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Trends In Communist Propaganda

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# **TRENDS**

## **In Communist Propaganda**

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
Authoritative Gorbachev Article - page 30

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## ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

## USSR RESERVED ON DISENGAGEMENT ACCORD, URGES FURTHER MEASURES

Moscow's treatment of the 29 May announcement of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement reflected the same correct but restrained attitude that it displayed toward the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement accord last January. TASS reported President Nixon's announcement within the hour, noting that the agreement would be signed on the 31st in the military working group of the Geneva peace conference. Subsequent TASS and Moscow domestic service reports attributed the announcement to the "Syrian radio," although Damascus radio in fact merely reported President Nixon's announcement. And TASS on the 30th cited an "official announcement" in Damascus in providing some details of the agreement. The TASS account placed its own stress on the final point of the accord, saying "it is emphasized" that the agreement is not a peace agreement but a step toward a just and durable peace on the basis of Resolution 338 of 22 October 1973.

Soviet media have not yet commented on the agreement, but Moscow commentators on the 26th, in apparent anticipation of the accord, conceded that such an agreement would have "a certain importance" and that the Soviet Union supported the idea of military disengagement. At the same time, however, they reiterated the USSR's contention that "half measures" could not be substituted for a comprehensive settlement. An Arabic-language commentary on the 28th observed that while disengagement moves were undoubtedly positive initial steps, there were no grounds yet for complacency since "some forces" want to keep the disengagement lines for several years.

**GROMYKO IN SYRIA** Gromyko's second visit to Damascus this month at the tail end of the disengagement negotiations was covered by the usual combination of brief TASS reports, a formal information "report" at the conclusion of the visit, and accounts of remarks of the foreign minister himself. TASS reported briefly that Gromyko met Secretary Kissinger on the 28th and that they continued their exchange of opinions on problems of mutual interest, including the "disengagement of troops on the Syrian-Israeli front as a composite part" of the

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general problems of a Mideast settlement. Otherwise the visit was presented as a routine affair conducted in an "atmosphere of friendship and full mutual understanding."

On his arrival, Gromyko reiterated that peace could be insured only on the basis of complete Israeli withdrawal and protection of the Palestinians' national rights. "Only those steps toward this objective which are being taken in the proper context with a view to a general settlement," he said, have real meaning and practical value. In a speech at a luncheon given by Foreign Minister Khaddam on the 28th, Gromyko declared Soviet approval of Syria's positions on a settlement and particularly on disengagement, and said his talks confirmed the two countries' "common approach" to a solution of the Mideast conflict.

The concluding report pointed up Moscow's interest in a resumption of the Geneva talks once disengagement is completed. Consistent with past Soviet-Syrian communiqués, the report made no mention of the Geneva conference, but it did call for implementation of UN resolutions, a change of position for Syria. It said that the two sides feel that as soon as agreement is reached on the disengagement of troops and its clauses are implemented, "appropriate measures should immediately be taken to achieve an all-encompassing and just settlement that would insure realization of corresponding decisions taken by the United Nations." The report repeated Moscow's frequent definition of disengagement as a "first step" and integral part of an overall solution; the Soviet-Egyptian communiqué on Gromyko's early March visit to Cairo used virtually identical language in referring to disengagement.

The Syrians again affirmed that the Soviet Union should take part in all stages and aspects of a settlement; a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 27th placed Gromyko's latest visit in that context, recalling that Syria and the USSR had frequently stressed the importance of such Soviet participation.

Gromyko also met with Palestine Liberation Organization chairman 'Arafat, as he had on his past two trips to Damascus this year. TASS merely said that in the course of a "friendly conversation," they discussed questions of a Middle East settlement with special attention to insuring the Palestinians' national rights. An Arabic-language commentary on the 29th pegged to the Gromyko-'Arafat meeting pointed out that Moscow regarded the issue of

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Palestinian rights as an "imperative condition" for a just Mideast settlement. Criticizing the attitude of Tel Aviv and "its protectors" toward Palestinian demands, the broadcast claimed that the Palestinians were angered by reports that the United States had doubts about Palestinian participation in the Geneva peace conference.\*

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\* According to a Vienna radio report on the 30th, during Austrian Chancellor Kreisky's talks with Kosygin in Moscow the latter observed that solution of the Palestinian problem within the framework of a Mideast peace war not simple. First, Kosygin reportedly said, "the Arab states and the Palestinians must come to realize what they want."

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## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

### SUPREME SOVIET VISIT PREPARES GROUND FOR NEW SUMMIT

Moscow has given the U.S. visit by a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation that began officially on 21 May extensive and enthusiastic coverage unmatched by any event in U.S.-Soviet relations since the June 1973 Washington summit. Such treatment has the effect of improving the climate at home for a new summit in the face of U.S. domestic uncertainties and the recent stalemate in bilateral relations. Moscow's coverage of the visit has followed the lead of the 18 May PRAVDA article by Vasil'yev and Slavin in stressing bipartisan support by U.S. Congressmen for a third summit and for a further improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.\* At the same time the visit has provided a glimpse of the views of delegation head Boris Ponomarev, CPSU Central Committee Secretary and Politburo candidate member, on bilateral U.S.-Soviet issues on which he has previously had little to say publicly.

PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA have carried signed articles by their own correspondents covering the visit highlighting the delegation's cordial reception and the support for improved U.S.-Soviet relations among both Republicans and Democrats. IZVESTIYA on the 25th noted that "particular interest" in the visit was shown by Senators Kennedy and Percy, "who are frequently mentioned as possible candidates for the White House in the 1976 elections." According to correspondents Kobysh and Kondrashov, this shows that "it is difficult to pursue top-level policy in America and to woo the sympathies of the mass of voters without promoting an improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations and without establishing personal contacts with leading Soviet figures."

On the 27 May Moscow radio roundtable on foreign affairs, PRAVDA's deputy chief editor Vadim Nekrasov made it clear that he saw the visit's political significance in the fact that Congress, the host institution for the visit, has been the "focal point" for opponents of U.S.-Soviet cooperation. The central press has reported that the arguments of the Soviet delegation against restrictions on

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\* The PRAVDA article is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 May 1974, pages 1-3.

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bilateral trade made a strong, favorable impression among Congressmen. PRAVDA's Vishnevskiy and Strelnikov reported on 23 May that Senate Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long, originally a cosponsor of the Jackson amendment, was changing his mind about linking most-favored-nation status and credits for Moscow to changes in Soviet emigration policy. IZVESTIYA concluded on the 25th that the delegation's discussions showed that "a dialog is both possible and effective" even with "skeptics" of U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

Ponomarev, best known recently for his remarks in January about "the general crisis of capitalism," during the current visit has voiced strong support for improved U.S.-Soviet relations in general and for further steps at SALT in particular. In doing so he has echoed some of the traditional themes of arms control advocates such as USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov. PRAVDA on 25 May carried a TASS account of Ponomarev's remarks at a press conference which included his observation about the need for military as well as political detente, since "detente and the arms race cannot proceed simultaneously indefinitely." That argument was also presented recently by Arbatov in an article in the May issue of USA which went on to warn that if new agreements at SALT do not follow soon the arms race may resume in full force. PRAVDA did not carry Ponomarev's further observation, as reported by TASS on the 24th, that success at SALT would enable both sides "to substantially reduce defense expenditures and rechannel these resources toward peaceful constructive tasks."

