

48-73

STATSPEC

Approved For Release 11/09/25 : CIA-RDP81-001000050004


TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

28 NOVEMBER 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

1 OF 1

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.



STATSPEC

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions

CONTENTS

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

USSR Welcomes Arab Summit, Marks Time on Developments. 1

SOVIET BLOC ENERGY

Moscow, Allies Acknowledge Fuel and Power Difficulties 6

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Moscow Replies to PRC Greeting, Restates its Border Position 10

INDOCHINA

Foreign Ministries Charge GVN Bombing, U.S. Overflights. 12

PRC-PRG Communique Shows Mutual Accomodation 14

CHINA

Provinces Stress Need to Follow Party's Rural Policies 16

NOTES

DRV Organization Congresses; Soviet Ambassador to India. 18

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. i

- 1 -

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

USSR WELCOMES ARAB SUMMIT, MARKS TIME ON DEVELOPMENTS

Moscow continues its reportage on developments connected with the cease-fire agreement and convocation of an Arab-Israeli peace conference, but there has been little comment of substance. The Soviet posture was typified in a message from Podgorny and Kosygin welcoming the Arab summit conference, convened in Algiers on 26 November. The message stressed the need for further Arab coordination as the Middle East conflict enters "a stage of practical steps," and it again called for Israeli withdrawal from "all" Arab territories.

While continuing to complain of Israeli tactics of "sabotage and procrastination," Moscow has briefly noted Israel's 25 November agreement in principle to take part in a peace conference with the "stipulation" that the Israeli Government cannot make any important decision before the parliamentary elections at the end of December. And Soviet media reported without comment Secretary Kissinger's assessment, in his 21 November news conference, of sufficient progress in the Egyptian-Israeli situation so that a negotiating process could begin in December.

KISSINGER NEWS CONFERENCE Short reports of Secretary Kissinger's 21 November news conference by TASS, Moscow radio and PRAVDA, while varying somewhat, all focused on his opening statement on the Middle East and paraphrased some of his remarks on detente.

+ U.S. objectives, peace conference: Kissinger was cited as explaining the U.S. objective in the Middle East as solidifying the cease-fire "so that we could move forward together with other interested parties" toward peace negotiations. TASS and PRAVDA noted his belief that sufficient progress had been made in the "complex situation" on the Egyptian-Israeli front so that "we can look forward with some confidence" to the beginning of peace negotiations. Kissinger was also reported as saying that "our effort will be to create the appropriate auspices called for in Resolution 338 and under the auspices of the United Nations" to begin a negotiating process hopefully during December. The Soviet reports did not mention Kissinger's remark that the peace conference should be under the auspices of Moscow and Washington with UN "blessing," and Moscow has never defined the

CONFIDENTIAL

28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 2 -

"appropriate auspices," going no further than observations by PRAVDA's Zhukov that the negotiations should be held under "suitable aegis," involving the assistance and participation "of the United Nations or that of various states." Thus Soviet media have ignored Cairo and Amman reports on the 27th that the U.S. and Soviet envoys had been jointly received by Egyptian Vice President Fawzi and King Husayn respectively; Amman radio explained that the ambassadors had extended an invitation to Jordan to attend the peace conference to be held in Geneva on 18 December.

+ Detente: The Soviet accounts of Kissinger's press conference all cited the Secretary as noting the "great significance" of detente in Soviet-American relations for the settlement of the Middle East conflict. According to PRAVDA and Moscow's domestic service, Kissinger said that from time to time "existing differences cause tension" in U.S.-Soviet relations and it was important at such moments to have sufficient trust between them to relax this tension. (Kissinger in fact said that, as happened during the Middle East crisis, "long-standing commitments--ideological pressures--produce actions that bring these two sides into confrontation." At that point, he added, "it is important that enough confidence exist so that the confrontation is mitigated.")

