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(by Vice Adm. V. Yakovlev)

CPYRGHT

In the last few years the military press has illuminated problems of the strategic use of naval forces in modern warfare in the battle against the enemy naval strike forces in his bases and in remote ocean and sea regions. There have been many articles, especially in the foreign press, devoted to the most difficult problems of combating atomic missile submarines at sea. The great attention to these problems and the definite interest on the part of the readers is justifiable, since in one way or another they reflect the main substance of naval actions in wartime.

Moreover the questions of joint naval and ground force operations in coastal areas under conditions of nuclear warfare and in limited wars have, in our opinion, not yet been elucidated in the necessary manner. At times one encounters statements that such operations have lost their former meaning because the ground troops with their high maneuverability and nuclear rockets do not require the support of naval forces. In the book Voyemaya Strategiya (Military Strategy) it is stated that the navy cannot be attached to ground theaters of operation "since under present-day conditions it is chiefly called upon to fight on the high seas, frequently far removed from the ground theaters of military operations.

This statement, correct in principle, does not at all mean that the problems of naval support to the ground troops in coastal areas should not be given serious consideration. It is pointed out on page 400 of the same book that "although the task of support to ground troops will not be one of the chief missions of the navy, its execution demands considerable efforts."

In connection with this we would like to point out on the basis of the experience of the Great Patriotic War, and also considering the level of preparation of the navy, its equipment status and the views of foreign specialists on the use of naval forces, the meaning and nature of joint naval and ground operations in modern warfare.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the outcome of which was decided on the ground fronts in Europe, the Soviet Navy directed its main efforts toward active support from the sea of the ground troops, at first in defensive and then in offensive operations in the coastal areas. Many examples can be cited of well-organized and skillfully conducted joint combat operations of ground and naval forces, which had an exceptionally great significance in the course of campaigns and the war as a whole.

Black Sea Fleet activities supported the troops defending Odessa, Sevastopol' and the North Caucasus, the Baltic Fleet -- the troops defending the Moonzund Islands, Hanko Peninsula and Leningrad, and the Northern Fleet -- the troops on the Rybachiy Peninsula. Without such support it would have been impossible to have had such a long, stubborn heroic defense of these and other cities and areas, which checked the onslaught and tied down for a long time huge numbers of German troops operating in the coastal areas.

With the move of the central fronts to the offensive, joint amphibious operations in the areas of Novorossiysk, on the Kerchenskiy Peninsula, and in the Baltic and Barents Sea permitted us in a comparatively short time to crack the reinforced defense of the Fascist German troops in the coastal areas and to mount a decisive offensive there also.

In the course of the war the Soviet Navy, actively supporting the defensive and offensive operations of the ground forces in the coastal areas, reliably secured their strategic flanks from enemy naval strikes. Chiefly for this reason the Hitlerite naval forces were not able even once during the war to attack our coast from the sea, even though they had a large number of special landing ships, surface gun boats and a considerable quantity of planes.

It must be said that many statements from the experience of the organization and execution of joint naval and ground force operations conducted during the Great Patriotic War preserve a practical value even now. In our opinion they are fully applicable in the combat and operational training of the coastal military district troops and naval forces.

The joint ground and naval combat operations in modern warfare have in their goals missions and scale a tactical, operational and even a strategic nature.

The article examines the joint operations of naval and ground forces which have chiefly an operational nature, i.e. such operations subordinated to the achievement of operational goals of unions of these types of armed forces conducting the war in the coastal areas of the ground fronts.

Questions on the joint operations of the navy and ground troops now occupy one of the important places in the military training of the armed forces of the USA and other NATO countries. Military leadership in the US devotes much attention to this.

According to the foreign press many exercises of the last few years have regularly worked problems of the support by carrier strike commands of the US and England to ground troops in coastal areas after a redevelopment of these commands following an execution of missions by them in a so-called "all-out nuclear attack." Much attention is given along with this

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to carrying out landings in different theaters with participation by units and commands of marines, landing forces and equipment, aviation and combat ships.

American naval specialists consider that combat operations of landing forces during sea movement and in the landing phase must be supported by naval strike forces, and above all by carrier strike commands.

Speaking before officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, US Secretary of the Navy Nitze briefly laid out the sequence of a typical, in his opinion, operation of the 1970's: "After aviation of the carrier commands has lowered the combat potential of the enemy air forces to an acceptable level, modernized landing forces are landed to seize the areas of interest." Speaking on the most immediate aspects of training for troop landings, Nitze pointed out that in the early 1970s the US Navy will be capable of moving and landing the echelons of an entire division and a Marine air wing onto enemy territory, delivering them to the landing area with a speed of 20 knots. It is envisaged that by 1975 these figures will have doubled.

It is considered that the US naval forces will have to carry out different missions in the most varied regions of the earth. Commander-in-Chief of Amphibious Forces of the US Atlantic Fleet Vice-Admiral J. McCain, in the article "Naval Landing Operations in the Next Decade," says that amphibious landings are now and will remain in the future one of the basic forms of combat activity of the Navy, and that the readiness for their conduct will as before have for the US Navy a vitally important significance.

Thus in devoting great attention to the training of navy and marine forces for landing operations, the American military leadership is going on the basic strategic concept expressed by the words of Admiral Ricketts which have a frankly aggressive nature: "We must have such naval forces as will allow us to carry the fight -- both at sea and on the ground -- to the enemy's territory."

An active partner of the US in NATO, West Germany is also pushing for the landing training of troops. The West German government plans to purchase in the USA 300 helicopters to be used above all for the rapid transfer of ground units and landing elements. One of the missions of the West German Navy is considered to be the landing of amphibious forces.

All military conflicts in the last 15 years in which the USA has been the aggressor have been characterized by a thrust from the sea by American ground troops and marines in the capacity of amphibious landing forces for crushing national liberation and revolutionary movements in countries which have taken an independent path of development.