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW BORDER STATEMENT ELICITS LOW-KEY PEKING RESPONSE

A 23 May Soviet Foreign Ministry statement publicizing a perennially sensitive Sino-Soviet border navigation issue elicited on 30 May a low-key PRC response which alluded to Chinese counter-action. The Soviet statement had detailed Moscow's longstanding position on the issue of Chinese ships passing through a disputed channel around an island in the Amur River, and it marked the first time since the border talks began that Moscow has published an official statement on this issue. The authoritative level of the Soviet statement seemed designed to underscore Soviet resolve in the face of China's continued detention of a Soviet helicopter and crew captured on 14 March. The statement portrayed the Soviet position as accommodating and willing to allow Chinese shipping, but only if the Chinese in effect recognized Soviet sovereignty over the territory. The statement came on the heels of a 16 May IZVESTIYA article that had reaffirmed the validity of a policy of restraint on border and other sensitive bilateral issues.\*

Peking's delayed response, a brief 30 May Foreign Ministry spokesman statement, was issued at a lower level than Moscow's statement and also at a lower level than Peking's three previous protests this year, all at the foreign ministry level. China's current response did not repeat the charges of earlier protest notes that Moscow must bear responsibility for the "consequences" of its actions, but focused instead on reaffirming Peking's claim, under terms of the Sino-Russian treaty of 1860, to navigation routes around and territorial sovereignty over the disputed river island. It highlighted alleged hypocrisy in Moscow's seemingly forthcoming statement, asserting that Moscow in fact was attempting to "black-mail" China by making Chinese river passage to the north of the island contingent upon Peking's recognition of Soviet claims in the area. Asserting that Peking "absolutely will not accept" this position, the statement nonetheless disclosed that Moscow since 1966 has been "obstructing by force" Chinese navigation north of the island.

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\* The IZVESTIYA article, by Oleg Borisov, is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 May 1974, pages 14-16.

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## PRC FOREIGN POLICY

## PEKING EMPHASIZES INTEREST IN CLOSE TIES WITH WEST

Peking's desire to sustain close political and trade ties with the West was emphasized on several occasions in the past week. In a series of high-level Chinese leadership contacts with Western visitors that were given extensive coverage and prominent attention going beyond the usual protocol requirements. The Chinese gave wide coverage to the opening on 22 May of a major French industrial exhibition in Peking, including NCHN reports on separate receptions marking the event given by the French embassy, the PRC Foreign Trade Ministry, and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. Chou En-lai on 23 May departed from normal protocol practice to meet and have a "friendly" conversation with the French National Assembly delegate charged with opening the exhibit, while Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping met the delegate on the 24th.

Mao Tse-tung on 30 May had a "very cordial conversation" with visiting Chinese-American physicist Li Cheng-tao. Li on 24 May had a "most cordial talk" with a widely representative group of Chinese leaders headed by Chou En-lai, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan and Teng Hsiao-ping. That occasion marked the first high-level Chinese leaders' meeting with Chinese-American scientists since late 1973. Chou, Chiang Ching, and other leaders had had a "cordial" conversation with Li when he visited China in October 1972.

Peking's desire to maintain close relations with Western leaders opposed to the Soviet Union was clearly evidenced by the extraordinary welcome it accorded former British Prime Minister Heath during his 24-28 May visit to Peking. Departing from normal protocol requirements, Heath was accorded honors reserved for visiting allies or heads of government, including rousing airport welcome and departure ceremonies and a meeting with Mao on 25 May. Chou En-lai was present at Heath's visit with Mao and held separate talks with him on 27 May. Chiang Ching accompanied the former prime minister to a Peking concert on 26 May.

Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, Heath's host in Peking, spoke positively of West European unity during a 25 May welcoming banquet address for the British guest. Teng asserted that West European unity has made progress in impeding Soviet "hegemonistic schemes"

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In Europe. This reading contrasts with Chou En-lai's more equivocal characterization, in an 11 September 1973 banquet address for visiting French President Pompidou, that European unity "if it is carried out well" will contribute to the safeguarding of European interests against outside pressure.

While duly scoring U.S.-Soviet contention as the source of world disorder that will lead inevitably to war or revolution, Teng focused his specific criticism against Moscow's policies in Europe. Charging that Moscow is the "main danger" to Europe, Teng endeavored to capitalize on anti-Soviet feeling in the wake of the Brandt resignation, scoring the hypocrisy of "some people" who "openly speak of friendship but send over spies under cover." In addition he repeated stock Peking charges of Soviet insincerity on disarmament questions.

#### PEKING ATTACKS "UNRESTRAINED" ARMS RACE ON SALT ANNIVERSARY

Peking marked the second anniversary of the U.S.-Soviet SALT agreement signed during President Nixon's May 1972 Moscow visit with a blunt 25 May NCNA article criticizing the superpowers' continuing arms race. Last year Peking was silent on the anniversary. The article demonstrates Peking's increasingly confident assessment, first surfaced late last year, that superpower detente measures have failed and that U.S.-Soviet contention will allow continued opportunities for Chinese maneuvering.\*

While indirectly criticizing both the United States and the Soviet Union for their detente-related declarations, the article carefully differentiated between the two superpowers. It stressed particularly that Moscow has endeavored to take the initiative in the arms race, trying to "seek strategic superiority over the United States," while the United States is portrayed as pursuing its arms programs in defensive reaction to Soviet advances.

Several passages provided evidence of broadly based U.S. official resolve not to compromise on important nuclear armament issues to meet present Soviet negotiating terms. The article noted determination to sustain U.S. strength not only on the part of Defense Department spokesmen, who are frequently cited by NCNA, but

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\* For a discussion of earlier Peking commentaries pointing up the lack of progress in U.S.-Soviet detente, see TRENDS of 21 February 1974, page 9.

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also on the part of the U.S. Congress and of Vice President Ford. This marked the first time Peking has referred to Vice President Ford's position on strategic questions.

The NCNA article made no direct mention of President Nixon or his planned trip to Moscow this June, but replayed earlier NCNA coverage on Secretary Kissinger's preparatory meetings with Soviet officials in Moscow last March and in Washington during April to underscore its view that U.S.-Soviet detente has failed. The article noted especially Kissinger's assessments that no "conceptual breakthrough" had been achieved in arms control and that Washington and Moscow will not have a permanent agreement this year.

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## INDOCHINA

## AID AGREEMENT, COMMUNIQUE CAP KHIEU SAMPHAN VISIT TO CHINA

The Cambodian Front delegation led by insurgent armed forces chief Khieu Samphan climaxed its extended tour of eleven countries over the past two months with a 20-27 May visit in Peking that was marked by the signing of a military aid agreement for 1974 and the release of a joint communique on the delegation's stays in China during April and May.\* The Cambodian visitors attended a dance performance with a Chinese delegation led by Mao's wife and three other politburo members on 23 May and held talks the following day with Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, who substituted for Chou En-lai, the group's chief host during its April stay in Peking. Li spoke at the reciprocal banquet given by the delegation on the 26th, signed the aid agreement along with Khieu Samphan on that day, and saw off the Cambodians at the airport, in the company of Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying and two other Chinese politburo members. Chou En-lai's only appearance with the Cambodian delegation during this leg of its trip was at the aid agreement signing ceremony.

The delegation stopped off on the 27th in Hanoi, where it was greeted at the airport by a high-level group led by Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, and was later received by Le Duan. The visitors were feted at a dinner on 29 May hosted by Pham Van Dong, who took the opportunity to denounce continued U.S. involvement in Indochina and the presence of U.S. forces in Thailand. A 28 May DRV Foreign Ministry communique marking the stopover disclosed that the DRV had accepted a Cambodian invitation to send a delegation to visit Cambodia at an "appropriate date."

**SIHANOUK'S POSITION**      Against the background of Khieu Samphan's emergence during the two-month foreign tour as a prominent Front international spokesman with authority rivaling that of "head of state" Prince Sihanouk, Peking and Front media continue to sustain an image of Front unity under Sihanouk's titular leadership role. As he had during the delegation's stay

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\* Apart from its recent stay, the delegation was in China from 1-5 April and from 8-19 April. See the 10 April 1974 TRENDS, pages 11-15, and the TRENDS of 24 April 1974, pages 19-20.

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in Peking last month, Sihanouk attended major ceremonial functions for the Front visitors, including the 23 May dance performance, the aid agreement signing and reciprocal banquet on the 26th, and the airport departure ceremonies on the 27th. In their speeches at the reciprocal banquet both Khieu Samphan and Li Hsien-nien were careful to note that the conclave was being held "under the auspices" of "head of state" Sihanouk. Li also went out of his way to recall that Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth had been present during the delegation's 2 April meeting with Mao.