+ Guarantees: Moscow's reports of the news conference did not mention Kissinger's observation that the final accord would have to include "an element of security arrangements" between the Arabs and Israelis and "may have to have an element of outside guarantees." But TASS on the 24th did note his remark on outside guarantees in promptly reporting Israeli Defense Minister Dayan as turning down "the American proposal for guarantees of Israel's borders and security." TASS cited Dayan as declaring that "the Americans 'tell us that we can and must rely on security guarantees. But why do we need such guarantees in view of the fact that Israeli borders will then be worth nothing?'" TASS assessed Dayan's statement as demonstrating that Israel's real concern was not the security of its borders nor even the establishment of peace, but rather a continued policy of territorial expansion. The same point was expressed in a Mayevskiy article in PRAVDA on the 23d which scoffed that the Israeli "theory of the 'need for reliable borders'" was simply a justification for the seizure of Arab land. Similarly, Kudryavtsev in an IZVESTIYA article on 10 October had dismissed Israel's insistence on secure frontiers as being only a cover for its "expansionist" policy. Kudryavtsev had reiterated his thesis that Israel's frontiers would become

CONFIDENTIAL

28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 3 -

genuinely secure only when it maintained "good-neighborly relations" with the Arab states. And in a 23 November IZVESTIYA article Kudryavtsev declared that genuine security for Israel could be insured only by guaranteeing the security of all countries and peoples of the region.

+ Energy crisis: The Moscow radio and PRAVDA versions said the Secretary noted the seriousness of the energy crisis in the United States as a result of the Arab oil embargo and stated that economic pressure would not change U.S. policy in the Middle East. But Moscow did not pick up his remark that if "pressures" continued unreasonably and indefinitely, the United States would have to consider what countermeasures it might have to take. TASS on the 24th acknowledged this remark by indirection in reporting from Dacca on indignation in Bangladesh over "Kissinger's announcement of U.S. intentions" to resort to "repressive economic measures" against Arab states which were seeking to liberate their lands. TASS also noted that a Congressional committee had conceded that a retaliatory U.S. embargo on grain and food exports would be ineffective. An Arabic-language broadcast the same day, citing Algerian and Lebanese press comment, said Arab public opinion condemned the "U.S. threat" to ban the export of grain and goods to Arab countries as a countermeasure against the reduction of oil exports. A KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article by Agaryshev on 24 November, discussing the U.S. oil supply situation, claimed that this "partly explains" American diplomatic activity in the Middle East.

ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE Moscow comment in Arabic on the Algiers summit conference has cited the consolidation of Arab solidarity in political, military and economic cooperation as the focus of the discussions, which would deal among other things with future oil policy and the "Palestinian question." A Moscow domestic service broadcast on the 26th additionally noted two other agenda issues, a Middle East peace conference and the status of Jerusalem. As in the case of the last Arab summit conference, in Rabat in December 1969, Podgornyy and Kosygin sent a greetings message to the participants.* Along the lines of Kirilenko's October Revolution anniversary

* The Podgornyy-Kosygin message and Soviet treatment of the 1969 summit are discussed in the TRENDS of 24 December 1969, pages 17-20, and of 31 December 1969, pages 19-20.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 4 -

speech, the message pledged that the USSR would continue giving "comprehensive assistance and support" to the Arab countries, and again expressed Soviet readiness to contribute to the creation of conditions for the establishment of peace. Kosygin and Podgorny repeated the standard Soviet call for Israeli withdrawal from "all" Arab territories and adhered to the usual formulation in supporting the Palestinians' "legitimate rights."

In reporting the opening of the conference, TASS on the 26th mentioned without comment that Iraq and Libya had not sent delegations. Libya's absence was dismissed as of no consequence by former PRAVDA Middle East expert Belyayev in the weekly Moscow radio observers' roundtable on the 25th. He remarked that there was nothing new in al-Qadhdhafi's stand, since he had disapproved of Egyptian and Syrian strategy and tactics in connection with the October fighting and "remained, as it were, outside the framework of Arab unity" since then.

