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Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070038-7

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Trends in Communist Propaganda

11 Sept 74

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**F B I S**

# **TRENDS**


**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

11 SEPTEMBER 1974  
(VOL. XXV, NO. 37)

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## C Y P R U S

## MOSCOW IMPLICITLY CRITICAL OF TURKEY, PESSIMISTIC OVER FUTURE

Moscow has shown signs of a slightly more critical stance toward Turkey on the Cyprus question combined with pessimism over the political future of the island republic. Although President Podgorny in his 8 September speech in Sofia continued the practice of refraining from direct criticism of Ankara, some comment has implicitly conveyed Moscow's irritation. Both Turkey's military pressure on the Greek Cypriots to accept a settlement on Ankara's terms and its rejection of the Soviet proposal to solve the problem within the UN framework have received more pointed attention. But comment has stopped short of criticizing Turkey by name.

The strongest indication of Moscow's frustration over the Turkish position appeared in PRAVDA on 1 September in Oleg Orestov's international review. Although in the past PRAVDA has softpedaled Turkish rejection of the Soviet proposal, this time it underlined the unreasonableness of Ankara by noting that "despite the complete bankruptcy" of the Geneva talks, both "Turkey and the United States have advocated their resumption." Citing Greek Foreign Minister Mavros' refusal to negotiate under pressure, PRAVDA identified this pressure as "the pronouncements of certain figures on Cyprus itself and outside Cyprus . . . statements to the effect that foreign troops will not be withdrawn from Cyprus and also the demand for the withdrawal of UN troops"--thinly veiled references to remarks by Turkish Cypriot and Turkish leaders. PRAVDA went on to label the statements "irresponsible" and sounding "like threats," which are worsening "an already grim situation."

This note of pessimism was reemphasized in Moscow radio broadcasts to East European listeners. Yuriy Shalygin in a Polish-language commentary on the 5th saw not "even the slightest indication of hope" for a peaceful settlement of the crisis, and Vladimir Silantsev in a Romanian-language commentary on the 7th foresaw "the danger of the liquidation of this state and its partition . . . ."

Podgorny was not so gloomy in his remarks on the 8th, although he did say that the situation "continues to be complex and tense" and blamed the "present crisis" on "the continued intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus by certain NATO circles." In his speech, delivered at Bulgaria's 30th liberation anniversary ceremonies and carried live by Sofia radio, Podgorny again put forth the Soviet proposal, omitting,

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however, any reference to the proposal's provision for "appropriate effective guarantees" by the permanent member-states of the Security Council.

Moscow typically has not publicized its most recent diplomatic activity, and Athens and Ankara apparently have not confirmed Western news reports that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev was visiting Turkey and due to visit Greece. But Nicosia radio on the 10th announced that Ilichev was expected to arrive in Nicosia "within the next few days" to exchange views on the Cyprus problem between the government of Cyprus and the Soviet Union.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## PODGORNY FAVORABLY CITES PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO "STATEHOOD"

President Podgorny, in his 8 September speech in Sofia, put the Soviet Union on record as endorsing the Palestinian Arabs' "sovereign right to establish their own statehood [gosudarstvennost] in one form or another." In the past, Moscow has been reluctant to discuss the idea of a new Palestinian state and has generally stressed the need to insure undefined "legitimate national rights" of the Palestinians as an indispensable part of an overall Middle East peace settlement.\* Podgorny's reference to some form of Palestinian "statehood," not further spelled out, would allow for considerable flexibility in interpretation.

Podgorny's reference may be related to the Soviet position at the upcoming session of the 28th UN General Assembly, scheduled to begin on 17 September. His speech occurred only days after the Arab League Council had agreed to place the Palestine issue on the UNGA agenda as a separate item. In noting the Arab League Council decision on 2 September, the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY stated that it had been made in response to a request by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), adding that the PLO rejected UN Security Council Resolution 242 and saw the Palestinian issue as "one of existence, not border lines." On 3 September the Cairo newspaper AL-AKHBAR, according to the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, reported that the Soviet Union not only welcomed the Arab League Council decision but also intended itself to adopt and defend the Palestine question during the UN session. The source of AL-AKHBAR's information was not provided, however, and reaction from Moscow media has been limited; TASS on 2 September promptly reported the fact of the council decision, and it was noted in a TASS roundup on the 4th of the council session. A Moscow Arabic-language commentary on the 3d, observing that the council decided to convene an Arab summit conference in Rabat on 26 October, added that "another important decision" provided for raising the Palestine problem at the UN General Assembly. Calling the Palestinian issue the "core" of the Middle East crisis, the broadcast said it was "necessary to tackle it" during the next UNGA session.

