Peking, and there was a barrage of poster attacks on ministries and their coordinating staff offices. These various developments suggested to some observers a warning to Chou En-lai and others not to persist in opposition to the plans of the dominant figures. While Chou and Tao Chu both might reasonably be regarded as less militant than some others, Chou at least was in good favor and remained so, and the line-up of the time thus remains obscure.

Mao's Scenario

On 31 October, Red Flag made public a scenario for the future course of the purge. It told party officials that, with the exception of a few hard cases, those in disfavor with the new team could keep from getting purged by conducting a grovelling self-criticism, admitting their errors (e.g. in the period of the work-teams, or during Red Guard "bombardments"), restoring the reputations of those they had damaged, and (in effect) swearing eternal allegiance to Mao's thought. While some observers argued that Peking was really saying that it was unable to act against leaders in disfavor, the editorial suggested instead that Mao was planning a prolonged, elaborate spectacle of a kind he had staged before on a smaller scale.

Materials received much later revealed that the Chinese party was holding a work-conference at this time --ending about 8 November--in which Mao and Lin made important speeches, and in which Liu and Teng, both in disgrace, offered their first self-criticisms. This conference was evidently attended by many or most of the regional and provincial first secretaries, whom Mao could have purged on the spot if that was all he wanted to do. The speeches of Mao and Lin, which are little known, are exceptionally valuable for an understanding of what Mao and Lin in fact wanted to do.

Mao in his speech blamed himself for having allowed Liu and Teng (for some years before August) to handle the "routine work" of the party, admitted that he had not foreseen every turn of the cultural revolution, and reaffirmed the value of mass action. He went on to tell his audience --in particular, the regional and provincial leaders-- that they had not been well-prepared for the Red Guard descent on them in August and September and should be better-prepared for (he implied) another wave. He attempted to reassure them that most of them would "pass the test," and said that even Liu and Teng need not be regarded as hard-case incorrigibles like Peng Chen and others of the first group. (Mao was not convincing, however, in this avuncular role.)

Mao's speech was apparently followed by the self-criticisms of Liu and Teng, in which both accepted responsibility for providing erroneous guidance (i.e., guidance later found so) to the work-teams. Liu went on to blame himself for certain rightist retreats in policy in earlier years which Mao almost certainly had approved at the time but which he now wished to attribute to someone else. However, neither self-criticism, as reported, was as grovelling as Mao appeared to desire. In fact, Liu made a thinly-veiled defense of his actions, arguing (truthfully) that he had not been given clear guidance.

Lin Piao in his speech to the conference did not bother to adopt a conciliatory pose and was harsh toward Liu and Teng in particular. He emphasized that Mao meant to carry out a thorough struggle against opposing ideology, for as long as necessary. He too praised the Red Guards. He also asserted that most of the party apparatus outside Peking was "good," but he said frankly that all local leaders would be judged for the mistakes that all local committees had made. It is doubtful that many of the first secretaries from the regions and provinces were reassured by this presentation.

[REDACTED]

Preparations for the Spectacle

Immediately following the conference, on 10 November People's Daily returned to the proposition--identified in particular with Chou En-lai--that the cultural revolution must not be allowed to interfere with production. It was further reported that factories were being allowed to disband Red Guard units and replace them by "militia." Chou continued in high favor.

During these first two weeks of November, there were renewed reports of serious incidents involving the Red Guards on one hand and party figures, the PLA, and factory workers on the other. In some of these, the Red Guards again beat and tortured party officials. In mid-November, the party closed the city of Peking to visiting Red Guards for the winter, and also forbade the Guards from operating private jails, kangaroo courts, and torture chambers. At the same time, however, the central committee issued a general directive on the rehabilitation of the militants, another sign of the favor of the dominant figures for the very forces which had been doing these things.

As of mid-November, the new team itself did not seem stable. It was still dominated by an irrational and highly suspicious man whose continued favor could not be counted on and who might himself behave so badly that his lieutenants would combine to overthrow him, and its other members looked like a mismatched set. There had already been signs of disagreement--perhaps very serious disagreement--among them, drawn along 'militant' and 'moderate' lines. Most observers, even while disagreeing about what had happened in the previous year, could and did agree at that time that the new team probably would not last.

On 23 November, Red Guard pamphlets denouncing Liu and Teng in detail seemed to foretell early public action against some of the party leaders who had previously been removed from the public scene or publicly demoted. Mao is said to have left Peking (after a final Red Guard rally) on 26 November. On 28 November, Mao's

wife publicly reiterated that those who had failed Mao would be put through criticism and self-criticism in public spectacles, and that some would be brought down in any case; moreover, Mme. Mao seemed to snub Tao Chu publicly on this occasion.

The Beginning of the Spectacle

On 4 December, Mao's new team began to stage this long-promised series of spectacles. On that day, Peng Chen and six lesser officials ("cultural" figures) were handed over to the Red Guards. Posters soon demanded their "trial," and other posters called for the dismissal from their posts of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. These were probably intended in part as a warning to regional and provincial officials to offer (or augment) their own self-criticisms before time ran out.

By this time, all or almost all of the party's regional bureaus and provincial committees, and most of the major municipal committees, had been repeatedly criticized in Red Guard posters. Some of this criticism--of those not criticized earlier--may have been commissioned by the new team to get such criticism on the record, in order to justify action against all of those (e.g. proteges of leaders in disfavor) against whom it wanted to move for whatever reason. No doubt a large purge-list was taking shape.

At this time (12 December), Red Flag reiterated the ritual by which an erring official must seek forgiveness--self-abasement, reinstatement of those injured, and correction of the record. This editorial was especially interesting in suggesting that many officials were refusing to make the kind of self-criticism Mao wanted, and in further suggesting that some of them were capable of putting Peking to a lot of trouble before being brought down.

Meanwhile, in early December there had continued to be serious clashes between the Red Guards and party

[redacted]

committees, between the Guards and workers, and among elements of the Guards. Beginning on 12 December, party leaders--particularly Chou En-lai and Mme. Mao--again condemned violence by, against, and among the Guards, but again stated their favor for the most militant elements of the Guards, those chiefly responsible for the violence. Chou and Mme. Mao soon took action to disband some of the Red Guard organizations which had opposed these militants/

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[redacted] Mao's new team was clearly planning to use the Guards on a large scale again.

From 12 December, the public scene in Peking was filled with rallies. On that date, Peng Chen was put on public display, possibly with others of the first group (Lu Ting-i, Lo Jui-ching, Yang Shang-kun). On 13 December Tao Chu, who himself may (but may not) have been already marked for discard, made the first public attack by a party leader on Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Tao is said to have stated that there had not been enough criticism of the Liu/Teng line--and, of course, not enough self-criticism by those who had implemented it. Tao's defense of himself for implementing that line in June and July was jeered by some of his audience.

In mid-December, the new team released Liu's self-criticism; and Mme. Mao publicly rejected it as a "hoax," but refused to let the Red Guards feature Liu and Teng in a public rally--possibly in the interest of not provoking any additional resistance from the party apparatus. She is also said to have told the Guards to allow the Ministry of Public Security to make all the arrests, while at the same time criticizing the Ministry (still directed by a protege of Teng Hsiao-ping who had turned against Teng) and announcing that it or at least elements of it would henceforth be subordinated to Lin Piao's PLA. Moreover, in the first known instance of specific targeting by a party leader against others not already in clear disfavor, Mme. Mao marked several second-level leaders for action by the Red Guards.

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Public criticism of those in disfavor intensified, others came into disfavor, and even old opponents were gathered in. On 19 and 20 December, fresh rallies were held to denounce Peng Chen and others of the first group; all were displayed at the rally, and were brutally handled by the Red Guards. At the same time, huge new posters demanded further action against--even "liquidation" of--Liu and Teng. Other leaders, including Ho Lung of the military affairs committee (who was later to be accused of planning a "rebellion" or "coup") were also denounced. Peng Te-huai, the former Minister of Defense (Lin Piao's predecessor) who had led the opposition to Mao in 1959 and then disappeared, was reportedly seized by Red Guards and brought to Peking.

The decision to move more forcefully against opponents of the new team seemed to be reflected in two other important developments in December. On 26 December (Mao's 73rd birthday), People's Daily made public the essentials of a party directive which turned the Red Guards and other "revolutionary" organizations loose on the factories; it was soon revealed that the "revolution" would move into the countryside "on a large scale" as well. Visible resistance to the "revolution" in those areas may have led the new team to take this action earlier than originally intended. The other was the fall of Tao Chu, and--apparently--of a number of military figures, perhaps a week or so later.

In early January, Tao, the fourth-ranking member of the new team, was being denounced in the same terms as Liu and Teng and may have been paraded around Peking; and at the same time a number of military leaders--both commanders and political officers--began to be denounced. There were several other party leaders, at the second level, who seemed marked for discard. The party appeared to be moving into a period in which there would be unusual opportunities for Mao's lieutenants to maneuver against one another.

Prospects

With respect to action against its opponents, Mao's new team by the end of December 1966 had moved some distance from the situation it had been in as early as October and as late as late November--when its pronouncements had in effect put the new team itself on trial, had obliged it to take some further action if it were not to seem either frivolous or impotent. It had taken such action. But it was again in a situation in which further action seemed to be demanded--action against those in disfavor who had refused to go through the elaborate ritual prescribed for them or had been found irredeemable anyway--including denunciation by name in the official press, the trial and sentencing of some of those in custody in Peking, and the dislodgement of some unregenerate leaders (probably the majority of the regional and provincial first secretaries) outside Peking.

The party directives of December, on extending the "revolution" to the factories and the countryside, gave Mao's new team both an occasion and an instrument for taking action at the same time against regional and provincial leaders: that is, the progress of the revolution would surely cause a great deal of disorder and additional resistance, and party leaders outside Peking could be blamed for this, whereupon the Red Guards and other "revolutionary" organizations could depose those leaders by the approved method of mass action, action taken together with acceptable elements of the party committees. Reports from the provinces in January 1967 suggested that this in fact was happening at several points; Peking was explaining that the simple "overthrow" of those in disfavor would not do, that there must be a "seizure of power" by a "mass movement," and was praising revolutionary "rebels" (against the conventional apparatus) who were calling for joint action with those in the party committees who were loyal to Mao's line. Once again, however, as often since 1957, Mao may have underestimated the resistance his new initiative would provoke. Already in late January there were indications that the PLA would have to be used, something that Mao had preferred not to

do, and which may have been the issue behind the purge of late December. Moreover, if as expected the new offensive were to have damaging economic consequences, the strength of the resistance would also be expected to increase.

The role of the PLA leaders--including the commanders of regional headquarters--may be critical. These leaders have had some reason to worry, but have not had as good reason as have first secretaries outside Peking to conclude that most of them will be purged no matter what they do. On balance, it seems likely that some of them will refuse to follow Mao's orders, but that the great majority will do as they are told. Thus, while it is conceivable that Mao and others of the new team will be overthrown following a split in the PLA, the probability seems otherwise. The prospect seems to be for substantial resistance by various combinations of forces at some points, but not for resistance coordinated to the point of posing a threat to Mao and the other central leaders.

The threat to the new team seems still to proceed primarily from itself.

The new team even as recomposed--without Tao Chu--still seems unstable; not even Lin Piao, let alone the less militant Chou En-lai, can be sure of Mao's continued favor.

There are various possibilities for a true "power struggle"--that is, for Mao's power. Two possibilities turn on Lin's position: if he sees himself as declining in Mao's favor (the tone of Peking's treatment of Lin has been muted since November), he might make common cause against Mao--with Chou and various military leaders--while he still can. Or if Lin is actually deposed before he can do this, there might in consequence be the kind of equalization of strength among the two groups of Mao's lieutenants--the Maoists, and the relative moderates around Chou--which would make a frank competition feasible; then, should Chou win out, he might go on--with the support of the military leaders--to depose Mao himself.

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[redacted]

There are at least two possibilities for a power struggle which do not depend on a decline in Lin's position. One is that of Mao's death [redacted]

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[redacted] the new team might quickly pull apart, through an intensification of the differences that seem already to exist. Another is that of Mao's severe deterioration, to the point of incapacity, so that he would have to be set aside.

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While evaluation of these possibilities [redacted] is hazardous, each of the four --a Lin-led coup, a Chou-led coup, Mao's death, or Mao's incapacity--should probably be regarded as an outside chance in itself. And the four of them seem to add up to less than an overall probability of Mao's early overthrow. In sum, the prospect for 1967 seems to be for the continued dominance of Mao and the Maoists, and for their continued progress--at various speeds at various points--toward the reorganization of the party, governmental and military apparatus throughout China.

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THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND ITS VEHICLES

The "great proletarian cultural revolution" in China is said by Peking to have derived from a number of insights and pronouncements by Mao Tse-tung between 1962 and the end of 1965: e.g. his admonition to the central committee's tenth plenum in September 1962 "never to forget class struggle," his complaint about the state of the arts in China in December 1963, his warning to Chinese literary associations in June 1964 that they and most of their publications had failed to carry out the party's policies, and his declaration in another central committee meeting of September 1965 that it was necessary to "criticize bourgeois reactionary thinking." Mao is further said to have "personally organized and led" the "cultural revolution" in the "last half of 1965."

While these initiatives now attributed to Mao were not made public at the time and cannot be confirmed, the regime did in fact launch a "socialist education" campaign in spring 1963--a conventional campaign, conducted through orthodox party organs

[redacted] and in mid-1964 publicly indicated that something more ambitious lay ahead. On 14 July 1964, in the last of a series of violently polemical articles directed against the Soviet party, Peking published an article "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism" which has since been attributed to Mao personally. Among other things, the article spoke of "degeneration" in Chinese society (and of the efforts of "degenerates" to find "protectors and agents in the higher leading bodies"), of the need for a "thorough socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts" requiring a century or several centuries, of the need to conduct extensive socialist education movements repeatedly throughout China, and of the need to train millions of successors who would carry on Mao's policies rather than to allow China to evolve into a "phoney" Communist state like the USSR. It was asserted further that such successors would come forward in "mass struggles" and be tempered in the "great storms of revolution."

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[REDACTED]

It is the thesis of this paper that Mao's obsession with the problem of revolutionary successors--of ensuring that his successors, and their successors, be leaders whom he could trust to carry out his will--is the central fact in developments in China since September 1965. This paper will contend that no other hypothesis can explain either the course of the "cultural revolution" or its casualties.

The September 1965 meeting--not a plenum--of the CCP central committee probably played an important role in shaping the "cultural revolution," and possibly in fixing its targets among the top-ranking leaders of the party; but there is little solid information about it. Beyond the bare statement of the party that Mao at this meeting "pointed out that it is necessary to criticize bourgeois reactionary thinking"--which might at the time have referred narrowly to "cultural" matters, or at the other extreme might have referred to every kind of opposition to the entire range of Mao's policies--the evidence on the content of the meeting is confined to a few statements on other occasions, [REDACTED] pronouncements by some purged leaders which can be read in various ways, and assertions made recently in wall-posters.

The September 1965 meeting need not, of course, have been confined to the coming revolution, but might have taken up--as well at that time as another--a set of large related matters, not only the content and scope of the "cultural revolution," but policies of economic and military development, the situation of the war in Vietnam on which Peking had staked so much, the implications of all this for Peking's relationship with the USSR, and so on.

[REDACTED]

There is some confirmation in the 1 October 1965 number of Red Flag that the September 1965 meeting had been concerned in large part if not mainly with the forthcoming "cultural revolution," and that there had been some resistance in the meeting to Mao's sense of it. A major editorial on that date, "Adopt the Proletarian World Outlook to Create Our New World," reviewed the "tremendous successes" which had resulted from following Mao's guidance and the party's line, and went on to observe ominously that "the old ideas...have always attempted to fight for survival and to disseminate their influence under the cloak of names and slogans of socialism and Marxism-Leninism"--the implication being that some persons in the party who presented an orthodox appearance were covertly heretical. (This line was later to emerge as the charge that Mao's opponents were waving a false 'Red Flag' in order to bring down the real Red Flag.) Nevertheless, it was still possible for the party journal to reassure its readers that the determination to achieve a through-going "proletarian world outlook...does not mean that we want to negate everything and denigrate heritage"; it was rather to "keep all the valuable parts intact," and the method of operation was to be that of "democratic criticism," making "full use of explanation." The Red Flag warning about heresy-masked-as-orthodoxy was not repeated in the editorial of the People's Daily, which was to lag until the following June in receiving the signals correctly in the "cultural revolution."

A wall-poster not reported until January 1967 also provides some confirmation of opposition to Mao's concepts in that September 1965 meeting. Mao himself is quoted in the poster as declaring that the "party center...proposed revisionism" in September and October 1965. The implication is that the top leaders of the party apparatus--Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping--led this opposition, and another poster of the same period expressly accuses Teng of being in opposition to Mao in that meeting; but these charges came at a time when Peking was blackening Liu and Teng retroactively, and it is uncertain whether they really were in opposition that early.

The evidence is a bit better that Peng Chen and Lo Jui-ching were among those offering resistance then


to some aspect of Mao's plans for the "revolution." Peng Chen, speaking on National Day (1 October) in Peking, can be regarded at least in hindsight as speaking like a man who had lost an argument about "cultural" policy and wanted both to reaffirm his position and to keep the subject open for another effort later: after a number of frank statements about China's backwardness and problems, Peng in this speech asserted that the party must encourage the "full airing of different views" and must pay attention to all views both correct and incorrect, because "divergent views make comparison possible and help guard against onesidedness." (This can also be read as an amplification of portions of the Red Flag editorial, but Chou En-lai in a speech on the same occasion did not take this line.)*

*Lo Jui-ching's speeches of May and September 1965 can also be read as implying favor for positions which, if stated in the September meeting, could have got him into trouble. But readers differ as to which of his conjectured views are applicable. Some hold that in his May speech, in discussing preparations for war and the strategy of "active defense" in war, Lo was stating his favor for some doctrine other than Mao's; it is hard to understand this argument, however, as Lo in his speech spells out the doctrine in terms which seem to be entirely consonant with Mao's, and in fact explicitly cites Mao as his authority for the doctrine. Others hold that in his September speech (delivered just prior to the meeting), Lo was stating his favor for a more aggressive policy in the war in Vietnam, one which would have meant war with the U.S.; others do not find that in his speech but find instead indications of a strong professional respect for (or fear of) the U.S. military establishment ("They are armed to the teeth and possess complete sets of machinery for killing people. Whoever is afraid of death...has no alternative but to surrender..."). Either point of view could have led him to argue that the central problem was not the indoctrination but the combat-readiness of the military establishment, which would entail a compromise with the USSR, and so on. He may well have argued this way, but, it will be contended, for other reasons than those imputed to him on the basis of this speech.



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Peng, at a propaganda conference the same month (September 1965), declared that everyone is equal before the truth--a proposition subsequently attacked as a slogan of the "black gang"--and that even Chairman Mao should be criticized if he were wrong.




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a "rumor" that Peng tried to muster a majority vote against Mao at the September meeting--presumably an overstatement, in view of Peng's continued activity through March 1966. However, the various material, including the fact that action was begun against Peng only two months after the September meeting, does seem to add up to a probability that Peng was in some degree of opposition to Mao at that meeting.

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The same is true of Lo Jui-ching, who was apparently seized just two months after the meeting.



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On the PLA anniversary in 1966 (1 August), the newspaper, reviewing the three "big struggles" against representatives of the "bourgeois military line" since 1953 (all of them, actually, stating a professional military point of view as opposed to Mao's obsession with guerrilla warfare and political indoctrination), spoke of the last struggle as "not very long ago," a struggle with those who "had got hold of important posts in the army and... opposed the Party's central committee and Mao Tse-tung's thought,...covertly opposed Comrade Lin Piao's directives on putting politics in the forefront,...gave first consideration to military affairs, technique and specialized work..."



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[redacted] In other words, Lo's offense was to resist Mao's desire for even further political indoctrination of the armed forces at the necessary expense of military preparedness.*

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As for others who may have opposed Mao at that September meeting, there is less evidence. [redacted]

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[redacted] Lu Ting-i, then director of the propaganda department and third in importance among the party leaders thus far purged, also spoke at the September 1965 propaganda conference summoned by Peng Chen, and in his speech attacked Stalin (read Mao). Another possibility is Yang Shang-kun, judging entirely from his disappearance. And as previously noted, it is possible that Liu and Teng were among the opposition. That is, the build-up of Lin Piao to replace Liu as Mao's chosen successor moved swiftly after September 1965, and, while it had begun before the meeting with the attribution to Lin of a major article on Mao's thought,** its acceleration may have reflected Mao's disappointment with Liu's performance at the meeting. Finally, recent poster attacks (since November 1966) on Liu and Teng include the

*A Red Guard poster has quoted Chou En-lai as asserting that Peng and Lo (the "armed forces") were in league. This may or may not have been true, but they seem to have had a common interest in preventing Mao from carrying out his extreme policies.

**One of the functions of Lin's article was to 'correct' a mistake made by Peng Chen in May, when Peng had publicly (and correctly) attributed to Aidit the concept that the countryside of the world will surround and overcome the cities of the world, a concept which Mao claims as his own; Lin in his article set the record 'straight,' and, in view of Mao's boundless vanity, it seems likely that Peng was already in some trouble about this.

charge that Teng at the September meeting made a speech declaring his opposition to the plans for a cultural revolution and in particular to changes in the educational system; this charge is no doubt over-stated, in view of Teng's subsequent continuance in some degree of favor until August 1966, but it is possible that Teng offered less than the resounding approbation that Mao desired.

In sum, while September 1965 was probably an important date in the development of the "cultural revolution," it is impossible to judge how much of Mao's thinking he made known at the meeting. Similarly, while several of the party's leaders--Liu, Teng, Peng, Lu, Lo, Yang, and perhaps others--were or may have been resisting Mao at that meeting, it is impossible to judge the degree or (in most cases) the precise issue.

A harsh tone about the party's intentions, together with a description of the ongoing campaign as a "cultural revolution," appeared in the official version (1 January 1966) of a speech given by the propagandist and culture monitor Chou Yang in November 1965. But Chou was not launching a qualitatively different campaign; he was instead trying to get aboard a bandwagon which (he had observed) had begun to roll in Shanghai three weeks earlier, and which was soon to run down Chou Yang himself.

Mao Contrives a Test, Winter 1965-66

The Shanghai development was the appearance in a local newspaper of a polemical attack by Yao Wen-yuan, a little known Shanghai writer, on a 1961 play by Wu Han, a well-known writer who had worked closely with officials on the party's Peking municipal committee headed by Peng Chen. This event--the initiative for which was taken directly or indirectly by Mao--was not even noticed in the West; this particular issue (10 November) of the paper was not received.

The contention of the party [redacted] that it was Mao who ordered the firing of this

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opening gun, is more credible than is the contention of some observers that one of Mao's lieutenants--say, Lin Piao or Teng Hsiao-ping--planted the article as a speculative investment for which he only later got Mao's backing. Mao was, after all, active at the time, and this was a major decision.* It also seems, on balance (although this was in doubt for some months), more likely that Mao deliberately did not make his intentions clear as to what purpose the article was to serve, than that Mao fell ill before he could make his intentions clear. In other words, Mao meant the article to serve as a test for his entire "cultural" apparatus and for the highest leaders of the party apparatus which supervised it, with a few possible exceptions: Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta and a few others (e.g., Chiang Ching) were probably regarded as having already passed the test, and were in Mao's confidence; while Peng Chen, Lu Ting-i and a few others (e.g. Chou Yang) were probably regarded as having already failed the test, and thus already marked for purging. Thus Mao was doing in 1965 what the party had asserted--probably falsely--that he had done in 1957 in the first stage of the "hundred flowers" campaign, namely, allowing people to respond freely (without guidance) to a major initiative, and then punishing those whose responses did not please him. (In the 1957 campaign, it had been Mao who was deceived: the evidence is good that in encouraging free expression in that campaign he had mistaken obedience

*Peking first said that the local newspaper published the article "under the leadership of the [Shanghai] party organization..." Later, Peking said that this was done by the Shanghai committee of the party under the "direct leadership" of Mao and the central committee.

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for love and was shocked by the opposition and hostility revealed, and that when the crackdown came the party was simply putting a good face on things by asserting that Mao all along had meant to entice his enemies to stick their heads up so he could cut them off; but Mao had learned something from 1957, that his opponents could be enticed into revealing themselves. It seems likely, although it cannot be proved, that Liu and Teng were already on the list of those to be "tested." There is an alternative hypothesis--that Liu and Teng were in Mao's confidence from the start, joined him in watching the party's "cultural" leaders disgrace themselves, and only later fell into disgrace themselves; but this is not consistent with evidence that Liu at least (if not Teng) was falling from Mao's favor as early as March. The failure of Liu and Teng to bring the central press into line on the "cultural" issue as Mao had posed it--whether Hai Jui was a "poisonous weed"--can be explained in either of two ways: (a) they may have been consciously resisting what they sensed to be Mao's will (if the charges of opposition as early as September 1965 are true), perhaps in the expectation that Mao would die or that they would prevail anyway, or (b), as seems a bit more likely, they may instead simply have failed to understand what Mao wanted, have lacked the illumination of his already-revealed thought and the revolutionary ardor which (in Mao's view) should have shown them the "correct" line without specific guidance. Either way, they failed the test.

immediately after the publication of Yao's article, the Peking committee queried the Shanghai committee as to what kind of high-level backing this article might have. In the next three weeks, most of China's important newspapers and journals reprinted the article; one group of publications--led by Lin Piao's Liberation Army Daily--forthrightly agreed with the author that Wu Han's play was a "poisonous weed," while another group--including the central committee's own newspaper, People's Daily, and the publications of the Peking committee--called instead for a "hundred flowers" debate on the question. Toward the end of November, Mao and a number of other important leaders dropped out of sight; two of these--Lo

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Jui-ching and Yang Shang-kun--were apparently the first top-level victims of the developing purge.*

It was not clear at the time that Lin Piao and the PLA newspaper had been chosen as the public leaders of the "cultural revolution," although there was some precedent. Since the time of the September 1962 plenum, the PLA under Lin Piao had been consistently presented as the model for all Chinese to emulate in the "creative study and application of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's works." In 1964, a political officer system modelled on that of the PLA had been established in several sectors of the economy, staffed in large part by PLA officers. In September 1965, with the appearance of Lin's first major article (this on Mao's concept of "people's revolutionary war"), the regime had begun to build up Lin as the foremost and ideal student of Mao's thought. And on 15 November 1965, Lin issued a five-point directive on the work of the PLA for 1966. Although this too was not clear at the time, this directive was to be used as the model for the testing of party officials as well as officers of the PLA--the essential point being whether these officials "regarded the works of Mao Tse-tung as the highest instructions" for their work. It was soon explicitly stated and reiterated that Lin himself had shown everybody how to study and apply Mao's thought.

There are various reports and conjectures as to why Mao left Peking and as to what he was doing in this period--lasting until early May--when he remained out of sight. One view (the view taken by this study) is that Mao withdrew in order to sketch out, or to observe (if it had in fact been sketched out in September), from a


*Lo failed to appear on an important military funeral committee in December. The removal of Lo--who had the power to order troops into action--was evidently thought to be a more urgent necessity than the removal of Peng. This was probably true of Yang also; although he may not have been arrested for months.

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safer place than Peking, the "cultural revolution" as it developed from November to June, and possibly to prepare for an operation during the winter. At the other extreme is the view that he left because of sudden and critical illness and was so indisposed through this period as to be capable of nothing at all.

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[REDACTED]

At the time of Mao's disappearance,* and particularly as the months wore on with no indication of Mao's whereabouts or condition, there was ground for speculation that Mao was seriously ill--perhaps completely incapacitated

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[REDACTED] There was not to be any additional 'hard' evidence as to Mao's condition until May 1966, when he re-emerged in what seemed to be astonishingly good shape.

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[REDACTED] While it seems fair to assume that Peking was never telling its officials the complete truth, the account of Mao's role [REDACTED] is generally credible, both because (a) some of the things stated, which moreover seemed improbable at the time, have since been confirmed, e.g. the importance of Mao's wife in the "cultural revolution" in general and with respect to specific tasks, and (b) the failure of

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*Liu Shao-chi was out of the news from mid-November to mid-January, and was presumed at the time to have been with Mao and in Mao's confidence; but the failure of Liu Shao-chi to bring the central party press into line on the question of Hai Jui, in the period of December to April while he was the ranking party leader, seems most credibly explained by Mao's failure to confide in Liu that he meant the issue of Hai Jui to serve as a test for the entire party apparatus (including Liu). Wall-posters have quoted Mao to the effect that he left Peking for Shanghai in November 1965 because he felt that the party apparatus in Peking was unresponsive to him--in other words, that he had already decided to purge the entire top leadership of the party apparatus; but it is uncertain whether he had really decided by that time to purge anyone but Peng Chen and Lo Jui-ching.

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any role to Mao between about which in effect concedes that he was out of action in that period. This latter indicator as to the period of Mao's inaction is supported by (a) the fact that no activity to Mao in this period, (b) the slow progress of the "cultural revolution" in general and the party purge in particular in the same period, as if other leaders were unwilling to make large decisions in his absence, which is just what would be expected, and (c) Mao's reappearance in May of 1965

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
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In sum, although the evidence is 'soft,' it seems to point to a situation in which Mao took the major initiatives in the "cultural revolution" at least before and after the period of mid-January to mid-March 1966.


To return, then, Mao during December meditated on the course of the "cultural revolution,"

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Already unhappy with the performance of Peng Chen as head of the five-man committee which had been in charge--possibly since mid-1964, possibly much later in time--of implementing the cultural revolution, and already having set in motion (directly or indirectly) the process that was to destroy Peng (criticism of Wu Han's play as a "poisonous weed"), Mao called together a few "cultural" figures who did not include Peng. Those summoned were: Kang Sheng (already regarded as the only reliable member of Peng's five-man committee), Chen Po-ta (Mao's principal ghostwriter), Ai Ssu-chi (a theorist who died two months later), and Chiang Ching (Mao's present wife, a onetime bit player in the movies.

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*Chen Po-ta has since emerged as head of the "group in charge of cultural revolution," Kang as a senior officer of it, and Chiang as Chen's first deputy in the group.



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[Redacted]

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In February, Peng issued an unsatisfactory report on the cultural revolution in the name of his committee and then in the name of the politburo--indicating, perhaps, Liu's approval--a report which minimized class struggle, minimized the importance of Wu Han's plays (as had Peng in October) and mildly defended rightist writers against their leftist attackers.*

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[Redacted]

*A wall-poster has confirmed the existence of the five-man committee and its issuance of this report at this time. Other posters assert that party and military leaders were plotting a coup at this time (February), the period of Mao's conjectured inactivity. The poster account is not credible as a whole, because it assigns key roles to Lo Jui-ching (almost certainly seized the previous November) and Ho Lung (in such good favor with Mao as late as August 1966 that Mao rode with him at a rally).

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Early in the same month (March), Teng Hsiao-ping had dropped out of sight, and was presumed to be with Mao. Later in March, on the 26th, Peking announced that Mao was not ill (meaning, probably, that he had recovered),** and on the same day Liu Shao-chi departed on a trip abroad that was to keep him out of Peking for the next four weeks, a period in which important steps were taken in the "cultural revolution" and the purge. Liu's trip served two purposes: to give the appearance of 'business as usual' after the announcement that Mao was well, and to get him out of the way for the move against

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**There is credible recent testimony from the Japanese Communist party that Mao was fully in command in late March. After the CCP and JCP had reached agreement on a joint communique, Mao met with the delegations and peremptorily rejected their draft, thus reversing Chou En-lai and several other senior leaders, whom he criticized for their conduct.

Peng Chen. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] On 29 March, Peng Chen made his last public appearance; and in the second week of April, probably some days after returning to Peking, Teng Hsiao-ping reappeared in public.

The dispute on the issue of how hard a line to take toward Wu Han's play had been conducted throughout the winter of 1965-66, and was still going on until a few days before Teng's public reappearance. At that time, the end of the first week in April, the party's central publications--People's Daily and Red Flag--agreed that Hai Jui was indeed a "poisonous weed," just as Mao's spokesman and the Liberation Army Daily (Lin Piao's voice) had contended all along. It looked (and still does) as though Teng had brought back to Peking--a few days before he reappeared in public--clear instructions from Chairman Mao, who had decided that the dispute had gone on long enough, that some had passed the test and others had failed it (some, of course, had been given the answers in advance), and that all would now line up on one position. (The PLA newspaper continued, however, to attack positions taken by People's Daily, the party organ, on other issues.)

The Peking committee itself tried quickly--and unsuccessfully--in mid-April to protect its leaders by taking the lead in denouncing one of its own lesser figures who had worked with Wu Han. It was not clear at the time whether any of the party's leaders--even the leaders of the Peking committee--would fall in consequence of the PLA newspaper's admonitions to "old comrades" and those in "high positions" (5 April) and Red Flag's call for action (29 April) against the "protectors" of Wu Han, but it was apparent that "socialist education" was about to move, as the Communists say, to a new and higher stage--that is, a wide-scale if not high-reaching purge.

On 13 April, the Liberation Army Daily in a major editorial forecast the direction, if not the full range, of the developments of the next several months. Entitled "Hold aloft the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thinking

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and take an active part in the great socialist cultural revolution," the editorial reviewed the "sharp class struggle on the cultural front" and the "black anti-socialist thread running counter to Mao Tse-tung's thinking" since 1949, introduced the term "great...cultural revolution" and traced it back to the tenth plenum in September 1962, reiterated its earlier assertion that Mao's works were to be regarded as 'supreme guidance,' asserted that a "mass movement is rising," and called in sum for nothing less than a "new culture." It did not, however, specify, as party journals were later to specify, that the main targets of the revolution would be the "reactionary academic 'authorities'" and the "bourgeois representatives within the party." On 30 April Chou En-lai lined up on the right side (where he was to remain), declaring that a "cultural revolution of great historical significance is being launched in China." In speeches in the same period, Teng Hsiao-ping spoke briefly but favorably of the new "revolution;" while Liu Shao-chi did not find--or was not given--occasion to mention it.

April-May: Dominance of the Party Apparatus

The "cultural revolution" began in some places in late April, soon after the PLA newspaper had given the signal in the 18 April editorial; and it seems to have been underway everywhere in May. The theme of the first stage was also stated (8 May) by the Liberation Army Daily: "Open Fire on the Anti-Party and Anti-Socialist Black Thread."

At just this time (on or about 10 May), Mao reappeared, receiving a group of Albanian visitors at some point believed to be in East China. With Mao on this occasion were Lin, Chou, Teng, and a liaison official (Wu Hsiu-chuan). (Chen Po-ta reappeared at the same time, but not in this group.) In films of the meeting, Mao looked astonishingly good: he looked younger than his years, moved easily and without assistance, and displayed no tremors.

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Throughout China, in late April and May, rallies and meetings of all elements of the population (or their "representatives") were held in order to denounce the "black gang" uncovered in Peking and to swear allegiance to Mao's thought and promise to study it even more thoroughly. These were not casual affairs; they seem to have disrupted community life all over China for a period of weeks; and worse was ahead.

Some observers have surmised that the "cultural revolution" was directed from the start by the "group in charge of the cultural revolution" at the party center in Peking--that is, by the extraordinary body headed by Chen Po-ta, a body which was an enlarged successor to the five-man group headed by Peng Chen until his downfall in or about April 1966. This surmise would seem reasonable at first glance, and also because a number of special groups named--from their own members--by party committees at all levels in April and May expressly to carry out the tasks of the "cultural revolution" were in most if not all cases known as "cultural revolution teams" or "cultural revolution groups." However, while the "group" at the party center may have existed in a quiescent state in April, May and June, there is good evidence that the conventional party apparatus was in charge of the conduct of the "revolution" in its early stages. This fact makes more interesting the emergence of extraordinary party bodies, and the activities of even more special organizations such as the Red Guards, later in the campaign.

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


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With the ground prepared in April and May, the party was ready to move against the range of cultural and educational organizations--"all cultural, educational, journalistic, publishing and academic units"--and in



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particularly against the educators, the principal carriers of the disease of "bourgeois ideology."

Before the campaign against these targets was launched, there was apparently another central committee meeting, analogous to the September 1965 meeting. Most of the party's leaders were out of the news during the third and fourth weeks of May. Wall-posters seen much later (December) quoted Lin Piao to the effect that the May meeting considered the fact that most central committee members had a poor understanding of the cultural revolution and were resisting it; and the account of Lin's speech to the October-November work-conference has him criticizing Liu and Teng for acting contrary to the line which--the speech suggests--was stated by Mao in May.* Other posters have suggested 16 May--the date of a "communique" cited by Lin--as the approximate date of the decision to send in work-teams.

The campaign against the educators--which was obviously planned from the start to be a campaign concurrently against the party committees in the universities, committees in which the administrators of the universities were usually leading figures--got underway on 1 June, with a Peking broadcast on the substance of big-character posters written by "revolutionary" students and teachers at Peking National University which denounced the university's administration for its poor (conservative) conduct of the revolution to that time. This was the signal for similar posters to go up on campuses all over China.

There is a fair amount of information on the campaign on several campuses in June, and substantial information on the campaign at Peking National University itself. The campaign at this university--commonly known as "Peita," a contraction of the Chinese name--seems to

*Analysts of OCI were conjecturing at this time, mainly on the basis of propaganda treatment of Liu, that he was already in trouble; this minority view is now known to have been correct, although it was weakened by a related thesis (regarded then and now as incorrect) that Teng Hsiao-ping rather than Mao was the prime mover. The very good treatment that Liu and Teng were getting in the Peking press as late as July is now believed to have been the result of their own dominance of the press (in Mao's absence) at that time.

have been representative of the campaign against all institutions of higher learning.

The campaign at Peita was launched prematurely on 25 May, with the slap-up of wall-posters denouncing the president of the university, posters written by a group led by a female teacher in the department of what passes for philosophy in China.

these posters were covered up by university officials (probably by the party committee in the university, a committee headed by the president himself) after a visit to higher party authorities (almost certainly the reorganized Peking municipal committee) in Peking. On 1 June, however, the party center was ready. On that day, concurrently with an incendiary editorial in the reformed and militant People's Daily which specified that "educators must be the first to receive an education," Peking broadcast the content of the 25 May posters attacking the president. On the same day or the next day (Peking has given both dates) the original posters--reinforced by other posters--went up on the walls. Peking has since described this action as the "first shot" in the revolution at Peita, and has attributed the decision to Mao.

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June: The Party's Work-Teams

The vehicle of the revolution at Peita, a vehicle which was to proliferate elsewhere in China during June, was the "work-team." This was a small team--rarely if ever larger than five people--assigned and named by higher party committees, and sent down to investigate and to carry out the cultural revolution.

Peking has confirmed the surmise that the concept of the work-team was approved by Mao if not actually originated by him. Speaking in November 1966, Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, did try to reduce Mao's responsibility for the failure of the work-teams ("As early as June of this year our Chairman Mao made the point that work-teams should not be sent out hastily"), but she nevertheless associated Mao with the decision to send in the work-teams.

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Peking announced on 3 June that the reorganized Peking municipal committee (known to have been in operation no later than 25 May) had decided to assign a "work-team" headed by Chang Chieng-hsien (a secretary of the Honan provincial committee) to Peking University to lead the cultural revolution; also, to remove the president and his deputy from the posts of secretary and deputy secretary of the university's party committee; and also, to have the new work-team function as the university's party committee until another could be organized. Underlining its point that the new Peking municipal committee--a part of the regular party apparatus--was in charge of the "revolution" at Peita, the 3 June announcement of Li Hsueh-feng and Wu Te as the new first and second secretaries of the committee went on to state flatly that all of the work of the cultural revolution in the city of Peking was under the "direct leadership" of the new municipal committee. On 5 June, Peking reported that "at present, under the leadership of the work-team appointed to the university" by the new Peking municipal committee, the masses of teachers, students and workers at Peita were "liquidating" the former president's "crimes."

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There was a precedent for the dispatch of a "work-team" of this kind. During the autumn of 1964, "socialist education" work-teams had been sent down from higher party levels to help with political work in the countryside. Such activity included the identification of

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activists, the organization of these activists, the organization of criticism of party cadres by the peasants, and eventually the self-criticism of the peasant associations. This activity in the countryside, however, had been low-key and leisurely, compared with the assignment given the new work-teams in the schools.

Similar scenarios--criticism of the administrators-and-secretaries of universities for conservative leadership of the revolution, and their displacement by work-teams sent from higher party levels--have been provided by Peking and by the provincial press for several other institutions of higher learning. At Chengtu University, for example, "revolutionary students and teachers" began on 3 June to put up posters criticizing the deputy secretary of the university's party committee--the "leader" of the university's existing "cultural revolution group," the group named by the university committee--for having failed to mobilize the mass of revolutionary students. He was moved to hold an "emergency meeting" about this; the Chengtu municipal committee and the Szechuan provincial committee backed the students and criticized him; the students and teachers put up more posters, and he again defended himself but was removed from office by the Chengtu committee sometime before 23 June, at which time it was announced that both the Szechuan provincial committee and the Southwest regional bureau had approved the action, and that the Chengtu committee was sending in a work-team to take over.* Similarly, at Chengchow University the acting president and concurrently secretary of the university's party committee was criticized in

*One interesting item in the Chengtu account is that the dismissal was announced by the Chengtu committee's propaganda department. This suggests that the members of these first "cultural revolution teams"--that is, the teams named by party committees from their own members, as distinct from the work-teams later sent down from higher party organs--were originally selected by the propaganda departments of the party committees.

early June, resisted, but was found guilty by the provincial committee of having suppressed the revolutionary students and teachers; the provincial committee dismissed him, and sent in a work-team in mid-June to "reorganize" his "cultural revolution group." There are similar accounts from a dozen other institutions. In all cases the actions of dismissal of the offending administrator/secretary and of dispatch of the work-team were said to have been taken by the appropriate organ of the conventional party apparatus.

Work-teams were sent to many other places, in addition to the schools. Peking itself has never provided a clear picture of the depth of the effort--that is, how far down into the cities and the countryside they were sent, and the provincial press has not presented a clear picture either. The latter, however, indicates that they were sent to "many" party and government organizations as far down as medium-sized cities and possibly below, and that they were concentrated on (although not restricted to) "cultural and educational units" of all kinds, including newspapers, publishing houses, radio-stations, cultural bureaus, federations of art workers, even movie-houses. The criterion for sending a work-team seems to have been the existence of "problems"--meaning, as in the case of the schools, an insufficiently militant local leadership, the presence of a leader or group of leaders who had already failed the test and was now marked for discard.*

*While these work-teams were struggling with their tasks, the party center publicly indicated its sense of the scope of the problem. On 13 June, the CCP central committee (along with the State Council) issued a notice decreeing the postponement of college entrance examinations for six months in order to "thoroughly carry out the cultural revolution and...reform the educational system." As surrounding commentaries made clear, the new system was to put a new emphasis on class background and political reliability as criteria for admission, on the division of the students' time between study and labor, and on political indoctrination. In late October, Peking reportedly extended the postponement to summer 1965.

Nevertheless, the work-teams do not appear to have been given directives to support the most militant elements of the "revolutionary students and teachers" that they could find, even though they were subsequently discredited for having failed to do just that. Neither, it appears, were the party committees themselves given such directives by whatever combination of leaders was then directing the "cultural revolution" from Peking. Many of the first directives may have emphasized the establishment of order, as many campuses were reported to be out of control.*

The picture is complicated by the fact that it is not known how active were the roles, at this stage, of Mao and the small group of lieutenants who were soon to emerge as the "group in charge of the cultural revolution." As previously noted, it is virtually certain that Mao approved the concept of the work-team, and it seems quite probable that Tao Chu as the new head of the Propaganda Department and other officers of the "cultural revolution

*In at least some instances, the work-teams were in fact directed to take action against the leftists. For example, in Tsinghai the provincial party committee announced on 13 June a decision to remove the editor of the Tsinghai Daily for an editorial he had commissioned and published ten days earlier, and to send in a work-team to "systematically examine and reform" the work of the newspaper. The editorial, condemned by the party committee as contrary to Mao's thinking, in fact stated precisely the militant line on the conduct of the revolution that was later to be vindicated (and the editor himself was later to serve as a prime example of a functionary to be "rehabilitated" by a party committee which had acted incorrectly). It is impossible to believe that the Tsinghai party committee would have acted in this way, at this stage of the revolution, if there had been an existing directive to support the militants.

[REDACTED]

group" (whether it was in operation yet as a group or not) took part in the discussions which preceded the decision to establish the work-teams. There is also a little evidence (to be presented later) that some of these leaders provided some degree of guidance, at least to work-teams in Peking. However, it is probable that the largest roles in providing guidance to the party committees, which in turn provided it to the work-teams, were played by the senior figures of the conventional party apparatus, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. In any case, it is probably the latter who will be forced--or have already been forced--to accept the largest share of responsibility for what has been found retroactively to be the "mistakes" of the work-teams.

Similarly, it is unclear whether Mao planned in advance to discredit the work-teams, as part of a scheme for discrediting the conventional party apparatus and its leaders, or whether instead he found them to be insufficiently revolutionary after examining their performance for some weeks. On balance, the latter seems more likely, if for no other reason than that the pioneer work-teams were assigned by the new Peking party committee which itself had just been named, and thus was not a part of the old apparatus. But in either case Mao was setting the conventional party apparatus another test, as he had with the issue of Hai Jui the previous winter, and as he had with the stage of the "cultural revolution" which had just been conducted by the local party committees whose teams were dislodged by the work-teams; and again it was to fail the test.

What happened was that "many" of the work-teams assigned to the universities--and presumably many of those assigned to other organizations and "units"--did not give in to the extreme demands of campus leftists whose clamor had already brought down the previous administrator/secretaries and leaders of the first "cultural revolution teams" and who were later to be justified in virtually the full range of their demands. In the great majority of cases (judging from Peking's later descriptions of the "mistakes" of the work-team concept and work-team operations), the work-teams sympathized

more with their fraternal party organizations on the campuses, the party committees there which likewise were the product of the conventional party apparatus, than with the militant students (many of whom were soon to emerge as Red Guards).* In other words, the work-teams, following the removal of the administrator/secretary previously marked by the party center as the main target, failed to carry through the range of action against the faculty and student-body demanded by the militants, and in many cases "suppressed" the militants in much the same ways as had the local leaders who had just lost their jobs.

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*A relatively small number of work-teams guessed right, or were sent in late enough (in July) to have got some clues. Speaking to this point in November 1966, Chiang Ching described the decision to send the work-teams in the first place as an "error," said that the work of the work-teams was "still more erroneous," and then noted that "some work-teams followed correct principles and policy and did not make mistakes." Apparently the most common attitude was that expressed by Li Hsueh-feng of the Peking committee (according to later posters) on 23 June: "At this tense moment, party members should stand up and defend their party leaders; if they do not, Nazis will take over." As it turned out, 'Nazis' took over anyway.

