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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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13 FEB 1974


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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda


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NUCLEAR STRATEGY

MOSCOW SCORES SCHLESINGER, DEBATES ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In limited, low-level comment, Moscow has reacted negatively to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's statements in January announcing changes in U.S. nuclear missile targeting strategy. The new U.S. "strategic doctrine," as commentator Sergey Vishnevskiy called it in a 3 February PRAVDA international review, has been treated as a Pentagon effort to step up the arms race and intimidate the Soviet Union at SALT. Similar charges have been made in Soviet comment on the proposed increase in the U.S. military budget. Soviet reaction to these developments appears against a background of continuing debate within the Soviet Union over the practical implications of Lenin's doctrine on the relationship between war and policy.

SCHLESINGER STATEMENTS

The most forthright response to the Secretary's announcement on retargeting of missiles came in an IZVESTIYA international review by Albert Grigoryants on 2 February. Citing criticism that had appeared in the New York TIMES, Grigoryants accused Schlesinger and the Pentagon of trying to counter the salutary effects of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of nuclear war by "forcing through the idea that in one form or another nuclear warfare is still conceivable." Grigoryants went on to quote the TIMES to the effect that Schlesinger's remarks were intended to provide a "trump card" at SALT, adding that "these phenomena accord poorly with the trend toward detente." Other more cryptic comment has also criticized the announced decision on the grounds that it could increase the possibility of nuclear war.

In attacking the Secretary's statements on retargeting and the proposed increases in U.S. military expenditures, Moscow has carefully avoided broadening the criticism to the Nixon Administration, zeroing in instead on the Pentagon. In a pattern typical of past years, Moscow has charged in voluminous comment that the proposed budgetary increases are inconsistent with the spirit of detente. But it has gone on this year to emphasize that the statements and requests issuing from the Pentagon are even contrary to established U.S. policy. Vladimir Kozyakov in a Moscow radio broadcast to North America on 8 February said that "the Administration may have scrapped confrontation for negotiations, but Pentagon leaders still seem to be thinking in

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the old categories of military preponderance and brinkmanship." IZVESTIYA's Vladimir Osipov, taking part in the Moscow radio international affairs roundtable on 10 February, concluded that Secretary of State Kissinger was addressing U.S. officials "who insist on increasing military appropriations and who are dragging out as long as they can the negotiations with the Soviet Union on a whole range of issues" when he told a meeting in Washington that "we should not toy with the danger of nuclear war; we should not turn it into a topic of domestic political debate."

Brezhnev himself, during his Cuban visit at the end of January, was uncharacteristically critical of the West, suggesting the emergence of a more sober appreciation in Moscow of hitches in the negotiations in Vienna and Geneva on limiting East-West arms levels. In his 29 January speech in Havana, he spoke of "some military leaders and civilian politicians who find it possible to call for intensification of the arms race" and the joint declaration issued on 4 February acknowledged that "opponents of detente and advocates of a return to the cold war are becoming more active in the United States."

But the 3-5 February Gromyko visit to Washington has served as the centerpiece for assertions that, despite complications, bilateral consultations are continuing apace and the overall picture for U.S.-Soviet relations remains promising. According to Vladimir Kozyakov's 8 February radio commentary, "relations are getting better between the Soviet Union and the United States and the leaders of the two countries are looking for new agreements to limit arms and guarantee security in other ways."

THEORETICAL DEBATE In a 7 February RED STAR article, Rear Admiral V. Shelyag vigorously reaffirmed the validity of the Leninist doctrine on war and politics in the face of various criticisms by "bourgeois ideologists." He rejected the notion that the advent of nuclear weapons had invalidated Lenin's dictum on war as a continuation of politics by other means and had rendered meaningless any distinction between "just" and "unjust" wars. He charged that critics had exaggerated the destructive consequences of nuclear war by basing their arguments about "the death of civilization" and "no victors in a nuclear war" on purely "mathematical calculations." In a rebuttal that avoided the issue of the consequences of nuclear war, he argued that the presence of "at least half of the world's nuclear potential . . . in the hands of the Soviet Union" was a reliable guarantee against nuclear aggression and in defense of civilization.