Such operations took place, for example, in September 1950 in Korea, when the US Navy landed a major amphibious force of 35,000 men. The landing was supported by 300 ships of various classes and more than 800 planes. In July 1958 the American Navy landed 5,000 marines in the port of Beirut to put down a liberation movement in Lebanon. During the Caribbean crisis in October-November 1962 the same kind of US amphibious landing force was in the waters of the Caribbean in readiness to land on the coast of free Cuba. In the course of an aggressive colonial war against the people of South Vietnam, who are struggling for freedom and independence, the US Seventh Fleet in March 1965 landed 3,500 marines in South Vietnam, and carrier aviation together with Air Force units continues the piratical raids on the populated points in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

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Great changes in the character and depth of joint naval and ground operations in coastal areas were introduced with the rearmament of naval ships and aircraft with nuclear missiles capable of destroying at long range not only sea, but also ground targets, and also the equipping of ground troops with rockets of various types and with quick-moving motorized means.

As is known, naval support of ground troops in the past was conducted with the aim of facilitating the movement of units and soyeдини-и-е along the coast, or of defending them in particular against landings or strikes by enemy surface vessels from the sea. In operations supporting ground troops from the sea the most important navy missions were the landing of tactical and operational forces, fire support of units and soyeдинеи-е with ships' guns, destruction of the enemy naval forces supporting his troops, interdiction of sea lines of communication supplying the enemy troops operating on the coast, and also the defense of sea communications supplying the friendly ground troops.

It seems to us that in a nuclear war the principle forms of conducting joint naval-ground troops operations are preserved. However the rate and depth of such operations is increased considerably, and the missions executed by the navy take on another content.

Joint navy and ground forces operations in modern warfare find no less broad an application than in earlier wars in offensive and defensive operations of the troops of a front in coastal areas. They can be of the nature of daily combat operations or of differing operations, for example the destruction of enemy naval forces opposing the friendly ground troops on the coast; providing amphibious landings on the coast and on islands; repulsing landings; destruction of enemy ground elements which have been surrounded and forced to the sea; securing the sea movements of troops and cargo to friendly forces operating on the coast; disruption and destruction of enemy sea shipments.

In connection with the development of long range forces and long range means of destruction (rockets and aircraft), naval operations in support of coastal ground troops encompass not only the coastal zone of the sea, but also spread to its distant regions.

Let us examine in this regard the solution of a problem in joint operations such as the destruction of the naval forces of one side which are opposing from the sea the ground troops of the other combatant

During the Second World War ground troops operating along a coast were subject to gunfire from surface ships from distances of 30-35 kilometers and bombing by carrier and shore-based aviation from distances of two to three hundred kilometers. In this regard naval support of ground troops by the destruction of enemy ships bombarding the shore with guns or bombing it with carrier aircraft were in the nature of shore operations of surface torpedo-gun boats, cutters, occasionally submarines, and also mine-torpedo and bomber aircraft.

Under present-day conditions ground troops can be struck from the sea by long-range missiles from surface ships, and in a number of instances even from submarines ("Polaris" - type missiles), from considerable distances -- 2000 kilometers and more. Carrier aircraft in support of ground troops can operate from distances of up to 2500 kilometers. The presence in the navy of atomic submarines and naval rocket and anti-submarine aircraft armed with long-range rockets and improved means of search, detection and destruction of the unfriendly missile submarines allows us to destroy the naval strike forces of the hostile side in remote regions of the seas and oceans beyond the range of their weapons (missiles and carrier-based aircraft) which could be used against the ground troops ashore.

Missile and gun surface ships, torpedo cutters and naval shore missile installations can be successfully used independently and in conjunction with ground troop rocket units and aviation for the destruction of the enemy naval strike forces operating against ground troops in the coastal area

Consequently the depth of naval support to the offensive operations of ground troops in a coastal area has increased many times. If before it was limited by a width of the coastal area calculated in tens of kilometers, then now it has increased to hundreds and even thousands of kilometers and can exceed the range of fire of enemy missiles and the radius of action of his aviation.

A characteristic trend of modern military operations at sea is their ever increasing connection with the battle on land. This can then explain the increase in the number of amphibious landing operations in the Second World War as compared with the First. If in the First Im-

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perialist War five landings was made. The number of landings was approximately 600, with 14 of them having strategic goals.

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Nuclear and other means of mass destruction, if examined in a military-scientific perspective, do not lower the actuality of amphibious landing operations on coasts and islands as a more active form of joint naval and ground forces operations and of unions of other types of armed forces.

The landing of amphibious tactical and operational elements on a shore, on a flank and in the rear of a defender in order to support the movement of attacking ground troops will also find broad application in nuclear warfare. The use of amphibious landing forces to seize fortified islands having an operational, and at times a strategic significance will in a number of cases be the only means of possessing them

A distinguishing feature of modern amphibious landings are the high rates of sea movement and landing ashore, provided in the navy by new high-speed landing ships and landing equipment, and also by the effective neutralization of the enemy antilanding defense by nuclear missile strikes of the naval forces and aviation. The speed of these means have doubled in comparison with those of the Second World War. This allows a shorter time of movement and delivery of the landing forces to the points of landing, and also an increase in their maneuverability in avoiding the attacks of submarines and of surface forces of the defending side during the sea movement.

The use of special ships -- landing helicopter carriers and landing ship-docks -- in landing operations makes it possible to begin the landing of advance detachments ashore from ships located beyond the range of shore artillery and to land these detachments by helicopter and high-speed landing craft in a short period of time. Landing helicopter carriers and ship-docks can take the personnel and combat equipment of the first landing waves from an unprepared shore and land them on an unprepared coast by helicopter and high-speed landing craft. This considerably shortens the time for delivery and landing of the landing elements, and also decreases the possible losses due to actions of the antilanding defense forces of the enemy.

In addition, according to the views established in a number of countries, the development of ship power systems, the introduction of new principles of engine operation, and the construction of ships and landing craft, for example in the USA, of the hydrofoil and air cushion types permit an increase by several times in the speed of sea movement and support the impetus of landing the forces ashore

It is held that an amphibious landing will be preceded by a nuclear blow by the attacker on the objectives of the defender. Thus, in parti-

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of a landing by amphibious elements onto shore immediately after powerful nuclear strikes are inflicted (all-out nuclear offensive) to seize certain areas and to support offensive operations of ground troops.

