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THE MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

IN SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE AND PRACTICE

by Maj-Gen N. Sushko and Capt 2d Rand V. Puzik

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Vladimir Il'ich Lenin emphasized repeatedly that gnoseological (theory-of-knowledge) problems of the development of science were becoming extremely urgent because of the very needs of the development of concrete sciences, because of the necessity to deepen and expand research on the problems which had arisen for science. This principle applies to any specific field of scientific knowledge, including Soviet military science. Problems of the theory of knowledge are of specially great importance for our military science for the following main reasons.

First, the modern revolution in the military field has caused qualitative changes in the former principles of the general theory of the art of war and of the doctrine of forms and methods of waging war. Many concepts and categories of military science have been subjected to radical change; some are gradually dying out, as obsolete; others which, in the course of development of military theory, reflect modern military practice, are being filled out with new content. A process is going on of forming new concepts and categories which reflect the essential traits of the qualitative transformations brought about by the revolution in the military field. These processes, taking place in Soviet military science, require deep scientific analysis from positions of the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge.

Second, the revolution in the military field has brought about a new stage in the scientific understanding of the principles governing the course and outcome of modern war. The complicated internal relations of armed conflict with the use of nuclear missiles and other means of mass destruction have brought into being new special methods of research. Today more and more military theorists and practitioners are using mathematical methods of analysis and generalization of empirical data, and cybernetic devices for scientific predictions and working out optimum solutions in the development of models of weapons and combat equipment and in conducting military operations. There is ever wider use of various deductive methods of arriving, from some general principles and rules of military practice, at private theoretical positions and concrete recommendations in regulations as to leadership and command of armed conflict. In this connection, gnoseological analysis of new methods of military-scientific research, their cognitive possibilities, and study of the interrelations of these methods with dialectical-materialistic theories of knowledge assume special importance.

Third, the revolution in the military field has caused qualitative changes in the nature of combat activities and the combat training of troops. These changes have complicated combat practice and have increased the role of scientifically-based guidance of the whole life and the combat activities of troops. Hence the objective requirement to improve the philosophical training of command personnel as an essential pre-requisite to creative direction of troops in their every-day activities and in the course of combat actions.

Consequently, military practice and the interests of further development of Soviet military theory confront military specialists and philosophers with many concrete problems which can only be solved on the basis of study of the principles and requirements of Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge.

The principles and requirements of dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge

Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge is the doctrine of the source of any scientific knowledge, of the acquisition of knowledge of the objective world as a dialectical process of reflecting the material world in the consciousness of people in concepts, categories, laws and theories of science, of the ways of attaining objective truths, and of the role of practice as the basis of cognition and the criterion of truth.

In creating the dialectical materialistic theory of knowledge, Marx, Engels and Lenin proceeded from the very important principle of the theory of reflection, that the consciousness of man is the highest form of reflection of the objective world. This theory of knowledge is the application of the principles of the dialectical materialistic theory of reflection to the process of cognition of the world by man. The organic interrelation of the theory of knowledge and the theory of reflection constitutes the immeasurable superiority of Marxist-Leninist gnoseology over all pre-Marxist, and modern bourgeois, gnoseology.

The dialectical materialistic theory of knowledge has a universal character, because it provides a general doctrine of the laws and principles of scientific knowledge of the world. Specific sciences do not have any special theories of knowledge. Theoretically generalizing the experience of specific sciences in the acquisition of knowledge of the objective world, dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge reveals and formulates the general laws of cognition; it formulates the general principles and requirements for scientific acquisition of knowledge, which serve as methodology for constructing theory in each science and the scientific basis for the activities of people in the revolutionary re-making of society. And it is because dialectical

dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge fulfills the function of a single theory of scientific knowledge that its principles and demands should be applied in any field of scientific research, and also in practical activities; "...in their practice people are guided completely and exclusively by the materialistic theory of knowledge." (Lenin, Complete Collected Works, Vol. 18, p. 143).

Let us examine the basic principles of Marxist-Leninist gnoseology in the acquisition of knowledge of armed conflict.

Unity of the empirical and the logical. The experience of military science in the scientific acquisition of knowledge, and all military practice and its basis and goal, show that any study of armed conflict begins with the accumulation of factual material. Observing the activities of units of various sizes in various training and combat situations, the military researcher collects empirical data. For this purpose he makes use of experimental methods in the form of proving-ground trials and various experimental exercises and maneuvers, and also of the method of statistical observation, enabling him to systematize the selection of facts. But study of armed conflict is not limited to the accumulation of empirical data. It should go on to abstract theoretical generalization of the empirical data. By special scientific methods the military researcher proceeds from knowledge of the phenomena of armed conflict and understanding of its essentials to the discovery of cause-and-effect relationships, to the discovery of the laws of armed conflict. The theoretical generalizations tested in practice are incorporated in regulations and manuals on the conduct of military operations and in methods of making calculations for the application of weapons and equipment in combat.

The movement of the acquisition of knowledge from the accumulation of empirical information to abstract thought, to theoretical generalization, is inherent in the process of cognition in any field of objective reality. It is one of the most important laws of knowledge. It shows that empirical knowledge and abstract thinking are two different levels of knowledge, a lower and a higher. Empirical knowledge gives us knowledge of the phenomena, and logical thinking, knowledge of the essences, the hidden principles which govern the phenomena of the objective world.

Based on this law, dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge has formulated one of the initial gnoseological principle without which it is impossible correctly to understand the whole succeeding process of knowledge in any specific field--the principle of the unity of empirical knowledge and logical thought. This basic principle of the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge teaches our military cadres to approach dialectically the very process of acquiring knowledge of armed conflict, to apply flexibly various methods of study of empirical information and of theoretical development of it, and also methods of practical testing of the truth of theoretical principles of military science.

The principle of the unity of theory and practice. Theoretical knowledge, the highest level of scientific knowledge, is not an end in itself. Soviet military science formulates various theories (in which are expressed the relations, conforming to laws, of the phenomena and processes of armed conflict) in order to utilize knowledge of these principles for the attainment of victory. Such relationship of theory and practice exists in all fields of knowledge and practical activity of people. Man acquires an understanding of the laws of nature and society in order, in his practical activity, to transform nature and make revolutionary changes in social life.

Proceeding from this, Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge formulates the principle of the unity of theory and practice. Applied to Soviet military science and modern military practice, this principle means that military theory is based on military practice, originates from it, and is given life, corrected, and tested in the course of training and combat activities of troops. In its turn, modern military practice is guided by scientific military theory.

The unity of theory and practice is a dialectical unity in which practice has the leading role, by virtue of the fact that it is the basis and the purpose of theoretical understanding of the objective world, and is the only objective criterion of the truth of scientific theories. The principle of the unity of theory and practice should be approached creatively, with consideration of the specific characteristics and conditions of the circumstances in which certain problems are being solved. This means that any belittling or exaggeration of the importance of theory will inevitably lead to a break between practice and theory, to a loss of the scientific theoretical bases for practical activity, and to "practicalism" and subjectivism in the activities of our cadres. Under-evaluation of theory and over-evaluation of practice is the gnoseological root of subjectivistic and arbitrary decisions which do not have sufficient scientific theoretical foundation. A creative approach to the unity of theory and practice means also that in certain stages of the development of scientific knowledge and practice, the importance of theory may increase, and it may become of primary importance. It has just such importance in the present-day situation of Soviet military science. The deep and all-round development of military science, the mastery of military theory by all officer personnel, is one of the conditions for the high combat-capability of the Soviet armed forces, and their readiness at any time to meet any aggressor with crushing resistance.

The principle of the concreteness of truth. Proceeding from the very important position of philosophical materialism as to the possibility of knowing the real world, Marxist-Leninist gnoseology considers the main goal of knowledge to be the attainment of truth, that is, a true reflection of objective reality in human ideas, and in scientific theories of the laws of its development. Then, and only then, can social practice be

guided by theory. In modern war, armed forces which are guided by military doctrine and principles of the art of war which do not reflect the objective conformity to natural laws (zakonomernosti) of armed conflict cannot gain the victory (other things being equal) over an enemy whose action are based on doctrine and theory which reflect the objective truth of armed conflict.

Dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge teaches that comprehension of objective truth is a long process, in the course of which man goes from the subjective idea "to objective truth through 'practice' (and techniques [tekhnika])" (V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 183). It is for this reason that Marxist-Leninist gnoseology demands a concrete approach to scientific knowledge. There is no abstract truth; truth is always concrete (Lenin, op. cit., Vol. 8, p. 400). For Soviet military science, concreteness of truth means that cognition (posnaniye) can adequately reflect military reality only if it takes the object of cognition -- armed conflict -- in concrete historical circumstances of time and place. What was objectively true in the principles and rules of the Soviet art of war of the period of World War II cannot be completely and unconditionally accepted for the practical operations of our troops in war today. Nuclear weapons and rockets have brought forth new laws of armed conflict. Concrete analysis of the experience of past wars is necessary, to make possible fruitful use of that experience under modern conditions.

Lenin saw concrete analysis of the concrete situation as the very essence of Marxism, as its vital dialectical soul. He developed this gnoseological principle further in the following words: "The whole soul of Marxism, its whole system, demands that every thesis be examined only (a) historically, (b) only in relation to others, and (c) only in relation to the concrete experience of history" (Op. cit.; vol. 49, p. 329). Such are the basis principles of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism. Lenin points out that along with these principles, of great importance also are the so-called elements of the dialectic, which confront any scientific knowledge with a number of fundamental (printsipal'nyye) requirements. Following are the main ones.

The requirement of objectivity of consideration. Objective consideration -- "not examples, not deviations, but the thing itself" (Lenin, op. cit., vol. 29, p. 202) -- thus Lenin formulates the essence of this most important gnoseological principle, which expresses a basic and completely obligatory requirement of any scientific research. It follows from the fact that the subject of knowledge of any science exists objectively. People cannot arbitrarily change the conforming-to-law nature of phenomena and the processes of surrounding reality; they must come to know these laws, and build their activity on the basis of these laws.

The correct relationship between the objective and the subjective is of tremendous importance for military activity. While based on materialistic ideas of the objective nature of the laws of armed conflict, Soviet military science by no means makes a fetish of these laws, but teaches our cadres to utilize them actively for victory over the enemy. This makes it possible successfully to develop the Soviet art of war and to combine organically a comprehensive evaluation of the objectively existing circumstances with decisive actions and dependable provision to the troops of the necessary means of warfare.

The requirement of comprehensiveness of examination. Objective consideration assumes knowledge of phenomena and processes in the concrete conditions of real existence, and especially from the point of view of the multiform relations of a given phenomenon or process with others. Hence we have still another requirement of the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge -- comprehensiveness of consideration, or examination, of the object of cognition. "The totality of all aspects of a phenomenon, of reality, and their interrelationships--this is what constitutes truth," said Lenin in Philosophical Notebooks (op. cit., vol. 29, p 178).

This requirement is of first importance for Soviet military science and for the practical activity of officers and commanders of all ranks, both in time of peace and of war. Strategy, operations and tactics, obviously, should be developed not just on the basis of personal experience, but on comprehensive generalization of all the combat experience of troops (and also the experience of the combat operations of a probable enemy), on deep study of the laws of armed conflict, and on scientific understanding of the nature of modern military operations. It is necessary, for example, not to judge as to the strength and capabilities of the enemy and the condition of his units from separate items of information and facts, but to do so after having studied all the elements of the combat situation and their interrelations and inter-dependencies. Only then will a well-founded decision for a battle (or an operation) be possible. For the officer called upon to command troops during combat operations, the following statements of Lenin are of urgent importance: "In order really to know an object, it is necessary to encompass and study all its aspects, all its relations, and the 'intermediaries' between it and other objects. We will never achieve this completely, but the requirement of comprehensiveness will guard us against mistakes and against [mental] necrosis" (op. cit., vol. 42, p. 290).

The requirement to study the object of knowledge in its movement and development. Military research, as well as practice, cannot achieve correspondence of thought with reality if it ignores the actually existing uninterrupted development and improvement of military equipment and weapons and the improvement of methods and forms of armed conflict. Ability to see, analyze and consider changes in the circumstances and

possibilities of armed conflict and of military equipment, and in the relative strength of forces, and to draw correct conclusions from them and to provide for wise revision of training and indoctrination of troops -- all this impells command personnel to make original decisions, work out plans independently, introduce into them timely changes in accordance with the changing military situation, and persistently put them into effect. Boldness of thought of the Soviet officer and military commander should be combined with and supplemented by boldness of action.

Observance of this requirement of Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge makes it possible to discover the relation of the present stage of development of military theory and practice to the past and future, to evaluate objectively military experience, to take from it everything valuable and necessary for present-day conditions, and to foresee the future. This helps our military cadres to determine both the immediate tasks and the long-range ones in their work.

Such are the basic principles and requirements of Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. They are not a subjective construction ofgnoseological principles and rules, remote from practical scientific knowledge of the world, but express the most general laws of human knowledge. This is why they are scientific theory-of-knowledge principles and requirements, the observance of which is a necessary condition for the attainment of truth.

Some problems of Soviet military science and practice in the light of Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge.

Dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge constitutes thegnoseological foundation by any science, including Soviet military science. This means that penetrating into the essence of the phenomena of armed conflict is subject to the general laws of scientific knowledge, its principles and requirements. By the application of them, the most varied military fields come to be understood. In the light of dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge, the direction becomes clearer in the solution of military theoretical and practical problems. Let us examine some of them, to show again the vast importance of the theory of knowledge for Soviet military science and practice of today.

The problem of the subject of Soviet military science. It has always been a pressing one. Its solution, because of the revolution in the military field and the unusually complicated nature of the development of the phenomena and processes of military reality, has assumed especially great importance. Therefore the ceaseless discussion is to be expected which is pursuing the goal of accurately defining the subject and content of our military science, of bringing it into correspondence with the deep changes which are taking place in the military field, in

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order on this basis to mobilize the military cadres for deep study of new problems of military theory and practice.

What does it mean, from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, to define the subject of a specific science? It means to establish qualitatively a defined sphere of the objective world, the development of which is subject to specific laws, and to make this sphere the objective of cognitive and practical activity of people. Each specific science is a system of knowledge of these laws. Science "in all fields of knowledge," wrote Lenin, "shows us the manifestation of basic laws in the seeming chaos of phenomena" (op. cit., vol. 25, p. 46). And our military science is no exception; it is a system of knowledge of the laws of armed conflict.

The phenomena of war are unusually complex and many-sided. In studying them in their interrelations and interactions, one gets the impression that all these phenomena must be included in the subject of Soviet military science. But such an impression can scarcely be called scientific, because it eclectically mixes together phenomena having specific, qualitatively defined characteristics.

It must be agreed that war and armed conflict are phenomena mutually interpenetrating one another. War is an extension of the politics of certain classes by the use of force. For this very reason it is at the same time armed conflict, that is, the totality of means of force employed by the belligerent sides in the interests of attaining certain class political goals. And at the same time war, in comparison with armed conflict, is a broader and more many-sided phenomenon. Armed conflict does not exhaust the total content of war. During a war armed conflict is always closely interwoven with other forms of conflict -- economic, ideological and diplomatic conflict. And only by combining all of them are class and political goals achieved in modern war. Moreover, when war comes it plunges a society into a special situation, very different from that of peace. This depends, of course, on the scale of the war, depending on which the society becomes more or less military.

It is true that war, and consequently armed conflict, too, depends on politics, and gives rise to and determines politics (or policy). But they cannot be considered as identical on that basis. Armed conflict is the basic attribute of war, its specific feature, its form of functioning, by means of which the warring sides accomplish military, and through them, social and political tasks and achieve certain aims. In armed conflict, as the basic form of war, is manifested the political essence and the class content of war.