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\* For a discussion of Moscow's increased public support recently for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in connection with PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat's visit to Moscow on 30 July-3 August 1974, see the TRENDS of 7 August 1974, pages 12-14.

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Podgorny's favorable reference to the Palestinians' right to some form of statehood broaches at an authoritative level a subject that has long been sensitive for Soviet media. In the past, Soviet references to the concept of a Palestinian state have been exceedingly rare. For several years after the June 1967 war, when such references occurred they were virtually always critical of the concept as an Israeli-sponsored scheme to establish a buffer state on the occupied West Bank territories, ostensibly governed by Arabs but in reality a "puppet" subject to Israeli control.\* The only known favorable Soviet reference to a new Palestinian state at that time occurred on 14 August 1969 in a Yiddish-language broadcast to Israel over the "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress, which asserted that "an Arab state in Palestine would be a real step toward a political solution on the Middle East problem." Although Soviet comment in more recent years has occasionally referred to the Palestinians' right to "self-determination," Moscow has been very reluctant to express a view on the desirability or possible forms of a new Palestinian state.

Moscow's reluctance has probably been due in large part to disunity among the Palestinians themselves on this issue and to a desire not to become committed to a policy position too soon on such a contentious question. A possible indication of Moscow's current thinking on the form of a Palestinian state was provided in a 30 July 1974 IZVESTIYA article by the editor-in-chief, Lev Tolkunov. Tracing the "severe fate" suffered by the Palestinians for almost three decades, Tolkunov seemed optimistic that "realistic trends" were now prevailing in the Palestinian resistance movement with regard to the future of the occupied Palestinian lands. By way of explanation, Tolkunov stated that many Palestinian leaders "believe that if Israel liberates the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza strip, a Palestinian state [gosudarstvo] may be formed on this territory." Urging the PLO groups to unite behind a common political program, Tolkunov warned that "some people in the Near East" plan to seize control of a new Palestinian state, "if it emerges in the Gaza strip and on the West Bank of the Jordan," and also plan to implement "so-called Palestinian autonomy within the framework of the Kingdom of Jordan." Tolkunov also warned that some circles seek to eliminate the PLO as a political force and "to place at the head of the future state, when it is created," a bourgeoisie aligned with "Arab reaction and imperialism."

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\* See the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 15 October 1970, pages 1-2, for a discussion of Soviet treatment of the idea of a Palestinian state during this period.



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## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW SILENT ON MAJOR ISSUES, PUSHES ROUTINE THEMES

After the flurry of attention prompted by the change in the U.S. presidency, Soviet media have fallen uncharacteristically silent on U.S. developments, apparently reflecting Moscow's concern lest premature comment adversely affect the development of relations with the new Administration.

Brezhnev failed to even mention the United States--although he did mention detente--in his major speech at Novorossiysk on 7 September. Even such major developments as the prospective breakthrough on most-favored-nation status was barely mentioned by the Soviet media, although the Soviet reluctance to acknowledge the reciprocal concession on increased Jewish emigration is understandable. In the meantime, Moscow has fallen back on stock propaganda themes to keep alive the notion that U.S.-Soviet relations are continuing on track and that the prospects for detente remain bright.

Although the Moscow domestic radio carried a brief report on 17 August that a meeting between President Ford and Senators Jackson, Ribicoff, and Javits had reportedly opened the way for Senate approval of most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union, this was apparently the only Soviet reference to what was subsequently described in the U.S. press as a deal involving an exchange of MFN status for a Soviet commitment to permit increased Jewish emigration. In the meantime, the Soviet media have carried a spate of items reporting interviews with Western businessmen who were said to have expressed highly optimistic assessments of the prospects for U.S.-Soviet trade.

Space cooperation and the prospects for disarmament were other themes played up by Soviet media over the past week. PRAVDA reported an interview with the head of the Soviet cosmonaut delegation on its departure from Moscow for Houston. The arrival of the cosmonauts in the United States, and the visit of NASA head Fletcher to Soviet Academy of Sciences President Keldysh were other items which attracted attention. Although--except for a Trofimenko article in the latest issue of USA that is not yet available in translation--the Soviet media have remained silent on SALT, arms control themes have continued to be promoted. A Berezhev commentary on 9 September, for example, praised Secretary Kissinger's Miami speech, describing as particularly "interesting" his assertion that the accumulation of strategic weapons would not raise the level of security but rather the level of risk.