For this purpose the American navy has in its arsenal approximately 240 large, although slow-speed, landing craft of Second World War vintage, which are gradually being replaced by new ones with improved equipment and rate of speed of 20 knots. In addition the US Navy has six landing helicopter carriers, of which three have been reequipped from aircraft carriers of the "Essex" type and three are of the new "Iwo Jima" type of special construction (two helicopter carriers of this type are being constructed). Each of these ships has a water displacement of approximately 18000 tons, a speed of 20 knots, and is capable of moving and landing by helicopter 2000 men with equipment. The USA is building landing transport-docks with displacement of 13,900 tons and a speed of 20 knots. Each of them is capable of transporting and landing approximately 1000 men and up to 2000 tons of cargo on special floating craft

The basic nucleus of the landing forces, in the opinion of the Americans, will be the marines, who will be landed in the first wave. The ground force units have the mission of widening the captured beachhead and are landed in the second and following waves.

In conducting major present-day landing operations it is considered that all classes of military ships and craft and all types of naval weapons can be used. The views of the Americans are, for example, that during the landing aircraft carriers will carry out air defense tasks and will provide direct air support and antisubmarine defense to the landing detachments. Cruisers and destroyers have the tasks of fire support for the landing and antisubmarine and air defense. Submarines may land reconnaissance elements ashore and participate in the fight against enemy submarines. Minesweepers fulfill the mission of clearing the beach approaches of mines. Special material-technical supply ships and craft under these conditions allow the landing forces to operate for long periods without returning to base.

The nature and peculiarities of conducting amphibious operations in support of offensive ground forces can be seen in the experience of the major exercises of the American armed forces.

The landing of the first wave is to be accomplished by helicopters from the landing helicopter carriers and also by amphibious landing craft from cargo transports, troop transports and special landing ship-docks. After the cargo transports, troop transports and special landing ship-docks. After the first wave is landed the large tank landing craft approach the shore and discharge heavy combat materiel and equipment. In order to exclude the possibility of large losses of landing forces from

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forces must be widely dispersed and the coastal sectors designated for
landing spots must be widely separated one from the other

Recently, according to foreign press reports, the intensity of training in landing operations in the US Navy has noticeably increased. Several major amphibious landing exercises have been conducted. One of them was the combined exercise of the naval forces of the US and Spain under the title "Steel Pike-1" in October 1964. A reinforced US marine division numbering 25,000 men was transported across the Atlantic and landed on the southwest coast of Spain in an area to the north of the port of Cadiz. In addition the landing included the participation of a reinforced battalion of Spanish marines numbering 1800 men. The exercise included the participation of approximately 120 combat ships, landing transports and craft of the US Military Sea Transport Service (including approximately 50 landing and transport ships, 30 combat ships, 15 rear supply ships and the strike aircraft carrier "Independence") and also 14 ships and craft of the Spanish navy.

The struggle for sea communications will always be an inalienable part of naval operations in support of ground troops of the coast front. The securing of sea routes of supply of cargo and reinforcements to the troops operating in coastal areas has been and undoubtedly will be one of the important missions of the navy. On the successful accomplishment of this in a number of cases will depend the success of ground force operations, both offensive and defensive, along the coast.

The necessity arises in ground force offensive operations in coastal areas for the navy to provide sea delivery to the landed forces of reinforcements and cargo until the moment that they link up with the troops of the front.

The combat assurance of uninterrupted supply to commands of the ground troops and other arms of the armed forces situated on islands can become one of the most important functions of the naval forces in joint operations or in everyday combat operations.

In the organization and conduct of ground force defensive operations in coastal areas the operations of the naval forces in securing sea shipments of reinforcements and cargo will find a broad application when only sea routes of communication can be used because of the geographic and operational conditions of the situation.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War the operations of our Navy in securing sea shipments of reinforcements and supply cargoes to the troops defending Odessa and Sevastopol' on the Black Sea, the Oranienbaum beachhead and the islands in the Gulf of Finland, the Rybachiy Peninsula in the Barents Sea and many others, had a decisive effect on the success of the land operations.

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It is also known how important a role was played by the Ladoga Military Flotilla in providing the "The Road of Life" to blockaded Leningrad and the forces of the Lenin-grad front.

The combat operations of naval forces in securing sea shipments of troops and cargoes can in a number of instances become entire operations in which, in addition to naval ships and aircraft, there will be participation by soyedineniyes and units of the air defense of the country, rocket troops and front aviation.

The air defense of convoys of transports during sea movement is one of the important forms of combat security of sea shipments of troops and cargoes demanding the joint efforts of the navy and the front. The systematic operations of naval forces in disrupting or destroying sea shipments supplying the opposing enemy coastal command have a direct influence on the stability of this command and will facilitate a successful troop of offensive in the coastal areas.

Coordinated operations for the encirclement and destruction of a hostile enemy command forced to the sea can have an important place in joint naval and ground force operations in coastal areas. The naval forces in this case may be faced with the tasks of a sea blockade of the forces surrounded on land, the prohibition of the delivery of reinforcements and supplies, and also the destruction of combat ships and transports in an attempt at evacuation by sea. The use in these operations of ships and naval aircraft armed with rockets with nuclear and conventional warheads will afford the possibility of inflicting from long ranges and with high accuracy powerful destructive blows on the ports and assembly points of the enemy troops and of formations of transport and combat ships of the enemy at sea.

A classic example of such operations from the history of the Great Patriotic War is the joint operation of troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, the Independent Coastal Army and the Black Sea Fleet in liquidating a major command of Fascist German troops cut off in the Crimea during the period 3 through 13 May 1944. Thanks to a skillfully organized and successfully executed coordinated action of our naval and ground forces in this operation, the Fascist German command did not succeed in the planned evacuation of its troops from Sevastopol'. The German 17th Army lost more than 100,000 dead and captured and did not succeed in arriving at the Yassko-Kishinev area. Moreover all the enemy equipment was left in the Crimea.

Combat operations of submarines, torpedo cutters and aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet in destroying at sea the enemy means of transport of troops and supplies disrupted the sea delivery of enemy reinforcements. This supported the success of our ground forces in the rout of the

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While supporting the ground troops in coastal areas, the navy could receive the mission of disruption or destruction of shipments of reinforcements and supplies to the forces of the opposing enemy command.

With a poorly developed railroad and highway network ashore where the enemy forces are operating, the use of sea routes of communication for the shipment of reinforcements, ammunition and provisions acquires an exceptionally important significance. This significance is increased and becomes decisive in the instance where the transfer of troop supplies to the front lines by air (helicopters or fixed wing aircraft) for any particular reasons is hindered, quite limited or entirely precluded.