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In advancing this line of argument, which could be construed as an argument against limitations on the Soviet strategic arsenal, Shelyag went on to endorse the regime's detente policies and reject the "absurd" notion that the Soviet Union would "pursue its policy with the aid of war." The existence of a powerful Soviet strategic arsenal was seen as a guarantee against the possibility that "reactionary circles" in the West might "gain the upper hand" over the now ascendant "realistically minded state leaders" and "succeed in unleashing a war."

The Shelyag article, like another article by three military writers in the December issue of COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 24, was ostensibly aimed at positions taken by foreign scholars at the 15th World Philosophical Congress in Varna, Bulgaria last September. However, there are abundant indications that it is also addressed to domestic critics who have persistently questioned the Leninist doctrine on the grounds of the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons and the likelihood that such destruction would affect all sides.

The Leninist doctrine has been defended on at least five separate occasions in RED STAR, COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, and INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS since the appearance of an article by Maj. Gen. A. Milovidov in RED STAR last May. Indeed, during the course of this debate, the prominent Soviet journalist Aleksandr Bovin, who reportedly once served on Brezhnev's personal staff and who has been an IZVESTIYA political commentator since 1972, was criticized by name for a "noticeable methodological mistake" in questioning the validity of the Leninist doctrine. This charge was made in a lengthy defense of it by Col. Ye. Rybkin in the October 1973 issue of COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 20. The Milovidov article had also criticized "some works by Soviet authors" for having committed the same mistake Shelyag imputed to "bourgeois ideologists."

The substance of the debate was illuminated by two articles last fall. In the November 1973 issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Lt. Gen. Pavel Zhilin advanced the same line of reasoning as Shelyag. In explaining the absence of any contradiction between detente and "the maintenance of our defensive might at a high level," Zhilin quoted Lenin to the effect that "only after the proletariat disarms the bourgeoisie can it scrap any weapons at all without changing its world historic mission."

Aleksandr Bovin, the target of Rybkin's criticism, presented the other side of the debate in an 11 September 1973 IZVESTIYA

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article. He argued that, though achievement of parity in strategic weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union had reduced the threat of war, it was not enough to stop there: It is "organically alien to socialist foreign policy" to "stabilize the situation at the level of a 'balance of fear.'" To Shelyag's argument that "nuclear weapons in the hands of Soviet fighting men would be a means of routing the aggressor," Bovin counterposed a different perspective: "Any attempt to accelerate the solution of the dispute between capitalism and socialism by military means would bring inestimable misfortunes to mankind. The aggressor would be crushed. But at what cost?"

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FORCE REDUCTIONS

MOSCOW BLAMES WEST EUROPEAN STATES FOR SLOWING MBFR

As the issue of "national" forces has emerged as a focus of East-West disagreement at the MBFR negotiations, Moscow has shown an increasing tendency to differentiate between the United States and its NATO allies in assigning blame for lack of progress in the talks. This was illustrated most recently by Moscow's treatment of the 5 February plenary session, when chief Soviet delegate Khlestov reportedly asserted that the United States, but not its NATO allies, was prepared to reduce forces. In follow-up reportage on the meeting Moscow radio reported the substance of Khlestov's remarks, but TASS and PRAVDA ignored them. This suggests that Moscow is still undecided as to how far to press this divide-and-conquer tactic.

SLOW PACE OF MBFR Moscow in recent weeks has gradually intensified its campaign criticizing the NATO proposal to leave for some undefined second phase the reduction of "national" forces, particularly the West German Bundeswehr, and to include only Soviet and U.S. reductions in the first phase. The comment generally has stopped short of outright criticism of individual NATO delegations at Vienna or their governments. However, Moscow radio's main commentator on MBFR, Vladimir Komlev, attacked the issue directly when he charged on 26 January that it was "difficult to understand the stubborn desire of Britain, West Germany, and other West European states not to agree from the very start to a reduction of their armed forces."