The panelists' failure to mention Iraq undoubtedly stems from Soviet annoyance over Iraq's rejection of the Security Council cease-fire resolutions. Thus the Iraqi foreign minister, asked in an interview reported by Baghdad radio on 17 November about Soviet efforts to persuade Iraq to accept the cease-fire, replied that "the Soviets have their viewpoint and we have ours on war and peace." He added that "we regard them as friends who give every possible means of support," but do not consider them "as an alternative to the Arabs with regard to Arab issues."

Perhaps not coincidentally, Moscow and Baghdad on the 27th announced the arrival in Iraq of a Soviet party-government delegation led by CPSU Central Committee Secretary Ponomarev.* The visit would seem to be connected both with Iraq's stance on a cease-fire and with Iraqi internal dissensions. Baghdad radio reported that at the delegation's first talks, with Ba'th Party Deputy Secretary Saddam Husayn, the sides discussed, "in an atmosphere of frankness and amity," bilateral relations and the situation in the Middle East on which they "exchanged views." On the internal front, the visit may deal with recent reported clashes between the Iraqi Communist Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party; both ICP and KDP delegations have had talks in Moscow this month with Ponomarev, the communists having

* At the same time, Cairo and Moscow announced the arrival in Egypt on the 27th of a CPSU delegation headed by CPSU Central Committee candidate member Kirichenko.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 5 -

also been received by Brezhnev. A TASS report on the talks with the Kurds indicated that the USSR was still pressing for Kurdish participation in the Iraqi national front established by the ruling Ba'th Party and the communists in July.

PALESTINIAN ISSUES Moscow continues its reticence in matters pertaining to the Palestinians. The visit of a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) delegation to Moscow was not acknowledged until the release by TASS of a "communique for the press" on 26 November, two days after the visit ended. The communique indicated that the talks were again held under the umbrella of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee although, as in the case of PLO Chairman 'Arafat's August visit this year, talks were also held with "other USSR public organizations." The communique referred to the Palestinians' legitimate "national" rights, as did the Soviet-Yugoslav communique on Tito's recent talks with Brezhnev in Kiev, but Moscow comment otherwise has generally avoided including the word "national."

Moscow followed up the visit on the 27th by broadcasting in Arabic an interview with delegation leader 'Arafat, a practice also observed in at least his last two visits. 'Arafat called the talks positive and constructive and praised Soviet support for the Arabs whether by "passing along its experience or giving arms," and he particularly expressed gratitude to Brezhnev for "insisting on mentioning" the Palestinians' "legitimate rights" in the Soviet-U.S. communique on Brezhnev's June visit to the United States.

Moscow has again conveyed in typical fashion its disapproval of the latest Palestinian hijacking. A broadcast to Great Britain on the 26th called attention to a PLO disclaimer of involvement in the hijacking of a KLM Boeing 747 out of Beirut on the 25th.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 6 -

SOVIET BLOC ENERGY

MOSCOW, ALLIES ACKNOWLEDGE FUEL AND POWER DIFFICULTIES

As the energy shortage grips the developed economies of the West, Moscow and its East European allies have coupled routine expressions of support for the Arab boycott with increasing attention to the status of their own energy resources. While the comment continues to emphasize the adequacy of oil stocks, in comparison with the situation in the West, there has been general acknowledgement of the need for conservation measures, as well as announcements of energy rationing in Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria. Only Hungary has explicitly acknowledged dependence on Arab oil deliveries.

MOSCOW Radio Moscow gratuitously reported on the 24th that deliveries of Soviet petroleum to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the GDR via the Druzhba pipeline were running 24 hours ahead of schedule, and that the volume of such deliveries to these countries had increased 12 percent over last year. On the 17th Moscow radio had reported completion of installations for the second segment of the Druzhba line, which would increase annual Soviet oil deliveries to Hungary from the present 4.5 up to 10 million tons. The report included a reminder of Budapest's dependence on such deliveries in stating that "Hungary produces only 2 million tons a year of its own oil."