According to figures in the American press, the requirement in supplies for one infantryman comprises an average of not less than 12 tons per month. Consequently, for the supply of one reinforced division numbering 25,000 men, it would require a monthly sea delivery of not less than 30,000 tons of various cargoes. A decrease in the quantity of military cargo delivered by sea and a lowering of this norm could sharply lower the combat capability of units and sovedineniyes of the ground forces. Sea shipments of troops and cargoes preserve their urgency also because military equipment of larger sizes can be delivered to the troops in this way. This cannot be achieved by air shipment.

Under these conditions the active combat of naval forces supporting ground troops with an aim of disrupting or destroying hostile sea shipments acquires great meaning. Atomic missile submarines and naval rocket-carrying aircraft are capable of inflicting powerful nuclear missile blows on the ports and transport delivery and pick-up points. Enemy convoys and single transports crossing the sea can be subjected to strikes of missile and torpedo submarines, naval rocket-carrying and long range aircraft, and also surface missile ships, and on the approaches to delivery ports can in addition be subjected to strikes by rocket and torpedo cutters and shore missile installations which are mobile.

It is known from the experience of the Great Patriotic War that thanks to the active operations of the submarines, aircraft and torpedo cutters of the Northern Fleet against the German sea routes of communication along the north coast of Norway a great number of hostile transports with troops and cargoes making deliveries of reinforcements to the front lines were sunk. Having encountered the stiff defense of our troops and not being in receipt of the necessary reinforcements by sea, the Fascist German troops could not conduct active offensive operations in the north and were themselves forced to go over to a protracted defense of almost the very same positions from which they had begun the war.

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Operations to repulse amphibious landings --- antilanding operations -- acquire a special urgency along with amphibious landings in the sphere of joint naval and ground force operations.

During the Second World War, in spite of the great possibilities of one side to organize a decisive resistance and to take measures to destroy a landing attempt by the other side, there was not one instance where a strategic amphibious landing was disrupted and only two instances where Japanese landings were foiled --- on Midway and in Port Moresby (New Guinea). The success of all the strategic landings was explained not by a weakness in the means of combating the landings, but by the generally favorable military-political situation for the invaders. Thus it was in the Norway operation conducted by the Germans, during the Japanese landings on islands in the Pacific, and in the course of Anglo-American landings in North Africa, Italy, Normandy and other areas.

As was shown by the Second World War, antilanding operations were a more complex form of military operations. The special difficulty in organizing an antilanding operation arose because reconnaissance data on the intentions and actions of the enemy making the landing was delayed. The difficulties in the timely discovery of the intentions about the landing operation forced the defenders to deploy their forces in various formations on a broad front, while the attacking side concentrated overwhelming naval and air forces on a relatively narrow sector of the front and there successfully overcame the antilanding defense.

Under present conditions with technical means of reconnaissance and long range detection of a landing at sea, highly maneuverable high-speed striking forces of the navy and air force, and also missiles with nuclear and conventional warheads, there are opportunities to detect the enemy in a timely manner and by the joint efforts of the navy and commands of other arms of the armed forces to break up his landing at sea, far from the approach to the landing area.

The chief conditions for the successful conduct of antilanding operations are well organized and constant reconnaissance and observation in the naval theater, which permits the timely detection of preparations for the landing and the deployment of forces for its repulse, and also a high state of readiness of naval forces in cooperation with aviation, ground troops and combinations of other arms of the armed forces for the rout of the landing attempt at sea. There will be great significance in a precisely organized and centrally located control of the forces in the operation, which assures the timely and successful direction of strike commands of the naval forces (atomic submarines, aircraft and surface missile ships) and the infliction of coordinated powerful blows against the landing detachments of the enemy at sea.

The success of joint operations by the navy, ground troops and

other arms of the armed forces. Successful amphibious landings will to a great degree depend on the well organized and practically prepared coordination of all forces taking part in the operations.

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An antilanding operation can begin with nuclear missile strikes from submarines, naval aviation and in some instances strategic missiles against ports and points of troop embarkation and loading of military equipment onto landing ships, as established by reconnaissance. The convoy and combat formations of the landing detachments during their movement at sea can be kept under the continual influence of faster atomic submarines and surface ships armed with missiles and long-range homing torpedoes with conventional and nuclear warheads, and also of carrier- and shore-based aviation. Using nuclear warheads of high gain it is possible to inflict great losses on the landing detachments.

In case a portion of the landing ships breaks through to the landing area, its final destruction will be accomplished by surface ships and naval shore-based missile installations, missile and artillery firepower of the ground troops, front aviation and combinations of the other arms of the armed forces.

The readiness of forces and means for antimissile and antiaircraft (including also antihelicopter) defense of the coastal regions, and also the defense of the ground forces and naval forces defending the coast against weapons of mass destruction takes on an exceptionally important meaning.

The joint operations of naval forces with the ground troops, conducted according to a unified plan, directed toward the achievement of a common operational or strategic goal, united by a common idea and mutually agreed upon for time, place and strike objectives, are the highest form of coordinated actions of soviedinenives and combinations of various arms of the armed forces.

Further improvement and development of the details of the methods of joint operations of naval and ground forces will raise even higher the level of combat readiness of our armed forces.

1. Voyennaya strategiya, edited by Marsu V.D., Voenizdat, 1963, p.370
2. Army-Navy-Air Force Journal and Register, January 18, 1964.
3. U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January, 1963, p. 105-111.
4. Ibid., p. 36.
5. Die Welt, August 28, 1964.
6. Navy Times, October 31, November 11, 18, 1964.

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CPYRGHT by Capt. 1st Rank A. Kvitnitskiy and Capt. (Res) Yu. Nepodayev

Recent events show that American ruling circles are expanding the scope of military preparations and are heating up the international situation to white heat. American imperialism cannot reconcile itself to the new distribution of forces in the world arena, with a weakening of its strategic positions and a decisive strengthening of the positions of the countries of the socialist community of nations.

US military thought is strenuously seeking ways and methods of struggle with the peaceful system of socialism. This has resulted in the appearance in the US of a great number of various military theories and concepts.

Considering it useless to give a critical analysis of each of them, we will dwell only on those concepts of modern military strategy which are current in the US at the present time and which are manifested in some degree in concrete actions of the political and military leadership of the US.