**AID AGREEMENT** The 26 May signing of the agreement on China's "gratis provision of military equipment and supplies to Cambodia for 1974" prompted a high-level turnout, including Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-ying on the Chinese side and Sihanouk, Penn Nouth, and Khieu Samphan for the Front. By contrast, Penn Nouth and Li Hsien-nien had been the highest officials present for the 13 January 1973 signing of the last aid agreement. In February 1972 Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-ying had led Chinese officials at that year's agreement signing, which was witnessed by Sihanouk. As in past years, NCNA did not report any remarks by either side during the ceremony. There was no mention this year of "economic aid," which had been covered in agreements for 1973 and 1972.

**PRC-FRONT RELATIONS** The joint communique noted that both sides expressed "full satisfaction" with the "complete success" of the delegation's China visit but failed to record a "complete unity of views" as had been marked in the 2 April DRV-RGNU statement on the delegation's 28 March-1 April 1974 visit to Hanoi.\* In the communique, and in Li's speech at the 26 May banquet, Peking conveyed a more restrained tone than had Chinese speeches at the start of the Front delegation's PRC tour early last month. Those speeches had revived themes from Mao's 20 May 1970 statement on Cambodia in an effort to underscore Peking's proletarian internationalist credentials and its commitment to the struggles of the Cambodian and other oppressed peoples. The Chinese did laud Khieu Samphan's foreign tour, reaffirm support for the five points and backing for the RGNU as the "sole legal government of the Cambodian people," and criticize the Lon Nol regime. Peking also routinely demanded that the United States end its interference in Cambodia and allow the Cambodians to settle their own affairs without outside interference.

\* The Hanoi visit was discussed in 3 April 1974 TRENDS, pages 9-11.

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Though Peking promised to support and assist the Cambodian struggle, Li Hsien-nien on the 26th alluded to a less than sanguine Chinese view of present military prospects when he pointedly admonished the Front concerning the need for "protracted people's war" to surmount "difficulties and obstacles." As had been the case last month, the Chinese carefully refrained from using past Peking formulations that had affirmed China's "powerful backing" and that Peking would provide "a reliable rear area" for the Cambodian struggle--formulations pointedly recalled by Front speakers and in the Front section of the communique. Peking demonstrated its influence with the Cambodians on the question of the Soviet Union, gaining Front endorsement in the communique of China's standard anti-superpower view of international affairs.

#### PRG BREAKS OFF PARTICIPATION IN FOUR-PARTY JMC TALKS

The PRG announced in a 30 May statement by its military delegation in Saigon that it was suspending its participation in the four-party Joint Military Commission (JMC) meetings, charging the United States and Saigon with raising "illogical conditions for restoring the prerogatives and immunities" allegedly being denied the communist delegation and failing to adopt a "serious attitude in negotiations." The latest PRG walkout from the negotiating table follows its 10 May refusal to continue its attendance at the two-party JMC talks and its 13 May announcement that the consultative meetings between the two South Vietnamese parties at La Celle-Saint-Cloud were indefinitely suspended--thus completely severing all formal negotiating ties with Saigon and the United States.\* The DRV military delegation to the four-party JMC talks has also issued a statement voicing its "full support" for the PRG's "correct move" but stopping short of cutting off DRV participation in the talks. Both the PRG and the DRV statements were broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 30th.

Averring that its delegation has displayed its "utmost patience" and that "nothing can be accomplished by the four-party JMC team," the PRG statement declared that it "finds it necessary to suspend its participation in the sessions . . . until the U.S.-Saigon side agrees to end all its sabotage acts, insure the restoration of normal activities of the JMC organizations and adopts a serious negotiating attitude." In commending the PRG action as "rational and necessary," the DRV statement asserted in closing that the

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\* For a discussion of the PRG's suspension of the bilateral meetings, see the TRENDS of 15 May 1974, pages 9-10.

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United States and Saigon "must bear full responsibility for the situation in which the organs in charge of implementing the agreement have been paralyzed and for the present extremely serious situation in South Vietnam."

In reiterating the latest communist complaints against the United States and Saigon, both the PRG and the DRV statements focused attention on U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin's speech at a 27 May embassy ceremony. The PRG charged that Martin had "brazenly distorted the South Vietnamese people's just struggle to protect the Paris agreement, denied the existence of the PRG, and slandered the DRV government." Echoing the same sentiments, the DRV statement claimed that his speech constituted "fresh proof" that the United States was "continuing the war and sabotaging the Paris agreement" in South Vietnam. Ambassador Martin's speech had been denounced in earlier comment, including a 28 May NHAN DAN article, a statement issued by the PRG Paris delegation to the talks at La Celle-Saint-Cloud, and Liberation Radio comment.

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## EUROPE

## MOSCOW WELCOMES PORTUGUESE EVENTS, WARNS OF COUNTERCOUP DANGER

In comment on political developments in Portugal since the 25 April coup, Moscow has given high marks to the military junta and the provisional government, while expressing guarded optimism over likely future developments and warning persistently of a possible "counterrevolutionary" turn of events.\* Typical of Soviet comment throughout the past month was a 25 May PRAVD. article which, although hailing prospects for radical domestic change and praising the "highly important but only first steps" already taken, cautioned that serious and urgent problems remained to be solved. The article underscored as particularly urgent the tasks of strengthening the leftist political alliance and of improving the nation's "extremely difficult" economic situation. Underscoring the urgency of these tasks, the article expressed concern that a variety of conservative forces were becoming politically active, posing the danger of rightist opposition to further "democratization" and even a counter-revolutionary coup.

**CHILEAN LESSON** Moscow has on occasion compared the situation in Portugal to the situation that existed in Chile before the overthrow of the Allende regime. TASS on 14 May carried two such explicit references by Mario Soares, head of the Portuguese Socialist Party and now the country's foreign minister. In both references Soares warned that economic difficulties and lack of leftist unity had permitted a rightist countercoup in Chile. Moscow media have also stressed the applicability to Portugal of a number of broad lessons drawn from the Allende experience, among them: (1) the need to implement the concept of "unity of the masses" and to expand ties between the armed forces, workers, and middle classes; (2) the need to support democratic measures in domestic and foreign policies to broaden and deepen the "democratic stage" of the revolution and establish the "embryo of socialism"; and (3) the need to avoid the "adventurist" actions of left extremists, such as "Maoist" groups, who needlessly panic the middle classes.

**CAUSES OF COUP** Moscow has been reluctant to offer a comprehensive analysis of the causes of the successful revolution. Soviet interpretations have centered largely on the fact that the leading role was played by the Portuguese armed forces, which had long

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\* For Moscow's initial reaction to the coup, see the TRENDS of 1 May 1974, pages 7-8.

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supported the regime. A "preliminary analysis" by A. Bovin in IZVESTIYA on 7 May set the theoretical framework within which most Soviet comment on the subject has subsequently been presented. Bovin emphasized that the coup was not fortuitous but had been "objectively" predetermined and was a logical consequence of a national socio-economic crisis, largely caused by Portugal's colonial wars in Africa and compounded by a "crisis of leadership" and ineffective reforms. The army, Bovin said, "an extremely organized force," acted first to overthrow the regime partly because its common soldiers reflected the social interests of their origins, partly because many army leaders feared a spontaneous popular revolt and wished to act first, and partly because of growing opposition to the wars in Africa. Bovin explained the speed and bloodlessness of the coup as a result of widespread mass support for the army's action.

**FUTURE PROSPECTS** In assessing the likely future course of events in Portugal, Moscow has been cautiously optimistic. Moscow has generally approved the domestic reforms adopted thus far, while stressing that only recognition of the "right to full independence" of Portugal's African colonies would complete the revolution. Moscow has also commented favorably on the formation of the provisional government and its program on 16 May. During the weekly international observers' roundtable over the Moscow domestic service on 26 May, however, IZVESTIYA observer V. Matveyev stated that Portugal is "in a state of flux" and that it was "of course still too early to try to sum up past events."

On foreign relations, Moscow has noted without comment that Portugal intends to establish relations with the USSR. On 20 May Moscow radio reported Foreign Minister Soares' reference to establishing relations with "all" countries, and TASS on 25 May reported a similar statement by Soares concerning relations with "African, Arab, and socialist states," while maintaining traditional ties with Britain, the United States and NATO. On 28 May TASS reported the issuance of a Portuguese communique which listed as one goal of the foreign ministry the establishment of diplomatic relations with "European socialist countries, the USSR included."