While being qualitatively a specific element of war, armed conflict at the same time possesses relative independence. This latter consists in the fact that the processes of development of armed conflict are subject

to the operation of specific laws. Marx, Engels and Lenin indicated that the laws of armed conflict, speaking of armed uprising as a form of political struggle.

Consequently, examination of war as a social-historical phenomenon and armed conflict as a form of manifestation of its political essence and class content, shows that these are interrelated by qualitatively different phenomena, each subject to its own laws of development. For war, these are laws of its dependence on the politics of certain classes, laws expressing relationship to the means of production of material goods, to the prevailing production relationships. For armed conflict, these are laws expressing the objective connections and causal relations of the phenomena and processes in combat activities on land and sea and in the air. The two rows of these laws are interconnected, but that they are qualitatively distinct, from the point of view of dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge, must be constantly kept in mind if we desire to define correctly the subject of Soviet military science.

Of what does this subject consist? Soviet military science does not specially study the laws of war a social phenomena. This is the subject of Marxist-Leninist sociology -- historical materialism and some other sciences (for example, political economy, which studies the problems of the effect of economics on wars). Our military science, in working out problems of military theory and in military practice, uses the data of these and other sciences taking into account the great influence on armed conflict of political, economic, geographic, national and other factors, in which the general laws of war are specifically manifested. Its subject is armed conflict, the laws, principles, and rules for carrying it on to victory.

Soviet military science is a system of scientific knowledge of the laws of armed conflict and military affairs (voennoye delo), knowledge of the conditions and factors which affect the course and results of armed conflict, and of the principles and rules of the art of war, based on understanding of these laws. In essence, it is a theory of the military field in its total scope. Recognition of the laws of armed conflict as the subject of our military science makes possible a certain division of labor among the sciences which study the various aspects of war as a social-political phenomenon. Study of the laws of armed conflict as the basic specific feature of war orients our military cadres to the working out of fundamental problems of armed conflict with the use of nuclear missiles and other means of mass destruction. At the same time it does not exclude the need for Soviet military science to take into account the data of other sciences and to use them in developing its own general theory, military strategy, operational methods, and tactics, and in the theory and organization of combat training and military and political indoctrination of personnel.

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The founders of dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge pointed out that each specific science is not just a system of knowledge about specific laws of the development of the objective world, but is at the same time a doctrine of the methods of study of these laws. Science is a unity of theory and method.

Special methods used for the study and acquisition of knowledge of various aspects of the material world are determined by the specific subject of the science. This is natural. Each object of scientific investigation requires special methods of systematization, analysis, and theoretical generalization of the empirical information. For example, the age of our planet is studied in geology by the method of radioactive decay, and the nature of minerals, by the roentgenometer.

Military science, too, has special methods of research. But inasmuch as it occupies a border position between the natural, technical, and social sciences, some of their methods are also peculiar to it. Thus, military specialists engaged in developing the latest models of weapons and equipment make extensive use of the methods of mathematics, statistics, cybernetics and other sciences.

Of great theoretical and practical importance is the scientific classification of the special methods of investigation of the phenomena of armed conflict, which are one of the important elements of the structure of Soviet military science.

Some authors, in trying to solve this problem, limit the variety of special military scientific methods just to statistical analysis and mathematical prediction. Their classification is arbitrary, failing to take into account the functions and capabilities of special methods in the various stages of military scientific research. This is the result of lack of attention to the theory-of-knowledge problems of the various special methods of acquiring knowledge, and also a lack of understanding of the dialectical character of the process of acquiring knowledge of the objective world in general, and of armed conflict in particular.

However, it is precisely the theory of knowledge which provides a scientific basis for the solution of the problem of classification of the special methods of investigating armed conflict. Any scientific investigation, from the point of view of Marxist-Leninist gnoseology, is carried out in the following order: preparation of the scientific investigation, theoretical investigation, practical test of the results obtained. In this sequence of the knowledge-acquiring process there is concretely manifested the most important gnoseological principle of the scientific acquisition of knowledge -- the principle of the

unity and interrelationship of the empirical and the theoretical on the basis of practice. "From lively contemplation to abstract thought, and from the latter to practice -- this is the dialectical way to knowledge of truth, to cognition of objective reality" (op. cit., Vol 29, pp 152-153). This principle, reflecting the objective law of any scientific acquisition of knowledge, should be the foundation of classification of all special methods of investigation in Soviet military science. In accordance with this principle all special methods of investigating the phenomena and processes of armed conflict and the military field may be divided into three basic groups: (1) methods of accumulating empirical data, (2) methods of theoretical investigation, and (3) methods of practical testing of the results of investigation. However, these three groups of methods in the concrete acquisition of knowledge of armed conflict are applied in synthesis, in combination, supplementing one another.

The accumulation and primary systematization of factual data is the preparatory stage of military scientific research. Here is where the methods of the first group are used, the methods of accumulation of empirical data: statistical observation, including that of historical experience; laboratory experimentation; proving ground trials; experimental training of troops; etc.

By the second group of methods theoretical investigation is carried out: analysis and generalization of statistical data, development of mathematical models of the processes being studied, etc. At this stage are used the method of probability, the method of statistical analysis and mathematical modeling, methods of the theory of operations research, and linear and non-linear programming.

The results obtained, in the form of static and dynamic principles, generalizations, conclusions, and practical recommendations are then tested by methods constituting the third group. These include the methods of game modelling: command and staff exercises, games on maps and on actual terrain, manipulation of the results of military scientific research on computers, research exercises, etc.

Thus classification based on the principle of movement of the knowledge process from the accumulation of empirical data to theoretical investigation and generalization of the data, and thence to practice as the test of truth, can encompass all the many forms of special methods of investigation of the phenomena and processes of armed conflict and the military field (deho).

The classification shows that some methods of the first and third groups are interrelated and interpenetrating. For example: proving ground trials and troop exercises. In the one case they provide empirical data for military scientific research. In the other, they make

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it possible to make a hypothesis for that research; to discover new parameters and requirements of the objective; to test theoretical generalizations under conditions most closely approximating those of combat; to make decisions as to further theoretical research or application of the results obtained in the armed forces, and incorporation of the principles developed into military regulations and manuals. The principle of the unity of theory and practice is expressed in the organic interrelationship of the special methods of military scientific research.

What is the relation of special methods of Soviet military science to dialectical materialism's theory to knowledge as a general method of scientific acquisition of knowledge? As we know, at the dawn of the development of our military science, the Trotskyites asserted that to understand military processes it was not necessary to be a Marxist philosopher; it was enough to be a military specialist; they said that Marxist philosophy had nothing to do with the theory of warfare, with the practical leadership of armies. Lenin and his comrades gave a decisive rebuff to this argument against the gnoseological bases of Soviet military science. They convincingly proved the great importance of dialectical materialism and its theory of knowledge for all fields of military science. Hence it follows that the scientific value and effectiveness of the special methods of military scientific research are determined not in themselves, but in dependence on those philosophical gnoseological principles which are the foundation for their use.

Marxist-Leninist gnoseology is that universal method of acquisition of knowledge in relation to which the special methods of military scientific research are manifested. It does not follow from this, however, that dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge stands above Soviet military science, above its special methods. The latter are individual aspects, elements, of the universal scientific methods of acquisition of knowledge. In other words, the gnoseology of dialectical materialism appears in its concrete form when it is embodied in the practices and methods, specific for Soviet military science, of understanding armed conflict.

Within certain limits the special methods of military scientific research are independent, but at the same time they represent the putting into practice of the principles and requirements of the universal methods of acquisition of knowledge, applied to armed conflict and the military field. For example, the statistical method expresses one of the principles of the theory of knowledge, requiring that the object of study be considered in movement and development, from the point of view of gradual quantitative accumulation and successive qualitative changes. The so-called net (setevoy) method of research, making it possible to encompass a great variety of phenomena and processes in their numerous connections and relations, is an expression

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ing physical, and mathematical modelling there is put into effect one of the procedures of the universal method -- analogy. In experimental methods and trial exercises of troops is manifested the requirement of Marxist-Leninist gnoseology to take into account the interrelations and the causalities of the processes being studied.

Thus dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge is the foundation of the special methods of military scientific research. The use of these methods is successful when there is strict observance of the principles and requirements of Marxist-Leninist gnoseology, which is an important condition for the development of Soviet military theory and practice.

The problem of truth and its criteria in the theory of the art of war. The use of the special methods and the universal method of scientific knowledge in its dialectical interrelations assures the attainment of truth and adequate reflection of the laws of armed conflict in the principles of military science and practice.

But what is the nature of objective truth, reflected by military theory? According to the assertions of the idealist philosophers, there is no absolute truth, and there can be none. Human knowledge, in their opinion, is always relative, i.e., lacking absolute credibility. Proceeding from such a resolution of the problem of truth, bourgeois military theoreticians are skeptical of the possibility of attaining objectively true, completely reliable knowledge in the process of gaining knowledge of armed conflict.

Clausewitz, too, believed that in the field of knowledge of the phenomena of war one could count on obtaining only probably, and not absolutely, true knowledge, since the very subject of knowledge -- the phenomena of war -- was a field in which chance played a part, and not one of [strict] cause-and-effect relationships, and the operation of law. One cannot fail to see behind all such reasoning the class limitations of the German military theorist and the direct influence of idealism.

Modern bourgeois military philosophical thought has not advanced very far in the solution of the problem of the nature of truth gained in the process of acquiring knowledge of armed conflict. Of course the theoreticians of the West cannot fail to take into account the changes in the military field which are taking place due to the appearance of weapons of mass destruction. In striving to study comprehensively armed conflict involving the use of nuclear missiles and the latest conventional weapons, they are doing a great deal to develop new quantitative and qualitative methods of studying the various kinds of military operations under modern conditions. However, typical of modern bourgeois military theoretical thought is a clearly expressed agnosticism, a denial of general, repetitive, persistent and essential connections and relations in the phenomena

and processes of armed conflict, i. e., a denial of the operation of laws governing the course and outcome of armed conflict. Thus, in the book of F. Mikshe, Atomic Weapons and Armies (Izdatel'stvo inostrannoy literatury, 1965, p. 33), we find the thought that half of the strategic and tactical principles of warfare are not subject to operation of laws and therefore cannot be known (poznana). "These factors which cannot be calculated," writes Mikshe, "can be known only intuitively, with much depending on chance, luck, initiative, and improved organization."

In denying the subject-to-laws nature of armed conflict, and asserting the dominance in it of chance, modern bourgeois military philosophical thought arrives at a denial of theoretical knowledge of military phenomena. This is evidence that the problem of truth continues to be the key point where modern idealistic gnoseology is closest to bourgeois military science.

Soviet military science has as its methodological base the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism -- dialectical materialism. Resting on the principle of the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge of the possibility of establishing objective truth and thus gaining reliable knowledge, our science believes that the phenomena and processes of armed conflict can be known, since they are subject to the operation of certain laws. The establishment of absolute truth in knowledge of the laws of armed conflict and a comprehensive reflection of them in theory of warfare, in other fields of military knowledge, and in regulations and manuals -- this constitutes the main goal of Soviet military science.

However, as Marxist-Leninist gnoseology asserts, the attainment of absolute truth is a process; that is, correspondence of knowledge with objective reality is achieved in the course of the development of human knowledge from the sum total of relative truths. "Each step in the development of science adds new kernels to this total of absolute truth, but the limits of truth of each scientific thesis is relative, sometimes being expanded, sometimes contracted, by the further growth of knowledge," wrote Lenin (op. cit., Vol. 18, p. 137).

From this thesis it follows, first, that in the theory of military science is expressed relative truth, which at each stage of development of military science is limited by the level of development of that science, by social conditions of the life of the people, and by the level of scientific and technical progress. Second, at each stage of scientific knowledge of armed conflict, relative truth, expressed by military theory, contains kernels of absolute truth. This is why military theory and the principles and rules of the art of war, incorporated in regulations and manuals, serve as the scientific basis of successful conduct of combat operations. And third, from this it follows that our art of war should continuously develop, being constantly enriched by new principles and rules. Our military regulations should constantly improve, being continuously replenished with new and more exact regulations which regulate on

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The test of the truth of any scientific theory is practice. "The question of whether human thought can arrive at objective truth," wrote Karl Marx, is not at all a matter of theory, but a practical matter. Man should demonstrate in practice the truth, i. e., the reality, the power, the comprehensiveness (posyustornnost') of his thinking (K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 1). And man, as Lenin said does prove in his practical activity the objective correctness of his ideas, concepts, and laws of science, and the correspondence of his conceptions with the nature of the things which he perceives.

What should we understand by practice as the test of the truth of military theory and the principles of the art of war? In our military philosophical literature one encounters statements that the only objective test of the truth of any doctrine, and of military theory, is war. One cannot agree with this. War is a practical determiner of the value both of military theory as a whole and of individual principles of warfare. But it would be incorrect to consider war as the only form of military practice. Why, if one were to follow the logic to the end, then, on the basis of the statement about war as the only objective test of truth, one would have to come to the conclusion that in modern military theory, which underlies the characteristics of armed conflict with the use of nuclear missiles, there is not a grain of absolute truth.

Military practice, which is the test of the truth of military theory, is not just battles and engagements. It is also combat training of troops in peace time -- exercises, maneuvers, marches. "In time of peace," says R. Ya. Malinovskiy, "there exists the only possibility of testing theoretical conclusions in conditions most closely approximating a battle situation: exercises and maneuvers, combat firing and launching of missiles, field marches and sea cruises. The utilization of this opportunity is one of the ways of enriching military science with practical experience and of strengthening the theoretical bases of practice." (Bditel'no stoyat na strazhe mira [Stand Vigilantly on Guard of Peace], Voenizdat, 1962, p. 54)

Military practice, as a part of the social practice of people, is the totality of material activity directed toward support of the high combat readiness of the armed forces and toward successful accomplishment by them of assigned combat tasks in the course of military training and military operations. Military practice consists, consequently, not only of combat operations, but also of the practical military activities of people in peace-time conditions, including various military experiments carried out for the sake of gathering empirical information and improving military theory. All these different forms of military practice also constitute objective tests of truth, and hence are also forms of testing the truth of individual principles of the art of war, and of all military theory.

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that is considered burning directly to military reality in order to test the correctness of military theory, truth to a certain degree can be tested by an intermediate logical means. "If our premises are true," wrote Engels, "and if we correctly apply to them the laws of thought, then the results should be in accord with reality." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, vol. 20, p. 269). This means that if during theoretical generalization, military research has observed the principles and requirements of the materialistic theory of knowledge and the laws and rules of logic, objective truth should be reflected to the highest degree in the theoretical theses.

* * *

We have considered only some of what in our opinion are the most important military theoretical problems in the light of Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. This, of course, does not exhaust the range of problems of military science and practice which could successfully be solved with the help of dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge. Among them, for example, is the problem of developing a logical system of Soviet military science as the totality of scientific categories, laws and principles, and theory and method of investigating armed conflict. Of great importance are problems of the dialectics of the development of the basic concepts and categories of military science in the modern stage of its development, and an analysis of the knowledge-acquisition functions of various special methods of military scientific research.

Thus dialectical materialism's theory of knowledge is the gnoseological foundation of Soviet military science and practice. It equips our cadres with a method of scientific foresight in military matters, shows not only the goal of knowledge of the laws of armed conflict, but also the means of attaining that goal, and also points out the way to use known laws during armed conflict for the defeat of the enemy. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge arms our military cadres with the dialectical method of thinking, which has to do with subjectivism, one-sided absolutism in the knowledge and practice of the military art, and dogmatism in decisions and the methods of putting them into effect.

This is why systematic attention should be paid, in the education of officer personnel, to these problems, along with other philosophical problems of military theory and practice. Here are many important problems which are of interest to a wide range of military specialists -- researchers and practical workers.