The highest political category which in the US determines the military strategic line of the US military command is the so-called national strategy. Its basis is the striving of US monopolistic capital to achieve world domination and destroy the world system of socialism. Therefore, of course, this strategy in its essence is not national. It is an expression of the aggressive aims of American imperialism and has nothing in common with the goals and tasks of the American nation.

US national strategy, in the form in which it appears at the present time in the works of American military theorists and speeches of US political leaders, is summed up in the formula of "protracted conflict." Its main content is active struggle, unlimited as to time, sphere or means, with the socialist camp and the states affiliated with it, in which "armed action against the communist system would always be considered along with political, educational and organizational measures directed toward the isolation and complete discrediting of the enemy."¹

According to US views, "protracted conflict" is made up of two closely inter-connected elements, the "cold war" and actual armed conflict.² The "cold war" has already been treated in our journal.³

The second element of US national strategy is actual armed conflict, or as it is often referred to by US military theoreticians, the "hot war."

In this field the primary role is assigned to strictly military strategy. It should be emphasized that the definition of military strategy as the officially accepted sum of views on the preparation for and conduct of

the achievement of certain military goals is considered obsolete in the US. It is remarked that "the changed nature of national strategy makes purely military strategy more impossible. In the field of national strategy there is no clearly defined line between the military and political spheres of conflict."⁴

In other words, US military theoreticians emphasize the continuity and organic unity of the political and military spheres of conflict. This phenomenon is called in the US the "politicalization of strategy", i.e., emphasizing the role of political factors in military strategy.⁵ Here it may be appropriate to present the military-philosophical definition of military strategy which in recent years has been accepted as "classic" in the West: "the working out for ourselves of a certain modus vivendi (in this case, from of actions) and the persistent imposition of it on the enemy so that any possible method of solving a problem by the enemy would be favorable for us and unacceptable to him."⁶

According to American views, this definition fairly completely reflects the content of the new US military strategy--the strategy of "flexible response," adopted in 1961 to replace the obsolete strategy of "massive retaliation."

However, when they say that the strategy of "massive nuclear retaliation" is obsolete, from this it should not be understood that it has outlived its time and has been consigned to the archives as unsuitable. This strategy has only been supplemented by the theory of "limited war", whose creators have tried to provide grounds for and justify the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. This theory has received official recognition, but nobody has rejected the strategy of "massive retaliation" or total nuclear war. They remain as the "highest, most destructive form of nuclear conflict."⁷ But even the theory of "limited war" has not encompassed the problem as a whole. There have continued searches for such a military strategy as would provide for the waging of wars of any kind: total nuclear, or limited, with or without the use of nuclear weapons.

Such a strategy, in American opinion, was that proclaimed by Kennedy and confirmed by Lyndon Johnson, of "flexible reaction," i.e., "a strategy making possible the elimination of various threats to American security, from direct attack on the territory of the US to subversive interference in the affairs of governments of any countries allied with the US."⁸

Consequently, the strategy of "flexible reaction" promotes still further expansion of the sphere of outbreak of armed conflicts and can result only in increase of international tension because of the increase in the number of potential hotbeds of war. The new US strategy, providing for "active response on all fronts" in anticipation of probable armed clashes, is entirely a result of the aggressive national strategy of the US in a general plan of carrying on a wide-scale and extensively planned "protracted conflict" with the socialist countries and the peoples who are

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What are the essential elements for carrying out the strategy of "flexible resistance"? US military theoreticians and leaders consider the first such element to be "dependable complexes of means of delivery of nuclear weapons to the targets; the second, "balanced armed forces, deployed abroad," the third, "a powerful US strategic reserve," the fourth, "effective means of transport;" and the fifth, "an effective system of air and anti-missile defense of the US."⁹

Thus the strategy of "flexible reaction" provides for various methods and principles of preparing for and waging armed conflicts. In particular, some of these methods are called for by the strategic concept of "counter-force." The essence of this concept is more clearly set forth in the works of H. Kahn, G. Snyder, T. Shelling, and A. Waskow.¹⁰

Thus, in Kahn's book, "On Thermonuclear War," it is stated that the strategic concept of "counter-force" envisages such a quantity of weapons as will make it possible: not only to strike a counter-blow in case of attack, but also to achieve victory."

According to this concept, "the military power of the US must stand in opposition to that of the enemy, and at the same time exceed it."¹¹ The creators of the concept of "counter-force, which is most prevalent in the US Air Force, assert that thermonuclear warfare on any scale may be conducted by the method of "counter-force," i.e., without affecting a great part of the population and social structure of the warring countries,"¹² but directing blows only at military targets.

This concept has been further developed in the works of T. Shelling and Waskow, and, in particular, of the staff of the Hudson Institute, a research organization which analyzes international and military problems, the director of which is H. Kahn.

Now it may be said that the strategy of "flexible reaction" combines the most varied methods and means of waging armed conflict, with and without nuclear weapons. This strategy, as follows from the statements of American theoreticians and of the US military-political leadership, cannot be derived from a single concept or method of waging war. It is rather a collection of those concepts and methods from which the politician or the strategist is to choose those most appropriate to a given concrete situation. "The main success of our strategy," writes T. Shelling, "is the categorical nature of threats. He who makes a threat must not refrain from the actions called for by the threat if the enemy has paid no attention to it."¹³

A consistent, gradual increase of threats and military efforts in carrying out the strategy of "flexible response" should be, in the opinion

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of US military theory, the theory of escalation, which is applied both to the hot and the cold war. As H. Kahn says escalation is a consistent increase of the scale of threats and military pressures in a limited conflict under conditions where it is not possible for the opposing side, at each given moment, to counter with even greater pressure. In other words, escalation is "competition in risk to be taken by one's own side."¹⁴

Escalation finds application primarily in conditions of international military-political crises and military intervention in the affairs of underdeveloped countries. A typical example of putting this theory into practice is the US intervention in Vietnam. "US aggression is expanding day by day, and taking on a dangerous character. It is being carried out in accordance with the so-called theory of 'moving up the ladder,' rung by rung, which should result in ever wider intervention in Vietnam and Southeast Asia," stated L. Longo in a report to the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Italian Communist Party. ¹⁵

For determination of the intensity of a crisis, there has been introduced in US military-theoretical writing the concept of "degree of escalation", which in each concrete case is related to the goals set up in this crisis, on the one hand, and to the corresponding measures to taken, on the other. For example, in Kahn's opinion, "the degree of escalation during a crisis, or in the course of actual warfare, is determined by such factors as: 1) the nearness of general war; 2) the existence of precedents; 3) the resoluteness or irresoluteness of the sides; 4) the existence or absence of loss [or damage; ushcherb]; 5) the degree of use of force already caused; and 6) the intensity of the threats." Here the levels of the development of a crisis are arranged in the order of its successive aggravation on a so-called "ladder of escalation", beginning with easily adjustable disputes and ending with uncontrollable total nuclear war. At the same time it is noted that "the development of a crisis does not necessarily go through all the steps."