Brezhnev, three days later in his main foreign policy address in Cuba, put on record Soviet dissatisfaction with developments at Vienna in the most negative official assessment of the talks to date. Without naming any individual country, Brezhnev specifically criticized MBFR progress by charging that "some NATO countries are obviously trying to replace an equitable and equal agreement with one that would actually lead to a unilateral lessening of the defense capabilities of socialist countries." Brezhnev also strongly denounced the "reservations" and "conditions" which are dragging out other detente developments, explicitly referring to the CSCE and alluding to U.S. actions denying most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union. Brezhnev declared: "All these phenomena cannot but alert us. It is difficult to square them with the policy of detente and strengthening of peace proclaimed by the governments of relevant countries." Moscow comment since Brezhnev's speech has customarily used such general formulations as "some NATO circles" in criticizing the NATO stand in Vienna.

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5 FEBRUARY MEETING Moscow radio reported on 5 February that Soviet delegate Khlestov that day had questioned the "desire" of the West European states to reduce their forces in central Europe. Khlestov, according to the radio, said that the socialist states were "prepared" to reduce their forces and so "apparently" was the United States, but that the American "partners in NATO had not yet given their consent." The substance of Khlestov's remarks was leaked to the Western press. Moscow's TASS services and the central press failed to carry a similar report; instead, they publicized the usual terse announcement that another plenary meeting was held on the 5th.

MOSCOW SAYS EUROPEAN DEFENSE SCHEMES INCOMPATIBLE WITH MBFR

While Moscow commentators continue to devote increasingly critical attention to the Western discussion of European defense cooperation, they have only rarely suggested that the implementation of any such plans would run counter to the professed goals of the MBFR negotiations. This argument has now been advanced in Moscow's public discussion of the Warsaw Pact proposals at Vienna, suggesting a Soviet intention to use the leverage afforded by the MBFR talks to dampen European enthusiasm for defense cooperation.

Moscow's comment in recent months has strongly denounced the West European defense discussion as a revival of cold war attitudes and as inconsistent with the aims of all-European cooperation embodied in the CSCE. However, the comment has usually avoided direct references to the force reduction talks in this context. A significant exception to this pattern appeared in a 17 January IZVESTIYA article by M. Mikhaylov timed to the resumption of both the CSCE and MBFR negotiations. He stated unequivocally that the various plans suggested in the West for a "European defense community" or a "European 'nuclear pool'" are "incompatible with the Vienna talks."

The significance of this warning becomes apparent when viewed against the background of Moscow's discussions of the terms which it would accept as the framework for an MBFR agreement. These include what would amount to a Soviet veto power over any change in Western defense arrangements that Moscow could interpret as inconsistent with the original agreement. Thus, in the most

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comprehensive presentation of the Soviet proposals at Vienna, an article in the 14 December NEW TIMES No. 50 by K. Borisov, the author wrote:

It goes without saying that the states party to an agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe should not make any international pledges which contradict the provisions of such an agreement.

He specified that any party to the agreement would have the right, in the event of any question arising concerning the implementation of the agreement, to demand "that consultations be held between all signatory states." This would obviously provide a broad warrant for Soviet interventions against changes in the status quo established by an MBFR agreement.

Somewhat inconsistently, but understandably from the Soviet point of view, Moscow has been equally adamant in resisting the notion that there should be any constraints placed on the movement and activities of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. IZVESTIYA commentator S. Vladimirov charged on 23 December that "serious complications" for Vienna were being created by Western proposals "relating not to the reduction but to the activities of armed forces in central Europe." He asserted that NATO leaders would "like to use such measures to place the activity of Soviet forces in this area under their control." In a similar vein, Moscow radio's main commentator on MBFR, Vladimir Komlev, on 14 January argued that Western proposals "unconnected" with reduction and "relating to activities" of armed forces "certainly cannot contribute to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement." Komlev declared that "these proposals have nothing to do with the talks in question" and "can only complicate the course of the talks." These comments are in keeping with the almost total silence maintained by Moscow and its East European allies regarding the words "associated measures," which are part of the official title of the Vienna negotiations.

