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Trends in Communist Propaganda

20 Nov 74

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
TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

Confidential

20 NOVEMBER 1974
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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

MOSCOW TAKES CAUTIOUS STANCE ON HEIGHTENED MIDEAST TENSION

Soviet media kept a low profile in treating the increased tension in the Middle East late last week after Western and Arab news reports of partial Israeli mobilization to face unspecified Syrian moves. Moscow's behavior suggested a strong element of Soviet concern about a possible outbreak of hostilities. Thus, while TASS on the 16th did acknowledge reports of the Israeli mobilization, reportage was kept to a minimum and Soviet media refrained from comment until the 18th, as tension was subsiding. On the other hand, Moscow has reacted to recent Israeli attacks on Lebanon with the usual routine charges of premeditated aggression, in effect implicitly suggesting that such raids would not demonstrably affect the Arab-Israeli status quo.

SOVIET COMMENT Moscow's first comment on the tense situation last week came in a foreign-language commentary by Zholkver on the 18th which predictably accused Israel of heightening tension by mobilizing reserves and "massing troops" on the Syrian-Israeli cease-fire line. Zholkver claimed that one Israeli objective was to use the alleged threat of Syrian attack as a convenient excuse for its own military preparations. But the commentator did not directly assert that these moves meant an Israeli attack, instead professing to see as a second objective the desire to attract more foreign military aid and to distract public opinion from the UNGA debate on the Palestinian question and from the "serious economic and political upheaval at home."

Moscow press comment on the 19th, as reviewed by TASS, took much the same tack: RED STAR asserted that Israel wished to cover up "preparations for another war" and to divert attention from domestic problems, and TRUD saw the latest Israeli "provocations and threats" as timed for the UNGA debate. IZVESTIYA's Beirut correspondent attributed to "local political observers" the view that Israeli leaders had decided to settle external and internal problems through "tension and war."

The same IZVESTIYA dispatch said that Arab capitals were taking seriously the possibility of an Israeli preemptive strike, chiefly against Syria. Going somewhat beyond this, a Timoshkin commentary broadcast to Arab audiences on the 18th called it important, as the Arab press put it, "not to allow Israel to take the Arabs by surprise." Timoshkin said it was necessary to maintain vigilance

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and preparedness "to give a decisive reply" to the "likely aggression." But at the same time, he urged that the Arabs and their friends also continue efforts for a peaceful settlement within the framework of the Geneva conference, and he reiterated previous Soviet criticism of "so-called quiet diplomacy or partial solutions."

Moscow responded only at the lowest propaganda level--a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Arabic on the 18th--to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin's "accusation that the Soviet Union is playing with fire" in continuing "comprehensive assistance" to the Arab countries. The commentary portrayed Israel as concerned over Soviet support for the Arabs and thus attempting to disrupt Arab-Soviet friendship, and in turn charged that through the flow of American arms to Israel "certain U.S. quarters" were encouraging Israel to new military adventures.

REPORTAGE ON DEVELOPMENTS Moscow typically gave no publicity to its diplomatic approaches, reported by Egypt's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY. MENA reported on the 16th that President as-Sadat had replied to messages from Brezhnev and from President Ford, and other MENA dispatches noted that Syrian President al-Asad had received the Soviet ambassador on the 16th and was handed a message from Brezhnev on the following evening.

Initial TASS and Moscow radio accounts of Secretary Kissinger's 15 November press conference gave no indication that he had responded to questions about the possibility of new hostilities in the Middle East, but a subsequent TASS report on the 16th did note that he said the situation remained serious. TASS cited him as pointing out that the United States could not agree with the idea that the problems of the area could be solved by military means, and that the United States would use its influence to prevent the increase of military activity. TASS did not report his remark that the United States expected other countries "that have any influence" to use it to restrain belligerents in the region. But it did note that the Secretary expressed the opinion that the forthcoming Brezhnev-Ford meeting in Vladivostok would have "a favorable influence" on the Middle East situation.

Events in the area were summed up in a TASS dispatch from Beirut later on the 16th which was replayed in abbreviated form in Moscow radio domestic and Arabic-language newscasts. The TASS item picked up Lebanese press charges of Israeli military actions heightening

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tension on both the Lebanese and Syrian borders.* The same dispatch, under a New York dateline, attributed to U.S. news agencies the report of a partial mobilization in Israel, noted "threats" by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin against Syria, and not unexpectedly drew attention to American press reports of "uninterrupted deliveries of offensive armaments" by the United States to Israel.

A broadcast in Arabic the same day claimed that Rabin had said in a speech that Israel would take preemptive measures against Syria, but the newscast seemed to soften this somewhat by citing "many observers" as believing this "whipping up of military hysteria" was due to the Palestinian debate in the United Nations.

On the 17th another multi-datelined TASS dispatch--from Damascus, Beirut, Cairo and New York--rounded up the situation. From Damascus, TASS noted Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam's statement that Israel in the past 24 hours had unleashed a "vicious campaign" to cover up its "intended aggression" and that Syria reiterated its commitment regarding the cease-fire, and would repel any Israeli aggression. Noting that Egyptian President as-Sadat had met with top advisers to discuss the situation, TASS said it was believed in Cairo that Israel's "massive" troop concentrations and callup of "a great number of reservists" indicated an Israeli intent to begin a new aggression.