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


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In a written self-criticism dated 10 October (reported in wall-posters), Mme. Liu was to provide a summary of the "errors" of the work-team at Tsinghua. The work-team had been (i.e. was found retroactively to have been) too conservative; there had been trouble with the "false leftists" (known to have included some vindicated later as the 'real' leftists, the revolutionaries who had acted correctly) who were trying to discredit the work-team; her own plan was to make an example both of the "black gang" (those regarded as extreme rightists) and the "false leftists," but unfortunately the team had acted against some people whose views differed

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from the work-teams (i.e. those later vindicated as true revolutionaries); the work-team had employed improper methods in prohibiting people from making complaints to the reception office of the CCP central committee and in using the excuse of "protection" to put people in jail; she had been unaware at the time that she was committing errors, had gone on in July to make more mistakes, and had defended the record of the work-team throughout July; and so on. Mme. Liu in this self-criticism gave credit to Chairman Mao personally--as Lin Piao was to do in his speech to the plenum in August--for discovering and reversing the errors of the work-team.

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
the picture presented by Chiang Ching in her November 1966 report. The summary of her speech (all thus far available) has her saying that "the sending of cultural revolution work-teams to various organizations...was an error," and "what those work-teams had done in the course of their work was still more erroneous. Instead of directing the spearhead against the handful of people in authority within the party who were taking the capitalist road and against the reactionary academic 'authorities,' they turned the spearhead against the revolutionary students. The question of what the spearhead of the struggle should be directed against was a cardinal question of right and wrong..."

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But it will be noted that Chiang Ching does not assert that the work-teams had been directed--by Mao or anybody else--to support the "revolutionary students" as later defined, and Mme. Liu's account also indicates that there was no such directive. Indeed, the very little evidence as to the roles of officers of the "cultural revolution group" in providing guidance at the time suggests that their guidance was little more militant than that of the conventional party apparatus.


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


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July and Early August: The "Cultural Revolution Group"



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When the "group" was surfaced in early July, its principal figures were soon identified: Chen Po-ta as the "head" or "leader," Chiang Ching as his first deputy, and Tao Chu and Kang Sheng as "advisors." Chang Chun-chiao, a secretary of the Shanghai committee, was later identified as another deputy, and Wang Jen-chung of the Central-South committee and Hupei committee and Liu Chih-chien of the General Political Department were still later (before their fall) identified as additional deputies. Other members (untitled) given during the fall by both official sources and wall-posters were Wang Li, Kuan Feng, Chi Pen-yu, Mu Hsin, and Yao Wen-yuan, all of them young writers and polemicists. NCNA has also given Hsieh Tang-chung, a general officer who heads the cultural department of the General Political Department, and wall-posters have additionally given Chang Ping-hua of the Hunan committee and some other provincial and regional figures who have not been confirmed. It is not known how many of this lot--apart from Chen, Chiang, Tao, and Kang--were functioning as members of the "group" in July.

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[redacted] in the official account of proceedings in Fukien, the workers, peasants, and soldiers were acting as the "main force" in the revolution; armed with Mao's thought, they were wiping out freaks and monsters; in the cities, while continuing their hard work in the factories, they wrote big-character posters in their off-duty hours, and criticized bourgeois ideas and customs, such as refusal to participate in manual labor; in rural areas, the poor and lower-middle peasants also wrote big-character posters, held meetings, exposed sabotage, denounced capitalist opportunism and church leaders, attacked old ideas, exposed and condemned bad books and music and drama, and at the same time prepared to increase agricultural production.

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Most of the work-teams which had been sent to the cities in June were apparently withdrawn in July, like the work-teams of the universities, other institutions of higher learning, technical schools, and middle schools. While the withdrawal of these teams from the cities has not been specified in any public statement, the 8 August declaration suggests that, and so do statements by provincial party leaders which appear to apply to all work-teams under their jurisdiction. The picture as regards the countryside is least clear. It appears that the "socialist education" work-teams in the countryside were in general let alone, i.e. that they did not have "cultural revolution" work-teams superimposed on them. And they were apparently not disbanded when the work-teams of June were disbanded; in one of his speeches in July and August, Chou En-lai [redacted]

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said that the work-teams sent originally to the countryside (beginning in 1964) had done well, the implication being that they would remain. Broadcasts of August made clear that "socialist education work teams" were still active in some places, and this was probably general.

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To return to the campuses, where the "revolution seemed to be most advanced and militant, [redacted] [redacted] speeches by Chou En-lai and other party leaders to meetings of students in Peking, beginning in early August. These speeches may have come immediately after a statement by Mao--apparently of this period--summarized

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by wall-posters seen in December. (Mao's statement pre-dates September, because it is cited in a briefing by an officer of the "cultural revolution group" on 2 September and probably pre-dates mid-August, as it does not mention the Red Guards.) [redacted] 25X1

The various accounts of the content of the speeches of other leaders agree that the party leaders again apologized for the work-teams of June--not just for the "mistakes" made by the work-teams, but for the top-level mistakes of sending in teams from the outside in the first place, and without clear directives. According to a fairly full account of Chou's 4 August speech (made at Tsinghua)

[redacted] Chou described the "sending of work-teams" as a "policy mistake" an attitude he shared, he said, with Li Hsueh-feng (the first secretary of the new Peking committee, which had organized and dispatched the work-teams in June.** Specifically, Chou is said to have continued, when the educational institutions had

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** [redacted] a 2 August speech by Teng Hsiao-ping at People's University, in which he said that the party center (including himself) had not adequately prepared the work-teams, in particular had not given them clear directives. Ironically, he went on to say--as did others briefing the students in August and September--that they must work out their problems for themselves, in other words that they were still not to get clear directives.

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asked for replacement of the party organs named by the old (discredited) Peking committee, "we hurriedly decided" to send the work-teams and "failed to consider carefully what the work-teams' basic tasks were" to be. (Chiang Ching was later to formulate the problem the same way, criticizing those who did this, contrary--she alleged--to Mao's instructions.) Moreover, Chou said, the "party's policy was not clearly stated" to the work-teams--another indication that the work-teams did not have clear directives to support the leftists. The work-teams in practice had adopted an "administrative" attitude and had ordered people about, rather than following the "mass line" of discussion. In sum, Chou said, if the party did not carry out the three duties defined by Chairman Mao as "struggling, criticizing, and reforming,"* if it failed to concentrate revolutionary forces to struggle against the "main target" (another formulation echoed four days later) but instead dissipated its forces in looking for "mistakes" and in "making trouble" among the students and other revolutionary forces, it would be committing a serious error in "direction."**

Chou reportedly went on to state his favor for freedom of expression for the students Kuai Ta-fu and Liu Chuan, but to state also that he disagreed with their expressed views. This was of some importance, as these students--still not "rehabilitated" as of early August--were later identified as the leaders of the most militant elements of the Red Guards in Peking, those who were to

*Chou referred to this formulation as if it were well-known to his audience, and perhaps it was, from wall-posters; but it did not appear in official documents until 8 August.

**According to her later self-criticism, Mme. Liu Shao-chi, who had been removed from the Tsinghua work-team just the day before (3 August), had committed errors of this kind. No version of Chou's speech indicates that Chou included any criticism of Mme. Liu personally.

lead physical attacks on party and government installations and to lead the poster attacks on many party leaders.

Chou reportedly went on to apologize on behalf of the central committee for the "mistakes" of the work-teams, and to state expressly that the mistakes must not be attributed entirely to the new Peking committee (although, he said, mistakes made in the course of the work were their responsibility). Chou then returned to the point that "we" (of the party leadership) were primarily to blame for failing to define the correct (militant) line, for having "poured cold water" on the mass movement out of "fear" (a phrase much used later).*

Red Flag was to say much the same thing, in summary form, on 21 August: that "during a short period, mistakes were discovered in the orientation and guidelines" of the cultural revolution, and that Mao Tse-tung at that moment "personally" sketched out the 16-point decision revealed on 8 August.

This 8 August declaration of the central committee--presented under 16 rubrics--was a curious document, a lumpy mixture of militant and cautionary elements, mainly militant. It was interpreted otherwise by many or most observers at the time--that is, as mainly an effort to put the revolution in order, to set some limits to the sweep for enemies, to gain control over the entire process. This was not an unreasonable interpretation, in the light of the disorder, the proliferating and apparently senseless violence of the previous two months, and the potential of the released monster for damaging if not destroying its creator; and it was that in part; but in fact the

*Chiang Ching (Mme. Mao) spoke at a Red Guard "debate" two days later and emphasized one of the points Chou had made--namely, that the students should concentrate their energies on the struggle against enemies (in the party), and not dissipate them in quarrels among themselves. In other words, Mme. Mao, like Chou, at that time refrained from stating the party leadership's favor for one Red Guard faction over another. A lesser figure of the cultural revolution group--Kuan Feng--took the same line in a speech on 2 August.

declaration was followed by the wildest period in recent Chinese history.* The document--which appears in retrospect to have been written deliberately to justify both a militant course (particularly in the short run) and periodic retreats from it as the campaign developed, and the final version of which was said by a party secretary later as having been approved by Mao himself--is worth considering in some detail. It remains the basic document on the conduct of the "revolution."

The 8 August declaration reiterated that the party's long-term aim was to change the "moral outlook of the whole (Chinese) society," and, to this end, its "present" aims were to bring down those "in authority /In the party/ who follow the capitalist road" and the "bourgeois reactionary 'authorities'" in the academic community, to criticize and repudiate bourgeois ideology, and to

*In describing the documents as "mainly militant," the present writer, who did not see the document until several weeks after the fact and some weeks after the Red Guards had been turned loose, cannot be sure that he would have described it this way at the time. It is surely true, even in hindsight, that there is nothing in the declaration which would permit any observer to predict the Red Guards. Nevertheless, an effort has been made to read this document, like others, as if one were reading it at the time of its publication, in order to get the best possible sense of the consistency or inconsistency of the signals which Peking has been giving its audience throughout the "cultural revolution"; this is important in order to judge whether certain curious developments have reflected disagreement among party leaders, the sending of false signals, or the sending of correct signals which have been misread.

transform education and the arts.* "Revolutionary youths" were presented as the "brave path-breakers" in conducting the revolution, with their big-character posters and "vigorous debates"--youths who inevitably had "certain shortcomings" but whose "main revolutionary direction has been correct."

The declaration conceded "fairly strong" resistance to the revolution, and called for this to be attacked in "a spirit of 'daring,'" a spirit which was to be "put above everything else." As for the party leadership being provided, the declaration went on to classify "party organizations" at all levels as (a) the "daring" and thus "correct"; (b) the conservative and lagging; (c) those who feared exposure of themselves but would be "excused" if they accepted it; and (d) the true bourgeois representatives, "extremely afraid," who had tried to suppress the revolution; those of this latter class were to be dismissed from their posts, although it was not clear just when this was to be done.

After asserting that the party "should not fear disorder," invoking Mao himself for the proposition that a revolution "cannot be gentle," and calling upon the masses to "make the fullest use of big-character posters and great debates," the declaration stated in strong language that "all forces must be concentrated to strike at the handful of ultra-reactionary bourgeois rightists and counter-revolutionary revisionists," and, again, that the "main target of the present movement" was to be those "in the party who follow the capitalist road." The declaration did, however, ask that care be taken to distinguish hard cases in the party from those who had simply made errors, and "reactionary" academics from ordinary academics, and pointed out that diverse opinions among the masses were to be expected, that reasoning and

*This spells out Chou's formulation of 4 August--attributed to Mao--of "struggling, criticizing, and reforming."

not force should be used (with the "masses"), and that minority views (among them) were to be tolerated. Mao himself was given credit, in wall-posters seen in September, for inserting the phrase about reasoning instead of coercing.

The declaration then switched back to the question of the proper attitude (particularly on the part of party officials) toward revolutionaries. It noted that "responsible persons of certain schools, units and work-teams have been launching counter-attacks against the masses" (i.e., had resisted attacks by the revolutionaries), even contending that "opposition to them /selves/ means opposition to the CCP central committee"; this kind of discouragement of revolutionaries was said to be "absolutely impermissible." It went on to warn both "anti-party elements" and erring officials against describing elements of the masses as "counter-revolutionaries," and to warn in strong terms against inciting the masses or students to fight among themselves (although there was to be much of this later), noting that "even proven rightists" in these groups would be dealt with at a later stage of the movement.

The declaration went on to classify party cadres in categories analogous to those used to describe the types of leadership being provided in the revolution: the good, the comparatively good (whose mistakes were small), those who had made serious mistakes but were not anti-party rightists, and the "small number" of anti-party rightists who must be "fully exposed" and "pulled down." In an odd ambiguity, this paragraph went on to say that even these elements "should be given a way out so that they can turn over a new leaf"--a passage which could be read, as a passage in Lin Piao's speech to the central committee plenum in the same week could be read, as promising even these elements an opportunity to reform and keep their posts, but which seems in the context of other pronouncements to have been offering them little more than a chance to keep their lives.

[REDACTED]

The 8 August declaration went on to inform the country that "cultural revolution groups, cultural revolution committees, and cultural revolution congresses" had been found to be "excellent new forms of organizations by which the masses become educated under the party's leadership" (i.e. for the conduct of the purge and reindoctrination), "organs of power" for the cultural revolution, intended as "long-term, permanent mass organizations..suitable for schools and government organizations" and also "basically suitable for factory and mining enterprises, neighborhoods, and the countryside." The members of these groups and committees, and delegates to their congresses, were to be elected locally (i.e., not simply appointed, like the first committees of April and May, and not--even worse--appointed by outsiders and sent down, like the work-teams of June); it was further stated that the "masses may at any time criticize" the members of these groups, and that members found "unfit" could be replaced. (This last provision, for criticism and replacement, was later to give a handle to the Red Guards in attacking, inter alia, the new cultural revolution groups of some of the provincial and municipal party committees.)*

*The party apparatus--presumably directed in this instance by the "group in charge of the cultural revolution" at the party center--moved quickly to establish the new cultural revolution committees and groups.

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Further, the 8 August declaration reviewed the task of transforming the educational system--that is, getting rid of the domination of "bourgeois intellectuals," combining education with labor, shortening and simplifying the courses, and so on.* It went on to speak of the question of criticizing the "bourgeois 'authorities'" (of the academy and of the party) by name in the press. This action, it said, should first be discussed by party committees of those levels and in some cases cleared by higher party levels.

The declaration, after steering the revolutionaries away from scientists and technicians, discussed "linking up" the cultural revolution with the "socialist education" movement in urban enterprises and rural areas. Where the socialist education movement--a less sharply-focused and less ambitious campaign--was proceeding smoothly, it said, it should not be disturbed. However, suitable occasions could be found for "discussing" questions related to the cultural revolution, and in some places the latter could be used to stimulate the other campaign, if the local party committees approved.

The declaration noted briefly that it ought to be possible to carry out the "cultural revolution" without interfering with production, and that both socialist education and the cultural revolution in the PLA were to be carried on in accordance with directions from the Military Affairs Committee and the PLA General Political Department--i.e., not by either the conventional party apparatus or the new extraordinary cultural revolution

*New violence on the campus was later reported to have erupted on this same day, 8 August. In this incident, at Lanchow, students at an industrial college there beat up a number of other students in the presence of the police, who did not interfere. This was not "Red Guard" activity, but action by "revolutionary students" who were apparently not organized or in any case not organized to that degree.

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apparatus. The declaration concluded by waving the banner of Mao's "thought" and listing specific works of Mao's as basic documents for party committees to study.

In sum, the militant elements are the more impressive--the call for "daring" to be "put above everything else," the rating of party organizations by degrees of "daring," the specification not to fear "disorder," the insistence that "all forces must be concentrated to strike" at the rightists and revisionists, the specification that the "main target" was that of party officials, the failure to specify that force should not be used against party officials, the warning to party and government officials not to resist, and the specification that the rightists were to be "pulled down." In other words, the Red Guards who were to attack party officials in late August and subsequently were correctly reading the 8 August declaration. Mao was inciting the revolutionary young against the party apparatus, and, moreover, without giving them any clear criterion for distinguishing between those loyal to Mao's thought and the disloyal who were to be "exposed" and "pulled down."

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The first commentary on the 8 August declaration-- by Red Flag, broadcast on 10 August--described it as the "principal document" of the cultural revolution and as the result of a "scientific summary...made under the personal supervision of Comrade Mao Tse-tung." It reiterated the aims of the revolution and the presence of "relatively strong and persistent" resistance to it, and emphasized the need for "daring" leadership and for turning the masses loose rather than preparing a script for them. It spelled out the point that

Experiences have indicated that each unit must carry out cultural revolution work by relying on its own masses and should not depend on arrangements by upper-level organs. Under general conditions, each unit should carry out cultural revolution work without the help of work-teams dispatched by upper-level organs.

However, persons would sometimes be "assigned by upper-level organs to contact the masses"--presumably, directly assigned by Chen Po-ta's "group" in Peking--and these persons were not to act as "'special envoys'" or rush to make a determination but must be suitably humble before the masses. Red Flag echoed the 8 August declaration in asserting that the effort now should "concentrate on those persons in authority within the party who have taken the path of capitalism"; and it spelled out the point in the declaration about criticism of officials by name. The names of "middle of the road elements" (those still regarded as redeemable), the party journal said, "may be mentioned in big-character posters issued by their own units," but "so long as their names are not openly published in newspapers"--which would require official approval--and "they are allowed in the meantime to issue big-character posters to defend themselves," they need not regard themselves as condemned.*

*In point of fact, the most important party leaders who had fallen had not been identified in the newspapers, but lower-level officials had been.


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At the time the 8 August declaration was published, a central committee "plenum"--with perhaps no more than half of the members actually attending--had been in session for a week, and was to continue until 12 August. It was apparent from developments in the week following 12 August--the issuance of a communique on 13 August, the surfacing of a new ranking of Chinese Communist leaders, and the emergence of the Red Guards--that the plenum had seen the formal presentation of Mao's new team and had discussed the future course of the "cultural revolution."

The tone of the communique, and the radical changes made in the leadership, raised the question of whether there had been a showdown in the plenum on policies for the "cultural revolution," a showdown which the militants--Mao and Lin and their supporters--had won.

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Some observers have attached importance to an odd circumstance in the reporting of Mao's visit on the evening of 10 August to a "reception center" in Peking maintained near the central committee headquarters for "revolutionary people." On 10 August NCNA transmitted an account of the visit which was presumably to appear in the 11 August People's Daily; however, the first edition of the newspaper on the 11th was withdrawn, and the paper appeared later in the day with no story about Mao. On the same day, NCNA carried an account similar to its 10 August transmission but reversing a reference which in the original version had named the central committee ahead

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of Mao in receiving expressions of regard from the masses. It was later reported that the newspaper's original version included a remark from Mao that the party was losing touch with the masses (obviously his true feeling, and the root of the changes he had made, but something that could not be stated publicly in just that way). And a [redacted] visitor to China has speculated that Mao was "brought out" on this occasion by the "new mainstream faction" (the implication being that Mao was their puppet), and that "the Liu faction" (the new outsiders) recalled the issue of People's Daily which reported this (only to be reversed and suppressed the next day). It seems unnecessary to reach very far for an explanation of the withdrawal. There seems a sufficient explanation either in the reported remark about the masses [redacted]

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[redacted] or in the differences between the two texts. The second text is hardly less idolatrous than the first (both accounts are ludicrous, like the accounts of Mao's swim) and even increase the numbers of those around Mao to "tens of thousands" and has the crowd expressing its "best love" for Mao instead of the earlier "warm feelings"; but the second text at a dozen points is a smoother and better job. It is not surprising that the propaganda apparatus--particularly in the light of what had just happened to the old propaganda apparatus--should take pains to get a story about Mao 'right.'

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Months later there came [redacted] an account of Lin Piao's speech at the plenum, which provided much insight into developments at the plenum and the relationships among Chinese Communist leaders revealed there. The generally credible account, from wall-posters apparently prepared by "revolutionary students" present at the plenum, supports Chou En-lai's version of events [redacted]

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That is, Lin throughout appears to be speaking like a man united with Mao in a secure majority of expressed opinion, one which could do what it wished with opponents in the plenum, and not at all like the spokesman for a "faction." In this speech he is speaking for Mao, informing the

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central committee of the program which he as Mao's first lieutenant intends to carry out for Mao, and defining for the central committee his relationship with Mao.*

Lin's speech as reported shows him to identify himself completely with Mao, and to think in the same simplistic terms, with the same visionary long-range goals. In the speech he begins by classifying people into "two kinds" down the line: those who eagerly study Mao's thought, and those who do not (he specifies Lu Ting-i and his "gang"); those who attach great importance to (i.e. are obsessed by) political-ideological work, and those who ignore it or even interfere with it (he fails to specify Lo Jui-ching); those who are energetic and make achievements (e.g. put up lots of big-character posters), even though they offend people and are attacked, and those who are inactive and conciliatory (e.g. put up few posters). Thus, he goes on, the party must be re-organized according to the principles governing the cultivation of revolutionary successors stated by Chairman Mao (in the mid-1964 article on "Khrushchev's Phoney Communism"), and "we"--referring perhaps to the politburo standing committee--have proposed, and Mao has agreed, to dismiss from their posts those who oppose Mao's thought, those who resist political-ideological work, and those who lack revolutionary zeal. Further, he says, "we" are now going to dismiss a number of people, promote a number, and keep a number in their posts. Those who make mistakes,

*This latter part of the speech at first seemed hard to accept at face value, not because of the relationship defined in it but because it seemed inappropriate for Lin rather than Mao to define it, especially if Mao were present.

Mao almost certainly had defined the relationship, in a brief earlier speech, making clear to the central committee that Lin was now his designated successor and would be speaking for him henceforth, and that Mao may well have been absent from some sessions of the plenum.

even serious mistakes, will be given a chance to be tested in future work, provided that they accept education and truly repent; but the incorrigible must be dismissed. (This was exactly the line taken in the 8 August declaration, and with the same ambiguity as to just when the hard cases were to be dismissed.) Unless this is done, Lin continues, the "stalemate" will not be broken, as such people will carry out subversive activity "once trouble flares up." (The reference to "stalemate" appears in the context to mean a loss of momentum in the "cultural revolution," which was at that time in a trough, rather than to designate a situation of "stalemate" between or among contending factions at the top of the party preventing any further action.)

In his speech as reported, Lin goes on to define his own role. In the best Chinese style, he speaks of his talents as unequal to his task, of the possibility that he will make serious mistakes or even fail, and of the need to rely on Mao, the standing committee, and the cultural revolution group. He insists on the need to do everything according to Mao's thought, and implies strongly that one group in the party--one would think, Liu and Teng and others--had been acting contrary to Mao's known will:

There cannot be two policies or two command headquarters. No wishful thinking can replace the thinking of the Chairman, and we cannot stage a rival drama in competition with the Chairman. We want monism...

Lin goes on to define his relationship with Mao. He says that there are "many ideas we do not understand," that "we" must carry out Mao's directives, that he asks Mao for instructions on everything and does everything according to his orders, that he does not "interfere" with Mao on major matters and does not trouble him with minor matters, and that sometimes he does not understand what Mao wants and therefore makes mistakes. He goes on to describe Mao as the "genius of the world revolution," to speak of the "wide gulf between him and us,"

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to reiterate a modest assessment of his own talents, but to state his willingness to accept the "decision" of Mao and the central committee.*

In his speech as reported, Lin then speaks directly to the "cultural revolution group" present at the plenum. He speaks of the movement as having begun with vigor, but then having "cold water poured on it"--an obvious reference to the interval dominated by the work-teams. Mao himself, Lin goes on, "reversed the situation"--meaning, presumably, called for the withdrawal of the work-teams and their replacement by cultural revolution groups. He reiterates the abiding aim of transforming men, the expectation of numerous struggles and reversals, and the necessary progress through many stages to achieve both spiritual and material ends. He praises the role of the "cultural revolution group" and again criticizes its predecessors (implying an intention to stick the party-machine leaders, demoted at the plenum, with the responsibility), and concludes resoundingly that Mao's thoughts are the pearls among the fish-eyes.

The 13 August communique of the plenum was less informative than the above account of Lin's speech, although consistent with it. It noted the plenum's "full"

*The "decision" was presumably that of naming Lin the party's only vice-chairman and thus designating him the successor. In regard to the self-deprecating formulations, [REDACTED] Lin could be expected to speak in this Chinese way no matter what the relationship between Mao and himself, and some have read the speech as a crafty and cynical description of manipulation of Mao by Lin: 'I handle the minor matters and I see that no major matters come up.' The other interpretation--that Lin is describing his situation frankly--gives a more credible picture: of Lin in awe of Mao, conscious of the difficulties of his new role, and trying to do what Mao wants but not always being able to, because for one thing Mao does not always make it clear and for another changes his mind, so that Lin has to accept the responsibility for "mistakes."

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approval of a "series of brilliant policies...put forward by Comrade Mao" since 1962, mainly related to the cultural revolution, and described these as an "important development of Marxism-Leninism." Like the 8 August declaration, it emphasized the need for "daring" in the conduct of the revolution, and said flatly: "Don't be afraid of disorder." It reiterated that the masses were to be turned loose, not "blindly" ordered about, and called for support of the "revolutionary left." And it included praise of the "brilliant example" set by Lin Piao and the PLA in the study of Mao's thought.*

On 16 August, Chen Po-ta, always regarded as a spokesman for Mao, spoke to a mass meeting of students in Peking. Although the Red Guards had still not appeared on the public scene, Chen's speech, not published until the Red Guards had been surfaced, was in effect the first of a series of interviews given the Red Guards by officers of the "cultural revolution group" and by Chou En-lai, interviews in which groups of Red Guards were given a few general directives. Chen's directive was very general in this case. Implying an expectation (like Lin Piao at the plenum) of considerable resistance, he called on the students to "smash all kinds of monsters," spoke of the value to them of passing through "storms and hardship" and the "big revolutionary furnace," and asserted

*In commenting on the 8 August declaration before the communique appeared, People's Daily on 11 and 13 August, and the Liberation Army Daily on 11 August, differed in their emphases. The party newspaper did not emphasize daring and did emphasize "moral force instead of physical force," while the PLA paper called for "absolute reliance on the left faction of the revolution." There was and continued to be speculation, given some support in the differences of emphasis in the speeches of the two leaders, that the former spoke for Chou En-lai and other possible "moderates," and the latter for Lin Piao (representing Mao) and other apparent "militants."

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that their lack of fear was "very correct!!!" (The triple emphasis is in the Chinese account.) He called upon them to "immerse" themselves in the masses and, to study "Mao's" program for the cultural revolution. He concluded that in making a revolution, "it is necessary to rely on ourselves." ("Revolutionary students" and Red Guards were later to assert that the party leadership had told them that they were the only forces that the revolution could rely on.)

As of mid-August, then, the picture seemed fairly clear. A militant cultural revolution would continue, and would now turn to the party apparatus across the board, led by the "group in charge of the cultural revolution" and its subordinate bodies, and making much use of "revolutionary students." It was not at all apparent, however, that these students were to be organized as uniformed "Red Guards" and encouraged to throw China into the worst disorder in the 17 years of the Peking regime.

Mid-August to Mid-September: The Unleashing of the Red Guards

The Red Guards made their first public appearance on 18 August at a million-strong rally in Peking, a rally which featured an appearance by Mao Tse-tung in army uniform, speeches by Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, and a new line-up of party leaders which displayed Mao's "close comrade" Lin as Mao's anointed successor.*

Before considering this new factor of the "Red Guards," the little available information on their

*Miraculously, Peking does not give Mao credit for creating the Red Guards--only for recognizing their value when he "discovered" their existence.

antecedents may be summarized.* A Red Guard who was interviewed in September stated that there had been "talk" about forming the Red Guards as early as late May, and that a detachment was first organized at the middle-school attached to Tsinghua university in Peking. Red Guards interviewed in Peking in October said the same thing, specifying 29 May as the date of organizing and naming the group at Tsinghua. Peking itself at the same time offered the same story, stating that this particular unit--now operating as the "Red Guard Unit of the Peking Militant School of Red Guards"--was "among the pioneers" and was organized in May. Some degree of confirmation is also available from wall-posters published in Red Flag, posters written by the Red Guard unit at Tsinghua which indicate that it had been in existence there at least since 24 June.

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Obviously some time was required for the organization and outfitting of the Red Guards before their massive

*The Red Guards came as a complete surprise to observers of the Chinese scene. Although several observers had a creditable record in forecasting many or most (but in no case all) of the spectacular developments--i.e. the party purge, the extension of the purge to the top level, the downfall of Peng Chen and Lo Jui-ching as individuals, the decline of Liu Shao-chi and the rise of Lin Piao and a new team, and the early break-up of the leadership group being presented by Peking as a harmonious unit as late as late July--not a single one of the hundreds of steady observers of the Chinese scene forecast the Red Guards.

and disciplined appearance in Peking on 18 August

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A wall-poster published in August in the Chinese press also helps to fix the time; this poster, dated 27 July, attributed to a high-school attached to Tsinghua (the point of origin asserted by the Red Guards themselves), and calling for "revolutionary rebellion" against "hysterical gentlemen" in power, has been treated by Peking as if it had been the opening gun for a nation-wide organizational effort.

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As for the 18 August rally at which the Red Guards first appeared publicly, while the NCNA account of the rally maintained continuity with the central committee's 8 August decision by reporting that Chen Po-ta of the "cultural revolution group" presided, it also reported that "'Red Guards', composed of the most active, bravest and firmest of the revolutionary students, packed the reviewing stands," that many were dressed in khaki with red armbands (and that Mao himself wore such an armband), and that these "revolutionary students" described themselves as "'Red Guards' for the defense of the party

central committee, Chairman Mao, and Mao Tse-tung's thought.* It also reported the speeches of Lin and Chou, in which both incited the audience to carry through the cultural revolution (Lin's was the more obsequious to Mao and militant toward everybody else) and in which neither saw fit to say a word about the role of the "cultural revolution group" (instead, Chou slipped in a little praise of Lin Piao). Both of these speeches, like Chen Po-ta's speech of 16 August, qualified as directives to the Red Guards in very general terms.**


At this 18 August rally, Peking published the new standings of party leaders in the form of a name-list of those attending. Mao of course appeared as number one, but followed now by Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Tao Chu, Chen Po-ta, Teng Hsiao-ping, Kang Sheng, and Liu Shao-chi. In other words, Lin had displaced Liu as second-ranking leader and Liu had slid all the way to eighth place (probably not even that, really); Chou had remained number three; Tao Chu, the new director of the propaganda department and one of the leaders of the "cultural revolution group," had leaped all the way from the second level (a regional leader, ranking low in the central committee)


*Mao did not share his "thought" on 18 August. Peking itself has said that some of the students asked Mao to make a speech, but that Chou answered for him, pointing to the 8 August declaration, and the books of quotations they were carrying, as equivalent to a speech. Some observers were quick--too quick--to conclude that Mao was not being permitted to speak for himself.


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**In early November, [redacted] Chou in this speech had urged the youth to limit their activities to their own schools, and that this reflected a continuing dispute with Lin Piao over the use of the Red Guards. While subsequent speeches were to suggest possible differences between Lin and Chou, Chou's 18 August speech neither stated nor implied the limitation the correspondent purported to see.

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to fourth place on the top level and indeed to first place among functionaries of the party apparatus (Peking may have been signalling an intention to make Tao the secretary general, and it was soon reported that he would serve as Acting Premier in Chou's absences, another job Teng had had); Chen Po-ta, head of the "cultural revolution group" which seemed to have become the most important part of the party apparatus; had risen several notches to fifth place; Teng Hsiao-ping, the secretary-general who had been head of the secretariat and thus the actual director of the orthodox party apparatus (i.e., less the special bodies like the "cultural revolution group") and who was regarded by some observers as having played an important role in carrying out Mao's purge of Peng Chen (a view that is still tenable) nominally retained his sixth position but now with an additional active leader between himself and the top and probably with his grip slipping from his key job; and Kang Sheng, another leader of the "cultural revolution" group suspected of having resumed his duties with the secret police during the purge, moved up several places and into the elite. In sum, Lin Piao had had a great triumph; Chou En-lai had had a triumph (in holding to his position in such a tricky and dangerous period); the leaders of the "cultural revolution group"--Chen, Tao and Kang--had had a great if perhaps insecure triumph; and the principal figures of the old party-machine, Liu and Teng, had had a defeat, Liu a disastrous one, Teng a substantial one.

It was surmised at the time that Liu and (to a lesser degree) Teng had been demoted for some combination of the following reasons: their actual or putative roles as "protectors" of Peng Chen in the past; the uneven performance of the party press (not fully in line until June) in the campaign against the "black gang" beginning the previous November; the retrospective "failure" of the work-teams in June; and opposition to, or lack of cooperation in, the superimposition of the "cultural revolution group" on the conventional party apparatus, in particular the direction of the activity of the "group" against the conventional apparatus (as forecast by the 8 August

declaration and emphasized by the 10 August Red Flag).* This surmise was all right as far as it went; but there was soon to be reason to conclude that another big item on the list of charges was going to be that of opposition--in the central committee plenum of 1-12 August--to the plans of Mao's new team for turning the Red Guards loose to terrorize, discredit, and (conceivably) wreck the conventional party apparatus as an entity. The question that immediately presented itself, to those who had watched Liu and Teng build up the party machine over the years into what had seemed to be a powerful instrument responsive to themselves, was whether Liu and Teng would accept this defeat meekly, or whether they would instead try to rally what forces they could to resist the new team (which in turn raised the question of whether they any longer had access to their old forces).

A color film of the 18 August rally, shown in Hong Kong two months later and attended by officers of the U.S. Consulate General there, provided some valuable if fragmentary indicators as to Mao's status and health and relations between Mao and other leaders. The U.S. observers were impressed by the youthful participants' "apparently sincere adulation" of Mao and the skillful exploitation of this feeling by speakers and cheerleaders, preparing the participants to "go out into the provinces energized and motivated to do battle against those...demons and monsters who oppose the thinking and will of Mao Tse-tung." The Consulate General surmised that the demonstration was also intended to make Mao's opponents in the leadership, both those in Peking and those seeking the films in the provinces, "feel hopelessly overwhelmed..., asking themselves: who can oppose a leader who evokes such evident adulation and who controls a mechanism which can organize such a demonstration of mass support?"

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U.S. observers of the film reported further that Mao moved slowly but firmly, usually without assistance, and appeared in good health, apart from his apparently poor vision. He seemed alert but detached, and unresponsive to others. (Others have reported this as Mao's "blind god" pose). He did exchange words with Lin Piao, who thereupon made some changes in his printed speech with a pen, and also chattered briefly with Chou, but was not seen to have any exchange with other leaders. Lin Piao had a "ghostly" appearance but seemed otherwise vigorous. Chou En-lai looked tired but performed smoothly. Tao Chu was the only other leader given the special treatment of being filmed standing alone. Some others of the new team--Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Chiang Ching--were visible but much less prominent.

Red Flag on 21 August reiterated that the principal targets of the "great revolution" were the "reactionary academic 'authorities'...and bourgeois representatives within the party," and it went on to warn that any person who opposed Mao's thought or failed to implement it--"no matter how high his position, how old his standing, and how great his 'fame'"--should be the object of a "struggle waged against him until he is dismissed from his official posts and functions." This seemed to be cut to the measurements of Liu Shao-chi, and to reinforce the impression that a number of other party leaders would be brought down before the purge had run its course.

Another article in that 21 August number of Red Flag, and a People's Daily article two days later, both suggested strongly that the Red Guards were to be sent into action as quasi-military units against elements of the party apparatus at the center and against its regional, provincial and municipal bureaus. The implication throughout was that the Red Guards had been formed in order to organize the "revolutionary students" in a uniform way, giving them the kind of charter and propaganda support which would deter local authorities from organizing resistance to them. Both articles seemed to incite the Red Guards to make physical attacks on their targets, and especially on party organizations. The Red Flag piece, persistently describing the "revolutionary youths" as

"fighters," jeered at the "overlords in power" who were "shaking with fear." It went on to emphasize that the "young fighters" had the "backing of Chairman Mao,"* and described their task as precisely that of "making trouble," bringing down "all the old ideas, culture, customs and habits" (soon to be known as the 'four olds'). Young people, the article went on, were the "most resolute" in following Mao's instructions, and had "by far the greatest love" for him. Finally, the young were bold, daring to "defy the power of law, not vulgar politicians..." The People's Daily for its part denounced a "stubborn faction" which had "absurdly regarded the leadership of its own units as equivalent to that of the party central committee," reiterated that the party committees of unspecified areas and units had resisted the revolutionary students and in "some areas" had even organized the masses to struggle against the students, and went on most ominously to declare that "the revolutionary student organizations, such as 'Red Guards,' 'Red Flag Fighting Teams,'** and others, are legitimate organizations" engaged in "legitimate revolutionary actions," and that anyone opposing these revolutionary actions "opposes Chairman Mao's teachings and the party central committee's decision." In other words, the party organizations marked as targets would have a choice between allowing the Red Guards to conduct violence against them or entering into armed warfare with the representatives of Mao's new team; on one hand, and with the odds against them, the local figures of the old party apparatus and whatever local military forces they could muster, and on the other Mao, Lin Piao

*One of the regime's own newspapers later quoted a female Red Guard to the effect that Mao himself at this time (19 August) had told her personally that violence was better than persuasion.

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and the bulk of the PLA, and the "cultural revolution group" leaders recently projected into the inner circle. Shaped up that way, if as though it would be an unequal, even if sometimes protracted, contest.

Wall-posters in September spoke of an interview given visiting Red Guards in Peking by Tao Chu on the day--21 August--of the ominous Red Flag editorial. Materials received much later indicate that Tao gave several such interviews in late August, and that other officers of the central "cultural revolution group" also gave such interviews--probably dozens. The new team clearly regarded these personal talks as the best channel of communication with the Red Guards, as the conventional party apparatus was still staffed by officials who were themselves to be targets of Red Guard action.

Accounts of the 21 August interview agree that Tao did not give the Red Guards particular targets, and, in response to their demands for action against particular party leaders, told them in effect that action was up to them. The September posters said that Tao invited the Red Guards to give an account of the behavior of their local party committees, and told them that it was within their power to criticize and "change" their local party officials. 25X1

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Chou En-lai was prominent among those giving interviews and making speeches to the Red Guards in this period, and there is a good wall-poster account of his speech at Tsinghua on 22 August. Chou in this speech, like Lin Piao at the August plenum, began in the approved Chinese way by deprecating his own abilities, and inviting further poster criticism of himself; he then proceeded authoritatively, as if he thought his position to be secure. He noted that the head of the former work-team at Tsinghua, who had made a self-criticism that same day, realized his errors, but he went

on to emphasize, as he had in his 4 August speech, that the errors were "fundamental errors...in direction and line" which were not the responsibility of the work-teams alone but also of the central party leaders who dispatched the teams. Citing the need for "speedy" action in Peking in late May, to correct the situation left by the "black gang," Chou said that the party had had a choice between sending in work-teams to regain the leadership or to rely on the local masses and risk "confusion," and chose the former course without due consideration. Further, the errors of the work-teams derived in large part from the fact that they were not given proper guidance. Thus the larger errors were those of the new Peking committee and of (unspecified organs or leaders of) the central committee.

Chou in this speech went on to speak of the many millions of students throughout China who were not as "fortunate" as students in Peking, because they had not "solved their problems there"--i.e., their party organizations and work-teams were making the same old (conservative) errors, often "even more errors" than had been made in Peking, injuring people and carrying out "white terrorism." Because Mao could not go to all those places in person, Chou said (implying, as others were to state expressly, that Mao had directly intervened in Peking), the 8 August declaration had been prepared as guidance for the students. As previously noted, the 8 August declaration was militant, and had incited the students against the party organizations without giving them any particular guidance; and Chou in this speech followed the same strategy. He urged them to "rise up for the revolution," to "solve the problems yourselves," and (speaking to visiting students) to "hurry home today with this fire." He reiterated that "You can solve your problems by yourselves," and went on to imply that the provisional cultural revolution committee of Tsinghua, which had succeeded the work-team not more than three weeks earlier, had already criticized itself for being too conservative (a good indication that the students were reading the 8 August declaration as a militant directive.)

Chou then answered questions, and made clear that the party leaders encouraged a wide range of student expression and of organizational activity (a point of importance, in view of the variety of opinion already being expressed by, and of organizations already being formed by, the Red Guards). Chou encouraged the convention of all kinds of meetings for "debating," stated clearly that the students had "freedom of publication" (they could say anything they liked in their posters), identified five different Red Guard organizations in Peking and said flatly that "any kind of organization is all right," and reiterated that "as long as the general direction is correct, opinions can be exchanged even if they are different."

Chou went on to ask the students to observe the long-professed party principle of "curing the disease and saving the patient," i.e., that the aim of the campaign was to re-educate and reform as many as possible of those in error, rather than to destroy them. Speaking specifically of the discredited president and party leader of Tsinghua, one found guilty of "following the capitalist road," Chou encouraged the students to struggle against him, but called upon them to make thorough preparations, to carry out propoganda among the people until the ground was ready, to go through the entire process of struggle, criticism and reform. In these passages, Chou seemed to be saying that any additional important party figures--like the one just mentioned, who was still a member of the CCP central committee--who were to be purged would be purged much later, after a prolonged campaign. If this reading is correct, this too was an important point, in view of the apparent failure of the party leaders in Peking to move against any of the party leaders denounced by the Red Guards in the weeks following the first attacks.

There is no evidence that Chou En-lai or any of the officers of the "cultural revolution group"--the small number of party leaders reported as giving general directives to the Red Guards before they were sent into action--gave the Guards any better directives than this. In other words, there is no evidence that they were told to take

action against specific individuals already marked for purging--to take such action against provincial first secretaries, for example, as would provoke such individuals to organize counter-action which would serve as a pretext for replacing them. If this is true, if they were simply told to go into action, without any particular targets and with no specific limitations placed on their actions, then Mao and his new team were making new tests--both of party and government officials and of the "revolutionary students" themselves; that is, the new team would be testing the revolutionary qualifications of the young and identifying those from whom the party's eventual leadership would be drawn, and testing the responses of the party seniors to these initiatives by the young, and would be marking the examinations later.

As of this time (nearing late August) before the Red Guards were sent out, the conventional party apparatus had been hit hard only in one sector--the "cultural" sector, that is, individuals concerned with the direction and management of propaganda, education, and the arts. About 80 important "cultural" figures had been publicly brought down*: seven directors and managers of the central apparatus, including the onetime chief (Peng Chen) of the first "cultural revolution group" and the director of the Propaganda Department (Lu Ting-yi); some seven members of the Peking committee of the party (the only regional, provincial or major municipal committee which had been hit hard as a whole); two deputy directors of departments of regional bureaus and two provincial secretaries; some 15 directors and deputy directors of provincial propaganda departments; six editors; about 23 administrators (presidents or vice-presidents) and

*Only a few party figures who were not concerned with the management of some kind of "cultural" activity had fallen: Lo Jui-ching, Yang Shang-kun (chief of the central committee's administrative office), Liu Jen (Peng Chen's first deputy), and Li Kuei (first secretary in Huehot, Inner Mongolia).

secretaries of party committees of institutions of higher learning; and about 17 officers of unions and federations of artists of various kinds and directors of governmental cultural bureaus. About 50 of these were known to have had important party positions--the main categories excluded being those educators who were not concurrently secretaries of party committees, and the last category given above. The implication of the 21-23 August commentaries summarized above was that this figure of 50 was to be multiplied several times before the Red Guards were put back on the leash.

While the party was preparing to send the Red Guards out into the streets, "cultural revolution committees" and subordinate "groups" were being formed throughout China--as in effect had been directed in the central committee's 3 August declaration--in those places where they had not already been established in July. Some of the schools took the trouble, on the occasion of "electing" these new committees (committees for universities, teams for smaller units), to criticize publicly the two earlier forms of "cultural revolution" organization--the first groups appointed by the party committees, and the work- 25X1 teams which supplanted them--as being inferior to these new bodies elected by and thus (it was implied) responsive to the masses. Nevertheless, at least in the universities, these new committees were in most cases identified as "provisional" committees/

just as the party secretaries who had fallen from favor were generally replaced by "acting" secretaries, the "provisional" committees were clearly on probation. There was considerable ambiguity in the remarks made by party secretaries on these occasions. While some chose to emphasize the role of the new committees and groups in "directing" and "giving instructions" and asserted that they must "boldly lead" the revolution, others chose to underline the point that the committees were to "give free rein to the masses," that the universities were to be "run by the revolutionary teachers and students," and so on; some of the chairmen of the newly-elected committees and groups picked up this last point, being quoted as promising to "run" the school in a worthy fashion, e.g. to "foster reliable proletarian successors."

The emergence of the Red Guards, and some of the remarks quoted above, raised the question of just what degree of authority the new committees were really to have. They were apparently--as "organs of power" given charters by the central committee and as bodies elected expressly to "lead the masses"--to be at least nominally in command of the Red Guards, while they were apparently to be at least nominally responsive to the "revolutionary teachers and students" among whom the Red Guards had just been identified as the best element. And the "revolutionary students and teachers" were apparently to have no relation whatever to the young Communist League, which had not been mentioned for weeks and the leaders of which were evidently in trouble. It appeared that the party center--probably meaning in practice, the "cultural revolution group"--could avoid chaos only by giving the "cultural revolution" units and the Red Guards and other students identical orders concurrently, so that the former could "order" and the latter could "demand" the same actions at the same time.* But there was no way to sort this out at the time; one could only wait to see what would happen.

There was not long to wait. At just about this time, beginning 20 August in Peking and a few other places and a few days later in most places, the Red Guards began to appear in the streets of China's cities, and proliferated in the last week of August. For the first few days, their activities were reported by both Communist and non-Communist media as a kind of dull-witted, humorless Hallowé'en, directed against everything on the scene regarded as "feudal, capitalist, or revisionist" (i.e., traditional,

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Western or Soviet). As reported, they put up posters, made speeches, shouted denunciations, changed the names of streets, markets, schools, hotels, temples, theatres, parks and lakes, tore down shop signs, defaced churches, and took similar direct action against both the possessors and the suppliers of offensive (non-proletarian) food and clothing, hair-styles and cosmetics, books and magazines, photographs and paintings and objets d'art, and so on. They were rewarded at once with an editorial in People's Daily, "Very Good Indeed!"--and by other such editorials in those first days.

Observers in Peking began on 25 August to report incidents of brutality by the Red Guards there--scenes of "street punishment," in which the victims were placed in a circle and beaten with belts or cords, or were beaten on the street and dragged into houses, as well as much parading of victims around the streets. On 28 August, posters in Peking reportedly asserted that several Red Guards had already been killed by "counter-revolutionaries." From such posters (reported later), a picture emerged of violence from the start (i.e., immediately after 18 August) at some places, and of widespread violence in the last week of August. In Peking, where the Red Guards had a free hand, the victims of their raids, beatings, torture, and assignments to slave labor, although primarily teachers, included party and government officials, one an officer of the "cultural revolution" section of a municipal cultural bureau; this last was the first reported attack by Red Guards on a subordinate unit of the "cultural revolution group" from which they were supposed to be getting their orders.* They also (in Peking)

*It should be kept in mind, however, that action by the Red Guards against any given cultural revolution committee or team does not necessarily imply refusal to recognize the authority of the central "cultural revolution group." All of the local committees and teams were to be "elected" locally, and could be replaced if found unfit; if the local cultural revolution committee or group were in fact selected and dominated by a party secretary who was himself unfit, it would follow that the cultural revolution group would also be unfit, and that the Red Guards would be hostile to the group as well as the man.

raided the apartments of senior party members, tearing up their clothing and throwing their furniture into the street. Some executions (although not of party officials) were surmised, and "many suicides" reported. In Tientsin (not far away), Red Guards from Peking reportedly beat up a municipal official and people who came to his aid (including women), beat up many other people in other incidents, killed a teacher and perhaps others, and (on 26 August) fought with a "Red Corps" organized by the Tientsin committee of the CCP; this last was the first report of elements being organized by local party officials to repel the Red Guards. (Peking later reported the death on 19 September--from "heart attack"--of the First Secretary of the Tientsin committee; a correspondent reported that the death was really the result of a beating by Red Guards.) There were soon reports from other parts of China of attacks by Peking students on student bodies elsewhere, of threats made by them against officials of "cultural revolution teams," of similar attacks by local students on local people, and of resistance to the Red Guards by a locally-organized "Red Corps" or by local crowds apparently responding to local party leaders.