ESSENCE AND PHENOMENON IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

by Col. I. Grudinin

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Essence and phenomenon, categories of materialist dialectics, reflect the most essential relationships and facets of reality, just as do its other categories. At the same time they constitute stepping stones of knowledge. Skilled application of the categories of essence and phenomenon in combination with a high level of professional knowledge and flawless utilization of special methods enables one to solve the most complex problems of military theory and practice correctly and in a timely manner.

The Nature of War and Its Manifestations

War, as any event of the reality which surrounds us, has two inseparably interconnected sides: the external and internal. The external side of war is accessible to direct contemplation. Its inner side is hidden from direct perception and is cognized with the aid of abstract thought on the basis of the data of living contemplation and practice, scientific methods of cognition. The internal and external side of objective reality are reflected by categories of materialist dialectics -- essence and phenomenon.

Essence is the inner basis of objects, events, processes, concealed below the surface of phenomena and manifested in them. Phenomenon is a method of manifestation, the discovery of the essence (the term "phenomenon" is frequently used to signify "object," "event," "process." In this definition it reflects the internal and external sides of reality, that is essence and its manifestation. In this article the term "phenomenon" is used in a narrow sense, as a form of manifestation of the essence.) War is a qualitatively unique phenomenon, radically differing from all other occurrences in society. It has only one inner basis, one essence, hidden below the surface of phenomena and manifested. The essential nature of war consists in the fact that it constitutes a continuation of politics of classes and nations by violent means. This definition was formulated by Lenin in his work "Failure of the Second International:" "applied to wars, the fundamental thesis of the dialectic...is that 'war is simply a continuation of politics by other (that is violent)' means "... this was always the viewpoint of Marx and Engels, who viewed each war as a continuation of politics of given, interested powers -- and different classes within them -- at a given time" (Poln. sobr. soch., [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 26, page 224). This essence is manifested in all elements forming the content of war, mainly in the various forms of armed struggle, as well as the reorganization of the

entire (Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090023-1) in the content and forms of the ideological and diplomatic struggle, that is of all the vital activities of society, which alters its condition. Armed combat is the chief manifestation of the essence of war and its specific expression. The essential nature of war and its phenomena are an organic unity. There is and can be no unmanifested essence of war. In equal measure there are no phenomena of war which do not manifest its essential nature. Lenin said: "...the essence is. The phenomenon is essential" (Poln. sob. soch., Vol 29, page 227).

In the course of war all battles, operations and strikes (independent of scope), directed toward destroying the enemy's armed forces and home front, represent in the final analysis a means of achieving political objectives pursued by classes and states waging war. This signifies that during the course of war armed struggle is always essential. It always represents the chief manifestation of the essence of war -- the continuation of politics by violent means. The significance of this thesis consists in the first place in the fact that it conditions the immense responsibility of the personnel of our Armed Forces and particularly command personnel in attaining the political objectives of war and in defending our socialist Fatherland. Secondly, it requires that command personnel, in resolving matters of military organizational development, preparation for and organization of a battle or operation, approach the problem from the standpoint of state interests. Thirdly, it prompts one to study carefully and skillfully utilize the objective, deep and essential relationships of armed combat. Fourthly, it aids in exposing those bourgeois ideologists who separate armed combat from the essence of war, endeavoring to prove that in war politics and armed combat represent independent elements. Under present-day conditions some bourgeois ideologists, realizing the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war and endeavoring to conceal the genuine culprits, announce that a new world war will not be a continuation of politics of classes and states. Bourgeois economist Sternberg writes: "In the atomic age war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means" (F. Sternberg, Die Militarische und industrielle Revolution, Berlin, 1957, page 62).

A new world war, if unleashed by the imperialists, will in its essence constitute a continuation of the adventuristic policies of the ruling classes of capitalist states. This will be an unjust, predatory war by the aggressive forces of imperialism. As for the socialist nations, it will be a just war in defense of the socialist system.

The chief manifestation of the essence of war -- armed combat with missiles and nuclear weapons -- will be expressed primarily in mass strikes against major economic and administrative centers of the warring states, as well as against troop concentrations. The essence of war and its chief manifestation, being an inseparable unity, also possess important differences. The essence of war acts as a

the determined, the derived. The essence of war is relatively stable, while the phenomena expressing it are more mobile. This is due to the fact that the phenomena change to the degree of quantitative accumulations within the framework of the existing quality. In addition they can change with an alteration not of the entire essence but merely of one individual facet. Finally, the phenomenon changes when changes take place in the conditions for the tenure of the essential nature, although the essence itself does not lose its qualitative certainty. During the course of a single war, at various stages diversified methods of waging armed combat may be utilized. But this does not alter the essence of war. During the course of the great Fatherland War, at different stages as well as in different operations, diversified methods of warfare were employed. This was due to circumstances, a change in the relationship of forces and development of the art of warfare. Here the essential nature of war, that is continuation of the policies of the Soviet Union by means of force against Fascist aggression, did not change, while the forms of its chief manifestation, that is the forms of armed combat, underwent change. The multiplicity of forms of manifestation of one and the same essence is determined by the diversity of conditions under which it forms and develops, as well as qualitatively diverse stages in the development of an object, phenomenon, or process.

The essence reveals the inner basis of war, the most important element in its quality, the root causes of its coming into being. The essential nature of war determines the overall character of armed combat and its other manifestations. At the same time there is something unique and characteristic only of each concrete phenomenon of war. Because of this the phenomena of war are richer and more diversified than the essence. The essence of war is manifested indirectly, chiefly through armed combat and is cognized by abstract reasoning. The phenomena of war -- armed combat, reorganization of the economy on a war footing, changes in the ideological and diplomatic struggle -- appear and act directly.

The job of science consists in reducing the apparent movement to the inner movement. Consequently, in studying war one cannot stop at the surface of phenomena but must penetrate into the deep-lying processes, into their essential nature. This enables one to elucidate the nature of each war, the natural laws governing its origin and development, to predict the course of events, to expose those enemies who are endeavoring to conceal the essential nature of their policies.

The essence of war is linked with the social and economic structure, for according to Lenin's definition politics is the concentrated expression of economics. From this proceeds the task of cognition, consisting in penetrating from the essence of the first order into the essence of the second order: from the study of the essence of politics to transition to a study of the essence of economics, which determines

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phenomenon to essence, from essence of the first, so to speak, order, to essence of the second order, etc., ad infinitum" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 29, page 227).

A superficial examination of the phenomena of war inevitably leads to subjectivism, to flimsy, hairbrained schemes, which serve as one of the main reasons for profound blunders in military organizational development and in the art of war. The adventurism of many bourgeois military leaders proceeds from the social essence of imperialism, doomed to inevitable destruction, as well as from the metaphysical method by which they are guided. The aggressive ideas and actions of imperialist reaction under present-day conditions once again confirm the correctness of Lenin's conclusion that imperialists are adventurists in their social essence: they may fail to consider the relationship of forces which are present in the world arena, and hence they may unleash a new series of wars. The American imperialists and those countries under their domination write and speak much of the necessity of preserving peace between nations. But the essential nature of their policies consists in the fact that they are striving to prepare a maximum quantity of forces and then, employing the element of surprise, to unleash a massive nuclear attack against the Soviet Union and other Socialist nations, gaining victory by abruptly altering the balance of forces in their own favor. Under these conditions it would be a most profound error to assume that the aggressors will not risk attacking the Soviet Union and other socialist nations.

On 18 January 1962, President John Kennedy gave an address at the White House, in which he stated that the first principle of American strategy is a further increase in much more powerful nuclear armaments than the nuclear striking force of the Soviet Union. The second principle consists in "possessing more numerous and more modern ground forces and other types of conventional armed forces." The third principle is the organization and improvement of special forces for underground and guerilla warfare. The essence of this plan is manifested in the intensified race for missiles and nuclear arms, in the increasing size of the army, in the organization of special forces for waging anti-guerilla warfare, for diversionary and subversive activities. Changes in directing the development of forces and weapons, as well as the strategy of the American imperialists, demand penetration into the essence of these changes and timely consideration of these changes in military organizational development.

Phenomenon and Essence in Military Organizational Development and in Warfare

The continuing revolution in military science persistently demands revelation of the essence of each new phenomenon within it. An erroneous appraisal of the results and prospects of the current revolution in

penetration into the essence of phenomena. The all-out development of science is essential for a timely disclosure of the essence of new phenomena in military affairs. Profound theoretical research with utilization of the latest scientific methods and technical devices is called upon to reveal the role of conventional and qualitatively new weapons, each branch of the armed forces and type of troop unit, and consequently the direction and intensity of development of corresponding branches of military economics.

A correct appraisal from the military viewpoint of new achievements of science is impossible without the timely revelation of the essence of these achievements. Here as in any other area a lack of coincidence between phenomena and essence is inevitable. Therefore, as well as due to attachment to the accustomed (in view of the well-known conservative nature of thought and a number of other causes), frequently the new and original, emerging beyond the framework of the generally accepted, is perceived for a certain period of time as insubstantial. But ideas which seem insubstantial very frequently include ideas which have comprised an entire era in science, in social and historical realities and in the development of military science. For example, French Marshal Foch said: "Perhaps the aeroplane is fine as a sport, but not for the army; it is useless for war" (B. L. Simakov, I. F. Shepilov, Vozdushnyy flot Strany Sovetov [The Soviet Air Force], Voenizdat, 1958, page 81).

As early as 1924 Soviet specialists developed a system of cumulative charges for the engineer troops. But they were negatively assessed and not utilized until 1942. An analogous case occurred in 1933 with an electronic mine detector: it was condemned as dead weight, and in 1939-1940 had to be redeveloped on a crash basis.

Before the Great Fatherland War the works of several Soviet authors (V. Melkov, R. Eydeman, R. Tsiffer) asserted that the nature of the initial period of war would be army cover operations, which would enable the main forces to be deployed. And yet the initial attacks by Nazi Germany against its neighbors demonstrated the endeavor of the aggressor to reach its objectives by surprise attack by previously deployed armies. Yet the essence of this phenomenon was not discovered in a timely manner and our military organizational development continued to be oriented toward a period of mobilization. The main cause of this situation was a blind faith in the experience of past wars. In order to avoid this, in all things (including military science) it is necessary to orient oneself on the new and developing — this is a law of human activity conditioned by the constant development of surrounding reality on an ascending line. Lenin teaches us: "...one must advance and look not at the past but rather toward the future..." (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 36, page 264). Of course it does not follow from this that one can ignore historical experience and not utilize it to a proper degree of feasibility.

the discovery of the essential nature of a situation. In strategy, operations and tactics a knowledge of the essence of a situation presupposes the following: correct appraisal of the enemy's and one's own manpower and weapons both from a qualitative and quantitative standpoint; determination of the strong and weak points of the opposing troop concentrations, their available and potential reserves, their positions, as well as terrain plus and minus points in the deployment of the enemy and one's own troops; timely discovery of the enemy's actual plan of action; appraisal of other elements of the situation, discovery of the possibility of victory with minimum losses.

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Penetration into the essence of a situation is possible only on the basis of a thorough knowledge of military science, on the basis of close interaction of vital perception, abstract thought and practical activity, that is well-organized, skillfully and continuously conducted reconnaissance in combination with analysis by appropriate staff personnel and military leaders. Penetration into the essence of a situation involves overcoming difficulties generated by the effect both of objective and subjective causes. These difficulties are conditioned by the lack of convergence between phenomenon and essence, the speed and intensity of combat operations, the absence of precise information on the enemy and finally by deliberate enemy actions designed to camouflage his plans.

The lack of convergence of essence and phenomenon, including in military affairs, is caused by the individual peculiarities of specific objects, events, processes, as well as by the unique nature of the conditions of their existence. One of the objective forms of manifestation of the essence of objects and events is semblance, which expresses the lack of convergence between essence and phenomenon.

The methodological significance of the thesis of nonconvergence of phenomenon and essence is immense. It teaches us first of all that one should not underestimate the results of live perception or sense degree of cognition, including sensations, perceptions and ideas. At the same time it requires that we not stop in the cognition of phenomenon at the stage of live perception. In order to penetrate into the essence of phenomena, analysis of the result of sense perception with the aid of abstract thought is essential. Sense cognition, perceiving the external side of a phenomenon, views it as from afar, and this is frequently deceptive. A superficial study of semblance in military affairs can serve as the cause of serious blunders. On the other hand a thoughtful analysis of semblance forms an essential condition for penetrating into the essence of a situation and constitutes a guarantee of making the right decision.

For example, in 1944 the command of the Third Ukrainian Front initially assumed that the bridgehead to the south of Tiraspol' was not at all suitable for launching the main attack, due to its limited size,

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marshy nature and heavy forestation. Subsequently, after a careful study of the area, the command determined that this semblance, in combination with a whole system of measures to be taken to effect concealed troop concentration, would help keep the deployment a secret from the enemy and enable them to use the element of surprise. This thorough analysis of the situation was confirmed. The German command of the "Southern Ukraine" army group thought that an assault by Soviet forces to the south of Tiraspol was impossible, and the main attack by the Third Ukrainian Front, launched from the bridgehead, was taken to be merely a support action, which in effect even to a greater extent deteriorated the situation of the German troops which had formed at the very beginning of the operation.

In addition to direct nonconvergence of phenomenon and essence one should bear in mind that many phenomena are not at all perceived by our sense organs without the aid of appropriate instruments. One of these phenomena was written about by the American magazine United States News and World Report. "Around the Soviet Union," states the magazine, "we have set up powerful radio monitoring stations which work around the clock. These 'ears' not only record all transmissions by stationary radio stations but also pick up short-wave radio communications between mobile units of the Soviet army from points thousands of kilometers away." For the timely revelation of the essence of such phenomena a well-organized intelligence setup is necessary, utilizing the most advanced technical devices, and extreme vigilance is essential.

One should also constantly bear in mind that in military science the nonconvergence of phenomenon and essence is intensified by the peculiar features of warfare and conscious camouflaging of essential nature on the part of the enemy. In order to deceive the Soviet government and carry out a sneak attack on the USSR, the Nazi Germans employed all types of false information and camouflage. With this objective in mind they created the impression of a concentration of the main German forces in preparation for crossing the English Channel and invading the British Isles, while they tried to sell their troop concentrations along the Soviet borders as an attempt to misinform the British. In addition they disseminated versions on the necessity of securing their new possessions (in Czechoslovakia and Poland), displacing troops in areas not subject to British air attack, and the conduct of operations in the Balkans. The essence of these actions by our probable adversary was not revealed by us in time, and this was one of the causes of the incorrect appraisal of the military and political situation and the success enjoyed by the Nazi German troops in the initial period of the war. The main role in concealing the essential nature of a situation and misleading the enemy is played by the subjective factor: skill, initiative and other personal qualities of military leaders, as well as all military personnel. It is they who utilize the features of terrain, season, time of day and military equipment for concealing the essential nature of the plan being implemented and the specific situation.

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exceptional importance to the concealment of the essential nature not only of their plans but also the methods of carrying them out, utilizing for this end the most advanced technical devices. In order to penetrate missile defense systems they consider it essential to employ decoy targets, to reduce the reflecting surface of the missile warhead, to jam the enemy's air defense radar, to employ anti-radar missiles, to select complicated trajectories for their missiles and to employ multi-target missile warheads. In the opinion of foreign specialists the availability of such devices and the skill to utilize them for concealing the essential nature of a battle plan and to deceive the enemy will to a great extent determine success not only in a battle operation but the war as a whole.

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The bourgeois military press recommends that radio be used more extensively for misleading information, for radio can be used to create the apparent existence of command posts, nonexistent airfields, to demonstrate supposed preparations for an operation by increasing radio communications volume, and to simulate the employment of fighter planes and guided missiles. It is considered that radio misinformation should be conducted together with other measures intended to mislead the enemy. Other measures include the following: rumors to incite confusion, the semblance of shifting troops and equipment, simulated heavy use of roads, and fictitious offensive operations. It is recommended to build decoy missile launching pads and mock-ups of nuclear warhead storage areas, to effect decoy transfers of nuclear weapons under heavy guard; to limit the movements of military personnel and totally prohibit civilians from areas simulating deployment of nuclear weapons.