UNDOF MANDATE, Moscow has not touched on the question of Syrian
GENEVA TALKS intentions with regard to renewing the UNDOF--UN
Disengagement Observer Force--mandate on the Golan
Heights at the end of the month, which Israeli spokesmen have made
clear they regard as a critical issue. The Beirut daily AN-NAHAR on
the 18th reported "diplomatic sources" as saying Syria would agree to
UNDOF extension for three to six months under three conditions:
resumption of the Geneva conference with no political negotiations
outside its framework; adoption of a timetable for Israeli

* Since it is not uncommon for Moscow to pass along Lebanese press accusations of alleged Israeli actions of aggressive intent, the appearance of such reports at times of increased tension would not necessarily constitute indicators of imminent hostilities. As recently as 9 November TASS was citing the Lebanese press for reports that Israel was intensifying military preparations on both the Lebanese and Syrian borders, and had not yet withdrawn reserve troops which had participated in recent Israeli exercises on the Golan Heights.

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withdrawal; and guarantee of the Palestinians' legitimate rights. Moscow has apparently not picked up this report, but TASS on the 18th noted without comment that Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi, in an interview with the Cairo weekly ROSE AL-YUSUF, reportedly said that Egypt considered the Geneva conference "the only possible forum" for discussions and would adhere to this stand "in all its forthcoming diplomatic contacts."

USSR PRAISES "CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM" OFFERED BY PLO AT UNGA

Soviet comment on the current UNGA debate of the Palestinian question has stressed the significance of the PLO delegation's appearance at the United Nations and has been virtually unanimous in emphasizing that PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat presented a "constructive program" for solving the issue in his 13 November speech opening the scheduled two-week debate. At the same time, however, Moscow has conveyed its continued reservations on some points in the PLO "program," principally the advisability of using terror as a political weapon and the practicality of the nature and boundaries of a new Palestinian state.*

Soviet media have stressed the general theme that the PLO has gained increased international prestige and stature through the UNGA decisions to debate the Palestinian question as a political issue--not a refugee problem, as in the past--and to invite the PLO to attend the debate and address the General Assembly in plenary session, thus breaking with the precedent that had limited such appearances to representatives of recognized governments. Comment has also pointed out that recent PLO diplomatic successes were made possible by external political support, primarily from the USSR, and by the PLO's own development of a "realistic approach" to achieving its goals.

Typifying this line, a 14 November IZVESTIYA article by V. Shmarov hailed the UNGA debate as a "portentous event" reflecting a "new approach" to the Palestinian aspect of a Mideast settlement. Claiming

* Given its current insistence on the PLO's "realistic" approach, and its past expressions of disapproval of Palestinian "extremist" actions, Moscow presumably was embarrassed over the Palestinian terrorist operation in Bet She'an on the 19th. The sole Soviet reference thus far, a New York-dated TASS dispatch on the 19th, cited a PLO delegation spokesman as expressing indignation over "the murder of four Palestine Arabs by the occupants of Bet She'an," with no explanation of the circumstances.

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to cite Arab press sources, Shmarov asserted that the Palestinian question had been included on the UNGA agenda "only" because of Soviet efforts. In an apparent reference to PLO acceptance of the UNGA invitation, as well as to increased PLO willingness in recent months to use diplomatic leverage in its conflict with Israel, Shmarov praised the PLO for "attentively listening to the voice of world opinion" and for "formulating a realistic approach to political solutions," noting in this context that "this inner evolution of the PLO is contributing" to its growing international prestige and acceptance.

PLO "PROGRAM" Soviet comment has professed to see the PLO's new "realistic approach" as being exemplified by 'Arafat's "constructive program," principally the three major appeals at the conclusion of his speech, asking for international support to assure the Palestinians' right "to determine their own fate," "to return from their compulsory exile" to their homeland, and "to establish their independent national authority and found their national entity on their land." At the same time, however, Moscow has reiterated its position that a final Mideast settlement will have to include the satisfaction of the interests of "all the states and peoples" in this region. Moscow has thus not extended its public support to the PLO's frequently expressed "ultimate aim"--reiterated implicitly in 'Arafat's speech--of replacing present-day Israel with a restored Palestine of pre-partition (November 1947) days and establishing, in 'Arafat's words, a "single democratic and progressive state" for Moslems, Christians, and "all the Jews who now live in Palestine."

Indications that Moscow stands by its long-expressed support for Israel's existence as a state have appeared in remarks by PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA commentators. On Moscow radio's "International Situation" program on 16 November, PRAVDA political observer Mayevskiy noted that the Arab countries have been divided over the question of "what sort of administration the territories west of the Jordan River should have after their liberation from Israeli occupation," as well as the question of whether Jordan or the PLO should represent the Palestinians. Citing the "unanimous" decision of the Rabat Arab summit conference that the Palestinians "have the right to their own national home on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip," Mayevskiy said the Soviet Union supported the Rabat decisions. Mayevskiy seemed to be making the point that the USSR accepts the notion of a Palestinian entity only within the confines of the West Bank and Gaza. In going on to discuss 'Arafat's "constructive program," Mayevskiy pointedly made no mention of the last point on national authority and national entity, referring only to the right to self-determination and to return to their native land.

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Also suggestive was IZVESTIYA commentator Mikhaylov's remark, on the 17 November Moscow radio observers' roundtable. In the course of refuting "slander" spread about the character of the Palestine liberation movement, he cryptically noted that aims had been attributed to it "which it has not and is not setting itself"--perhaps an oblique reference to the PLO call for a democratic and progressive state in all Palestine. Mikhaylov also complained that the Palestinian movement had been equated with "the terrorist actions of extremist groups."