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ENERGY CRISIS

USSR PREDICTS WASHINGTON CONFERENCE WILL FAIL

Moscow has reported negatively, selectively and with little comment on the 13-nation energy conference that opened in Washington on 11 February. Soviet media maintain that the U.S.-sponsored conference will fail to achieve results because of significant differences among the participants. TASS reportage on U.S. initiatives at the conference has ignored some key points and stressed negative reactions to others, while playing up in favorable terms what it depicts as almost unanimous opposition by European delegations, particularly France. Moscow's East European allies generally have echoed the negative Soviet view of the conference, while Peking so far has completely ignored it.

U.S. PROPOSALS U.S. efforts to forge "a common front" of oil-consuming states by avoiding bilateral agreements and creating new bodies to deal with energy problems have been rebuffed by some participants, notably France, and have received a mixed reaction by others, according to TASS. Moscow has devoted little attention to the details of the seven-point program advanced by Secretary Kissinger, reporting only that the proposals envisaged "coordinated steps for saving energy," "the development of alternative energy sources and cooperation in scientific research," and "the idea of 'sharing' energy stocks in emergency conditions." The key proposal for establishment of a coordinating group was ignored by Soviet media. Dealing with President Nixon's 11 February dinner remarks in only a few words, Moscow emphasized that his views on the pitfalls of bilateral oil deals were opposed by several conference participants, such as France and Japan, who were pursuing such arrangements "notwithstanding pressure from Washington."

Moscow gave favorable treatment to views opposing the U.S. policies. It noted that "practically all" participants had indicated before the conference that they were against formation of a bloc of oil-consuming countries, and that the United States had to modify many of its positions while the agenda was being drafted. Moscow reported with evident sympathy the strong anti-U.S. positions contained in French Foreign Minister Jobert's speech at the conference on the 11th and the French premier's statement during an interview the next day. Moscow said the impasse reached on the second day of the talks was the result of French unwillingness to sign a communique supporting common actions and creation of new international bodies that would usurp the functions of existing

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institutions. Moscow quoted "observers" as being pessimistic about the conference outcome and noted their belief that French intransigence reflected an "unwillingness to fortify the U.S.-dominated Atlantic Alliance."

ARAB COUNTERMOVES TO CONFERENCE Moscow also publicized activities in the Middle East casting a shadow on the Washington proceedings. It reported Libya's claim that the decision to nationalize completely three U.S. oil companies was timed to the opening of the conference. An effort was made to suggest that the Algiers meeting of the heads of state of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Algeria was convoked in response to the U.S. meeting, so that the common subject of Arab oil deliveries could be discussed "in the atmosphere of continued attempts of Israel and the imperialist circles to put pressure on Arab countries."

Soviet energy expert Ruben Andreyan, in commentaries broadcast to Arab audiences on 10 and 11 February, took an ambivalent stand on the idea of broad international conferences relating to energy and raw material issues. In his first talk Andreyan refrained from direct criticism of the Washington conference, instead pointing out that Arab oil-exporting countries and some capitalist countries considered the U.S.-initiated meeting an attempt to establish an economic bloc to defend the interests of American oil monopolies and of American "imperialists" in general. Typically, he blamed the energy crisis on the "selfish and greedy" policies of the oil monopolies, charging that in circumstances of a general shortage of oil and the OPEC price increases, the monopolies increased prices of their oil products, stockpiled oil reserves, and disrupted supplies.

On the price issue, Andreyan in his second talk expressed Soviet "understanding" of Arab efforts to increase prices to end the "plunder" of their resources by the monopolies. But in an unusual fashion he cautioned his Arab listeners about the effects of high price policies, in adding that "nevertheless" it should be taken into consideration that high oil prices could bring economic difficulties "not only in the Western countries but also in the developing countries."