With the objective of fortifying the "authenticity" of measures observed by the enemy it is planned to feed enemy intelligence appropriate "documentary" materials. In order to successfully deceive the enemy it is considered essential to study the enemy intelligence setup and to know the indications according to which enemy intelligence identifies a given installation or phenomenon. One's own intelligence has the assignment of determining how the enemy will react to measures taken to deceive him. In order not to be deceived by the enemy it is essential to analyze and check extremely carefully all information obtained, to thoroughly expose the essential nature of enemy intentions and actions.

The Decisive Role of the Commanding Officer in Revealing the Essential Nature of a Situation

The essential nature of a situation is cognized by men and not machines, and consequently the process of cognition depends on their subjective qualities. In 1940 the Allied Command was unable to determine the main direction of the imminent offensive by the Nazi German forces. Ardennes, where the main blow was to come, was weakly defended by French troops. This occurred in the first place because Anglo-French

Some of the reasons why the French command failed to discover the essential nature of the enemy's plans, and camouflaged operations and misinformation by the German command reached their objective. Secondly, the French command had incorrectly evaluated Ardennes, believing it impossible to utilize heavy forces, particularly tank ob"yedineniya, in this area.

The concealment of the essential nature, that is the internal, deep side of a situation below the surface of phenomenon is fostered by war itself, with its constant danger to human life. During war the manpower and weapons of the enemy are frequently exaggerated. Numerous facts of history attest eloquently to this. During the first week of the German offensive in France 2,500 German tanks were transformed in the eyes of the French General Staff officers into as many as 7,500. (Col D. M. Proektor, Voyna v Yevrope 1939-1941 gg [The War in Europe: 1939-1941], Voenizdat, 1963, page 301).

The thesis that one can penetrate into the essential nature of a situation only through comprehensively analyzing phenomena extends to all constituent elements of the art of war: strategy, operational planning and tactics. It remains in force even in the area of operating military equipment. Frequently phenomena which seem insignificant are viewed by some specialists as small matters, for which they must pay dearly. Since phenomenon, as the expression of a given facet of essence, is always significant, one cannot tolerate underevaluation of even one phenomenon until its real essence is determined. Otherwise one may overlook an essential factor, knowledge of which may greatly aid in achieving victory, while to ignore or underrate it leads to defeat. There are many examples of such underestimation. On 7 December 1941 the American radar station located at the north end of the island of Oahu detected some suspicious targets rapidly approaching Pearl Harbor. The radar operators reported this fact to headquarters. But the duty officer assumed that it was a squadron of "Flying Fortresses" which was expected to arrive from the mainland that day. Actually radar had detected the first wave of Japanese carrier-based aircraft, 45 minutes flying time from the American base. There was enough time to sound the alarm and prepare to repel the attack. By failing to reveal the essential nature of the phenomenon detected by the radar the Americans were taken totally by surprise. Under modern conditions the outcome of an entire war can depend to a great extent on the ability to discover the essential nature of such a phenomenon in a timely manner.

If a phenomenon expresses a given individual side of the essence and not the essence as a whole, this signifies that in analyzing a situation it is essential to study not isolated phenomena but phenomena in their entirety. Only by penetrating into the essential nature of a situation is it possible to discover targets and enemy troop concentrations, a blow against which will provide maximum effect. Otherwise a scattering of forces is inevitable, in strikes against secondary targets and the pursuit of phantom success. For example, if in the fall of 1941

the Soviet High Command based its primary reserves not against the main enemy forces but had deployed them uniformly along all fronts, the Nazi German troops would not have been defeated near Moscow and the city's defense could have been seriously endangered. At the end of 1942 large Soviet reserves were located near Stalingrad and in the summer of 1943 near the Kursk Bulge, for the most powerful enemy troop concentrations were in those places at those times.

The genuine (aggressive) essence of such a phenomenon as the creation of military-political blocs by American imperialism was revealed in a timely manner by the Communist Party and Soviet government. This enabled us to take timely and necessary measures to strengthen the defensive capabilities of our country. At the present time one should bear in mind that in order to camouflage an armed attack under preparation the imperialists may create the appearance of a lessening of international tensions. Timely discovery of the essential nature of a situation depends to a decisive degree on many causes, including the quantity and quality of technical intelligence devices, on acts of initiative by persons capable of utilizing with maximum effectiveness the most advanced technical devices for rapid determination of enemy forces and enemy plans. It is therefore extremely important to effect a comprehensive and timely preparation and training of a sufficient number of special cadres capable of immediately distinguishing decoy enemy actions and installations from authentic ones.

While the ability to discover in a timely manner the essential nature of a situation serves as a primary condition for opening the possibility of victory in a battle, operation and in a war as a whole, a careful camouflaging of one's own forces and the ability to deceive the enemy and mislead him in respect to one's own plans and actions serves as one of the major conditions for transforming this potential into reality. In the summer of 1944 the headquarters of the First Ukrainian Front, in order to conceal preparations for an operation, drew up a plan of camouflage activities, which provided for simulating the concentration of two tank armies and one tank corps on the left side of the front in the zones occupied by the First Guards and 18th Armies. In order to carry out this deception on a large scale we employed false tank movements by railroad, simulated tank soyedineniya staging areas, designated their routes of movement and concentration areas and conducted appropriate radio communications. In the false areas of concentration a large number of mock-ups of tanks, trucks, heavy guns and field kitchens were set up. At the same time steps were taken to conceal the regrouping of troops along the front. All movements of chasti and soyedineniya were conducted only at night, under strictest concealment. Although we were unsuccessful in completely deceiving the enemy (he detected the location of the armies in the first echelon along the front), redeployment of the First Guards Tank Army to an area south of Lutsk and the Fourth Tank Army into the Ternopol' area remained unnoticed, which was of major significance.

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Without knowledge of the unique nature of effect of the objective laws of warfare. Expressed in science, these laws constitute the sum total, the synthesized result in cognizing the essence of a phenomenon. "Law and essence," said Lenin, "are homogeneous (of the same order) concepts or more accurately are of the same degree, expressing more profound cognition by man of phenomena and the world..." (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 29, page 136). However law and essence are not identical concepts. As mentioned above, essence is the inner, relatively stable basis of objects, processes of objective reality, concealed below the surface of phenomena and manifested in them. In contrast, "law is a relationship...a relationship of essences or between essences" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 29, page 138). It follows that knowledge of the laws of warfare creates the potential to discover relationships between essences in a battle, operation and in a war. One of the most important laws of warfare is the law of battlefield support. Nowadays the possibility of victory can be quickly lost even with an unlimited quantity of high quality manpower and weapons if the commanding officer commits errors in organizing battlefield support, primarily reconnaissance, camouflaging, anti-atomic, anti-chemical, anti-bacteriological protection and operations against enemy radio and electronic devices. Without well-organized reconnaissance and intelligence activities, conducted continuously and utilizing all the most advanced technical devices, it is impossible to discover the essential nature of a situation in a timely manner and to locate the position of enemy nuclear weapons, the main direction of the imminent strike and the time of the strike, and it is impossible to open up the potential for a victory and achieve it.

Without well-organized camouflaging and successful counter-operations against enemy reconnaissance and intelligence it is impossible to keep one's nuclear weapons intact. Only with superior intelligence, reconnaissance, camouflaging and superiority in suppressing enemy intelligence and reconnaissance is it possible to gain advantage in a battle and combat operation, in directing nuclear and conventional strikes against enemy nuclear weapons.

The potential of being first in a battle and combat operation to engage in nuclear and conventional strikes and the possibility of swift combat operations in turn can be transformed into reality only by correct utilization of the law of interaction. The precise and reliable interaction of all branches of the armed forces and types of units promotes concentration of superior forces in selected areas and realization of the potential to defeat the enemy. Skilled actions by the military in accordance with the above-mentioned objective laws, bearing in mind their interrelationships and interdependencies, makes it possible simultaneously to follow the demands of the law of maximum destruction of enemy manpower and weapons with minimum losses. This makes it possible to reduce the potential of the enemy, to alter the situation in one's

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own potential and to direct a battle or
combat operation to a successful conclusion.

When the military leader fails to bear in mind the essential links, objective laws and their interaction, or if he commits serious errors in cognizing and utilizing the laws of warfare, this inevitably reduces the potential of his troops, promotes change in the situation in the enemy's favor and leads to defeat. Toward Voronezh our troops had 1,000 tanks against 500 enemy tanks; thus, they had the potential of frustrating the planned German summer campaign of 1942. However, due to a lack of ability to penetrate into the essential nature of the situation, to cognize and utilize the objective laws of warfare, due to the lack of initiative and firmness in directing our troops on the part of the Voronezh Front command, this opportunity was lost.

The lessons of the last war as well as experience gained in field exercises attest to the extreme importance of teaching our officers and generals (both in line assignments and in Armed Forces schools) the ability to discover the essential nature of a situation, the ability to think, analyze and creatively comprehend, and not simply to assimilate course material. Only on this basis is it possible to train and develop initiative and decisiveness in the actions of command personnel. Simple assimilation of material is based primarily on live perception. It does not demand thorough independent logical thinking. Each commanding officer in his practical activities encounters at every step the necessity of independently revealing the essential nature of a situation. Consequently it is necessary that our command personnel training programs in line assignments and in armed forces schools always provide for conducting classes which in content and form will promote maximum development of independent thinking for timely revelation of the essential nature of a situation.

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COMBAT OPERATIONS BY TANK UNITS AGAINST
OPERATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVES

by Lt Gen (Res) Rsrsv B. Arushanyan

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In resolving the problem of combat operations against operational defense reserves along with problems dealing with the use of nuclear weapons and several others, of great interest is the utilization of tank assault groups. Moving ahead of the main forces and at a considerable distance from them, tank soyedimeniya will be the first of the advancing ground forces to engage in combat with the tactical reserves of the defensive forces. The latter may differ in composition and designation. Initially they will be neighboring reserves -- as a rule consisting of several individual soyedineniya or unified into a single unit type such as an army corps, and subsequently deep reserves, represented most frequently by individual infantry or tank soyedineniya, possibly having been less exposed to strikes and retaining their combat capability to a relatively greater degree. Airborne troops may also be dropped in the path of advancing forces in order to hold important installations and key positions. Naturally the defending forces will attempt to unify in a single plan the employment in a given area of all their tactical reserves, putting them into action chiefly with the aim of striking from various directions, immediately following nuclear strikes by missiles and aircraft and supported by conventional weapons.

All defense reserves, in the interest of maintaining a high rate of advance, gaining time and attaining the objectives of an offensive operation in a short period of time, should definitely be destroyed preferably as they are detected, or upon their approach and deployment. In principle the nuclear firepower of the advancing forces enables them to carry out such assignments even if the total forces of all troops engaged in combat and deploying reserves are superior to the tank group operating out in front. Obviously this is possible in practice only if the advancing forces possess the requisite quantity of nuclear warheads and reliable means of delivering them to the target. It is most probable that it will be necessary to destroy reserves subsequently, concentrating the main efforts on defeating the strongest and most dangerous reserve groupings at a given time. Air strikes and airborne assaults as well as soyedineniya advancing directly behind the tank group can be directed against other reserves. In this situation an important condition for successful operations against defense reserves is to take care of them by chasty. This in turn depends on the skilled employment of nuclear weapons and on taking swift advantage of the results of strikes. Of great importance is a rapid rate of tank advance. The more rapid the rate of advance, the less manpower and weapons will be required in

principle to carry out a given assignment of taking care of enemy reserves. With an overall high rate of advance, actions not only by the tank group as a whole but by individual chasti can be extremely effective. Advancing on the heels of nuclear strikes, they are capable of consistently handling considerably superior defense forces.

Even if the defending forces have been able to deploy and simultaneously bring large reserves into action, it will of course not be advisable to employ against these reserves the entire force of the tank group, thus creating the threat of becoming involved in a protracted engagement. To take care of such forces it is desirable to use primarily mass destruction weapons and minimum forces from the tank group, using the rest of the tank forces to advance deep into enemy lines. In order quickly to complete the elimination of enemy reserves, sometimes part of the forces from the second echelon or senior command reserves can be moved up. Thus in order to wipe out defense force reserves joined into various groupings, under modern conditions as a rule one should not employ the main forces of the tank groups operating out in front. These groups should push their rapid advance deep into enemy lines in the interests of carrying out their main assignment -- rapid attainment of the objectives of the operation. In order for part of the tank group forces to handle the assignment of taking care of the defense reserves, first of all continuous reconnaissance will be required, timely annihilation of nuclear defense weapons, skilled utilization of the results of offensive nuclear strikes, close coordination between advancing tank sovedinemiya, attack aircraft and airborne assaults, as well as reliable air cover for the tank troops. In addition it is essential to provide ahead of time the execution of all preparatory measures connected with support for successful tank group operations separated great distances from the remaining advancing forces. These measures include engineer support for traversing zones of destruction and radioactive contamination deep in enemy defense, the crossing of a number of water barriers and other types of support.

In order to achieve a high rate of advance and to create the requisite conditions for putting defense reserves out of action, in a number of cases airborne troops will be required, as well as air drops of units of the advancing forces, which are capable of anticipating defending forces in taking action, seizing and holding important installations and areas until the tank forces arrive (airfields, port facilities, primary crossing points over major water boundaries, mountain passes, road junctions, etc.), as well as delaying the deployment of certain reserve columns until others are put out of action and securing the flanks of the advancing tank forces.

Tank units operating far ahead of the rest of the advancing forces can take care of operational defense reserves in a meeting engagement, an advance against reserves temporarily on the defensive, by

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pinning down reserves with part of the forces and subsequent or simultaneous strikes by the main forces.

Considerable attention has been devoted to problems of the meeting engagement in military literature. Therefore we should like to examine only a few features of the meeting engagement, which a tank group can conduct simultaneously with several soyedineniya of tactical reserves operating from different directions. In this situation the nuclear weapons at the disposal of the tank group, as well as a certain quantity of nuclear warheads from the larger unit, will be concentrated against the primary grouping of defending forces which are the most heavily equipped with nuclear weapons and which present a serious threat to the advancing forces in the forthcoming meeting engagement. Air power will be directed toward wiping out intact combat chast'i and podrazdeleniya of those defensive forces against which nuclear strikes were launched. If air power potential at a given moment is somewhat limited, air strikes should be directed against the most dangerous grouping of defense reserves not yet struck by nuclear weapons, approaching the area of the meeting engagement.

Systematic strikes against troops in narrow spots, road junctions, destruction of bridges and crossings over major water barriers even with conventional weapons may delay reserves significantly and cause heavy losses. This is attested to by the experience of the Great Fatherland War. We have examples of successful actions by Soviet air power in delaying German tactical reserves, particularly during the counter-offensive toward Belgorod and Khar'kov. In this operation, as a result of strikes by the 8th and 17th Air armies and long-range bombers, followed by soyedineniya of the 2nd and 5th Air armies, a large group of enemy tank forces which were being shifted from the Donbass to the Khar'kov area sustained heavy losses. What is most important, the tanks were unable to arrive on time at the designated areas to prepare countermeasures (Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy vojny Sovetskogo Soyuzn 1941-1945 [History of the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945], Vol 3, Voenizdat, 1964, page 287).

Air strikes against approaching reserve columns will increase as they approach the deployment area and reach maximum at the initial moment of the meeting engagement. At this time nuclear strikes can be most effective. In all cases one should attempt to reach a position in order to launch nuclear-missile strikes or air strikes with nuclear or conventional warheads against spotted reserves before they are able to employ their nuclear weapons. With this objective in mind it will be necessary to increase the intensity of aerial reconnaissance in the interests of the tank group. Reconnaissance should be conducted continuously far out in front, as well as on the flanks of the tank group. The highest demands are placed on night reconnaissance and reconnaissance under poor visibility conditions along probable reserve approach routes.