Other comment has also charged Israel with slandering the Palestinians in the course of pointing up Israel's hostile reaction to the PLO appearance at the United Nations and Tel Aviv's refusal to talk with the PLO "except on the battlefield." Soviet media have accused Israel of failing to accept "the reality" of the Mideast situation and of doing everything possible to prevent a peaceful solution. As a result of its unrealistic and "aggressive" policies, Moscow claims that Israel is locking itself into a state of political isolation and severe economic difficulties.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

SOVIET ROCKET TROOPS COMMANDER DENIES SALT DECEPTION

Asserting that "not a single silo" has been constructed in the Soviet Union since May 1972, General Ivan Tolubko, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, has strongly denied that the Soviet Union has violated the strategic arms limitation agreement. Responding to charges reportedly made in the United States recently, Tolubko declared, in an interview published in the 11-17 November issue of NEDEL'YA, that the Soviet Union has never violated its obligations and will certainly not do so on such an "important political issue" as the interim agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

U.S. CHARGES Although the denial was purportedly prompted by recent statements in the United States, including-- as Tolubko himself specified--a speech by Senator James L. Buckley to the Overseas Press Club on 31 October, it is clear that broader considerations were also involved. For some two years now, according to an article by Michael Getler in the WASHINGTON POST on 1 November, there has been a controversy among Western experts over the purpose of certain structures which the Soviets have been installing at some missile sites. Recently, General George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and William Beecher, DOD press spokesman, took note of this controversy and publicly denied that the Soviet Union was violating the SALT agreements.

Tolubko referred to this controversy obliquely in a statement which seemed intended to absolve the U.S. Government of blame for encouraging suspicions of Soviet intentions. Describing such suspicions as the "fabrications" of the "enemies of detente," he pointed out that the "representatives of the Pentagon, Brown and Beecher" had specifically refuted them. He immediately took away whatever magnanimity this acknowledgement was intended to convey, however, by adding acerbically that this was the first time "in over two years" that such a refutation had been volunteered by U.S. authorities.

OTHER ISSUES Elsewhere Tolubko struck a generally optimistic note in his references to U.S.-Soviet relations. Although he did charge that the purposes of the anti-Soviet accusations being made in the United States were to undermine the Soviet peace policy and to justify U.S. arms programs, he indicated, by his reference to the Brown and Beecher statements, that these purposes were not shared

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by the U.S. Government. He went on to refer approvingly to the forthcoming meeting between President Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok, and he stated that "all the Soviet people" were behind the detente policy and believed that it should be made an "irreversible" process.

Tolubko refrained from commenting in detail on other specific charges which he said had been made against the Soviet Union. Apart from his denial that the Soviet Union had constructed new silos, he made only one other specific denial--that the Soviet Union was "conducting any tests of new mobile intercontinental systems." For the rest, he treated the charges as not worth dignifying with specific rebuttals.

On other military issues, to which the interview as a whole was addressed, Tolubko made two rather expansive claims. One was that the Soviet missile forces were kept in a state of "constant combat readiness" which enabled them to launch weapons within seconds or even fractions of a second after receiving a battle order. The other was that "all" combat training launches over the last few years had been completed with marks of either "excellent" or "good."

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

BLOC'S CALL FOR INITIAL TROOP CUT IN 1975 CALLED "REASONABLE"

In an obvious effort to put public pressure on the NATO states at the Vienna force reduction negotiations, Moscow and its East European allies have insistently argued that NATO should negotiate on the basis of the new Warsaw Pact "initial step" force reduction proposal offered in Vienna on 31 October. Comment has stressed the reasonableness and readiness for compromise on the part of the East European states in their attempt to unlock the stalemated MBFR talks, contrasting this with the announcement by Secretary Schlesinger during his recent visit to the FRG that the United States would be increasing the combat strength of its forces in West Germany.

An article by the chief GDR delegate to the Vienna talks explicitly pointed out that the new proposal need set no precedent for any future agreements, and that it allows the NATO states to retain the basic provisions of their negotiating position. Other authoritative statements, by Moscow and Warsaw spokesmen, have reiterated the linkage between MBFR and CSCE which Gromyko broached in his October Revolution anniversary speech on 6 November.

OESER HORIZONT ARTICLE: NO
RENUNCIATION OF PRINCIPLES

The article by the head of the GDR delegation in Vienna, Ingo Oeser, in the East Berlin weekly HORIZONT

(No. 47, signed to press 11 November), included the longest apologia for the new Pact proposal to date. After a detailed review of the standing NATO and Pact proposals, Oeser wrote that the Pact, with its new proposal, was suggesting "an independent agreement on an initial step" for reducing forces and arms in 1975, an agreement of "limited scope" and one that would "make some allowance" for the negotiating position of the Western states. Oeser listed only two conditions for the Pact's limited agreement: first, the vague, but customary, Pact stipulation that no agreement giving the NATO states one-sided advantages would be permissible; and second, all 11 negotiating Vienna participants "must" contribute to the mutual reduction.

Continuing, Oeser pointed out that an initial reduction agreement would include a commitment by all participants to work toward a more comprehensive agreement. Appealing to Western proponents of

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immediate force reductions, while reassuring them that initial steps would not prejudice fundamental positions, Oeser declared:

Moreover, it [the limited agreement] must expressly stipulate that through its provisions no precedent will be set for future agreements. Thus the socialist states uphold their just basic positions on an overall settlement, as contained in their draft agreement, and do not make it a precondition for the agreement of an initial step that the capitalist participating states renounce their overall position.

Concluding, Oeser observed that the "important" Pact initiative displayed "great flexibility" and "made allowance--within the scope of what was feasible--for a number of elements" in the West's position. He called upon the West now to demonstrate "an accommodating attitude" toward the new initiative and to declare its readiness to work out an initial agreement. "The socialist states are ready for discussion," Oeser remarked, perhaps implying a Pact willingness for compromise even on the new proposal.

Notably, in the context of his discussion on the new proposal, Oeser made no explicit reference to either the inclusion of air and nuclear-armed forces or to the Pact demand that after any future reduction all 11 participating states could no longer exceed the then established strength of their forces and arms in central Europe--the stipulation which in effect precludes any future reorganization or regrouping of forces among the NATO states or in any possible future West European defense organization. But as Oeser made clear, these basic elements of the Pact's original proposal would not be excluded at this time from the formal Pact position in working out a more comprehensive agreement.