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## GERMANY

## EAST BERLIN WELCOMES ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S.-GDR RELATIONS

Soviet as well as East German comment has hailed the 4 September establishment of U.S.-GDR diplomatic relations as the final step in the international recognition of the postwar status quo of two German states. East German observers have in effect gloated over the fact that Washington, as an East Berlin radio commentator said on the 9th, finally had "to adapt itself to reality in Europe, that is, to the existence of the two German states." While comment has triumphantly underlined the success of the GDR's entire postwar policy of striving for international recognition as an independent, sovereign state and nation--including the long battle against such West German policies as Willy Brandt's thesis of "two German states within one German nation"--treatment of the Washington signing ceremonies was low-keyed and moderate, reflecting East German satisfaction.

GDR comment has highlighted the remarks by the head of the GDR delegation at the 4 September signing ceremony, Ambassador Herbert Suess, who noted that the signing was a "good beginning" for the future development of GDR-U.S. relations. Both the official remarks and comment made clear that East Berlin hopes to expand its economic and trade relations with the United States as soon as possible, with comment expressing some concern over "discriminatory" trade provisions such as the "refusal to grant the GDR the most-favored-nation clause, as well as marketing restrictions, the still existing embargo list, and other things." A radio commentator on the 9th noted that GDR leader Honecker in an AP interview in early June had listed these restrictions in commenting on future U.S.-GDR relations.

NEGOTIATIONS ON CLAIMS,  
ISRAELI QUESTION

East Berlin media have, not surprisingly, ignored the details of the agreement with Washington to hold negotiations in the near future "on the settlement of claims and other financial questions which are pending between them"--language from the joint communique issued in Washington to cover future talks on claims by American citizens against the GDR Government and claims for possible compensation by Jewish and other victims who suffered under Nazism. East Berlin reported that these negotiations would be held and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND frontpaged the text of the communique, but without any elaboration.

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The view that the GDR is one of the two successor states of Hitler's Third Reich--the basis for the U.S. position on claims against the GDR for victims of Nazism--has, with only one known exception, never been acknowledged by official East German spokesman. The exception came in the speech by GDR Foreign Minister Winzer at the 3 July 1973 foreign ministers' meeting in Helsinki at the conclusion of the first stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation Europe. In discussing the postwar period and the issue of recognition of the postwar European borders, Winzer stated unequivocally--and his speech was published textually in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND--that "being a successor state of the former German Reich" the GDR must see that the European borders must never again be violated from "German territory."

In an obvious effort to stem Arab speculation about reparations to Israel and to head off demands for compensation, a statement issued by the GDR Embassy in Cairo, reported by TASS and Arab media on the 10th, refuted a Cairo AL-AHRAM report that the GDR had agreed to commence talks on payment of compensation to Jewish victims of Nazi Germany. An IRAQI NEWS AGENCY report said the embassy statement declared that the GDR "categorically refused" to compensate Israel or any other Jewish or Zionist organization for the "so-called Nazi atrocities" because "the GDR is not the successor of the Third Reich--Hitler's regime." According to the TASS report, the embassy statement concluded that all questions related to payment of compensation were settled in the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945, and that the U.S.-GDR agreement on establishment of diplomatic relations "does not have a single word about any compensation to Israel" by the GDR.

#### USSR REPEATS STAND ON BERLIN IN AGREEMENT ANNIVERSARY COMMENT

Marking the third anniversary of the 3 September 1971 signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, Moscow commentators have reiterated the conventional Soviet interpretation as concerning only "West" Berlin rather than governing Big Four relations in the entire city. At the same time, Moscow has used the occasion to seemingly wind up the recent controversy over the establishment of the FRG Federal Environmental Agency in West Berlin and the resultant transit difficulties, while warning that the USSR and the GDR would respond similarly in the future to any "illegal" acts by Bonn considered contrary to the Quadripartite Agreement. Since the Big Three and Moscow exchanged formal demarches on the FEA question early in August, Moscow has gradually diminished its attention to the issue, perhaps to set the stage for the upcoming 15-16 September Cromevo visit to Bonn to prepare for a possible visit to the Soviet Union by Chancellor Schmidt this fall.