In the most sensational single development of that last week of August, the Peking regime publicly reported through the Harbin radio on 27 August that a meeting had been held by "revolutionary" people in Heilungkiang to denounce a "black gang" within "leading groups" of the Heilungkiang provincial committee of the CCP (a meeting chaired by an alternate secretary of that committee itself), and then on 29 August that the Red Guards of various Harbin schools had held a "rally to burn down the provincial CCP committee and shell the command headquarters"* (a meeting addressed by a secretary of the Northeast regional bureau of the party). The provincial

*This "shelling" was later defined as ferreting out the "bourgeois careerists," but one report of the same period states that Red Guards actually set fire to one municipal party committee headquarters in Hunan.

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committee was evidently one of those which had organized resistance against the Red Guards (possibly splitting off some of the Red Guards themselves), as the resolution adopted by the rally asserted that local counter-revolutionaries had "put on arm-bands and called themselves Red Guards" and had carried out a "fight against the revolutionaries"; further, the resolution called for a reorganization of the local Red Guards and for the coordination of student activity in the future. In attacking the provincial committee in this fashion, those naming the target and directing the fire--presumably the "cultural revolution group" in Peking and those local officials still in their favor--were making good on their recent threats to incite the Red Guards against the party apparatus.

In all the agitation in Peking at that time (the last 12 days of August), the most interesting development was not reported at the time and not in detail until three months later--the splitting of the Red Guard movement into hostile factions, which physically clashed with one another, and which were alleged by elements of the Guards to be carrying out the will of different groups in the top leadership. The information on this development which became available from wall-posters in November merits a summary.

The Red Guards in Peking began to polarize soon after their original organization there, even before the Red Guard movement was revealed on 18 August;

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On 11 August the decision to remove the work-team was announced, and this, perhaps together with Chen Pota's militant speech of 16 August, apparently emboldened the sympathizers or supporters of Kuai Ta-fu to agree in a meeting of 17 August to demand his reinstatement. This

[redacted]

set the stage for the "incidents" of 19 and 24 August in which there were physical clashes between the leftists and another group which was no less aggressive in pursuit of its aims but more nearly "moderate" in its attitude on the issue in contention--namely, whether to attack central party leaders openly, especially Liu Shao-chi and his wife.

On the morning of 19 August, [redacted] the leftists put up posters denouncing Mme. Liu and demanding that she return to the campus for criticism (she had not yet submitted her self-criticism), but these leftists were immediately denounced by other forces, which put up counter-posters and raised the issue of the propriety of public attacks on central party leaders.

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
On 22 August, as noted earlier, Chou En-lai spoke again at Tsinghua and incited the revolutionary students in general terms against the party apparatus (not particular leaders), and expressly encouraged them to say almost



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anything they liked in their wall-posters, to "debate" in this way, and to form as many kinds of Red Guard organizations as they cared to. This apparently gave fresh encouragement both to the leftists and to the moderates at Tsinghua.

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September: The Subsidence of the Red Guards

In late August Mao's new team in Peking had given an appearance of concern about those aspects of Red Guard activity which were getting or might get out of hand, although evidence was lacking that Mao and his new team up to that time had wanted it any more in hand than it had been. (In other words, Mao and the new team had wished to have a large degree of disorder, had in fact called upon the young revolutionaries not to fear disorder, had seen this as essential in order to terrorize the populace and in particular to strike fear into party functionaries, and now, having made their point, were willing to assert falsely that the Red Guards had exceeded their instructions.)

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on 28 August People's Daily--in an editorial entitled "Revolutionary Young People Should Learn from the PLA"--had called for greater discipline. Noting that Mao himself had originally issued this call, the party newspaper asserted that the Red Guards and "other revolutionary organizations" had been established with the PLA as their model, and asked them to "learn still better from the PLA" to carry out the "three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention" stipulated by Mao, to "adhere to mass discipline," and to defend the "people's interests" and "state property." it pointed out that the 8 August declaration had called for reasoning, not coercion or force, and said--as the 8 August declaration had not--that this was applicable even to "those in authority who are taking the capitalistic road" (i.e., even to the party figures previously identified as the main targets). In other words, now that the Red Guards had correctly read and acted upon the militant emphasis of the 8 August declaration, and subsequent

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commentaries, the party leaders could retreat for a while into one of the cautionary provisions of the declaration. Lin Piao and others of the new team were soon to call more clearly for discipline--a discipline which if effected would permit the Red Guards to be used in a more orderly way, over the long term, against a narrower range of targets.

On 31 August there was another huge rally of "revolutionary teachers and students" in Peking, in which Mao had the starring roles. Mao arrived at the rally in the first car, accompanied by Lin, Ho Lung (another old-time military leader and officer of the Military Affairs Committee), Hsieh Fu-chih (still Minister of Public Security, despite the fact that he had been a protege of Teng Hsiao-ping), and Yang Cheng-wu (commander of the Peking headquarters of the PLA); there seems no doubt that Mao intended in this way to emphasize the degree to which the new team united and rested upon the regime's instruments of force. In the second car were the third and fourth-ranking leaders, Chou En-lai and Tao Chu, along with Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) and another party leader (not Chen Po-ta, fifth-ranking, who was missing, but Nieh Jung-chen, a new figure in the inner circle). Back in the third car were the demoted leaders of the old party apparatus, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.

The rally was opened by Chiang Ching in her capacity as first "deputy head of the cultural revolution group," and was apparently presided over by her (thus maintained continuity, as Chen Po-ta had presided over the first rally). Lin Piao and Chou En-lai again made the speeches.* Lin 25X1

strongly praised the contribution of the Red Guards to date in destroying the "four olds." He went on, however, to call upon the Red Guards to "distinguish who are our enemies and who are our friends," to "unite with the great majority and concentrate all forces on striking at the handful of bourgeois rightists." The "main target of the attack," he said, must be "those persons in power who have wormed their way into the party and are taking the capitalist road." In this formulation, Lin was reiterating almost verbatim the line which had been taken in the militant portions of the 8 August declaration and by Red Flag on 10 August. (It seems important to recognize that Lin in his August and September speeches was not originating a new line, but identifying himself primarily with the militant elements of the existing line.) Thus restricting the range of Red Guard activity while inciting them anew against party leaders, Lin went on to line up with the 28 August People's Daily on the means of struggle ("Don't hit people," not even the bad "persons in power"), and to describe the Red Guards as "the shock force...of the great cultural revolution and a powerful reserve force of the People's Liberation Army."

Chou En-lai also praised the Red Guards, but he went on to emphasize the need for a discipline as strong as the PLA's, and he did not incite the Red Guards to further action against party leaders as Lin had. Stating expressly what Lin had simply implied, Chou asked the Red Guards to build themselves into a disciplined body and to become a "reliable reserve force" of the PLA.

During the first two weeks of September there were additional indications that Peking intended to put the brake on the Red Guard movement as a whole, while shaping it up as a permanent vehicle on the PLA model--a vehicle which could be driven headlong if so desired for a period of weeks, or used to run over given individuals while missing others, and then reliably slowed or halted.* The

*Delegations from both Red Guard units and the party committees they had been attacking were reported to be trooping into Peking in this period to appeal to the party center.

[REDACTED]

party's actions at this stage like others cannot be fitted neatly into a clearly-defined period, owing to the lack of synchronization, especially the lag behind Peking itself; as previously noted, the Red Guards in Peking had begun to slow down at the end of August, while Red Guards at many other places (including Red Guards from Peking) were staging riots until mid-September. But the actions taken in Peking of course indicated intentions as regards the conduct of the "cultural revolution" as a whole.

Following up on the admonitory editorials and admonitory elements of leaders' speeches of late August, People's Daily reiterated on 5 September that it was the party's policy to "Struggle By Reasoning, Not By Coercion or Force" (the title of an editorial that day).* And 25X1 on 7 September the party newspaper told the Red Guards directly that they were not to interfere with productive work and should in fact organize themselves to assist with the autumn harvest.

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The paper went on to say that the leaders of economic units should establish two teams--one "mainly" for the cultural revolution, one "mainly" for production.

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*The party on the same date put in better order its plans for bringing provincial students to Peking for indoctrination. A later wall poster cites a party-government directive of 5 September establishing quotas, teacher-student ratios, length of stay (four days), and responsibility for food and transportation. It does not appear, however, that such good order was achieved.

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On 11 September People's Daily returned to a proposition that had been put forward in the 8 August declaration and had been spelled out by the party newspaper itself on 23 August--namely, that the targets of the Red Guards were not to be allowed to fight back, to organize resistance. Quoting the 8 August declaration to the



effect that "it is not permitted, whatever the pretext, to incite the masses to struggle against one another, or to incite the students to do likewise," the 11 September editorial took note (as it had on 23 August) that "responsible persons in some localities and units openly defied this decision, ...created various pretexts to suppress the mass movement, ...even incited a number of workers and peasants...to oppose and antagonize the revolutionary students." (There were of course many more instances of this as of 11 September than as of 23 August.) The newspaper reiterated that such resistance was "diametrically counter" to Mao's directives," and that a "firm struggle" would be waged against anyone so foolish as to resist Mao.* This editorial could of course be read as the corollary to the admonitions to the Red Guards in that period--better discipline for the Red Guards, less resistance from the party leaders attacked, a neater script all around. But this could hardly have been satisfactory to the party leaders who were then under attack or expected to be attacked: even if assured in advance that they were in good favor and would just be playing out a farce (a very few such assurances may have been given), acquiescence in this role--public humiliation by children--would undermine their authority forever and thus their ability to perform the jobs they were trying to keep.** This was soon proved to be the case, in Heilungkiang, where a first secretary in high favor with Peking found his provincial committee to be paralyzed, after a particularly militant attack by Red Guards.

*It would seem that those who had "openly defied" a central committee directive would have to be severely punished at a later stage of the campaign, if the central committee and its subordinate organs were ever to exercise authority again.

**The Book of Job comments on their situation: "Unto me men gave ear, and waited, and kept silence at my counsel. After my words they spake not again... But now they that are younger than I hold me in derision, whose fathers I would not have set with the dogs of my flock."

In the same period (dating from late August, in Peking), posters were observed reminding the Red Guards of their subordination to /cultural?/ "revolutionary committees," and warning them not to attack "old revolutionary cadres," nor to use force except against those targets "ratified by the central committee" and municipal committees, nor to search the houses of "revolutionary cadres" (party members?) except when ratified as above, nor even to search "bad elements" unless in coordination with the local police and public security officials.*

In this period of early September, the regime appeared to be taking organizational measures to ensure the continuing coordination of the activities of the Red Guards in a given province or municipality, and perhaps even on a national basis. Provincial broadcasts and wall-posters first spoke of a "Red Guard General Headquarters of Universities and Colleges in Peking," and soon other "General Headquarters" were reported as having been established by a preparatory committee. The objectives were stated by one provincial broadcast as being to "organize, merge, unify, and handle matters under centralized control." The regime seemed to intend to combine all of the individual Red Guard "headquarters" representing separate types of schools into a true general headquarters for a given area--one representing first all types of schools and then all types of Red Guard activity in the area.** The establishment of headquarters in a given

*Visitors to Tientsin in mid-September reported walls and vehicles covered with posters saying "use peaceful methods, not violence." 25X1

area was normally celebrated in a rally attended by leading figures of the provincial and/or municipal party committee, of the local cultural revolution committee, and of the local military headquarters, with speeches by one or more individuals from each such group. These Red Guard headquarters "elected" their officers, and were then supplied with "instructors" from the local PLA headquarters.

Three of these provincial accounts referred to a possible national headquarters of the Red Guards. One (Mukden radio) spoke of an "Amalgamated General Headquarters of the Red Guards," and two others (in South China) referred to the "combined command" of the Red Guards, one of them (Kweiyang) specifying that the Red Guard headquarters in Kweichow had been established as a result of a proposal of representatives of this "combined command" and local colleges. It was not at all clear, however, what the components of this "combined command" were; while it would have made sense for the "combined command" to be simply the command of a general headquarters, representing many types of Red Guard units, the Kweiyang broadcast spoke of the headquarters itself as having been established partly on the initiative of the "combined command" (that is, the combined command existed first); thus the "combined command" may have been composed of local leaders of the party committees, the cultural revolution bodies, and the PLA. Neither was there any way to judge whether there was a "combined command" in Peking. Subsequent materials gave no indication of a national headquarters.

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Another important organizational measure taken in this period, in order to slow the momentum of the Red Guards and get or keep them under control, was the establishment of Red Guard Control Squads, a kind of military police (but with larger powers) given complete uniforms and appreciable training. The first of these was reported in Peking at the end of August, and another soon appeared in Tientsin. These were said--like party pronouncements and wall-posters--to have ordered Red Guards to stop using coercion (including torture) and to adhere to the 16-point directive of 8 August, and to recognize at all times the authority of the central committee and municipal committees; they were further said to have the authority to expel disreputable elements and to tear down posters that did not reflect the true intentions of the party leadership. One poster, dating the decision to establish them as 25 August, described them as the elite corps of the Red Guards--just as the Red Guards were the elite corps of the "revolutionary students," and the latter were the elite corps of the masses--and declared that they had authority to "investigate Red /Guard?/ organizations in all schools, organizations, factories and units."* Similar bodies were subsequently reported in the provinces, sometimes under the name of "Picket Corps" or "Provost Teams" described as being concerned with "security work and the maintenance of revolutionary order" (among the roving Red Guards). Observed (in films) in action in Peking on 1 October, the control squads did indeed look like the elite of the Red Guards.

This impression of early September--that Peking was moving toward the systematic coordination of Red Guard activity--proved to be misleading. The more important development--which was not to become clear until November--was the logical consequence of the polarization of the Red Guards into militant and moderate elements which had

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begun even earlier than 18 August and which was noted in the foregoing section of this paper. This was preparatory action by the most militant elements of the Red Guards to set up rival headquarters, which first appeared in the Northeast, in late September, and then in Peking and several provinces in October.* The Red Guards had been implicitly authorized to do so--that is, to set up whatever organizations they liked--in Chou En-lai's speech at Tsinghua on 22 August (not available until late November), and they may have been explicitly authorized to do so in interviews with officers of the central "cultural revolution group." Unfortunately, no material on the preparatory stage is available, and it is not known whether the militant organizers of the "rebel" headquarters got explicit permission from these officers or any other leaders of the inner circle.

The question remained, in these first two weeks of September which saw the closing of the first--that is, the most violent--phase of Red Guard activity: from whom were the Red Guards getting their orders? The answer--set forth in detail below--seems to be that individual party

*Analysts of OCI were the first to recognize that some of the "headquarters" appearing in this period were not later forms of organizations originally reported in the "preparatory" stage, but were in fact rival headquarters.

The present writer does not agree, however, that the material shows the rival groups to be "responsive to different individuals" in the politburo standing committee; what it shows, on this writer's reading, is that the militants believe that they are responsive to Mao and Lin, and believe that their opponents are responsive to others, and in some respects are probably right about this--but not in the sense of attacking targets to order.

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leaders, the conventional party apparatus, the PLA, and the new "cultural revolution committees" all had roles, but that their most important guidance from the top level came from Chou En-lai (as their "advisor") and from the central "cultural revolution group," and, at the working level, from the subordinate "cultural revolution" bodies.

In a vague, general sense, the central committee and Chairman Mao were the "leaders" or "commanders" of the Red Guard. In fact the Red Guards were quoted in their first appearance--18 August--as defining their mission as that of defending the central committee, Mao, and Mao's thought. Red Guards like others were constantly describing Mao as China's "supreme commander," or "great leader," or "helmsman," and Red Guard wall-posters often spoke of the party central committee as exercising "leadership" or even "supreme" leadership, and told the Red Guards to recognize this. But there was no suggestion in any material that either Mao or the central committee issued orders directly to the Red Guards.

Similarly, Red Guards were sometimes quoted as recognizing Lin Piao as their leader or commander, or as deputy to Mao in such a role, and it is true that Lin had publicly given them some of their general directives at the rallies of 18 and 31 August.

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The conventional party apparatus was sometimes said to be in authority over the Red Guards, in the sense that provincial party committees were sometimes described as "leading the cultural revolution" in the province, or as "supervising" the activities of Red Guards in their jurisdictions; and in at least one province Red Guard speakers cited the "leadership" of the provincial committee as well as that of the central committee and Mao.

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Leading figures of regional, provincial and municipal party committees were prominent in public gatherings--usually giving the main speeches--at public gatherings centered on the Red Guards, and provincial committees were credited with having called some of these meetings;

[REDACTED]

The bulk of the evidence from that period suggested that the party committee's leadership was being exercised through an extraordinary party organ, the cultural revolution committee or group. This did not mean that the party committee's leadership was purely nominal; the cultural revolution committee or group was often if not usually led by a secretary of the local party committee, and it was later learned that at least some of the cultural revolution committees and groups in this period were submitting regular or at least numbered reports to the local party committees (as well as to the central committee). But even in cases in which the local cultural revolution committee and groups were headed by local secretaries who had been loyal to their first secretaries, it is doubtful that the local party committees could effectively direct and control the activities of the Red Guards, because the cultural revolution committees and groups were also getting orders from the central "cultural revolution group" which they could disregard only at their peril, and, moreover, Mao's new team in Peking was bypassing the conventional party apparatus in giving the Red Guards their most important instructions in personal interviews, instructions which the Red Guards were bound to take more seriously than orders received from the local party secretaries whom they were free to attack.


The "PLA"--as distinct from Lin Piao personally--was surmised by some observers to be leading, directing or supervising the Red Guards. This surmise appeared to be built upon the many descriptions of the PLA as the model, the calls upon the Red Guards to "learn from the PLA," the assertion that the Red Guards were already or

were to become a "reserve force of the PLA (according to one report, an "armed" reserve), the links with the PLA through the establishment of Corps and the assignment of PLA officers as "instructors," the references to a "combined command" of the Red Guards (the assumption being--perhaps correctly--that the PLA at some level represented part of the combined command), and the prominent roles of military figures (along with party committee and "cultural revolution committee" figures) in the meetings celebrating the establishment of the various headquarters and welcoming Red Guards back from their travels. At least one observer conjectured that the General Political Department of the PLA was directing the Red Guards, and more than one concluded that the supervisory role of the PLA--in itself uncertain--was at any rate "increasing" as of mid-September. Apart from the establishment of the various headquarters, which did indeed suggest a larger PLA role at least in making the Red Guards a disciplined body, the surmise of PLA direction of the Red Guards as of mid-September seemed to be built on little more than an impression of an increased prominence of PLA figures in public activities related to the Red Guards; for example, in at least two Red Guard ceremonies of mid-September, military figures--uncharacteristically--were listed first among the dignitaries present, and in at least three instances the military figures gave the main speeches.

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The "cultural revolution group" in Peking and its subordinate bodies--together with Chou En-lai--appeared to have the largest role in the direction of Red Guard activity in this period.


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
"cultural revolution" committees and groups continued to organize the Red Guards, with the lower-level bodies sending their lists to higher-level bodies for approval.

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There was considerable evidence of a close relationship between the "cultural revolution" bodies and the Red Guards--much of which evidence indicated the direction of the latter by the former--from broadcasts, posters, and intercepted messages of the period. Just as officers of the "cultural revolution group" in Peking had presided over the first two Red Guard rallies in Peking (18 and 31 August), in the meetings at many points in China which established Red Guards Corps or welcomed Red Guards home, in most cases in which a presiding official was identified the presiding figure was a party committee official who was concurrently an officer of the committee's cultural revolution committee or group, although there were a few reports of such meetings in which "cultural revolution" figures were not identified as present. Local cultural revolution committees and groups were sometimes identified as receiving "revolutionary students" from other areas,

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As previously noted, the students attacking the provincial party headquarters in Sinkiang in early September claimed to be acting under the authority of Chen Po-ta; and it was to the "cultural revolution groups" all over China that the local academics sent their protest. At about the same time, according to later wall-posters, the competing forces in a research institute attached to a hospital in Peking--the work-team and the body that had dislodged it (a "cultural revolution" body)--both claimed to have the word--a "directive" or direct instructions--from Tao Chu himself*;

[redacted]

at least four other 25X1 officers of the cultural revolution group--Chiang Ching, Kang Sheng, Kuan Feng, and Chang Ping-hua--were giving speeches and interviews to the Red Guards in this period.

Chou En-lai also had a major role, perhaps the most important role of any party leader. Chou was known to 25X1 have given important instructions to the Red Guards in at least two major speeches in August [redacted] he was reported to have given at least two more important interviews in early September 25X1

*This incident was to figure later in posters attacking Tao Chu himself. The Minister of Health was said in the September posters to have sent the work-team and to have intervened personally on its behalf, while posters of November charged Tao with defending this same Minister of Health.

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and he was soon to give another major interview--appearing together with Tao Chu--in which he gave the Red Guards the clearest guidance ever reported. This role has to be kept in mind when considering reports that this or that Red Guard activity was directed against Chou; this is not to say that there was no such activity, as the most militant Red Guard units in late August did appear to believe that their opponents represented Chou's line, but to say that some of the lines which the Red Guards were acting on were formulated by Chou himself.

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[REDACTED]

While the party leaders in Peking were calling both for militancy [REDACTED] and for discipline, and Peking itself was fairly quiet, elsewhere in China in the first two weeks of September many clashes were reported. These continued to include attacks by Red Guards on ordinary citizens, attacks by Red Guards on party committee headquarters and on individual party and government officials (including functionaries of the new "cultural revolution" committees and teams), the "shame parading" of party officials,* battles between various groups of Red Guards (those from Peking were generally reported as the most militant and obnoxious), battles between Red Guards and local citizens organized by party committees to oppose them, and such other features as "hunger strikes" outside party committee headquarters and the use of troops to quell "riots." In some of these disorders, thousands of people were reported to have been engaged, and in some cases hundreds were reported to have been injured and dozens killed, or hundreds as the sum of several incidents).**

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*TASS later reported that party officials in Harbin-- and their wives--were bound, covered with mud, and taken around town in carts.

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The [redacted] confusion in the relationships between the various vehicles of the cultural revolution. By the book, the provincial committee had authority over the "cultural revolution" committee, which in turn had authority over the Red Guards, which in turn were modelled on the PLA. Yet here the Red Guards had just taken violent action against the provincial committee (and one under a first secretary with an apparently good record), had felt free to make "demands" of the cultural revolution committee, and had beaten up men of the PLA. It is true that all of those engaged in the action--that is, the party committees, the revolutionary students, and the protesting academics--seem to have recognized the authority of the central "cultural revolution group" in Peking, but they could not agree as to whether the students had that authority behind them, and the central group in Peking seems not to have helped them to clarify the situation.*

*A similar account is provided for Wuhan by wall-posters. Students from Peking went there on 2 September and reported to the reception center set up by the cultural revolution committee there, as they apparently should have; however, they then "demanded" to see immediately the provincial second secretary, who was out of town; incensed by this absence, the Peking students held a meeting (at which, inter alia, they quarreled with Wuhan students over the importance of "proletarian background," which some correctly pointed out that Mao did not have), then marched off to the Hupei party headquarters where they staged a 40-hour hunger strike; while there, they called the party committee a "black store," demanded the dismissal of the second secretary, and threatened violence against the deputy chief of the cultural revolution group of the committee.

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[REDACTED]

Some observers have contended both (a) that all of the party leaders outside Peking who were "bombarded" in this period were targetted in advance by party leaders in Peking, and (b) that it was really the mission of the Red Guards in August and September to overthrow the first secretaries of the regional bureaus and provincial and municipal committees which they "bombarded"--that is, to kill them, or put them out of action with injuries, or force them to abandon their posts and flee--and that they therefore failed in their mission, as this did not happen. The evidence is to the contrary, on both points.

As for the targetting, there is abundant evidence-- in the many reported talks of party leaders with Red Guards, that there was not specific targetting, that in fact party leaders briefing the outgoing Red Guards expressly refused to give them targets. This feature of the "revolution" has been incomprehensible to many observers, who have tended to argue that party leaders "must" have issued orders to attack specific targets (i. e. to "bombard" specific party committees and first secretaries), as it would not "make sense" to proceed otherwise.

[REDACTED]

While it cannot be proved that specific targetting was not ordered secretly (a negative proposition of this sort cannot possibly be proved), a survey of the "bombardments" as they in fact occurred does support the conclusion that there was no specific targetting-- indeed, that this was not to come until December, at a different stage of the campaign, after enemies were clearly identified. 25X6

It is recognized that calculations based on assessments of given leaders in terms of a patron-protege relationship must be offered cautiously, but such calculations with respect to Chinese leaders have seemed to work out well enough in the past so that a little weight can be given them. With respect to the "bombardments," whether considered in terms of proteges (known or believed) of

party leaders in disfavor, or in terms of proteges of members of the new team (who might be suspected of targeting others' proteges), or in terms of people apparently unconnected with either class of leaders, the available reporting shows no pattern. As for the proteges of those in disfavor, they were hit hard or fairly hard in the Northwest Bureau, Kansu, Heilungkiang, Anhwei, Fukien and Shanghai, but were missed or touched only lightly in the Southwest Bureau, Szechuan, Yunnan, Tsinghai, Kirin, and Shansi. As for proteges of members of the new team, they were hit hard in Hunan and Kwangtung, and missed or touched lightly in Honan and Hupei. As for the unassociated, they were hit hard in Peking itself, Hopei, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Shensi, and Sinkiang, but missed in Liaoning, Shantung, Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Ninghsia, and Tibet. Moreover, some people not regarded as proteges but known to be in favor with Mao and others of the new team at the time--e.g. Li Hsueh-feng in Peking, who had just been appointed to his post, and Pan Fu-sheng in Heilungkiang, appointed not long before--were hit hard; indeed, the new team was at pains to defend Pan against the Red Guards, informing them after the fact that they should not continue their attacks on this good comrade.

As for the weight of the attack, it is true that the 8 August declaration had stated that it was the aim of the "revolution" to "pull down" the hard-case incorrigibles in the party, but again there is no indication in the many briefings that the Red Guards were instructed in this first stage to go so far as to effect the physical removal of any official from his post. This too has seemed irrational to many observers, as the bombarded secretaries could hardly conclude otherwise than that Mao and Lin were already prejudiced against them and that most of them--whatever they did--were going to be found unfit, so that the new team in Peking "must" have intended to bring them down in that first stage. Nevertheless, the mission of the Red Guards in the eyes of those who sent them seems to have been--in that first stage--to shock, to shake up, to test the responses of, the party leaders outside Peking, partly out of Mao's general belief that

the truth would emerge from such a "storm" and partly from the new team's particular desire to accumulate a part of the truth--that is, evidence for a later judgment as to how much (what portions) of the party apparatus could be salvaged; in other words, for use when the real purge list was drawn up later.

That violence was used at all against the party secretaries, contrary to the nominal provisions of the 8 August declaration that reasoning was to be used instead of force, appears to have derived from the general exhortation to militancy, the failure to provide any rational criterion for differentiating between good and bad officials, and the failure to set clear limitations on the Red Guards' conduct. It would nevertheless be of value to know exactly why some got hit so hard, and some lightly or (so far as is known) not at all. 25X1

[Redacted]

In at least some cases, the Red Guards bombarding the party headquarters--e.g. in Sinkiang, Kansu, and Shanghai--seem to have been so militant that even the most well-prepared and tactful first secretary probably could not have handled them, could not have persuaded them they they (the secretaries) were devoted above all else to Mao and Mao's thought and 25X1 deserved to hold their jobs; and, of course, a number of the first secretaries were neither well-prepared nor tactful. In other cases

[Redacted] the first secretary apparently did a good job with them, either because they were not especially militant in the first place or because he was unusually well-prepared, conciliatory and adept. The militants seemed to have the best sense of Mao's wishes--to provide a hard work-out, a hard examination to be graded later. At the same time, the provincial leaders' response to the

[Redacted]

Red Guards--as evaluated by the Red Guards--was certainly not the only factor in determining their later status. Indeed, there is some reason to believe that the new team commissioned poster criticism of some provincial leaders later in the year--those who had previously escaped it--in order to swell the case against any given provincial leader whom the team might decide, for whatever combination of reasons, to purge.

On 15 September Peking held its third great rally ("a million") within a month. Again Mao "reviewed" the gathering without speaking (he is said to have walked to and fro and waved), again Lin Piao appeared as his only "close comrade," again an officer of the "cultural revolution group" opened the meeting (this time Kang Shang, described as "advisor" to the group), again the new lineup of leaders was brought out, and again Lin and Chou En-lai made the main speeches. Lin again praised the Red Guards strongly, again identified the "main target of attack" as people in power in the party, and again exhorted his audience to take action against them--and did not repeat his admonitions against violence, although he did call for the development of a "high sense of organization and discipline."* It was again Chou En-lai

*Just two days later, Wang En-mao, the first secretary in Sinkiang who had had a good deal of violence used against him in early September, delivered himself of some invective. Speaking in Urumchi (Tihua), Wang praised the progress of the cultural revolution in Sinkiang and endorsed Lin Piao's call for "bombarding the headquarters," but went on to voice "resolute opposition" to the "schemes of monsters and demons...to bombard the headquarters of the proletarian revolution." (A similar broadcast from Hunan on 20 September used much the same formulation to describe what had happened there.) Obviously, in Wang's eyes, and in the eyes of the CCP leadership until summer 1966, the headquarters of the revolution in Sinkiang was the office of the party's provincial committee.

who stated an unmilitant position, this time formulating a constructive role for the Red Guards--assisting in production, and in the roles of workers as well as exhorters. It was not exactly a question of Lin and Chou giving their audience different directives, as the content of Chou's briefings of Red Guards at the time indicated that Chou, like Lin, saw the main immediate role of the Red Guards as that of testing party leaders. But again there was a difference of emphasis, suggesting, at least, the possibility of an important disagreement on the relationship between the "revolution" and production.*

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The 16 September Red Flag chose to emphasize the same point that Lin Piao had. It took up his remarks of 31 August about the need to distinguish between friends and enemies, and reiterated his point of both 31 August and 15 September--as the 8 August declaration had first said--that the "main target" was to be persons in authority in the party. It specified that the "main orientation" of the struggle was to "concentrate efforts to strike at this "handful" of "primary, important, and most dangerous enemies," and warned its audience to avoid the mistake of "taking hold of questions secondary in importance while permitting the main targets to slip by." This formulation, in the context, seemed pretty clearly to call for early and decisive action against a number of party leaders (later, the editorial specified that the revolution was not aimed at "all leading cadres," only the handful). The editorial went on to say that by secondary questions it meant "general shortcomings and mistakes in the work style of the people," as distinct from party functionaries.*

On 18 September the Liberation Army Daily--almost certainly reflecting the views of Lin Piao--chose to emphasize the point that Chou En-lai had. It agreed with Chou that one important task for the PLA, government organizations, and "schools and colleges which have not yet carried out the great cultural revolution" was that of helping to gather the autumn harvest. On the same day Peking Radio announced that, "in response to the call of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the CCP central committee," more than 100,000 Red Guards and other young revolutionaries had gone to Peking's suburbs to do so. It was further announced on the same day that "large groups" of young people were so engaged "in many parts of the country."

And on 19 September People's Daily underlined the point: the regime's highest-priority task was now the harvest.*

Nothing new was said or done publicly in the rest of September. There was an interesting development on 24 September, however, when People's Daily reprinted in its entirety a long, tedious article from the Liberation Army Daily of the previous day.** The article--actually a collection of materials for PLA units to study in preparation for National Day on 1 October--was a review of the "situation" ("very fine") in familiar terms: the importance of the "cultural revolution" led by Mao (and secondarily Lin), the continued presence of a "small number of persons in power in the party" who must be "struck down," the great contributions of the Red Guards and the PLA, the necessity for studying and applying the works of Mao ("the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era"), the "transformation" of ideology and enthusiasm into material gains (an "overall leap forward" seen on "every front"), the PLA as a "great school of Mao's thought" and the model for the entire country (the creation of the universal man, who could and would play all social and productive roles), the illumination given the entire world by Mao's thought (the fantasy of China as the center of the "world revolution"), and the need for the PLA to press ahead on its

*Ironically, in the same period (21 September) a Honan broadcast denounced a party official there for evading the thought of Mao Tse-tung and concentrating on his job of agricultural production; he was quoted as having said that the central problem for him was how great the food shortage would be and how to feed the people better, and as having criticized the work-teams for holding meetings instead of working.

**The first posters criticizing Liu Shao-chi were reported on this day, and on the following day (25 September) Japanese visitors were told that they could not see Liu because he was "under criticism now."

present lines (carry through the revolution, hold aloft Mao's banner, etc.). The thing of interest--apart from the demonstration of the PLA's adherence to Mao's dogma in its most extreme form--was the reprinting of it by People's Daily. That is, the party newspaper, rather than originating material of its own for National Day, served up this material prepared for the narrow PLA audience--as if indeed the PLA were the model for everyone in the narrowest, strictest sense. The action placed the PLA newspaper again in the position--which it had occupied through the previous winter and spring--of providing leadership for the "cultural revolution," and it also gave the party's imprimatur to the picture of Lin Piao alone as standing on the heights with Chairman Mao.

Little new material came to hand in the last two weeks of September on the relationship between the Red Guards and the "cultural revolution group" and its subordinate committees and teams. The little there was did not change the picture of mid-September: that is, it was still a mixed picture, with most of the evidence still indicating that the cultural revolution bodies had the largest role in the direction of the Red Guards (even though Lin Piao in Peking might and probably did have a larger voice in policy than either Chou En-lai or the leaders of the central cultural revolution group there).

Broadcasts showed that officials of the cultural revolution bodies continued to preside over Red Guard rallies

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at the provincial as well as national level;




As previously noted,



the Red Guards were not getting orders to attack particular targets; that they were being turned loose with not much more than an exhortation to "sic'm" and an assurance that the truth would be shaken out.*

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In sum, the most violent stage of Red Guard activity subsided after mid-September, and the Red Guards throughout September appeared to be shaping up as a disciplined organization for further use, including violent use again if required;

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Chou En-lai and the leaders of the central "cultural revolution group" apparently continued to play the largest roles in giving the Red Guards their directives

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The dominant voices of the new team--Mao's voice indirectly, and Lin Piao's and Chou En-lai's voices directly--throughout September encouraged the audience to believe that further and strong action would be taken against a number of important figures in the party (although Chou's voice was softer); after mid-September these same voices (especially Chou's) also suggested that such action might not be taken for some months.

October: Waiting, or Debating (or Both?), or "Struggling"?

Throughout October, observers of the China scene speculated as regards the future of the party leaders who had been demoted in August, of the regional and provincial figures who had been "bombarded" by the Red Guards in August and September, and of the additional party leaders in Peking who came under attack in wall-posters in October. All month long, observers waited in vain for some clear sign of the intentions of those few members of Mao's new team who had not been attacked and were presumably in a position to make the decisions as regards the others, although some observers believed that even these few were unable to work their will. In other words, observers were divided into those who believed that the new team was

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waiting for conditions to become ripe before taking further action, others believed that members of the team were debating their future course, others believed that both of these propositions were true (i.e., that the team by this time had in mind a rough scheme--a prolonged morality play--for the next several months, but was debating whether some of the scenes should or even could be staged; the viewpoint of this paper), and others believed that the new team was paralyzed as a team owing to a fierce "power struggle" among its leaders.

The National Day ceremony in Peking on 1 October set the tone. Mao Tse-tung--described by Peking as "looking very healthy"--stood on the Tienanmen rostrum and watched a reported 1,500,000 people parade past, many of them bearing his portrait and selections from his works. Although Mao was on view for several hours, he said nothing, contenting himself with "waving his hand" to the "paraders" and "masses." Lin Piao, who stood beside Mao, made an "important speech" which said nothing, simply taking note of the "earth-shaking changes" of the 17 years of the Peking regime and reiterating that the aim of the "cultural revolution" was to "overthrow through struggle the small handful of persons within the party who have been in authority and have taken the capitalist road," while ridding China of its old ideas, culture, customs and habits. Other speeches--none by party leaders--added nothing to nothing.*

The Red Flag editorial of the following day was hardly better. It reiterated the formula of the "struggle against a handful of persons in power within the party," gave the conventional explanation of their emergence (the

*The ceremony was nonetheless impressive. A newsreel of the occasion shows the landscape of a nightmare, with rank upon rank of young Chinese, densely packed and stretching under the blank sky as far as the eye could see, surging past with their eyes lifted to Chairman Mao, brandishing their little red books of dogma and shouting.

[redacted]

"law of class struggle"), contended that "only by means of striking down" such persons in the party could the schemes of the exploiting class be thwarted, and took note that the

...tiny handful of persons has adopted new ways to deceive the masses, to resist the 16-point decision and to persist in maintaining the reactionary line of the bourgeoisie, and has gone to great lengths to fulfill its targets by means of inciting the masses to struggle against the masses.

The editorial went on to ask rhetorically how the process of struggle, criticism and reform--i.e., remaking society--could be carried out correctly if "we" maintain the previous "wrong line," again oppress the masses, and continue to incite students against students. But this question had been asked before, and the real question was what Mao's new team was going to do--or try to do--about these people. The editorial simply called upon those people to "pay attention to their own errors and correct them..., and not reach the point of antagonizing the party."

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By this time there was abundant evidence--some of it from Peking and provincial broadcasts [redacted] [redacted] but most of it from wall-posters which were being observed in September by diplomats, correspondents and travellers--that the Red Guards regarded quite a number of the officials of the party's regional bureaus and provincial and municipal committees as having committed grievous "errors" of this kind and as having qualified themselves eminently for "striking down"--rather than being let alone to "correct" their errors themselves.*

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In the regional bureaus, two of the three first secretaries regarded as close to Teng Hsiao-ping--Li Ching-chuan of the Southwest Bureau and Liu Lan-tao of the Northwest Bureau--had seen their areas hit hard by "bombardments" since late August, and both had been and were still being denounced personally in strong terms.* Li, concurrently a full member of the politburo, was being charged in particular with having protected a municipal party committee first secretary (in Chungking) who had tried to suppress the Red Guards; while Liu, head of the hardest-hit area of all since August and concurrently an alternate member of Teng's secretariat, was being charged with having refused to meet with the revolutionary students and was also apparently being held responsible in general for the large-scale counter-attacks on the Red Guards (many beatings, some deaths) reported from three provincial capitals (Shensi, Lanchow, and Tihua) of the area. A fourth regional first secretary, Li Hsueh-feng of the North China Bureau, had also been denounced periodically since late August and steadily from 1 October, but not in this capacity--rather in his role as first secretary of the Peking municipal committee. As for the other regional first secretaries, Sung Jen-chiung of the Northeast, as noted, had not been attacked; Wang Jen-chung, the new first secretary of the Central-South Bureau (succeeding Tao Chu), had not

*The third of these first secretaries regarded as close to Teng--like Li Ching-chuan, a protege from Teng's days in the Southwest--the First Secretary of the Northeast Bureau, Sung Jen-chiung, had not had much trouble of this kind in his area, apart from the special case of Heilungkiang, and was not reported as denounced in even one poster. Sung had gone on public record during the summer with strong praise of Lin Piao--a kind of notification to all concerned that he was changing his allegiance--and was given a vote of confidence by Chou En-lai in late September, but it was an open question whether any of Teng's principal proteges would get off so easily.

been attacked and seemed in great shape, as might be expected of a man who was a personal friend of Mao's and had been close to Lin and Tao as well; and there had not been a first secretary of the East China Bureau (since Ko Ching-shih's death in early 1965) to be attacked.

In the provinces and cities, there were several first secretaries who would seem--judging from the fact and the terms of the "bombardment" of their headquarters, and/or from the terms of the wall-poster criticism of them which was still on view--to be eligible for purging, and many more who might be (cases in which the situation had been reported in a confusing way, and/or in which other posters were defending the secretaries attacked). Among the provincial and municipal secretaries subordinate to the Southwest Bureau, first: although the head of the Sichuan provincial committee had not been reported as denounced and was giving an appearance of smooth cooperation with the Red Guards, his subordinate of the Chungking committee and his superior of the Southwest Bureau were both being denounced in strong terms, and he himself would seem at least as responsible as the latter for not backing the students against the Chungking official; the Kweichow committee had been charged with organizing at least three demonstrations against the Red Guards and with jailing some Red Guards, and, while the first secretary was not reported as being denounced by name, the provincial committee itself was soon to come under attack in the posters; and there had been vague reports of Red Guard action against some of the local committees subordinate to the Yunnan provincial committee. Among those subordinate to the Northwest Bureau: the Sinkiang committee had been under heavy "bombardment," the first secretary had very probably organized physical resistance and had publicly denounced those who had wanted to bomb "the his headquarters of the proletarian revolution," and he himself was being repeatedly denounced by name; the Shensi provincial and Sian municipal committees had been under continuous "bombardment" for about a month (mid-August to mid-September), there had been organized counter-attacks and at least one very serious incident in Sian (according to a later intercept, this occurred on 25 August and involved some 20,000 people), and the posters in September

were demanding that this committee be dismissed en masse for these offenses; and the Kansu provincial committee, which had apparently been bombarded in late August, was being charged with organizing physical resistance leading to hundreds of injuries and a number of deaths, and the first secretary was being denounced by name (some posters were asking "Tao Chu" to fire him). Among those subordinate to the North China Bureau: Li Hsueh-feng, first secretary of the Peking municipal committee (as well as of the North China Bureau) and concurrently a member of Teng's secretariat, had been denounced for weeks for the poor work of the new Peking committee, attacks presumably heartened by Chou En-lai's August action of publicly attributing to this new committee part of the responsibility for the failure of the work-teams in June and July*; in Hopei, where the old first secretary (Lin Tieh) had already been removed in the spring or summer and was later accused in posters of close association with Peng Chen and Peng's (alleged) policies, there had been serious trouble under his successor, chiefly in the form of clashes (with many deaths and injuries) between Red Guards from Peking and Red Guards in Tientsin (the provincial capital), although it was not clear that the provincial committee had any responsibility for the actions of the latter; and in Inner Mongolia, although there had been no reports of "bombardments" and the head of the Huhehot municipal committee had been purged before the Red Guards went into action, Ulanfu, the first secretary of the Inner Mongolian committee and concurrently an alternate member of the CCP politburo, was being criticized in posters. Among those subordinate to the Northeast Bureau: the Heilungkiang

*The top leadership's intentions toward Li Hsueh-feng were of special interest, because they could certainly be realized. That is, while there was some question in any given case of whether Peking could bring down a well-entrenched regional or provincial leader without using the PLA for that purpose (which would involve, at least, certain questions of public relations), Li was right at hand and in no position to resist.

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provincial committee had been openly bombarded (that is, with Harbin radio announcing its progress), but the old first secretary had been replaced in the spring and the new first secretary was helping to direct the fire in late August and early September, after which some lesser secretaries were removed but he remained untouched and apparently still in favor (later material, as previously quoted, showed Chou En-lai to have given him a strong vote of confidence in late September); similarly, the Kirin committee had acted swiftly to purge one of its officers after the Red Guards criticized him; and, while in Liaoning province a mid-September clash between Red Guards and local workers had been reported from Anshan, there had been no mention of involvement by party committees; all of which may explain why as of early October no regional, provincial or municipal first secretary in the Northeast was reported as being under attack by the posters. As for those subordinate to the Central-South Bureau: the Honan provincial committee, apparently under the command of an acting first secretary after the transfer of its old first secretary to Peking, was being accused of arresting some Red Guards from Peking, and the acting secretary seemed to be implicitly admitting this; the Hupei provincial committee had apparently been bombarded

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although the Red Guards themselves were being criticized for this in September by some elements; the Hunan provincial committee, which had been under the leadership of an acting secretary while the first secretary was acting temporarily as a deputy director of Tao Chu's propaganda department (he was back in Hunan in September), apparently also had been bombarded and had organized resistance, there had been at least one serious incident in Changsha, and wall-posters in September were criticizing the Changsha committee for refusing to receive the Red Guards and for permitting some of them to be beaten; and in Kwangtung there had been reports of serious clashes in Canton between the army and police on one hand and rioting Red Guards on the other in both August and September, and among groups of Red Guards in September; and in Kwangsi,

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there had been eye-witness reports of the clash of hundreds of Peking and local Red Guards with a large group of local 'Red Guards' organized by somebody. Finally, as for those subordinate to the East China Bureau: in Shantung, there had been serious clashes in Tsinan and Tsingtao in late August and early September, and posters in September were charging that a "bad secretary" in Tsinan had organized thousands of workers against the Red Guards and that the municipal committee's cultural revolution group itself in Tsingtao had organized some 40,000 people against them, although, curiously, the posters were not criticizing the Shantung committee for this; in Kiangsu, at least two of the municipal committees (Shanghai and Yangchow) had reportedly been bombarded, with serious incidents in Shanghai (although organized resistance was not reported), and posters in September criticized the Shanghai committee; the Anhwei provincial committee had been bombarded in late August [redacted] and posters were subsequently criticizing the first secretary by name for barring the Red Guards and for allowing local crowds 25X1 to beat them, although other posters reportedly defended the secretary and blamed the Red Guards; the Kiangsi provincial committee had apparently also been bombarded, clashes between Red Guards and workers had been reported, and September posters were accusing the committee of having organized beatings of Red Guards; and the Fukien provincial committee and the Foochow municipal committee had also evidently been bombarded, with a number of incidents reported in Foochow (the provincial capital), and subsequent posters were charging the two committees with having jailed some Red Guards and demanding the overthrow of at least the provincial committee.

In sum, as of early October the Red Guards--that is, elements of the Red Guards, as there was no central office known to speak for all of the units--were out for the blood of at least a dozen regional, provincial or major municipal first secretaries: of the Southwest and Northwest Bureaus (and of the North China Bureau in another hat), of the Sinkiang, Shensi, Kansu, Anhwei, Hupci, Kiangsi and Fukien provincial committees, and of the Peking, Chungking, and Sian municipal committees; and they may have been out for the blood also of the first secretaries

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of the provincial party committees of Szechuan, Kweichow, Yunnan, Hopei, Inner Mongolia, Honan, Hunan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Shangtung, and Kiangsu, and of the municipal committees of Tientsin, Changsha, Tsinan, Tsingtao, Shanghai, and Foochow, as well as (conceivably, although there was no evidence) some of the secretaries in the Northeast. Some move had to be made, toward satisfying them.