STRULAK INTERVIEW;
MBFR-CSCE LINKAGE

In another authoritative assessment of the new initiative, Warsaw's delegate to Vienna, Tadeusz Strulak, who has acted in the past as the chief public spokesman for the East on this issue, argued in an interview published in the Vienna daily KURIER on the 9th that the Pact was not trying to sell dead stock under a new label with its first step proposal; he observed that "we thought it advisable to now give our consent to first [step] reductions." But more significantly, Strulak went on to make an unusual statement on the motives behind the recent Vienna

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initiative. In response to a question on the reciprocal relationship between MBFR and CSCE made by Gromyko on the 6th, Strulak went beyond Gromyko's remarks in clearly pointing out that the recent Pact initiative in Vienna was part of an overall strategy. Strulak said: "Yes. One motive of our proposal was the consideration that progress at the Vienna talks could also lead to a success in Geneva--just as, in turn, progress in Geneva would certainly positively affect the negotiations in Vienna." Strulak added that "both conferences must be viewed in context of the global efforts of the two great powers."

The Pact's new MBFR proposal and Strulak's remarks, at a minimum, clearly set the stage for Moscow to argue that, on the one hand, the socialist states have made an effort to meet certain NATO demands at Vienna and thus it is now the West's turn for some "give" either at MBFR or the Geneva CSCE negotiations; and on the other, that Moscow has now offered a proposal which can bolster the policy of detente in the military field.

NATO REACTION "CONDEMNED" As for the NATO reaction to the new Pact initiative at the MBFR plenary sessions on the 7th and 14th, Prague media have apparently been assigned the role of reporting publicly the West's negative response. RUDE PRAVO on the 8th, in a CTK dispatch from Vienna, reported that the British representative had declared that "the West has not found" in the new proposal "any new elements." The Czechoslovak delegate, R. Klein, was reported as saying that it was impossible "to ignore the significant new elements" of the proposal, that the West's reaction demonstrates the lack of "necessary realism and flexibility," and that the West continues to insist upon an "unrealistic" and "unacceptable" basis for the negotiations. The vehemence of the Warsaw Pact's reaction to the West's response was intensified on the 14th when Prague radio reported that the Hungarian delegate in Vienna, Janos Petran, "condemned" the rejection by the West of the new initiative as expressed by the Belgian delegate at that day's plenum. Then on the 15th, in the first signed commentary in the Soviet central press on the new Pact proposal, I. Melnikov in PRAVDA wrote that "it has become known" that the West "has not yet shown any concrete readiness for an agreement on the basis" of the new initiative. Melnikov then went on to criticize Secretary Schlesinger's statements in Bonn, saying that they were "clearly at variance with a constructive approach toward the Vienna talks." Other Soviet and East European commentators have similarly criticized Schlesinger's remarks.

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BELGRADE CONDEMNS NATO ADRIATIC EXERCISE AS THREAT TO STABILITY

Yugoslavia has manifested sharp disapproval of the 9-16 November NATO maneuvers in the Adriatic. According to TANJUG, the ranking diplomatic envoys of the United States, Italy, Turkey and Great Britain were called in to the Foreign Affairs Secretariat on 15 November to receive "firm and sharp" protests. Yugoslav media, in the meantime, have backed up the protests with strongly critical comment.

This reaction stands in some contrast to the attitude Yugoslavia adopted toward the last NATO exercise in the area--the joint U.S.-Italian maneuvers held from 29 March to 5 April this year. Although Yugoslavia condemned those maneuvers at the time, it seemed mainly concerned with their bearing on Yugoslav-Italian relations, rather than on their implications for general East-West relations. It portrayed the United States as providing moral support to Rome in its dispute with Belgrade during a flare-up over the recurring Trieste issue. The current maneuvers, on the other hand, have been depicted as a dangerous escalation of bloc confrontation, involving for the "first time" a naval exercise of a "group" of NATO states in the Adriatic. TANJUG diplomatic editor Budimir, writing on the 16th, scored NATO for failing to keep its military activities within accepted boundaries rather than expanding to "new areas."

Predictably, Belgrade assessed the maneuvers as NATO "pressure" against Yugoslavia's nonaligned position. Budimir, however, introduced a new note in concluding that the maneuvers could also be interpreted as pressure on Albania as well. This adds to the evidence that the 4-month old diplomatic flirtation between the two countries is continuing. In the single monitored Tirana comment on the maneuvers, ZERI I POPULLIT, according to ATA on the 19th, leveled a standard attack against both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, failing to mention Yugoslavia by name but expressing concern for the "sovereign countries" of the region,

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

BLOC MEDIA CONVEY MOSCOW'S REBUFF OF NEW PRC BORDER STANCE

Moscow itself has not yet acknowledged the PRC's altered public stand on the Sino-Soviet border issue contained in the 6 November Chinese greetings message to Moscow on the Soviet October Revolution anniversary.* But Soviet disapproval has been communicated indirectly in a recent series of reports by Moscow's allies that publicized refutation of the Chinese position by unnamed Soviet officials. A half dozen reports in Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and GDR media from 13 to 16 November noted that "official circles in Moscow" had found the PRC stand merely a "reiteration" of the standard Chinese position that has blocked progress in the border talks for the past five years and that it is "completely unacceptable from the Soviet point of view." The reports have attacked the Chinese motives in publicizing the revised border terms and have endeavored to portray the USSR as the truly forthcoming party in the border dispute, noting that past Soviet offers were turned down by Peking. In so doing, they have provided the first public reference in communist media to a March 1973 Soviet proposal to adjust border river boundaries on the eastern part of the frontier in a way advantageous to China.