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Highlighting Moscow comment on the anniversary, articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 3d and 4th, respectively, maintained the standard Soviet position on the agreement. Thus PRAVDA's West Berlin correspondent Yuriy Voronov in his article on the 3d cited the passage stating that "the western sectors of Berlin are not an integral part of the FRG and would continue not to be administered by it." Voronov charged that "opponents of the four-power agreement," particularly leaders of the CDU/CSU opposition, have propounded the view that "West Berlin is FRG land and are persistently fighting for the expansion of the 'Federal presence'" in West Berlin. Repeating criticism expressed in IZVESTIYA last July, Voronov agreed with "those observers who note the inconsistent and contradictory position . . . adopted by some politicians from the coalition of FRG ruling parties."

Voronov rejected the view that establishment of the FEA fell within the limitations outlined in the Quadripartite Agreement to the effect that it does not deny West Berlin's ties with the FRG. Everybody knows, Voronov said, that "there are ties and then there are ties." He added: "With regard to West Berlin, they are permissible only so long as they do not contradict the pivotal provision of the agreement to the effect that the city does not belong to the FRG." Ridiculing the idea that the USSR and the GDR would have "to make concessions in West Berlin" in order to continue the further relaxation of tensions, Voronov warned that Moscow was prepared to take similar action in the future in defending what it sees as its interests in the Quadripartite Agreement:

Any unlawful or unilateral actions contradicting the spirit and letter of the Quadripartite Agreement are bound to have and will have consequences.

The 4 September IZVESTIYA article by T. Sergeyev, while making many of the same points as Voronov, omitted any threatening reference to "consequences," observing only that "a desire to evade the provisions" of the four-power agreement "or to interpret them unilaterally can lead only to an unnecessary aggravation of relations in the center of the continent."

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## PRC - U. S. RELATIONS

### PEKING SAYS U.S. FACES "PROFOUND" ECONOMIC CRISIS

Peking propaganda recently has given stepped-up attention to U.S. economic problems--a departure from its general silence on the Ford Administration policies in other areas. This was capped by an atypical, albeit brief remark by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on 5 September that "the superpower known as the 'dollar empire' is now facing a profound crisis of acute inflation coupled with a decline in production." Li's remark came in a speech at a banquet welcoming visiting Nigerian head of government General Gowon.

Since former President Nixon's February 1972 Peking visit, Chinese leaders have been reluctant to comment specifically on U.S. economic and other internal problems, and they have not gone beyond the generalized formula used by Chou En-lai at the 10th CCP Congress in August 1973--that the United States, as well as the USSR, is "beset with troubles internally and externally" and is finding the going "tougher and tougher." Peking media have long provided routine, low-key reportage on U.S. problems, and they have given unusually full coverage to gloomy Ford Administration assessments and new policy moves designed to cope with the negative performance of the economy. Reporting on the President's 12 August address to Congress, NCNA had highlighted his remark that inflation represented his Administration's first priority, while a recent NCNA report on the 5 September White House economic conference quoted the President's statement that "there is no quick fix for what ails our economy." NCNA went on to note gloomy remarks by others at the conference that there was little likelihood of an economic upturn next year and reported Senator Mansfield's 4 September remarks to the press that he felt the United States was now in a recession and that current economic indicators were similar to those of the 1930s.

Peking's portrayal of U.S. economic problems has thus far not been accompanied by a change in Chinese treatment of U.S. foreign policy in general or of Sino-U.S. relations in particular. Li Hsien-nien's speech on the 9th duly underlined the basic Chinese belief that irreconcilable U.S. rivalry with the USSR remains the salient feature of the current international scene, while NCNA's report on President Ford's 12 August address carefully noted his determination to maintain a strong U.S. military posture and to stand by Washington's commitments abroad. Peking demonstrated its continued interest in improved Sino-U.S. relations by replaying in full the President's 12 August promise to continue the new U.S. relationship with China, by giving its usual correct treatment to the latest U.S. Congressional delegation to visit China, and by sustaining Chinese discretion on Watergate, avoiding mention of President Ford's pardon for former

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## P R C - I N D I A

## PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY VOICES SUPPORT FOR SIKKIM RESISTANCE

Peking has capped its heavy outpouring of criticism over India's "annexation" of Sikkim with a strongly worded 11 September PRC Foreign Ministry statement that for the first time offers explicit Chinese support for Sikkimese resistance to Indian rule. The statement represents the most authoritative Chinese denunciation of New Delhi since the Indian-Pakistani war of 1971.