Under these conditions it is particularly important to determine the direction of movement of enemy columns as rapidly as possible, to discover the primary concentration of enemy reserves and determine the location of nuclear weapons which can be utilized by the defending forces against the advancing units. This will make it possible to determine the plan for utilization of reserves and provide enough time to prepare for employing missiles and nuclear weapons, to assign missions to the aircraft and troops designated to destroy the enemy reserves in a meeting engagement.

The form of combat operations by a tank group in a meeting engagement with dispersed march and battle formations will most frequently constitute tactically intercoordinated strikes from various directions, launched in coordination with nuclear strikes, as well as advance and frontal shift by some of the forces in a new direction. In the latter case there will of course be no time for a complicated maneuver. Therefore before turning the front of some of the advancing forces toward the flank, of particular significance is anticipating the enemy in launching mass nuclear strikes at all newly spotted elements and at their nuclear weapons. Under these conditions the nuclear weapons of the higher command will have to be brought in to supplement strikes by local tactical weapons. Of particular significance also are bold and decisive actions by individual units of the tank group. The remaining tank forces should continue to advance rapidly in the main direction.

The elimination of tactical reserves can take place in a situation whereby they have been able partially or completely to shift to temporary defense with the aim of repelling the strike by the advancing tank forces, to weaken and delay their advance, to win time in order to regroup their own forces and prepare a new counterstrike.

If as a result of a successful meeting engagement a shift to the defensive has taken place along an unprepared line, it can usually be crossed and the defending forces taken care of while advancing, and if necessary immediately following nuclear strikes from the air. In case of an early shift of operational reserves to defense along a prepared line, in order to push across and wipe out the enemy it may be necessary to direct nuclear strikes and order a brief conventional artillery softening-up. Under these conditions of particular significance is preparation of the strike at such a time that would enable our forces to prevent the enemy, which has shifted to the defensive, from using nuclear weapons. In principle this becomes attainable only if combat against enemy nuclear weapons is waged continuously. In other words, it would be wrong to time the use of all weapons to the initial moment of artillery softening-up. Action against enemy nuclear weapons should be conducted continuously up to the preliminary artillery barrage, during and after it, as well as during the period of support of the advancing forces.

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The advancing forces can drop airborne troops to the rear of the reserves shifting to a defensive position. Also designated for seizing and holding important areas and lines along the approach routes of reserves further to the rear, with the aim of preventing reinforcement of the existing defense forces. The paratroop drop, in spite of the fact that the tank group is operating far ahead of the remaining advancing forces, will be set up and carried out by the higher command. As in a meeting engagement, the main forces of the tank group should not become involved in extended battle with the defense reserves, but should continue the advance. In order to wipe out the defending reserves it is advisable to utilize only part of the tank forces coming into direct contact with them, as well as newly-arrived soyedineniya of the main forces of the higher command.

In some cases a tank group out of physical contact with the remaining advancing forces will have to use part of its forces temporarily to pin down enemy reserves, shifting to defensive actions on a tactical scale at one point, with subsequent or simultaneous strikes by the main forces in another area. For example, this may occur with the necessity of delaying one group of defense reserves launching a counter-strike from different directions until the defeat of another, more dangerous group.

Temporary defense may also be employed if in any area the defense forces have succeeded in being first to launch nuclear strikes and the advancing forces need time to regain order. Part of the forces may shift to temporary defense as a result of an unsuccessful meeting engagement in any given area. Under these conditions a special feature of operations by tank forces will consist in the fact that organization of the fire system, the laying of tank traps in the most tank-vulnerable areas and digging-in actions by podrazdeleniya for repulsing the attack of the main forces of the approaching defense reserves will have to be done simultaneously with combat against engaged reserves. In this type of situation it is important not to scatter personnel and weapons in attempting to wipe out several enemy troop elements all at one time, but rather the most important should be chosen, the most dangerous to the advancing forces. We believe that in order successfully to repulse an enemy in direct contact it is advisable to employ the massed firepower of artillery and tanks along with nuclear strikes. The main efforts of the advancing forces, and primarily nuclear weapons and aircraft, should be directed toward destroying the approaching enemy reserves, enemy nuclear weapons and aircraft from the ground.

Renewed advance by that part of the tank forces temporarily shifting to the defensive will be organized while repulsing the enemy, with the approach of troops pulled from other areas, and the preparation of missiles, nuclear weapons and air power. The primary operations of the tank forces and newly-arrived soyedineniya and chasty from the advancing forces develop as soon as possible after mass nuclear strikes,

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on the flank and to the rear of the main force to reserves and to re-
serves undertaking a counterstrike, with the objective of totally wiping
them out.

A favorable result from the operations of a tank group in combat with operational defense reserves depends to a great extent on effective and continuous fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft missile cover of its marching columns and combat formations. The seizure and holding of airfields and landing strips deep within enemy defenses aid the aircraft supporting the tank group.

Success in actions by tank groups against tactical defense reserves exerts a decisive effect on the outcome of the entire offensive. Therefore the high command must constantly be particularly concerned with keeping its forces at a proper degree of combat capability and with timely support of the combat operations of these groups deep inside enemy defenses, and it must be concerned with supporting these forces with needed missiles, nuclear weapons, fuel and ammunition, aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. The organization and maintenance of continuous cooperation between neighboring tank groups also constitutes one of the major concerns of the higher command and its headquarters.

In conclusion we shall touch briefly on a few characteristics of combat by tank groups against operational defense reserves when advancing without the employment of nuclear weapons. Under conditions whereby both sides possess these weapons, each side, fearing a sudden nuclear strike by the other, will be compelled to maintain troop protective gear and their own weapons in constant readiness to launch an immediate retaliatory strike. Thus the threat of nuclear attack as well as other means and methods of conducting an offensive operation will leave their imprint on the combat operations of tank forces, including actions involving the annihilation of operational defense reserves. Speaking of conducting an offensive without nuclear weapons, one should bear in mind the immense changes which have occurred since the war in the development of conventional weapons and in troop organization. In view of these changes alone there can be no simple repeat of the techniques and forms of warfare employed in the last war. During the threat of nuclear attack the operational structure of defense and advancing troops will be preserved in almost the same form we see for nuclear war conditions. The defending forces will place their operational reserves in scattered and concealed staging areas, realizing the danger of nuclear strikes. The advancing forces, in order to overcome the resistance of defense reserves, will be compelled to concentrate considerable artillery firepower in the most important areas, will have to call in air power and possibly a preliminary artillery barrage. The rate of advance even of tank groups under these conditions will be slower than during an advance with nuclear weapons utilization. This will make it considerably easier for the defending forces to maneuver their operational reserves and organize in short

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order (considering the threat of nuclear strikes) large counter-strike groups of these reserves. Under these conditions conventionally armed aircraft become much more important.

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It will nevertheless be insufficiently effective to inflict losses on tactical defense reserves in areas of concentration and on the march by air power and artillery. As a result of this the reserves may approach the lines of deployment for launching a counterattack with greater combat capability than when nuclear weapons are employed. Under these conditions heavy forces will be required to stop a counterattack by the defending forces. Sometimes advancing ground forces will shift to temporary defense in order to repel a counterattack, with subsequent strikes and offensive movement once again with the aim of wiping out the counter-attacking elements.

Since conventional weapons will not be enough to assure simultaneous coverage of the entire depth of primary defenses, it will be necessary to successively eliminate initially nearby and subsequently deep tactical and strategic defense reserves. The primary role in destroying reserves and frustrating their counterattack will be tank troops in coordination with airborne troops, heavily supported by air power, particularly jet aircraft, and artillery.

We have examined only a few of what we believe to be the most vital problems in this area, and we do not claim to have dealt with them exhaustively. A further study of all aspects of the problem of engaging tactical defense reserves during an offensive constitutes one of the urgent tasks of Soviet military-scientific thought.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE OF GROUND FORCES

by Col M. Kir'yan

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A study of military organizational development in various countries shows that in resolving the matter of development and improvement of branches of the armed forces and the various types of units primary attention is focussed on those branches and types with the aid of which it will be possible most efficiently and effectively to reach the objectives of a future war. Continental nations, as is well known, have shown preference for land forces, which have played the primary role in past wars. Artillery has been the basis of their firepower. Troop organizational forms were to provide the most effective utilization primarily of artillery firepower, tank weapons, as well as air power and infantry weapons. Subordinate to this was the development of means of locomotion, control and other military equipment.

Now the main trend in the organization of land forces is determined by missiles and nuclear weapons. The appearance of these weapons in the arsenals of the armies of the world's leading nations, as well as the exceedingly intensive and extensive military application of the latest scientific and technological advances has led to a radical change in many military problems: there has been a revision of the nature and methods of waging war and conducting military operations, a revision of views on the role of various branches of the armed forces and the various types of troop units in a future war, as well as views of their organizational structure, weapons and equipment.

The theory of military science proceeds from the standpoint that a future world war will inevitably become a war of nuclear weapons and missiles, where the primary attack weapon will be the nuclear warhead, and where the primary means of delivering it to the target will be the missile. A war fought with missiles and nuclear weapons can spread to, if not all, at least the majority of continents. It will not be initiated by a clash between ground forces, but by decisive, massed nuclear bomb and missile strikes at major targets located both in theatres of military operations and deep in the heartland of the warring nations. Strategic success will be achieved not only through destroying the enemy's nuclear strike potential and by destroying major enemy troop concentrations, but also by simultaneous annihilation of the enemy's war-economic potential, by disorganization of governmental and military control. Therefore the main role in carrying out the fundamental tasks in such a war will be played by a qualitatively new branch of the armed forces -- the Strategic Missile Troops.

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...believes that in a future war, in addition to strategic missile troops, other branches of the armed forces will also be used extensively, and each will have its own specific assignments; air defense troops -- to prevent nuclear bomb and missile attacks and to destroy enemy aircraft in the air; the air force -- to strike enemy ground targets in the heartland and to hit enemy supply lines, as well as to strike land targets along the front, and to engage in combat with enemy attack aircraft; the navy -- to strike at bases and other targets deep behind enemy lines and to engage in combat with enemy sea power.

The primary utilization of ground forces will be to destroy opposing enemy troop concentrations, to seize and hold enemy territory with the objective of preventing its utilization for the further waging of war. On the other hand land forces will also play an extremely important role in repulsing enemy ground strikes attempting to break through out lines, as well as in preventing enemy airborne and beachhead assaults. Ground forces will play an extremely important role in a future missile-nuclear war.

Just what will this branch of the armed forces be, in what direction will it develop and how will it look organizationally? The answer to these questions depends on sociopolitical, economic and particularly military factors, most important of which are the following: the nature of a future war, the combat potential and trends in the armed forces development of a probable adversary, the geographical position of the country and the nature of the theatres of war. Proceeding from the standpoint that a future world war may be a nuclear war, all of the world's leading armies make primarily such important demands on their ground forces as the capacity to wage successful warfare against enemy nuclear weapons, a high degree of mobility and ability to penetrate and cross zones of destruction and radioactive contamination, a high capability to protect personnel and combat equipment against nuclear weapons, etc. In accord with this, missile troops are being organized in our ground forces. These troops are capable of striking all targets at distances ranging up to several hundred kilometers. The range of TNT-equivalent force in our nuclear warhead arsenal is becoming broader.

All armies are focussing attention on the further development of tank forces and are equipping them with new tanks, protected to the maximum against the effects of mass destruction weapons and possessing heavier armaments. Improvements are being made in airborne assault troops, capable of being transported by air across zones which ground troops are unable to traverse. There is a considerable increase in the number of military transport aircraft, which have the job of carrying units of ground forces over great distances.

The mobility of ground troops takes on great significance under modern conditions. This is due to the necessity of utilizing most

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effectively the results of nuclear strikes, thereby covering extensive radioactive contamination zones and zones of destruction, as well as scatter-deploying troops in the interests of their protection against enemy nuclear attack.

In connection with this all the most modern armies are doing much to increase the maneuverability of combat units by equipping them with armored personnel carriers and other armored vehicles with the capability of negotiating rugged and diversified terrain. The design of these vehicles provides combat units with the capability of engaging in combat without disembarking.

The rapid development of means of attack from the air has led to the necessity of further improvement of antiaircraft and development of anti-missile defense for ground forces, and hence to the necessity of new troop units equipped with antiaircraft guided missiles, antiaircraft guns and diversified radio and electronic equipment.

All foreign armies are seeking the most effective techniques of protection of personnel. From an organizational standpoint this takes shape in the organization, such as in the West German Army, of special units outfitted with equipment enabling them to counteract the consequences of utilization of all mass destruction weapons. Engineer, chemical warfare, road-construction and other troops are being outfitted with new equipment so that they will be able to carry out the most complex and complicated technical assignments in the interests of supporting ground force operations and protecting them against mass destruction weapons.

Much attention is being focussed on the perfection of reconnaissance methods and devices, particularly aerial reconnaissance. Operational and tactical units in the ground forces of the USA are being more and more heavily equipped with reconnaissance aircraft, capable of carrying out reconnaissance assignments in the interests of maximum utilization of mass destruction weapons. Special units are being formed with the special assignment of jamming enemy radio and radar.

Bearing in mind that ground force operations will be of a focal nature and will develop simultaneously at great distances along the front and behind enemy lines, in the absence of solid fronts, the organizational forms of ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya are faced with the need of providing necessary independence of the latter in carrying out their combat assignments. Therefore soyedineniya, chasty and in some cases even podrazdeleniya contain in requisite proportions weapons and combat equipment of all types of troop units and special troops, and in ob'yedineniya -- of armed forces branches.

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the war may begin without the employment of nuclear weapons, the armies of the world's largest nations, primarily those possessing nuclear weapons, are endeavoring to maintain ground forces which could successfully carry out combat assignments with the employment not only of nuclear weapons but also conventional weapons, which would be capable of quickly shifting from conventional to nuclear operations. Solution to this complex problem in the most highly developed nations finds expression in the endeavor to equip ground forces with artillery systems adapted for using both nuclear and conventional ordnance, as well as in an increase in the overall quantity of artillery, tanks, anti-tank weapons and tactical air units. All this also finds expression in organizational changes in sovedineniye and ob'yedineniya.

History teaches us that in every war elements of the past are inevitable alongside new features of the art of warfare. To a certain degree this holds true for a future war as well, in which isolated principles and even techniques of warfare from the Second World War will undoubtedly be manifested, particularly in those areas where only conventional weapons will be employed in large quantity. Proceeding from this standpoint, in determining the organization of ground forces under modern conditions it is essential to bear in mind experience in utilizing these weapons during the Second World War, as well as the reasons leading to organizational changes in the course of the war and after the war. The fact is that changes in combat techniques do not immediately lead to radical changes in troop organization. During a certain period of time the old forms of organization adapt to new combat techniques. Troop organization in a sense is more stable than techniques of warfare. Its changes usually occur after the art of warfare formulates operational-tactical demands for new models of weapons and combat equipment, when they are fabricated and incorporated in the line units. Since the process of developing and incorporating new weapons and equipment is normally a lengthy one, it seems that old forms of organization absorb new weapons and equipment for a certain period of time. Only when major changes take place in combat techniques under the influence of new weapons and equipment does the quest begin for new troop organization.

Only a state possessing a strong economy and high level of scientific and technological development is capable of creating ground forces meeting the demands made by the nature of a future war, and only such a state is capable of supplying these forces with everything needed to conduct successful combat operations. With the development of diversified radio equipment and electronic devices, nuclear-missile and other costly weapons, the influence of economic potential has become particularly great. Under modern conditions the thesis of Engels that "weaponry, composition, organization, tactics and strategy depend primarily on the level of production achieved at a given moment" has become even more significant. Without a highly developed economy it is now impossible to create modern ground forces and properly equip and supply them.