The bloc reports, denying "sensational" Western press claims that the 6 November Chinese greetings represented a new demarche on the border issue, focused on the Soviet officials' objections to the linkage implied in the Peking message--that the Chinese were willing to consider a Sino-Soviet nonuse of force and nonaggression pact together with China's longstanding demand for a withdrawal of forces from disputed frontier areas.

The reports cited Soviet officials as saying that Peking in effect was demanding that Moscow first "give up its present borders" under terms of the disputed territories question in exchange for Chinese agreement to conclude a nonaggression and nonuse of force agreement. The Moscow correspondent of the Hungarian daily NEPSZABADSAG on the 13th said that "Soviet national territory of 1.5 million square kilometers" would be involved, and the Moscow correspondent of the GDR radio said on the 15th that Peking's demand would mean that the border would be moved into the Soviet interior a distance of "100 or 200 kilometers."

* The Chinese message and initial Soviet response are discussed in the TRENDS of 13 November 1974, pages 3-5.

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The reports have carefully reiterated the Soviet position that the present frontier is generally valid and subject only to minor adjustments, and have rejected the Chinese claim that Kosygin reached an understanding with Chou in September 1969 on withdrawal from disputed regions. The Moscow correspondent for the Hungarian news agency MTI reported on the 14th that "eyewitnesses" to the Sino-Soviet summit told him no such agreement was reached during the September 1969 meeting, adding that even though Chou raised a claim in this connection, Kosygin did not bargain on the issue.

To shore up an image contrasting Moscow reasonableness and Peking intransigence over the border dispute, the reports have complained of Chinese refusal to respond positively to Moscow's offers of a nonuse of force pact and nonaggression agreement, as well as to a March 1973 Soviet offer to adjust the border river boundary on the eastern frontier in a way that would give China ownership of several hundred disputed border river islands. The 14 November MTI report and a 16 November article in Prague's MLADA FRONTA said that Moscow offered to adjust the river boundary "in a way customary in international practice" and "by taking into consideration the changed river beds" so that the USSR would declare "several hundred smaller islands as Chinese territory." The reports suggested this forthcoming Soviet gesture was "contrary to the treaties concluded in the last century between China and Tsarist Russia, "which Moscow has held drew the boundary generally along the Chinese bank of the river. However, the reports indicate that the Soviet proposal stopped short of endorsing the PRC claim that the riverine border should follow the main channel, with MLADA FRONTA asserting that Moscow's proposal said that "in disputed areas the frontier should lie along the rivers in those places where the rivers can be navigated, as usual in international practice." Since there are stretches in the border rivers with more than one navigable channel, some islands--including the strategic isle opposite Khabarovsk--would still be in dispute.

The reports accused the Chinese of publicizing their border stance at this time as part of an "operation of deceit" brought on by Peking's increasing international isolation as a result of its strident opposition to detente and international relaxation. They also pointed out Peking's inconsistency in not reporting the message to the Chinese domestic audience. Most of the comment indicated that Peking should show its good intentions by responding positively to the various Soviet offers over the border issue, but the CA radio on the 15th said that Soviet foreign ministry sources feel that "if Peking really honestly wished to improve relations" it should release the Soviet helicopter crew detained since their capture in China last March.

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USSR ON PRC
PRECEDENT

Despite official Soviet silence on the altered PRC stance, a 15 November Vasilyev commentary broadcast in Mandarin to China disclosed a past instance in which Peking had attempted to link its demand for withdrawal from disputed territories with Moscow's offer of a nonuse of force pact. Noting that Moscow on 15 January 1971 proposed a nonuse of force pact, Vasilyev added that Peking countered with an offer that the provisions be included in an agreement to maintain the status quo on the border. "To cater to the Chinese side," Vasilyev said, "the Soviet side agreed to this suggestion and discussed the wording of corresponding provisions." He alleged that progress in the talks had thus appeared likely, until the Chinese "suddenly asked the Soviet side to accept their concept about so-called 'disputed areas,'" which he said amounted to "putting forward a prerequisite unacceptable to any sovereign country in order to hamper settlement of the nonuse of force issue."

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

TITO-HONECKER JOINT STATEMENT STRESSES EQUALITY, INDEPENDENCE

Yugoslav President Tito's 12-15 November "official friendly" visit to the GDR was his first visit to East Germany since 1965, and the first meeting between the top leaders of the LCY and SED since June 1967, when Ulbricht spent a two-week "vacation" in Yugoslavia at Tito's invitation. In hosting the Tito visit now, the East Germans have somewhat belatedly joined the series of meetings between Tito and Soviet bloc party leaders that followed Brezhnev's landmark visit to Belgrade in September 1971. Only Bulgaria's Zhivkov--at odds with the Yugoslavs over the Macedonia issue--had failed to meet with Tito since the Brezhnev visit.* From the Yugoslav standpoint, Tito's visit to the GDR served to further underscore Belgrade's nonalignment, coming in the wake of the Yugoslav leader's visit to the FRG in June. It also served to project an image of recovered health and vigor for the aging LCY leader, who since his illness in February has successively visited Hungary, the FRG, Romania, Denmark, and now the GDR.

The joint statement issued at the conclusion of Tito's visit underlined the concept of "equality" governing Yugoslav-GDR state and party relations, as well as relations among the parties of the world communist movement--such equality, of course, being a perennial Yugoslav concern. In noting that cooperation between Yugoslavia and the GDR had been "successfully developing" in recent years, the statement declared that this cooperation was based on "respecting the specific features of their internal development and the specific features of the two countries' international positions." The significance of the GDR's recognition of Yugoslavia's independent course was stressed on the eve of Tito's visit by Zagreb radio commentator Sundic, who added that while such recognition "does not mean that Yugoslavia's position is also always supported, this still represents progress considering some earlier views on the Yugoslav path to socialism."