Similar to Peking's earlier attack in a 3 September PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article,\* the foreign ministry statement denounced the Gandhi government by name and linked its incorporation of Sikkim with past Indian dismemberment of Pakistan and alleged Indian designs to use the recent successful atomic test to "do whatever it pleased with its neighbors." The statement also echoed past Peking criticism in pointing to Moscow's supportive role for New Delhi's "colonialist" moves; it claimed that the USSR's role as the sole defender of Indian action shows that Moscow is "the boss behind the scenes as well as the abettor of Indian expansion." The statement added the voice of the Chinese "government" to the previous denunciation of India by the Chinese "people" in the 3 September Commentator article.

Though the Commentator article had avoided reference to possible Sikkimese resistance and had predicted only vaguely that India would be "sternly punished by history," the present statement hailed recent resistance by the Sikkim ruler and people and predicted that India's act "is bound to arouse the Sikkimese people and the people of the whole world, including the Indian people, to even stronger resistance." It affirmed that China "absolutely does not recognize India's illegal annexation" and pledged that Peking "firmly supports" the "just struggle for national independence and sovereignty and against Indian expansionism."

Peking in the past week had led up to the foreign ministry statement with the greatest outpouring of critical Chinese comment on a South Asian issue in more than two years. An 8 September PEOPLE'S DAILY article by Yuan Ku-ping had hinted at possible Chinese support for Sikkim resistance in noting that Sikkimese efforts to rebuff Indian

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\* The Commentator article is discussed in TRENDS of 5 September 1974, pages 13-14.

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dictate were "winning sympathy and support from the peoples of their neighboring countries." The article made a highly unusual reference to resistance to Indian oppression by the Naga and Mizo peoples, minority groups in India that until recent years had received ample propaganda and some material support from Peking.

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## COMMUNIST RELATIONS

## ZHIVKOV SCORES CHINESE, PODGORNYY RESTRAINED AT SOFIA MEETING

Mutual avowals of Soviet-Bulgarian solidarity and differing public stances on the issues of China and a new world communist conference marked the speeches by Zhivkov and Podgornyy at the 8 September celebration in Sofia of Bulgaria's 30th liberation anniversary. Zhivkov roundly assailed the Peking leaders and called for both a European and a world conference of communist parties. Podgornyy preserved the low profile that the Soviet Union has assumed on these issues during the current round of East European anniversary celebrations by avoiding direct statements on either. The Soviet Union's discretion on these issues in East European forums stands in contrast to the intensified anti-Peking campaign which the Soviet media have mounted in connection with the 25th anniversary of the PRC.

Both speakers had refrained from polemics at the 1969 Bulgarian anniversary, which came in the wake of the Czechoslovak events and the June 1969 Moscow party conference. In 1964, Brezhnev, who headed the Soviet delegation, joined Zhivkov in attacking the Chinese. This year the Soviet Union has been represented by top leaders at each of the East European anniversary celebrations: Brezhnev attended Poland's in July, and Kosygin Romania's in August.

ZHIVKOV            Zhivkov's blistering anti-Peking attack seemed calculated  
SPEECH            in part, at least, to draw unfavorable attention to the  
                  relative restraint recently shown by other East European  
leaders on this score:

Our position is clear: We do not hide our conviction that the adventurous, revisionist and nationalist course of the clique of Mao Tse-Tung threatens the socialist conquests of the Chinese people. We resolutely reject and condemn the anti-Soviet and anticommunist slanders of Peking, its ferocious struggle against the unity and cohesion of the world socialist community, the international communist movement, the national liberation movements, and its reactionary pro-imperialist positions and actions on the world stage.

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Zhivkov's attack came in the context of a review of Bulgaria's relations with other socialist countries, in which ten countries--including Romania--were listed as having ties of "strong militant friendship" with Sofia. He then singled out Yugoslavia, Albania, and China for special comment. With regard to Albania, he merely noted that Bulgaria would like to improve relations. With regard to Yugoslavia, he observed that "our country makes constant efforts to improve relations," and that "we have achieved new successes in this field." (Belgrade, however, sent only a Yugoslav Presidency member, Doronjski, to the Sofia festivities after sending a more prestigious figure, Vice President Stambolic, to the Bucharest anniversary observance.) Zhivkov buttressed his portrayal of improving Sofia-Belgrade relations by recalling elsewhere in his speech that after liberation in 1944 the Bulgarian People's Army had fought "shoulder to shoulder" both with the Soviet Army and the Yugoslav People's Liberation Army.