Andreyan hedged in offering any Soviet suggestion to solve the energy problems. Thus, he noted the Algerian and French proposals for wide international conferences to counter the U.S.-proposed conference in Washington, but said only that the Soviet Union

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OTHER COMMUNIST COMMENT Peking has not yet mentioned the Washington conference, but it has informed UN Secretary General Waldheim that China supports the alternative proposal of Algerian President Boumediene for a UN General Assembly special session on raw materials and development problems at which the energy crisis would be discussed. Although there is no available comment from Romania, the other East European Warsaw Pact allies of the USSR have echoed Moscow's negative appraisal of the conference. Albania and Yugoslavia have also criticized U.S. motives for holding the meeting, but the most recent Belgrade reporting has suggested that the United States has adopted a more reasonable position at the conference than expected.

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In summing up the economic achievements for 1973, Nghi said guardedly that "the direct consequences of the war have been overcome to a significant degree." He contended that the "weak and unsatisfactory aspects of the economy" can be explained on the basis of a backward agriculture, natural calamities, and, above all, the ravages of "two wars of destruction" conducted by the United States. In accounting for the "weaknesses and shortcomings of economic and state management"--a longtime concern of the DRV--the vice premier declared that, while party and state lines are "correct," they are not "satisfactorily reflected in concrete actions, planning and programs." And in a candid admission of the effects of these failures, Nghi observed:

Socialist industrialization is the central task of the period of transition toward socialism, but it is not yet firmly understood and realized The state apparatus and the system of organizing economic management . . . have not yet satisfactorily implemented socialist enterprise methods or a unified, concentrated managerial system.

In expounding the guidelines for economic recovery in 1974 and 1975, Vice Premier Nghi routinely asserted that the "revolutionary struggle in the South" continues to exert its influence on the North economically, politically, ideologically, culturally, and in public security. He briefly noted the need to conduct the "three revolutions--the revolution in production relations, the technological revolution and the ideological and cultural revolution, with the technological revolution playing the key role." Nghi referred to heavy industry in much the same way that First Secretary Le Duan had in a comprehensive article released in February 1970. Thus Nghi said that the development of heavy industry must be on the basis of "developing agriculture and light industry and building the economy at the central level"*

Characterizing the 1974-75 period as an "initial" step in the socialist industrialization of the DRV and calling for "preparations for future economic development," Le Thanh Nghi announced a second five-year plan to take place from 1976 to 1980.** The decision to launch a new

* For a discussion of the Le Duan article see FBIS SPECIAL REPORT "North Vietnamese Problems and Policies As Outlined in Le Duan's February 1970 Article," 7 August 1970.

** Hanoi's first five-year plan ended in 1965 and plans for a second were dropped in 1966 because of the war.

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five-year plan was noted last year in Pham Van Dong's National Day address on 2 September, but since then Vietnamese communist propaganda has not elaborated on its goals. The need for long-term planning was also discussed by Le Duan in his February 1970 article--but without specific reference to a second five-year plan. Le Duan did stress the desirability of "long-range plans--plans for five or 10 years," and this is reflected in a later section of Nghi's report urging the study of a "10- to 15-year developmental plan."

In his discussion of medical and health work to be accomplished over the next two years, Le Thanh Nghi warned that the DRV is confronted with a population problem. "In order to reach a rational birth rate as concerns the development of the population," Nghi said it was necessary to initiate a birth control movement. A 10 February NHAN DAN editorial hailing the National Assembly session further underlined the seriousness of the problem in economic terms: "Although the level of production of some products has reached the plan norms per capita, it remains too low compared with the actual requirements arising from the soaring birth rate." Hanoi media in the past have only infrequently called attention to birth control measures--usually in low-level reports on public health--although a 30 October 1973 NHAN DAN editorial in bolstering its call for increased grain production cited "the rapid population growth in the northern part of our country."

In his only substantial mention of the 22d plenum, Le Thanh Nghi listed the "general tasks" that it had set forth "in the new phase"--beginning with uniting the people and maintaining peace, including the close coordination of economic development with national defense, and concluding with a pledge to strive "to fulfill our duties in the revolutionary struggle to achieve independence and democracy in the South and proceed to peacefully reunify the fatherland."