The tenuous state of Belgrade's support for the conference of European communist parties, planned for next year, was reflected in the absence of any reference in the joint statement to the

* Poland's Gierk and Czechoslovakia's Husak visited Belgrade in 1973, followed by Tito's trip to Budapest in April this year. Gierk returned for a Yugoslav vacation this July.

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planned conference or to the "consultative meeting" of European CP's last month in Warsaw, which both the LCY and SED had attended. The omission is the more noteworthy in view of the broad support voiced at the Warsaw meeting for convening the European CP conclave soon after the conclusion of the European security conference--a conference strongly supported in the present document. On the score of economic cooperation, the joint statement followed the practice of past joint documents involving the Yugoslavs in omitting any reference to CEMA, despite Belgrade's ten-year-long "participation" in the activities of the Soviet bloc economic organization.

TASS late on the 15th reported the Tito-Honecker statement as highlighting the contribution of "socialist, nonaligned and other countries," and "all democratic and progressive forces" to the reduction of international tensions and the promotion of "equal" international cooperation.

The statement's qualified reference to "agreement or similarity of views" on major international issues was reflected in the public statements by Tito and Honecker during the visit. Thus, Tito, in an interview on East German TV on the 15th, said he and Honecker had reached "joint or approaching standpoints" in their talks. The SED leader, in his dinner toast on the 12th, similarly noted only "a high degree of correspondence" of views on international developments. In his toasts both on the 12th and 14th Honecker reminded his guest of the GDR's firm identification with the Soviet bloc, stressing in the latter speech that the GDR was "in an unshakable alliance with the main force of socialism--the Soviet Union--and firmly integrated in the community of socialist states."

In his toast on the 12th, Tito included what could be construed as a veiled reference to Soviet pressures as exemplified in the Cominformist affair. In noting the progress in relaxation of tensions "particularly" in Europe, he added that "a great number of countries, particularly nonaligned ones, are subject to various pressures and crude attacks on their freedom and independence."

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VIETNAM

LE DUC THO VWP DELEGATION LEAVES FOR PARIS TO VISIT FRENCH CP

Hanoi reported on 19 November that a Vietnam Workers Party delegation headed by Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy had left for a visit in Paris at the invitation of the French Communist Party. The ostensible purpose of the visit is to reciprocate the 10-17 November 1973 visit to the DRV by a French CP delegation headed by Secretary General Georges Marchais.

Despite speculation by AFP that the visit might lead to a meeting of the DRV officials with Secretary Kissinger, the brief, identical Hanoi radio and VNA accounts place the visit in a purely party context, listing delegation head Tho and deputy head Thuy only by their party titles, as member of the VWP Central Committee Politburo and Central Committee Secretary, respectively. Both Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy figured prominently in the French CP delegation's 1973 DRV visit, with Xuan Thuy accompanying the French on their visits outside Hanoi, as would be expected of the head of the VWP Central Committee external relations board. Both he and Le Duc Tho also participated in discussions with the French delegation that were led by First Secretary Le Duan. The VWP visit invitation had been noted in the 19 November 1973 communique on the French party delegation's visit, which said that Le Duan had accepted Marchais' invitation on behalf of the French CP.

The only other members of the VWP delegation bound for France announced by Hanoi media were Tran Quang Huy, alternate member of the Central Committee, and NHAN DAN deputy chief editor Nguyen Thanh Le. Western agencies reported the delegation consisted of 10 members. Hanoi media named only two of the DRV leaders at the airport to say farewell to the Tho delegation--Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi (who also is DRV foreign minister), and VWP Central Committee Secretary Nguyen Van Tran.

DRV DELEGATION TO
ALBANIAN ANNIVERSARY

A DRV party-government delegation which will attend the 30th anniversary celebration of Albania's Liberation Day and revolution victory, headed by VWP Central Committee member and Vice Premier Tran Huu Duc, departed Hanoi on 19 November and stopped over in Peking one night, according to VNA and NCNA reports. No other delegation members were listed by VNA, which added that the Albanian, PRC, and Hungarian ambassadors as well as the Soviet charge d'affaires in Hanoi said farewell to Duc. No special DRV delegation was reported to have attended the 1973, nondecennial observances in Tirana, but the 25th anniversary in 1969 drew a DRV delegation headed by VWP Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan.

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C H I N A

PEKING STRESSES THAT ARMY MUST SUBMIT TO PARTY AUTHORITY

A 13 November PEOPLE'S DAILY article indicating that some military leaders still resist party leadership has warned that "there has never been any change in the position of the absolute leadership of the party over the army, and no such change will be permitted." The article, entitled "The Gun Must Forever Be Kept in the Hands of the Party and the People," stated that army units must obey civilian party organs at all levels, and that within the PLA the party committee must exercise collective leadership.

The article seemed to be aimed especially at military commanders, pointedly noting that commanders must share responsibilities "under the collective leadership of the party committee." The article argued that "only by exercising collective leadership can we expose in time the antiparty features of certain individual careerists" and "smash their criminal acts in...setting up sects and forming factions for selfish ends." Lin Piao was the ostensible target of the piece, which attacked his attempt to wrest "direct command" of the PLA from Mao and the party and his effort to assert the principle of individual authority, "ousting the political commissars."

While using unusually frank language to focus public attention on Lin's attempt to usurp the military authority of the party, the article was careful to reaffirm the party loyalty of the PLA as a whole. The article noted that Mao's principles on army building have "struck deep roots" among fighters and commanders throughout the country and could "by no means be sabotaged" by any conspirator. It also praised the army's contributions to the cultural revolution "under the leadership of the party," ascribing to Lin alone attempts during that period to control the party with the gun. The recent anti-Lin campaign was credited with making the army "even more united."