In regard to Romania, the Bulgarian leader's indication of normal Sofia-Bucharest ties was qualified by a remark elsewhere in his speech that could be construed as critical of Ceausescu's course: "There are still people in this world who call themselves revolutionaries but who are so afraid for their independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union" that they show a willingness to renounce the true revolutionary path. The Bulgarians, he added, "gratefully use" the Soviet experience and example.

Zhivkov followed up his attack on the Chinese with a vow to help strengthen "the united front of the communists of the world," declaring that "the conditions for convoking a European and later a world conference of the communist and workers parties are ripe." He added that his party was prepared to participate in and contribute to the success of these conferences. The directness of Zhivkov's appeal contrasted with the low-keyed endorsements of international party "conferences" registered by Gierak and Brezhnev in Warsaw in July. Brezhnev at that time directly endorsed only a European CP meeting.

PODGORNYY        Following Zhivkov, Podgornyy delivered a largely  
SPEECH            routine speech replete with praise for Bulgaria's  
                  post-liberation achievements and its contribution  
to the socialist camp. He praised Zhivkov's leadership as well as Brezhnev's. Underscoring the Bulgarians' exemplary socialist credentials, the Soviet president declared that the new generation of Bulgarian people in the past 30 years has been "educated in the spirit of boundless fidelity to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism" and are "genuine patriots-internationalists." In a veiled allusion

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to the Chinese, he went on to stress that "we know the Bulgarian Communist Party as an integral part of the world communist and workers movement, as a party which wages a merciless struggle against the enemies of the working class, against those who are trying to split its ranks." In underscoring the solidarity of the Soviet and Bulgarian parties, Podgorny singled out Zhivkov in a fairly standard tribute as "the well-known figure of the international communist and workers movement and faithful friend of the Soviet Union." The tribute was comparable to Zhivkov's preceding praise of Podgorny as "the great son of the Soviet Union and one of the most important officials of the CPSU and the international communist movement." Zhivkov had followed up this tribute with more fulsome praise for Brezhnev as, among other things, a tireless fighter for world peace.

Podgorny recalled Brezhnev's remarks at the Polish liberation anniversary on "how much has been done in recent years" to lessen the cold war atmosphere in favor of cooperation on the basis of peaceful coexistence, citing the relaxation of tensions in Europe as largely responsible for the governmental changes in Portugal and Greece. Referring to the opponents of detente in this context, Podgorny registered a further veiled criticism of Peking on the score of its stand on Portugal's African territories, citing "those politicians who mask themselves under revolutionary phraseology and speak as supporters of peace and defenders of the interests of the people, but in fact cause harm to the liberation movements, trying to brake the genuine and positive shifts in the international arena."

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## INDOCHINA

## HANOI CONDEMNS THAI LEGISLATION ON U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Hanoi's continuing concern over the presence of U.S. military forces in Thailand has been reflected in its criticism of legislation, sponsored by former foreign minister and now assemblyman Thanat Khoman, that would give the Thai National Legislative Assembly greater control in regulating foreign troops stationed in Thailand. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on 7 September claimed that the bill would "legalize" the presence of the troops, rather than restrict their activities, and a Hanoi radio commentary on the 6th assailed Thanat Khoman by name and identified him as Prime Minister Sanya's foreign affairs adviser. Hanoi's sharp reaction is consistent with the critical attitude it has shown toward the Bangkok government since mid-May when it abandoned the circumspection it had initially adopted following the installation of the Sanya government in October 1973.\* Thus far, there has been no criticism of the bill on foreign military forces from the Thai Communist Party's clandestine station, Voice of the People of Thailand, or by Peking and Moscow.

Ignoring Thanat Khoman's position that his bill will provide greater Thai control over U.S. forces, the DRV spokesman's statement denounced the proposal as "just another move to legalize the presence of the U.S. armed forces in Thailand" and "the conversion of that country into a military base of U.S. imperialism for use against the peoples of Southeast Asia." It accused unnamed "Thai authorities" of "selling" Thailand's independence and sovereignty to the United States "at a cheap price," adding that they are also acting against the national rights of the Indochinese countries and are blatantly violating the 1962 Geneva agreement on Laos.