According to Kahn's definition, the "ladder of escalation" is an arrangement for systematic study of a crisis, "a convenient listing of the basic alternative courses of action among which the strategist should choose."

A typical structure of the "ladder of escalation" in an armed conflict takes the following form. The whole ladder is broken into "groups of steps" corresponding to the basic stages of the development of the crisis. Each new measure or action in a given group actually means a rise by one "step". Each shift from one step to another, higher one involves numerous alternatives, in their nature not going beyond the limits of these two steps. In other words, the decision of both sides must be such that they do not provoke an involuntary rise in the intensity of the conflict to the next step.

and tactical, according to the level on which they arise or are applied. It is noted that with balancing strategic capabilities on both sides, a strategic escalation is less probable than a tactical one. This is because it is very difficult to prohibit military commanders on the battlefield from using their tactical nuclear weapons. Certain theorists think in general that the strategic decision cannot eliminate the danger of the so-called spontaneous tactical escalation, brought about by the two sides in combat simply "in the heat of battle." There are enumerated seven "steps of escalation", corresponding to the stages of aggravation of a crisis and differences in the seriousness of a conflict already begun. According to Kahn, they may be arranged in the following order, according to the degree of increase in the intensity of the conflict.

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I. Pre-crisis maneuvering. This is made up of disputes which can easily be settled, military-diplomatic acts, and resolutions of parliaments or official pronouncements of heads of states about their intentions. In this no disruption of the equilibrium is yet observed. Actually, all this amounts to diplomatic actions and steps which, as Kahn says, "burn no bridges," and assume the possibility of political maneuvering. The use of armed force is either completely excluded, or else is only very incidental, as a show of force, and then not in the first steps, but only in the last step of this group.

At least three steps can be distinguished in this group: 1) an "imaginary crisis" amounting to a clearing up of the subject of dispute; 2) unfriendly non-military acts; and 3) official declarations of the intention of the parties making them to begin escalation in case the other party does not yield. An example of the latter is the resolution of the US Congress in August 1964, after ships of the Seventh Fleet appeared in the Gulf of Tonkin. In it, as is known, there was asserted the determination of the President of the US to take all measures, including the use of armed forces, to help any member of SEATO.

The last step of this group may be regarded as transitional to a new level of escalation, i.e., to a new group of steps, combined in the concept of the "traditional" crisis.

II. Ordinary "traditional" crisis. From a military point of view, this group of steps of escalation, apparently, is the beginning of the preparation of a theater of military operations. It is caused by a disruption of the balance by one of the sides. It begins with a strengthening by the parties of their positions. And this is the first step of escalation at this level. Open demonstration of will and determination is considered the main stimulus here. At this level the parties may resort to the following successive measures: 1) a show of force; 2) partial mobilization (delay of demobilization); 3) some elements of economic warfare (embargo, peaceful blockade, etc.); 4) "anonymous" acts of violence and "incidental" minor armed clashes (most often, border or perispherical sea clashes).

These successive measures also constitute four steps of escalation in the period of aggravation of international tension.

It is characteristic that carrying out each of these measures assumes different methods and ways. For example, a show of force can be made in two ways: directly and indirectly. In the first case, one side or the other shifts naval or air forces, mobilizes

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reserves, carries out provocative training and maneuvers in the crisis areas openly and even with a maximum of publicity. In the second case there are such things as tests of missiles, ordinary maneuvers outside the crisis zone, etc.

Examples of partial mobilization in crisis situations are the call-ups of reservists by the President of the United States during the Berlin crisis in 1961 and the Caribbean crisis in 1962.

The last step of this group-- "anonymous" acts of violence--is a transitional step to a new level of escalation--to a serious crisis, if the parties do not agree to adjust the dispute by a demarche. This step, as Kahn puts it, is "the threshold of war," and from a military point of view, obviously, this whole stage must be considered a period of completion of the preparation of a theater of military operations and the beginning of strategic or corresponding operational-tactical deployment of forces, depending on the magnitude of the crisis and the dimensions of the area it involves.

"Anonymous" acts of violence (in the terminology of Kahn and other theoreticians), acts of successive increase of strains in the crises of the cold war and in armed conflicts, consist of illegal acts to confuse, frighten, weaken or demoralize the enemy. Among them, for example, are pointed out such acts as bomb explosions, instigated and carried out by persons unknown, assassinations of individual citizens of the enemy country, border provocations, etc.

III. A serious crisis is a special kind of prelude to nuclear war. In this stage of aggravation of the crisis, nuclear war is already contemplated as possible. This stage, or level, of escalation begins with a declaration of a condition of "super-readiness," after which there may follow small-scale non-nuclear clashes. The latter may grow into limited non-nuclear war, the beginning of which is supposed to have been officially declared. During this war there may be "involuntary" use of tactical nuclear weapons, followed by a so-called nuclear ultimatum. In case of further intensification of the crisis, it is assumed there will be a limited (20%) evacuation of the population of cities located in the zone of probable nuclear attacks. This measure is supplemented by an "obvious show of force" and "justified attacks on elements of the armed forces." These two latter actions signify the "limit of non-application of nuclear weapons."

Concretely, this stage of escalation breaks down into the following steps: 1) a decisive military confrontation in some limited region; 2) a provocational breaking-off of diplomatic relations, signifying the determination of one of the parties to resort to open use of force; 3) the establishment of a condition of "super-readiness."

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expressed in the dispersal of strategic forces, the cancelling of leaves, the cessation of normal military training, and the bringing of all units into complete combat readiness; and 4) non-nuclear war, signifying open transition to organized use of force.