**NATO CONNECTION** Until recently Moscow has played down Portugal's ties with NATO, relying on occasional statements that the 25 April coup had "worried" the NATO "militarist circles," who had become uncertain what Portugal's future policy toward NATO would be. Occasionally, as in a TASS

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report on 2 May, a specific concern was cited, such as the future of the U.S. air base on the Portuguese-owned Azores Islands. Toward the end of the month, however, Moscow began stressing the theme that South Africa was attempting to enlist NATO support in preparing for possible crisis situations along its borders resulting from disorders that may develop in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola.

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## LATIN AMERICA

## MOSCOW SEES CONTINUING FAILURES IN U.S. LATIN AMERICAN POLICY

Moscow has depicted the establishment of a new U.S. commission to reexamine Latin American relations as a sign of the continuing failure of U.S. policy in that region. Although the 28 May Moscow domestic radio commentary does not identify the body specifically, it is clearly referring to the 23-member independent study commission headed by former U.S. OAS ambassador Sol M. Linowitz.\* Moscow depicts the move as the latest in a series of U.S. efforts designed to respond to Latin American demands for a new deal in hemispheric relationships.

The commentary goes on to underscore what is described as "a considerable worsening of relations between the United States and many Latin American states," stemming from U.S. efforts to strengthen its influence in the region. These observations are consistent with Moscow's reports of acute differences between the United States and its southern neighbors said to have been manifested at the OAS foreign ministers' conferences at Tlalatelolco, Mexico, last February and in Atlanta in April. The U.S. position at these conferences had been described by Moscow as conciliatory in principle, but vague as to specific commitments concerning Cuba, the Panama Canal, and private investment, among others.

The commentary suggests that the new commission is likely to share the fate of Washington's previous efforts to repair relations with Latin America. Noting Secretary Kissinger's recent efforts to "open a dialog" on U.S.-Latin American relations, the commentary observes that these efforts stimulated a "growing unity" among the Latin American states, and strengthened their resolve not to submit to the "diktat" of the United States. In these circumstances, the commentary concludes, Washington is obliged to search "feverishly" for new ways and methods and to "reluctantly" agree to a review of these relations.

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\* The commission, whose membership was announced in New York on 14 May by Linowitz, is being funded by the Ford and Clark foundations and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

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## YUGOSLAVIA

## LCY CONGRESS MARKS IMPROVED CPSU TIES, STRESSES NONALINEMENT

The 10th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) on 27-30 May reflected the marked improvement in Belgrade's relations with the CPSU and the other parties of the Warsaw Pact countries. This improvement was manifested both in Yugoslav pronouncements and in speeches by delegates from the orthodox Warsaw Pact countries, which had boycotted the last LCY congress five years earlier. At the same time Tito's main report as well as remarks by party lieutenants Edvard Kardelj and Stane Dolanc clearly served notice that Yugoslavia will continue to pursue its policy of nonalignment. On the domestic front, the party congress took place against the background of Belgrade's three-year campaign to reassert the party's leading role in society and the principle of democratic centralism within the party.

**RELATIONS WITH CPSU, PACT** Parties of every Pact country were represented at the congress, unlike the last congress in 1969 when, following Yugoslav criticism of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, only Romania sent a delegation. Again this year, neither the Chinese Communist Party nor the Albanian Workers Party was represented. Dolanc, according to the 26 May Moscow PRAVDA, explained at a pre-congress news conference that neither party had been invited, since party-level relations do not exist because according to those parties "the LCY is not a party with which they can maintain contacts."

Led by the CPSU's Andrey Kirilenko, who in a Kragujevac factory speech on the 28th labeled Yugoslav-Soviet positions on "key" international issues as "either identical or very close," the Pact delegates and party greetings messages noted acceptance in varying degrees of Yugoslavia's current domestic and foreign policies, while at the same time calling for socialist unity and coordination.

However, the Bulgarian Communist Party and its delegate Zhivko Zhivkov both took the opportunity to obliquely criticize the LCY for its repeated concerns over Bulgaria's refusal to identify its Macedonians as a nationality. The Bulgarian CP Central Committee greetings and Zhivkov in a 27 May speech while visiting Montenegro called for "respecting the principles of noninterference in internal affairs . . . ." The Romanian Communist Party greetings indicated a cooling of relations since the 1969 congress, when they were characterized as developing

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In a "spirit of full confidence, esteem and mutual understanding." The current Romanian greetings downgraded this characterization to one of "mutual sincerity, esteem and understanding"; moreover, the Socialist Front organ ROMANIA LIBERA of the 27th, reporting the congress opening, characterized the past meetings between Ceausescu and Tito as being held in a "spirit of frankness, esteem and mutual understanding."

The CPSU, in its greetings message broadcast by Moscow in Macedonian on the 27th, expressed "deep satisfaction" with the development of "mutual understanding and trust" between the two parties and states and noted "tangible progress . . . in all spheres." The theme of trust was also alluded to by Kirilenko, who in his factory speech noted the existence of "forces who sow discord" between the two parties. The greetings also gave a nod to Yugoslavia's brand of socialism, acknowledging that "fraternal parties were achieving successes in the creation of a new society by using patterns and methods based on general rules of socialist development and, at the same time, reflecting the concrete historical conditions in each country." However, the CPSU greetings also indicated pleasure that the LCY is now reasserting control within the country, pointing out that the Yugoslavs "have made fundamental changes in the country's destiny . . . ."

Tito echoed the CPSU's expressions of satisfaction over the development of relations, while noting in his congress report that differences "may lead and have led unfortunately to tense relations between individual socialist countries." Tito eschewed charges of Stalinism voiced at the Ninth Congress but reiterated the position that relations among socialist countries must be based on "principles of equality, independence, mutual respect and noninterference in internal affairs." Individual communist parties, Tito said, "must not make absolute or glorify only their paths and the specific traits of their development and must not impose their systems on others." And in a remark that could apply to the PRC, Tito noted that differences among parties are inevitable, and he proposed not only "dialog" but also "mutual constructive criticism" among communist parties.

**COMMITMENT TO NONALINEMENT** Tito's expressions of satisfaction with the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and the other Pact countries were tempered by a strong reaffirmation of Yugoslavia's commitment to nonalignment. Tito pointed out that nonalignment is both "anti-imperialist and antihegemonic. Therefore it is not and cannot be anybody's

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instrument or reserve [force] . . . ." At his pre-congress news conference, Dolanc also reasserted Yugoslavia's nonaligned policy. Denying rumors that Yugoslavia was "joining the socialist camp," Dolanc, according to TANJUG on the 24th, said: "We are not going anywhere; we are staying right where we are--a socialist country, but a country for whose foreign policy nonalignment is the foundation." Party theoretician Kardelj elaborated on Yugoslavia's nonaligned policy in a 27 May speech on the compatibility of nonalignment and socialism. Nonalignment, he said, is "directed against all forms of political and economic oppression," but he also emphasized that its "fundamental essence" is "anti-imperialist."

Kardelj, as well as Tito, called for restrictions on the activities of multinational companies. Although neither Tito nor Kardelj referred specifically to the United States, TANJUG on the 28th reported UN delegate Lazar Mojsov telling the congress: "Although these companies were multinational ones, by and large, one rich powerful country stood behind them--the United States."

Tito did directly criticize the United States in his remarks on Indochina, calling for a "cessation of all interference by the United States" in Vietnam and Cambodia. However, he avoided criticizing the United States during his remarks on the Italian border dispute, unlike his 15 April speech in Sarajevo, when he had attacked the timing of U.S.-NATO maneuvers in the Mediterranean. Italy was the only Yugoslav neighbor directly criticized by Tito, although obviously he had in mind the difficulties with Bulgaria over the Macedonians and with Austria over the Carinthians when, in referring to national minorities, he condemned "the denial of their national and ethnic affiliation and of their language and culture" and also condemned "their assimilation by the nation in whose state they are now included."