Economics influences the organizational development of ground forces through weapons which are distributed in such a manner that they may secure the most effective employment of the selected techniques and forms of conducting combat operations, that is in such a manner that troop organization corresponds to the predicted nature of combat operations. At the same time the nature of combat operations, changing under the influence of new weapons, demands constant improvement of the troop organization adopted before the war. This is conclusively demonstrated by the experience of the last war, during which there was constant improvement in the organizational forms of ground forces by increasing the firepower and strike potential of ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya by organizing and incorporating in these units podrazdeleniya, chasty and soyedineniya equipped with new systems of artillery and mortars, tanks, self-propelled artillery and other equipment.

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Of great importance for proper solution to organizational problems is a profound knowledge of the strong and weak points in the enemy's troop organization, in order to confront him with more highly perfected troop organization. One can see the results of erroneous or tardy conclusions in appraising the enemy's troop organization through the example of the Great Fatherland War. The initial experience of the Nazi German troops in Western Europe demonstrated that maximum successful combat operations were possible only when the ground forces included large tank and motorized units. These correctly drawn conclusions served as a basis for returning to the creation (delayed, to be true) of mechanized corps. By the beginning of the war their organization and outfitting had not yet been completed. The organizational forms of these soyedineniya were also imperfect -- they were too unwieldy and control was difficult.

Blunders committed in the organization of ground forces just before the war began had to be eliminated during the course of the war. Correct conclusions drawn from the conditions created during the first months of the war and a critical analysis of the defects existing in the prewar organization of our operational ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya enabled us not only to neutralize the enemy's advantages in troop organization but also to create improved ground force organization. To a considerable degree this predetermined our success and our potential to conduct continuous and swift offensive operations.

But this was the past. Now that troop organization is heavily influenced by new types of weapons, particularly missile-nuclear weapons, a constant study of the troop organization of the probable adversary and a solid knowledge of the basic trends in organizational development of the enemy's armed forces, the strong and weak points in the organization of operational ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya and the methods by which they are to be used in combat becomes even more important. In a modern nuclear war troop reorganization at the beginning of or during such a war, such as that which took place in the last war, is impossible. Now

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is never before it is essential before the war to possess troop organization which in all respects is superior to that of the enemy and which corresponds to the nature of forthcoming armed combat.

The influence of physical-geographical conditions on the organization of ground forces is manifested through their equipment and combat techniques. This finds expression in the creation of special combat elements, highly adapted to operations under the conditions of a specific theatre of war. Along with the development of weapons and combat equipment, and particularly reduction in the weight, size and terrain capabilities of this equipment, in all the armies of the world's largest nations one observes a tendency toward universalization of combat units, that is the tendency to set up ob'yedineniya, soyedineniya and chastii which can operate under conditions of various theatres of military operations and carry out diversified assignments. But this problem has not yet been completely resolved.

It is believed that ground force organization adopted in the armies of the majority of western nations basically corresponds to the conditions of conducting combat operations in such theatres of war as Western Europe. This is due in the first place to the fact that in past wars the decisive battles took place in this area and, in the second place, this theatre now as formerly contains the major regions, both in an economic and administrative-political respect, the largest nuclear weapons bases and other important military installations.

At the same time a study of the nature of probable theatres of possible military operations shows that they differ greatly one from another in relative ruggedness of terrain, road system, climatic and other conditions. All these factors exert substantial influence on the utilization of troops and of combat equipment, techniques of conducting battles and operations, and thus on troop organizational structure. The use of nuclear weapons in such geographically difficult theatres of military operations as mountainous or heavily forested areas will complicate to an even greater extent the employment of soyedineniya and chastii of ground forces designed to operate primarily in highly developed and densely-populated theatres of operations.

As the experience of past wars attests, the act of ignoring the specific conditions of a given theatre is fraught with disastrous consequences. The equipment and organization of the Nazi German troops successfully withstood the test under the geographical conditions of Western Europe, but they were counting on a blitzkrieg, and this equipment and organization turned out to be poorly adapted for conducting combat operations under the severe winter conditions of Eastern Europe.

The possibilities of troop operations in many theatres, particularly mountainous ones, restricted to certain accessible areas and along certain accessible routes, units split up one from another, make

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difficult such things as bringing reserves and second echelons into battle. As a result of this it is essential to have combat units for operation in such theatres which can independently carry out combat assignments. In desert areas it is not always possible to employ heavy equipment. Here vehicles with greater terrain-crossing capabilities are necessary. The same can be said in respect to the arctic regions and forest-swamp areas. In the mountains it is not always possible to employ artillery systems suited to ordinary intersected terrain. Mountain roads frequently do not permit the passage of large-caliber weapons, as well as tactical missiles. Mountains also complicate the problems of logistics.

Bearing all this in mind, it is essential to develop weapons and combat equipment which on the one hand can be successfully used to carry out combat assignments and on the other hand are suitable for utilization under specific conditions of mountainous terrain. These demands are taken into consideration in the organizational development of the armed forces of various countries. For example, many modern armies possess various types of mountain artillery, transport vehicles, engineer vehicles and other military equipment furnished to troops trained to operate in mountain theatres.

The development of weapons and equipment specially designed for use in specific conditions of various theatres of war leads to the development of new, independent podrazdeleniya and chasty outfitted with this equipment. Their organization should correspond to the nature of the combat assignments of the troops and guarantee the most effective utilization under given conditions. Some of this equipment can be incorporated in conventional soyedineniya, chasty and podrazdeleniya with the objective of broadening their combat potential.

The influence of geographical conditions on troop organization is also manifested in change in the ratio of types of troops in various troop units. If with operations on conventional terrain (flat, moderately broken) the combination of a certain number of podrazdeleniya (chasty) of different types of units in soyedineniya and ob'yedineniya guarantees the capability of carrying out assignments, such a balance may be disturbed under other conditions. For example, under sandy desert conditions troops will hardly ever be forced to cross waterways, while personnel water supply will constitute one of the most important tasks. Consequently the ratio of podrazdeleniya securing the crossing of water barriers and water supply podrazdeleniya will appropriately change. In forest and swamp areas, where tanks have limited capabilities, the ratio can be changed in favor of reducing the number of tanks and anti-tank weapons, while the number of combat vehicles with high terrain-crossing capabilities can be increased.

The individual characteristics of theatres of war present varying demands on retaining troop vitality and combat capability. These

demands can not always be met without incorporating appropriate podrazdeleniya into soyedineniya and ob'yedineniya. For example, the mass utilization of nuclear weapons in a mountain theatre of combat operations will cause large landslides and rockslides on the roads, block crossings, etc. Under these conditions combat troops may find themselves in a difficult situation, and detachment from the main body of podrazdeleniya to counteract the consequences of enemy nuclear strikes may reflect on fulfillment of the combat mission. The situation will be analogous during operations in large forest areas, where the employment of nuclear weapons will cause fires and obstructions. Obviously special units must be used for these purposes or special detachments must be organized.

It is clear from the above that two directions are possible in seeking organizational forms of ground forces from the viewpoint of having them correspond to the conditions of various theatres of military operations. First there is the organization of special soyedineniya and chasty for operating in various theatres of military operations; second, there is the organization of units designed to reinforce conventional soyedineniya and chasty applicable to various theatres.

Both trends have their positive and negative points. The organization of special units is advantageous in that such troops are prepared and equipped ahead of time primarily for conducting combat operations in a specific theatre. At the same time this is disadvantageous from the viewpoint of economics. The organization of podrazdeleniya and chasty to reinforce conventional soyedineniya is more advantageous from the viewpoint of economics, but they are not always able to guarantee the successful performance of troop combat operations in a given theatre.

Bearing the above in mind, in all the armies of the major nations, in seeking the most suitable forms of ground force organization, one observes the endeavor to provide them with the capability of conducting successful operations in all combat carried out in developed, populated regions. At the same time the minimum essential number of troop units designed for operations in theatres with specific physical-geographical conditions are being set up. In the German Federal Republic an alpine infantry division was formed in 1956 and subsequently assigned to NATO. The main purpose of this division was that of operating under extremely difficult climatic conditions and on rugged terrain. The American, British and French armies devote much attention to the organization and training of soyedineniya to function under arctic conditions, and in southern regions, particularly in the jungle, where they undergo testing and advanced training.

Speaking of the influence of the nature of combat operations in a modern war on the forms of troop organization, one must remember that at a specific stage a large number of demands on these troops cannot be met in view of the lack of sufficient quantity and requisite quality of new

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equipment and weapons. It is quite logical. Military science, looking far into the future, determines appropriate demands on long-term troop organization and weapons. Weapons in turn, as they are incorporated in the line units, exert a direct influence on troop organization. In conclusion we shall note that the importance of the problem of continuous improvement of ground force organizational structure demands the ever increasing attention of military-theoretical thought toward resolving this problem.

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LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR TROOP REGROUPINGS

by Maj Gen A. Skovoroda

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In modern highly maneuverable operations the role of troop regroupings becomes much more important. They will be a particularly common phenomenon in the initial period of war, when the most abrupt situational changes are possible, causing the necessity of introducing substantial revisions into troop groupings organized earlier. Our military-theoretical press devoted much attention to a study of the problems of conducting and supporting regroupings. A number of articles in the journal Voyennaya Mysl' (Military Thought) have discussed in sufficient detail the aims and objectives of tactical regroupings, the effect of new conditions on the nature and methods of their organization and execution. Techniques of negotiating destruction zones and zones of radioactive contamination have been examined, as well as engineer support, problems of reconnaissance, effective air cover for ground forces, road commandant service and troop control. These are all very complicated facets of combat operations, which have a most direct effect on executing regroupings. Naturally logistical support of troop regroupings becomes very important, primarily continuous supply of tactical ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya with various types of fuel, medical assistance to the wounded and ill, maintenance and repair of combat equipment while on the march. Logistical support becomes considerably more complicated when troops are using rail and water transport. During the Great Fatherland War the Soviet Army supply services received much practical experience in organizing support of large troop regroupings. This experience indicates that in organizing support for operational regroupings three major tasks must be met simultaneously: full support to operational ob'yedineniya and soyedimeniya in preparing for and carrying out a march (providing truck, rail and water transport); timely organization of facilities in new staging areas for supporting subsequent combat operations; transfer and deployment of support and supply chasti and administrative units with troop grouping in new areas.

In conducting regrouping operations one must always bear in mind that soyedineniya and chasti should arrive at the staging areas as a rule with supplies on hand enabling the forces to go into combat immediately. Support and supply organizations of all elements will of course participate in meeting all tasks connected with troop regrouping, but the primary role will be played by those which are directly organizing and planning the regrouping. All principles enumerated, formulated on the basis of extensive experience from the last war,

have not lost any of their significance. But in a missile-nuclear war the conditions and nature of the regrouping activities will change substantially. The cost in men and materials will rise, and communications and transport operations will be much more complex.

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Let us examine the primary features of logistical support of large regroupings under these conditions. In organizing support for troop regroupings it is essential first of all to bear in mind their larger scope, greater speed of execution and reduced time interval. Supply outfits should be capable of furnishing forces within a limited period of time and over great distances an increased quantity of material, rapidly fuel combat and transport vehicles, repair damaged equipment and evacuate the wounded. A quite logical contradiction arises: on the one hand the quantity of supplies, particularly fuel, increases greatly, while on the other hand the high speed of troop movements sharply reduces the time available for meeting these requirements. It is therefore difficult at present to count on bringing up everything necessary from dumps and bases far to the rear during the process of troop movements. Support and supplies in the regrouping areas should as a rule be organized ahead of time, before the troops move out. Tendencies in this direction were observed in the last war, where supply dumps and field hospitals were set up along the route of troop movements. A characteristic example of this is the organization and operations of supply outfits of the Second Belorussian front preparing for the Berlin operation in April 1945. In accordance with a directive by the front deputy troop commander for supply, one main and one auxiliary fuel dump were set up to replenish fuel consumed during the regrouping, as well as two main and one auxiliary dump for replenishing food supplies. In addition, essential mobile fuel reserves were organized by supply outfits. We believe that the early placement of dumps of primary supplies along troop regrouping routes will find extensive application under modern conditions as well. Primary attention must be focused on fuel dumps, for fuel consumption now comprises more than two thirds of the total quantity of supplies allocated for regrouping support. In the aim of maintaining a high degree of troop combat readiness during regrouping, expended supplies should be replenished daily, preventing a sharp drop from established norms. This must be done as rapidly as possible, with a minimum expenditure of manpower and equipment. These demands can be met to a considerable degree as a result of bringing supplies as close as possible to the enroute rest and bivouac areas. Bearing in mind the higher speed of troop movements and increased daily mileage therefrom, it is possible to place dumps considerably farther apart from one another than during the Great Fatherland War. But the quantity of supplies in each dump, particularly fuel, will increase sharply since average daily consumption increases. Early organization of supplies along troop routes constitutes only one of the fundamental conditions for continuous enroute supply. It is also very important to organize rapid issue of the supplies to the passing troops as well as vehicle refueling. This problem is met by the combined utilization of various types of transport, as well

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as with an automated system of fuel releases from dumps and high-flow fueling equipment. Refueling time can also be reduced by coordinated utilization of fueling equipment from different supply outfits. This makes it possible more efficiently to utilize all fueling equipment, to set up a considerably larger number of refueling stations, scattering them throughout the area where troops are resting or bivouacking. In this case there are no great shifts of refueling equipment, and vehicles can be fuelled directly at the designated stopping points. Time required to refuel combat and transport vehicles is thus sharply reduced.

The above method of refueling demands particularly careful planning in the hauling of fuel and utilization of refueling equipment during regrouping, bearing in mind the enroute troop formations, routes and movement schedules. Depending on the specific situation, it is advisable to set up refueling stations at rest and bivouac points either before or immediately after the arrival of advanced units. Therefore trucks carrying fuel and refueling equipment should either move out ahead of the others or advance with the columns of *chasti* and *podrazdeleniya*.

Under modern conditions, whereby railroads and highways can be subjected to enemy attack to a considerably greater degree than during the Great Fatherland War, particularly with nuclear weapons, the role of air transport is much more important in support operations during long-distance regrouping. Air transport can be effectively utilized to deliver supplies during abrupt changes in direction of regrouping movements, upon the destruction of supplies placed ahead of time on routes of movement, during truck delays in heavy destruction and contamination zones. Air transport can also move important support and administrative units considerable distances in a short time, support and administrative units needed to support line units moving into combat. Transport aircraft can be used on return runs to evacuate wounded from *soyedineniya* and tactical *ob'yedineniya* directly to hospitals in the rear. In view of these facts the necessity of constant development of military transport aviation is quite obvious, in order to use it more extensively in tactical combat support units and central support organizations.

Complex tasks will have to be met by road transport units of tactical *ob'yedineniya* in securing troop movements together with engineer units. The assignment of wider corridors and considerably more routes for regrouping operations will of course require more equipment and manpower for road building and maintenance. One should also bear in mind that the time required to rebuild destroyed roads should be as short as possible in order not to delay the advance of fast-moving troops. Hence there are two very important conditions which must be borne in mind when organizing troop regrouping road building and maintenance: routes of troop movement should be prepared ahead of time to the extent that this is possible and there should be available requisite supplies of repair and rebuilding materials for the fast neutralization of the results of enemy attack; a certain number of alternate routes and parallel roads

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enable shift of traffic to secondary roads be provided if maneuvering is necessary during troop movements.

Enroute traffic detachments in our opinion should also be extensively used, detachments assigned to support troop regroupings and to move transport and supply columns. The role of such detachments in the operations zone becomes much more important under conditions of heavy destruction and contamination of communications and transport. In combination with road commandant units handling the primary and secondary roads, they make it possible to utilize the entire road system in a designated zone and thus guarantee continuous transport operations for the hauling and timely transfer of supply and administrative units.