The statement voiced the DRV Government's stern condemnation of Thailand's "continuing collusion" in supporting U.S. designs of aggression and intervention in Indochina and supported the Thai people's struggle for complete U.S. withdrawal. It reiterated the DRV stance that an end to Thai Government involvement in U.S. moves against Indochina remains "a basic condition" for the establishment of friendly Thai-Vietnamese relations.

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\* For background, see the TRENDS of 5 June 1974, pages 14-15, and 22 May 1974, pages 21-22.

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## CHINA

## PEKING LAYS NEW STRESS ON UNITY, NARROWS ANTI-LIN CAMPAIGN

While Peking continues to pay pro forma attention to the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, a new and recent insistence on unity seems to signal an effective pause in the campaign until China's leadership quandry arising from Chou En-lai's illness is resolved. The new insistence on unity was most graphically demonstrated by Peking's 7 September television coverage of the 4 September meeting between Mao and Togo President Eyadema, in which Eyadema was escorted by Teng Hsiao-ping. Mao shook hands not only with the Togo delegation but also with Teng, a move that seems designed to underline that past opponents can be united. Teng, the former CCP Secretary General, was purged with Liu Shao-chi in 1966. Monitoring of Chinese television coverage of such meetings since 1971 has not produced any earlier instance in which Mao was observed shaking hands with another PRC leader.

The need for unity was also stressed by a September RED FLAG article which called for the nation to close its ranks politically and to set aside certain "controversial issues" in the campaign to criticize Lin and Confucius. In unusually frank terms, the article stressed the need for greater unity under party control to help guard against class enemies who try to "instigate the masses to fight one another." In dealing with "certain matters" on which "no agreement can be reached in a short time," cadres are to keep the "public interest" in mind and seek common areas of agreement while "reserving minor differences." Attempting to achieve greater unity by narrowing the scope of attack, the article warned that it is necessary to "prevent ourselves from becoming endlessly entangled in certain problems" which might serve to turn the masses away from criticism of Lin and Confucius.

Peking has continued to deal with protocol meetings and greetings formerly handled by Chou through temporary expedients. Two of Chou's vice premiers--Teng Hsiao-ping and Li Hsien-nien--continue to stand in for the ailing premier and share hosting duties for visiting delegations, and during August Vice Chairman Wang Hung-wen filled in for Chou in his party-government role during airport departure and return ceremonies for Li Hsien-nien's delegation to Romania. Wang is the only party vice chairman to have made a public appearance since the Army Day reception on 31 July, and even he has since dropped from sight, not making his customary appearance during recent Mao meetings with visiting African leaders. Wang's absence

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from the meetings with Togo's Eyadema and Nigeria's Gowon on 10 September may signal that he has assumed other duties formerly carried out by Chou or other currently inactive vice chairmen.

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## D P R K - J A P A N

### PYONGYANG SOFTENS LINE ON JAPANESE FOLLOWING SEOUL-TOKYO RIFT

Pyongyang media have moderated their usual harsh treatment of the Japanese in the wake of friction between Seoul and Tokyo over the investigation of the 15 August assassination attempt on ROK President Pak Chong-hui--friction exacerbated by Pak's demand that Japan take action against Chongnyon, the pro-DPRK overseas Korean organization in Japan. While initially the DPRK press had treated events following the assassination incident as a sign of Japan-ROK collaboration to suppress Chongnyon, a 4 September DPRK Foreign Ministry statement signaled a new approach, dropping the charge of collusion and blaming Pak "personally" for requesting that the Japanese government oppress Chongnyon. The statement expressed the DPRK's belief that the Japanese would not comply, since the request was "unreasonable and beyond the bounds of common sense." A 5 September NODONG SINMUN signed commentary went beyond the ministry statement, charging that South Korea had "insolently demanded" that the Japanese restrict Chongnyon and that it was "natural" for Japan to refuse such a demand. The commentary went on in a highly unusual display of praise to credit Japan with "past instances of protecting progressive-minded men of Asia after the Meiji restoration."