While maintaining outward calm, Moscow hastened to convene a series of CEMA meetings on energy problems. On the 23d Radio Moscow carried reports of meetings in the Soviet capital of the CEMA standing commissions for electric power and for peaceful use of atomic energy, and TASS on the 26th reported a meeting of the CEMA standing commission for power engineering. The reports included glowing accounts of past achievements and of long-range projects to step up fuel and power supplies to the member countries over the next two decades.

The overall Soviet portrayal of a favorable domestic energy situation was marred only by a 13 November MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA report of a Moscow gorkom conference convened to discuss the city's power situation for the coming winter. The lengthy report referred repeatedly to difficulties in delivering heating gas to Moscow homes and enterprises and stressed the "extreme" importance of economical use of power resources. It appeared to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 7 -

raise some possibility of future gasoline rationing in pointing out that 16 million liters of gasoline had already been saved since the start of the current five-year plan in 1971. In contrast to the generally somber tone of the MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA article, TASS on the 22d reported the Soviet English-language weekly MOSCOW NEWS as claiming that there were plentiful stocks of natural gas to heat Moscow apartments this winter.

POLAND, Warsaw's uniquely rather restrained support of the
BULGARIA Arab cause in the recent hostilities has been followed by official acknowledgement of a serious energy shortage. On the 24th, two days after TRYBUNA LUDU had publicized a government decision to switch to coal as the future power base, the Polish Council of Ministers announced a series of restrictions on the use of liquid fuels in motor transportation, effective 1 December. Although the fuel rationing order was restricted to "official" motor vehicles, according to the Warsaw radio, it was "closely linked with the situation which has arisen lately in the world fuel market."

The government order specified a one-third reduction in fuel consumption by official passenger cars, compared with average monthly consumption during the first quarter of this year; a ban on driving on Sundays and other religious holidays; and a speed limit of 70 kilometers per hour for trucks and 80 for passenger vehicles. The order, as reported by Warsaw radio, called for voluntary cooperation by private passenger car operators, in contrast to "many countries" which have banned all Sunday driving. In justifying the decision, the government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 25th stressed that Poland imports all its liquid fuels and that the restrictions were designed to "avoid a tense situation which could affect our economy."

Bulgaria's rationing order, announced on 21 November by the Ministry of Power Supply, restricted the use of electric power in the public sector and urged voluntary cooperation in limiting power consumption in private homes. The official announcement indicated that the order was necessitated by, among other things, "a shortage in some liquid fuels." On the 25th the party daily RABOTNICHESKO DELO reported that as a followup to the rationing order a five-day work week and a reduction in total working hours would be introduced on 1 December.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 8 -

HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA An article in the 17 November issue of the Budapest trade union daily NEPSZAVA, reported by both MTI and the Budapest domestic service, noted that Hungary has "sufficient reserves" of gas and fuel oil and that its crude oil stocks are "about double" that of a year ago. The article pointed out that two-thirds of Hungary's crude oil comes from the Soviet Union and one-fourth from domestic production, with the remainder coming from Iraq by rail from Yugoslav harbors and by river from Romanian ports. The article said that deliveries of Iraqi oil from Syrian ports had been temporarily interrupted for "understandable reasons" but have now been resumed.

Prague has issued a number of public denials of a general energy shortage. On the 24th Czechoslovak Finance Minister Rohlicek was quoted by CTK to the effect that there was "no danger of an energy crisis." A radio commentary by the Prague domestic service on the 22d, in ridiculing "rumors" of a sharp rise in the price of gasoline, noted that the price of crude had "tripled" in the West and that "no wonder our motorists are asking if similar trends will not come to our country as well." Both items were accompanied by doctrinaire assurances that economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries ruled out the danger of fuel price increases or shortages. News of the discovery of a new crude oil source was reported by RUDE PRAVO on the 21st. The new deposit, in the Zdanice forest area of Moravia, was reportedly expected to produce 15 tons of petroleum per day.