PROVINCIAL The need to improve party-army relations has been a
REPORTS standard theme in the campaign against Lin, and
 several provincial radios recently have claimed that
progress has been made in strengthening the party's authority over
the army. Huhhot radio on 19 November, for example, reported on
a provincial PLA meeting for exchanging experiences in studying Mao's
works on military affairs and in criticizing Lin's military line.

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Local border defense units were lauded for successfully criticizing Lin's crime of "undermining the unity between the army and the government" and for improving "the quality of their military and political work." The report claimed that commanders and fighters of border defense units now "consciously submit themselves to the centralized leadership of local party committees." Nanchang radio on 14 November hailed a local PLA unit for correctly understanding that the army is subordinate to the party. The broadcast denounced Lin for failing to ask higher level party authorities for prior instruction and for failing to submit reports after actions had been taken. And a 9 November Hofei report on a provincial meeting on militia work praised local party committees for carrying forward "the glorious tradition of the party taking care of the armed forces" by strengthening their leadership over militia work.

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U S S R

IDEOLOGY SECRETARY DEMICHEV DEMOTED TO CULTURE MINISTER

In a demotion apparently reflecting the ascendancy of the conservatives in the current ideological crackdown, TASS on 14 November announced the appointment of P.N. Demichev, Central Committee Secretary in charge of ideology, to the post of minister of culture, vacant since the death of Ye. A. Furtseva in late October. This is a clear step down for Demichev, since Soviet practice requires that he now give up his Secretariat position. Although Demichev may be permitted to retain his rank as Politburo candidate member (other ministers such as Polyanskiy, Gromyko and Grechko hold Politburo membership), he will lose his party position as top administrator of the Soviet ideological system, becoming the first victim of the ideological crackdown.

Demichev's demotion in the midst of the current crackdown suggests that he was regarded as too soft or as responsible for the shortcomings being criticized. His ouster may open the door for the appointment of a more hardline ideological supervisor. Although Demichev has helped direct the repressive Soviet cultural policy over the past nine years, his infrequent statements on ideology have not been as strident or extreme as those of many other ideological leaders. He has been caught between his conservative superiors, Brezhnev and Suslov, and his influential hardline subordinates, Brezhnev protege S.P. Trapeznikov, head of the Central Committee's science and educational institutions section, and Mazurov protege V.F. Shauro, head of the Central Committee's culture section, who have advocated more repression.

Demichev has labored under the additional disadvantage of not being a clear Brezhnev protege, and his demotion fits in with the recent undercutting of other independent figures. Conservative Belorussian and Moscow leaders had been charged with failing to keep their own bailiwicks ideologically pure in recent Central Committee decrees which initiated the crackdown.*

* See the Supplementary Article "New Moscow Ideological Drive Appears to Undercut Detente Foes," in the TRENDS of 13 November 1974.

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Demichev's replacement as ideology secretary will probably be named at a Central Committee plenum in mid-December. A Supreme Soviet session is to open on 18 December, and such December sessions on the annual plan and budget are customarily preceded by a Central Committee plenum.

AGRICULTURE MINISTRY RESISTANCE TO LINKS APPEARS TO CONTINUE

The long-standing controversy over the link system of agricultural organization has been revived in recent Soviet press articles arguing that the system is incompatible with the national goal of increased specialization and mechanization of agriculture. This renewed criticism comes at a time when opposition to the system by the Ministry of Agriculture had seemed to have been overcome and the links solidly established as an accepted form of farm organization. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the Ministry of Agriculture itself, or elements within it, is encouraging the new criticism.

One critical article, written by Penza Obkom Secretary V. Ogarev in the 26 August 1974 SOVIET RUSSIA, argued that while all-purpose brigades and mechanized links had looked very promising several years ago, they were losing their importance now with the trend toward specialization. Although the author has not previously played an important role in the controversy, the chief editor of SOVIET RUSSIA, P.F. Alekseyev, had a clear record of opposition to links while chief editor of RURAL LIFE in the late 1960's. He declared in the May 1969 ZHURNALIST that links tended to disrupt the work of brigades, hindered correct use of equipment, and furthermore, that it was incorrect to recommend one form of labor organization for all farms.

The most detailed current attack on links appeared in the October 1974 issue of the ministry's organ ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE. Entitled "From Links to Mechanized Units," the article by Bryansk Agricultural Equipment Association chief A. Illarionov argued that all-purpose brigades and mechanized links did not use equipment efficiently and should be replaced with specialized tractor brigades and mechanized units bigger than links. He wrote that his oblast already had 1,500 mechanized links which, while they have advantages, also have important drawbacks. Since links are assigned responsibility for certain fields, the output of which determines their income, they lack interest in the farm's other fields and resist being called upon to work other fields. Since the links' fields

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are too small to keep their equipment busy all the time, and since they resist having their equipment taken away for use on other fields, equipment is underused and the farm is unable to maneuver its resources with maximum efficiency. Illarionov argued that bigger mechanized "units" (otryady), first introduced in his oblast in 1965, are needed to overcome the links' overly narrow attitude and to give the farm more control. He explained that these "units" work areas of 1,200-1,500 hectares, while links in his oblast usually work under 50-100 hectares.

Although he claimed such units had the same advantages as links--long-term responsibility for specific sections of land and pay based on the final result--it seems unlikely that the much larger units could avoid the loss of personal responsibility and initiative involved in assigning daily work and maneuvering people about characteristic of traditional brigades. One of the main and most controversial features of unregulated mechanized links is their similarity to private farming--they are very small groups (often only two or three tractor drivers) with their own equipment, long-term responsibility for their own section of land, freedom to organize their own work, and with pay based on their ability to use that land and equipment most productively.