The last step already goes beyond the limits of a serious crisis and may be regarded as the threshold to a new level of escalation, or, in Kahn's words, "the limit of non-use of nuclear weapons." In the opinion of American strategists, the US "police action" in Korea corresponded to this step of escalation. The peculiarity of this step is that the war, even though fairly intensively waged, remains local, and neither of the sides makes use of its most effective weapons, i.e., nuclear, bacteriological, or chemical ones.

As an additional measure in the last step of this stage of escalation, one of the parties may stage a sensational show of force. In essence it would be to frighten the enemy by the use of a powerful weapon in such a way that it would not cause any apparent damage. The explosion of a nuclear weapon at a great height over the territory of the enemy is considered the most suitable for such a demonstration. An example of "justified attack on elements of the armed forces" might be the destruction (including that contrived by a secret plot) of an enemy submarine which was carrying strategic weapons and carrying out maneuvers near foreign shores.

IV. Acute crisis. This begins with the cautious, selective use of nuclear weapons, accompanied by an official declaration of nuclear war limited to purely military goals and targets. The first use of nuclear weapons would have as its aim not so much the destruction of enemy military objectives, although it would be directed exclusively against them, as the restoration of the balance, or, as Kahn puts it, "to exert bargaining pressure (vytorgovat') on the enemy." In this stage great importance is assigned to convincing the enemy that more bombs and missiles may follow the first if he does not yield or agree to a reasonable compromise. The highest step of this stage is considered the evacuation of up to 70 percent of the population of large cities and an official declaration of limited war with the use of nuclear weapons. This last step is intended to establish limits for those forms of nuclear operations which the attacking party intends to undertake, and to make clear what kind of retaliatory blow he is ready to accept without creating conditions for continuation of the escalation.

The steps of this level of escalation are less clearly defined than in the first three examples. Great stress is laid on unusual, provocative and other extraordinary measures, the nature of which is not revealed. That is probably because the authors of the theories of "escalation" are themselves unable to have a clear picture of the

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probable actions of the sides in conditions of the beginning of limited nuclear warfare, especially since, for example, NATO planning organs are still debating whether such warfare is possible at all in Europe. Nevertheless, as is obvious from the statements of NATO military leaders and US strategists, the most important aim of the US armed forces is, and will be in the future, to be in a position to carry on such warfare in Europe, and mainly in Europe.

V. The diplomacy of nuclear pressure. This is called "the threshold of central nuclear war", war between the principal nuclear powers. Here the following steps of aggravation of the situation are assumed: 1) a demonstration of a nuclear attack on an unpopulated part of the territory of the enemy; 2) demonstration attacks on purely military objectives, which do not cause any secondary destruction; 3) demonstration raids on various installations and targets (including cities, with preliminary warning and evacuation of their populations); 4) attacks on the population with selective use of bacteriological, biological and radiological weapons; 5) complete (95 percent) evacuation of the population of cities; 6) mutual nuclear counterattacks of a limited nature (i.e., excluding the destruction of cities). The last two measures bring the belligerent sides right up to a "central nuclear war", which is divided into two independent stages, depending on whether nuclear weapons are used only against military objectives, or against any targets, including cities.

It is characteristic of this level of escalation that nuclear warfare between the nuclear powers is here considered controllable. The creators of the theory of escalation propose to begin this warfare with a demonstrative explosion of a multi-megaton nuclear charge somewhere in the desert, in a peripheral part of the country of the enemy, or in an adjoining sea area, in order to cause only a psychological effect, and not to invite a retaliatory nuclear attack. The American theorists believe that neither a demonstration blast on foreign territory, nor selective attacks on military objectives which would supposedly not affect the population near them, nor even the destruction of valuable structures or installations (bridges, dams, gas plants, irrigation systems, etc.), in conditions of a non-nuclear war already in progress, will cause immediate and automatic escalation of such a war into unlimited total nuclear war. The guarantee of this would supposedly be a firm and stable "balance of terror", depending on the existence on both sides of powerful factors of mutual restraint.

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VI. Strategic central war. It is thought that nuclear war between the principal nuclear powers would begin with a formal declaration of war, after which there would be a pause, devoted to making the final decision. A formal declaration of war generally might mean that the side making it did not intend immediately to launch an all-out nuclear attack, but was ready to wait for concessions. The idea of strategic central war assumes the possibility of carrying out simultaneously or at different times strategically important operations in peripheral areas. The step following the declaration of war would be an attack on the most important part of the armed forces in the plan of the strategic conception of "counter-force." It is assumed that the war would slowly develop further with the aim of destroying the armed forces of the enemy and would lead to unlimited nuclear attacks predominantly on military objectives not located in large cities or their vicinity.

VII. Central war, involving the civilian population.

The nuclear attacks, previously launched only against military objectives, would be gradually extended to non-military objectives as well. It is expected that this would cause the strategic central war, not touching the cities, to grow into a war for the destruction of material resources, national wealth, and people. Massed nuclear attacks on sources of national power would grow into uncontrollable total nuclear war, which Kahn calls "spasmodic."

With regard to the methods of using nuclear weapons in the various stages of escalation, there are 18 different kinds of nuclear attacks conceived of according to this theory. It is thought that at the present time there have been developed, accepted, and recognized as classical the following three kinds of attacks: an all-out attack, aimed at the total destruction of the material wealth and resources of the country; a mixed attack, with destruction of both material resources and armed forces; and a counter-attack against military objectives and targets. It is pointed out that these "classical" forms of attack are not the only ones to be carried out by the combatants in the various stages of intensification of the armed conflict. In this connection there are distinguished two additional kinds of nuclear attacks for which the US must be ready--the attack "not fixed as to place" on military targets and objectives, and the pin-pointed attack on military targets which does not touch the large cities near them. Incidentally, there is now intensified debate about these two forms of attack in US military circles.

But even these, in Kahn's opinion, are far from sufficient for carrying out all possible tasks of the strategy of "flexible response." It is thought that in the future there will arise the question of such attacks as that with aim of partial reduction of the power of the

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armed forces of the enemy; the attack only on material resources; systematic attacks against the sources of national, especially military, power, pursuing the aim of crushing the armed forces and putting military objectives out of action; nuclear counter-attacks; demonstration nuclear attacks launched with very powerful weapons on unpopulated areas on the periphery or in the vicinity of the country of the enemy; etc. Studies are now being made as to how expedient and how effective such attacks would be.