In citing objectives for the period 1974 and 1975, Nghi reiterated the same tasks outlined by Le Duc Tho, special adviser to the Paris talks, in his 26 January interview and by Nghi himself before an awards presentation ceremony in Hanoi on 12 January. This list began with the task of "completing the healing of the wounds of war and making strenuous efforts to restore and develop the economy and develop culture, and concluded with the pledge to "fulfill our duty to the heroic South."

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MILITARY REPORT Vice Defense Minister Nguyen Don in his report on the military situation at the 5 February assembly session complained that the U.S. mine clearing obligation has not been "fully" accomplished. Foreign Minister Trinh, on the other hand, suggested that the United States had fulfilled its obligation when he said that it "had to destroy and deactivate the mines in North Vietnam territorial waters." Trinh's more positive assessment accords with the DRV Foreign Ministry White Book issued in January to mark the first anniversary of the Paris agreement. In listing those provisions of the agreement that have been implemented, the White Book declared that the United States has "neutralized or destroyed the mines that it dropped along 10 waterways in DRV territorial waters."

CLOSING MEETING In reporting the final meeting of the fourth session, Hanoi media noted that it was conducted in the presence of the diplomatic corps and foreign newsmen, a precedent set in February 1973 at the third session. Attended by assembly presidium members Ton Duc Thang, Nguyen Luong Bang, Le Duan,* Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong, the closing meeting passed the customary resolutions on its proceedings, elected Hoang Van Hoan, vice chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, to the concurrent position of secretary general of the committee--a post reportedly held by Ton Quang Phiet at the third assembly session, and announced the creation of a foreign relations commission of the National Assembly to be headed by Xuan Thuy, former head of the DRV delegation to the Paris peace talks.

According to the resolution establishing the commission, it will be tasked with: "Reviewing government reports and draft plans on foreign relations entrusted to it by the National Assembly or its Standing Committee; proposing that the National Assembly or its Standing Committee issue statements with regard to international questions upon which it is deemed necessary to state its attitude; and carrying out foreign relations tasks entrusted to it by the National Assembly or its Standing Committee."

* Although some Hanoi domestic broadcasts had omitted Le Duan's name from the honorary presidium for the assembly, the radio report on the closing session ceremonies listed him among the members.

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U. S. - C U B A

MOSCOW HINTS SUPPORT FOR NORMALIZED U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS

Although the issue of U.S.-Cuban relations did not come up in elite material on Brezhnev's visit to Cuba, comment since the visit has implied Moscow's support for normalization of those relations. Such support was conveyed most directly in a TASS report in PRAVDA on 8 February and in a Moscow radio commentary two days later.

The TASS report described a movement in the U.S. Congress for normalization of relations with Cuba and noted Senator Byrd's "appeal" to the Administration to "take all necessary steps to establish contacts with Havana." The report cited Byrd's remark that the renunciation by the United States of its former policy toward Cuba was "especially urgent in light of the current relaxation of international tension." The 10 February commentary, by Leonid Levchenko, also cited Byrd's remarks and added that "discerning voices" can be heard in the United States "with ever-increasing frequency calling for the normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba." Levchenko also called for an end to the economic blockade of Cuba, observing that "no one can now claim to be for peace and international detente and at the same time enforce anti-Cuban sanctions."

Discussion in the weekly Moscow radio roundtable on foreign affairs for 10 February seemed to imply that Foreign Minister Gromyko's stopover in the United States on the way back to Moscow from Havana may also have been linked with the issue of U.S.-Cuban relations. IZVESTIYA political observer Vladimir Osipov said that "although the discussions in the American capital were about both Soviet-American bilateral relations and general international problems, it is in the order of things that international public opinion should regard and does regard this visit in close connection with the Cuban visit."

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CHINA

ANTI-CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN BUILDS MOMENTUM; CADRES MUST LEAD

There has been an escalation of revolutionary rhetoric in some recent articles in Peking's anti-Confucius campaign, but no specific targets for attack have been singled out and the campaign continues to stress that there is still time for erring comrades to come over to correct views. However, while the campaign has not yet produced any current incitements to violence, there has been a decided upswing in the number and intensity of favorable recollections of cultural revolution turmoil.