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On 5 October, [redacted]

[redacted] the central committee issued a directive related to the "rehabilitation" or "reinstatement" of leftist students--like Kuai Ta-fu of Tsinghua--who had been denounced, suppressed, or labelled pejoratively (as counter-revolutionary, anti-party, whatever) by the work-teams of June and July. This first directive was reported to relate only to one class of students; according to a Yugoslav news agency, it was concerned with "rehabilitation in military academies,"

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[redacted] Moreover, Peking was not to call publicly for "restoring the reputations" of such people until 31 October [redacted]

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[redacted] Nevertheless, non-military students were being "rehabilitated" immediately after the 5 October directive; later information indicates that Kuai Ta-fu was reinstated by Chou En-lai in the first "oath-taking ceremony" on 6 October.

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By 7 October, [redacted]

[redacted] the leftists at Tsinghua (supporters of Kuai's extremely militant faction) had compiled a detailed and extensive brief in defense of their actions in the early stages of Red Guard activity and in accusation of their enemies, as if they expected a show-down sooner or later. Their expectation may have derived from Chou En-lai's remarks of late September (that the factions would contend and eventually reach "unanimity") and from the 5 October directive, and would certainly have been given impetus by the 6 October ceremony.

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[REDACTED]

They might reasonably have believed that they would win-- would be supported by the party leadership--in the show-down.* As previously noted, this particular group of militants (the only one from which there is a mass of material) had believed themselves to be carrying out the will of Mao and Lin Piao and their opposition to be carrying out the different will of other leaders, and that they were probably right in some respects. But with respect to the particular issue of early and strong action against leaders, it was not clear what the position of Mao and Lin was, and it seemed probable that the new team was still discussing the scenario. Disagreement would seem to matter greatly only if it were about such questions as whether to take any further action against these groups, singly or in combination, or whom to include, or whether there was to be a long delay in taking any action (a delay which would make Peking look foolish) or if there were wide differences as to the degree of action to be taken against them, questions which members of the new team might see as involving the future of their own individual "kingdoms" or even political lives.

The first half of October provided further evidence of Peking's intention to make clear that Lin Piao

* [REDACTED] at least some party leaders--including Chen Po-ta, Hsieh Fu-chih, and Yang Cheng-wu--in talks with Red Guards in this period were praising them (by implication, the militants) as representing the "minority" of true believers who must win over the majority. The militants had in fact been in the minority at most schools.

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was to be Mao's successor and to validate his claim to that position.* On 9 October Peking Radio reported Lin's "extremely important directions on the study of Chairman Mao's works" in the PLA, as reported by Hsiao Hua, Director of the General Political Department. (The U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong observed that the quotations from Lin in this account were printed in boldface type, a treatment previously reserved for Mao's statements.) Taking as accepted fact the "great achievements in the few years since Comrade Lin Piao took charge of the work of the Military Affairs Committee" of the central committee (Lin had been Mao's deputy in this committee but had seemed really to run it), Hsiao gave credit to Lin's adherence to Mao's thought and went on to emphasize that Lin had "always implemented Mao Tse-tung's thought and followed his correct line most faithfully, firmly, and thoroughly," and at "every historical, crucial turn" in the revolution had "resolutely taken his stand on the side of Chairman Mao and carried out uncompromising struggle against every kind of 'left' and right erroneous line and courageously safeguarded Mao Tse-tung's thought." (Hsiao clearly meant to leave the impression that some of these "crucial turns" had been recent.) Further, Lin was "the closest comrade in arms of Chairman Mao, his best student, and the best example of creatively studying and applying Chairman Mao's works." Lin's own organ, Liberation Army Daily, in commenting on 11 October, included verbatim these passages

*In contrast, Liu Shao-chi, who had been presented for more than 20 years as Mao's chosen successor, was kept very much in the background; pro-Liu posters were reported to have appeared in Canton briefly in this period, but to have been taken down by Red Guards.

Moreover, wall-posters read in Peking on 10 October criticized Liu's wife, Wang Kuang-mei, and one called for her to return to Tsinghua university for self-criticism. It was later learned that Mme. Liu had submitted a written self-criticism this same day, 10 October.

about Lin's implementation of Mao's thought, his place on Mao's side at every turn, his uncompromising struggle against error, his courageous safeguarding, and his place as the closest comrade, best student, and best example. Moreover, [redacted] in this period the appearance in three major cities (Peking, Tientsin, Canton) of examples of Lin's calligraphy alongside Mao's. Commenting at the time, the U.S. Consulate General noted that this adulation of Lin had come "almost exclusively from military sources"--that is, the PLA newspaper, and speeches by military leaders--and surmised that the effort was inspired by Lin himself in order to consolidate his position and to develop a popular reputation after his many years behind the scenes.* 25X1

Nevertheless, the little information available in this period on relationships among the vehicles of the "cultural revolution" continued to suggest that the directing body was the "cultural revolution group" in Peking--along with Chou En-lai--rather than the PLA. [redacted]

[redacted] On 12 October, Wuhan radio reported a rally denouncing the deputy director of the Wuhan provincial cultural bureau: all five of the party officials identified as attending were officers of the provincial and municipal cultural relations groups, the dismissal of the condemned official was announced by one of these officers (in the usual form of crediting the provincial committee with the decision, and of noting approval of it by the regional bureau), and the main speeches were given by two of these cultural revolution officers. [redacted] 25X1


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*Lin may have been inspiring the most extreme statements, but all of Peking's propaganda media contributed to this image-building. For example, People's Daily, editorializing on 12 October, described Lin's "directive" to the PLA as "extremely important and timely for all," and praised the PLA's "brilliant example" for "many years."


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In mid-October there was another hint of the ,
in which Mao's new team might choose to handle the matter
of party leaders denounced by the Red Guards, including
those whom the team wished to keep in their positions.
Li Hsueh-feng seemed a good possibility as an example of 25X1
the latter type of official, if only because he had been
appointed only in May and his early removal would be
politically embarrassing.




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


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On 16 October, according to a wall-poster of early January 1967, a report was made--apparently to the central committee or the cultural revolution group--which formulated an "erroneous line" on some important question with respect to the cultural revolution. The wall-poster gives an account of an undated speech by Chen Po-ta which asks why those who submitted the erroneous line in this report

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refuse to identify themselves and accept the responsibility.* If they were to admit and correct their errors, he reportedly went on, they would be treated much less harshly than if this were not the case. The speech as reported goes on to assert that the erroneous line is in fact the line of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, which was exposed at the August plenum, but that it had been carried on since August by others. One surmise is that the reference was to Tao Chū and some lesser figures of the cultural revolution group, who would have occasion to report on the progress of the revolution and who began to be attacked in wall-posters in early November. Although these and later posters attacked Tao on a number of counts, the recurrent specific charge was that of defending provincial and municipal committees and their leaders; it seems possible that Tao--until recently a regional leader himself--had primary responsibility, among officers of the cultural revolution group, for the handling of those committees, that the report of 16 October denounced by Chen Po-ta was by Tao and on that question, and that it made him "objectively" a supporter of Liu and Teng in their attitude toward the party apparatus. (If so, it would be only a short jump to make Chou En-lai "objectively" a supporter of Liu and Teng; Chou had taken a 'soft' line toward the party apparatus as a whole, and just a week earlier--although citing Mao in support--had rejected a Red Guard request for direct examination of Liu's wife.)

On 18 October, maintaining the more-or-less bi-weekly schedule observed from the start (18 August, 31 August, 15 September, 1 October), Mao and other Chinese leaders again held a mass rally of Red Guards and revolutionary students. This one, however, turned out to be a non-event, and as such the most surprising development of the month. Although many or most of the crowd of 1.5

*This report may have been given by Chen at the work conference which reportedly began about 20 October and continued into November.

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million had been waiting for hours, presumably expecting (as did outside observers) another prolonged appearance by the party leaders and again a speech or two; but what they got was a motor-cavalcade, a drive-by, that was evidently over in half an hour, with no speeches (not even a few words, just waves of the hand), followed by a wait of an hour and then an announcement that the ceremony was over.


The affair left a strong impression that the rally had aborted; that is, that Peking had originally planned something more ambitious--on the model of the first four receptions--and for some reason had been forced to change its plans too late in the day to permit a smooth performance to be staged. Observers were quick to speculate--citing differences between Lin Piao's and Chou En-lai's speeches at previous rallies--that the explanation lay in the inability of the members of the new team to agree among themselves as to the line to take at the rally on the future of the Red Guards. This speculation seemed to some degree supported also by the erratic course of the Red Guard movement--the Red Guards had been turned loose in mid-August, but had been braked in the first two weeks of September, had been diverted mainly to training and production tasks in mid-September, then had been told again on 1 October that important persons in the party were still to be overthrown but had seen none of their targets fall. Another explanation offered was that, despite the impression left by the 18 October rally, the new team did plan it that way all along, i.e. the leaders did not disagree but had nothing new to say; in other words, "It's a crazy way to run a railroad, but that's the way Mao runs a railroad"--a view which was to be supported to some degree by the fact of other rallies in this format later.

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
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On the next day (19 October), the 30th anniversary of the death of the 'proletarian' writer Lu Hsun, People's Daily offered the first of a series of Peking commentaries presenting Lu Hsun as the "chief commander of China's cultural revolution" (Mao's words), a man of "unyielding integrity" and a model of revolutionary intransigence, who believed in "beating the wild dog...to death." The editorial declared that "we should develop this spirit" and "never show softness or mercy to the enemy," and then immediately spelled it out:

We must resolutely strike down the small handful of those within the party who are in positions of power and have taken the capitalist road, the counter-revolutionary revisionists and all the

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monsters and demons. We must hit them hard, completely discredit them, and never let them rise again.*

The impression was left by this editorial, and by others the same day--and was to be reinforced by other commentaries during October--that the dominant figures of the new team, whose voices presumably appeared in these statements, had decided on their next step and were now trying to persuade other members of the team, or at least some outside the inner circle whose support they wished to have, that the time was at hand or near for the decisive action against other party leaders so often promised. The impression was of disagreement--recent debate--on both the timing and the force of the blow, but there was no good indication as to whether the range of targets was at issue.

On the same day (19 October), correspondents in Peking reported that Red Guard wall-posters were calling for severe punishment of two regional leaders (first secretaries) with whom the Red Guards had had trouble in August and September: posters were demanding that Li Ching-chuan of the Southwest Bureau and Wang En-mao of

*Mao Tse-tung himself was soon to express this spirit in his own words. In a letter to the Albanian party on 25 October (broadcast 3 November), a letter signed and almost certainly written by Mao, Mao praised the Albanians as "dauntless proletarian revolutionaries, ...not like those false friends and double-dealers who have 'honey or their lips and murder in their hearts,' and neither are we... We are invincible; the handful of pathetic creatures who oppose China and Albania are doomed to failure... The U.S. imperialists and all other such vermin have already created their own grave-diggers; the day of their burial is not far off." The letter well illustrates what feature of anyone's behavior is most important to Mao--namely, loyalty to him personally--as well as the harshness of his intransigence and the depth of his delusional thinking.

the Sinkiang Committee be "burned alive" (probably not meant literally). Two days later, the posters demanding the ouster of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping (presumably from their jobs as government chairman and party secretary-general) were reported to have appeared on Peking's main boulevard (similar anti-Liu posters in other cities had been reported by travellers, but this was the first seen in Peking, and the first anti-Teng poster seen anywhere).* On the same day, the Red Guard newspaper resumed the attack on Li Hsueh-feng.

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*The anti-Liu poster was said to have remained up only a short time (as had reportedly been the case with the pro-Liu posters in Canton earlier), but, curiously, it was not reported that the anti-Teng posters had come down.


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


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21 October raid seems in retrospect to have been related to the beginning on the same day (21 October) of a three-week barrage of poster attacks on, and demonstrations against, some 23 government ministries and four of the staff offices which coordinate their work. Among the party and concurrently government leaders denounced in this period were Chen Yi, Li Hsien-nien, Tan Chen-lin, and Po I-po, all of whom were members of the politburo and only one of whom seemed out of favor with the new team (Po I-po, who had been out of sight, had been criticized a month earlier for assigning some of the work-teams that were found to have failed, and was being hit hard again for this and for allegedly approving--with Teng Hsiao-ping--an exhibit of February 1966 which played up Liu and Teng and played down Mao).*

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Again it was (and remains) unclear as to whether the attack was taken on the initiative of a militant group of Red Guards or at the instigation of a party leader. Neither incident--of 21 October and 24 October--was reported by observers in Peking and there may have been other such unreported incidents in that period. However, it seemed pretty clear even at the time that not all of those criticized were going to have their ministries smashed up, and that not all--probably not even most--were in disfavor with the new team. (For example, Chen Yi appeared with Mao in meeting a foreign delegation, and Li Hsien-nien headed a party delegation abroad, continuing to represent the regime in these meetings as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping for example had not been allowed to do for months.)* Thus some observers speculated that this combination of events--the poster attacks on ministries and ministers, and the invasions of ministries--were designed not to bring down all or

*The test of this question of whether a given official was in disfavor--and whether the new team was ready to move against him--might prove to be that of whether the posters remained up (it will be recalled that the Red Guard Control Squads were reportedly given the task of tearing down posters which did not reflect the thinking of the party leaders.

even most of the government establishment but rather to serve as a warning to Chou En-lai (the prime minister) and others regarded as opposed to early or severe action against discredited party leaders (and perhaps to the range of marked targets)--a warning that, unless they forthwith ceased their opposition, they would be added to the list. While Chou and Tao Chu both could reasonably be regarded as less militant than some others, Chou at least appeared otherwise in good favor, and remained so; while it seems possible that there was indeed some disagreement, the line-up of the time is still obscure.*

In the same period (late October), there were renewed reports of fighting (even among girls) among Red Guard units in certain cities (particularly Peking and Harbin), and, of even greater interest, the splitting of Red Guards into factions with different lines and different headquarters. For example, the Red Guards of universities and colleges in Peking were reported at the time--from wall-posters--to have split into three separate factions which had established three separate headquarters;

*It should be said, in connection with Red Guard poster attacks on whomever, that this paper rejects the view that attacks on individual leaders were all, from the start or at any time, either officially inspired or the expression of initiatives of some leaders against other leaders; however, some probably represented that--Tao Chu is one possible case--and explicit targeting by party leaders did indeed appear in December.

It was not only party figures with important government posts who were attacked in October: regional, provincial and municipal party leaders continued to be attacked, and the attack also extended to a few military figures, despite the provision in the 8 August declaration that the cultural revolution in the PLA would be carried out by the PLA's own organs.

[redacted]

according to a reported poster presumably put up by the third headquarters [redacted]

[redacted] the first two headquarters were reactionary and corrupt, and the first in fact had already been dissolved.*

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[redacted] the split in the Red Guards in Peking which had in fact begun in August and was institutionalized by October had reached several other parts of China--perhaps most of China's cities--by October and was being institutionalized there also.

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Although the evidence at the time was inconclusive--for example, the Tihua headquarters announced that it would "organize all Red Guards" and thus implied that it would be a true general headquarters for the province--some observers were soon able to surmise correctly that these headquarters, both of them in provinces in which the Red Guards had clashed violently with the local party organizations, were in fact set up as headquarters rivaling those of the Red Guard headquarters--of less militant elements--established there earlier. All of the Red Guard headquarters seemed at the time to have the blessing of Mao's new team (and local party leaders attended the establishment of all kinds), in accordance with

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Chou En-lai's earlier assurance to the Red Guards (reported later) that they were free to take any organizational form and to follow any line that they liked. But presumably those provincial party leaders who had had trouble with the militant elements of the Red Guards were sorry to have to allow the formation of headquarters of these same elements.*

On 31 October Red Flag continued the discussion of Lu Hsun begun by People's Daily on 19 October. The theme was the same: Lu's intransigent, unforgiving spirit as the model. Red Flag went further in explicitly denouncing (attributing to Lu Hsun a hatred of) "the 'peace-makers,' those seemingly 'fair' and 'just' people, the 'fence-sitters' who pretended to be 'unbiased' in the battle..." The journal made clear too that it was speaking not only of the struggle between Communists and non-Communists but of the current domestic campaign:

In the great proletarian cultural revolution too, there is no middle road in the struggle between the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the bourgeois reactionary line. Conciliation or eclecticism in the struggle between the two lines is,

*That the new team still had much for the Red Guards to do--presumably including new "bombardments"--was confirmed by Chou En-lai in a speech (received later) to some Red Guards on 31 October. Chou told them that the "polemical struggle" in the cultural revolution was still in its "preliminary stage," that they should go out and exchange revolutionary experiences (as "a leftist group is not self-appointed, but should be tested in the furnace of revolution"), and that it would be ten months--i.e. August 1967 at the earliest--before they would be returning to their studies.

in fact, to protect the bourgeois reactionary line and oppose the proletarian revolutionary line...*

It could only be conjectured, of course, who those peace-makers and fence-sitters (those standing between the dominant figures and their targets) might be, at just this stage of the cultural revolution and purge. The Red Flag piece reinforced the views of some observers that Chou En-lai and some of the "cultural revolution group" leaders were the persons being denounced, but all still seemed in good favor.

Moreover, on the same day Chen Po-ta, head of the central "cultural revolution group," publicly associated himself with the militant line. Presiding over and speaking at a Peking rally commemorating Lu Hsun, Chen carried on the line established by People's Daily on 19 October, citing Lu Hsun's "very important testament" to the effect that "not...a single one" of one's enemies should be forgiven. Chen's discussion of Lu Hsun--who "was diametrically opposed to the capitulationism" of certain Chinese Communist leaders who were opponents of Mao in the 1930s--was weakened by his concluding focus on foreign enemies (the Soviet and American camps) rather than enemies in the Chinese party, but the point came through just the same, just as it had in Mao's letter to the Albanians.

*The editorial at one point praised Lu Hsun for not feeling alone even when "isolated" and at another point said that the "left comrades" engaged in the cultural revolution should "fear no twists and turns, fear no encirclement or attack, fear no isolation...", formulations which could be read as conceding that the new team had been in a minority among party leaders at various stages in the conduct of the revolution. It is doubtful, however, that the new team was hereby admitting that it had been in a minority at the August plenum (as one report had asserted); the passage seemed rather to be reiterating that resistance to the revolution at various levels was likely to be substantial.

The following day, Peking broadcast another Red Flag editorial (also from the 31 October number), "The Victory of the Proletarian Revolutionary Line Represented by Chairman Mao"--a victory over, of course, the "bourgeois reactionary line"--which seemed to be making public a scenario for the future course of the purge. The representatives of this latter line, the party journal said,

undertake to suppress the masses, stifle the initiative of the masses, shift the target of the attack, point their spearhead toward the revolutionary masses, and bludgeon the revolutionary masses for being 'counter-revolutionaries,' 'anti-party elements,' 'rightists,' and 'pseudo-leftists but real rightists.'

It seemed clear that party leaders previously denounced for their attitude toward the cultural revolution--especially as expressed in the "bombardments" carried out by the Red Guards--were being addressed again here, and the editorial presently took note that the often-cited "handful of persons in authority within the party who are taking the capitalist line" also took this "wrong" view of the masses.

The editorial went on to draw distinctions between the "various people who have committed errors of line": (1) between the small number ("one or two, or just a few") who "put forward the erroneous line," and the "large number" who have "put it into effect";* and (2) between the small number who "consciously" implemented a wrong line, and the large number of those who "unconsciously" implemented

*It was not clear whether "put forward" is meant to convey 'decided upon,' 'formulated,' 'advocated,' or all of these, and whether 'known to be wrong' was meant in addition in this connection. Later speeches by party leaders indicated that all of these meanings were intended.

a wrong line; and (3) between those who have put a wrong line into practice to a "serious" extent, and those who have put it into practice to a small extent; and (4) between those who "persist in error," and those who are "willing to correct it and are already in process of correcting it." "Generally speaking," the editorial continued, comrades who had made mistakes could be rehabilitated, and "not only might serve as cadres of the second and third categories, but might also be developed into cadres of the first category." The reference is clearly to the categories employed in the 8 August declaration in classifying the attitudes of party organizations toward the cultural revolution: (1) the "daring" and therefore correct; (2) the merely conservative and lagging; (3) the worse cases which feared exposure but would be "excused" if they accepted exposure; and (4) the really hard cases who tried to suppress the revolution and in consequence would be purged. In other words, the 31 October editorial was saying that, with the exception of a few hard cases, party officials now in trouble with the new team--not in all cases those in trouble with the Red Guards--could put themselves right, or at least could keep themselves from getting purged this time around.

But how could this be done? Red Flag answered forthrightly:

The standard to distinguish those who have corrected their errors from those who persist in their errors is their attitude toward the masses--whether they openly admit before the masses they have the wrong line, whether they will sincerely reverse the decisions passed on those of the revolutionary masses who have been branded.../as above/...and undertake to openly reinstatē their reputations, and whether they support the revolutionary activities of the revolutionary masses. A Communist who has made an error of line should have the courage to admit and examine his error, and, alongside the masses, criticize what he has done wrong.

Thus Mao and his new team seemed to be pulling together and making official the earlier indicators as to their plans for party functionaries in disfavor with themselves and with the Red Guards. The plan seemed to be: to invite--that is, to direct--party and government leaders to engage in self-criticism over the course of the "cultural revolution" to date, to restore to good standing those militants who had been criticized and suppressed and pejoratively labelled during any stage of the revolution (i.e., by the work-teams, cultural revolution groups, or by party committees during Red Guard "bombardments"), and to apologize in particular for those instances in which resistance had been offered to Red Guard attacks. Presumably, depending both on the prior standing of a given leader with the new team and the fervor of his testimony, a given self-criticism and apology would be (a) accepted, (b) found unsatisfactory and ordered repeated (perhaps again and again), or (c) found to be hypocritical and as proving that the given official was a hard case who could not be rehabilitated and must be purged.

Agreement on this procedure by all members of the new team (as seemed likely) would of course leave room for disagreement as to which officials (from Liu Shao-chi on down) to find to be incorrigible hard cases, and how soon and how harshly to move against them. The four leaders discredited during the previous winter (Peng, Lo, Lu, and Yang) were pretty clearly already classified as incorrigibles, but it was not at all clear whether a decision had yet been reached on Liu and Teng, and, with respect to both groups of leaders, it was not clear how the new team intended to stage their punishment (e.g., whether public or private, concurrently or in waves).

It was possible to argue--some observers did argue--that in choosing this as its next step Peking was confession its temporary impotence, that is, was saying that it could not act against those party and government officials who were already in disfavor, could not act either because it was paralyzed by disagreement among members of the new team or was physically unable to remove leaders outside of Peking itself. It seemed more

likely, however, that Peking was not making such a confession, but was instead choosing to follow on a national scale a course something like the one it had followed in the Liaoning case of 1958. In that case, the party had staged an enlarged conference of the Liaoning party committee with 186 persons attending--all 48 members of its provincial committee, members of its departments and committees, officials of departments and bureaus of the provincial government, representatives of "people's organizations," and so on. The conference had continued for 112 days, with a nine-day break in the middle, and in the later stages had expanded to include more than one thousand participants. In the course of it, the participants had put up nearly 6,000 big-character posters; Teng Hsiao-ping and Li Fu-chun had come from the Secretariat in Peking and had made reports; and the first secretary of the provincial committee had made the summing up, after which the conference "unanimously" adopted a resolution on the anti-party activities of seven officials of the provincial committee. According to the account: "By using the methods of big blooming, big contending, big debate, baring facts and using reason, the conference exposed, criticized, and thoroughly smashed" the anti-party group. Whether these seven had been given an opportunity to engage in self-criticism before being found hard-case incorrigibles is not clear from the Chinese account; but the point is that Peking thought it worth-while to spend nearly four months in this elaborate exercise, directed against party officials who, like some of the officials under attack in 1966, were "resisting certain important policies and measures of the central committee" and "wanted to take the capitalist road..." A similar spectacle, with new figures in the center of the stage, seemed to be ahead.

It was evident at the time that it would be necessary for Mao's new team to find against--whether sooner or later--at least some of these officials under attack in 1966--as it had found against those in 1958--if it were not to give the impression that it was indeed unable to act as it would like. Peking had spoken too harshly in recent months, and had made it too clear that some leaders could not be rehabilitated, for the new team to back away without having caused any casualties. Even if the new team did move ahead to purge some additional leaders at the center and in the provinces--as seemed likely--it could not prove that it could do whatever it liked; that is, it would still be possible to argue that the new team had wanted to bring down some additional leaders but could not. But reasonably early action--say, at least the beginning of the exercise against a number of leaders before the end of the year--would be expected if the new team were, as it seemed, in effective control.

November: 'Waiting for Lefty'

On 1 November, Peking broadcast a full account of how Lin Piao gladdened the hearts of railway workers by writing an inscription on the 20th anniversary of the naming of the "Mao Tse-tung locomotive,"* and on 3 November Mao and Lin presided over a sixth reception of "revolutionary young people" at which Lin made the only speech. All of the members of the presumed new standing committee of the politburo were on hand (except one abroad as head of a delegation), and so were Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-

*Lin's inscription: "People's revolution under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought is the locomotive for the advance of history." This is a good example of Lin's ability to say just the kind of thing that would please Mao (although the actual locomotive was so old as to be hardly serviceable).

ping. Again Mao, with Lin at his side, walked around and waved to people; according to a correspondent, he gave the impression that he was about to speak, but did not do so.

Lin in his speech summarized the content of the "victory of the proletarian revolutionary line" represented by Mao over the "bourgeois reactionary line"--essentially that of "putting 'daring' above everything" and relying on the masses--and added one thing to the script: that the masses were to "criticize and supervise" government as well as party organizations and leaders. (This was a post facto justification of the attacks on government ministries reported in the last week of October. It was evidently not regarded by the Red Guards, however, as a call for fresh attacks on the ministries, as these soon dropped off.) Lin also made it explicit that "Chairman Mao supports" the practice of young people travelling about the country on foot to "exchange revolutionary experience (they had been tying up too much transportation), although, he added, such travel needs to be organized. Lin did not refer in any way to Red Flag's call on 31 October for party leaders whose status was questionable to try to clear themselves by self-criticism, but neither did he again incite attacks on party leaders, an omission which again suggested the possibility of resolution of a disagreement as to how to proceed.

There was a surprising development on 5 November, when correspondents in Peking reported the appearance there of posters attacking Tao Chu, the fourth-ranking leader of the party since August and in the same period apparently the most active officer of the "cultural revolution group." (Summary or fragmentary accounts of his remarks in that period had seemed to indicate that he, like Chou En-lai, was taking the line approved by the dominant leaders at the time, even when this line was not the most agreeable to the most militant Red Guards, e.g. telling them to work out their problems for themselves, or directing them to turn over their "prisoners.") Tao was reportedly accused of "taking a revisionist line," and in particular of having supported the Minister of Health

[redacted]

in his oppression of revolutionaries at a research institute.* [redacted] on the same day [redacted] the office of the party's propaganda department--of which Tao was the director--appeared to be closed. However, other posters defending Tao Chu, also put up by Red Guards of this institute, were reported as appearing alongside shortly, apparently the same day; in these posters, Tao was praised for "putting into practice the proletarian revolutionary line." According to posters reported a few days later, the Red Guards had an interview with Tao Chu at midnight on 5 November--after the posters had gone up--and learned from him that the Minister of Health had been relieved as secretary of the party committee of the Health Ministry in late September. The "interview" itself suggested that Tao was securely-based at the time--that is, it was an "interview", not a "bombardment"; the posters soon (within two or three days) came down, and a few

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*It is hard to sort this out. The Minister of Health had been charged in earlier posters with having sent an unsatisfactory ("rightist") work-team to the institute in June, and of having intervened on its behalf in August, "bullying" the members of the "cultural revolution committee" which had presumably been elected to replace the work-team and which presumably had its orders from Tao Chu's "cultural relations group." According to one of these posters, the cultural revolution body at the institute returned from an interview with Tao Chu to "expose the Minister's crimes" and to reverse the situation. However, another poster of the same period (September) had asserted that it was the Minister of Health who was correctly carrying out "Tao Chu's instructions." Those who put up the anti-Tao posters in November were apparently accepting, and renewing, this latter charge. As noted earlier, it does seem likely that the officers of the "cultural revolution group" did have some role in the decision to establish the work-teams in the first place, and they may have had some role in directing the work of these teams; thus it is conceivable that both of the competing factions in this institute did in fact have their instructions from Tao Chu, at different times.

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days later posters were observed calling for Tao to be defended "to the death" (like Mao and Lin). Nevertheless, it was apparent that Tao's positions--as an officer of the cultural revolution group and concurrently director of the propaganda department, a very tricky job--made him a fat target, if not at the time then later.*

On 6 November, the Red Guards turned their attention again to Li Hsueh-feng, first secretary of the Peking municipal committee, whom they had been denouncing periodically for weeks. It was reported that several thousand Red Guards staged an angry demonstration all day long outside the Peking committee headquarters and then broke in and occupied it, giving the impression that they intended to remain; it was later reported, however, that after some shouting and waving of banners, the Guards left the building and dispersed. Thus it was not clear whether the new team had finally made a decision not to defend Li against the Red Guards.

On the following day, 7 November, posters attacking another politburo member, Li Fu-chun, reportedly appeared in Peking. A lesser figure, apparently the head of the party committee in the Academy of Sciences, was reportedly made the object of a "concentrated attack" the next day; the interest here was in the implication that the Red Guards were out to disrupt the work of this important academy if not to wreck it. On the same day, Red Guards were reported to be milling around in front of the State Council building with a banner demanding an immediate audience with Chou En-lai, although Chou was not being attacked in the posters. On the next day, a military leader, the chief of the PLA's Rear Service Department, came under poster attack. And at or about this time, Lin Piao himself was reportedly criticized

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*As previously noted, [redacted] the possibility that Tao had been criticized-- although not by name--in a report made by Chen Po-ta at about this time.

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nothing more than having trusted some lieutenants--clearly Liu and Teng are meant--who had proved to be unequal to the task.

In this speech, Mao states that years ago he had "set up a first front" (of others) and a "second front" (where he placed himself), meaning that he allowed others to handle the "routine work" of the party, in the belief that this would facilitate a smooth transfer of power on his death. As it turned out (Mao goes on), he "should have" handled some of these matters himself, and therefore is "in part" responsible for the bad situation in Peking (which has now "been solved").

In this speech as reported, Mao reviews the cultural revolution since June and admits that he did not foresee every development, and in particular that he had not expected as much disruption as had attended the Red Guard movement and that he can understand the complaints of some party figures. He expresses his confidence, however, that his decision to send out the Red Guards was right, as it was this that "really aroused attention" and made everyone take part in the revolution. He then tells his audience that they should make--should already have made--preparations for meeting the revolution "when it comes down on your own head," and goes on to advise them:

After you have gone back you will also have a great deal of political-ideological work to do. Central committee bureaus, regional bureaus, provincial committees, and county committees must hold meetings for ten days or more...

He goes on to say that, following the August plenum, some 70 to 80 percent of these regional bureaus and provincial committees had failed to hold such meetings before the Red Guards were upon them, a failure which was responsible for the disorder. Specifically, the secretaries were not prepared to answer the Red Guards' questions and were placed on the "defensive"; this stage of passivity must

be changed, to regain the initiative (People's Daily picked up this line).*

In this speech, Mao goes on to state that it is "understandable" that a "great cultural revolution" is hard for party leaders to handle, because they have never seen anything like it; and then addresses himself to the question which (he realizes) is in all of their minds--namely, whether Mao and Lin intend to bring them down. Mao assures them that if they correct their mistakes they will be all right: "Who wants to overthrow you? I don't wish to overthrow you, and to my mind the Red Guards do not want to overthrow you either." He goes on to reassure them in three ways, (a) telling them first that the party leaders were once Red Guards themselves, and then (b), using the concept of examination which had been central to the cultural revolution from the start, assuring them that "If you cannot pass the test, I will also find it hard to pass," and finally (c) stating his recognition that most mistakes were honest mistakes and could be forgiven.

Mao then speaks of Liu and Teng by name, stating that they cannot be assigned all of the blame for mistakes, that they are responsible but the central committee (like Mao himself) is also responsible, in that it did not exercise control. The speech as reported concludes with a good illustration of the relationship between Mao and his lieutenants: "Will anyone else take the floor? This will be all for today. Meeting dismissed."

The speech associates Mao in his own person with the official line stated in the 8 August declaration and by Chou En-lai (before and after) in interviews with the Red Guards: that the dominant figures of the new team are aiming at a minority, not a majority, of party leaders, and that the principal figures among those in disfavor--Liu and Teng--need not be regarded as hard-case anti-party elements like Peng Chen and others of the first group to fall in disfavor. Mao seems less convincing in this role, however, than does Chou; as witness the intransigent editorials of the period on "beating the wild dog to death" and Mao's harshness in his letter to the Albanian party the same day (25 October). It would not be surprising if many or most of the party leaders present concluded that Mao had already decided that he was going to purge Liu and Teng and most of the regional and provincial first secretaries who were part of the Liu/Teng apparatus, and that he was simply staging an elaborate spectacle for the edification of others. This conclusion would seem especially likely if the 16 October report (discussed) had in fact been by Tao Chu, had in fact taken a moderate line toward the regional and provincial leaders, and had already begun to be criticized by Mao's direct spokesmen. There is some evidence that Chen Po-ta did indeed denounce this report at this conference.*

Mao's speech at the October conference may have been preceded, but seems to have been followed, by the

*Tao Chu reportedly made one foolish mistake while the conference was going on. He and Chen Po-ta on 23 and 24 October talked with Red Guards who were criticizing the People's Daily. According to wall-posters, Tao told the students that they could not criticize the party newspaper because that would mean criticism of the central committee; Chen told the students, on the contrary, they should feel free to criticize the newspaper like anything else (this was in fact the approved line).

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self-criticisms of Liu and Teng. Two accounts of Lin Piao's speech seem to indicate that his was the closing speech, or at any rate followed the self-criticisms of Liu and Teng, so the latter two will be summarized here first.

In Liu's speech, [redacted] he begins by taking note that many comrades in the central party apparatus and its subordinate organs outside Peking had already conducted self-criticism for their mistakes in guiding the cultural revolution, and expresses regret that most of these mistakes derived from the larger mistake that he himself had made in formulating guidelines in June and July. He notes that "many people" (by implication, including Mao) had favored the dispatch of work-teams, but that the work-teams had worked badly (i.e. were guided badly), "restricting" the masses (from such things as demonstrating and putting up wall-posters), and keeping domestic news away from foreign eyes (a kind of censorship criticized by Mao in his wall-poster of 5 August). Following the mistaken model of the work-team at Peita, Liu goes on, work-teams all over China were responsible for clashes in which the revolutionaries were "suppressed" and pejoratively labelled. In sum, Liu continues, "we did not quite understand the true meaning" (i.e., what Mao wanted) of the cultural revolution.

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Liu goes on [redacted] to describe his mistakes of 1966 as deriving from other "fundamental" mistakes he had made since 1946. He goes on to cite a number of such mistakes--apparently minor--in 1946, 1949, 1951, 1955, and then cites two larger ones--in 1962 and 1964--which have the effect of blaming himself for "rightist" retreats which Mao himself almost certainly approved at the time but now in 1966 wants to attribute to someone else.

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Liu goes on to note that his mistakes were discussed by a work conference in late July, followed by the August plenum which had corrected Liu's mistakes in formulating the 8 August declaration (the militant line), that in the course of the conference and plenum a new standing committee

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of the politburo had been elected and Lin Piao had been "unanimously" chosen (to replace Liu) as Mao's successor, and that he recognized that Lin and other comrades "are all better and greater than I."

In his speech as reported, Liu concludes by reviewing the reasons for his mistakes: of trusting the apparatus (the work-teams) instead of the masses, of taking the "unavoidable defects" of the masses' revolution as anti-party manifestations, of standing objectively with the "bourgeois class" while regarding himself as a good teacher, and of failing either to understand Mao's thought or to implement it correctly. Moreover, he had failed to seek Mao's guidance sufficiently and had not made enough reports to him (in other words, he had thought he had been given the job, as he had been), and he had ignored correct opinions while welcoming mistaken opinions. Finally, Liu asks for another chance to become "useful" to the party and people.

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The two accounts of Lin Piao's speech to the October conference-- [REDACTED] both from wall-posters--agree almost entirely on the contents; the differences appear to be in the translation of some phrases. Lin's speech is on the face of it tougher than Mao's--that is, he does not bother to adopt an avuncular pose and is harsh toward Liu and Teng in particular; but whether this represented a real difference is uncertain.

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Lin opens by taking note of the "tension" in the cultural revolution at one time--presumably August and September, when the Red Guards were attacking the party apparatus--and says that Mao observed this and therefore called this conference, originally scheduled for three days, then for a week, then for 17 days. He goes on to describe the two powerful forces of the revolution--Mao's leadership and the masses--and the "resistance" in the middle, i.e. in the party apparatus between Mao and the masses. Lin says that part of the cause of this resistance was the ideological deficiency of local party committees, but a "more important cause" was the fact that Liu and Teng took a policy line contrary to the line which Mao had stated to the central committee (in May, apparently). "As Chairman Mao's wall newspaper stated" (presumably the poster of 5 August, which did not name Liu and Teng), the Liu-Teng line was a "bourgeois reactionary" line. Everyone knows now (he continues) of the "sabotaging" activity of Liu, Teng, and Lu Ting-yi.

Continuing, Lin observes that not even Stalin had managed to carry out a thorough struggle against opposing ideology, but Mao means to do this. All of Chinese society has been mobilized for the struggle (he goes on), and it will continue.*

*Sometime prior to this conference, perhaps in early October, Lin spoke to the students of a military institute on the need to study Mao's thought. Although there is not much nourishment in the speech [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] it well illustrates Lin's identification with Mao. Lin tells the students that the Marxist-Leninist classics are not worth their time, that "99 percent" of their study should be of Mao, that military students must be the model students of Mao, that a "genius" like Mao appears in China only once in several thousand years, and so on at sickening length. This speech expresses the same attitude toward Mao as stated by Lin at the August plenum, but is even more fulsome; none of Mao's lieutenants had gone this far.

According to wall-posters, Yeh Chien-ying on 15 October told a meeting of the Higher Military School that all should rejoice that Lin Piao had been chosen as Mao's successor, because Lin had "gone through a period of examination" by Mao for 38 years, had fully recovered from illness, and was now "the healthiest of all comrades."

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The policy line represented by Liu and Teng, Lin continues, a policy of suppressing the masses and opposing revolution, was in control for a period, but is being overcome. The Red Guards are a true expression of the mass line, have the right impetuous "spirit," and should be "trusted."

Lin reiterates that Liu and Teng were "mainly" responsible for the wrong line which was implemented by many, and that their punishment must be more severe than that given those whose mistakes were unintentional (the line that had already been taken in the People's Daily editorial of 31 October). He then asserts--as Chou and Mao had said--that "we" recognize that the majority of secretaries of party regional bureaus and provincial and municipal committees are "good" people.

Finally, Lin says, "all of you" (apparently speaking directly at this point to the party leaders who had come from outside Peking) must bear some responsibility for mistakes, as "all" local committees had carried out mistaken policy lines to some extent. Each secretary, he concludes, will be treated on his individual merits; cases will be judged neither harshly nor leniently.

In sum, the participants in the conference had been assured that "most" secretaries were recognized to be good or at least redeemable, but not quite that most first secretaries were so regarded. Perhaps the majority concluded that Mao and Lin had not yet made up their minds as to who had "passed" the examination.* The clear implication, however, like the explicit directive of the 31 October editorial, was that they must engage in a thorough, self-abasing self-criticism--the contents of which in any given case could be used as a justification for bringing the self-critic down. Perhaps only a few would finally pass.

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On 10 November People's Daily* returned to a topic introduced by the 8 August declaration and discussed in September by People's Daily, Chou En-lai, and others: how to carry out the cultural revolution without interfering with production (there had obviously been considerable interference, both before and after 8 August). The 10 November editorial reiterated--as Chou had said--that the circumstances of the revolution were not the same in urban and rural production units as in schools; that, in particular, schools could close to give all their attention to it, while "production absolutely cannot be suspended in industrial and mining enterprises, trade and service units, and people's communes."** Thus the revolution in these economic production units must be conducted in the spare time of the workers, who, moreover, should not go to other areas to exchange experiences. The editorial also reiterated--as Chou had said--that the "revolutionary students" sent to help with production would take part in productive labor as well as propagate

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Mao's thought, and must allow the workers and peasants to carry out their own revolution. Finally, it expanded on what it had said on 7 September, that "each unit carrying out the cultural revolution must organize two groups, in accordance with the stipulations of the party central committee," one to guide the cultural revolution and the other to guide production. Evidently progress had been slow in the establishment of these groups.

On 10 and 11 November Mao received the Red Guards and other "revolutionary" youth for the seventh time--reviewing more than two million people, a number which made it necessary to split the rally into two days if all were to be reviewed.

In the 10 November portion, Chen Po-ta in his capacity as head of the "cultural revolution group" opened the rally, and hundreds of thousands of young people--many of them driven in trucks--passed by Mao, Lin Piao and others for a reported six hours. There were three noteworthy developments this day. First, Mao was moved, according to Peking's account, to speak in a "clear and resounding" voice into the microphone, saying "Long life, comrades" to the shouting youths; according to a correspondent, Mao himself shouted this first public utterance credited to him in several years. Second, according to Peking, Mao had a "cordial conversation with other leaders" on the rostrum, telling them that "you should put politics in command, go to the masses and be one with them, and carry on the great proletarian cultural revolution even better"--a message which was described in a subsequent Peking broadcast as "new instructions" from Mao. Third, according to [REDACTED] the televised proceedings, Mao spend half an hour in a "smiling" conversation with Liu Shao-chi, whom he had ignored at all past rallies (all of which had taken place after Liu's demotion in early August), a development

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interpreted by some observers as an indication that Mao was blocking further action against Liu or at least was saying again that the time had not yet come.*

In the 11 November portion, Mao and other leaders drove for 90 minutes in open cars past the ranks of youths lining the streets. The only noteworthy development on this day was that Chou En-lai rode with Mao--a pairing perhaps deliberately designed to refute speculation that Chou was in trouble as a "fence-sitter" or "peace-maker," or perhaps reflecting--as Lin Piao's comparatively soft speech of 3 November had perhaps reflected--the resolution of a disagreement.

Chou had a starring role also in the mass rally the next day to commemorate the centenary of the birth of Sun Yat-sen. Although Liu Shao-chi had originally (a year ago) been advertised as being in charge of the Sun ceremony, it was Chou who gave the main speech, while Liu gave none. Chou's speech was a routine celebration of Sun as an uncompromising enemy of imperialism, and included a routine denunciation of the "ruling clique" in the USSR which caused Soviet bloc diplomats to walk out.

*At this time (mid-November) it was reported that the consensus among non-Communist diplomats in Peking was that a "struggle" was going on between Mao and Liu. If the word was being used in a conventional sense--the mobilized forces of the one leader engaged with the mobilized forces of the other--the consensus was a fantasy; Liu and Teng had lost the contest back in August. There was a sense, however, in which the concept could be true: that the new team was (perhaps) reluctant at the time to move against portions of the conventional party apparatus, particularly in the provinces, which it surmised might resist them and which would therefore require an embarrassing and perhaps messy campaign. Even in this sense, the Liu/Teng sympathizers would probably be getting nothing more than a temporary reprieve; the new team, sooner or later, would be moving deliberately against them.

On 15 and 16 November, most of the party leaders and concurrently government leaders who had been attacked in wall-posters in late October and early November were displayed prominently on two official occasions. Chou En-lai, Tao Chu, Li Fu-chun, Chen Yi, and Tan Chen-lin were five of the six "leading members of the CCP central committee" (with Chou foremost) receiving the "long march detachments" of revolutionary youth on 15 November; neither Liu Shao-chi nor Teng Hsiao-ping participated in this reception. On this occasion, Chou added his voice to Lin Piao's in calling for the young people to march around China "spreading revolutionary truth"; in one of those graceful turns which have contributed to Chou's survival and prosperity, he cited Lin as well as Mao as having issued the call. On the next day, Chou, Tao, Li, and Tan, along with Li Tien-yu, a Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the PLA who had also been attacked in posters, were the party leaders who welcomed at the airport the CCP delegation--headed by Kang Sheng--returning from the Albanian party congress. Chou, Tao, Kang, and Li were all identified as members of the standing committee of the politburo, Li for the first time.*

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*It was unclear how many members the standing committee now had, in addition to Mao, Lin, Chou, Tao, Chen Po-ta, Kang (the latter three the principal officers of the "cultural revolution group"), and the most recently identified Li. If Peking were following the order of precedence used since 18 August and including in the standing committee all of the leaders through Li Fu-chun (tenth-ranking), Teng Hsiao-ping, Liu Shao-chi, and Chu Te--all members of the old standing committee--would be included. It seemed likely, however, that the real standing committee had dropped the demoted Liu and Teng, the aged and inactive Chu, and also the eleventh-ranking Chen Yun, replacing the latter with Li Fu-chun as the inner circle's economic specialist.

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On the same day, a poster reported that Chou En-lai was supervising the investigation of the incident of early November (previously noted) in which a Peking party committee officer had died after interrogation by Red Guards, and that Chou had put Li Fu-chun (revealed the same day as a member of the new politburo standing committee) in charge of the investigation.

Moreover, on this same day (16 November), Peking took a step to reduce the prominence of the Red Guards in national affairs, at least in Peking itself. A joint directive of the CCP central committee and the State Council, signed by Lin Piao for the former and Chou En-lai for the latter, "closed" the city of Peking to visiting Red Guards for the winter. Noting that Peking had already received nine million visiting Red Guards, the directive cited the approaching cold weather (large-scale and increasing illness among the visitors had been reported) and the regime's need for railway transport for important economic tasks, stated that Peking would be a "closed city for all Red Guards from the provinces" after 21 November and that trains carrying Red Guards toward Peking after that date would be turned back, and informed the Guards that even when the "exchange of revolutionary experiences" resumed in April 1967 "only small groups" would be allowed to visit Peking; curiously, the final provision re-opened the "closed" city to Red Guards visiting "on their own responsibility," i.e. able to provide their own food, shelter, and transportation, but this provision would presumably discourage all but a small number.*

*On 1 December, another joint directive extended the deadline--for the departure from Peking of visiting Red Guards--to 20 December; the directive gave the PLA responsibility both for continuing the "training" of those remaining (until the deadline) and for seeing that they actually left and actually got home. It was apparent that the job of clearing Peking was too big for the time originally allowed, partly because a lot of the Red Guards simply ignored the original directive; moreover, some of those leaving Peking were not returning home but were going to other romantic places, e.g. Tibet.

The 16 November directive had the effect of moving the Red Guards away from the center of the stage, as if the party leaders had something else in mind for that position during the winter. This impression that the Red Guards were to play a supporting role for a time--to re-emerge in a leading role but as a better-disciplined vehicle--was strengthened by the party's action on or about 20 and 21 November in sharply forbidding certain forms of "illegal" action. First observed by a TASS correspondent in Peking in the form of wall-posters signed by the Peking committee of the party,* the party notice forbade "anyone" (meaning primarily the Red Guards) from operating private jails, kangaroo courts, and torture chambers. The correspondent cited Red Guard publications--it is not clear whether they were quoted in or appeared together with the notice--as stating that "opponents" of the Red Guards had been subjected to these methods in a number of places [redacted]

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[redacted] the opponents themselves had employed such methods on occasion, although much less often. Intercepted messages of 20 and 21 November to party committees in the western part of China showed that directives to the same effect were given to these committees to be made public in posters; and such directives almost certainly went out to party committees throughout China.** The directive led some observers to speculate that the

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*There was some doubt that the Peking committee, the first secretary of which had been under prolonged attack, would have been self-assured enough to issue this order unless it had been given a new first secretary.