A completely uninvestigated field of nuclear warfare, which the American theorists propose to examine, includes: secret or "anonymous" nuclear attacks of a provocative nature; special selective attacks with the aim of overturning a certain regime or changing its nature (it is anticipated that such attacks would be launched against administrative centers, key points of the communications and transportation systems, etc.); nuclear attacks on military targets and objectives with serious consequences for the natural environment; nuclear attacks on cities and material resources which have an effect on natural conditions; nuclear attacks making it difficult for the enemy to repair the effects of destruction and damage; and nuclear attacks intended for coercion (shantazh) and disruption of the morale of the enemy and his will to continue the war.

In the US it is thought that the process of being drawn into a nuclear war would be exceptionally smooth and gradual and would have almost no effect on the level of international tension or even on the general situation. The American "limited nuclear war" theorists, G. [H.?] Kissinger and M. Halperin, assume, in particular, that this smoothness will be achieved because of the use of nuclear weapons of low power: nuclear "bazookas", grenades, etc. Nuclear weapons of low and extra-low power, according to Kahn, make the process of development of nuclear war so smooth that finally even the subsequent use of nuclear weapons of great power should not cause a serious movement upward on the "ladder of escalation."

According to the views of some US military specialists, the process of escalation as such assumes movement both up and down the "ladder", i.e., toward increase of international tension and intensification of the conflict, or toward peaceful adjustment and compromise. The latter alternative, which consists of a decrease in the degree of risk, or of refraining from carrying out the proposed tasks is called de-escalation in the US. They distinguish two aspects in this: de-escalation from lower rungs of the ladder, and de-escalation from upper rungs. These two aspects differ mainly in their consequences. It is thought, for example, that in the first case these consequences might take the form of fear, or an easing of the situation of the weaker side; a decline in spirit (temperament), a sobering, or a demoralization of one of the opponents; a preparation for new attempts to aggravate the crisis; an even more intensive

arms race; a decrease in tension; or a new agreement, new military alliance, condominium, etc. De-escalation from upper rungs may result either in a formal agreement for a cease-fire, and the conclusion of a treaty of peace, or in an intensification of all forms of activity characteristic of the lower steps of escalation--in other words, in active cold war--or, finally, in serious social and political changes in one or both hostile camps.

The ehtory of "escalation," presented in the works of H. Kahn, seems hazy and inadequately substantiated if only because, in spite of Kahn's statements about the gradual transition from one step to another in the aggravation of the crisis, there are no guarantees or means of slowing down this rise except the tacit agreement of the parties. Kahn's proposition about limiting the scale of the conflict by the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons of low power cannot be taken seriously. Even Kahn does not deny the weakness of this argument when he writes that the importance of victory in a nuclear war is so great that each side will be interested in increasing its efforts, calculating on gaining an advantage, if it is sure the other side will not do the same thing. And since there is not and cannot be any such assurance in any of the situations presented by Kahn and in the absence of any means of influencing the decision of the enemy except the immediate raising of the stakes (stavki), the only criterion of all escalation turns out to be the risk involved. In other words, the basis of the theory of "escalation", like that of any other theory linking nuclear war with increase of pressures according to any kind of "understanding", is military-political adventurism.

Very indicative in this connection is the statement of A. Waskow: "It is very possible that under actual conditions the unprecedented dimensions of the catastrophe which has begun will make individuals and whole nations behave not in the 'rational' way which was outlined in the calculations. It has already been shown that in periods of extreme aggravation of the international situation, political leaders become not very receptive to the warnings and threats of probable enemies."¹⁶ The theory of "escalation" does not become any more complete by the addition to it of Gen L. Norstad's idea of the "pause." It is thought that this pause would occur at the beginning of any open armed conflict, and would make the antagonists adopt a new, better thought-out decision as to the possibility of continuing the war. It is characteristic that until recently most of the American authors in one way or another took a common ground with Kahn in the approach to working out methods of carrying out the strategy of "flexible response."

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It should be noted that a certain tendency to regard the probable development of nuclear war as a successive raising of the stakes in a "protracted conflict" is observed also in new works of several West European military theorists, including B. Liddel Hart, E. Kingston-MacClure, P. Gallois, S. Delmas, and Beaufre.

Thus, for example, in analyzing the theory of "escalation", the French military theorist, Gen Beaufre, writes that the whole problem of "escalation" amounts to a determination of "whether or not an incidental or premeditated use of tactical nuclear weapons, aimed at achieving a local success, will provoke a terrifying retaliatory attack, leading to nuclear catastrophe."¹⁷

Strongly recommending to the French command the American theory of "escalation" as a basic strategy, Beaufre writes: "We may be sure that the use of a limited amount of nuclear ammunition would not lead to escalation," since in this situation "the danger of strategic escalation would play a restraining role."¹⁸ An obvious contradiction in the views of US and French military theorists is evident since the former think that strategic decisions are not a restraining factor on the tactical level, while the latter do not see a danger of spontaneous escalation of the conflict directly on the battlefield.

Moreover, almost all the works dealing with escalation are based on one rather disputable position, i.e., that in the course of any controllable war there may be achieved a certain tacit agreement between the combatants as to possible courses of action, aims which can be pursued, weapons which can be used, and even methods of armed conflict. With the existence of multi-megaton nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and perfected means of delivering them to targets, along with the state of extreme nervous tension during modern armed conflict, especially conflict between nuclear powers, such a "return to a knightly tournament" is either a fantasy, or an attempt to mask the true state of affairs, i.e., to conceal the inability and the impossibility of US "nuclear strategists" to find ways of implementing the strategy of "protracted conflict" with a minimum degree of risk.

The theory of "escalation" of war has the aim of giving freedom of action to US reactionary circles in unleashing any war, even with the use of nuclear weapons, in the interests of monopolistic capital. With this theory American militarists are trying to disguise the destructive nature of modern war, to legalize it as a means of deciding all controversial international problems, and thereby to frustrate the struggle of peoples for peace and complete general disarmament.

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However, any attempt to put such a theory into practice would prove fatal for its initiators.

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