The most notable such escalation of inflammatory language came in an article in the current issue of RED FLAG, written by the mass criticism group of Peking and Tsinghua universities, which used a strongly worded criticism of Lin Piao's alleged opposition to cultural revolution violence to warn cadres that "a revolution is not a dinner party." Elaborating on a theme presented in one of the group's previous articles, which appeared in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 24 January, the RED FLAG article launched a strong defense of cultural revolution violence and claimed that Lin had attacked the struggle as having "gone to the extreme" and "has put everything in disorder." The article recalled that Lin had reacted with counterrevolutionary violence, and warned that one must "deal with a man as he deals with you."

While there is not yet any clear target for attack, the potential for attacks on party leaders appears to exist, as local party officials are being told in increasingly frank terms that they will be tested on how well they exercise leadership over the campaign by "giving free rein to the masses." A Nanning radio broadcast on 7 February warned local leaders to avoid repeating the leadership mistakes of the early days of the cultural revolution, when "some comrades did not have a very good understanding of work and were pushed forward by the masses." And a Yunnan broadcast the same day revealed that some local party leaders "do not dare to mobilize the masses, because they fear that the masses will criticize them." Local authorities must "abandon fear, have courage," and "stand ahead of the struggle and resolutely lead the masses to advance."

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Judging by a 7 February Canton broadcast, some areas have many cadres who are out of step with the current campaign. The broadcast faulted "quite a number of comrades" for failing to "catch up with the development of the situation" and for not "daring to give free rein to the masses." Similarly, Sian radio on 7 February characterized the problem of whether local leaders take an active attitude and lead the masses to advance, or take a passive approach "and be pushed along by the masses," as a "serious question which must be answered immediately by the leadership at all levels." Describing the anti-Confucius campaign as "rolling irresistibly like a prairie fire with the force of a powerful thunderbolt," Changsha radio on 8 February called upon local leaders to stand in the front rank of the struggle and destroy "all interdictions and taboos binding up the masses' hands and feet."

At this stage of the struggle, however, the ominous-sounding injunctions for local leaders to either stand at the front of the masses and properly lead the campaign or run the risk of being rolled over from behind by them are balanced by clear signals that contradictions among the people should be resolved without polarizing one group against another. PEOPLE'S DAILY on 11 February printed a letter from a model student who recently received much publicity for "going against the tide" by criticizing her teacher. The current letter from the student reminded readers that the teacher had realized his error and was now "brimful of revolutionary zeal," and it criticized the revisionist line in education for having "set teachers and students against each other in the past." By contrast, the letter noted that Mao's revolutionary line today "reunites teachers and students, they are fighting shoulder to shoulder." The paper also carried several accompanying letters, one of which, by a 7 May school teacher, argued that students criticizing Lin and Confucius must use the party's basic line as their "guide to action."

The revolutionary edge of many articles calling for deepening the campaign is also being dulled by indications of constructive activities generated by the mass mobilization required to conduct a "people's war" against the influence of Lin and Confucius. Much of this energy is apparently being used to expand factory production. NCNA on 11 February specifically linked expanded production at a Shanghai shipyard with the struggle to criticize Lin and Confucius. Since late January the shipyard workers reportedly wrote nearly 1,500 articles criticizing Lin and Confucius and called 120 meetings, but still found time to fulfill by 5 February half of the monthly quotas for castings and propellers.

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YUGOSLAVIA

BILIC SPEECH DENOUNCES NEW "CENTRALIST" FACTION

There are indications that the Yugoslav regime's drive against liberalism and nationalism, in high gear since Tito's disciplinary letter of October 1972, has caused the pendulum to swing too far in the opposite direction. This development was disclosed in a speech by LCY Executive Bureau member Jure Bilic at a 9 February meeting of the Zagreb city party committee. Bilic, a leading proponent of the antiliberal campaign, gave the impression of high-level disarray at a time when preparations for the 10th LCY congress, scheduled for May, are being made.