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## LENART CALLS FOR CONTINUED STRUGGLE AGAINST REVISIONISM

Slovak party First Secretary Jozef Lenart has implicitly cautioned that the softer line toward "revisionists" among Czechoslovakia's scientific and technical intelligentsia--reflected in the 14-15 May Czechoslovak party plenum--did not signal any basic shift away from the party's orthodox line on the 1968 events.\* Lenart, a pragmatic moderate of Husak's stripe, emphasized in a 20 May Bratislava speech that revisionism "remains the main danger," an affirmation reflecting the moderates' concern to avoid leaving themselves vulnerable to possible charges of ideological compromise from hardliners such as Bilak and Indra.

Lenart's speech, delivered at a seminar devoted to the 30th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising, was reported by CTK on the 20th and published in the Bratislava PRAVDA on the 21st. Four days after it had carried an innocuous recorded excerpt of the speech on the 20th, the Prague domestic radio on the 24th pointedly summarized the passages dealing with the struggle against revisionism, indicating the importance of its action by noting at the outset that "today we return once again to" Lenart's speech.

In an unusually outspoken comparison of the Hungarian events of 1956 and those in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Lenart argued that the very fact bloodshed was averted in Czechoslovakia made it more difficult to convince the populace that the Warsaw Pact intervention was necessary and that a continuing struggle must still be waged against revisionism. Thus, he pointed out, while a victory was achieved in overcoming the "counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia by "political" means, rather than the "rigid administrative procedure" used in Hungary, this at the same time confronted the Czechoslovak communists with "a problem" which he said was still unsolved:

As our people did not go through the cruel experience of the Hungarian people, it is necessary to explain to the people the logical developments which would have occurred--that in our country, too, everything was pointing to a civil war--so that they can under-

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\* For a discussion of the 14-15 May Czechoslovak Central Committee plenum, see the 22 May 1974 TRENDS, pages 25-26.

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stand the great importance of our allies' help. From this viewpoint the struggle against the revisionist rightist forces remains topical, and for this reason revisionism remains the main danger.

While stressing the need to continue the struggle against revisionism, Lenart repeatedly insisted, in standard terms, that the post-1968 "consolidation" of the situation in Czechoslovakia had been successfully carried out.

The Prague broadcast of Lenart's remarks wound up with a further tribute by the Slovak party leader to the August 1968 intervention and to the "Leninist" leadership of Husak since April 1969. Lenart had been Czechoslovak premier during the Novotny era and was thus out of favor during the 1968 liberalization. Following Husak's takeover from Dubcek as Czechoslovak party first secretary, Lenart in January 1970 was restored to full membership in the CPCZ Presidium and appointed Slovak CP first secretary.

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## U S S R

## CPSU OFFICIAL ATTACKS BREZHNEV, URGES ECONOMIC REFORMS

In a remarkably transparent attack on Brezhnev's leadership, a CPSU Central Committee official has called for thorough exposure of mistakes in leadership of the economy and an open, party-wide debate on a new economic policy. F. F. Petrenko, whose career appears to have gone into eclipse after authoring several anti-Brezhnev articles on collective leadership in the mid-1960's, declared in an article in the April issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, signed to press on 28 March, that only sweeping criticism of mistakes along the lines of the repudiation of Stalin's cult and Khrushchev's "subjectivism" can clear the way for adoption of effective new policies.

In 1973 Petrenko reappeared in the central party press with several provocative articles, the most notable of which was published in PRAVDA on 19 October. In that article he pointedly praised the work of Supreme Soviet agencies, trade unions and economic managers along the same lines as in his earlier articles, conveying by implication his admiration for bureaucracies headed by Podgorny, Shelepin and Kosygin, respectively. Petrenko's visits to and writings on the bloc countries suggest a relationship with KGB chairman Andropov, who until May 1967 was head of the bloc relations section of the Central Committee and who has long been reputed to be a "modernist" in the Politburo.

In view of Petrenko's unmistakably revisionist outlook and his apparent political affiliations with the opposition to Brezhnev, the timing of his most recent articles assumes critical importance. The twin appearances of the PRAVDA article less than two weeks after the outbreak of the Middle East war and of the second Petrenko article at the close of Secretary of State Kissinger's 24-28 March visit to Moscow suggest that foreign policy considerations were paramount in the timing of the apparent moves against Brezhnev.

QUESTIONS OF CPSU  
HISTORY ARTICLE

Petrenko's April article, entitled "Freedom of Discussion and Criticism Is a Fundamental Principle of CPSU Life and Activity," declared that nothing can remain unchanged forever and placed party cadres on notice about the onset of a period of intense criticism and discussion. Stating that various economic traditions and practices and even some

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aspects of the political system have become outdated, he argued that if moves to criticize and correct these shortcomings were not made, there could be "a serious political crisis, as shown, for example, by events in Czechoslovakia in 1968-69." Further, the wide discussion of "social and intraparty problems" were said to be necessary because of the possibility of "subjective" mistakes in leadership. While conceding that collective leadership, "on which the party relies at all levels," reduces the likelihood of errors, he maintained that it "cannot fully exclude them."

Petrenko virtually called upon Soviet leaders to admit their mistakes, recalling pointedly that Lenin "considered honest admission and correction of mistakes a sign of political maturity" and that he had maintained that if leaders tell the people "even bitter and harsh truth," the "masses will understand" and "any difficulties" can be overcome. Citing Lenin's idea that publicizing "is a sword which heals the wounds it causes," Petrenko refuted those who argue that it is too dangerous to reveal mistakes and weaknesses because these will be used by enemies, and he also ridiculed the "strange logic" of those who argue that a hidden fault "is not really a fault at all."

Progress, according to Petrenko, is ensured by thorough exposure and criticism of shortcomings, followed by determination of a correct course through broad discussion. "Every time the communist party has faced new complicated tasks," he went on, it has turned to criticism of shortcomings and party-wide discussion. The two historical examples he cites have striking parallels with the present day. In 1925, he recalled, when the party was "summing up the results of the new economic policy and deciding questions of further paths of economic construction," it ordered that the "party masses must be drawn into the most active participation in discussion and decision of questions facing the [coming] congress," and in the late 1920's, when the growth of the economy and culture made urgent the task of fighting "bureaucratic distortions in state and economic work," the Central Committee made the theme of criticism from below of everyone, irrespective of rank, one of the key slogans of the day.

He argued that even the most radical repudiation of the party's past errors would be accepted by the public and would be successful. "One of the most striking examples" of the positive value of thorough criticism and exposure of errors, he wrote, was the party's "bold and open declaration on errors and distortions committed as a result of the cult of Stalin's personality." This received the "full support

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of the whole Soviet people," cleared away "serious obstacles on the path of development of Soviet society," and strengthened the communist movement. He depicted the overthrow of Khrushchev in October 1964 in a similar light, alleging it opened the way for great improvements in economic management.

Party decisions, according to Petrenko, must be arrived at collectively, by "free discussion of problems of theory and practice on all levels" of the party. Virtually ignoring the Politburo, Petrenko described the recent party congresses and Central Committee plenums as the key decision-making bodies which have thoroughly debated economic policies and shortcomings. Discussion of social and intraparty problems, he declared, is becoming even more important today, and he reported that at all levels of the party the rank-and-file are now discussing such questions as the CPSU peace program, economic plan fulfillment and the "effectiveness and style of party leadership."

**PAST ARTICLES** Brezhnev's antipathy toward economic reform appears to be the target of Petrenko's article, especially since Petrenko's antipathy toward Brezhnev is abundantly clear from past articles. Every article he has written since Brezhnev's rise in 1965 has been permeated with themes inherently inimical to Brezhnev's interests: collective leadership, reduction of party interference in economic affairs, reliance on specialists and intellectuals, the urgency of economic reform and the right of the Czechoslovaks and other nations to pursue an independent course. In particular, his articles in 1966-1967 criticizing first secretaries who set themselves above the collective were unmistakable swipes at Brezhnev.