At the same time, an "especially pressing" electric power shortage was acknowledged in a Prague domestic service commentary on the 14th which reported a joint meeting of the committees for industry, transport, and trade of both chambers of the Federal Assembly to deal with the problem. The shortage was attributed to shortfalls by hydroelectric plants resulting from this year's drought. Articles on the power shortage in the Bratislava PRAVDA on the 10th and in the Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE on the 13th combined demands to conserve power with assurances that help was forthcoming from the CEMA power grid.

ROMANIA Bucharest's decision on fuel rationing, adopted by the party Executive Committee on the 13th and subsequently spelled out in decrees by the State Council and the Council of Ministers, was more drastic than Poland's. It restricted both public and privately owned automobiles to 40 liters of gasoline per month from 1 November through 31 March 1974 and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 9 -

to 60 liters per month thereafter. Lower vehicle speed limits and reduced quotas for natural gas consumption in home heating were also imposed, and electric power consumption for public buildings and public lighting was cut by 50 percent.

Romanian comment has gone no further in explaining the fuel shortage than to indicate that its economy is dependent on fuel imports which are not available in sufficient quantities. Thus, a commentary carried by AGERPRES on the 9th, four days prior to the announcement of the rationing decision, stressed that the country's growing electric power and industrial requirements demand "bigger quantities of oil products, natural gases, and other fuel" and that "imported fuel" was a necessity. The large-scale drive for fuel conservation, it added, was occasioned by the fact that "Romania's reserves are not limitless."

CONFIDENTIAL

28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 10 -

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW REPLIES TO PRC GREETING, RESTATES ITS BORDER POSITION

In an unusual step, Moscow publicized its message of thanks to the Chinese for their greetings on the occasion of the October Revolution anniversary earlier in the month. The message was carried by TASS on 24 November and appeared in the central press on the 25th. Moscow normally sends individual messages of thanks directly to the parties concerned but publicizes only a generalized message to all well-wishers. This year's general message was carried by TASS on 17 November.

The Soviet message was in response to a somewhat conciliatory Chinese greeting which had dropped certain provocative phrases used in previous years to suggest ideological backtracking on the part of Moscow.* The Chinese message had also for the first time referred to the border question, reiterating Peking's call to solve the issue through negotiations "under conditions which exclude any threat." The message echoed Chou En-lai's remarks on the border issue at the 10th CCP Congress in August, where he had also reiterated Peking's proposal that relations between the two countries be normalized on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

While the Soviet reply is not polemical, it breaks no new ground in the dispute. It reflects the posture taken in recent leadership statements and in earlier responses to Chou's remarks at the 10th Congress by repeating past Soviet proposals, reminding Peking that "concrete deeds are of decisive importance for normalizing relations," and implying that the next move is up to the Chinese. The Soviet message lists two specific proposals at the border talks already rejected or ignored by the Chinese--the January 1971 nonuse of force proposal and the nonaggression treaty proposed in June of this year. The same day that TASS transmitted the Soviet message of reply, NCNA reported remarks by a Chinese representative at the UN which accused Moscow of "hypocritically proposing the nonuse of force against each other."

The publication of the message is apparently a further attempt by Moscow to place its position in the dispute in the best light possible while indicating to the Chinese that it does not intend to relax its own demands for a settlement. The message thus conveys, in a more subtle fashion, the same assessment

CONFIDENTIAL

28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 11 -

of Sino-Soviet relations provided by Kosygin a few days earlier in Minsk. As reported in SOVIET BELORUSSIA on 15 November, Kosygin lamented the lack of progress in the border talks and observed pointedly that Chou's remarks at the 10th CCP Congress had not been backed by "real actions." He went on to call for such action in the form of "businesslike discussion" of "the constructive proposals submitted by the USSR."