Bilic charged that "neo-Stalinists" were intent on exploiting the antiliberal drive for the purpose of establishing a strongly centralized Yugoslav state. Bilic's charge contrasts sharply with statements made late last year by Tito's heir apparent, Stane Dolanc, which held that neo-Stalinism had been overcome in the Yugoslav party and that strengthening the leading role of the LCY--heretofore neglected--was the leadership's top priority. Dolanc's remarks on the party's leading role were reported approvingly by Moscow.

In his Zagreb speech, summarized by TANJUG and the Belgrade domestic service, Bilic portrayed the centralist faction as formidable and well-organized, though "not in the leadership," and as embracing "unitarists, Rankovicites, and neo-Stalinists" bent on establishing "a strong Yugoslav state based on nationalism and a firm hand." He dramatized the charge by contrasting the deviant factions of 1971 and 1974, declaring that "the faction of 1971 had a separatist program," whereas "the faction of 1974 has a bureaucratic-centralistic program which recognizes neither the rights of the peoples nor the right of the working class to leadership." Without identifying the centralists, Bilic said they were promoting their cause through both "illegal and legal" means and were "exerting special pressure on parts of the veterans organizations."

In a manner suggesting that he was inaugurating a new public campaign against the centralist faction, Bilic reportedly "stressed that the party membership must be acquainted as fully as possible with all these matters, so that it may conduct at the grassroots level the most resolute action against these and other anti-self-management and antisocialist forces." This suggestion is strengthened

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by the fact that Bilic's speech was reported in the central Belgrade media. A speech by LCY Presidium member Bakaric at a 5 February Croatian party plenum also touched on the activity of the Croatian centralists, but was reported only in the Zagreb domestic service.

DOLANC In an interview published in the 29 November
STATEMENTS Ljubljana DELO, LCY Executive Bureau Secretary
 Dolanc had pointedly downgraded the danger of
centralism. Listing this danger together with the other long-
standing Yugoslav deviations, he declared that centralism, statism,
bureaucratism, and neo-Stalinism had been "superseded." And
Dolanc was portrayed, in a 14 December PRAVDA report of his
interview on Ljubljana TV three days earlier, as being concerned
primarily with strengthening the LCY's leading role. Dolanc
reportedly said the situation in Yugoslavia prior to 1971 had led
to "objective disparagement of the LCY's role" and that the LCY
"still lacks clear and durable ideological-political unity."

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NOTE

CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOLZHENITSYN: The public phase of the Soviet media's month-long campaign against Solzhenitsyn appeared to be coming to a close shortly before his arrest on 12 February and his expulsion from the Soviet Union the next day by decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Apart from a few sporadic attacks in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in late January and a brief 7 February report in most central papers that Solzhenitsyn had been praised by a West German neo-Nazi leader, the campaign was carried out mainly by the literary press. By early February, however, it appeared to be on the wane even in the literary papers: the 6 February LITERARY GAZETTE published only one attack, by Leonid Novichenko at a 28-29 January conference of literary critics, and the 8 February issues of LITERARY RUSSIA and SOVIET CULTURE carried no further criticism of Solzhenitsyn. Among the republic papers, the Ukrainian press was especially virulent in its criticism of Solzhenitsyn throughout the month of January and into February.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 4 - 10 FEBRUARY 1974

<u>Moscow (2735 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1190 items)</u>	
Brezhnev Cuban Visit	(15%) 29%	Domestic Issues	(60%) 54%
[Brezhnev-Cuban Messages	(--) 5%]	[Criticism of Lin	(9%) 6%]
on 3d Cuban "Revolution"		Piao and Confucius	
Committees Conference		Indochina	(9%) 7%
[Joint Declaration	(--) 4%]	[PRC Foreign	(--) 3%]
China	(3%) 6%	Ministry Spokesman	
Gromyko in U.S.	(--) 5%	Statement on	
Vietnam	(1%) 3%	Paracel Islands	
		Dispute	
		Japan-ROK Continental	(--) 4%
		Shelf Agreement	
		Attacks on Antonioni	(5%) 3%
		Film	

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.