Petrenko's works disappeared in the central party press after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but they reappeared in 1973 in the form of articles urging greater scope for soviet and governmental agencies in running the economy and greater reliance by party leaders on advice of specialists and intellectuals. Brezhnev responded to this viewpoint with a warning at the December CPSU plenum against a "technocratic" approach to management of the economy.

Petrenko's first controversial article after Khrushchev's fall appeared in a September 1965 issue of PARTY LIFE, and it was co-authored by Yu. V. Bernov. In May 1965 Petrenko, identified as a "responsible official of a Central Committee section," and Bernov, head of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav sector of the Central Committee's bloc relations section, had accompanied Suslov on a visit to Bulgaria.

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In the September article they described the role of the Bulgarian party in the economy and society. They reported that the Bulgarian Central Committee had condemned party leaders for duplicating the functions of economic officials and that "direct interference in the operational-economic activity of enterprises and their leaders" had thus been reduced. They also described how the Bulgarian Central Committee and local party committees had increased their reliance on specialists by creating "problem commissions" headed by party secretaries and including prominent scientists and specialists. The description of Bulgarian affairs was in fact similar to themes then prominent in Soviet commentary on domestic affairs.

In a December 1965 KOMMUNIST article keyed to the upcoming party report-and-election conferences prior to the 23d CPSU Congress, Petrenko argued that higher echelons of the party should allow lower echelons greater scope in electing their own leaders and that election meetings should be marked by free discussion, bold criticism and more openness and publicity. He rejected the notion that this would undermine "the organizing role of a higher party committee in relation to lower" committees.

Petrenko's next article was a transparent response to abortive attempts in early 1966 to elevate Brezhnev above the collegial organs of authority. At the 23d Congress in March-April 1966, Gorkiy oblast first secretary Katushev—who had been installed in that post by Brezhnev in December 1965—was the only prominent official to urge that "henceforth the Central Committee be headed by a General Secretary." In a 20 July 1966 PRAVDA article on collectivity, Petrenko criticized "some leaders" who "force" their opinion on party committees. "A party committee secretary is not a chief, he has not been given the right to command," he wrote, "he is only the senior in an organ of collective leadership elected by communists," and "in deciding questions he has only as many rights as other members of the committee." Collectivity "is strengthened where respect for authority does not exceed reasonable limits . . .," he added.

In March 1967 Petrenko authored a QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article on criticism not unlike his most recent QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article. The 1967 article clearly revealed Petrenko's reformist credentials. Not only under capitalism but also under socialism, he wrote, the "assertion of the new is impossible without critical negation of the old which has ceased to correspond to changed conditions and tasks." But under socialism, he maintained, "this negation is aimed not at weakening the existing system but, on the contrary,

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at strengthening it." He went on to point out that the struggle between new and old ideas and practices "as a rule" does not lead to "great social conflicts" under socialism. And he praised the efforts of historians and writers to "critically interpret" the Stalin period as a "necessary stage in the further development of historical science and artistic creation" but cautioned that the past must not be depicted only as a "chain of mistakes."

**MILITANT REFORMIST** Petrenko returned to the theme of collectivity shortly after N. G. Yegorychev was ousted as Moscow city first secretary for reportedly criticizing Soviet policy in the Middle East at the June 1967 CPSU plenum. In a September 1967 PARTY LIFE article, entitled "Strictly Observe Leninist Norms of Party Life," Petrenko warned that "creation of truly comradely conditions for collective leadership largely depends on the secretary of a party committee or bureau," and if that official "misuses his position, collectivity can be reduced to nought." Noting that Lenin provided an "instructive example" of how collectivity should operate at meetings of the Central Committee, Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat, Petrenko declared that "one could argue quite freely with Lenin on any question . . . ." Shortly afterward Petrenko, identified as a "responsible official of the Central Committee," also delivered a lecture on "Collectivity--the High Principle of Party Leadership," according to the 7 January 1968 MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA.

In a 17 April 1968 PRAVDA article on the role of the party, Petrenko again argued that the party should not engage in "petty supervision" of state and economic organs and also voiced indirect support for the upsurge of reformism in Prague. Arguing that national peculiarities often dictate differences in approach by communist parties in different nations, Petrenko recalled the "different roads to socialism" thesis made familiar in the Khrushchev era. He insisted that "each fraternal party is independent in determining its own policy and also the concrete forms and methods of activity," and that "the CPSU treats the experience of fraternal parties with deep respect and attention."

But the crisis over Czechoslovakia and the August 1968 invasion clearly placed Petrenko and other reformers on the defensive. In an October 1968 PARTY LIFE article on democratic centralism, he blamed the "Czech events" on the abandonment of the principle of democratic centralism in the name of party democracy--specifically, the failure to prevent overt factionalism and uphold party discipline. However, the Czech failures, he contended, do not discredit reformism, since the events in that nation "have nothing in common with genuine concern for development of party democracy . . . ."

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No subsequent articles by Petrenko appeared in the major party publications until 1973, though a book review appeared in the journal for the party rank-and-file, POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION, in April 1971. The book review was used by Petrenko as a vehicle for propounding the view that state and economic agencies should be independent of party interference. He noted that "propagandists and social science teachers sometimes are asked whether the party and its organizations should so thoroughly 'push their way' into economic problems and whether state and economic agencies cannot themselves handle economic matters and decide them." He wrote that Lenin had considered it necessary to raise the independence of soviet institutions and officials, leaving the party with responsibility for "general leadership."

Although his articles no longer appeared in the major party publications, Petrenko retained his Central Committee post. He was identified in the September 1971 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY as a "responsible official of the Central Committee," and he was reported to have addressed a July 1971 conference of "Znaniye" Society lecturers on the 24th CPSU Congress and the role of the party. He was again identified in PRAVDA on 22 May 1973 as a "responsible official" of an unnamed Central Committee section and as a member of a delegation headed by Katushev attending a Warsaw theoretical conference.

RECENT ARTICLES      In 1973 Petrenko once again emerged as an author in PARTY LIFE, KOMMUNIST and PRAVDA. In his April 1973 PARTY LIFE and July 1973 KOMMUNIST articles, he subtly manipulated the words and experience of Cuban and North Vietnamese party leaders in a manner calculated to support a case for ending party interference in the economy. In his 19 October 1973 PRAVDA article, he advocated his views more directly.

In the April PARTY LIFE article he reported that in August 1970 the Cuban Politburo had adopted a basic decision to separate party and state functions. Before that, party cadres had handled both party and economic work, regional secretaries had directed plan fulfillment, and party secretaries at enterprises had concurrently served as directors of their plants. "Now party and economic functions at enterprises have been separated," he wrote, and, according to Castro, Cuba was raising the role of mass public organizations which had been neglected.

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In the July KOMMUNIST article, a laudatory review of a new book by North Vietnamese First Secretary Le Duan, Petrenko focused on Le Duan's statements upholding the prerogatives of state organizations in the management of the economy. He cited Le Duan's statement that it is a "task of extreme importance" that party officials and committees "raise the scientific level of their leadership by close collaboration with scholars and specialists and learn to rely on their knowledge and experience," and he quoted Lenin to the effect that "a communist who cannot demonstrate his ability to rally and modestly direct the work of specialists . . . is often harmful."

In the 19 October PRAVDA article, Petrenko stated that the quality of work by "state and public organizations"--economic agencies, local soviets and trade unions--had improved so much that party agencies no longer need interfere in their work and are free to concentrate on more important problems of socio-economic, political and spiritual life. While crediting the party with the "leading role" in the state, he urged state and public organizations to "use their rights and opportunities to the maximum." Further, Petrenko attributed the party's ability to lead industry, agriculture, science, culture, state administration and foreign policy to "the growth of the intellectual potential of the party"--an article of faith among revisionist party officials and intellectuals.

Petrenko's article was clearly aimed at a profoundly derogatory point of view toward the Soviet middle class of economic specialists and administrators advanced by such reactionary party ideologists and spokesmen for Brezhnev as V. P. Stepanov and R. I. Kosolapov. It was not until the public disclosure of a partial text of Brezhnev's 10 December 1973 speech at the two-day CPSU plenum that Brezhnev was directly linked with this point of view. According to the published version of Brezhnev's remarks, he called for a "party approach" in all spheres of economic activity and, reflecting evident disdain, declared that "one cannot approach leadership of the economy and the improvement of this leadership from narrow managerial--let alone technocratic--positions." Petrenko's response to the body of opinion championed by Brezhnev was thus tantamount to a direct accusation of failure by Brezhnev in economic policy.