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In order to break up the regrouping operation the enemy will endeavor to direct nuclear strikes at the troop columns and create zones of heavy radioactive contamination. According to foreign military specialists these strikes are most effective when troops are crossing large water barriers, mountain passes, defiles and other narrow points en route. Therefore a particular concern of the headquarters of the regrouping troops should be organization of road commandant service along the entire route and particularly at the most crucial points. Without going into detail on this matter, we shall mention that the basis of road commandant service in the rear-echelon area can be dispatcher points for road commandant units servicing primary and secondary roads. But one should bear in mind that road commandant units, in addition to guaranteeing troop movements, should be shifted to new areas in a timely manner and prepare the roads in these areas for organizing the hauling of supplies.

Bearing these facts in mind, road commandant units should be utilized in the overall commandant service system, particularly in rear-echelon sectors and areas requiring particularly painstaking organization of troop movements. In this connection we are in full agreement with the idea expressed by Maj Gen P. Fomichev and Engr-Col V. Rudenskiy in an article entitled "Some Problems of Traffic Dispatch in Modern Warfare," that under modern conditions it is advisable to "locate road commandant podrazdeleniya chiefly at junctions and in major sectors, that is in garrisons, and extensively utilize patrols and technical control devices" (Voyennaya Mysl' [Military Thought], 1964, No 12, page 45).

During mass troop regrouping and extremely heavy road traffic it is very important to correctly plan utilization of the road system in the interests of meeting the overall needs of the tactical ob'yedineniya of the various branches of the armed forces, the different types of units and support outfits. The primary organizer in this matter should be the combined arms headquarters which, in accordance with decisions of the commander in chief, plans troop regrouping and comprehensive support. It is necessary that traffic control on the roads be unified and centralized. This can be achieved by clear assignments for the manpower and

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units, troop movement control podrazdeleniya) and by delineation of zones (regions) where they are to be used. Nonobservance of these principles may lead to a lack of coordination in directing traffic, uneven vehicle loads on truck routes and, what is most dangerous, to the forming of "bottlenecks" and truck jam-ups. The problem of most effective utilization of roads, improved organization and traffic safety during major troop regroupings can be resolved by employment and precise following of traffic schedules approved by headquarters and smooth operations by the dispatcher service.

Success in supply operations during troop regroupings depends to a great extent on the quality of preparation of combat and transport vehicles for the march. Resolution of this task is somewhat facilitated, since modern armed forces are equipped with vehicles with a greater operating range, extended time and mileage between servicing, good terrain-negotiating capability and high cruising speeds. But nevertheless it is essential to see that the troops are constantly ready to execute extended marches without special preparations. This is dictated by the extremely limited time allotted to organizing regroupings and the high speed of such operations. Extremely important for the timely restoration and repair of damaged and out-of-commission equipment is the early stockpiling and proper spacing of supplies of ready units, assemblies and components, as well as efficient distribution of repair chasti and podrazdeleniya along the columns. Repair chasti of a tactical element, depending on the situation, should be moved out ahead of time into the planned rest areas (major bivouacs) or to probable areas where major equipment losses will be sustained. A high rate of enroute progress is promoted by well-organized technical support of the columns, effected chiefly by regular repair podrazdeleniya. In order to repair damaged equipment it is necessary to make extensive use of local repair facilities in the regrouping zone and deployed repair outfits in front of the active forces. It is well known that during major regrouping operations troops may sustain considerable personnel losses, particularly in crossing water barriers, in troop concentration areas, on mountain passes and in other vulnerable areas. Therefore in order to carry out medical- evacuation measures en route it is essential to utilize the manpower and equipment of all elements of the medical service, skillfully combining them with local medical facilities. After giving medical assistance to the sick and wounded, they should be evacuated to well-equipped field hospitals (civilian hospitals) or transferred to medical outfits ahead of operating ob'yedineniya. A decisive role in coordinating these matters is played by the medical service of the next higher command.

It is essential to take particular care in working out measures connected with medical assistance in mass destruction zones. A procedure of cooperation should be set up ahead of time between medical podrazdeleniya and other chasti brought in to counteract the results of enemy attack. It is an extremely complicated matter to transfer supply

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chasti and administrative elements of regrouping units to new areas. Support chasti and administrative elements should be transferred to new areas with the thought of utilizing them in forthcoming combat operations. Therefore the grouping of support chasti and administrative units en route as well as the time required for transferring them should be closely coordinated with the operational arrangements of the regrouping forces and schedules of arrival in the new areas.

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In principle it is advisable to assign a minimum number of support chasti and administrative elements of the tactical unit for troop support during regrouping, bearing in mind that the main objective consists in timely organization of supply and support in the new area. Therefore the bulk of support chasti and administrative units of tactical ob'yedineniya should immediately be moved to operate in the new regions, moving them into these areas as rapidly as possible.

The procedure of transferring support chasti and administrative units into new areas may differ. It is important only that the integrity of the support chasti and administrative units not be disturbed and that the columns made up of these units represent a specific support grouping. Since there are very many support chasti and administrative units with varying assignments, they should apparently be moved in echelons, following up the supported troops or following specially assigned routes.

In conclusion we should like to make a few comments on directing support units during troop regrouping. In a nuclear war direction of support units constitutes a very complex and multi-faceted process. This is connected with frequent and abrupt changes in the situation, greatly extended lines of communication, changes in traffic routes and troop structure en route. One must also remember the fact that as a rule after regrouping troops will be required to engage the enemy without pause. All this gives rise to the necessity of dividing tactical support unit control entities so that support units will be under direction in the areas of initial departure, en route and in the new areas at the beginning of combat operations. Under these conditions there is much more importance attached to tactical support groups working in close contact with combined arms headquarters and capable of taking upon themselves direction of support units at any time. During the process of regrouping an important part is played by reliable communications with support columns, as well as timely formulation and specification of their assignments. Without these elements, support units cannot be properly transferred nor can they do their job of supplying regrouping forces in an organized and totally satisfactory manner.

A NEW EDITION OF A SCHOLARLY WORK ON WAR AND THE ARMY

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By Col S. Lukonin

The fourth edition of Marxizm-Leninizm o voyne i armii (Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army), the work of a group of authors, has come out in a great number of copies¹. There has invariably been a great demand for it among Soviet readers, particularly officers and generals of the Soviet Armed Forces. The heightened interest in this book is due to the great importance and urgency of the problems with which it deals. Under modern conditions, when revolutionary changes are occurring in the military field, theoretical problems of war and the army have assumed urgency and importance. With regard to these problems, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is constantly called upon to fight against various reactionary bourgeois theories and against modern revisionists and dogmatists.

As the authors correctly emphasize, "Marxist-Leninist doctrine of war and the army is a theory called upon to solve the sociological problems of the origin, course, and outcome of wars in world history, especially in the modern era" (p. 4). Being a constituent part of dialectical materialism, this doctrine serves as the philosophical-sociological basis of Soviet military theory and practice. "It is of primary importance for the solution of present-day problems of war and peace and the development and strengthening of the armed forces of the socialist states" (p. 5).

Mastery of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army, constructive study of it, and bold application of it in the practical work of strengthening the military might of our country have been and continue to be important tasks of Soviet military cadres. Preceding editions of this book have already been of great assistance to officers in the accomplishment of these tasks. The new edition continues this noble mission.

Preserving everything that was good in the previous editions, the staff of authors have revised the book both as to structure and content of some of the chapters and sections. In it is systematically and consistently set forth the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army, based on the classical works of Marxist-Leninism, the program of the CPSU, and the decisions and materials of the congresses of our party, meetings

1. Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, Fourth edition, revised and enlarged. Maj-Gen N. Ya. Sushko and Col S.A.M. Tyushkevich, editors, Voenizdat, 1965. 384 pages.

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or represents lives of the fraternal communist and workers' parties, and the October (1964) and subsequent Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

In the book are reflected all the new achievements of Marxist-Leninist theory on war and the army, with a consideration of the radical changes in the relationship of social forces in the international arena and the revolution in military affairs.

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Among the structural changes, the most important, in our opinion, is the inclusion of a new chapter devoted to a consideration of the methodological problems of Soviet military theory (Chapter 7). The effort of the authors to meet the growing interest of military cadres in the problems of methodology in the now so rapidly developing military field deserves every commendation. Also certainly provoking interest is the inclusion of a special section on the modern revolution in the military field (Chapter 6). Other chapters and sections have been greatly brought up to date and systematized: in the first chapter is set forth the problem of the relationship of war and politics under conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction. The second chapter more clearly expounds the social character and types of wars of the modern era. There is shown more fully the relation of Marxist doctrine on war and the army to Soviet military doctrine and military science, and to the practice of training and indoctrination of personnel of the army and the navy. In short, there is much that is new, interesting, and instructive in the book.

We believe it is necessary to dwell, if only briefly, on certain chapters and sections of the book.

Considering war as a social-political phenomenon (Chapter 1), the authors reveal its essence, origin, and causes, and logically follow out the interrelation of war and politics, the economic basis of various wars, and the connection between war and ideology. They provide criticism of bourgeois theories of the causes, the nature, and the role of wars in history. In the book it is stated with emphasis: "From the point of view of Marxism-Leninism the basic question in the analysis and appraisal of war should be that of its social-political nature" (p. 14). And this is right: without discovery of its social-political content, it is impossible to understand either the essential nature of war in general or the specific peculiarities of each war in particular.

In continuing the analysis of the essence of war, the authors show two of its interrelated aspects as social phenomena. The political interests of the warring classes and states determine the goal of the war, and armed conflict, the means of attaining the goal. At the same time it is concluded that war, especially under modern conditions, "a special qualitative condition of society as a whole" (p. 17). In this connection there is subjected to criticism the views of some of our military theoreticians and philosophers who advance the "thesis of the identity of war and armed conflict" (p. 17).

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The authors show convincingly enough that war does not consist only of armed conflict, although there can be no war without it. Armed conflict constitutes the distinguishing mark of war, its specific, but the waging of war is not limited to it. With the beginning of war, the whole life of society changes qualitatively. All the material and spiritual forces of the people, of the country, are directed toward assuring victorious progress and outcome of the armed conflict. A world war, if one were to be started by the imperialists, "would be a complex and many-sided process, in which, along with the activities of the armed forces, there would develop economic, diplomatic and ideological conflict. All these forms of conflict, as well as armed conflict, will be subordinated to the policies of the belligerent states and will be guided by them" (p. 18).

Here it would have been better to call attention to the fact that all non-military means of conflict become different in time of war.

The book analyses in detail the role of politics in the preparation, starting and direction of a war, and also the effect of war on politics. From this analysis the authors reach a conclusion as to the importance of the organic unity of a political approach to military problems and an excellent knowledge and sober consideration of specific military circumstances and principles of waging armed conflict for the attainment of victory.

As we have already said, the books deal separately with the relation of politics and war when the use of weapons of mass destruction is involved. (pp. 29-30) It is correctly noted that the increase in the power of means of destruction leads not to diminution but to increase of the role of politics in the control of war, for directly at the disposition of the governments of the belligerent states are means of armed conflict of unprecedented effectiveness. However, at the end of this paragraph there is what we think is a vague and contradictory statement about the possible consequences of a nuclear world war. This is all the more disappointing when in the second chapter (pp. 89-90) this question is expounded fairly clearly.

Examining the economic basis of wars, the authors analyze the economics of modern imperialism and disclose the reasons for the increase in aggressiveness of the imperialist states in the present era. "It is just because capitalism in its higher stage is on the verge of decline and ruin, going through a new, third stage of its crisis, that its aggressive aims are not only not declining, but are increasing still more" (pp. 37-38).

The section, "War and Ideology," not only examines theoretical questions of the role of ideology in war, but traces its role historically through various wars of the past, and reveals reasons for the growth of the role of ideology in modern war.

Unfortunately, some of the statements in this section are in the nature of general opinions and declarations without the necessary foundation in evidence. (pp.48-49).

In our opinion, the section on modern bourgeois theories of war is written interestingly and with a militant party spirit. The most widespread bourgeois views on war are subjected to criticism: the theory of coercion (nasiliye), the theory of the "salvation of civilization," racist and chauvinistic views, Malthusianism and geopolitics, and clerical and psychological conceptions of war. It would be useful to introduce some fresh material into this section.

The book examines in detail the social character and types of wars of the modern era (Chapter 2). The scientific solution of these problems is of primary importance for determining the political lines of communist parties, the working class, and all workers, in relation to each specific war of our time. Speaking of just and unjust wars, the authors write: "Any war waged by a people in the name of liberty and social progress, for liberation from exploitation and national oppression or in defense of the independence of their state, against an aggressive attack, is a just war ... A unjust war is contrary to historical progress" (pp. 70-71).

The position is well-founded that the legality and justice of revolutionary-liberation wars must not be confused with the question of the expediency of using military means of struggle for social progress and national independence. Oppressed classes and peoples take up arms not by choice, but by necessity, forced to this by the oppressive actions of the exploiters.

The authors examine the social bases of classification of wars, considering the basic clashes of interests which result in military conflict and the social forces which enter into armed conflict. Proceeding from this, they define the actual and possible wars of the modern era: (1) world war between opposing social systems; (2) civil wars; (3) national-liberation wars; and (4) wars between bourgeois states (pp. 79-80).

Unfortunately, in describing the types of wars the authors missed the opportunity to emphasize the different, directly contradictory nature of wars of one type. Thus, speaking of a world war which the imperialists might start, they assert that "it would be regressive in its effect on social development and most reactionary in its political content" (p. 82).

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This statement is true only with regard to one side -- the imperialist side. But in a world war there will also be another side -- the socialist countries. And here nothing is said about the just nature of war from the point of view of the latter. The book thoroughly examines the relation of war and socialist revolution. Presenting the Lenin thesis that revolutions are not made to order, but are brought about by a complex of a great number of internal and external causes, the authors write: "War is not an indispensable element of this complex; it is not a determining condition of revolution. Between war and revolution there is no constant, unvarying relationship" (p. 85). On the basis of concrete historical material, the book traces the complicated and contradictory relation of war and revolution, and those new features which have arisen in the relationship of nuclear war and the world revolutionary process. The authors give the detailed characteristics of civil wars and wars of national liberation. It should be noted that the section on national-liberation wars is somewhat drawn-out because of inclusion in it of material on the national-liberation struggle in general. Also, only one side of civil wars and national-liberation wars is considered -- the just side, and the other side -- unjust war waged by counter-revolution and by colonialists -- is omitted.

The chapter, "Wars in Defense of the Socialist Fatherland," has been revised in the new edition. In it are revealed the basic characteristics of such wars: their undeniable justness, their revolutionary nature, their involvement of the whole people, and their international character. But we think the chapter still has not been brought up to the necessary scientific-theoretical level, and it is excessively drawn-out.

In a separate chapter (Chapter 5) in the new edition are selected materials on the armed forces of the socialist states. This deals with the following subjects: the social nature, historical mission and main distinguishing features of the armies of the socialist states, and their development, training and indoctrination. The authors depend not only on very rich military experience and the glorious progress of the Soviet armed forces, but also utilize interesting material from the history of the establishment and development of armies of the other socialist countries, picking out those general features which are characteristic of all the armies of the new, socialist type. The book clearly formulates and provides sound basis for the four main distinguishing features of these armies: their truly popular (narodnyy) character, the friendship and fraternity between peoples, and the friendship of the peoples of all the countries of socialism and of the armies of fraternal internationalism toward the working class and the toilers of the non-socialist countries. These traits of the armies of the socialist countries find their generalized expression in their spiritual aspect, in moral and political superiority to the armies of the bourgeois states.