* For an analysis of the Chinese message, see the TRENDS of 7 November 1973, p. 22.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 12 -

INDOCHINA

FOREIGN MINISTRIES CHARGE GVN BOMBING, U.S. OVERFLIGHTS

Alleged Saigon bombing raids on 23 November in the Katum area, Tay Ninh Province, prompted protests from the DRV and PRG at the foreign-ministry level which also reviewed alleged air attacks since the beginning of October. While in the past two months the spokesmen for the foreign ministries have issued frequent protests over bombings, the current statements are the first at foreign-ministry level since early October, when the GVN carried out large-scale raids over PRG-controlled areas of Tay Ninh in retaliation for the communist capture of the Le Minh base in Pleiku Province.

Issued on the 26th, three days after the air strikes were supposed to have taken place, the PRG statement termed them "the largest-scale bombing of the Tay Ninh liberated zone since 28 January" and claimed that the Saigon air force killed and wounded "dozens of civilians, most of them women and children" and destroyed large amounts of civilian property. The statement warned that the PRG will "resolutely counter" all violations of the cease-fire agreement by Saigon. This was milder language than in the 15 October PLAF Command order, which promised to "resolutely counterattack" GVN forces "anywhere in appropriate form and with appropriate forces" for violations of the cease-fire agreement.

The DRV statement issued on the 27th similarly described civilian deaths and destruction allegedly caused by Saigon's air attacks and characterized them as "another very barbarous crime" and an "extremely grave violation" of the Paris agreement and the 13 June joint communique. The DRV statement gave more attention than had the PRG to the alleged U.S. role as the instigator of the raids. The DRV statement declared that Saigon was "encouraged and assisted by the United States" in carrying out the air attacks, and it additionally asserted that this was part of the "U.S.-Saigon Administration clique's sinister scheme to systematically sabotage the cease-fire." The PRG statement, while not neglecting charges of U.S. complicity, accused the United States only parenthetically, in its concluding paragraphs, of "abetting and encouraging" Saigon to violate the cease-fire.

Aerial reconnaissance of PRG-controlled areas in Quang Tri Province on 21 and 24 November and of the DRV's coastal Nghe An Province on the 28th, reportedly conducted by SR-71 and "unmanned" aircraft dispatched by the United States, drew routine-level foreign ministry spokesmen protests from the PRG on the 24th and

CONFIDENTIAL

28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 13 -

27th and from the DRV on the 28th. The three latest statements are virtually identical in wording and tenor to protests by the DRV and PRG on 19 and 21 November for alleged overflights at that time.*

PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman statements on the 24th and 27th, like the statement of the 21st, charged that U.S. overflights of PRG territory constituted a violation of Article 4 of the Paris agreement, "denounced and condemned" such action, and "demanded" it be discontinued. The protest of aerial reconnaissance by unmanned aircraft reported in the statement of the 27th is the first time since 2 May that unmanned aircraft have been mentioned in this regard. While the May spokesman's protest did not specify the type of aircraft involved, media commentary then described the overflight as being carried out by "pilotless reconnaissance aircraft."

Unlike earlier DRV protests of SR-71 intrusions, which clearly charged that North Vietnam's interior had been penetrated, the latest statement only asserts that U.S. aircraft "encroached upon . . . many areas of Nghe An." The statement repeated the standard charge in overflight protests that the alleged intrusion was in violation of Article 2 of the Paris agreement and the first point of the 13 June joint communique.

* The DRV protest statement of the 19th and the PRG protest statement of the 21st are discussed in the TRENDS of 21 November 1973, page 17.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 14 -

PRC-PRG COMMUNIQUE SHOWS MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION

The 21 November joint communique marking the "complete success" of the 18-23 November China visit by the PRG delegation led by Advisory Council Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho reflected bilateral efforts to reconcile Sino-Vietnamese differences evident in leaders' speeches and other authoritative pronouncements during the visit.* Most notably, the two sides reaffirmed common stands on crucial issues such as alleged U.S.-Saigon violations of the Paris agreement, while implicitly acknowledging continued Sino-Vietnamese differences by failing to mention whether "identical views" had been reached. This omission was a departure from the last PRC-PRG communique of 1 January 1973 marking Foreign Minister Binh's visit to Peking.