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## NEW GRECHKO ARTICLE REFLECTS RECENT SHIFTS IN OFFICIAL OUTLOOK

An article by Soviet Defense Minister Grechko on regime-army relations, appearing in the May issue of the journal QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, provides an authoritative glimpse at recent changes in the Soviet official outlook on domestic and world affairs. In tone, content and documentation the article differs markedly from an earlier Grechko article on the same subject, published in a February issue of KOMMUNIST No. 3, 1974. The two articles are also noteworthy because their respective dates of publication-- 18 February and 24 April--coincide with significant changes in the editorial board of KOMMUNIST and the supervisory agency for QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY. The KOMMUNIST article was written at a time when that journal was without a chief editor, while the QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article appeared after the former chief editor of KOMMUNIST, Anatoliy Yegorov, was identified as new director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the CPSU Central Committee agency responsible for publication of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY.

The most notable substantive differences between the two Grechko articles may be summarized as follows:

- + On the issue of political authority over the armed forces, the first article meandered vaguely in a purely doctrinal vein about the founding fathers of communist revolution; the second stressed the strict subordination of the armed forces to collegial organs of political authority in a manner suggesting that certain military leaders have been reprimanded for major violations of the political-military code.
- + On the image of the outside world, the first article conveyed a conventional, doctrinaire and almost frantic image of a genuine external military threat; the second projected an image of a potential, though clearly manageable, external military danger.
- + On the authority for the differences in outlook, the first article cited a passage from Brezhnev's 26 October speech to the World Peace Congress in Moscow, which referred ominously to "continuing and even intensifying" preparations in the West for a new "world war;" the second conspicuously skirted this passage, repeatedly alluding instead to statements made in the controversial "CPSU Program," formulated in the Khrushchev era, and the "CPSU Central Committee report" to the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971.

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+ On a military buildup, the first article reiterated the conventional goal of strengthening the defensive capability and combat might of the armed forces; the second treated that goal more as a necessary evil than as a desirable condition of international relations.

+ On military training programs, the first article recited the conventional doctrinaire ritual on the "profoundly scientific line" of the regime--a line said to be fully consistent with the "political, economic, spiritual and military capabilities of the Soviet state"; the second stressed the overriding importance of military knowledge and military science and the need to avoid "obsolete tenets," as well as "voluntarism and hare-brained schemes" in military matters.

+ On domestic affairs, the first article merely mentioned the official designation of the Soviet Union as a "developed" socialist state made at the 24th CPSU Congress; the second gave new content to the official formula, stressing the "complexity" of the Soviet system, the confrontation with "qualitatively new tasks on a far-reaching scale," and the consequent urgency of obtaining "profoundly scientific, principled leadership oriented toward long-term objectives and ideals."

The differences in outlook between the two articles are so substantial as to raise questions about Grechko's authorship of either. Circumstantially, the evidence suggests that different Politburo factions have at different times used his authority--and that of the armed forces--for their own purposes. Grechko's most recent article places his authority squarely on the side of what might be called a faction of tough-minded though practical modernists represented by men like Yegorov and his high-level backers.

**CHAIN OF COMMAND** The most recent Grechko article opened with a clear-cut delineation of the operational subordination of the armed forces to the highest collegial organ of authority, the CPSU Central Committee. It cited the text of the official 1918 decree on the political-military chain of command as follows:

The policy of the military department, as well as of all other departments and establishments, is pursued on the precise basis of the general directives of the party via its Central Committee and under its direct control.

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It went on to cite the authority of the CPSU Program, adopted by the 22d CPSU Congress in 1961 in the midst of Khrushchev's controversial revival of de-Stalinization, as a more recent basis for party leadership over the armed forces.

The reasons for Grechko's unusual reminder about the subordinate role of the armed forces in the Soviet state were undoubtedly compelling. The issuance of such a reminder two months after the appearance of an article covering the very same ground of regime-military relations suggests that it was prompted by some act of high-level insubordination, perhaps even by Grechko himself. This suggestion is strengthened by Grechko's failure to deliver a speech or contribute an article to PRAVDA on V-E Day--the first such occurrence since he became defense minister in 1967. This indignity was compounded by the appearance of an obscure military historian writing the 9 May PRAVDA literary assignment traditionally performed by the defense minister--an indignity surpassed only by Brezhnev's failure to monopolize the May Day ceremonies as he had in recent years.

The QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article also introduced a new clause in an otherwise stereotyped listing of "Leninist principles" allegedly governing Soviet military policy. The innovation, which did not appear in Grechko's February KOMMUNIST article, referred to "the unity of political, economic and military leadership," and this principle was ranked second in a list of nine official guidelines for Soviet military behavior. Although the motivations behind the introduction of the new guideline are unclear, they clearly reflect heightened official concern over relations between military leaders, on the one hand, and the leadership of other elements of Soviet society on the other.

This concern was notably amplified in a later passage in Grechko's article, which warned against "any miscalculations" in the use of the nation's fiscal, economic and manpower resources. The passage reads as follows:

The CPSU demands that army communists, workers of the defense industry, and planning organs approach every question in the sphere of armaments and combat equipment from positions of consistent and specific implementation of the economic and social policy formulated by the 24th CPSU Congress and developed in the documents of subsequent Central Committee plenums, and that they insure that decisions, at whatever level they may be taken, are justified, effective, and economical. Any miscalculations in this sphere could lead to unjustified expenditure of funds and of the country's economic and manpower resources.

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Logically, a public warning of this kind could be interpreted as a rebuke to **spendthrifts** in the armed forces, as well as to countless political, economic and military spokesmen lobbying for greater defense expenditures along the lines of Grechko's **KOMMUNIST** article. Coming from an official with an unmistakable record as a military lobbyist, however, Grechko's warning was both ironic and self-critical.

DIVERGENT IMAGES  
OF EXTERNAL THREAT

Unlike Grechko's **KOMMUNIST** article, which was replete with grossly exaggerated images of the military threat posed by the West, his **QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY** article was, by Soviet standards, relatively objective. Adopting a posture of almost **equanimous** vigilance, the article criticized the "aggressive" intentions and actions of "capitalist monopolies" and "reactionary forces" in the West and regretfully affirmed that as a consequence the Soviet Union had been "forced" to rearm after the war. The pro forma exercise in criticism was marked, however, by unusual restraint and little truculence or invective.

Surprisingly enough, the Soviet defense minister surveyed the state of world affairs with almost unbounded confidence. In this respect, his most recent article echoed themes akin to those sounded in the awards speeches by Kosygin and Podgorny in Minsk and Riga last November and December, respectively. He referred to the existence of a "new correlation of forces" in world affairs which was "constantly" and irretrievably moving in favor of the interests of socialism. Thus, while taking appropriate note of the potential danger of war, he took special pains to discount its likelihood under present and foreseeable circumstances and to reiterate the regime's commitment to detente and "the struggle for general and complete disarmament."

By contrast, the themes of detente and disarmament had been notably absent in Grechko's **KOMMUNIST** article. Instead, that article echoed the militant, truculent themes made familiar in the past by hardline theoreticians of the Lenin Military-Political Academy, the notorious ideological citadel of the army's political cadres. Not only did the earlier article reiterate in belligerent terms the validity of the Leninist doctrine on war and politics, it also totally disregarded the doctrinal implication of the advent of nuclear weapons on the world scene. It pointed to the "innately aggressive" nature of the "capitalist states," and stressed the role of military power as the "only means" to curb their "expansionist aspirations" and ensure victory in the event of war. "War and aggression," it maintained, "always have been and will remain the inevitable companion of capitalist society."