**It seemed of some importance that--just as Chou En-lai had been at pains to make clear the authority of party committees in his talk with the Red Guards in late September--the new team chose to make this particular notice public through the party committees rather than through the "cultural revolution" committees and groups or the Red Guards themselves.

action might be the first step in a campaign to discredit the Red Guards as a movement; but Mao, Lin, Chou and the other top-ranking leaders of the party had all been so intimately associated with the movement from the beginning that this seemed unlikely, less likely than a decision to clear the center of the stage and to bring back the Red Guards later as a better-disciplined body.

If the thinking of the party leaders in mid-November did indeed include a desire to get and keep the Red Guards under control, they took a step at the same time which could only be subversive of that end. It was reported on 21 November--by the newspaper of the 3rd Red Guard Headquarters (the most militant body) in Peking--that the CCP central committee on 16 November had issued a general directive on the rehabilitation of leftists suppressed and pejoratively labelled by party committees, work-teams (primarily) and other vehicles in the course of the cultural revolution since spring 1966. (It will be recalled that a directive of 5 October relating to this action in the Military Science Academy had been reported, and that Red Flag on 31 October had called expressly for party officials to restore the reputations of those left-ist elements as part of their own process of self-criticism. The reported directive [redacted] is said to have called for the destruction of "all files" compiled after 16 May (the possible date of the decision to send in work-teams).

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While this reported directive of 16 November was consistent with the new team's own evaluation of the early stages of the cultural revolution--that its management had been too conservative, that Mao's intentions were being subverted--there is some reason to believe that Mao himself took the initiative in the issuance of the directive. In earlier statements on the student movement attributed to Mao, he had seemed to come down hard on the side of the most militant students, of precisely those forces represented by Kuai Ta-fu, whose newspaper reported the directive. Whether Mao was personally responsible or not, there could be little doubt that the directive would encourage the militants--the newly-vindicated--to continue along their violent course, probably including some of the same actions that were forbidden to them in the directive of 20 or 21 November.

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The militants were in action again the very next day (22 November), according to a later account in a Red Guard newspaper apparently published by the Shanghai equivalent of Kauai Ta-fu's group in Peking. There was said to be a demonstration in Shanghai on that date by some 15,000 Red Guards from Shanghai, Peking and other cities--featuring Nieh Yuan-tze, the female leader of the militants at Peking University--against the Shanghai municipal committee of the party and specifically against Tsao Ti-chiu, its acting head.

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(The Red Guard newspaper which reported the demonstration was said also to have denounced the Shanghai Liberation Daily, the newspaper of the Shanghai municipal committee which had helped to launch the "cultural revolution" just a year before.) The officials were apparently not beaten, however, and Tsao appeared in his official capacity in sending off a delegation of foreign visitors the same day.**

On the same day (22 November), the 3rd Red Guard Headquarters in Peking--the militants, presumably heartened by the 16 November directive on the rehabilitation of leftists, and not disheartened by the 20-21 November ban on "illegal" actions--were reported to be announcing their intention to wreck the rival "royalist" (2nd) headquarters. Their newspaper was said also to be asserting that there were at least two categories (actions) of Red Guards in every school in Peking.

On 23 November, it looked as though 'Lefty' was finally about to arrive--that is, that Mao and his new team had finally given the signal for early public action against some or all of the party leaders who had earlier been removed from the public scene or publicly demoted,

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[redacted]

and to carry out this action in the center of the stage just vacated by the Red Guards.* In what seemed to be a pretty clear signal of intent, there appeared in the streets of Peking a printed Red Guard pamphlet making very serious charges--of deliberate disloyalty, virtually treason--against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, and demanding their dismissal from all posts. Whereas it had been reported a few days earlier that on 15 November Red Guard posters denouncing Liu had been seized by another Red Guard organization--thus suggesting that the "militants" and the "moderates" were still being allowed

*It was high time.

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[redacted] the present writer had put it this way: "Thus, as of late November, there was stronger reason than ever for Mao's new team to take some action against the 'handful' of irredeemable party leaders whom it had repeatedly threatened to bring down, rather than to let the pressure behind the 'cultural revolution' just leak out into the air. The new team, if it were not to appear either frivolous or impotent, must do one of two things, if not both: (a) take quick action against a few leaders at the center and in the provinces, publicly removing them from their positions and employing whatever physical force was necessary to remove them physically from their offices, or (b) follow the course which it had indicated at the beginning of November as the more likely, that is, to set in motion a ponderous, slow-moving process something like the kind it had employed in the Liaoning case of 1958, in which self-criticism would be invited from almost all officials and would be demanded from those already on the list to be purged, in which most self-criticisms would be accepted but many ordered repeated and a 'handful' found as proving the case against those out of favor, in which elaborate 'conferences' might be staged to conduct the 'struggle' (these might be publicized at the time but more likely after the close), and at the end of which the black 'handful' (or what remained of it) would be publicly expelled from the party."

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[redacted] the dominant figures had already set a similar process in motion during the conference which ended in early November.

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to "debate" this issue, in other words that as of 15 November the new team was still undecided or still thought that the time was not ripe--the 23 November materials seemed for the first time to have high-level backing. That is, the materials for the first time were printed, and for the first time included information which appeared to come from unpublished party documents, or, at least, from party meetings which would not be expected to be publicized in this detail without high-level approval.

On the very next day, however, the pamphlet reportedly came down from the walls, and on 25 November Liu and Teng appeared with Mao on the first day of another split rally of the Red Guards as if the pamphlet had never appeared. These developments were confusing. That is, it was not at all clear whether (a) the pamphlet had been read correctly as a signal of early public action against Liu and Teng (at least), or (b) it had been read correctly as an indicator of the new team's longer-range plans but incorrectly as an indicator of immediate intentions (in other words, the militant Red Guards had jumped the gun again, as they had at the 18 October rally, and were being told so), or (c) it had been read incorrectly as a team signal instead of an expression of one faction, and the developments of 23 to 25 November really did indicate disagreement among the members of the new team on a serious issue (in other words, one leader or faction had taken the initiative, through the Red Guards, and was being countered by others, including Mao).* Subsequent

*A serious issue, with respect to the treatment of party leaders in disfavor, has been previously defined as those of whether to take further action, whether to suffer a long delay in taking it, whom to strike and how hard to strike. There had been indications for months of possible disagreement among party leaders on these issues, and of possible disagreement among them too on the serious issue of the definition of the role of the Red Guards. But, at least on this writer's reading, there had never been the kind of evidence which would permit a careful analyst to convert the possibility into a probability. This continued to be the case through November, but not through December.

developments were to make clear that the first reading was right--that is, public action against Liu and Teng was soon staged--but they did not make clear that the third interpretation was necessarily wrong; that is, it is possible that Mao himself did not make clear until about this time that he meant to have some sort of public spectacle centering on the crimes of Liu and Teng, and, if he had not, it is possible that when he did he was resolving a disagreement among members of the standing committee.

The Red Guard rally of 25-26 November, advertised as the last until the spring of 1967, was uneventful, apart from the appearance of Liu and Teng in their regular (since August) places. Maintaining continuity, the rally was opened by Kang Sheng as "advisor" to the central cultural revolution group. On the first day, viewing the march-past of some 600,000 Red Guards, Mao is said to have waved repeatedly. Important missing figures--that is, not identified as present--were Chen Yun, Po I-po, Li Hsueh-feng, and Yang Cheng-wu. On the second day, Mao and Lin and others drove in open cars past 1.8 million young people, and Mao waved some more. Mao is said to have left Peking for his usual winter in the south immediately after the rally, a report supported by Peking's statement that on 26 November the Red Guards lined the road to the airport.*

On the previous day (25 November), posters attacking Chen Po-ta, head of the central "cultural revolution group," and two lesser figures of that group (Wang Jen-chung and Chi Pen-yu) had been observed; it was not known whether they were quickly taken down, as the attacks on Tao Chu had been. It was soon reported also that a 23 November pamphlet attacking Liu and Teng, although taken off the walls, was being used as "material for discussion" in major cities, and that Li Fu-chun and Po I-po were being attacked as supporters of the Liu/Teng line. Thus

*Mao reappeared in Peking in January; it is not certain that he was ever away.

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[REDACTED]

with every day in late November there was additional reason for the new team to clarify publicly its intentions.*

On 28 November, in a development withheld from the foreign audience until 3 December, Mao in absentia seemed to signal again--as the Red Guard pamphlet of 23 November had seemed to signal--that 'Lefty' was about to arrive, with very bad news for party leaders in disfavor. He did this through his wife, Chiang Ching, who gave the central speech to a rally of 20,000 "militants in the field of literature and art," a speech which had the effect of giving Mao's own promise that those who had failed him must put themselves through a long period of criticism and self-criticism

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and that some of these would be brought down in any case. Peking's account of the rally was remarkable for its illustration of the importance of Chiang Ching, who was clearly illuminated as one of the top leaders of the party (regardless of her nominal rank), and thus for its illustration of Mao's continued domination of the party.*

The 28 November rally was presided over by Chen Po-ta, who made the opening speech; the speech was pedestrian, giving Mao credit for "direct guidance" of the cultural revolution and praising the outstanding contributions of Mme. Mao to the revolution in literature and art. Mme. Mao followed, speaking first of the need to make Chinese literature and art conform to Mao's thought, asking whether a revolution was not necessary ("shouts of Yes! Yes! from the audience"), and going on to criticize the handling of the revolution across the board in the period dominated by the work-teams (roughly June-July 1966). As had other party spokesmen, she described the decision to send the work-teams as an error in the first place and went on to say that their work had been "still more erroneous," as they had directed their efforts not against the proper targets in the party and in the schools but against the revolutionary students. Notably, Mme. Mao did not say that Mao had disagreed with the decision to send in the work-teams, but attempted to absolve

*Chou En-lai, the third-ranking party leader, and Chen Po-ta, fifth-ranking, both played supporting and deferential roles at this rally. Moreover, Peking announced that Mme. Mao "received a thunderous ovation from the entire rally" when she stepped forward, and that her speech was received with "repeated ovations"--virtually unprecedented praise, for anyone but Mao himself. It is hard to understand how any observer could argue, after this performance, that anyone but Mao is running the show in China, as it is incredible that anyone but Mao would accord Chiang Ching such treatment. Chiang's role also illustrates, of course, how few people Mao felt he could really trust.

him of responsibility for the larger errors--as he himself had done in his speech--by asserting that as early as June (the first work-teams were sent in at the beginning of June) Mao had said that "work teams should not be sent out hastily; but a few comrades sent out work-teams hastily without asking Chairman Mao's permission." She emphasized that the serious error was not the organizational form--the work-team--but rather the "principles and policy it followed," implying again that Mao intended to fix the responsibility for this on the party-machine leaders, particularly Liu and Teng.

Mme. Mao went on to speak of the work of the central "cultural revolution group" of which she was first deputy chief (and in which role she had been since summer something like the seventh in importance among leaders of the party), and noted that "new problems cropped up" soon after the Red Guards were turned loose on 18 August; implying strongly (as the U.S. Consulate General noted) that the Red Guard movement was not tightly controlled, she described the group's role as that of gathering facts and investigating and in general trying to "keep up with the constantly developing revolutionary situation." She spoke in particular of her own work in reforming the No. 1 Peking Opera Company, taking note that this work had been supported and encouraged by Mao, Lin, Chou, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng.* Mme. Mao implicitly criticized the new Peking municipal committee--the first secretary of

*Mme. Mao here cited five of the six party leaders who appeared still to be more important figures than she. The one omission was Tao Chu, who as an officer of the "cultural revolution group" should surely have been named; the omission seemed deliberate, so Tao had something to worry about. Moreover, on this occasion at least four "cultural" organizations were removed from the jurisdiction of the propaganda department headed by Tao Chu. Posters criticizing Tao--for protecting party leaders in the provinces--were on view in Peking again in late November.

which was absent from the rally--for having failed to cleanse the opera company of the influence of the former (disgraced) Peking committee, and then made clearer than ever before Mao's intention to stage a prolonged spectacle of criticism and self-criticism of those who had opposed or had been thought to oppose Mao's line:

Some leading members of the company /read: of the party/ must make a clean breast of what they have done and reveal in a thorough way what others have done. This is the only way, and there is no other way out. If they really do so after full criticism by the masses, if they repent genuinely and make a fresh start, they will still be able to take part in the revolution...

Mme. Mao went on to make clear that not all party leaders then in disfavor would be credited with genuine repentance, and called for completion of the task of "struggling against and crushing those in authority who are taking the capitalist road" (along with criticizing and repudiating bourgeois authorities and ideology and transforming education and the arts, just as the 8 August declaration had first formulated it).

Chou En-lai followed, congratulating the No. 1 Peking Opera Company and three other troupes on their incorporation into the PLA--one of the two big "cultural" events announced at the rally, the other being the "good news" of Mme. Mao's official appointment as cultural advisor to the PLA, which she had been de facto for months. Chou went on like Chen Po-ta to emphasize Mao's guidance of the cultural revolution and to praise Mme. Mao's role in the field of literature and art.

In sum, through most of November Mao and the new team spoke equivocally: they continued to permit the Red Guards to criticize whomever they chose, but the party leaders took no public action against any of their targets. They again told the Red Guards not to interfere with

production, forbade them certain "illegal actions," and sent the visiting Red Guards home, but at the same time they apparently did not interfere seriously with the continued violence of the militants, and in fact took action --directing the rehabilitation of the leftists--which could only encourage the militants. Toward the end of November, Mao declared publicly through his wife his intention to stage a prolonged spectacle of criticism of and self-criticism by his opponents, including Liu and Teng.*

December: Less Bread, More Circuses

In early December Mao and his new team began to stage a series of public spectacles featuring party leaders in disfavor, and by mid-December there were some indications that at least one leading member of the new team itself might join those in disfavor. Serious incidents involving the Red Guards continued in December; while the incidents and some of their possible sponsors were officially criticized, there were further signs of official favor for the militant wing of the Guards which had been most active in such incidents. One important action of the month was taken quietly--the extension of the "cultural revolution" on a much larger scale into industry and agriculture, a decision which on the face of it reversed a position associated mainly with Chou En-lai --although Chou need not have opposed it--and which was

* [redacted] persons writing in late November from different points in China that the process of rehabilitation of people wrongly labelled in earlier stages of the cultural revolution--a process which was to be an important part of the process of self-criticism and correction of error--had begun in their areas and was evidently general. One of the writers noted that he did not dare to take revenge, as he was not sure that the line would not change again.

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to provoke the same kind of resistance which the "revolution" had met in its encounter with party organizations.

On 3 December Peking broadcast the proceedings of the rally of 28 November, featuring Mme. Mao's speech with its apparent reiteration of Mao's intention to put party leaders in disfavor through a circus of criticism and self-criticism and to "crush" those whose confessions were deemed incomplete or insincere.* The 3 December broadcast may have been followed quickly by a party directive formulating the next step--the handing over of discredited party leaders to the Red Guards, as a wall-poster of 6 December calling for trials cites an unidentified "decision" of 4 December.

In any case, on 4 December Peng Chen, the senior figure and principal offender among the group of party leaders removed from their posts in the period from November 1965 to May 1966, was taken by the Red Guards from the unresisting hands of his custodians, as were several lesser figures. According to wall-posters, the Red Guards, acting "in compliance" with Mme. Mao's 28 November speech surfaced the day before (in which she had demanded that

*On the previous day, 2 December, the Tsinghai provincial committee had gone through the approved exercise (although perhaps with insufficient self-abasement), issuing a public statement criticizing its own handling of a Tsinghai Daily editorial of 3 June--which had taken the militant line on the "cultural revolution" later vindicated by Mao and the new team--and restoring the reputation of the responsible editor; the provincial committee held itself "fully responsible" for its June error, although it pointed out that it had not had correct guidance from Peking at the time.

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Peng and others be "further exposed"), reconnoitered the houses of Peng and others on 3 December, and in the early hours of the next morning were allowed to seize him in his bedroom and bear him off to "an appointed place"--to be held, as it later developed, for an appearance before an accusatory rally. The Guards then went on (the same morning) to pick up six other officials long in disfavor (all of them concerned in one way or another with the management of "cultural" matters). They apparently did not pick up at this time, however, the other main figures of the group which was first to fall into disfavor--that is, Lu Ting-i, Lo Jui-ching, and Yang Shang-kun, perhaps because each was regarded as deserving a spectacle of his own. Very soon (within two days at most) posters observed in Peking were demanding that "proceedings" be instituted against these four--plus Tien Han, whose "criminal" activities were publicly attacked on 6 December--or even (explicitly) that they be brought to "trial."

Soon after this--before 10 December--the Red Guards (apparently the same group that had prepared the 23 November pamphlet) also advanced the level of the public campaign against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Posters were reportedly observed at this time describing Liu as the "biggest chief" of the opposition to Mao, the protector of Peng Chen, the enemy of worthy members of the new team (e.g. Kang Sheng), the "creator of the bourgeois reactionary line," a "most disgusting" figure, and so on. These posters reportedly described Li Hsueh-feng and Po I-po--neither officially in disfavor, but both out of sight for weeks--as members of Liu's entourage and executors of his mistaken line.* Interestingly, however, the posters as reported called for the dismissal of Liu and Teng from their posts but did not call for

*This was true in a sense, as both had played important roles in the June-July period of the work-teams.

their public trial, unlike the poster treatment of the leaders who fell into disfavor earlier.*

Meanwhile, in early December, there continued to be serious clashes between the Red Guards and party committees, between the Red Guards and workers, and among elements of the Red Guards. There was a report of repeated harrassment of Tsao Ti-chiu in Shanghai, and of several deaths in a clash in the office of Liberation Daily there on 3-4 December; a report of 11 killed and 200 injured (alternatively, 18 dead and 240 injured) in a clash in Chungking on 4 December between Red Guards and workers; a report of a "bloody clash" in Wu-hsi (near Shanghai) the same day; a report of a clash between Red Guards from the various headquarters in Peking on 7

*It was not clear, of course, whether this signified anything more than the fact that the campaign against Liu and Teng was not as far along as it was against the other group. That is, those of the earlier group had already lost their posts, so the posters were calling for the next stage of action against them, some kind of trial, whereas Liu and Teng had not been publicly stripped of their positions, so it would be reasonable to call for this first, moving on then to demand a trial. It seemed possible, however, that Mao and at least some members of the new team thought of Liu and Teng as in a different category from Peng Chen and others of the first group--that is, as being not incorrigible hard cases but rather as among those who could demonstrate by abundant self-abasement that they deserved another chance to perform some humble function for the party. Materials received later indicated that Mao had in fact taken this position on Liu and Teng in the October-November conference, although it was not clear in early December whether he still held it. It was clear that Mao was able to purge Liu and Teng--both evidently under house arrest--if he chose to.

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December, at a meeting on the organization of the reception of visiting Japanese students; reports of Red Guard assertions that resistance to the "cultural revolution" was greatest in the Southwest (where a direct protege of Teng Hsiao-ping was still presiding) and that a "period of Red terror" was required; and reports that the Northwest and Central-South Bureaus, and the Anhwei, Kweichow, and Shensi provincial committees were also under one kind of bombardment or another by the Red Guards.


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Finally, the 3rd Red Guard Headquarters' newspaper complained publicly in early December that there had recently been several serious incidents in which their "fighters... were attacked and cruelly beaten up," and that "some of our representatives sent to the scene were beaten up or put in prison, while certain comrades are missing."


By this time, early December, all or almost all of the party's regional bureaus and provincial committees, and most of the major municipal committees, had been repeatedly criticized in Red Guard posters. The only possible exception among the regional bureaus was the Northeast bureau, where Sung Jen-chiung, a protege of Teng Hsiao-ping, remained surprisingly free from attack, although all of his subordinate provincial committees were

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being denounced in early December. The only possible exceptions among the provincial committees (merely possible, because not all posters were reported) were those of Kwangsi and Yunnān; all of the others had been denounced in the fall, or were being denounced in November and early December, or both. By this time all of the important party and government leaders in Peking had been or were being denounced as well in at least a few posters, although there had not been serious or sustained criticism of Mao, Lin, or Chou. Thus the new team was free to select, from all of the heads demanded, those that it wanted to cut off, abase, or demote.



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The new team seemed also to be addressing itself to the problem of violence by, among, and against the Red Guards in a Red Flag editorial broadcast on 12 December. The editorial was subject to so many possible readings, however, that its message did not come through clearly. For example:

Our party will allow no one to use the concept of opposing the bombardment of proletarian headquarters in order to punish the revolutionary masses and suppress the revolution. At present, a small group of persons...stay in the background, praise mass student organizations and mass workers organizations which they have fooled, sow discord among these organizations, create sects, and instigate armed fights. They have gone so far as to adopt all sorts of illegal means to deal with the masses, so that they might sit back and watch the tigers fight...

This "small group" being denounced could be read (first sentence) as meaning party leaders at the center and in the provinces who had organized resistance to Red Guards bombarding them or had divided the bombarding forces, and/or as meaning (the rest of the paragraph) party leaders who had given guidance to the Red Guards and had consciously or unconsciously encouraged the splitting of the movement and clashes among its components (e.g. Chou En-lai in early speeches and officers of the cultural revolution group), and/or party leaders

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in the center and in the provinces who were encouraging physical or poster attacks on the opponents or personal enemies of these leaders.*

And again:

Once the masses who were deceived for the time being come to realize the true features of those who played tricks ...they will immediately abandon them and stand on the side of the correct line of the party central committee headed by Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao taught us to carry out the struggle peacefully, not with brute force... Only by resolutely persisting in peaceful struggle and opposing the bad elements who instigate the masses to carry out the struggle with brute force... (and so on)

In point of fact, no one had been genuinely more responsible for inciting the Red Guards themselves to acts of violence than had Mao and Lin Piao, and it was hard to believe that the editorial was aimed at them.** While here too the "bad elements" could be any of the groups

*Some observers took the editorial as "authoritative evidence" that rival Red Guard factions were being "directed by different individuals in the current /top/ leadership," but that is surely only one possible reading.

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cited above, materials of January indicated that the 12 December editorial was aimed primarily not at party leaders in the center but at provincial and municipal secretaries--e.g., in Shanghai--who were even then using a combination of "soft" and "hard" methods against the "revolutionary rebel" workers then being organized.

The editorial went on to reiterate the position first stated in Red Flag on 31 October, which had made public the scenario for the purge: that in order to be regarded as having "sincerely corrected" one's errors, one must (a) expose his errors "before the masses", (b) reinstate those pejoratively labelled by him, (c) correct the picture for lower levels deceived by one's mistaken line (a new requirement), (d) learn from the masses, and (e) support the "revolutionary leftists" in their struggle against the bad "handful" of party leaders. As the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong noted, there was a "strikingly plaintive" note in the editorial's observation that "If only the comrades who committed errors in the past on the line to be followed" would do these things, "they would most assuredly be pardoned by the great revolutionary masses..." It was hard to read this passage as meaning anything else than that a substantial number of party leaders were refusing to follow the lines of the scenario, were refusing to play their assigned roles in the great spectacle beginning to be staged. The editorial went on to warn such "comrades" that if they failed to play their assigned roles, they would surely be "brought down." This seemed to be true, although some of the "comrades" were apparently regarded as having the capability of putting the new team to a lot of trouble before succumbing.*

*It seems very doubtful that Liu and Teng were regarded as having this capability, i.e. of "leading" a rebellion against Mao and Lin (as the popular press was fond of presenting the case). Both Liu and Teng were probably being held incommunicado somewhere in Peking, absolutely impotent in their own persons. It nevertheless remained possible that Mao and Lin would have preferred to finish off Liu and Teng but were hesitating to do so out of fear of the consequences--that is, fear of massing resistance (footnote continued on page 179)

The public scene in Peking for the rest of December was dominated by rallies. On 12 December, according to Red Guard newspapers, a large rally (possibly 100,000) was held in Peking to "struggle" against Peng Chen and "other counter-revolutionary revisionists." The rally, reportedly attended by leaders of the cultural revolution group, featured Peng Chen: that is, he was put on display and was forced to listen to speeches denouncing him for conspiracy and demanding that he be put on trial. (Some later posters said that Peng denied the indictment.) The various accounts do not make clear whether other leaders in disfavor were put on display with Peng at this first rally, but speakers at the meeting denounced them too, in similar terms.

On the following day, 13 December, the new team took another step against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping --the first public attack on them by a party leader--through Tao Chu, a member of the team whose own position was hard to evaluate. On one hand, he had been under fairly heavy poster attack and had (apparently) been snubbed by Mme. Mao. 25X1

Speaking at a rally (Liu and Teng were not produced), Tao followed roughly the line taken by Mao and Lin Piao earlier: that Liu and Teng represented and had

(footnote continued from page 178)

from the party machine--and elements of the governmental and military apparatus as well--throughout China, resistance not in "support" of Liu and Teng but motivated by a desperate hope of avoiding the same fate as Liu and Teng, a resistance which could be reduced if Liu and Teng were spared.

formulated a "bourgeois-reactionary" line; that in Mao's absence in June and July they had poisoned the entire country with this line in the name of the central committee, deceiving even Tao himself; that the counter-attack on the Liu-Teng line had been led by Lin Piao; that the Liu-Teng line still had wide influence in leading organs of the party at the center and with the leaders of provincial and municipal committees (possibly his own area of concern), and that it still had not been adequately criticized. He is reported to have said also that the cultural revolution was now to extend more deeply into the factories and the countryside, which was soon confirmed. Finally, he is said to have denounced poster attacks on Mao, Lin, Chou, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng (possibly attempting to associate himself more solidly, in the minds of this audience, with the other five of the big six) and on the cultural revolution group as a group, and then to have said that he welcomed such attacks on himself, that he recognized he had made errors (he specified one, but attributed it to Teng's orders), and that he hoped he would be found to be an adherent of the proletarian line; portions of the audience reportedly jeered this expression of hope. Conspicuous by its absence from this speech as reported was any call for punishment of Liu and Teng or of the regime's plans for them, apart from the implication that they were to participate in further criticism of their "line."*

Three or four days later, on 16 or 17 December, Mme. Mao, who seemed to be rising rapidly to a position as (unofficially) the third-or-fourth-ranking party leader, was the featured speaker at another Red Guard rally. The rally, reportedly attended also by Chou En-lai, Tao Chu, Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng, seems to have had the purpose primarily of giving further encouragement to the militant wing of the Red Guards.

*It may have been about this time, however, that Liu and Teng--according to later posters--began to be handed over to Red Guards for a series of small, private "struggle" meetings.

[redacted]

Mme. Mao in her speech reportedly criticized an officer of the cultural revolution group (Wang Jen-chung, concurrently acting first secretary of the Central-South bureau and a protege of Tao Chu), the secretary-general of the premier's office (Chou Jung-hsin),* and the one-time first secretary of the Canton committee recently transferred to the Peking committee (Yung Wen-tao, presumably a close associate of both Tao Chu and Wang Jen-chung), as being responsible for the persistence of a bourgeois "hard core" among youth groups, including the Red Guards. Mme. Mao reportedly went on to blame the three for "recent incidents" (presumably not all incidents), an action which had the effect--because she had already described them as representatives of the "bourgeois" line--of placing the responsibility for incidents on the opponents of the militant wing of the Red Guards (just as party secretaries had been blamed for resisting Red Guard attacks on them). According to some reports, Mme. Mao explicitly criticized the Red Guard control squads which were known to have clashed with the militants--quoting her to the effect that "we are criticizing ourselves because we educated them insufficiently." She reportedly did not, however, ask that those she criticized be imprisoned or otherwise punished; one of the three accused reportedly was present and acknowledged the criticism with bowed head--probably Chou Jung-hsin.

Other speakers at the rally reportedly also criticized opponents of the militant Red Guards; their reported criticism of "bourgeois reactionary" actions by officials in various geographical areas of Peking almost certainly refers to control squads in those areas, which were denounced in the same terms on 16 December by the newspaper of the militant (3rd) headquarters. [redacted]

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[redacted] Chou En-lai in his speech went even further than Mme. Mao in depressing if not suppressing the opponents of the militants; in this version, Chou asked the control squads to "disband their organization voluntarily." According to another version of his speech, as reported, his criticism of "errors," violence and crime among the Red Guards was directed evenly against all factions of the Red Guards (like his earlier speeches), rather than

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[redacted]

concentrating on one. Perhaps both versions are right: that is, Chou declared his opposition to sin, and then took a practical action on behalf of the militants.

Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, at the 16 or 17 December rally, seem to have offered little more than an endorsement of other speakers. Tao Chu, if present, was apparently given no opportunity to speak; at any rate no remarks of his were reported.

Mme. Mao reportedly spoke again at a rally of Red Guards on 18 December, stating a mixture of "militant" and "moderate" positions which appeared to represent Mao's positions at the time.* According to wall-posters [redacted]

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[redacted] Mme. Mao denounced Liu Shao-chi as a "Khrushchev-type person" and dismissed his self-criticism as a "hoax," but also told the Red Guards that they could not "seize" Liu and Teng--i.e., could not feature them in a public spectacle--because their status was to be resolved by the party (possibly implying, had not yet been resolved). Mme. Mao reportedly again criticized the Red Guard control squads and said that they would be disbanded [redacted]

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[redacted] but on the other hand criticized all Red Guard violence, violence by whatever wing or faction [redacted] and also asked [redacted]

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*It is not entirely clear whether Peking staged one, two or three rallies in the period of 16-18 December.

[redacted] content of the speeches was so nearly identical that a single rally, on one day or the other, seems more likely. The similarity of the reported content of Mme. Mao's speech attributed to 18 December makes it possible that this is simply a fuller version of her speech of 16 or 17 December, but it is treated here as a separate speech because the sources agree on the date of 18 December.

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the Red Guards in future to submit their charges to the Ministry of Public Security, which would be responsible for taking action (another line first stated by Chou, in or about September), this specification was curious in the light of the remainder of Mme. Mao's speech as reported, and a later report suggested that Mme. Mao may have said instead that the Ministry of Public Security had failed to make the necessary arrests, so Red Guards could now make their own--but other later materials indicated that the first version was correct.

Mme. Mao is said to have gone on to include "Public Security" among the "bourgeois-style" organizations which were not really in sympathy with the revolution, and to have "proposed" that "public security forces" be taken over by the PLA (she said that Hsieh Fu-chih had already agreed to this). However, the various versions of her speech do not make clear whether she was talking about the Ministry of Public Security as a whole or simply about one unreliable component, the municipal Public Security Bureau in Peking. This question is still open.

Further, Mme. Mao is said to have reiterated her charges of 16 or 17 December against Wang Jen-chung, Chou Jung-hsin, and Yung Wen-tao, adding the deputy secretary-general of the State Council, Hsu Ming. [REDACTED]

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Mme. Mao in this 18 December speech went on to add to the list of those in disfavor a much more important regional leader than Wang Jen-chung--namely, Li Ching-chuan, the powerful first secretary of the Southwest Bureau and a full member of the CCP politburo. Adding to the indications that all or almost all of the regional first secretaries and most or many of the provincial first secretaries would be brought down, Mme. Mao is said to have denounced Li as a "manifest wrong-doer" (whether this is a direct quotation is uncertain) and to have gone on to charge that provincial party committees had operated their own intelligence services in Peking (the implication being, on behalf of their independent kingdoms).

On 19 and 20 December, fresh rallies were held to denounce Peng Chen and others of the first group (Lu, Lo, and Yang). Apparently all four were displayed at this rally. A picture was later circulated of Peng, Lu, Lo and Yang standing before a rally with bowed heads and placards around their necks. All of them were handled brutally by the Red Guards, and some of them were reported to have attempted suicide after the rally.

On the same days, fresh posters attacking Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were reported. These were said to be "huge," and to be demanding their dismissal from all posts and even their "liquidation." Some posters related these two leaders to those of the first group, asserting that the two senior figures were "marshals" of the opposition to Mao and had recruited the others as "generals." Attacks on Liu Ning-i, the labor leader, Li Hsien-nien, the finance and trade specialist, and Ho Lung of the military affairs committee (the latter, apparently, for the first time) were also reported.*

On 20 December, "leaders of the central committee" received some 90,000 officers and men of the PLA, and some 10,000 party and government functionaries, who had helped with the work of taking care of the visiting Red Guards. Hsiao Hua (later to be attacked) spoke on behalf of Lin Piao, the Military Affairs Committee, and departments of the PLA; Mme. Mao spoke as first deputy chief of the central cultural revolution group; and Chen Po-ta and Chou En-lai spoke as members of the politburo standing committee. Mme. Mao and Chen both praised the PLA in particular, at the PLA's portion of the reception, while Chou's praise was more evenly distributed. Both Chen and Chou were given "stormy" applause. Chou went on to lead the singing at the stadium where party and government functionaries were later received. Tao Chu was listed first among other leaders attending, and some others being attacked then or to be attacked later were also present.

*In late January wild accounts of Ho's plans--of February 1966--for a "rebellion" of the PLA and/or a "coup" appeared in posters. Ho in fact had been in good favor at least through August.

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On 23 December, according to a correspondent's account of a Red Guard newspaper of 27 December, Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, and Mme. Mao spoke to representatives of all three Red Guard headquarters in Peking--the first, the reorganized second (a more militant group), and the third (all along the most militant)--plus Red Guards from secondary schools. Chou is said to have "demanded" that all Red Guards from universities and colleges be united into one group--presumably meaning, among other things, the merger of the three headquarters. Months earlier, Chou had told the Red Guards that debate would continue until all were united in one position, and, if his speech was at all accurately reported, he may have been telling them now that the debate was over and that there was to be just one position--presumably that of the militants, in the light of the many official expressions of favor for them in previous weeks. A few days later, according to another correspondent's account, one of the Red Guard newspapers reported (28 December) that nine of the Red Guard "units" in Peking had "recently" merged.

Also on 23 December, it was reportedly "announced" that Lo Jui-ching had been "taken away"; perhaps his reported suicide took place after this date rather than immediately after the 20 December rally. On 24 December, according to wall-posters, Chi Pen-yu, an officer of the cultural revolution group, reportedly told a rally that Liu and Teng were the leaders of the opposition to Mao, and incited the Red Guards to seize them (this would have been in conflict with the line reportedly taken by Mme. Mao a week earlier, and Chi may instead have told them to keep denouncing Liu and Teng). On the same day, according to a TASS account of a Red Guard newspaper, Pong Te-huai was arrested by Red Guards in western China, to be brought back to Peking for a presumed appearance in a spectacle.

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On 26 December, a correspondent reported that trucks with loudspeakers were touring Peking announcing that Liu and Teng were the leaders of the "black line" and that they should be deposed. The correspondent reported the

same loudspeakers to be blaring out the "latest" from Mme. Mao, namely (as reported) that all opponents of Mao's thought should be arrested, that "security" authorities in Peking had not been sufficiently militant in doing this, and that in consequence real revolutionaries (Red Guards) were entitled to make such arrests themselves. (While this seemed at the time a possibly genuine account of Mme. Mao's "latest" position

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Chou En-lai soon criticized the use of sound-trucks for such purposes.) The same correspondent reported fresh wall-poster attacks on Liu Shao-chi, Po I-po and Wang Jen-chung, calling them such things as "dogs" and asserting that Mme. Mao had called them a "group of rotters."

On 26 December (Mao's 73rd birthday), a People's Daily editorial made public most of a 10-point directive on the relationship between revolution and production, a directive perhaps formulated in early December, sent through normal party channels at the time, and partially reported in wall-posters later.* The directive, and the editorial reflecting it, quietly but radically changed the line established by People's Daily in September, affirmed by Chou En-lai then and later, and reiterated by the party newspaper in November (see pages 102 and 153) --that the revolution should be so conducted as not to interfere with production.

The 26 December editorial began from the new proposition that the "working class" is the "leading force and most active factor of the cultural revolution" and the related proposition that industrial and mining

*Fragmentary information on organizational activity in factories in November suggests the possibility that the directive was dated as early as November, but it may be instead that the early activity was experimental and there was no directive until December.

enterprises must not be allowed to slide down the path of "capitalism and revisionism." But in "some" such enterprises party authorities posed that danger, and therefore the revolution must be carried out in all such enterprises vigorously; indeed, revolution must be put "in command" of production. Those to be charged with this were the "worker masses," who would now conduct a "serious struggle" against those who had pretended to be concerned with production. These latter had done such things as using material incentives to seduce the workers and inciting the workers to struggle against one another and against students (Red Guards). Thus the central committee "has decreed" (a reference to the directive) that officials of industrial and mining enterprises must not retaliate against the masses who criticize them, and (as party officials had earlier been directed to do) they must restore the reputations of those pejoratively labelled; moreover, they must return their jobs and back pay to those fired. Further, workers were now to elect their own cultural revolution bodies--like those set up since August in the universities and all "cultural" organizations--to conduct the struggle. Finally, the workers must be permitted to create "all kinds of revolutionary organizations"--that is, Red Guards or their equivalent. The editorial went on to counsel these revolutionary organizations, as the Red Guards had long been told, to conduct the struggle by reasoning not force, and concluded with an admonition to the workers to "welcome" the revolutionary students coming to the factories to "exchange revolutionary experience"--something they had previously been expressly forbidden to do.

The editorial was consistent with the party directive as reported in wall-posters, but omitted two major points in the directive which were provided in the poster accounts. One related to the "re-election" of groups to "guide" production. The editorials of September and December had directed economic units to establish two groups--one to guide the cultural revolution and one to guide production. The production guidance groups were apparently to continue (or to be established where they had not been), but there was now no clear division between their authority and that of the cultural revolution groups and the Red

Guards or their equivalents (what were soon to emerge as "revolutionary rebel" workers), and, indeed, the editorial strongly suggested that--as in the days of the "great leap forward"--it was to be another case of "politics in command," with all that that would mean for rational management. The other point related to arbitration; the directive as reported provided for the workers to send a "small number" of representatives to the party's municipal or provincial committees or regional bureaus to appeal an issue, or even to Peking (a point which was to prove important).

It was apparent that, just as the Red Guards had been turned loose on the party apparatus in August, the new team was now turning the "revolutionaries" (of whatever designation) loose on the factories. Party leaders did not on this occasion, as they had in August, explicitly call for "disorder" to be created, but a mechanism to promote disorder had again been contrived.* Just as the Red Guards had "bombarded" party headquarters, shaken them up, and made it impossible for them to perform their jobs properly (all in the name of testing them as revolutionary successors), so now the party was setting the new revolutionary organizations against the existing party, youth, and union organizations in the factories and mines, with a similar prospect of armed clashes, purges, and a decline in actual production (all in the name of preventing the restoration of capitalism). One factor in this decision was presumably the desire to eliminate the influence of party authorities (managers and youth and union leaders) who had in the past been associated with party leaders now in disfavor--e.g. Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, Po I-po, Liu Ning-i--who had been concerned with such activity at the national level.

On the night of 26 December, according to wall-posters observed later, Mme. Mao, Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng talked with the leaders of a new revolutionary

*It may be that visible resistance to the "revolution" --in the factories and countryside--impelled the new team to take action earlier than originally intended. But the campaign against this resistance would surely increase disorder, as well as resistance, in the short term.

trade union federation, the "All-China Federation of Red Revolutionaries," obviously designed to replace the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Mme. Mao at this meeting reportedly denounced the leaders of the ACFTU and the Ministry of Labor--apparently present--as unresponsive to Mao and the politburo; and reportedly again criticized Liu Shao-chi at this meeting, to an audience expected to have some sympathy for Liu. On the next day (27 December), Red Guards of the new federation and also of the old "sealed the office" of the ACFTU in Peking, and four days after that seized the ACFTU's newspaper. The reason given in wall-posters was that the leaders of the ACFTU--notably Liu Ning-i and Lai Jo-yu--had carried out the "revisionist" line of Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Peng Chen.

Also, on 27 December, there was reportedly another rally of 100,000 Red Guards and workers to denounce Liu and Teng. The speakers were said, echoing Mme. Mao, to have described Liu as "China's Khrushchev" and to have again demanded removal of both from office.* The speakers still did not, however, call for the arrest of Liu and Teng--that is, their arrest by Red Guards for a personal appearance at such a rally.

At the same time, posters were observed demanding that Peng Chen and others of the first group--Lo, Lu, and Yang--be executed. It was not clear whether the

*Liu's self-criticism (at the October-November work conference) had reportedly appeared on Red Guard posters in Peking the previous day (26 December) and been denounced at once in Red Guard posters as "insincere." TASS reported two days later that Red Guard posters gave Liu an "ultimatum" to come to an Industrial Institute in Peking on 7 January and make (another) self-criticism;

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"trial" of these leaders had been held or would be held. Peng Te-huai was reportedly returned to Peking on this same day (27 December).

On the following day, posters were observed denouncing a group of economic specialists once identified with relatively conservative positions in economic policy but inactive in recent years--Chen Yun, still a member of the politburo, Teng Tzu-hui, and Liao Lu-yen. Fresh posters were observed attacking Chen Yi again, and Hu Chiao-mu, author of the CCP's official history (1951).

By 29 December, Tao Chu had pretty clearly fallen from favor. On that date, fresh posters were observed--reportedly plastered all over Peking--denouncing Tao as a "new representative of the bourgeois reactionary line." (Later information indicated that Tao had in fact fallen by mid-December.) Judging from poster attacks beginning in early January, a group of military figures--both professional military leaders and political officers--also fell from favor in December, perhaps not until late December but perhaps as early as Tao did. Some observers have conjectured that the cases are connected, that all may have fallen on a single issue, e.g. whether or how to use the PLA against opponents of the new team. This may prove to be the case, but poster-accounts of the speeches of party leaders denouncing Tao in early January show a continued emphasis on the charge of 'protecting' the party apparatus as a whole and the Central-South in particular.* The reasons for the December purge of the military leaders remained quite unclear as of late January.

*Tao may have been making an all-out effort in that period to demonstrate that he was not a "bourgeois-reactionary" element.

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Finally, on 31 December Peking radio announced that in 1967 the cultural revolution would be carried out "on a large scale" in rural areas as well as in factories. This too made public the essentials of a party directive--attributed to 15 December--reported in wall-posters. It was statly flatly in the broadcast editorial that any argument against this course was "incorrect." Young "intellectuals and students"--presumably including the Red Guards--were explicitly encouraged to go to the countryside--as to the factories--to "merge themselves" with the peasants, a course which had also been previously forbidden. The directive as reported on posters said that the revolution in the countryside would be directed "mainly" at a "handful" of party officials and unreformed landowners, rich peasants, reactionaries and rightists, and would be carried out by elected cultural revolution groups composed of poor and lower-middle peasants. Moreover, the directive as reported called expressly for the organization and development of Red Guards composed of these classes of the peasantry.

This directive was revealed--presumably deliberately--at the beginning of the slack season, so that it would not have the same immediately serious effects there as would be produced in the factories by the equivalent directive revealed on 26 December. Nevertheless, if the new team persisted in its intention, eventual disruption and a decline in production could be expected to appear in the rural areas as well.

During December, in sum, Mao and his new team used the Red Guards to publicly humiliate Peng Chen and the three others of the first group, along with some lesser figures, and to return Peng Te-huai for further action; members of the new team themselves publicly denounced, for the first time by leaders, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, while declining to allow them to be put on display at rallies; other leaders were specifically targeted for Red Guard attacks--so far as is known, for the first time; the new team marked for discard one of its own members, Tao Chu; party leaders again condemned violence against, by, and among the Red Guards, while giving further encouragement to the most militant elements

and calling for the merger of Red Guard units (under the presumed domination of the militants); Mme. Mao revealed that either the Ministry of Public Security or the municipal Public Security Bureau in Peking would be subordinated to the PLA; the new team reiterated the ritual by which an erring official must seek forgiveness (self-abasement, reinstatement of those injured, correction of the record), while suggesting that many officials were refusing to perform this ritual; the party leaders issued directives turning the Red Guards and other "revolutionary" groups loose on the factories and the countryside, obviously accepting a risk of large-scale resistance; and a group of military leaders apparently fell from favor, possibly on the issue of use of the PLA against opponents of the new team. With respect to action against its opponents, the new team had moved some distance from the situation it had been in as early as October and as late as late November--when its pronouncements had in effect put the new team itself on trial, had obliged it to take some further action if it were not to seem frivolous or impotent; but it was again now in a situation in which further action seemed to be demanded--action against those in disfavor who had refused to go through the elaborate ritual prescribed for them* or had been found irredeemable anyway--including denunciation by name in the official press, the trial and sentencing of some of those in custody in Peking, and the dislodgement of some unregenerate leaders outside Peking.

*A wall-poster observed in Peking on 22 January gives a credible account of a "Chairman Mao Tse-tung's four point instruction" on just this question: (1) "everyone must bravely volunteer to meet the masses, conduct self-criticism..., and set fire to himself to burn away his errors"; (2) even if he is put to shame by having his face painted and a pointed hat put on him, he must carry on with his work; (3) only a minority are irredeemable, the others should be "made to correct their mistakes" and allowed to "recover"; and (4) party officials should face the masses' criticism "squarely" and with "dignity," as "the more timid they are, the higher the price."

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DDI/RS

21 June 1967

THE PURGE OF THE P.L.A., 1959-67

POLO-XXIII

Summary

Prior to the massive purge of the Chinese Communist military leadership in 1966-67, the last substantial purge of the PLA had been the comparatively small one of 1959. Opposition to a range of Mao's radical domestic and foreign policies was led at that time by Minister of Defense Peng Te-huai. Mao replaced Peng at once with Lin Piao, who had long been his favorite military leader but had also long been ill. Mao at the same time replaced the PLA's chief-of-staff with Lo Jui-ching, a security specialist, and purged perhaps a dozen other high-ranking officers of the PLA.

In 1960 and 1961 Mao and Lin rebuilt the PLA around a "rectification" campaign, aimed at gaining recognition of the priority of political factors. The methods employed for this indoctrination were later to serve for the "cultural revolution." Mao and Lin at the same time reorganized, expanded and strengthened the PLA's political apparatus, while seeking also to enhance the combat-effectiveness of the PLA. The good showing of the PLA against the Indians in 1962 appeared to vindicate the approach of Mao and Lin.

In 1963, Mao issued his call to "learn from the PLA," and in 1964 military-type political departments were established in important sectors of the government. As this new network came to be staffed predominantly by PLA figures, the ground was being prepared for the emergence of the PLA as the most important instrument of the "cultural revolution." However, there is some evidence that by the end of 1964 Mao and Lin had begun to be suspicious of the PLA's chief-of-staff, Lo Jui-ching.

It was apparent in early 1965 that Mao and Lin had found renewed opposition in the officer corps to the emphasis on "politics" in the PLA and to all of the expressions of this--e.g., the increasing authority of political officers, the quantity of political indoctrination, the concept of "men over weapons," and the related doctrine of "people's war." At this time, a period of increased concern over the possibility of war with the U.S., Lo apparently did differ with Mao and Lin on the question of how best to prepare for war. Mao and Lin responded typically, by increasing the political element at the

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expense of the professional, and publicly admitted a continuing serious problem with "bourgeois thinking" in the PLA. In mid-November, Lin issued a directive on the PLA's work which made the test of the loyalty and competence of PLA cadres that of whether they regarded Mao's works as their "highest instructions." Two weeks later, Lo Jui-ching suddenly disappeared. Disappearing at the same time was Yang Shang-kun, who held two key posts in central committee organs in which he would probably have worked closely with Lo.