In contrast to Peking's silence in speeches during the visit on the subject of alleged U.S. obstruction of the Paris agreement, in the communique the Chinese compensated by pointedly condemning Saigon violations "with the support and connivance of the United States" and by demanding that Washington shoulder its "unshirkable responsibility for implementation of the Paris agreement." This was a stronger Chinese position than Peking's generalized expression of support for the Vietnamese charges in the 12 June 1973 joint communique marking DRV party leader Le Duan's visit to China. In that communique Peking had blandly admonished the United States to respect and implement the peace accord. Peking enhanced its accommodation of PRG interests by offering in the communique its first authoritative endorsement of recent PRG warnings that it would take countermeasures against the Saigon violations. Specifically, the Chinese joined with the PRG in affirming that the South Vietnamese people are entitled to take "all resolute measures" to check Saigon violations, defend the liberated areas, and uphold the Paris agreement.

Some PRG accommodation to the Chinese positions was evident in the communique's playing down of the seriousness of U.S.-Saigon violations. Thus, although Tho had stressed in his Peking speech on the 18th that the United States and Saigon had "ever more crudely and systematically violated many most important provisions of the Paris agreement," in the communique the PRG merely pointed

* The major Sino-Vietnamese pronouncements during the visit, apart from the communique which was released following the PRG visitors' departure on the 23d, are treated in the 21 November TRENDS, pp. 14-17.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 15 -

to "violations of some vital provisions" by Washington and Saigon. This formula was even milder than that used by the DRV in the 12 June communique, which stated that Washington and Saigon had "incessantly, systematically and grossly violated important provisions of the agreement." Furthermore, the PRG side inserted in the communique more effusive praise for Chinese support than the DRV had in the 12 June communique, noting in particular that it has "always received enormous and effective support and assistance" from the PRC.

Peking pointed out "emphatically" its firm support for the South Vietnamese struggle for national rights, but this time avoided any reference to pledges of continued Chinese assistance to the Vietnamese struggle, pledges mentioned in both the 12 June and 1 January communiqués. The Chinese duly reaffirmed support for the PRG as the "sole authentic representative" of the South Vietnamese and for the PRG six-point proposal.

Both sides' treatment of Cambodia and Laos echoed their complementing statements earlier in the visit, adding a demand that the United States halt its support for Lon Nol and interference in Cambodian internal affairs. The 12 June communique had sidestepped any specific demand in mentioning the futility of the U.S. bombing and military intervention in Cambodia.

After short stays in Tientsin and Canton the PRG visitors departed for Hanoi on the 23d. While in Canton, Tho and Binh reportedly had a "friendly" meeting on the 22d with Cambodian Prince Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth, and also met with Sihanouk's ailing mother. Penn Nouth attended a Canton banquet for the delegates on the evening of the 22d, but Sihanouk's only other publicized appearance during the PRG visit was on the 23d, when he received Tho's Chinese host, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, who came to pay respects to the prince's mother. Upon arrival in Hanoi on the 23d, the PRG delegates were received by the same high-ranking DRV officials who greeted them during their 18 November stopover on the way to Peking.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 16 -

C H I N A

PROVINCES STRESS NEED TO FOLLOW PARTY'S RURAL POLICIES

With the end of the harvest season, PRC media are following time-honored tradition in again stressing ideological and capital construction tasks in rural areas for the winter. The broadcasts suggest no change in current policies dealing with production relationships, but there seems to be increase over recent years in the attention devoted to ideological struggle.

Kirin radio on 23 November carried a CHANGCHUN DAILY commentator's article that criticized certain cadres for mistakes in harvest distribution policies which would weaken the economy and dampen the peasants' enthusiasm. Such criticism indicates the errors were "leftist" in their opposition to current PRC distribution policies, which stress the legitimacy of the peasants' needs for gradual increases in income as production increases. The article noted that "efficient distribution arouses people's socialist enthusiasm, which in turn promotes production."