A diminution of anti-Japan rhetoric was clearly evident in the 9 September DPRK National Day speech by Pak Song-chol. In contrast to past such speeches and other recent major anniversary addresses, Pak Song-chol did not accuse Japan either of obstructing Korean reunification or of being a U.S. lackey, and he referred only in passing to Japan's alleged plans to "reinvade" South Korea. At the same time, he reflected Pyongyang's newest interpretation of ROK-Japanese relations in noting that the South Koreans are "entreating" the "Japanese government" to oppress Chongnyon.

In line with this more positive treatment of Japan, Pyongyang has given unusually high level treatment to a visiting delegation of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) headed by its chairman. Kim Il-song attended a 6 September banquet for the JSP delegation, an honor he had previously reserved this year for heads of state or of ruling parties. He also held a private meeting with the delegation.

BACKGROUND        The current brouhaha between Seoul and Tokyo is  
                      Pyongyang's second experience in a year, following  
the Kim Tae-chung kidnaping, of serious tension erupting between  
two governments it usually depicts as reactionary conspirators.

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In the Kim case, North Korean media initially presented Tokyo as an active partner in the incident, but eventually noted the split caused between the two countries over the kidnaping and stopped describing Japan as an active participant.

Pyongyang's original interpretation of events after the 15 August shooting in which Mrs. Pak was killed suggested that Seoul was using the incident to work "hand in glove" with the "Japanese reactionaries" against Chongnyon. Prime Minister Tanaka's 19 August trip to Seoul for Mrs. Pak's funeral prompted a harsh 22 August NODONG SINMUN commentary which contained some of the strongest language against Tanaka DPRK media have ever used, reminiscent of their barrages at former Prime Minister Sato.\* The commentary accused Tanaka of promising cooperation with ROK schemes to link Chongnyon and North Korea with the assassination attempt in order to advance Japan's "reinvasion" of South Korea. Less severe and more typical media comment accused Japan of plotting with the ROK, but noted that Japanese investigating authorities differed with South Korean claims about the assassination plot.

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\* Since 1972, when Sato resigned, the North Koreans have maintained a hard line toward Japanese activity in South Korea but reduced the level of abusive hostility towards the Japanese government, and have indicated publicly on several occasions that they hoped Tanaka would not follow Sato's policy toward the DPRK.

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## NOTE

MOSCOW ON DRV ANNIVERSARY: Moscow marked the 2 September 29th anniversary of the DRV's founding with the traditional message of greetings from Soviet party and state officials to their DRV counterparts, rallies to celebrate Soviet-Vietnamese friendship, and a DRV ambassador's reception which prompted the usual level of Soviet representation-- Politburo member Polyanskiy and Secretariat member Dolgikh. Reflecting Moscow's less sanguine view of the Vietnam situation since last year's anniversary, the leaders' message, unlike the 1973 greeting, directly acknowledged problems in implementing the Paris peace agreement and did not dwell upon the advantages for peaceful development accruing to Hanoi from the peace accord. Consistent with Moscow's public statements at the time, last year's message had endorsed efforts to implement the Paris agreement in the interests of consolidating international peace and security but had not acknowledged Hanoi's complaints about violations of the accord. This year the message directly accused the Saigon government of attempting to "prevent" implementation of the peace agreement and to "frustrate a political settlement," and it promised "all-sided assistance and effective support" for the Vietnamese "just struggle." The message made no allusion to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, although the Soviet leaders' greeting to the PRG on its 5 June founding anniversary had criticized "foreign forces" patronizing Saigon. More recently Podgorny charged, in an 8 September speech in Sofia, that Saigon had the "practical support of the imperialist state" in its "sabotage" of the peace agreement.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 2 - 8 SEPTEMBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2661 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1108 items)</u>		
China	(7%)	7%	Seventh Asian Games, Teheran	(15%)	25%
Novorossiysk Award Ceremony	(--)	6%	Togolese President Eyadema in PRC	(--)	8%*
[Brezhnev Speech]	(--)	4%]	Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius	(7%)	7%
Cyprus Crisis	(9%)	6%	Indian "Annexation" of Sikkim	(--)	6%
Chilean Solidarity Week	(--)	5%	Guinea Bissau Independence	(1%)	6%
Bulgarian Revolution 30th Anniversary	(--)	5%	DRV National Day	(--)	5%
[Podgorny Speech in Sofia]	(--)	2%]	Law of the Sea Conference	(11%)	3%
DRV National Day	(2%)	5%	Nigerian President Gowon in PRC	(--)	3%
			UN World Population Conference, Bucharest	(6%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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\* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Eyadema.