Lo and Yang reappeared only in January 1967, in the hands of the Red Guards. Although nothing about Lo can be demonstrated beyond the fact that he was not regarded as sufficiently trustworthy--at the beginning of the "cultural revolution"--to be left in operational control of troops that might have to be used, there are several credible charges in the long list of crimes now attributed to Lo. Most of these can be summarized as resistance to the concept of "giving first place to politics" and resistance to specific policies of political leaders. As for the charge of conspiracy among Lo, Yang, Peng Chen, and Lu Ting-i, about all that can be said is that the simultaneous disappearance of Lo and Yang suggests that Mao might really believe it about Lo and Yang, at least in the sense of their working together with the conscious aims of obstructing the policies of Mao and Lin and of eventually dislodging Lin as head of the PLA.

The PLA's General Political Department called a political work conference in January 1966 to study Mao's directives to the PLA and means of carrying out Lin's "principles" for "giving prominence to politics." Within a month, Lin chose to make an example of a deputy director of the General Political Department itself, Liang Pi-yeh. Lin said later that he himself purged Liang in February 1966 for contending that politics should be better coordinated with the practical work of military preparedness --one of the offenses for which Lo Jui-ching had fallen.

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In the spring of 1966, while the PLA was taking the public lead in the "cultural revolution," Mao and Lin made preparations to extend the "revolution" into the PLA itself and to conduct a thorough-going purge of the PLA. Madame Mao, who was to accumulate an impressive list of victims as the purge proceeded, prepared the ground with a symposium on "cultural" work in the PLA. Mao himself called for the PLA to master its speciality but also to conduct propaganda and take part in production--a justification for much of its unconventional activity in the year ahead. Among the new appointments made at that time or soon after was that of Liu Chih-chien, the most important remaining deputy director of the General Political Department, to the new central Cultural Revolution Group under Chen Po-ta and Madame Mao.

The period of June and July 1966 was dominated by the "work-teams," assigned to carry out the "cultural revolution" throughout China. The PLA supplied some of the personnel for work-teams operating in non-military organizations, and its own military academics and schools suffered the activity of the teams. When the line followed by these teams was subsequently discredited as insufficiently militant, Liu Chih-chien was made the scapegoat for this period, although in fact he had been in high favor at the time. Ho Lung and some other leaders who fell from favor in December 1966 were charged with having acted in collusion in this period of June and July to oppose Lin Piao; while this may be true, the weakly-specified charges cannot be confirmed.

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In the period of violence which followed the appearance of the Red Guards in mid-August 1966, the PLA was

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ordered to stand clear, and PLA units themselves were sometimes the targets of Red Guard attacks. In the PLA itself, the "cultural revolution" was proceeding quietly, and, according to the later judgment of Mao and Lin, too slowly, and in the wrong direction. The "revolution" was still concentrated in the military schools and academies, was conducted by party committees (rather than by the special cultural revolution teams taking over from the work-teams elsewhere), and was pursued by more conservative methods than those employed outside the PLA. The luckless Liu Chih-chien was later made the scapegoat for this period too.

In early October 1966 a MAC directive moved the "cultural revolution" in military academies and schools into a higher gear. The directive reversed actions which the work-teams (June and July) and the party committees (August and September) had taken against the most militant students, called for the use of the more militant and disorderly methods already in use outside the PLA, specified that "bad elements" were to be brought down, urged a more militant interpretation of the criteria for examination of cadres stated by Lin Piao in August, and gave the leadership to special cultural revolution teams. The PLA almost certainly set up at this time its first Cultural Revolution Group, probably under the direction of Liu Chih-chien. At the same time the MAC issued a directive--in the spirit of Lin's criteria--which may have been intended to serve as a general directive for the conduct of the "revolution" in the PLA as a whole.

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Whether Liu Chih-chien honestly tried to implement these directives is not known; but it was in this period of October and November that he fell from favor for insufficient militance.

Ho Lung, who ranked just below Lin Piao as a deputy chairman of the MAC but had been in some degree of trouble by November, was in disgrace by 18 December, when Madame Mao denounced him. Ho and six other important military figures who apparently fell at the same time--Li Ching-chuan, Huang Hsin-ting, and Kuo Lin-hsiang of the Chengtu headquarters, Liao Han-sheng of the Peking headquarters, Su Chen-hua of the Navy, and Hsu Kuang-ta of the Armored Forces--plus a number of lesser figures who may or may not have fallen at just this time, were soon charged with having acted in collusion against Lin Piao; and an eighth major figure, Yang Yung of the Peking headquarters, was later charged with having been a member of this cabal.

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As in the case of Lo Jui-ching, there are several credible charges in the long list of crimes attributed to Ho Lung, but, as in Lo's case, all that can be said about the charge of collusion among these military leaders is that the simultaneous fall of seven of them suggests again that Mao may really believe it, at least in the sense of their working together to frustrate Lin's policies.

By the end of 1966, when it was evident that Mao might have to send the PLA into action against his opponents outside Peking, it was also apparent that the leaders of the PLA's military regions and military districts--that is, the commanders and political officers there--had already been hit hard by the purge. Of the 24 key figures of the military regions, at least ten had been replaced in 1966 (and an eleventh was soon to fall), and the status of several others was in doubt. And of the 44 key figures of the provincial military districts, at least 14 had been replaced in 1966, and the status of more than 20 was in doubt. No information was available on the commanders of armies in the field.

On 10 January 1967 Madame Mao denounced Liu Chih-chien, and on 12 January the PLA Cultural Revolution Groups which he had headed was reorganized, with Hsu Hsiang-chien (perhaps already a vice-chairman of the MAC) as the new chief and the Madame as his "advisor" and de facto superior. Others who had had important roles in the "revolution" in the PLA--e.g., Hsiao Hua and Yang Cheng-wu--were named his deputies. The PLA newspaper at the time called for the revolution to proceed militantly in "all high-ranking leading organs" of the PLA (as well as in its academies and schools and "cultural" organizations), but for the continuation of a low-key program of "education" in the line organizations. For reasons still not clear, several members of the new PLA/CRG were attacked in Red Guard posters within a few days, but only two low-level members failed to survive the attacks.

In mid-January Hsiao Hua, director of the general political department, teetered under attack but recovered. He had been criticized in posters in early January, was given a vote of confidence in his 12 January appointment as senior deputy chief of the reorganized PLA/CRG, but apparently continued to be criticized by other leaders in favor for errors in the conduct of the "cultural revolution" in the PLA--the errors for which his deputies, Liang Pi-yeh and Liu Chih-chien, had been purged.

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Yang Yung, commander of the Peking military region, who had dropped from the news in mid-December, took the initiative in mid-January in making this criticism of Hsiao public, apparently in the hope of reducing some trouble he himself was in. Chen Po-ta and Madame Mao soon added to this public criticism of Hsiao. Chou En-lai repelled the attacks on Hsiao on 21 January, making clear that, while Hsiao had made mistakes, he remained in favor. Yang Yung was broken immediately, but Chen and the Madame remained strong.

As of mid-January, the "revolutionary rebels" were "seizing power" in various parts of China, but there was great disorder in this "January revolution." Much of this was caused by Mao's opponents (who turned some of Peking's directives to their own advantage), but much by the rebels themselves. Mao's concern over the scale and potential of this disorder--concern probably reinforced by Chou and the military leaders--was soon expressed in a directive to the PLA on 23 January rescinding the directives which had kept the PLA out of action and ordering the PLA now to support the "genuine" leftists and to suppress counter-revolutionaries. It is doubtful that many PLA leaders opposed the decision--which was essentially a decision to restore order--but there may have been dissatisfaction over the lack of clear guidance for the PLA's political mission.

At the end of January and in early February, new directives modified the militant conduct of the revolution at the higher levels of the PLA itself which had been called for in mid-January. These directives provided for the revolution to be conducted at these higher levels (busy now) as opportunity permitted, and assigned the conduct of it at these levels to the party committees; they forbade the use of force, arrests without orders, and physical harassment; they also forbade the "seizure of power" in military "leadership (or "guidance") organs and assaults on military organs of any kind; and they also reaffirmed that "education" was sufficient for line organizations (at least of division-level and below). These directives amounted to reassurances to the military leaders--in particular the line units which would have to do the fighting--that the purge of the PLA as a whole would not be carried out to the extreme degree or in the wild way that the purge of the party had been, and that the majority of PLA leaders whom Mao and Lin wanted to purge had already been purged. These reassurances probably did help to make the PLA a reliable instrument in the new stage of the "revolution."

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PLA commanders everywhere in China apparently responded loyally and swiftly to the 23 January directive which had sent the PLA into action. Within a few weeks, the PLA had restored order sufficiently to be able to take further steps to carry out its political mission, looking toward the formation of "revolutionary committees." Here, however, it ran into trouble. One factor evidently was that in many or most cases Peking itself did not know enough about the local situation to be able to give the PLA commander on the spot clear directives about whom to support. In those cases, the PLA seems to have engaged in a holding action while it tried to sort things out, and it had a hard time with this. Another factor was that the guidance provided at the time--in leadership statements and the party press--was in apparent conflict with the general directive the PLA was operating under. That is, the 23 January directive had ordered the PLA to support the "genuine" leftists--which, as previously defined, would mean the most militant of the "rebel" groups and the kind of local officials who would find favor with them--but the signals from Peking were increasingly to the effect that the extreme militants were out of favor at a time when the main job was to restore order. The PLA in the field, perhaps baffled at first, seemed increasingly to take these signals as a mandate to find against, and to suppress, the most militant of the "rebel" groups on the spot. By the end of March, the PLA was acting so aggressively against the militants that Mao was concerned for the continued good health of the young "revolutionary successors."

The PLA was leashed again in April, almost certainly on orders of Mao himself. Following a speech by Lin Piao in which he said that the PLA would now be restricted in its use of arms and other forms of coercion and emphasized that PLA units henceforth were to act only on orders from above (a clear admission that the PLA had been found guilty of "mistakes"), the MAC issued a 10-point directive on 6 April making explicit the restrictions. The directive forbade the PLA to fire on rebel groups (meaning, probably, without extreme provocation), to make mass arrests, to classify rebel organizations as counter-revolutionary with central committee approval, or to use force to get confessions or to punish; and it called for the PLA to make sure that rightist cadres were not permitted to suppress leftist rebels. Whereas the intent and effect of the 23 January directive (reinforced by signals from Peking) had been that of restoring order, placing the rebels in a position subordinate to the PLA, the 6 April

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directive placed the restrictions on the PLA instead, with the predictable consequence that the most militant rebels would assert themselves more aggressively than ever. Also on 6 April, there appeared intensive poster attacks on Hsu Hsiang-chien, who was to be made a scapegoat for the PLA's "mistakes" in dealing with mass organizations; ten days later, Madame Mao reportedly dismissed Hsu as chief of the PLA's Cultural Revolution Group and said that Hsiao Hua, Hsieh Fu-chih and Yang Cheng-wu would now run it. At the end of April, the only top-level military leaders still clearly in favor were Lin, those three, and Su Yu. At the same time, Chou En-lai [redacted] confirmed that the PLA leaders in most of the provinces had not been able to move very far forward with their political mission.

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In late April, May and early June, there was again serious and increasing disorder in China, in part the result of the 6 April directive placing crippling restrictions on the PLA. Much of this probably represented "unprincipled" struggle--among "rebel" organizations competing for position and by some of those organizations against local leaders in Peking's favor. Much of it, however, apparently represented "principled" struggle by rebel groups in Peking's favor against local leaders whom Peking wanted to keep the pressure on. Peking was keeping both forces--attackers and defenders--in the field, and they both seemed to represent aspects of Mao's "thought." As of early May, Mao's immediate concern was still more with correcting the faults of the PLA in handling the rebels than with the troubles caused by the rebels themselves, but as disorder increased the emphasis shifted. In mid-May the new Peking revolutionary committee (installed in April) issued a stiff six-point notice forbidding the rebels to use force or to destroy or seize state property, and calling for "revolutionary order." Reports of serious disorder--including large-scale clashes between the rebels and the PLA, initiated by the former--continued to come in. On 22 May, the party newspaper called for an end to violence everywhere, but large-scale clashes continued. Finally, after provincial broadcasts had made clear that rebel violence was preventing the provinces from setting up or operating revolutionary committees, the leaders in Peking on 6 June provided the necessary new directive. It ordered an end to the violent offenses of the rebels and called upon the PLA to enforce this order. It was an open question, however, whether the PLA, once burned, would now proceed aggressively under the terms of the new directive.

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As of mid-June 1967, the scale of the purge of the PLA was impressive. Of some 130 key military posts considered (down to the level of a commander of a provincial military district), the occupants of some 46 were known or believed to have been purged since the "cultural revolution" began in November 1965, and the status of dozens of others was in doubt. This would have been a purge--if the figures were complete--on about half the scale of the purge of the party leadership, which had removed something like three-fourths of those in comparable positions. But the figures were not complete, and additional information might show that the PLA leadership had been purged on a scale as much as two-thirds as great as the purge of the party leadership. Moreover, the purge itself had not been completed.

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THE PURGE OF THE P.L.A.The Small Purge of 1959-60

Prior to the massive 1966-67 purge of the Chinese Communist armed forces (PLA) as an important part of Mao's "cultural revolution," the last substantial purge of the PLA--a comparatively small one--had come in 1959. This had followed the Chinese Communist party plenum of July-August 1959, at which opposition to a range of Mao's radical domestic and foreign policies was led by the then Minister of Defense, Peng Te-huai. It is not known whether, as Peking now alleges, Peng's forces presented a 10,000-character document setting forth their views systematically, but Chinese materials indicate that Peng's forces advocated a return to more orthodox Chinese programs, and--in the interest of regaining Soviet military, economic and technical assistance to these programs--a compromise in the Sino-Soviet dispute. They were also accused later of having advocated over a longer period abolition of the party committee system in the PLA.

Mao, whose leadership and policies had not been openly challenged since 1935, struck back at once, replacing Peng Te-huai with Lin Piao, who had long been his favorite military leader but had been ill and comparatively inactive for years. Lin, who had not been on good terms with Peng in earlier years, had been added to the politburo standing committee in 1958, and had probably played an important role in shaping some of the policies which Peng rebelled against: the emphatic reassertion of the party's authority over the military, the rejection of Soviet experience and practice, the imposition of Mao's "thought" from guerrilla days as the strategic doctrine of the regime (in the light of the failure to obtain nuclear weapons), and the assignment of large roles to the military in non-military projects related to the "leap forward" and commune programs.

Mao at the same time (September 1959) purged the PLA's Chief-of-Staff and replaced him with Lo Jui-ching, a security specialist who had also been close to Mao. Lo himself was replaced as Minister of Public Security by Hsieh Fu-chih, one of Teng Hsiao-ping's proteges. In the "cultural revolution" of 1965-67, Lin and Hsieh have played important roles as leaders, and Lo and Teng have played important roles as victims.

Lin Piao responded to his appointment as Minister of Defense with a major article in support of Mao's fundamental propositions in which he pledged the PLA's "unconditional" allegiance to Mao personally. Although Peking described Lin as still "very weak" physically, he was strong enough to take firm hold of the Ministry, to become de facto leader (under Mao) of the party's Military Affairs Committee, and to carry on the modest purge of the PLA's leadership. Among the known or probable victims in the following year or so--some dismissed and degraded, some simply demoted--were the Director of the PLA's General Political Department, the Director of the Rear Services Department, some of the deputy commanders of the service arms, some of the onetime leaders of Chinese forces in Korea, and some of the many commanders and political officers of military regions and military districts and garrison commands at that time who have never appeared since. The purge of 1959-60, however, was not conducted on anything like the scale--especially at the top of the PLA--as the purge of 1966-67.

"Rectification," 1960-62

In the fall of 1960, the situation of the PLA was bleak. The withdrawal of Soviet military aid in mid-1960 forced Peking to adopt a program of self-reliance; the "leap forward" was collapsing; and there was an agricultural depression. Mao and Lin were concerned about the morale and combat-effectiveness of the PLA, and about the poor condition of its political control apparatus; more than one-third of the PLA's companies reportedly had no party committees at all.

In 1960 and 1961 Mao and Lin rebuilt the PLA around a "rectification" campaign. They began in October 1960 by putting first things first. At that time Lin introduced at a MAC meeting the "four firsts"--all of them political imperatives--which were to put man first in handling the relationship between men and weapons, to put political work ahead of other work, to put ideological work ahead of other kinds of political work, and to put "living" ideas ahead of ideas in books. The last and most important of these made the PLA's political cadres responsible for making clear to the troops the "correct" ideas of their political (party) leaders and for making these ideas effective ("living") in their daily lives, and also for making clear to the party leaders the degree to which these ideas had been implanted and were operative.

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
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The methods employed for this indoctrination were later to serve for the "cultural revolution"--the shouting of slogans, the slap-up of wall-posters, and the printing of large-character bulletins, as well as the "struggle" techniques of contention, blooming, and debate. All of these were of course expressions of "Mao's thought," the study of which was repeatedly specified as the PLA's main task.

Mao and Lin at the same time reorganized, expanded and strengthened the political apparatus which was to carry out the "rectification." All companies that lacked party committees were given them; the collective leadership of the party committees at all levels was emphasized; and the status of the political officers (often or usually the heads of the party committees) was enhanced, and their authority vis-a-vis the military commanders was increased. All of this was a part of the assertion of the party's absolute authority over the PLA.

While emphasizing "politics" and indoctrination, Mao and Lin in that period sought to enhance the combat-effectiveness of the PLA in other ways. For one thing, the regular armed forces were given preference over the militia, and military training was given priority over non-military activities;

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The party organs principally concerned with control of the PLA were the Military Affairs Committee and the General Political Department; the latter was probably not yet directly subordinate to the former. The principal officers of the MAC were Lin Piao as vice-chairman (under Mao) and de facto chairman [REDACTED] as well as Minister of Defense; Ho Lung as

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the next-ranking, vice-chairman; Nieh Jung-chen as next-ranking, concurrently chairman of the regime's Scientific Technological Commission, probably responsible for planning the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; Lo Jui-ching as secretary-general, in charge of MAC's daily work, as well as chief-of-staff; Yeh Chien-ying as the committee's specialist in training; and Hsiao Hua, deputy director (soon director) of the General Political Department. Less important figures appeared to be Hsu Hsiang-chien and Liu Po-cheng, (although Liu may have been a vice-chairman), who had both been ill, and Yang Cheng-wu, the senior deputy chief-of-staff. All of these except Liu were to be featured in the "cultural revolution."

Peking's party and military leaders, who had frankly expressed their fear of U.S. nuclear weapons in 1961, clearly were not confident of the PLA's military capabilities against a serious opponent by the spring of 1962. They were clearly made anxious by the appearance at that time of a small threat from India and some indications of Chinese Nationalist plans for an invasion of the eastern coast, either of which might be supported by the U.S. In the fall of 1962, however, the PLA had a chance to take on the Indians alone, and did well. The performance of the PLA seemed to vindicate the methods of Mao and Lin.

In this period of 1960-62, there were only a few visible changes in the Chinese military leadership. There were three deaths among top-level figures: Ho Ping-yen, the commander of the Chengtu headquarters, Chen Keng, deputy minister of defense and deputy chief-of-staff, and Li Ko-nung, deputy chief-of-staff and one of the two most important specialists in party police work. And there were several unexplained disappearances of second-level figures, mostly in the headquarters of the service arms; these may or may not have been deaths.

The PLA as a Model, 1963-64

By the end of 1962, the military establishment, which had been so worrisome in the winter of 1960-61 that Lin Piao warned of the need to "ensure that the armed forces do not get out of hand," now seemed a model of order and discipline. In launching a "socialist education" campaign at that time (late 1962) to re-educate the Chinese people and "reorganize our revolutionary ranks," Mao seems to have decided to apply to Chinese society as a whole--and particularly to the Chinese party--the extreme

methods of political indoctrination tested and perfected in the PLA.

It is true that Mao and Lin did not take the pressure off the PLA itself. In March 1963, for example, the "Regulations Governing Political Work in the PLA" made clear that there was still some distance to go in making the PLA a perfectly reliable, perfectly responsive instrument. But in comparison with the rest of society, the PLA was in great shape. Thus in December 1963 Mao issued his call to "learn from the PLA."

In February 1964 a major campaign was launched to this end; all political, economic and social organizations in China were directed to study and emulate the organizational, operational, and ideological training methods of the PLA. As part of this, in the spring of 1964 military-type political departments were established in all industrial, commercial and financial ministries and bureaus and their subordinate enterprises. This was, of course, an early expression of Mao's distrust of the conventional party apparatus. As this new network came to be staffed increasingly--and predominantly--by PLA officers, cadres, and soldiers, who were to "grasp both ends well" (the levels above and the levels below, in accordance with the most important of the "four firsts" introduced by Lin), the ground was being prepared for the emergence of the PLA as the most important instrument of the "cultural revolution."

PLA officers were also given increased roles in the party organization at regional and provincial levels, with several more commanders of regional military headquarters becoming concurrently secretaries of regional bureaus; the closer integration was mutual, however, as local party leaders assumed the posts of political officers in many commands. PLA leaders were also increasingly prominent in managing the national defense industries; of the five ministers of the new ministries of machine-building established in 1963-65, four were generals or admirals, and there is some evidence that a fifth (Su Yu) was made the overall coordinator of defense industries.

Although the "professional" military point of view was still an object of political attack, this point of view seemed in fact to be taken into consideration. Despite a low level of announced military activity in 1964, there was a high level of military investment. There was evidence of enhanced capabilities in such fields as advanced aircraft and missiles. Moreover, the leaders of the military

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establishment--Lin, Lo, Ho, Nieh, Yeh, and Hsiao (who moved up to Director of the General Political Department in 1964)--seemed to be working well together. Peking now says that Lo in 1964 tried to displace Lin, in part on the ground that Lin was still sick, and that Lo was really subverting the Mao/Lin principle of "politics to the fore" and rejecting Lin's "four firsts" at the same time that he was publicly stating the military doctrine which derived from those concepts, with its emphasis on political training and close combat. There is some evidence--centering on Lo's promotion of a "weapons competition" in 1964, which in effect challenged Mao's dogma of "man over weapons"--that by the end of 1964 Mao had begun to be suspicious of Lo.

In the period of 1963-64, there were again only a few visible changes in the Chinese military leadership. There were three additional deaths among top-level figures: Lo Jung-huan, Director of the General Political Department, Kan Szu-chi, a deputy director of that department, and Chou Pao-chung, a longtime general officer whose post was not known. There was only one unexplained disappearance: of a deputy commander of the CCAF.

Increased Dissidence in the PLA, 1965

It was apparent in early 1965 that the party's and the PLA's leaders had found renewed opposition in the officer corps to the emphasis on "politics" in the PLA and to all of the expressions of this--most importantly, the increasing authority given to political officers, the amount of time assigned to political indoctrination, and the concept of "men over weapons" and the related doctrine of "people's war." In this connection, Peking now says that Lo in 1965 stated openly his opposition--expressed indirectly in 1964--to the concept of "politics to the fore" and emphasized the importance of military training in fundamentals--which had been the implicit point of the "weapons competition" in 1964.

There was obvious concern in Peking in the early months of 1965 over the rapid escalation of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam, in particular the U.S. decision to initiate large-scale regular bombing of North Vietnam; this was a refusal to play according to Mao's book, which envisaged the sanctuary of revolutionary bases, and it made possible the extension of the war to China. There is some evidence that the top Chinese leaders reacted

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differently in evaluating the threat of war posed by this escalation and thus in judging the line to be taken on "class struggle" in the face of a possible war; but only Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping--none of the military leaders--have been specified as opposed to carrying on a "class struggle" at the time.

Some observers have surmised that in 1965 the PLA's leaders were divided between a dominant "political" group (led by Lin) which favored "people's war" and the "professional" group (presumably with Lo as its spokesman) which wanted to rely on positional warfare and contended that the PLA should be freed from political indoctrination in order to prepare. This surmise seems, however, to misstate a bit the central military issue, which was probably that of military-preparedness for all aspects of conventional warfare, particularly in the light of the risk of U.S. air attack (almost certainly the thing Peking feared most). The central political question would have been that of the degree of risk of U.S. air attack to accept, and related to this, as in 1959, would have been the question of improving relations with the USSR in order to have the benefit of the Soviet deterrent. There is evidence that Lo did indeed stand in opposition to Mao and Lin on the question of how best to prepare for war, but not on the matter of acceptable risk; in his statements of the period--e.g. in May 1965--he stated his favor for the same degree of risk accepted by the dominant figures, i.e. the moderate degree entailed in keeping the Vietnamese Communists fighting rather than negotiating, while keeping the Chinese overtly out of it.

In May 1965 Mao and Lin responded in a typical way to the opposition to "politics" in the PLA--that is, by increasing the political element at the expense of the professional. They abolished military ranks, and told officers to take the lead in the creative application of Mao's thought.

In August 1965, a few weeks before the party meeting which was to launch the "cultural revolution," Ho Lung summed up those issues in the PLA which Peking was willing (although only by implication) to admit. The common feature of the opponents of Mao's line on "army building," Ho said, was "bourgeois thinking," expressed as opposition to the principle of "absolute leadership" by the party over the army, resistance to "democracy" and the "mass line," including opposition to the "strengthening of political and ideological education," resentment of "supervision" by lower (as well as higher) levels,

opposition to the party committee system, strong favor for "only those commanders and technical experts who had undergone strict professional training," and rejection of the man-over-weapons dogma.

In 1965 also there were only a few visible changes in the Chinese military leadership. There were three additional deaths: Ko Ching-shih, first political officer of the Nanking headquarters as well as first secretary of the party's East China Bureau; Liu Ya-lou, commander of the Air Force; and Lai Chuan-chu, second political officer (under Sung Jen-chiang) in the Mukden headquarters. There was no unexplained disappearance until late November, when there was a spectacular one--the disappearance of Lo Jui-ching, secretary of the party secretariat, secretary-general of the MAC, and the PLA's chief-of-staff, second only to Lin Piao among Chinese military leaders.

The Fall of Lo Jui-ching and Yang Shang-kun, Late 1965

Peking has long maintained that Mao launched the "cultural revolution" at a central committee meeting in September 1965 in which he stated that it had become necessary to "criticize bourgeois reactionary thinking." Red Guard posters have more recently asserted that in this meeting Mao criticized Wu Han--the playwright who was to serve as a symbol of all opposition to Mao's thought and policies--and called for an "investigation." They have also asserted that some resistance to Mao--described as "revisionism"--appeared at that meeting and in the following month, partly in terms of questioning the advisability of carrying out a harsh internal program at a time of increased external danger (Mao himself apparently felt secure against this threat). There is some evidence that Lo Jui-ching was among those resisting: in Lo's case, resisting the implications of the "cultural revolution" for the armed forces, primarily the disruption of the PLA's work, the further emphasis on political "struggle" at the expense of military preparedness as a military professional would see it. However, Lo remained publicly active for two more months.

On 10 November 1965 a Shanghai newspaper opened the "revolution" with an article--planted by Mao--attacking one of Wu Han's plays. Just five days later, Lin Piao issued a five-point directive on the work of the PLA for 1966, the principal point of which was that the test of the loyalty and competence of PLA cadres was to

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be whether they regarded Mao's works as the "highest instructions" with regard to "all aspects of the work of our entire army." The other four points called for persistence in the "four firsts"--the four political imperatives stated in October 1960--and for leading cadres to provide energetic leadership to the work (mainly political work) of basic units, for the promotion of good (young) officers and men to key posts, and for hard training in close-range combat and night fighting (part of the "people's war" doctrine). In broadcasting the directive, Peking radio went on to state that at the forthcoming all-PLA political work conference, "great emphasis" was to put on the role of politics in the work of the PLA, and it quoted Lin to the effect that Mao's thought "always puts politics in first place and puts military affairs under the guidance and command of politics," and that Mao's thought was itself the "best weapon."

On 28 November, Lo Jui-ching dropped out of sight in Shanghai, to reappear only in January 1967 in the hands of the Red Guards. Lo went to Shanghai with a foreign delegation; he may have been given this errand by Mao or Lin in order to be separated from his Peking assets and thus set up for an easy arrest. Yang Shang-kun, head of the general (administrative) office of the central committee and Lo's associate on the secretariat, disappeared at the same time and reappeared in the same circumstances.

Red Guard posters and papers in 1967 have provided lavish detail on the crimes of Lo Jui-ching. If the posters are to be believed, Lo began conspiring against Mao in 1949; as early as 1958, he rejected Mao's sense of the need for "class struggle", and later denied the existence of "class struggle" in the PLA; after 1958, as chief-of-staff (from 1959), as secretary-general of MAC (from 1960 or earlier), and as a party secretary (from 1962), he failed to implement honestly the directives of Mao and the central committee (specifically, he withheld one on the militia), prevented others from making reports to and seeking guidance from Lin Piao and other officers of MAC, and acted as a dictator in the daily work of MAC; from 1960, he failed to carry out Mao's directives on transferring some PLA divisions for use as the core of local armed forces in East China opposite Taiwan, and at some time in that period he instructed those East China forces to attack enemy naval units on their own initiative and took other "reckless action" of this kind; from about the same time, he favored an improvement of relations with the USSR in the interest of getting modern weapons, and, specifically, failed to accept portions of Peking's case

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in the Sino-Soviet border dispute; beginning about 1963, he tried to take over Nieh Jung-chen's Scientific & Technological Commission and to gain control of national defense industry (from Su Yu, apparently), in order to concentrate on the immediate production of standard materiel, while "borrowing from abroad" the modern weapons that Chinese long-range research and development was then working toward; from 1964, he expressed a "purely military viewpoint," opposed political leadership of military affairs and opposed the emphasis on political work in the PLA, and consistently called for an emphasis on "military matters and techniques" and on training in military fundamentals; from about the same time, he opposed Lin Piao's insistence on the primacy of Mao's thought (and in fact derided Mao's works), conspired with a number of other military leaders and planted counter-revolutionaries in key positions in order to "usurp military leadership," tried similarly to enlarge his own authority on the grounds of Lin's ill health, and held that Lin should step aside in favor of a man of "greater ability" (presumably himself); and finally, after his arrest, he "rebelled" against the party by trying to kill himself.

Obviously not all of these charges are true (or he could not have lasted as long as he did), but, as previously suggested, there is some reason to believe some of them, or some part of some of them. It is credible, in the first place, that Lo opposed the long-standing degree of emphasis on political work in the PLA and the Maoist dogmas expressed as military doctrine, resisted Mao's plans for a disruptive "cultural revolution" in the PLA, and resisted Lin's directive for an even greater emphasis on political work in the PLA. 25X1

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The party also implied the same thing in the PLA newspaper's account, on 1 August 1966, of a "big struggle...not very long ago" against those who had "covertly opposed Comrade Lin Piao's directives" and in practice had "given first consideration to military matters and techniques and specialized work" (a formulation almost identical to that used in the 1967 posters setting forth Lo's crimes).

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It is also credible that Lo failed to implement some of Mao's directives in the way that Mao wanted them implemented, and that he acted too often (in Mao's later judgment) on his own initiative. This charge is similar to credible charges against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, who clearly did not act as Mao wanted them to act in 1966 on the question of condemning Wu Han's plays and who were later said to have failed for years to consult Mao sufficiently and thus to have taken some decisions out of his hands.

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Some of the other charges against Lo are not inherently incredible. He may indeed have been one of those who favored a compromise in the Sino-Soviet dispute--both in general, partly in the continuing interest of rapid modernization of the Chinese military establishment, and, again, in particular in the face of the apparently increased danger of war, and he may have argued in this connection that Chinese research and development ought to be reoriented (but not enough is known about the structural relationships among the organs concerned to judge whether he may have been trying to get actual control of R & D). Similarly, he may indeed have placed his favorites in key posts (as most other leaders did and do), and he may indeed have believed that he was better qualified than Lin Piao to lead the PLA. However, these charges, even if accepted as a total bag, do not add up to an active conspiracy against Mao and Lin of the sort implied in the Red Guard accounts--that is, a conspiracy to overthrow them.

Lo's co-conspirators, as given almost from the start, add up to a formidable group: Peng Chen (head of the Peking committee), Lu Ting-i (director of the propaganda department), and Yang Shang-kun (chief of the central committee's general office), the four bracketed together since early January 1967 as the most serious offenders, who "deserve death." Red Guard newspapers and posters soon supplied the names of Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Ho Lung, and a number of lesser figures, including some who like Lo were concerned with the operational command of the PLA, and a party police figure. The alleged conspiracy of Lo with most of the major figures is not credible, because they did not fall when he did--not until months, or in Ho's case a year, later. Moreover, the charges

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involving most of these major figures came at a time when Peking was saying just about anything that would serve to blot out those in disfavor.

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Nothing about Lo can be demonstrated beyond the fact that he was not regarded as sufficiently trustworthy, at the beginning of the "cultural revolution," to be left in operational control of troops that might have to be used. Nevertheless, as suggested above, some of the charges are credible, and the disappearance of Lo and Yang Shang-kun at the same time provides a little evidence for the view that Mao does really believe the conspiracy charge with respect to Lo and Yang. It is a striking fact that Yang disappeared from the news just one day after Lo did, in late November 1965 (both may have been seized in early December), and that no other party leaders fell for some months after that. In their common capacities as secretaries of the party secretariat, and in Lo's capacity as secretary-general of the central committee's Military Affairs committee and Yang's capacity as director of the central committee's general office, they probably did work closely together.

Another (although lesser) military leader who may have fallen at the same time as Lo and Yang is Hsiao Hsiang-jung, Lo's subordinate and Yang's opposite number in the Ministry of Defense who probably would have worked closely with both Lo and Yang. Director of the general (administrative) office of the Ministry since 1954 and for years before and after that time apparently close to Yeh Chien-ying, Hsiao was out of the news in 1966 and was displayed with Lo and Yang at a rally in the first week of January 1967. Posters subsequently linked Hsiao with both Lo and Ho Lung. Another who may have been seized about the same time, or a bit later, was Yang Shang-kuei, first secretary of the Kiangsi committee and a military figure as the political officer of that provincial military district; a Red Guard newspaper denouncing Yang in February 1967 revealed that Yang, out of the news since late December 1965, is the brother of Yang Shang-kun.

In some specifics, the poster charges against Yang Shang-kun go even farther than those against Lo. Yang is charged, for example, with having conducted espionage on behalf of the USSR, and, to this and other ends, having placed monitoring devices in Mao's apartment (where important meetings were sometimes held). While

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there is evidence that Yang was close enough to Mao to do this, there is of course no evidence beyond the poster assertions that he in fact did it, and these specifics seem doubtful. Moreover, it can be argued that Yang was simply, as has been said of Othello, a man "unfortunate in his interpersonal relationships"--he was one of the "young Bolsheviks" who studied in the USSR, he then spent years with Peng Te-huai, was then for years a protege of Liu Shao-chi's and was in recent years very close to Teng Hsiao-ping, all of these now in disgrace. But Yang was brought down months before Liu and Teng were in disgrace, and, moreover, had been so close to Mao in recent years (making trips around China with him) that it seems fair to conclude that Mao would not have purged him as he did except as a clear and present danger.

In sum, there are several credible charges against Lo Jui-ching, most of which can be summarized as resistance to the concept of "giving first place to politics" and resistance to the specific policies of political leaders; the most that can be said about the charge of conspiracy, however, is that Mao himself might believe it, at least in the sense that Lo and Yang were working together with the conscious aims of obstructing Mao's and Lin's policies and enlarging Lo's authority in the PLA. Peking has in fact recently bundled all of its charges against Lo into these two principal accusations. A Liberation Army Daily editorial of 20 May 1967 asserts that Lo "opposed Chairman Mao's military line and the instructions to give first place to politics and other instructions by Comrade Lin Piao," and worked in "collusion" with other disgraced leaders to carry out insidious activities to usurp military power..."

The Political Work Conference and Liang Pi-yeh, Early 1966

As promised in November 1965, the General Political Department in or about early January 1966 called a political work conference of representatives of all elements of the PLA, which--Peking said--"studied" the directives of the central committee and Chairman Mao on construction of the PLA and on political work in it, and also "studied" ways of implementing Lin Piao's "five principles" of November 1965 on "giving prominence to politics." Within a month of the conference, Lin found a high-ranking officer--in fact, a deputy director of the General Political Department itself--to make an example of, as a leader who did not understand the principle of "politics in first place" and therefore was unqualified to lead. This was Liang Pi-yeh.

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The participants were received by Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Peng Chen, each of whom except Chou was to be disgraced in the following year. Chou, Teng, and Peng gave "important reports" which were not published. Yeh Chien-ying of the MAC, Hsiao Hua, Director of the Political Department (who presided over the conference), and Yang Cheng-wu, the senior deputy chief-of-staff (believed to have been acting- chief-of-staff by this time), made speeches; only Hsiao's was made public (in summary). There may have been a speech by Liang Pi-yeh himself, as Peking speaks of "two documents presented by the General Political Department" but identifies only one, Hsiao's. Lo Jui-ching was not present, a good indication that he was arrested prior to January; in fact he missed an important military funeral in December.

The political work conference of course called upon the PLA to "continuously give prominence to politics and resolutely implement the five principles," and it reaffirmed that the organizational form of "giving prominence" was the "system of dual leadership by the military commands and local party committees..." (Organizationally, this is in fact a triple leadership--the military commander, the political officer, and the secretary of the party committee; but the political officer is normally the secretary, so it can be described as "dual." The political officer/ secretary normally has the greater power, this itself being an expression of "giving prominence to politics.")

Hsiao Hua in his speech explained that "putting politics first" was necessary because "class struggle" still existed in the PLA (something Lo was charged with denying). Indeed, Hsiao went on, "putting politics first" was the "supreme and most essential factor in our combat readiness" (because morale is the most important factor in fighting). Further, Hsiao said, there had been a dispute in the PLA about whether to put politics first, a dispute which itself reflected the fact of continued "class struggle" in the PLA.

In mid-February, Liang Pi-yeh, a onetime political officer with Lin Piao's 4th Field Army and who had served in Korea before becoming a deputy director of the Political Department under Hsiao Hua, suddenly dropped out of sight after making several appearances in the first half of February. He was not heard from again until he was denounced in wall-posters in early 1967; at the same time, a reported speech by Lin Piao on 10 August 1966 explained Liang's fall in terms of his resistance to the concept of "putting politics first."

Lin implied in his speech (as reported) that he himself had purged Liang. When he (Lin) had put forward during the winter the "five principles of putting politics first"--that is, the directive of 15 November 1965, previously summarized--Liang had resisted Lin's formulation. The account of Lin's speech does not make clear whether Liang argued the question with Lin at the time (probably not, since he lasted until February), or later changed the sense of Lin's directive in materials prepared by the General Political Department, or had taken a different line in a speech of his own (at the political work conference of January, or on some other occasion). But in any event, as Lin was said to have put it in his 10 August speech, Liang had held that politics should be "adapted to"--the sense is, better coordinated with--the "practical business of preparing for war." Thus Liang had failed the first test of the loyalty and competence of PLA cadres, as stated by Lin in November; he had opposed Mao's thought, which "always puts politics first." In other words, the Mao-Lin approach to military preparedness had proved too much even for this top-level political officer whose entire career was built on political work--as it had proved too much for Lo Jui-ching and was to prove too much for others. Posters later got around to charging Liang with conspiracy with both Lo and Ho Lung, but this was obviously an afterthought; Liang's fall came too long after Lo's, and too long before Ho's, for this charge to be credible. Lin's given reason, which is credible, was enough.

The So-Called 'Coup' of February 1966

Since January 1967, there have been frequent charges that a "coup" was attempted in Peking in February 1966, when Mao was absent from Peking. Although the waters have been badly muddied, the "coup" seems to relate entirely to some initiative--actual, planned, or suspected--on the part of Peng Chen, against which counter-action may have been taken by Mao or someone acting for Mao, possibly Lin Piao.

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Wall posters of January 1967 purported to give Lin Piao's account (apparently recent) of "coup" plotting by the four party leaders in the greatest degree of disgrace at the time Lin spoke--Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching, Lu Ting-i, and Yang Shang-kun. In the poster accounts, Lin did not specify the period of the plotting, but pointed to Peng Chen as the key figure, and appeared to include in his remarks the incident or aborted incident of February 1966.

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In late April 1967, according to wall-posters of early May, two of Mao's closest comrades commented on the February "coup." Chou En-lai reportedly said that, so far as he knew, there was not even a plot to carry out a coup in February 1966. Chou is said to have gone on to remark that, while suspicions were natural, the storing of food was a routine matter (Peking was still worried about possible expansion of the war). Kang Sheng, who himself had been the main source (among party leaders) of remarks encouraging a belief in such a plot, was reportedly more evasive. He distinguished the general question of Peng Chen's attempt to enlarge his powers from the specific question of a "February coup conspiracy,"

and reportedly said that Peng Chen's action in ordering two PLA regiments into two Peking universities in February 1966 were the apparent basis of the rumors, but he disclaimed full knowledge (it is not clear whether he meant of the rumors or of the plot).

There are some differences in the reported testimony of Lin, Chou and Kang on the question of plotting a "coup" in or for February 1966, and Kang may have been leaving himself room to return to this subject later. It may turn out that a group around Peng Chen was indeed plotting a coup (although the accounts to date have been either weakly or fantastically specified), but the three party leaders cited above appear to agree on one central point --that no "coup" was staged.

Some Preparations, Spring 1966

In the spring of 1966, the PLA took the public lead in the "cultural revolution" in China. At the same time, however, Mao and Lin made preparations to extend the "revolution" into the PLA itself, and to conduct a thorough-going purge of the PLA. Contrary to the popular belief, the conduct of the "revolution" and the purge in the PLA did not lag behind these developments in the party, but ran parallel with them, in the same time-periods. The differences lay in the intensity of the "revolution" and the scale of the purge--weaker and smaller in the PLA than in the party.

In February 1966, Madame Mao, who was to accumulate an impressive list of victims as the purge proceeded, had conducted a prolonged symposium on "cultural" work in the PLA. She then wrote a report in which--judging from subsequent developments--she concluded that the political condition of the PLA was not satisfactory. She included in this report a refutation of the thesis--attributed to the fallen Lo Jui-ching--that there was no "class struggle" in the PLA (and hence no need for a "cultural revolution" in it). This report was approved by Chen Po-ta and then by Lin Piao, in late March. At the end of March, Mao himself, who had been out of sight since late November, was again visibly in command

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In April and May 1966 the PLA, whatever its own political weaknesses, was well ahead of the party in

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stating Mao's positions and intentions. Back in November 1965 the Liberation Army Daily, had correctly denounced Lu Hsiang's play as a "poisonous weed" while most of the party press was calling for a "hundred flowers" debate on it. On 18 April, with the party press now in line on this issue, the PLA newspaper took the lead again, in a major editorial forecasting the direction of the next several months. It reviewed the "sharp class struggle on the cultural front," introduced the term "great...cultural revolution," reiterated that Mao's works were to be regarded as "supreme guidance," and called for a "new culture." The newspaper followed up on 4 May with an equally important editorial clearly forecasting a purge, and on 8 May with another calling expressly for it.

At the same time (7 May), Mao is said to have sent a letter to Lin Piao--not publicized until 1 August, Army Day--calling for the PLA to be turned into a "great school" which would serve as a model for all of China to become such a school. The PLA, while mastering and emphasizing its military tasks, was also to study politics and economics--specifically, it was to engage in agriculture, industry, and propaganda. (Other components of society were similarly to master their specialties and learn those of others.) When the letter was surfaced in August, it was used to beat those like Lo Jui-ching and Liang Pi-yeh charged with opposing Lin Piao's directives on putting politics first and with wishing to confine the PLA to the "single" task of training and fighting. Mao's letter was also to serve as a justification for much of the PLA's unconventional activity in the year ahead.

It may have been in about this period--although the appointments were not publicized for some weeks--that some PLA leaders were given key new posts in preparation for the PLA's role in the "cultural revolution" as a whole and for the workings of the "revolution" in the PLA itself. Liu Chih-chien, Hsiao Hua's most important deputy in the General Political Department after the fall of Liang Pi-yeh, and Hsieh Tang-chung, head of its cultural subdepartment, may have been named at once to the central committee's new Cultural Revolution Group, headed by Chen Po-ta and Madame Mao, which was formed in May to replace an analogous five-man committee headed by the disgraced Peng Chen. (The PLA's analogous group was not formed until the autumn.) Hsiao Wang-tung, a longtime political officer of Culture under Lu Ting-i for about a year, may have taken over in May as acting Minister to replace the disgraced Lu (linked with Peng Chen and other

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of Mao's opponents). And Yeh Chien-ying of the MAC may have been added at this time to the party secretariat (under Teng Hsiao-ping), which was to have a large role in the management of the first stages of the "revolution."

The "Failure" of the Work-Teams, Summer 1966

The main instrument of the "cultural revolution" in June and July of 1966 was the work-team. These small teams, deriving from the "socialist education" work-teams of 1964, were assigned and named by higher party committees, and sent down to investigate subordinate bodies and carry out the "revolution" in them. It is apparent from the testimony of Madame Mao that Mao himself approved the concept of the work-team, and there is evidence that Chen Po-ta--chief of the Cultural Revolution Group--did so too.

The PLA had a double role in this stage of the "cultural revolution." It supplied PLA officers and men for some of the work-teams which acted on non-military organizations, and it was itself the object of the activity of work-teams.

The PLA's role in the work-teams acting on non-military bodies was hardly mentioned by Peking in the summer of 1966. One poster has given a figure of 3,000 for the total number of PLA men taking part, but this seems low. There has been some effort in 1967 to present the PLA personnel as playing a heroic role--that is, as having been the most militant (therefore most correct) elements in the work-teams, and as having been kept down by the party figures who dominated the teams. Thus there has been speculation that Mao and Lin knew at the beginning of this stage of the "revolution" that they were going to use the work-team period to disgrace the leaders of the party apparatus--that is, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping--and that the role of the PLA personnel in the teams was to be precisely that of discrediting the teams, calling for a militant position in accordance with Mao's wishes (not then revealed) which would necessarily be moderated by the party personnel on the team, who were in retrospect to be found guilty of suppressing the revolution. This speculation may prove to be correct, but seems weakened both by the fact that work-teams operated concurrently in the PLA itself and by the fact that they were found insufficiently militant there too.

Peking has told us so little about the work-teams in the PLA--an embarrassing topic--that we do not know

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either their composition or the full range of their attention. That is, we do not know whether the teams were composed entirely of PLA personnel or included outsiders, and, whichever the case, what the mix was of military and political PLA personnel; and we do not know how far into the PLA the work-teams got. But the "military academies and schools" were clearly the main concerns of the teams, along with PLA "cultural" organizations, just as "cultural and educational" organizations were the main objects of the activity of teams working in non-military organizations.