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The bellicose rhetoric about the threat posed by the West was authenticated by reference to Brezhnev's 26 October speech in Moscow: "'Nor do we have the right to forget, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev said at the Moscow World Peace Congress, 'that even under conditions of relaxation of international tension, a process which is in fact tantamount to material preparation for world war is continuing and even intensifying.'" Grechko had reiterated this very same formula in his January awards speech in Kazan, as had Suslov and Ponomarev--they alone among the members of the Soviet ruling group. However, the formula was missing from Grechko's more temperate appraisal of the international situation in his 13 March report to a Kremlin conference of Komsomol secretaries in the armed forces.

**MILITARY DOCTRINE** The two Grechko articles also displayed sharply divergent interpretations of the origins of Soviet military doctrine. The **KOMMUNIST** article flatly stressed the ideological sources of Soviet military doctrine:

Developing these [military] tenets to conform with new historical conditions, V.I. Lenin formulated a harmonious doctrine on the defense of the socialist fatherland, thereby making a major contribution to the treasury of Marxism. He enriched the ideas of Marx and Engels on the need for the armed defense of the victorious proletariat's achievements and the creation of its military organization and resolved many questions raised by the practical revolutionary struggle of the working class and all working people against the aggressive forces of the old world.

Without slighting Lenin's role in the development of the Soviet state, the **QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY** article gave an entirely different account of Soviet military development:

In building the Soviet army the party had to travel unknown paths, for there were no ready-made theoretical theses--even less, any practical experience--in this respect.

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Instead of stressing the role of seemingly immutable ideological principles in the shaping of the Soviet armed forces, as was done in the earlier article, the more recent Grechko article focused on the impact of domestic and foreign influences on the leadership and structure of the armed forces. Above all, it stressed the combined role of "Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and of research and conclusions of Soviet military science," with particular emphasis on the latter.

Buttressed with quotations from Lenin not contained in the February article, the more recent Grechko article stressed the overriding importance of military science. Lenin's statements on "the tremendous significance of military knowledge" and on the need to "really learn military affairs" were cited, along with his dictum that "a modern army cannot be built without science."

**TECHNOCRATIC OUTLOOK** In keeping with a pragmatic outlook on the development of the armed forces, the **QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY** article offered an unusual glimpse at the components of a "developed" or "mature" socialist society, which had been touched upon only briefly in Grechko's earlier article. Placing a high premium on qualities of leadership, the article declared:

A mature socialist society is a complex social organism, but the more complex it is, the more difficult it is to direct, and the more it needs proper leadership.

The article went on to emphasize that the search for solutions to "qualitatively new tasks on a far-reaching scale" would require "profoundly scientific, principled leadership oriented toward long-term objectives and ideals expressing the aspirations and interests of the working people of all nations and nationalities and of all citizens of the Soviet Union." The clearly pragmatic and enlightened outlook on domestic affairs conveyed in this article was a far cry from the attitude projected in the earlier one, which had described the Soviet regime in characteristically doctrinaire terms as a "state of the dictatorship of the proletariat"--a concept conveying visions of class warfare instead of social harmony.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS** Where the earlier Grechko article clearly seemed to be plugging for increased military expenditures in the face of an allegedly implacable foe, the more recent article seemed to view the maintenance of a strong military

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posture as an unavoidable though unpleasant reality of modern life. However, in attempting to make the most out of an imperfect world, the more recent Grechko article advanced a number of unusual ideas with perhaps far-reaching implications for Soviet behavior at home and abroad.

On domestic affairs, it spoke of a "definitive" and "irretrievable" withering away of the coercive functions of the Soviet armed forces. This was explained by the alleged absence of "exploiter classes and social groups against which military force might be used." This unusual statement, which clearly is more applicable to the distant Soviet past than to the present period of Soviet politics, may be a veiled reference to the coercive functions exercised by organs of Soviet authority other than the armed forces. Insofar as the KGB has been particularly active against dissident elements in recent years, the statement in the Grechko article could signal a possible onset of internal relaxation.

In foreign affairs, the Grechko article referred to the "close union" between the theoretical and practical activity of foreign communist parties, and it credited those parties with a "leading role" in their respective domestic pursuits and international relations. Whether this statement foreshadows any change in the traditional relationship between the Soviet Union and its allies remains to be seen.

The Grechko article also appealed to Soviet citizens to become "consistent internationalists," as well as "ardent patriots." In a similar vein of internationalism, the article, while reaffirming the traditional goals of detente and disarmament and disclaiming any predatory intentions on the part of the Soviet state, introduced a notable escalation in the Soviet posture of opposition to the export of "counterrevolution." Where earlier elite statements had spoken of Soviet "solidarity" with and "active" support for this cause, the Grechko article added a new "purposeful" ingredient to the Soviet posture:

In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state actively and purposefully opposes the export of counterrevolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggles, and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear.

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The new Grechko formulation may be related to recent signs of movement in Moscow's public posture on Vietnam. Moscow moved in March to give its first authoritative endorsement to Vietnamese communist demands for a settlement of outstanding political issues in South Vietnam, after avoiding official Soviet endorsement of earlier six-point proposals in April and June 1973 by the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government for implementation of the political aspects of the January 1973 Vietnam peace agreement.

The first indications of this shift came in Soviet reports of a 20 March 1974 meeting between Kosygin and DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, which quoted the Soviet premier as declaring the "unswerving solidarity" of the Soviet Union for DRV and PRG efforts for implementation of the Paris agreement "on a just settlement of the internal political problems of South Vietnam." Two days later, on the 22d, the PRG issued a government statement with a revised version of its six-point platform. The six points were finally officially endorsed by Moscow on 31 March, in a TASS statement which said that they had met with "great satisfaction by authoritative Soviet circles."

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In terms of the novelty of its outlook on Soviet domestic and foreign affairs--not to mention its possibly far-reaching practical implications--the latest Grechko article clearly ranks among the most striking and most explicit pronouncements to emerge recently from the Soviet Union.

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## NOTE

KOREAN RED CROSS TALKS: The sixth and seventh "contacts" between delegates to the North-South Korean Red Cross talks have moved the two sides a step closer toward resuming the stalled full dress Red Cross sessions. At the sixth "contact" held in Panmunjom on 22 May the two sides agreed to hold working-level meetings, headed by the deputy chiefs of the delegations, in Panmunjom. At the seventh "contact" on 29 May the delegates discussed the composition and procedural matters of the working-level meetings, the first of which is scheduled for 10 July. The last full-scale session of the Red Cross talks, which began in August 1971, was held in Pyongyang in July 1973. In the interim, beginning in November 1973, the two delegations have held a series of "contacts," wherein each side has scored the other for delaying the holding of the next full-scale session. The North Koreans claim full credit for breaking the stalemate: A 24 May NODONG SINMUN commentary greeted the results of the sixth "contact" as the "fruition of the tireless and sincere efforts" by the North, and placed the onus for future problems entirely on the South Korean side.

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## APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 20 - 26 MAY 1974

<u>Moscow (2950 items)</u>		<u>Peking (870 items)</u>	
Supreme Soviet Elections	(10%) 12%	Cambodia	(2%) 7%
China	(6%) 6%	[Front Leaders in PRC	(-- ) 3%]
African Liberation Day	(-- ) 5%	Cypriot President	(8%) 6%
Ponomarev Visit to U.S.	(-- ) 5%	Makarios in PRC	
Chile	(3%) 5%	32d Anniversary of Mao's	(-- ) 5%
[Arrests/Trials of	(2%) 2%]	Yenan Talks	
Latin "Patriots"		Criticism of Lin Piao	(5%) 4%
World Peace Council	(-- ) 5%	and Confucius	
25th Anniversary		Vietnam	(1%) 4%
Podgorny Congratulatlons	(-- ) 3%	Pakistan's Bhutto in PRC	(16%) 3%
to French President		Congratulatlons to FRG	(-- ) 3%
Giscard d'Estaing		Leaders on Election	
Afro-Asian Film Festival,	(-- ) 3%	Congratulatlons to French	(-- ) 3%
Tashkent		President	
Arab-Israeli Issue	(3%) 3%	Congratulatlons to Yugo-	(-- ) 3%
Libyan President Jallud	(4%) 3%	slav Leaders on	
in USSR		Reelection	

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.