The book gives much attention to revealing and substantiating such important principles of Soviet military development as increasing the leading role of the Communist Party in the life and activity of the armed forces, and strengthening the activity and influence of the party organizations in the army and navy. The great importance of the decisions of the October (1964) and subsequent Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the development of our armed forces is emphasized. The authors call attention to the importance of systematic, well-provided party-political work.

The new edition examines in detail the conditions, causes and factors determining the course and outcome of military operations and of a war as a whole (Chapter 6). Unquestionably praiseworthy is the fact that in the exposition of these very important military-philosophical problems the authors proceed not from formulas and diagrams put out by somebody, sometime, but from present-day actual conditions. They trace the dependence of the military power of the state on the level of the economy, the degree of development of natural and social sciences, the psychological and political state of the society, and the fighting power of the armed forces, and on the relative power of the forces of the opposing sides. In bringing to light these problems, the criticisms and desires expressed in judging previous editions are taken into account. In particular, a new, very important section on the modern revolution in the military field and its effect on the military power of states (or coalitions), is included. The authors strive to reveal the causes and essential nature of this revolution and its decisive effect on the military power of states.

Examining the role of scientific and engineering progress in the radical changes which have occurred in the military field, in the methods and forms of waging armed conflict, the authors stress the influence of politics and ideology on these changes: "The present revolution in the military field began and continues on two diametrically opposing social-political bases and under different ideological influences" (p. 248).

We must not fail to note the interesting and, in our opinion, profound exposition of the economic bases of the military power of the state. The authors correctly emphasize that the role of economic conditions in a thermonuclear war has not only substantially increased but also has essentially changed. Now the possession in advance of the necessary stock of nuclear charges and the means of delivering them to targets has assumed special importance, especially various types of missiles, and also other modern weapons and all possible materiel necessary for waging war.

A definite virtue of the book is the thorough study by the authors of the dependence of military power not only on the development of natural sciences and engineering, but also on that of social sciences. The book shows, in particular, the enormous influence of the social sciences. The

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book shows, in particular, the enormous importance of the social sciences, the nucleus of which is Marxism-Leninism, and also scientific research in such currently leading branches of natural science as nuclear physics, radioelectronics, cybernetics, chemistry of high-molecular compounds, biology, and others. On this basis, the authors consider the scientific potential of a country (or a coalition) to be "the level and rate of development of scientific thought, its capability of rapid and effective solution of problems of the development of society and of science itself. This includes natural, social, and military sciences" (p. 275).

In studying the psychological (moral'no-) and political bases of military power, the authors define the essence and content of the morale of the people and the army and of the morale (moral'nyy) potential, and explain the influence of the social-political system and the war aims on the morale of peoples and armies, showing the increase in importance of the morale factor in a nuclear missile war.

The reader will find much that is new and instructive in that part of the book which considers the essence and the elements of the combat power of the armed forces. Here a sociological analysis of the problems presented is based on a great amount and variety of information on modern military developments.

The concluding chapter (Chapter 7), "Marxist-Leninist Doctrine on War, and Problems of Methodology of Soviet Military Theory," appears for the first time in this work. The authors examine the most important principles of methodology of Soviet military science, arising from the laws and basic categories of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, especially the categories of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army. Interesting and important problems are presented, the solution of which will promote further strengthening and development of the fruitful union of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and Soviet military science. Not everything in this chapter has been brought up to the required level. There still is not the necessary consistency and logical harmony in the exposition of the problems posed; certain formulations are unclear. But what has been done certainly deserves favorable comment.

We should also speak of some general defects of the book. First of all, it is too long (384 pages). This is due, in our opinion, not so much to the multitude of problems dealt with as it is to the unevenness of exposition. Some chapters are very long-drawn-out. For example, in the third chapter ("Wars in Defense of the Socialist Fatherland"), as mentioned above, there is much material having only a remote connection with the subject: discussions of the distinguishing features of a socialist fatherland, the role of the masses of the people in history and in the struggle for socialism, etc. As a result the length of the book has been unjustifiably extended by 45 pages. In addition, there are repetitions in the book. Probably the:

editors are primarily to blame for this. For example, both the third and fifth chapters deal with the combat cooperation of armies of the socialist countries. On pages 150 and 293 the same quotation from Lenin is given.

From our brief review of this book, it may be concluded that the authors have created a useful and important scientific work, in which are set forth the most important achievements of Marxist-Leninist theory, at its present level of development, on war and the army. The book will serve as a good textbook for ideological-theoretical training of officers.

CPYRGHT

The problem of a uniform understanding of military terms has frequently been brought up in Voyennaya Mysl', since in the postwar years a great many new words and concepts have been added to military language. A main characteristic of military language, as of any other professional language, is the rapid addition to it of new terms, produced by the revolution in science and engineering. New words, upon becoming professional terms, acquire an unambiguous meaning necessary for them and distinguish a certain concept from bordering ones. Terms, especially military ones, should not permit of more than one interpretation, especially within the bounds of current military doctrine.

The existence of specialized terms makes possible great brevity in military speech, since it makes it possible to convey briefly complicated concepts, the explanation of which would otherwise require many words and much elucidation. People who know the meanings of the terms easily grasp the meaning of regulations and manuals, and of military theoretical literature, and as a consequence uniformity of understanding is developed and the process of thinking is expedited. In the conditions of today, when military operations have become rapid-moving, and abrupt changes in the situation require of command personnel firm, resourceful and continuous direction of the troops under them, a common, uniform understanding of military terms is becoming all the more important.

Unfortunately, not all our terms are understood in the same way by everybody. Such a situation is intolerable. Now, as never before, there is required absolute uniformity in this, for which there is also necessary a single dictionary of military terms.

The first postwar publication of such a dictionary was undertaken in 1958². Unfortunately, for all its virtues, the dictionary expressed the point of view of its compilers, which could not be shared by all. We need a dictionary which has codified ["legalized"] the principle persisting military terms and made them uniform and obligatory for all. Such a dictionary, in our opinion, should be small, and should include primarily those terms needed for the command of troops.

1. Slovar' osnovnykh voyennykh terminov (Dictionary of Basic Military Terms. Voenizdat, 1965, 248 pp.
2. Kratkiy slovar' operativno-takticheskikh i obshchevovennykh slov (terminov) (Brief Dictionary of Operational-Tactical and General Military Words (Terms)). Voenizdat, 1958, 324 pp.

PYROHT

The recently published Slovar' osnovnykh voyennykh terminov (Dictionary of Basic Military Terms), despite defects in it, with which we will deal below, undoubtedly will be of positive value and will help to attain a uniform understanding of many terms. The dictionary will be a valuable training aid for the training of young military cadres, and to a certain extent it can be used by scholars and military editors, although both the latter would undoubtedly be better served by a military encyclopedia, in the publication of which a wide range of Soviet readers is now interested.

In the main, the dictionary being reviewed reflects the changes which have taken place since the publication of its predecessor. Operational terminology is widely represented in it. However, along with the obvious virtues of this book, it is not lacking in defects which should be taken into account in subsequent editions of books of this kind.

First, it should be noted that the authors in many items draw a parallel between operational art and tactics, thinking that those characteristic traits inherent in a battle are to an equal degree inherent in an operation. They do not even try to find the difference between them -- those characteristic features which are typical of each of these phenomena taken separately.

The dictionary is guilty of inexact and, in places, not entirely correct definitions.

Thus, for example, "artillery instrumental reconnaissance" (AIR) is treated in the dictionary as "a constituent part of ground artillery reconnaissance" (p. 15). One asks, why only ground? It is well known that not only in the conditions of today, but also in wars it has been a part also of air artillery reconnaissance.

On the next page "artillery observation" is explained as "a means of reconnaissance of the enemy consisting of observation of the enemy from ground artillery observation points." Again the question arises: why only from ground points? Has not artillery observation been conducted, and is it not conducted, from the air? For this there exists special spotting planes, and besides these, during a number of past wars balloons were sent up for artillery observation. Incidentally, it should also be pointed out that the term "observation," one of the most important methods of reconnaissance, is not in the dictionary.

The dictionary states that a "ballistic rocket (raket) (p. 22) is a means of destruction. That is true. It may carry a nuclear, chemical, or conventional warhead. But the raket is primarily a means of delivery. Therefore it would be more correct to consider it just as a means of delivery.

The compilers have confused the concept of "blocking" (blokirovaniye) with "encirclement." The former only preceded the latter; it is not identical with it. Besides, "blocking" is of briefer duration than "encirclement,"

and is carried out with fewer forces with the aim of temporarily depriving the enemy of the possibility of maneuver in outer directions.

PYRGHT

"Combat training" (boyeвая podgotovka) is defined as "teaching to various categories of service personnel, podrazdeleniya, chasty, soyedineniya, and staffs the carrying out of combat operations, and to rear agencies ---their rear support." The question arises: to whom does "their" refer? To the rear agencies themselves? Here, obviously, striving for brevity has not been justified. It would have been better to have said "the rear support of troops," but that definition, too, would be somewhat too narrow, since rear personnel also engage in their own protection and defense, and to a certain extent also must be taught to carry out combat activities, especially repulsing surprise attacks of the enemy and protection against his means of destruction.

We cannot understand on what basis the authors say that a "military umpire" (voyskovoy posrednik) is designed only for troop or command-and-staff exercises involving two sides (p. 54). Military umpires are also designated for exercises involving only one side.

A "second echelon," in the opinion of the authors, is: "a part of the operational formation or combat order of troops not participating directly, at a given moment, in the engagement (battle)" (p. 56). In the circumstances of today such a definition cannot be considered correct. The second echelon, even before entry into the engagement, may often wage battle, carrying out such missions as fighting against enemy forces which have broken through, and against his landing assaults, carrying out encirclement and destruction of forces remaining in our rear, etc.

Combat aviation never has been attached to soyedineniya, especially not under the conditions of today. Its great speeds do not permit it to be used in the zone of operations of a soyedineniye, and the compilers of the dictionary should have remembered this; under "combined-arms battle" they treat this subject incorrectly (p. 145).

In the opinion of the compilers, a "march security detachment" (pokhodnaya zastava) can only be an advance party or a flank party (p. 176). This is not entirely accurate. A rear party (tyl'naya pokhodnaya zastava) also has every right to exist.

A "reconnaissance patrol" is sent out not only from a reconnaissance detachment, as is asserted in the dictionary (p. 194), but also from a reconnaissance group. Besides, in considering the term "reconnaissance patrol" one cannot ignore the existence also of the term, "combat reconnaissance patrol," and fail to tell, at least in general outlines, for what purpose and when it is sent out.

There are many such definitions in the dictionary which are mainly correct but are not complete. And this does not permit the meaning content of the

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terms to be clarified. For example, in explaining the term, "artillery group," the authors state that it is created for the accomplishment of missions in a battle (p. 15). They should have added: also in an operation, since these groups in the past war were created not only in an army, but even in a front. This is all the more important since a reader often encounters the term "artillery group" in military historical literature.

In considering "surprise" (vnezapnost') as one of the principles of the art of war (p. 39), it should have been stated that it operates in the course of a certain period of time, i.e., it has a beginning and an end.

Under "military reconnaissance" it would have been appropriate to add that, depending on the sphere in which it operates, it is subdivided into land, air, space, and sea reconnaissance.

In explaining the meaning of "further (subsequent) mission" (dal'-neyshaya [posledushchaya] zadacha), it should have been pointed out that in order to accomplish it, changes are necessary in the combat disposition (operational formation) and in the organization of cooperation (for example, entry into battle of the second echelon).

Unjustifiably narrow is the treatment of the term "operations research" (p. 99). The process of studying operations cannot consist only of mathematical methods. Many methods of scientific research are applicable here, including historical, logical, statistical, etc.

Under "defense of the sea coast" (p. 143) it is not indicated by whom this is carried out, and this is something that is most basic.

In explaining the meaning of "defensive operation" (p. 143), the authors say nothing about holding occupied lines. This mission under modern conditions is not taken away from defending forces.

In defining the term "operational coordination" an important feature was overlooked -- the operations of troops, as distinguished from tactical coordination, outside of coordination of fire (ognevaya svyaz). On the same page, under "operational ob'yedineniye" they might have mentioned that its composition is not permanent.

The term "reconnaissance group" (p. 194), in our opinion, should have been defined more broadly. Reconnaissance groups may be formed also for searches and ambushes. When necessary reconnaissance groups may carry out their own combat missions.

There are also explanations in the dictionary which, because they are too general and in places not definite enough, cannot satisfy the reader. For example, in defining "advance guard" (p. 5), they should have said for what kind of march it is detailed. You see, in addition to an advance

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guard, assigned for a march in the direction of the front, in a flank march there is also detailed a flank advance guard. It is important also to answer the questions: is an advance guard always designated in carrying out a march, and who has the responsibility of guarding the troops if an advance guard is not detailed? What organizations detail from their own forces an advance guard, and for what purpose? It would have been good to state the composition of an advance guard, and by what principles one should be guided in designating it.

There should have been fuller explanation also of the designation of a "rear guard." It is detailed not only for a march from the front to the rear, but also in a withdrawal. Troops withdrawing from battle move back following the line of the rear guard. When necessary the rear guard engages in battle on intermediate lines of defense, in order to delay the enemy long enough for disengagement of the main forces. It is also important to tell which organizations of the defense detail a rear guard from their own forces, and who covers those columns from which one is not detailed.

A very general explanation is given of the term "immediate mission" (blizhayshaya zadacha): "Depending on the situation, an immediate mission is destruction of means of nuclear attack, defeat of a main force of the enemy, and taking of targets, regions and lines, the seizure of which assures successful accomplishment of the further (subsequent) mission" (p 25). In our opinion, definition of this mission should not be given apart from its relation to the general combat mission. Besides, there should have been a statement of the principles which underlie the breakdown of the general combat mission into a number of ones to be accomplished in sequence. Considering that the meaning of "immediate mission" in podrazdeleniya, chasty, and soyedineniya (not to mention ob'yedineniya) is very different, it seems inappropriate to us to put under this term one version of an immediate mission, since it may mislead some officers, who will take what is recommended as an obligatory standard.

In speaking of "kinds of battle" (p. 39), they might have named them, and indicated the basic principles of classification. On the same page, under "kinds of armed forces," they should have stressed that the distinguishing feature of any kind of armed forces is its capability of carrying on independent operations. The foreign term, "zone of combat operations" (p. 87), is not thoroughly explained. First, this zone can also include coastal regions, and consequently there can develop in it not only combat operations of ground forces, but of naval forces as well. The latter, as a rule, support the ground forces, of which the conduct of war by the US army is convincing evidence.

Second, the compilers are of the opinion that a zone of combat operations is occupied only by field armies and army corps. But it can also be occupied by groups of armies. It all depends on the scale of combat operations and the operational size of the theater itself.

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Third, if the compilers include the term "zone of combat operations," why do they not give the term "zone of communications," which is the second constituent part of a theater of military operations?

Under "objective laws of war" (p. 145) there should have been stated the particulars of their application in war. They are manifested in the form of principles, and it would have been appropriate to point this out under "principles of the art of war" (p. 179).

There is too brief exposition of the term, "alerting of troops" (opoveshcheniye voysk). The most important thing will not be clear to the reader: how and when it is done, and what means are used for this.

In the preface it is stated that the compilers made use of Kratkiy slovar' operativno-takticheskikh obshchevoynnykh slov (terminov) (Brief Dictionary of Operational and Tactical and General Military Words (Terms)). So they did. But it is too bad that they did not listen to the voice of criticism. A study of the reviews of the 1958 dictionary would have enabled them to avoid some defects. For example, in one of the reviews of the 1958 dictionary the absence of the term "voyennoye delo" [military affairs: the military field] is pointed out. It often occurs in our literature, but is not understood by everybody in the same way. And the authors of the new dictionary should have included it.

On the whole, the book we are reviewing will be useful to our generals and officers and is a necessary one for their libraries.

CPYRGHT