In recent years links have become widespread, and articles criticizing them are rare. Even the Agriculture Ministry's resistance had appeared broken in 1973. Polyanskiy, whose silence on links had suggested lack of enthusiasm, had been demoted in early 1973 from First Deputy Premier in charge of agriculture to agriculture minister. In June 1973 a PRAVDA article attacked the Agriculture Ministry for delay in issuing recommendations on links. The 10 June article complained that V. Zhurikov, chief of the ministry's administration for organization, norms and wages, had conceded only to prepare a draft of recommendations by the end of 1973, whereas the recommendations should have been issued at the beginning of 1971, the article stated. PRAVDA on 15 August 1973 reported a reply by Deputy Agriculture Minister A.P. Chubarov, agreeing with the article's criticisms of Zhurikov's administration and stating that recommendations had now been finished and would soon be issued.

Nevertheless, no recommendations have yet appeared, and Zhurikov cautiously reaffirmed his doubts about the links in a December 1973 article in the ministry journal ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE. Although praising the incentive-oriented mechanized links as efficient, he pointed out that they do only part of the work, while the rest is done by brigade workers not working on an incentive basis, thus causing difficulties. Further, he reasserted that a single form of organization cannot be recommended for everyone and must not be forced on farms.

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NOTES

FORD VISIT TO JAPAN: The Japan Communist Party (JCP) greeted President Ford's 18 November Tokyo arrival with a statement and an AKAHATA editorial protesting the visit, claiming it was intended to open the way for overt introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan and to aid the beleaguered Tanaka government. The editorial made an "urgent appeal" for the mobilization of forces to "resolutely oppose" the visit. Nevertheless, the JCP has been careful to publicly disassociate itself from "Trotskyite" groups the party claims are plotting violent activities. Soviet media coverage of the President's Japan visit thus far has been limited to reports highlighting strains in U.S.-Japanese relations. On 17 November, before the President's arrival in Tokyo, TASS carried a dispatch by PRAVDA's Tokyo correspondent noting general "economic and political contradictions" between the two countries, as well as specific policies opposed by forces in Japan struggling against Japan's rearmament and its participation in "U.S. military blocs." Monitored Soviet media have not acknowledged that there were demonstrations against the visit; in fact, on 17 November TASS reported a Tokyo "workers" rally protesting economic conditions but failed to note anti-U.S. speeches and slogans. Peking media have not yet mentioned the President's visit. Vietnamese communist media thus far have characterized the President's visit as an effort to prop up the "extremely reactionary imperialist alliance" still dominated by the "Nixon doctrine" in the face of widespread opposition among Japanese and South Koreans. Several commentaries by Hanoi and Liberation radios and NHAN DAN articles stress the large protest demonstrations in Japan, adding that Prime Minister Tanaka is expected to resign after the visit. Thus far both Hanoi and Liberation media have generally treated the Presidential visit as though it were confined to Japan and Korea, although Liberation Radio once noted that Ford would visit "a number of countries," including those two, without mentioning the planned Vladivostok meeting with Brezhnev.

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VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT: Soviet advance publicity for the forthcoming summit at Vladivostok has been low-level but constant since the plans for the meeting were first announced at the conclusion of Secretary Kissinger's visit to Moscow on 27 October. The media have provided reports of President Ford's and Secretary Kissinger's press conference remarks on the meeting, roundups of U.S. press comment, reports of citizens' reactions in Vladivostok, and so on. The tone of the reportage and comment has been upbeat, although there have been occasional references to the opponents of detente in the West. Except for predictions that the meeting will contribute to further progress on strategic arms limitation issues, there has been little attempt to define the substantive purpose of the meeting beyond vague generalities about detente.

ABORTIVE COUP IN BOLIVIA: Moscow, in commenting on the 7 November unsuccessful coup in Bolivia and subsequent events, has accused "extreme right elements" within the armed forces of provoking the coup in order to justify the cancellation of elections scheduled for 1975. In the days immediately following the abortive coup, it was given scant coverage, possibly because Moscow media equated as "rightwing" both the government and the coup leaders--the latter being disaffected members of the cabinet and the Bolivian Socialist Falange, which formed part of the civilian coalition supporting President Hugo Banzer's government. However, Soviet media reacted strongly to the 10 November La Paz announcement that a "new" military government, retaining Banzer as president, would remain in power until 1980, with political and labor activities suspended indefinitely. TASS commentator Peter Tamarin said on the 18th that the post-coup measures amounted to a "legalization of military dictatorship" and reported that a "stormy protest" had been set off in the country--an apparent reference to student unrest. Moscow radio commentator Leonid Levchenko asserted that sectors of the military had planned the revolt in order to justify their "repressive measures" and predicted that the government would have to face the "determined resistance of the Bolivian people." Havana, which has shown decreased interest in the government of Bolivia since the overthrow of the leftist Torres regime by Banzer forces in 1971, has not commented on recent events in Bolivia, and PRENSA LATINA did not distribute a 12 November report submitted by its Lima office on a Bolivian official's denial that the coup was staged.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 11 - 17 NOVEMBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2453 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1092 items)</u>		
China	(4%)	6%	South Yemen Chairman	(1%)	14%*
Sri Lanka Premier	(--)	5%	in PRC		
Bandaranaike in USSR			UNGA Session	(6%)	9%
[Kosygin Dinner	(--)	2%]	[Palestine Debate	(--)	3%]
Speech			Criticism of Lin Piao	(10%)	7%
October Revolution	(36%)	3%	and Confucius		
Anniversary			Indochina	(8%)	6%
UNGA Palestine Debate	(--)	2%	World Food Conference,	(3%)	4%
Mongolian 50th	(--)	2%	Rome		
Anniversary			Trinidad and Tobago	(--)	3%
			Prime Minister		
			Williams Visit Press		
			Communique		
			Japan	(1%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Rubay'i 'Ali.