In any event, the more interesting development, for the purposes of this paper, is the effort made by Mao and Lin to make the period of the work-teams in the PLA serve the purposes--developed later--of the purge of the PLA. This effort has focussed on Liu Chih-chien, the deputy director of the General Political Department and most active figure in the "revolution" in the PLA from June to November, who did not really fall out of favor until November 1966.

Red Guard posters and papers, quoting party and military leaders, have condemned Liu both for the PLA's participation in the work-teams acting on non-military organizations and for the activity of the work-teams in the PLA. As for the former, Liu is said to have "eagerly agreed"--as if he made the decision on his own--to the proposal of Liu and Teng for PLA representation on the work-teams, the subsequent conduct of which (in retrospect) "damaged the good name" of the PLA; and Liu is also condemned for supporting Liu and Teng in opposing the withdrawal of the work-teams when Chen Po-ta proposed this. This line has generally not seemed as profitable to the Red Guards, however, as the line--noted above--which presents the PLA participants as having been gloriously militant members of the teams.

In fact nobody at the leadership level was being gloriously militant in that period. It is obvious (as our earlier papers have argued) that Liu and Teng did not have a clear directive from Mao to make the work-teams support the "revolutionary" (the most militant) elements in the non-military organizations which the work-teams were acting in, and it seems just as clear that Hsiao Hua as director of the General Political Department did not have a clear directive--from Mao, Lin, or whomever--of this kind for the activity of the work-teams in the PLA. Whereas the insufficiently militant action of the work-teams in general served admirably to bring down Liu and

Teng, at the time, there was no parallel wish on Mao's part to bring down Lin Piao or Hsiao Hua, who could just as easily have been blamed for the similar behavior of the work-teams in the PLA. Nevertheless it later seemed desirable--when Red Guard posters raised this politically embarrassing question--to have a scapegoat for this admittedly insufficiently-militant period in the PLA's life, and, since Lin and Hsiao were not in disfavor and could not be used, Liu Chih-chien was selected.

Thus in 1967 the posters and papers have said that in the summer of 1966 Liu--allegedly acting in the absence of Lin and Hsiao, just as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping are said to have acted in the absence of Mao--did not want to pursue the class struggle in the PLA and issued a number of "incorrect" directives. He is said to have sent work-teams to "military schools and [civil] localities" where they acted to suppress the revolutionary movement, just as the work-teams directed by Liu and Teng in non-military organizations did this. The work-teams are said to have suppressed the masses in a "fascist" manner, prevented the schools and localities from exchanging experiences (in visits), and in general kept the "revolutionary fire" out of the schools; moreover, Liu personally condemned some right-thinking naval leaders who wanted more emphasis on Mao's thought, he personally prevented the revolutionary students from conducting propaganda in the "front lines" on the ground that they would interfere with the PLA's work, and, when Mao decided on the withdrawal of (all kinds of) work-teams, Liu made false reports, preserved the teams, and continued to suppress the revolution.

It is obvious that Liu Chih-chien is not guilty as charged for this period. Whereas Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were brought crashing down in early August for the general failure--as defined by Mao in late July--of the work-teams in June and July, Liu Chih-chien was in high favor at that time and for months thereafter.

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It was in this period of June and July 1966, [redacted] that Ho Lung--acting in Lin Piao's absence as the chief of the MAC--was

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acting or began to act in collusion with a number of other military leaders to oppose Lin Piao and to enlarge his (Ho's) own powers. The most important of the charges assert that Ho was supporting his own men against those in Lin's favor in the General Staff, the Air Force, and the Navy, and was scheming with certain leaders of the military regions. [redacted] it is possible that Mao and Lin believed that there was something to these charges at the time they were made

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Lin Piao's Outline of the Purge, August 1966

On 8 August 1966 the party central committee--then in plenum--issued a 16-point directive for the conduct of the "cultural revolution." The directive was mixed in character--allowing for periods of retreat--but was predominantly militant. It stated the party's aim of bringing down Mao's actual or putative opponents, called for them to be attacked with "daring" and without fear of "disorder," and forbade those attacked to offer resistance or to incite the attacking forces to fight among themselves. The directive informed the country that the revolutionary masses (primarily the Red Guards about to emerge) would be directed by new instruments, the central Cultural Revolution Group and its subordinate bodies.

The 8 August declaration was not very informative, however, as to how the "revolution" was to be carried out in the PLA. It said simply that both socialist education and the cultural revolution in the PLA were to be carried on in accordance with directives from the Military Affairs Committee and the General Political Department.

Lin Piao provided an analogous directive for the PLA in two interviews on 10 August [redacted]

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[redacted] These interviews were in amplification not only of the 8 August declaration, but also of Lin's five-point directive of November 1965 and the 1 August (1966) editorial of the Liberation Army Daily which took note of recent opposition to the Mao/Lin line on the primacy of politics and of impermissible concentration on "military matters."

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On 10 August, according to the poster account, an unknown person submitted a report to Lin--evidently on the progress of the "revolution" in some part of the PLA-- and asked for instructions. In two interviews, one in the presence of Liu Chih-chien and Yang Cheng-wu, the other in the presence of these two and Yeh Chien-ying, Hsiao Hua, Chen Hsi-lien (commander of artillery forces), and some lesser figures. For some reason not apparent, Lin did not assemble the MAC to hear his remarks, but instructed these officers--most or all of whom were members of MAC--to pass his remarks on to MAC and solicit comments.

Following the line which he took in his speech of the same week to the central committee plenum, Lin told these PLA leaders that all cadres would be judged on the basis of (a) whether they demonstrated their support of Mao or not, (b) whether they gave priority to politics or not, and (c) whether they had revolutionary enthusiasm or not. One who got these big things right although making mistakes on secondary matters (e.g. in his personal life) was to be preferred, Lin said, to one who was personally upright and pleasant but got the big things wrong; in this connection, "we do not want men of compromising nature."

Lin went over this ground three more times in these two interviews. From now on, he said, in terms similar to those he used in his speech to the plenum in describing the party leadership's policy toward all party cadres--the PLA's policy would be to dismiss anyone opposing Mao, regardless of his ability, and to dismiss anyone who failed to give priority to politics, regardless of his ability. (He may have included a point here on dismissing those who lack zeal, as he did in his party plenum speech, although the account does not report it.) In instructing his audience to report his remarks to MAC, he said it again: there are two lines, one upholding Mao, giving priority to politics and showing zeal, and the other of looking at things "entirely" from "military and technical" points of view. He reiterated this distinction in the second interview, and reiterated that the unfit--as so defined--must be dismissed.

In one of these interviews, Lin is reported (in the same poster account) to have said that he was calling the attention of Yang Cheng-wu (Lo Jui-ching's successor) to the question of policy toward cadres, and was asking Liu Chih-chien to have a "good talk" with "Comrade Li-ching" (almost certainly Hsu Li-ching, like Liu a deputy director of the General Political Department, and a one-time specialist in cadres work), because, Lin said, there

must be no more undesirable cadres in the PLA; further, Liu was entrusted with making the Liberation Army Daily a "good paper."

In sum, Lin in these interviews stated his intention to carry out a purge of the PLA, stated the principles which were to govern it, and gave the task primarily to the General Political Department under MAC supervision. The purge of the PLA was to be synchronized with the large-scale purge of the party and in accordance with the principles governing that purge, but differed in two important respects: whereas the purge of the party was to affect all party organizations and was to be carried out by extraordinary party bodies and extra-party bodies (the conventional party apparatus having been discredited), the purge of the PLA was apparently to hit the line organizations only lightly if at all and was to be carried out by the PLA's own instruments.

The PLA Above the Struggle, Early Autumn 1966

At the 18 August rally at which the Red Guards first appeared publicly, and again at the 31 August rally, Lin Piao made clear that the PLA would be standing behind these militant students who were being turned loose as quasi-military units against the party apparatus. It was just as clear, however, during the violence which exploded in Peking in other major cities in the last two weeks of August and continued at some points well into September, that the PLA had orders to stay out of it. While some of the general directives to the Red Guards were given by Lin at the two August rallies, their better-defined directives came from others, and the PLA did not physically support the most militant Red Guards in their "bombardments" of--including physical attacks on--party headquarters; in fact, PLA units were sometimes the objects of Red Guard attacks. (One of the subsequent poster charges against the commanding officers of the Peking headquarters was that they assigned troops in August and again in October to protect this military headquarters--as well as the new Peking committee of the party--against the "masses.") Posters later quoted Chou En-lai as saying that in the first stage of Red Guard activity, the PLA was indeed under orders not to interfere, as the "fronts were not clearly defined" and interference could have damaged the revolutionary masses--an admission that the PLA would in some places have intervened against the Red Guards.

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There was a temporary truce between the Red Guards and the party apparatus--which would mean also between the Mao/Lin team and the party apparatus--in September and October. This was in effect an admission, made explicitly by Chou En-lai in a speech in this period, that mistakes had been made, that the Red Guards must not struggle indiscriminately against the entire party apparatus, and so on. Mao and Lin themselves, at a work conference in this period (October) said that most of the party apparatus was good and would "pass the test." There were indications even then, however, of a difference between Mao and Lin on one hand and Chou En-lai and others on the other hand--namely, that Mao and Lin, despite their reassurances, intended to conduct the purge on a larger scale than Chou and others favored.

Meanwhile, the "cultural revolution" in the PLA was proceeding quietly--too quietly, too slowly, and in wrong directions, according to later charges against the much-abused Liu Chih-chien. There are virtually no materials dating from the period of August and September which illuminate what was actually going on in the PLA,

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Liu Chih-chien was later assigned the principal blame for the defects of the cultural revolution in the PLA in this period from mid-August to early October, as well as for the defects of June and July

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In the posters and speeches of January 1967 which criticized Liu's leadership in the period from June through October, he was charged (as previous noted) with having issued "several" incorrect directives, with having taken action against those who wanted more emphasis on Mao's thought, with having prevented the dissemination of revolutionary propaganda, and with having restricted revolutionary exchanges. There may be more justification in the charges against Liu in the later (August-October) period than in the earlier (June-July), in view of Lin Piao's fairly strong statements of early August about getting on with the purge in the PLA, but it is impossible to judge this without knowledge of the specific directives he was operating under. It can only be observed that Liu was neither the head of the MAC (Lin was), nor the MAC officer apparently charged by Lin Piao with supervising the purge (Yang Cheng-wu was), nor the head of the Political Department principally charged with carrying it out (Hsiao Hua was); nor, probably, did Liu have the power to issue on his own any important directives such as the one of 5 October. Moreover, if as will presently be argued Liu was named as head of the first PLA/CRG in early October, that almost certainly means that Mao and Lin were well pleased with him at that time. Thus Liu seems to serve largely as a

scapegoat for this August-October period, as later viewed and condemned by Mao and Lin.

The Fall of Liu Chih-chien, Late Autumn 1966

The 5 October "emergency" directive cited above--which was endorsed by the central committee on the same day and extended to apply to all middle-schools and universities--moved the revolution in the military academies and schools into a higher gear. There was a concurrent directive which Mao and Lin may have intended to serve as a "cultural revolution" directive for the PLA as a whole.

The 5 October directive noted that "some leading organs and some leading bodies" of the academies and schools over-emphasized the special status of these institutions. (The implication was, a special status as institutions too important to be disrupted; and Liu Chih-chien was later specified to have taken just this position.) The directive rebuked them for repressing the revolution and inciting struggle among revolutionary groups and against leftists, and called upon them to strike the shackles from the mass movement and carry out the revolution in the same way that non-military institutions were doing, i.e. by "blooming and contending," by big-character posters and big debate. (In other words, it radically changed the existing directive that the "revolution" in the academies and schools be conducted by the [conservative] methods used in line organizations; later in the text, it expressly withdrew this earlier directive.) The directive reversed the actions taken by the work-teams of June and July and by the party committees of August and September: it voided their charges against individuals and directed that these persons be publicly rehabilitated, and called for self-critical material to be returned to them and for criticism written by others to be destroyed; it called for putting "daring" to the fore and "dragging out" the handful of "bad elements" in the academies and schools; it called for examination of "leading cadres" on the basis of the three criteria stated by Lin Piao in August (supporting Mao, putting politics first, and showing zeal), meaning, presumably, that Mao and Lin wanted a more militant examination; it cancelled the earlier order for leadership to be provided by party committees, and specified that leadership would now be provided by cultural revolution teams like those that had been working outside the PLA for two months; and it provided for the exchange of visits and experience among

academies and the localities (although, as previously noted, it also stated that these academies and schools were not to interfere or intervene in the cultural revolution in non-military institutions).

The PLA almost certainly set up at this time--the time at which it transferred leadership from party committees to cultural revolution teams--a central PLA Cultural Revolution Group analogous to the central committee's CRG (responsible for the cultural revolution as a whole) under Chen Po-ta. This presumed PLA/CRG would have been an unpublicized forerunner of the PLA/CRG surfaced in January 1967 at the time of its reorganization. This first PLA/CRG--of October 1966--was probably put under the direction of Liu Chih-chien, who was concurrently the senior military figure on the central committee's Cultural Revolution Group; Liu has in fact been generally accepted as the first chief of the PLA/CRG, although this has not been directly confirmed by Peking.

Yeh Chien-ying, speaking as a vice-chairman of the MAC, discussed the 5 October directive in a speech to a rally of military academies and schools in Peking on the same day. He emphasized that Mao and his comrades wanted "revolutionized and militant youth," and that the PLA's leading organs must not "fear disorder." (These injunctions were taken to heart; subsequently, some of the most militant Red Guard organizations were those of the military schools, e.g. the Peking Aviation Institute.) In commenting on the "bad elements" to be brought down ("dragged out"), Yeh estimated them as three percent. In emphasizing the importance of examining cadres according to Lin's criteria, Yeh called for the removal (additionally) of those who were given to bourgeois amusements like hunting and card-playing (a notable example would be Ho Lung, brought down in December but largely on other grounds). Finally, Yeh made clear that PLA organizations were not to take part in the "revolution" in the "localities" (regions, provinces and municipalities), as the non-military Red Guards were charged with putting these areas through "the test"; the PLA's Red Guards could have "ties" with them but were not to take part in "bombardments" of party organizations and were to confine their activity to the PLA itself. This final provision of the directive, as interpreted by Yeh, did not stand up; it was not long before Red Guard organizations of the PLA were doing just these things which were forbidden them.

It is not known whether there was a concurrent directive on the conduct of the "cultural revolution" in the PLA as a whole--that is, for the examination of

all PLA cadres on the basis of the criteria stated by Lin Piao in August. There ought to have been something like that--not necessarily a consonant directive, because any such directive would probably have called for a much lower-key revolution in the PLA as a whole than in the schools, but some directive filling the obvious gap; and some of the remarks attributed to Liu Chih-chien and some of the later criticism of him by Madame Mao and others suggests that there was, but the Red Guard press and posters have provided no account of such a directive --covering the PLA as a whole--at that time or at any time up to late January 1967. 25X1

It may be, as posters were later to assert, that Liu never tried to implement the 5 October directive on the revolution in the schools, but tried instead to sabotage it, to keep the revolution in the schools in a low gear. (He may also have never tried to implement the concurrent directive on searching out Mao's and Lin's enemies.) If he did try honestly to implement it (or them), he failed. Either way, it was only a month or so before he was in trouble. He seems to have got in trouble in particular with Madame Mao, who was Chen Po-ta's first

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deputy in the central committee's CRG and also "cultural advisor" to the PLA, and thus in a position to collide with Liu frequently.

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According to the January posters, Liu opposed the spirit of the 5 October directive [redacted]

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and therefore failed to support the revolutionary left; indeed, they charge, by November he was actively suppressing the revolutionary left. One way in which he did this, they charge, was to see that the line taken in speeches given by top-ranking military leaders in November--the drafting of which he supervised--was one which "threw cold water" on the left. (It is not explained why these leaders delivered the speeches, unless this was in fact the approved line at the time.) In other charges which imply misconduct of the revolution in the PLA as a whole, Liu is said to have illegally appropriated the names of the Military Affairs Committee and the General Political Department (for his own policies), issued poor directives (both orally and in writing, it is implied), and "destroyed" the PLA/CRG (another indication that he headed it).

Madame Mao herself made some of these charges in her 10 January speech [redacted]. In this speech she implied strongly that she had been trying for some time to bring Liu down, saying that it had proved difficult because he--like herself--had been an officer of the central committee's CRG. The Madame went on to accuse Liu of "many plots," of inciting fights among Red Guards and blaming the central CRG for it, and, again with apparent reference to the PLA as a whole, of directing the struggle against "good comrades" in the PLA (a charge which could easily relate to the directive on searching out opponents of Mao and Lin), and of associations (not quite conspiracy, although this was later charged) with Peng Chen and Lo Jui-ching.

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There is one very curious charge against Liu, attributed to--of all people--Chou En-lai. This was in the context of an assertion by Chou--as reported in a poster--which may really be a garbled account of Chou's remarks on the 5 October directive--that the question of PLA intervention in the cultural revolution (the kind of

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[redacted]

armed intervention directed in late January) had come up as early as 4 November. The Military Affairs Committee, Chou reportedly said, decided against intervention at that time, in accordance with the wishes of Liu Chih-chien. Chou's remarks [redacted] were presumably a part of an effort, after intervention had been decided on, to explain why it had not happened earlier, when the need was perhaps just as great; and it may be that the question did come up in early November and that Liu was among those who opposed it; but it is absolutely inconceivable that Liu on his own could have prevented it, if Mao and Lin had wanted to do it.

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In any case, by late November Liu Chih-chien apparently saw the handwriting on the wall. [redacted]

[redacted]

Liu apparently was not removed from his posts until mid-December or even early January, the time of the fall of a number of other military leaders, but he seems to have known by late November that he was finished.

The Fall of Ho Lung and Others, December 1966

In the period between mid-December 1966 and the reorganization of the PLA/CRG in early January 1967, it was revealed that a good-sized group of military leaders had fallen from favor, although not necessarily at the same time. Of these, the most important was Ho Lung, for 40 years one of Chinese Communist movement's foremost military figures, in recent years a full member of the politburo and the second-ranking deputy chairman (after Lin Piao) of the MAC, in high favor with Mao as late as 31 August, and active until late December.

Later materials made clear that Ho [redacted]

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[redacted] was in disgrace by mid-December. On 18 December Madame Mao made clear in a speech [redacted] that Ho Lung had been found against--another case in which the first denunciation of

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a military leader in a leadership statement came from the Madame. In this 18 December speech, the Madame told the Red Guards to turn the screw on Ho's son--a leader of a Red Guard faction discredited by more militant factions--in order to get additional derogatory information about the father. She denounced at the same time Li Ching-chuan, an equally important figure (although not strictly as a military figure), also a politburo member, first secretary of the Southwest Bureau, and concurrently first political officer of the Chengtu military region.

On 1 January a Liberation Army Daily editorial implied again--as had Red Flag on 13 December--that some additional PLA leaders were going to be purged, and on 4 January or 5 January or both a Red Guard rally put on display a number of party and military leaders who had already been purged. The most important party figures were Peng Chen and Yang Shang-kun; the military leaders were Lo Jui-ching (linked with Yang), Hsiao Hsiang-jung (linked with both), and Liang Pi-yeh (a separate case).

A few days later, with the opening of heavy poster attacks on Ho Lung, Liu Chih-chien, and Liao Han-sheng (deputy minister of defense and political officer of the Peking military region), there was apparently intense questioning as to the status of other military leaders (some of them also under poster attack), as would be expected when so many with whom they had worked were now clearly or apparently in disgrace.

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Within two or three days, Red Guard posters and papers were providing the names of Ho Lung's "accomplices" in plotting against Lin Piao and those in Lin's favor.

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The various accounts were in disagreement as to when this plotting had taken place. Some asserted that Ho had been involved in the plot for a coup in February 1966. Another version alleged that Ho and Lo Jui-ching had planned to conduct military maneuvers and turn them into a coup at some time or other. Others linked Ho with a string of military and party leaders known to have fallen from favor--Lo, Yang Shang-kun, Hsiao Hsiang-jung, Liang Pi-ych, Peng Chen, and Liu Chih-chien--thus in effect providing a scenario in which plotting had continued over a prolonged period, with the survivors at each stage carrying on.

The most nearly authoritative account of the official position seemed to be that of a Red Guard newspaper of 13 January; this account appeared to come from insiders, because it gave the names of a number of military leaders not then known to be in disfavor who turned out to be. In this account, Ho was not charged with planning a "coup" but rather of using his position in the summer of 1966--when he was standing in for Lin Piao in the MAC--to oppose Lin Piao and to enlarge his own powers, a charge similar to one of those against Lo Jui-ching. In this account, Ho supported Wang Shung-jung and Lei Ying-fu (director and deputy director of operations for the general staff) against Yang Cheng-wu (acting chief-of-staff), supported Liu Chen and Cheng Chun (deputy commanders of the Air Force) against Wu Fa-hsien and Yu Li-chun (commander and political officer of the Air Force), supported Su Chen-hua (political officer of the Navy) against Wang Hung-kun (deputy commander), supported Liao Han-sheng of the Peking headquarters (who had just been attacked in posters) and Huang Hsin-ting and Kuo Lin-hsiang of the Chengtu (Southwest) headquarters, sent troops to the Southwest to suppress the "cultural revolution", and protected Li Ching-chuan there against the vengeance of the "revolutionary masses." Another poster of the time agreed on several of the names but was less authoritative, omitting some who were in disfavor and including one (Chin Chi-wei) who was not. Other posters added some names, including Hsu Kuang-ta, commander of the armored forces, and Chiu Hui-tso, director of rear services. Yet other posters accused Ho of offenses directly against Mao as well as Lin; Ho was accused of writing an article in February 1966 which on examination proved to be anti-Mao, and of describing Mao derisively as "Generalissimo Mao" and the "new Emperor."

The case of Ho Lung is similar to that of Lo Jui-ching. In Ho's case as in Lo's, all that can be demonstrated is that Ho was not regarded as sufficiently trustworthy

to be left in a key post. But in Ho's case as in Lo's, some of the charges are credible, or not incredible. To take the superficially smaller first, it is not hard to believe that the tough, irascible Ho did not give Madame Mao the deference she felt she deserved, or that he commented scornfully on the cult of Mao or on the value of Liu's confession." It is also possible to accept summer 1966 as a period for which Ho--in the hindsight of Mao and Lin--had to accept some part of the responsibility (like Liu and Teng of the party machine, and Liu Chih-chien of the General Propaganda Department)--that is, responsibility for "errors" in implementing the Mao-Lin line at that time. It is also possible to believe that Ho tried to protect some of his subordinates against attack and tried to protect some of the leaders of the Southwest (his onetime area) against the excesses of the Red Guards and against plans to purge them, just as Tao Chu did for leaders of the Central-South. It is also credible that Ho, like Lo, gave preference to his favorites. And in Ho's case there are both professional and personal relationships with disgraced leaders which could be and probably were used against him--e.g., longtime association with Peng Te-huai and others in the Northwest, and with Teng Hsiao-ping, Li Ching-chuan and others in the Southwest, and personal relationships with his own disgraced son, with Li Ching-chuan and his family, and with Liao Han-sheng (reportedly married to his niece). But these things do not add up to a confirmation of the charge that Ho and others were conspiring against Lin Piao, and in Ho's case as in Lo's it is necessary to look for some development external to the charges which would suggest at least that Mao and Lin believe that there is something in this particular charge.

In Lo's case, the external development was the sudden and simultaneous fall of Yang Shang-kun, months before any other leaders fell. There is the same kind of evidence in Ho's case--the apparently simultaneous fall of at least six others later alleged to be members of Ho's cabal. Li Ching-chuan, as noted, was denounced by the Madame on the same date (18 December), Liao Han-sheng disappeared from the news after 19 December, Su Chen-hua and Hsu Kuang-ta failed to make any appearances after late November, and Huang Hsin-ting and Kuo Lin-hsiang of the Chengtu headquarters (not regularly in the news) apparently fell at this time; a seventh, Yang Yung, commander of the Peking headquarters, also dropped from the news after 19 December, and was much later accused of being one of this cabal. The time of the fall of other alleged members of the cabal,

however, is not known. And a complicating factor, with respect to both groups, is that most of them were known or believed to be in trouble anyhow.

It may be useful to consider first those who apparently fell at the same time, as if Mao and his comrades in favor had finally decided, in or about early December, that they were indeed a group of conspirators. Li Ching-chuan had been a direct, longtime protege of Teng Hsiao-ping, and as such was expected to fall in any case. (Hsieh Fu-chih, still in high favor, was another such case, but reportedly turned on Teng in the summer of 1966 and saved himself; Li apparently declined to do this.) Li was obviously in disfavor also for the treatment accorded the Red Guards by organizations subordinate to the Southwest Bureau in the fall of 1966, was clearly marked as an object of the next wave of Red Guard attacks, and was pretty clearly marked for purging. Similarly, Liao Han-sheng was already in trouble; long associated with Peng Te-huai, he was both an in-law of Ho Lung's and a brother-in-law of Yang Shang-kun's (enough in itself to sink him, as the materials have shown that Chinese Communists like other Chinese take family relationships very seriously), and there is a credible charge that he helped to protect the Peking headquarters and the new Peking committee (the one which succeeded Peng Chen's group) against Red Guard attacks in the autumn of 1966. Similarly, the Navy man, Su Chen-hua, had been so closely associated with Teng Hsiao-ping that he was suspect in any case; and in fact a statement attributed to a military leader in favor (Hsu Hsiang-chien) denounced Su not for conspiracy with Ho but for being Teng's "nail" in the Navy. Hsu Kuang-ta had had some unfortunate associations (he had had a great deal to do with the Russians, and had been close to Peng Te-huai and other discredited leaders), and could have been found against on that basis. The two officers of the Chengtu headquarters, Huang and Kuo, were already in trouble, held responsible--like Li Ching-chuan--for resistance to the Red Guards there during the fall. Yang Yung was probably in some degree of trouble, like Liao, for the Peking headquarters' opposition to Red Guard groups.

The timing of the fall of the others alleged to be members of Ho's cabal is not known. The two deputy commanders of the Air Force, Liu Chen and Cheng Chun, had not made appearances for months; one of them (Liu) had already provided enough ammunition to bring him down, in an article of 1965 which gave high praise to Liu Shao-chi as a military leader (this may also explain the disappearance from the news after late November of another

military leader. Chang Ai-ping, who had written an even more fulsome piece on Liu in 1965), and either or both of the deputies may have run afoul of the two senior officers of the Air Force in 1965 in the maneuvering for position which probably followed the death of the commander, Liu Ya-lou. The two officers of the operations subdepartment of the general staff, Wang and Lei, had been out of the news for some months and had had past associations with a number of leaders in disfavor. (Some posters linked Wang and Lei with Lo Jui-ching rather than Ho, and at least one suggested that they had got into trouble at the time of the "February coup" by failing to act rapidly to bring in reliable troops; but both Wang and Lei appeared to be in good favor as late as August or September, so both of these charges seem weak.) Finally, Chiu Hui-tso, although in trouble for some weeks, was defended by party and military leaders in favor and thereafter appeared to be in good favor himself.

It can be argued that there was a single issue in December which precipitated a negative judgment on several members of this group, and that they are linked by their position on this issue rather than by bonds of collusion. It might be contended, for example, that the question of whether to send the PLA into action against Mao's opponents arose in late November or early December and that some members of this group--e.g. Ho Lung and the commanders of service headquarters and the operations chiefs--expressed their opposition, and that--after Mao and Lin had decided upon intervention--this made them (objectively) guilty of "collusion" with some of the regional leaders who were to be moved against. There is no good evidence, however, that Mao and Lin were discussing as early as late November the question of sending the PLA into action, and, as will be argued later, it is hard to believe that any significant number of military leaders would have opposed a step aimed at restoring order.

Another possibility, of course, is that some of them were simply framed by rivals, that there was no real basis for moving against them. Since this is an occupational hazard for Communist leaders, it may have happened in any number of cases in the purge; but evidence is lacking.

On balance, the roughly simultaneous fall of at least seven of this group--Ho Lung, Li Ching-chuan, Liao Han-sheng, Su Chen-hua, Hsu Kuang-ta, Huang Hsin-ting, and Kuo Lin-hsiang--suggests that Mao and Lin may really believe that some of them were in collusion against Lin, at least in the sense of working together to frustrate his policies. This opposition was not discovered in summer 1966, as Ho rode with Mao at the 31 August rally, and need not have existed--even undiscovered--as far back as summer 1966. The probability is that it shaped up later,

as each member of the group had more reason to oppose the disruptive and dangerous policies of the top leaders. 25X1

The Purge of the Regional and Provincial Commands, 1966

It was apparent in August 1966 that the political apparatus in the PLA's military regions and military districts, and in the armies disposed in these areas, would be hit at least moderately hard. Many of the ranking regional and provincial political officers were concurrently the first or second secretaries of the regional bureaus and provincial committees, and the 8 August declaration on the conduct of the "cultural revolution" incited the Red Guards against them. Moreover, the purge of both party and military leaders in Peking seemed certain to have consequences down the line, and the purge of the General Political Department and the PLA/CRG toward the end of 1966 could also be expected to have some consequences for military commanders and political officers outside Peking. Moreover, it was evident that the PLA might have to be sent into action in order to remove some of Mao's opponents at various points in China and to restore order in the wake of the "revolutionary rebels" sent into action into December. This raised another question, because some of the leaders of the military-political apparatus to be used against Mao's opponents were Mao's opponents. While it looked as though Peking could manage, sooner or later, to bring down any or all of these leaders of military regions and military districts if the armies in the field were reliable, it also seemed likely that

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Peking would have made the effort during 1966 to get either a fully reliable military commander or a fully reliable political officer in place in each regional headquarters and district headquarters before the need arose for the PLA to go into action, if for no other reason than in order to have in each headquarters its own man to whom to send the orders (when necessary) to dislodge and arrest the other, in order in turn to have reliable men in both posts at the time of crisis. (Where one man held both posts, arrangements would have to be made through deputies.) Although information was and still is far from complete and is lacking entirely with respect to the armies, it is sufficient to indicate that for all of these reasons --a purge of party secretaries, a purge of political officers, a purge of military commanders, and a desire to make replacements if possible by the end of the year-- Peking did indeed replace the leaders of the military regions and districts at an extraordinary rate in 1966. While it is still not known whether all of those regarded as unreliable were in fact dislodged by the end of 1966, it is evident that one important object of the purge was achieved: the PLA served Mao well in the critical period of January-March 1967.

Of the 24 key figures of the 13 military regions (12 military commanders and 12 political officers, rather than 13 of each, because in two regions one man occupied both posts); at least 10 were replaced in 1966, and an eleventh was soon to fall. Ten others appear--in the light of events in 1967--to have been in favor at the end of 1966, but some of them insecurely. The status of the other four was obscure.

Beginning with the Peking headquarters, Liao Han-sheng, the political officer, was removed in the latter half of December, and the military commander, Yang Yung, was soon to fall. There was no difficulty in seizing them.

Proceeding more-or-less clockwise, the military commander and concurrently political officer of the Inner Mongolia military region, Ulanfu (also first secretary), was probably removed from the troops (although not formally replaced) by the end of 1966; he was denounced in the fall and made no appearances after October. The commander of the Mukden headquarters, Chen Hsi-lien, once associated with Teng Hsiao-ping, was one of those whose status was in doubt; although not denounced, he made no appearance after October; the political officer, Sung Jen-chiung, seemed in good favor in late 1966, but, as a protege of Teng Hsiao-ping, not secure, and he was criticized in

posters in early 1967. The military commander of the Tsinan headquarters, Yang Te-chih, long with Lin Piao, was in favor; the political officer, Tan Chi-lung (also first secretary in Shantung), was denounced and disappeared in November and was probably dislodged at that time.

The status of both the military commander and the political officer of the Nanking headquarters was obscure, the commander, Hsu Shih-yu, had not appeared since November, and the political officer as of late 1966 was not known; there was a lot of trouble in the Nanking area early in 1967. The apparent commander of the Foochow headquarters, Han Hsien-chu, who once served with Lin Piao's forces, was in favor; the political officer, Yeh Fei (concurrently first secretary in Fukien), was reportedly removed around the end of the year.

Down in Canton, the military commander of that military region, Huang Yung-sheng, for many years with Lin Piao, was in favor; the political officer, Tao Chu, was taken into the top leadership in Peking in August, purged in December, and smoothly replaced in Canton. Up in the Wuhan military region, the military commander, Chen Tsai-tao, who had served with Lin Piao, was in favor; the probable political officer, Wang Jen-chung, was also purged in December (he had been closely associated with Tao), and he too was smoothly replaced.

In the Kunming headquarters, Chin Chi-wei once closely associated with Hsieh Fu-chih, apparently was in favor, although perhaps not securely, as Red Guard posters denounced him; the political officer, Yen Hung-yen (also first secretary in Yunnan), once close to Teng Hsiao-ping, was purged and replaced in November, and killed himself (or was killed by Red Guards) soon thereafter. In the nearby Chengtu headquarters, once the command of Teng Hsiao-ping, both the military commander, Huang Hsin-ting, and the political officer, Li Ching-chuan (also first secretary of the Southwest Bureau), as well as the deputy political officer, Kuo Lin-hsiang, were denounced in December and apparently dislodged almost at once, as Li was reportedly shame-paraded in January.

Up in the Lanchow headquarters, the military commander, Chang Ta-chih, apparently was in favor, although perhaps not securely, in view of denunciations of him in Red Guard posters; the political officer, Hsien Heng-han, was in favor (although the regional first secretary, Liu Lan-tao, a man close to Teng Hsiao-ping, was purged and

crucially used). In the Tihua (Sinkiang) headquarters, Wang En-mao, who was (and is) both the military commander and the political officer, apparently was in favor, although not securely, because he had a lot of trouble with the Red Guards and he may have been an instance of a local leader in a tricky area with whom Peking was willing to compromise--for the sake of order--until it was convenient to bring him down. Finally, in the Lhasa (Tibet) headquarters, Chang Kuo-hua, the military commander and also one of those who was hard hit by the Red Guards, apparently was in favor, in view of his subsequent assignment to an even more important post in Chengtu, but he did not seem entirely secure; the political officer of the Lhasa headquarters, Tan Kuan-san, was transferred to a meaningless job in Peking during 1966, unless the latter job is held by a man with an identical name.

There is less information on the leaders of military districts, in particular on the dates of changes, but there is enough for a picture to emerge. Of the 44 key figures of the 22 provinces subordinate to nine military regions (the military regions of Inner Mongolia, Szechuan, Sinkiang and Tibet have no subordinate military districts, but are self-contained, single-jurisdiction military regions), at least 14 were replaced in 1966 (most of them purged) only nine are known to have been in favor and in place, and the status of 21 was obscure. There is little doubt, however, that some of these 21 were replaced before or soon after the end of 1966, and that others will yet fall.

Of the military district headquarters subordinate to the Peking regional headquarters: in Hopci, the military commander, Mao Hui, was left in place, but the political officer, Liu Tzu-hou, was removed around the end of the year and put on display; while in Shensi, the military commander, Chen Chin-yu, may have been replaced in 1966 (he made no appearance after January 1966), and the political officer, first Tao Lu-chia and then Wei Heng, was apparently purged and replaced twice before the end of 1966.

As for the military districts subordinate to the Mukden headquarters: in Heilungkiang, the military commander, Wang Chia-tao, remained in place (and has been very active politically in 1967), while the political officer, Ouyang Chin, was apparently replaced by August; in Kirin, the fate of the military commander, Lo Kun-shan, is obscure (he has made no appearances since January 1966), while the political officer, Wu Te, was transferred to Peking

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in mid-1966 (not to be purged); and in Liaoning, the status of the military commander, Ho Ching-chi, is obscure (he has not appeared since October), while the political officer, Huang Hwo-ching, was replaced and probably purged, perhaps before the end of 1965.

In the single military district subordinate to the Tsinan headquarters, the Shantung military district (the only case in which a one-province military region also has a military district for the same area), the status of both the military commander and the political officer is obscure, as neither incumbent in 1966 was known, although Ho Chih-yuan may have been assigned in 1966 to replace the political officer.

Of the military districts subordinate to the Nanking headquarters: in Chekiang, the military commander, Chien Chun, has not appeared since October, while the political officer, probably Chiang Hua, was replaced in the fall of 1966; and in Kiangsu, the military commander, Chao Chun, may have been replaced late in 1966, and the political officer may likewise have been replaced (if he was still Chiang Wei-ching).

As for the military districts subordinate to the Foochow headquarters: in Fukien, the military commander, Chu Yao-hua, has not appeared since November, while the political officer, possibly Lu Sheng, may have been replaced in 1966; and in Kiangsi, the military commander, Wu Jui-shan, was left in place, while the political officer, Yang Shang-kuei (brother of the doomed "conspirator" Yang Shang-kun), was definitely purged during 1966.

Of the military districts subordinate to the Canton headquarters: in Kwangtung, the military commander, Liu Hsing-lung, was apparently replaced in 1966, while the political officer, Chen Te, remained in place, perhaps shakily; in Kwangsi, the military commander, Ou Chih-fu, has not appeared since October, while the political officer, if he was still Wei Kuo-ching, remained in place; and in Hunan, the military commander, Lung Shih-chin, has not appeared since October, while the political officer, assuming he was Chang Ping-hua, was denounced and replaced in the fall of 1966.

As for the military districts subordinate to the Wuhan headquarters: in Anhwei, the military commander, Liao Jung-piao, was apparently replaced sometime in 1966, while the political officer, Li Pao-hua, was denounced, purged, and replaced in the fall of 1966; in Honan, the

military commander, Chang Shu-chih, survived poster attacks and remained in place, while the political officer, if he was still Wu Chih-pu, may have been replaced in 1966; and in Hupei, the military commander, Han Tung-shen, was left in place and has been politically active in 1967, while the political officer, Chang Ti-hsueh, was denounced and probably replaced late in 1966.

Of the military districts subordinate to the Kunming headquarters: in Kweichow, the military commander, Ho Kuang-yu, and the political officer, Shih Hsin-an, were both confirmed in their posts, presumably one of the reasons Peking early in 1967 described Kweichow as a model province; but in Yunnan, the identity of military commander was uncertain, and the political officer, Chou Hsing, made no appearance after October and may have been purged.

Finally, of the four military districts subordinate to the Lanchow headquarters: in Kansu, neither the military commander nor the political officer was known as of 1966 (or is yet known); in Ninghsia, the same is true; in Shensi, neither the military commander, Hu Ping-yun, nor the probable political officer, Yuan Ko-fu, appeared after August; and in Tsinghai, the military commander, Liu Shien-chuan, was left in place (although his deputy has since been purged), while the political officer, first Yang Chih-lin and then perhaps Wang Chao, was denounced and replaced at least once and perhaps twice in 1966.

The Reorganization of the PLA/CRG, January 1967

On 10 January, speaking to the Red Guards, Madame Mao denounced Liu Chih-chien, believed to have been the first chief of the PLA's Cultural Revolution Group, and told the Guards that the PLA/CRG was about to be reorganized. The MAC decision was in fact approved by Mao and the central committee the next day, and announced on 12 January. The MAC document stated that the decision was taken in order to "strengthen the leadership over the great proletarian cultural revolution in the entire army," and that the new PLA/CRG would "carry out its work under the direct leadership" of the MAC and of the central (and superior) Cultural Revolution Group of the central committee.

The new chief of the PLA/CRG was to be Hsu Hsiang-chien, an independent (i.e., not closely associated with any particular party or military leader), a politburo

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member and perhaps already a vice-chairman of the MAC who had been criticized by the Red Guards in the days preceding his new appointment and had been defended by Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta and perhaps Madame Mao (reports differ), who had acted as "advisor" to the PLA/CRG at least since late November. The Madame was now to take the title formally, and--as events were to show--was to have more authority than Hsu himself had. Liu Chih-chien (on whom poster attacks had begun on 9 January) had been dropped entirely, and lost his post on the central CRG (which he had wished to resign) at the same time.

Hsu's deputies were to be (in apparent order of rank): Hsiao Hua, secretary-general of the MAC and director of the General Political Department; Yang Cheng-wu, acting chief-of-staff; Wang Hsin-ting, a deputy chief-of-staff, once connected with Teng Hsiao-ping; Hsu Li-ching, the other active officer (with Hsiao) of the general political department; Kuan Feng, a member of the central CRG and a writer for the PLA newspaper; Hsieh Tang-chung, director of the cultural subdepartment of the general political department, once associated with Tao Chu; and Li Man-tsun, director of the propaganda subdepartment of the general political department.

The other members of the group (without titles) were to be: Wang Hung-kun, senior deputy commander of the Navy, who had had an early association with Hsu Hsiang-chien and then Teng Hsiao-ping; Yu Li-chin, political officer of the Air Force, who had appeared (in party material) to be an able man; Liu Hua-ching, a little-known Navy officer; Tang Ping-chu, a former editor of the PLA newspaper who had taken over People's Daily, the party newspaper; Hu Chih, an editor of the PLA newspaper; Yeh Chun, an unknown who turned out to be Lin Piao's wife and thus probably the de facto second-ranking figure of the Group, behind Madame Mao

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[redacted] Wang Feng, another unknown who remains so; Ho Ku-yen, reported to be a military propagandist; and Chang Tao, another unknown.

The Liberation Army Daily on the same day (12 January) called for an attack on the "handful" of persons in the PLA who were taking the wrong road or the wrong line. On 13 January a Red Guard newspaper printed an authoritative list of military leaders who had fallen with Ho Lung, and on 14 January the PLA newspaper made clear that the purge of the PLA still had a long way to go. This editorial, insisting that the revolution in the PLA be carried out

thoroughly, spoke of the "circle upon circle of resistance" (mainly from the military equivalents or followers of discredited party leaders like Liu and Teng), and declared that the PLA must be manned by those "truly loyal" to Mao, Mao's thought, and Mao's line. Rejecting the argument that the PLA did not need such a revolution, it stated that the struggle between the two lines "not only exists, it is acute and complicated..." The editorial went on to call for an intensive and ambitious program in "all high-ranking leading organs, military colleges and schools, and cultural organizations" of the PLA ("daring to advance...and drag out one after another" those taking the wrong road or wrong line, "struggle against them, pull them down, and discredit them"), while calling only for a low-key program in the PLA's "armed units," a program featuring "correct education." In other words, Mao and Lin were willing at that time to accept a good deal of disruption at the upper levels of the PLA, but not of the military units which would do the actual fighting if the PLA were sent into action. It is not known whether this line was embodied in any directive prior to the appearance of the 28 January directive--which in fact changed the line, in the interest of reducing disruption in the high levels as well.

In a sensational development, within a few days of their appointment several members of the new PLA/CRG were being attacked by the Red Guards in posters and apparently in interviews with leaders of the central committee's CRG. Two of the deputies, Hsich Tang-chung and Kuan Feng, and four of the ordinary members--Wang Hung-kun, Tang Ping-chu, Hu Chih, and Ho Ku-yen, were denounced in this way. The initiators of the attacks were not known but the contents clearly disconcerted some of the leaders of the PLA/CRG and of the superior central CRG and put them on the defensive;

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There was some speculation at the time that the attacks were really aimed at Lin Piao--through the standard practice of following the thread from the lesser figures to the higher. Lin had been out of sight and may have been sick, and his name had curiously not appeared in the authoritative 14 January editorial. Lin's opponents--who may conceivably have included Madame Mao, as the following section will argue--may indeed have thought that this was a good time to start a process envisaged as ending with the fall of Lin. If so, however, the initiative failed.

These first attacks on members of the reorganized PLA/CRG made a disorderly episode, at the least; all of those attacked had surely been investigated and found virtuous before their appointment. And the attacks may have been, at most, the beginning of a campaign against some top-level military leaders. But the attacks did not serve to discredit either the new PLA/CRG or the central CRG as a body; both continued to function, although very little publicity was subsequently given the PLA/CRG.

The Teeter and Recovery of Hsiao Hua, January 1967

Hsiao Hua, director of the General Political Department, had come under poster attack in early January but had been given a vote of confidence on 12 January with his appointment as senior deputy chief of the reorganized PLA/CRG. Nevertheless, Hsiao apparently continued to be criticized by other leaders in favor for errors in the conduct of the "cultural revolution" in the PLA--as, indeed, he should have been, inasmuch as his subordinates, Liang Pi-yeh and Liu Chih-chien, had been not only criticized but purged for them. And he had apparently been invited to make a self-criticism.

Yang Yung, commander of the Peking military region and a key figure in the Chinese military leadership, apparently took the initiative in mid-January to make public the charges that were being made against Hsiao by other leaders. His eagerness seems explained by the probability that he was in trouble himself, and his calculation that he could deflect or reduce the charges against himself by inciting the Red Guards against Hsiao. (There seems to have been no position for which they were competing.) Yang had been out of the news for several weeks, having disappeared from it on the same day as Liao Han-sheng, his colleague in the Peking headquarters (Yang was the military


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commander, Liao the political officer); Liao had just been "exposed" as one of Ho Lung's co-conspirators, and it may be that Yang knew or thought himself vulnerable through his close association with Liao, as well as to the charge (made later) that he had worked with Liao to frustrate the Red Guards in the autumn. (The Red Guards later provided a long list of Yang's "crimes" over the course of many years, most of them incredible.)

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On the same day, and for two days thereafter, posters attacking Hsiao were observed on army trucks in Peking. Whether these were Red Guard trucks or trucks supplied for the occasion by Yang Yung is not clear, but it is apparent that the Red Guards were encouraged by the reported remarks of Yang, Chen, and the Madame, which were in fact quoted in the posters.

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some posters did name a successor for Hsiao (Kuan Feng of the CRG, who was himself soon attacked in posters but remained in favor).

Chou En-lai was chosen to repel the attack on Hsiao on 21 January, on which day PLA troops were also sent out to tear down the posters attacking Hsiao.

speaking to "cultural revolution" cadres of the PLA, Chou did not deny that Hsiao had been under criticism within the party, but said that this was an "internal question" which should not have been publicized. He further said that the criticism had been "distorted" in the posters. In particular, Chou said, it was "slanderous" to assert that Chen Po-ta had "slandered the PLA" in the way reported, as Chen understood Mao's thought too well to have done that. In other words, Hsiao had made errors which he would have to recognize and admit, and Chen (and the Madame) had been unwise to speak publicly about Hsiao's case, but both Chen and Hsiao (not to speak of the Madame) were good comrades who were still in favor with Mao and Lin. This seems to have been exactly the case.

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The luckless Yang Yung was broken on the next day. According to posters, Chen Po-ta and Hsu Hsiang-chien, chairmen of the CRG and PLA/CRG, on 22 January denounced Yang as being as bad as Peng Te-huai, and said further that "others in Yang's group should confess." Chen reportedly linked Yang with the earlier-discredited Liao Han-sheng, declaring that the question of the Peking headquarters which they had commanded was "extremely grave" and that power must be seized back from them; and further, that it had been intended (from what date is unclear) to decide Yang's fate later, but his attitude had been bad and the Red Guards could settle it themselves. Yang was reportedly paraded the same day.

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The most interesting feature of the affair was the apparent freedom with which Chen Po-ta and Madame Mao--as well as Yang Yung--discussed the case of Hsiao publicly (although they may have been cornered by the Red Guards on this). As previously suggested, the Madame may have wanted Hsiao's job. It is entertaining to speculate further that one or both, more likely the Madame, was engaged in an operation to bring Lin Piao down, and that Chou's defense of Hsiao was a way of telling Lin's enemies that they could not hunt any further down this path. In other words, Chou could have been saying that, whereas under the rules governing the purge of the party they were permitted to follow the thread from Wu Han to Teng To to Peng Chen to Teng Hsiao-ping to Liu Shao-chi, in this case the thread would lead from Liu Chih-chien to Hsiao Hua to Lin Piao, and they should recognize that there was nobody below Lin's level who was strong enough--not even Madame Mao--to bring Lin down. While it was and remains conceivable that the Madame would like to dislodge Lin, the evidence for this proposition in the Hsiao Hua case is very thin.

The Order to the PLA to Intervene, Late January 1967

In the first half of January, the "cultural revolution" was in high gear. Party leaders were being denounced and displayed, the purge of a large group of military leaders was revealed, the PLA/CRG was reorganized and told to move aggressively against resistance to Mao's thought and policy, and the "revolutionary rebels" (including the Red Guards, which retained their separate identity), were being urged to act on the December directives extending the "revolution" into the factories and the countryside. The "rebels" in Shanghai, who "seized power" in early January, were praised as examples for the entire country, and it was said that the revolutionary rebels nation-wide were about to launch their "general offensive."

There was, however, great disorder in this "January revolution." Much of this was probably caused by Mao's opponents still in place in the party apparatus outside Peking, at least in the sense of defending themselves against attack, one means being that of turning Peking's own directives on the "revolution" against it--disrupting production and stimulating clashes among elements of the population. But much of the widespread disorder was caused by the "rebels" themselves. Not only were they

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unable to cope with the disorders caused by other elements, but they contributed greatly to the disorder by attacking at random and by fighting among themselves.

It may be, as some observers have surmised, that Mao would have sent the PLA into action earlier than he did if he had been confident of the loyalty of the PLA, and that he had such confidence only after the purges of December and early January (and, some add, the easing of those purges in late January). The evidence indicates to this writer, however, that Mao's scenario called for the PLA to be used only as an absolutely last resort; surely it would have been much better in terms of Mao's doctrine if the "rebels" had managed to "seize power" without any assistance except that offered by the enlightened masses. Mao evidently was not persuaded that they would be unable to do this until after the middle of January. Whatever the case, it seems likely that Mao himself was concerned with the scale and potential of the disorders in China at the time, and that he was also given counsel--on the need to restore order--by Chou En-lai and his associates, who needed a greater degree of order if they were to operate the government, and by the military leaders still in favor, who had probably been unhappy about the role of the "rebels" from the start.

On 17 January, Madame Mao expressed for Mao the leadership's concern about "anarchy" among the rebels and about certain other of their failings. On 19 January, the Military Affairs Committee met, almost certainly to consider the question of armed intervention by the PLA. On the following day, despite Madame Mao's warning, a rebel corps reportedly invaded the State Council, and was arrested for it.

On the next day (21 January), according to posters, Mao told Lin Piao that the policy of non-intervention had proved to be a failure and that the PLA must now intervene. On 22 January, according to posters, Chou En-lai affirmed the need to send the PLA into action.

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On 23 January, the PLA was officially ordered into action by a joint directive of the central committee, State Council, Military Affairs Committee, and Cultural Revolution Group. The provisions of the directive soon appeared in a Red Guard newspaper and a number of posters.

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This directive opened by speaking of the "new stage" of the revolution--the "struggle for seizure of power"--and called upon the PLA to support the "proletarian revolutionaries" in this struggle. It cited Mao's "recent" statements that non-involvement was a false concept and that the "demands of all true revolutionaries for support and assistance from the PLA must be satisfied." The directive declared that "all past directives" which had kept the PLA out of action were now rescinded, that when "genuine" leftists asked for help the PLA must "send out troops" on their behalf, and that counter-revolutionary individuals and organizations must be "resolutely suppressed."

There was the obvious problem of how the "true" or genuine leftists were to be distinguished from the false. This in fact proved to be a very complex task for the PLA, in those cases--perhaps the majority--in which guidance was not provided. It was provided in some cases; for example, on the same day (23 January), according to later accounts from official sources, the PLA in Harbin came to the aid of the "true" rebels, surrounding and disarming the counter-revolutionaries; the latter were almost certainly identified for the PLA by the party leader in favor there, Pan Fu-sheng, whose list had presumably been approved by the party leaders in Peking. But this was a "model" province, and in many if not most places, it seems, the leaders in Peking and the PLA locally were not in happy possession either of a Pan Fu-sheng or of thorough knowledge of the local situation. Thus the PLA seems in fact to have been given a good deal of discretion in sorting out the good comrades from the rascals and the "true" rebels from the false, and--judging from the fact that only a few revolutionary committees have yet been approved by Peking--it seems to have had its troubles.

On 24 January, the Peking Radio, as might be expected, claimed the allegiance to Mao of "all" officers and men of the PLA, and on 25 January the Liberation Army Daily smoothly explained everything to the troops. The editorial, entitled "The Chinese PLA Firmly Backs the Proletarian Revolutionaries," presented the argument in terms of a struggle against the bad "handful" in the party, although much or most of the PLA's activity for some months was in fact to be directed against some of those calling themselves "rebels." It was stated that the proletariat was now struggling to "seize power," and that Chairman Mao had called upon the PLA to "firmly support and assist them," even where and when the (true) rebels were in a "minority temporarily."

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The 25 January editorial went on to dismiss the argument of "some people" that the policy of non-intervention should be continued; it pointed out that non-intervention (at this stage) would have the effect of assisting the opponents of the revolution. Some observers took this line as an admission that some of the leaders of the PLA itself opposed Mao's decision, and this may be true; posters denouncing Hsu Hsiang-chien, chief of the reorganized PLA/CRG, and Hsiao Hua, who had just been "cleared" by Chou, reportedly appeared on the day that the decision was announced and on the next day. But it seems doubtful that any substantial number of PLA leaders opposed the decision, and the attacks on Hsu and Hsiao seem more credibly explained on other grounds (Hsu was later criticized not for opposing the decision but for carrying it out all too aggressively, and Hsiao remained in favor). The PLA newspaper's assertion of opposition by "some people" would be expected in any case, as all important decisions are opposed by "some people," and the newspaper had asserted just 10 days earlier that there was a struggle between two lines in the PLA--a struggle which, in the dialectic, would of course be expressed in this instance. Moreover, no individual opponents of the decision were named, either at the time or subsequently, even in posters. Inasmuch as the principal mission of the PLA, under the new directives, was to be the restoration of order, it is hard to understand why any significant number of military leaders would have opposed it in principle: the hardest people to convince, of the need for such a directive, would seem to have been the extreme militants like Mao himself, those who all along had demonstrated a willingness to accept a large degree of "disorder" in the interest of a thorough revolution. If there was opposition, it seems more likely to have been expressed as dissatisfaction with the lack of clear guidance for the order's implementation.

Reassurances to the PLA, Late January-February 1967

The militant line on the conduct of the "cultural revolution" in the "leading organs" of the PLA--the line affirmed, or perhaps reaffirmed, in the editorials which followed the reorganization of the PLA/CRG in mid-January--was eased within a few days of the time of issuance (23 January) of the order to the PLA to intervene in support of the "true" leftists. Some observers have interpreted the MAC directive or directives of late January as halting the "revolution" in the PLA; while this is clearly not correct, it does appear that the late January line and

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the elaboration of it in mid-February substantially modified the conduct of it--at the higher levels of the PLA--as prescribed in mid-January.

In order to estimate the extent of the change, a brief recapitulation may be helpful. The work-teams of June and July had been found to be far too conservative. Lin Piao in August had supplied a more militant directive, but the purge of inadequate cadres was still to be carried out in only a portion of the PLA and by the PLA's existing instruments, as directed by the General Political Department; the task was given to party committees, which were told to carry out a program of what was still a fairly conservative nature, probably emphasizing "education" rather than "struggle." The 5 October directive had changed this with respect to military academies and schools, telling these institutions to pursue a more vigorous program employing the more disruptive methods already in use by non-military organizations (contending, posting, debating, exchanging experiences), and transferring leadership from party committees to special cultural revolution teams under a PLA/CRG; there may have been a concurrent directive for the conduct of the revolution in the PLA as a whole, under the direction of the PLA/CRG, but, if so, it surely called for less disruptive methods in the PLA as a whole than in the schools. In early January this PLA/CRG had been reorganized and put under the direct leadership of the MAC and the central CRG, and editorials which followed the event called for an intensive struggle in all high-level organs (under the slogans of "daring..., dragging out..., pulling down..., " and so on).

The new orders--changing the mid-January line--were embodied in a MAC directive of 28 January. This may have been preceded by a directive of 27 January--dealing with one part of the problem--which is worth a moment's diversion. It will be recalled that Liu Chih-chien had reportedly, in late November, expressed discouragement over the progress of the revolution in the 13 military regions, saying that fewer than half were really participating. The 27 January directive, as reported in posters later, was reportedly concerned entirely with this question; it reportedly placed the military regions on the [Sino-Soviet] "frontier" (at least three) on the alert against the "revisionist" military threat and stated that (in consequence of this concern) the "cultural revolution" could be postponed in some regions. This reported directive was later criticized in Red Guard posters as representing the personal initiative of Yeh Chien-ying rather than Mao's

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will, but in fact it is consistent with the 28 January directive as reported and with some remarks attributed to Chou En-lai a few days later. What is uncertain is whether there was in fact a separate 27 January directive; it is possible that the Red Guards whose posters reported it had simply got hold of one portion of the 28 January directive and misdated it by a day. In this connection, there would seem no great need for a separate directive on a matter essentially covered in a directive issued one day later.

No official text of the 28 January directive is available, but a purported reproduction in a Red Guard newspaper--confirmed in part by posters--is probably generally accurate. It was a MAC directive, endorsed and praised by Mao on 28 January and published (on Mao's order) the same day. Like the 23 January directive ordering the PLA into action, it spoke of the "new stage" in which intervention by the PLA was necessary, and gave directions appropriate (as it said) to this new stage. The first of its eight points reiterated the central point of the 23 January directive as to the need to support the "true proletarian revolutionaries" and to suppress the counter-revolutionaries, while the rest of its points concerned the conduct of the cultural revolution in the PLA.

The most important of these points provided: that the revolution would be conducted--meaning, perhaps, would continue to be conducted--by means of "big contending, big blooming, big-character posters, and big debates" (but not exchanges of experience) in "units of the armed forces where the great cultural revolution has been launched" (while evading the question of just where it had been launched and also failing to call explicitly for bad leaders to be brought down); that the revolution should be conducted by reason and not by force; and that those criticized should not be lightly classed with the enemy; that there were to be no arrests without orders, and no physical harassment (torture and parading; Westerners had observed officers forced to lie on the ground with their men's feet on their heads); that those who had gone to exchange experience should return to their units to handle their own struggles; that there were to be no more assaults on military "leadership" (later reported as "guidance") organs; that PLA organizations above division-level could carry out the revolution either at different times or by easy stages (either reading is possible, meaning 'as opportunity permits'); and that military formations of army level and below must undertake "positive education."

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There was reportedly an elaboration of this MAC directive in a central committee directive on 21 February. Again there is no official text, but again there is a detailed account, this one from posters. According to [redacted] these posters, which appears to give the provisions of both the 28 January directive and the 21 February elaboration, the main points of the two were: that military organizations above division-level should conduct the revolution by posters and debates, but in separate groups and at separate times, while lower-level units should conduct the revolution entirely through "regular education" and in particular should not take part in "exchanges of experience"; that "seizing of power from below" in "military guidance organs" (earlier reported as "leadership" organs) was absolutely forbidden (a provision presumably addressed to the "revolutionary rebel" groups known to exist in some of these organs); that there were to be no further "invasions" of these organs (there had reportedly been some more, since 28 January); that the cultural revolution in units of division-level and above was to be directed by party committees rather than cultural revolution teams, in the interest of maintaining a strict command system; and that PLA leaders who had made "mistakes" were not to be treated harshly and were not to be irresponsibly classified with the enemy.

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It is apparent that the two reported directives added up to a substantial modification of the line being expressed as late as 14 January--with its exhortations to have daring, drag out, pull down, and so on. Some observers concluded at the time that the PLA "agreed" to join the revolution--that is, consented to support the rebels in seizures of power, and to restore order generally--because these two directives promised that the purge of the PLA would be "called off." But they did not promise that. Where they differ from the 14 January line is that they are evasive or conciliatory on the question of pace at the higher levels, and more conservative with respect to the treatment of those criticized. This was a 'promise' which was not very hard to make, because Mao and his team had already conducted a large-scale purge of the PLA leadership, had already purged what was almost certainly the majority of those they intended to purge. (As it turned out, the purge of the PLA did continue, but at a much slower pace.) It can be argued that this modification represented a "price" for, or the "terms"

of, PLA assistance in the revolution outside the PLA; but, apart from the question of whether Mao and Lin would have to buy the obedience of a military leadership which they had already showed themselves capable of cruelly purging, it seems better to put the case in terms of reassurances rather than hard coin. On this reading, the military leaders, and in particular the military units which would have to do the actual fighting (if any), were being given public reassurances, in the interest of the smooth operation of the PLA in the months ahead--reassurances that the purge of the PLA would not be carried out to anything like the degree or in anything like the wild way that the purge of the party had been. The military leaders may additionally have got private reassurances that only a few PLA leaders were yet to fall. While it was possible (and may have been recognized by the military leaders as possible) that these reassurances--like the assurances given party leaders by Mao and Lin in the work-conference of October 1966--would prove to be worth nothing, the reassurances probably did help to make the PLA a reliable instrument in the "new stage" of the revolution.

The PLA Occupation of China, Late January - March 1967

Military commanders everywhere in China apparently responded loyally and swiftly to the 23 January directive ordering the PLA into action. Contrary to early reports in the Western press of defiance by various regional and provincial military leaders, there was not one known instance of such defiance. Within a few weeks, the PLA was in effective occupation of all or virtually all of China--that is, it had restored order sufficiently to be able to take further steps in those provinces and cities in which it knew what steps to take.

The paucity of effective resistance to this occupation--resistance in a plain military sense--was a striking feature of the early months of 1967. While it had been presumed all along that the PLA was the ultimate base of power in China--in other words, that political power in China would continue to rest on military force--it had also been presumed that some of those in disfavor, i.e., party-machine leaders (like Liu, Teng, and Peng), individual military leaders, and long-entrenched party secretaries in the provinces, would be able to make some part of the PLA responsive to them personally. Indeed, in the early months of 1967, when all three groups were under attack at the same time, some observers predicted

a PLA split down the middle and civil war, and most observers (including this one) expected that at least a few combinations of party and military leaders marked for purging would be able to offer effective, prolonged resistance, especially in some of the outlying areas like Szechuan; although further information may establish that this was indeed the case at this or that point, so far as we now know this did not happen anywhere. Similarly, while it may turn out that some of the apparently smooth operations (like the pacification of Sinkiang) represented compromises with local leaders (like Wang En-mao in Sinkiang), there is as yet no good evidence of this. In sum, the solidarity of the PLA as an operating instrument--despite the network of controls in it established by the old party machine, and despite the purge of a number of military leaders and the threat to a number of others--was truly an impressive thing.

According to official accounts of PLA operations in this period, the PLA did not have to do much fighting; the threat of force was usually enough. Its first task everywhere seems to have been to restore order sufficiently to permit it to play--or try to play--its predominantly political role, to this end occupying if necessary the headquarters of the local party committee. According to the scenario given for the few provinces where things went more-or-less smoothly, the PLA, once in visible command, then "analyzed the nature" of the party officials there and of the various "rebel" organizations; the next step was to consult the "good" cadres and the "true" leftists as to whether a complete "seizure of power" was necessary; if not, the PLA "helped" to reorganize the leadership to whatever degree was required; if, however, a full-scale "seizure" was judged necessary, the PLA "supported" the good cadres and true leftists in effecting this seizure--that is, it installed them in office, together with its own representatives, as a "three-way alliance," looking toward formation of a "revolutionary committee." In so doing, (still according to the official scenario), the PLA would do such things as preventing the bad cadres from staging a "sham" seizure, assuming control of "vital organs" like the public security bureau and propaganda media and legal organs, setting up patrols, and assigning armed guards to protect those cadres and "rebel" leaders in favor; after this, the PLA would sometimes have to repel propaganda assaults and physical attacks--including attacks on PLA installations--by false "rebel" groups, sometimes incited and organized by bad cadres; this repulsion of hostile actions would entail a propaganda offensive, "exposure of plots" (using Mao's thought), suppression of a "handful" of counter-revolutionaries

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and disbandment of their organizations, the holding of demonstrations and parades, protection of the "revolutionary committee" (if one had been formed), and even assistance to the rebels in carrying out their own "rectification" (mainly of trends toward "anarchism").

This account, however, is of the PLA's operations in those few provinces and municipalities in which the PLA's intervention proceeded smoothly enough to permit a "revolutionary committee" to be established which was in turn good enough to be recognized by Peking. It seems apparent, from the failure of Peking to recognize more than a handful of these committees, that in most cases the course of events was not so smooth.

There seem to have been two main factors in this. One was that in many if not most cases Peking itself did not know enough about the local situation to be able to give the PLA commander on the spot clear directives about whom to support, with respect both to party officials and to competing "revolutionary" organizations. Where that was the case, the PLA seems to have engaged in a holding action while it tried to sort things out. It seems apparent that the PLA had a terrible time trying to do this. Where it was on its own, it had little more to help it than the searchlight of Mao's "thought." In other words, just as the party press in early 1966 had been expected to denounce Wu Han's plays without a specific directive to do so, just as the work-teams of summer 1966 had been expected to support the most militant students without explicit orders to do so, just as the Red Guards in the autumn of 1966 had been expected to distinguish those party officials faithful to Mao's thought from those unfaithful without specific targetting by Peking, so now the PLA--as that component of Chinese society which had proved itself most faithful to Mao--seems to have been expected, in those cases in which guidance was not provided, to recognize and bring forward the other good servants. In some cases, probably, the PLA on the spot recognized its inability to do this, and in other cases it found this out only when Peking disapproved its selections. In yet other cases, the PLA on the spot and the leaders in Peking probably agreed on the lists but ran into such spirited opposition from those who had been excluded that they chose not to go ahead.

The other main factor seems to have been that what guidance there was--in leadership statements and the party press--was in apparent conflict with the general directive the PLA was operating under. That is, the 23 January directive

had ordered the PLA to support the "genuine" leftists and to suppress counter-revolutionaries. The PLA in the field had good reason to believe that those regarded as "genuine" leftists, at the time the order was issued, were the most militant of the "rebels"--those symbolized by the Red Guards of the 3rd Headquarters in Peking--and the kind of local party officials who would find favor with such elements. Yet the signals from Peking, after 23 January, were increasingly to the effect that the extreme militants were out of favor. And they were out of favor for a reason that must have appeared to the PLA leaders in the field as a very good reason--their inclination to "anarchy."

While the leaders in Peking were not yet ready to declare against disorder per se (as they were by June), the extreme militants among the Red Guards were criticized repeatedly in this period by officers of the Cultural Revolution Group and also by Mao (according to posters), and militant leaders were criticized--sometimes sharply--by name. Many of their organizations were suppressed or dissolved; e.g., the three Red Guard headquarters in Peking were merged in late February. They were ordered to keep out of the military establishment, were told that they could not "seize" ministries without permission from the central committee and could only "supervise" those seized, and were forbidden to seize power in the countryside. They were apparently put in the bottom layer of the "three-way alliances." Travel by the rebels to "exchange experience" was suspended, and students were ordered back to school.

In the same period, the strong defense of the PLA--in the party press--against any and all detractors was pretty clearly aimed mainly at the rebel extremists. A typical editorial (22 February) praised the work of Lin Piao, insisted that the rebels could not do without PLA support, demanded that all rebels in turn support the PLA, asserted that this was in fact a test of true revolutionaries, and declared that no one was allowed (under pretext of the cultural revolution) to incite the masses against the PLA.

The PLA seemed increasingly to take these developments as a mandate to find against, and to suppress, the

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most militant of the "rebel" groups. Although a complete picture of the relations between the PLA and the rebels throughout China is not available

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the PLA was acting so aggressively against the most militant rebels that Mao was concerned for the continued good health of the young "revolutionary successors."

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This is not to say that Mao in March withdrew his confidence from the PLA. On the contrary, he continued to provide it with expressions of confidence. In early March Peking called for PLA personnel to be represented in all units "seizing power" at the provincial level and below, and by the end of March the PLA was deeply involved in the civilian sector (including industry and agriculture). It was clearly replacing the shattered party apparatus as the main channel through which policy instructions were issued and the main instrument by which these instructions were supervised and enforced. In sum, the positions of Mao and Lin appeared to rest directly on the military leaders in Peking, in the regional headquarters and provincial districts, and in command of armies.

The "cultural revolution" in the PLA itself, which had been substantially modified at the higher levels of the PLA and kept in very low gear at the lower levels, continued to move slowly. In late February the Peking press appeared to be rejecting the notion--from what source was not clear--that revolution in the PLA itself should be speeded up, and it asserted that the revolution in the PLA was in fact "vigorously developing" in line with Mao's and Lin's instructions. The main visible evidence of this, however, was the continued appearance of poster attacks on PLA leaders.

Lin Piao himself was not attacked, but remained out of sight, and speculation continued that his status was declining. He may have been sick for a time, and he may even (as another military leader asserted) have been working out a theoretical rationale for the PLA's support of "power seizures," but there were probably not significant fluctuations in his status. Most of the PLA leaders attacked in posters in this period were people who had got into trouble in an earlier period, i.e. prior to the PLA's intervention in the revolution; these cases have already been reviewed. There were a few new names, however: Hsiao Ching-kuang, commander of the Navy (probably for his

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association with Su Chen-hua and for errors in conducting the revolution in the Navy); Li Tso-peng, Hsiao's deputy in both jobs (probably for the same reasons); Hsiao Ko, the PLA's onetime director of training (for alleged pro-Soviet feeling); and Yuan Tzu-chun, a deputy director of the General Political Department who had apparently been added to the PLA/CRG (probably criticized for bonds with Liu Chih-chien, who was said by posters to have been replaced by Kuan Feng). Most of these attacks appear to have been speculative investments which failed; that is, most of those first attacked in this period continued in favor. Hsu Hsiang-chien came under additional criticism in this period, and he too continued for a time in favor, being identified in late March as a deputy chairman of the MAC, perhaps only recently appointed; but within two weeks, when the line changed, Hsu was to be hit hard in posters.

The Leashing of the PLA, April 1967

A counter-current to the conservative movement of the period from late January to sometime in March, in which the PLA dominated developments and dealt harshly with the most militant and disorderly of the "rebels," became visible in March and was dominant by early April. Although Mao's opponents made no comeback, his most reliable ally, the PLA, was leashed again in April, and one of the PLA leaders concerned with directing its operations in the conservative period of February and March was set aside.

Tan Chen-lin, a vice-premier who for some years had been one of the party-machine group around Liu and Teng but had recently been defended by Chou En-lai and Madame Mao against poster attacks, had begun to be attacked again in the second week of March. These attacks were a new expression of the line of the most militant "rebel" forces, and raised the question of whether Mao meant to reverse the conservative current which was then dominant.

The Military Affairs Committee met in the latter half of March in a session or sessions described as agitated by one of the most militant of the Red Guard leaders--who may have known that the MAC was working out a new line governing the conduct of the PLA in the "cultural revolution." There was no public expression of this new line in March, but it was clearly visible in an unpublicized speech (received later) by Lin Piao on 30 March.

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Lin's speech, as credibly reported in posters, was of interest on several counts--e.g., his admission of substantial production losses and many deaths in the course of the revolution but his dismissal of this as necessary for the production of reliable "successors," his description of the party apparatus outside Peking as entirely "rotten" (the question being only that of degrees of rottenness), and his confirmation that his own health remained poor. But the speech was of greatest interest for its clear signal of a change in line for the PLA. Stating that the PLA was now in control of more than 7,000 party and government organs throughout China, Lin said that the conduct of the PLA in the present stage was of even greater importance than in the past struggle against Liu and T'eng. Citing the MAC's formulation of "ten points" (not made public until 6 April) to guide the PLA, Lin said that the most important of these were those restricting the PLA in its use of arms, physical force, and the power of arrest (the first, second and sixth of the points as published). Calling for the PLA to rely on the "left" and admitting that it was hard for the PLA to discover the difference between left and right, Lin emphasized that PLA units were not to take action on their own initiative but were to act only on orders from above--not from the party committees outside Peking (all "rotten") but, presumably, from superior echelons of the PLA and local bodies dominated by the PLA. This was the clearest possible indication that PLA units on the spot had made many "errors" in carrying out the directive of 23 January, as judged by Mao (if not Lin) in hindsight.

Just two days later, on 1 April, a central committee directive reportedly told party committees and the new revolutionary committees everywhere (including those in military regions and districts) not to classify "rebel" organizations as counter-revolutionary without the central committee's permission, and forbade arbitrary arrests and physical humiliation.

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the leaders of the militant Red Guard organizations at the college and university level --leaders criticized in February--returned to the lime-light, making important (and militant) statements.

On 6 April the Military Affairs Committee embodied all of this in a 10-point directive, endorsed, and ordered published, by Mao. Declaring that the work of the PLA in supporting the revolutionary leftists had been "examined"

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for several weeks and found uneven in quality, the directive imposed several specific restrictions on the PLA and added several inhibiting observations. The directive as reported in posters told the PLA not to fire on "rebel" groups but to confine itself to propaganda (it seems likely that the actual text did not impose an absolute prohibition but instead ordered the troops not to fire except as a last resort), not to make "mass arrests" (only of hard-case individuals), not to classify rebel organizations as "counter-revolutionary" unless and until authorized by the MAC, not to initiate investigations of or legal proceedings against the rebels (one version called for investigations to continue but to be reported to the CRG or PLA/CRG), and not to use force (including physical humiliation) to extract confessions or to punish. The directive as reported exhorted the PLA to remember class-standpoint (i.e. to recognize that the militants were on the right side), to recognize its main mission as propaganda, to ensure that only "politically reliable" PLA cadres dealt with the masses so as to preclude rightist cadres from suppressing leftist rebels (the directive cited a deputy commander of the Tsinghai military district as guilty of the kind of "brutal" suppression of rebel groups which was now prohibited), to remember that the PLA itself must "obey" and "learn from" the masses, and to correct all its earlier mistakes in accordance with the foregoing.

Lin Piao's speech of 30 March had taken away from the PLA most of the large degree of discretion it had enjoyed in dealing with disorderly elements and in sorting out local officials and competing revolutionary groups. And the spirit of the 6 April directive--and of editorials of 6 and 10 April calling on the PLA to be humble before the masses--was in sharp contrast to that of the 23 January directive. That is, whereas the intent and effect of the 23 January directive was that of restoring order, placing the party apparatus and the revolutionary rebels in subordinate positions in which they would obediently play their assigned roles, the 6 April directive placed the restrictions on the PLA rather than on the rebels, with the predictable consequence that the most militant rebels would assert themselves more aggressively than ever.

On the same day (6 April) that the new directive was issued, there appeared intensive poster attacks on Hsu Hsiang-chien and Yeh Chien-ying, who had been prominent in the MAC in the period following the 23 January directive and who had probably played large roles in directing the

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conduct of the PLA in that period. Both the timing and the content of these poster attacks suggested that Hsu and Yeh were to be held responsible for "errors" in implementing the line of that period--that is, were to be the scapegoats for the mistakes of Mao and Lin, as Liu Chih-chien had been but as Yang Cheng-wu and Hsiao Hua (both close to Lin Piao) had escaped being.

The poster charges against Hsu--made by the most militant of the Red Guards--emphasized that he had carried out the "Liu/Teng line" and had oppressed the revolutionary masses (e.g. with "rectification") and suppressed mass organizations. Secondary charges related to his conduct (as chief of the PLA/CRG since January) of the revolution in the PLA itself (he was held responsible for a 4 March directive on this matter which has not come to hand), his protection of discredited figures like Liu Chih-chien but at the same time his use of Liu as a scapegoat to save himself, his responsibility for specific bad situations (Szechuan, where serious fighting was reported, and Hupei and Wuhan), his effort to restrict the role of Madame Mao (his "advisor") in the work of the PLA/CRG, and his opposition to Lin Piao in a recent MAC meeting (possibly on the matter of the change of line). The poster charges against Yeh were similar although less emphatic, charging him with suppression of the revolutionary rebels, linking him with bad situations in several areas (Szechuan, Hupei, Tsinghai, Inner Mongolia), accusing him too of opposition to Lin in the MAC and to the Madame, and asserting that he had protected Madame Liu Shao-chi.

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on 16 April, posters reported that Madame Mao (de facto chief of the PLA/CRG) had dismissed Hsu and had said that the group (and/or revolution in the PLA) would be run by Hsiao, Hsieh, and Yang Cheng-wu.

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On 20 April, with the inauguration of the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee, the Chinese leaders appeared to be saying that they would proclaim further

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"seizures of power" only when revolutionary committees of this type had been put together--meaning that most of China would remain under the control of the PLA indefinitely. On this same occasion, Madame Mao tried to put the best face on the differences between the MAC directive of 28 January (a directive conciliatory to the PLA) and the directive of 6 April (hard on the PLA), asserting that they had the same spirit. They did not, but the Madame was making or trying to make an important point: that MAO wanted it both ways, that he hoped and believed that both the Red Guards and the PLA would reward his confidence by correcting their errors (through their respective "rectification" programs) and meeting in cooperation on a middle ground. 25X1

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Criticism of the rebels continued. In fact, Kuai Ta-fu himself (the worst of all militants) publicly condemned "anarchy" in mass organizations. In the same week, officers of the central Cultural Revolution Group (including Madame Mao) met with rebel groups and told them again to stop fighting among themselves, and editorials of the week again defended the PLA. But the thrust of developments in the first three weeks of April was clear: the PLA's control of events in China had been severely qualified by the directives it was now operating under, and the PLA had been placed on the defensive.

On 23 April, posters reported the recent promotion of four members of MAC to posts as vice-chairmen: Hsiao Hua, Hsieh Fu-chih, Yang Cheng-wu, and Su Yu. (Red Guard materials had indicated that Su, the onetime chief-of-staff, in recent years had been concerned with national defense industries, and a reported speech by Chou En-lai on 30 April also connected Su--along with Hsiao and Wang Shu-sheng--with these.) At the same time, the MAC apparently quietly dropped Hsu Hsiang-chien as a vice-chairman; neither Hsu nor Yeh Chien-ying (who had been criticized in posters along with Hsu) was denounced as a conspirator, or disgraced, and both were identified as politburo members on May Day; but Hsu at least was evidently set aside as a military leader. The status of Yeh--and of Nieh Jung-chen and Liu Po-cheng, carried also as vice-chairmen--

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was not made clear. At the end of April, the only top-level military leaders still clearly in favor, in addition to Lin Biao, were the four new vice-chairmen of MAC: Hsiao, Hsieh, Yang, and Su.



The most interesting question at this time was that of the initiative for the radical change in the emphasis, during April, in the line governing relations between the PLA and the "masses." Only three leaders--Mao, Lin, and Chou--were believed capable of taking the initiative on a matter of this importance. It seems probable that the initiative was not Lin's, as he had been made to look foolish (the fate of all of Mao's lieutenants), no matter what other military leaders had been made to take the fall. It also seems probable that the initiative was not Chou's, as he had shown a much greater concern for order than had either Mao or Lin. That leaves Mao, who seems again to have declared his favor--as on several occasions in 1966--for the most militant elements of the "masses," accepting (at least for a time) whatever degree of disorder might ensue.

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Disorder Again, May-June 1967

At the May Day rally, Mao and Lin put on display their first team, which has taken the field on several occasions since: the core of the politburo, Mao, Lin, Chou, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, and Li Fu-chun; the top-level military leaders (in addition to Lin), Hsieh Fu-chih, Hsiao Hua, Yang Cheng-wu, and Su Yu; and five leaders of the central CRG and PLA/CRG, Madame Mao, Wang Li, Kuan Feng, Chi Pen-yu, and Madame Lin.

This small, mismatched group was presiding over what appeared to be a deteriorating situation, in part the result of the 6 April directive placing crippling restrictions on the PLA and thus in effect inciting the Red Guards to make trouble. Hsieh Fu-chih, who had assumed office on 20 April as head of the new Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee, is said to have described the situation in Peking itself as poor, because the leftist rebels were again splitting up and fighting among themselves; he is said to have specified that serious fighting was going on in schools, factories and "various organs." At the same time, there were reports of serious clashes in recent weeks in at least nine provinces; these were said to be especially severe in Szechuan, where troops of the Chengtu headquarters were reportedly embroiled with militants representing the 3rd Red Guard headquarters in Peking.

Some observers expressed the belief at the time that most of these clashes--what Peking itself called "unprincipled civil war"--represented fighting among Red Guard organizations over their shares of the spoils, their strength in the new structure of power which was being or was to be built. Even this issue--representation in the structure of power--would carry the Red Guards into conflict on some occasions with other elements in the structure, i.e. the party cadres in favor and the PLA. In addition, there was fighting between groups of workers, although probably not on the same scale. Beyond this, however, much of the fighting (some observers thought most of it) represented "principled" struggle, with a pattern apparently emerging in which fighting Red Guards tended to divide between relatively conservative elements aligned with and defending the local authorities--predominantly military leaders--and extremely militant elements, apparently directed by Red Guards from Peking of the 3rd Headquarters type--who were attacking the local (generally military) authorities and the local workers

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and relatively conservative Red Guards who were aligned with them. (There is no doubt that some of the attacks by the militants included physical assaults on government and PLA personnel and on government organs and PLA installations.) This situation has apparently been confirmed in some instances, and some observers (analysts of OCI, who have done more [redacted] than [redacted] have others) believed that this situation was general, throughout China, and that it was the aim of the most militant of the Red Guards to discredit the PLA as a whole by forcing it to take actions which were forbidden it in the 6 April directive. While this writer lacks the kind of knowledge of local situations which would permit a judgment as to a general pattern, it seems equally possible that the pattern was not and is not general but was and is confined to a few provinces, a selective operation in which the leaders in Peking have been keeping pressure on some local leaders whom they do not entirely trust but feel obliged to work with for a time. It is apparent that Peking has been keeping both forces--attackers and defenders--in the field, and these forces both seem to represent aspects of Mao's "thought." (It is very doubtful that anyone but Mao would have conducted the operation in this way.) In any case, those observers at the time (May) were surely right who concluded that the disorders could not begin to be controlled unless and until the PLA was given a fresh mandate.

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Mao was not ready to reverse himself, however. According to later posters, Mao on 7 May directed Lin Piao to give PLA units up to two weeks of "rectification" training. In other words, his immediate concern was still more with correcting the faults of the PLA in dealing with the rebels than with the troubles caused by the rebels themselves. As previously noted, Mao wanted it both ways--wanted the rebels too to carry out a "rectification"; but the directives under which the PLA was operating were not such as to give the rebels any incentive to correct their faults, or to encourage the PLA to help them to correct them.

The line began to shift a bit in the 12 May editorials of People's Daily and Red Flag, but the PLA was still put on the defensive. People's Daily praised the PLA and asked the masses to recognize that its "general orientation is correct," but the PLA was nevertheless enjoined to "sincerely learn" from and "humbly listen" to the masses, in order to learn to recognize the leftist forces

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they were supposed to be supporting; this editorial was especially interesting for its confirmation that the 6 April directive was being "used to undermine"--that is, was being interpreted correctly as being in conflict with the directives of late January which had given the PLA the dominant role. Similarly, Red Flag gave a list of arguments (undoubtedly used by some PLA and government leaders) in support of the case for strong measures to restore order--that the "revolutionary masses are disobedient," that "the left has also committed errors," that "revolutionary mass organizations are not pure," that "organizations of various factions" (not only the militants) have their strong points, that revolutionaries are not concerned with production, that the situation is "confused"--but it also rejected each of these arguments; this editorial took note that the PLA had sometimes supported the wrong groups, and went on to imply that the PLA could hardly go wrong if it supported the most militant.

Sometime prior to 14 May, however, Madame Mao, who was probably as good a friend as the Red Guards had but had been telling them for weeks to shape up, went so far as to say that Red Guard leaders (those ordering attacks on other Red Guard groups and on government and military organs) were "not necessarily following the central committee's instructions." (That "necessarily," seems to suggest a distinction between "principled" and "unprincipled" struggles.) And on 14 May, the same day on which Red Guards reportedly invaded the Foreign Ministry and destroyed documents and beat up some Foreign Ministry officials and PLA personnel they found in their way, the Peking revolutionary committee served notice that it had had enough. It issued a stiff six-point notice, obviously addressed to the most militant rebels, telling them that they must carry out Mao's directive to use reason and not force and that offenders against this principle would be punished (it was specified that the Peking garrison command had the authority to take action), forbidding them to destroy or seize state property, calling for efforts to overcome the "anarchy existing in many localities," speaking of the "sacred duty" of maintaining "revolutionary order" in the interest of protecting the state and state property, and telling all students (Red Guards) to return to their home areas. Hsieh Fu-chih of the PMRC made a commentary on this notice, reportedly stating that there had been a great increase in armed struggles in Peking, that more than 60,000 Red Guards had been involved, that there had been much beating, destruction, looting, and

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illegal search and arrest, and that the situation was getting worse.

While the situation in Peking apparently improved, there were still some serious incidents there, and reports of serious disorders continued to come in from the provinces. There were reports of large-scale clashes between the Red Guards and the PLA, with hundreds of dead, in Szechuan and Heilungkiang, and clashes between the same forces on a smaller scale in Honan and Hupei in central China, Fukien in the southeast, and Kansu and Sinkiang in the northwest. Red Guard posters of course blamed the PLA for initiating these clashes, but neutral observers

[redacted] placed the blame on the militant Red Guards. In view of the directives under which the PLA was then operating, the judgment of those neutral observers was almost certainly correct, at least in the great majority of instances.

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On 22 May, People's Daily finally called for an end to violence. It took note that these clashes had shifted the focus of the struggle, "wrecked production," upset the "orderly process" (sic) of revolution, destroyed state property and taken lives. It described "struggle by force" as a form not of revolution but of "degeneration," cited both Lin Piao and Mao as opposed to it, and told the Red Guards either to resolve their disputes by discussion or agree to disagree. It set forth the six points of the PMRC notice of 14 May--prohibiting the use of force and destruction of property, calling for an end to anarchy and for maintenance of order, and sending the Red Guards home--and implied that this notice was to be applicable throughout China. The trouble was, however, that an implication of this sort was not nearly enough. What was still required was a new directive to the PLA, and some new, clear, tough directives to the Red Guard leaders in private talks.

In the final week of May, there were reports of fresh clashes, all on a large scale and all involving the Red Guards and the PLA, in Sinkiang, Honan, Chekiang, Kwangsi, Kiangsi, and both northern and southern Kiangsu. What evidence there was still pointed to the militant Red Guards as the initiators.

Some observers conjectured at the time that Peking had ceased to announce the establishment of additional three-way alliances and revolutionary committees in the provinces and municipalities because of the inability of

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the Chinese leaders in Peking to agree on the people to be named to lead them. This may have been true in some instances, but the general explanation seems more likely to have been the inability of the PLA leaders on the spot to come up with a slate which any of the leaders in Peking would approve or even one which they themselves (the PLA on the spot) would approve, and by the apparent fact that in many places the militant rebels were making so much trouble for the other components of the alliance that no further political steps could be taken until order was restored (again).

A number of provincial broadcasts of the period suggested that disruptive activity by the rebels was the principal factor in their failure to make good progress, and the revolutionary committee in Shantung said this flatly on 28 May. Noting that all of the things cited in the PMRC notice of 14 May had also been taking place in Shantung--"assaults, destruction, looting, confiscation, and illegal arrests"--the committee argued that this violence stood in the way of the "revolutionary great alliance." The Honan Daily took note of the same developments, and, speaking for a province with an unrecognized revolutionary committee and under the control of the military, emphasized the difficulties of operation caused by the "struggle against the PLA"--including repeated assaults on PLA organizations--by the Red Guards there. The Honan radio went over the same ground on 1 June, reiterating that the 6 April directive was being used to "undermine" the 28 January directive, describing the aim of the militants as that of bringing about a "state of wild confusion," and concluding that it was "necessary to depend on guns...to maintain and consolidate political power." There were similar broadcasts from other provinces, telling Peking pretty clearly that it was time to send the PLA into action again.

A joint editorial by Red Flag and People's Daily on 1 June stated Peking's agreement with this position. The editorial affirmed that new revolutionary committees were "in preparation," but argued that, unless "anarchism" were overcome, the struggle for "seizure of power" would be simply a struggle for power for "small groups" and, even after the seizure of power, it would be "absolutely impossible" for the organs of power to function. Whether a new directive to the PLA was imminent was still debatable, as Mao's own position was not clear; but there was no doubt of the need for it.

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It was an open question, however, as to whether the PLA would proceed aggressively under the terms of this directive. It had been burned before, and it would serve Mao right if the PLA were to proceed very cautiously, allowing the party leaders in Peking to live with the disorder which their own earlier directives had encouraged. It seemed likely that some commanders would move aggressively and some would not.

The Scale of the Purge of 1965-67

It is generally recognized that the purge of the Chinese Communist party has removed something like three-fourths of the party leadership (from the level of provincial first secretary up) as it existed in November 1965 when the purge began, but the scale of the purge of the PLA leadership (from provincial commander up) in the same period--to June 1967--could perhaps not even be approximated by most observers. A survey of the PLA leadership, in terms of key military organs, seems in order for a concluding section.

As for the top-ranking military organ, the Military Affairs Committee of the central committee, the two principal officers, Chairman Mao and senior vice-chairman Lin, have of course remained in place. But of the five other key figures as of late 1965--the four other vice-chairmen and the secretary-general--at least three have been purged or removed from their posts, and the other two may have been. The three are vice-chairmen Ho Lung and Chen Yi,

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and secretary-general Lo Jui-ching; the two uncertain cases are Nieh Jung-chen (apparently still a vice-chairman as of 4 June) and Liu Po-cheng. Of their three known replacements, up to April 1967, at least one, Hsu Hsiang-chien has already been removed as a vice-chairman; the status of one, Yeh Chien-ying, is in doubt; only one, Hsiao Hua, who succeeded Lo Jui-ching as secretary-general, definitely remains. The three new vice-chairmen (in addition to Hsiao Hua, reportedly moved up to vice-chairman in April) named only in April 1967--Hsieh Fu-chih, Yang Cheng-wu, and Su Yu--are still in place.

The PLA's Cultural Revolution Group has not been hit as hard as the MAC, partly because it has been in existence only since October 1966 or thereabouts. Of its 10 known officers in that period, only two have been purged or removed. But these two were two of the three chairmen it has had in its brief life--Liu Chih-chien and Hsu Hsiang-chien; and at least two of the other 10 known members of the group have been purged.

As for the Ministry of National Defense, Minister Lin Piao has survived and prospered, but of the other 10 ranking officers (nine deputy ministers and the head of the general office) as of late 1965 at least five are known or believed to have been purged--Lo Jui-ching and Tan Cheng, who were the two senior deputies, and Hsu Kuang-ta, Liao Han-sheng, and Hsiao Hsiang-jung; one died, Liu Ya-lou; one is in doubt, Hsu Shih-yu in Nanking; and only three--Hsiao Ching-kuang, Su Yu, and Wang Shu-sheng--seem still in favor.

Of the 11 principal officers of the General Staff Department as of late 1965, at least three have been purged--the then chief-of-staff Lo Jui-ching, deputy chief Yang Yung, and the director (as well as the deputy director) of the operations sub-department. The status of two other deputies, Chang Tsung-hsun and Chang Ai-ping, is in doubt.

As for the General Political Department, director Hsiao Hua has survived and prospered, but of the other six principal officers as of late 1965 at least two have been purged, deputies Liang Pi-yeh and Liu Chih-chien. No officer of this very tricky department is secure.

Of the directors of the other key departments and sub-departments (regarded as rear services, training, cadres, mobilization, intelligence, and security), less is known. Both of the two known directors seem to be in

place, but both the identities and the status of the other four are uncertain. (Thus this group will not be included in the summary.)

Of the 13 principal figures of the seven service headquarters as of late 1965--that is, the commanders and political officers, with one case of a leader holding both posts--only two are known or believed to have been purged, but the status of some others is uncertain. Commander Wu Fa-hsien and political officer Yu Li-chin of the Air Force remain in place, having survived alleged intrigues. Commander Hsiao Ching-kuang of the Navy has similarly survived, but political officer Su Chen-hua, an alleged intriguer, has been purged. The commander and political officer of the Public Security headquarters, Hsieh Fu-chih, who apprehends intriguers, has prospered. Commander Hsu Kuang-ta of the Armored Forces has apparently been purged, but political officer Huang Chih-yung has survived. Commander Chen Shih-chu and political officer Tan Fu-jen of the Engineers both appear to be in place. Commander Li Shou-hsien of the Railway Engineers has been out of sight, but political officer Tsui Tien-min seems to be in place. The commander and political officer of the Artillery Forces, Wu Ko-hua and Chen Jen-chi, have both been out of sight.

Of the 24 key figures of the 13 military regions as of late 1965--the commanders and political officers, with two instances of a single leader holding both posts in his command--at least 11 had been purged or replaced by early 1967, as noted in an earlier section. Appointments announced in posters in May bring the total, as of June 1967, to at least 13 of the 24; most of the appointments reported in May were replacements for men known to have been purged, but two--Pan Fu-sheng as the new political officer in the Mukden headquarters, Chang Chun-chiao as the new political officer in the Nanking headquarters--were replacements for men believed in favor or in question who had not been included in the 11 purged or replaced. The status of four more of the 24 remained in or had come into doubt, meaning that of the original 24 only seven were known to be in place and favor by June 1967. Briefly, by headquarters: the commander and political officer of the Peking military region were both purged; Inner Mongolia, the single man in both posts purged; Mukden, one in doubt, one replaced; Tsinan, one in place, one purged; Nanking, one in doubt, one replaced; Foochow, one in place, one purged; Canton, one in place, one purged; Wuhan, one in doubt, one purged; Kunming, one in place, one purged;

Cheungta, both purged; Lanchow, both in place (the only instance of this); Inner Mongolia, the single man in both posts purged; Sinkiang, the single man in both posts in place but in doubt; and Tibet, both replaced, but one in another key post.

Of the 44 principals in the 22 military districts, the figures as of June 1967 had not changed much from those of January 1967; it was now 15 known or believed purged or replaced, nine known or believed in place, and 20 in doubt.

In sum, of the 130 key military posts considered (a somewhat smaller number of individuals, as some served in more than one post), the occupants of some 46 of these posts are known or believed to have been purged or replaced. If the figures were complete, the purge of the military leadership would thus have been on a scale of a bit more than one in three, or about half the scale of the purge of the party leadership. However, the figures are not complete, and, as the status of the many individuals in doubt is resolved, the casualties will surely prove to have been substantially greater than one in three, perhaps even as high as one in two. Thus the purge of the military leadership has been at least half as large as that of the party leadership and perhaps even two-thirds as large--a purge substantially smaller than the party purge, but probably larger than generally recognized; and the purge is not yet over.