Current production relationships were also reaffirmed by Kweichow in a 25 November broadcast summing up results of a provincial conference on afforestation. The broadcast stressed the rights of lower-level production teams when their resources are used by brigades and communes, stating that when teams contribute labor and investment, they must receive "compensation in proportion."

The status of production teams was also treated by Shensi radio on the 23d, in an attack on "erroneous tides" by rural cadres. The radio defended the current size of production teams in recalling that during the 1962 rightist surge supported by Liu Shao-chi, "upper levels" had requested that a brigade reduce the size of its teams and that the brigade had "disobeyed the persons sent by the upper level" in a spirit of going against the tide. But the article pointed out that the correct tide may sometimes be hidden, noting that Lin Piao in 1969, using as a pretext criticism of Liu's incorrect line, had interfered with the party's rural policies from the "ultraleft," attempting to "cut off the tail of private ownership."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 17 -

As usual, middle level cadres are left most exposed in the current stress on rural line struggle. The Shansi provincial radio on the 23d carried a pointed warning to such cadres in reporting a speech by Tachai model Chen Yung-kuei, now a member of the Politburo, to a symposium on learning from Tachai held earlier this month. Chen attributed Tachai's success to its adherence to the party line and stated that "the failure in some localities to implement policies is a great obstacle to the current campaign to learn from Tachai. . . . If policies are not implemented we cannot blame the lower level; the responsibility lies with the leadership." Chen demanded that "the county CCP committees in particular" get rid of their apprehensions and "implement correctly all party policies." Cadre apprehensions appear natural since past swings of the pendulum have brought severe attacks on those who implemented moderate policies.

PEASANT CONGRESSES Following Hunan's 18 November announcement of the convening of its provincial peasant congress, the nation's first since the cultural revolution, Hubei on 26 November announced its peasant congress had convened on the 25th. Anhwei leader and party Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng sent a greetings message to the meeting, but he remained in Peking. Provincial secretary Kuo Hung-chieh reported to the congress that grain, cotton, and pig production had all risen "by a fairly big margin" over last year. Shantung, Shensi, and Kiangsu have all announced peasant congress preparations, and most provinces will probably try to hold their congresses during the current slack farming period.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
28 NOVEMBER 1973

- 18 -

NOTES

DRV ORGANIZATION CONGRESSES: The announcement by a third DRV mass organization, the trade unions, that their first congress in more than 12 years will be held in early 1974 is further evidence of a return to normal organizational activity after the long war effort. If the pattern of 13 years ago is followed, the calling of three congresses by mass organizations suggests more strongly that another Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) congress may be in the offing. The Vietnam General Federation of Trade Unions will hold its third congress in mid-February, according to a Hanoi radio 22 November report. Earlier announcements of congresses included a 9 August newspaper report that the Ho Chi Minh Working Youth Union would hold its fourth congress in 1974, and a 16 October directive of the VWP Central Committee Secretariat broadcast by Hanoi on 20 October stating that the Vietnam Women's Union would hold its fourth congress in 1974. All three of these mass organizations held their last congresses in February and March 1961, several months after the VWP's third and most recent congress in September 1960.

SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO INDIA: Although Moscow has not announced the long-awaited appointment of a new ambassador to India, Soviet media reports that "USSR Ambassador" V.F. Maltsev is a member of Soviet party chief Brezhnev's delegation visiting India suggest that Maltsev's appointment to this post is imminent. Moscow has been searching for a suitable candidate since April, when Ambassador to India Nikolay Pegov was appointed deputy foreign minister. Since Pegov was one of the few Soviet ambassadors in noncommunist countries who was a member of the CPSU Central Committee, Moscow and Delhi obviously wanted to maintain this symbolic manifestation of their close relations. After the long delay the two countries may have settled on Maltsev, a candidate member of the Central Committee who is presently Soviet ambassador to Finland. The tentative nature of this move, however, is reflected in the failure of Moscow to acknowledge formally that Maltsev is absent from his post in Helsinki.

CONFIDENTIAL

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 19 - 25 NOVEMBER 1973

<u>Moscow (2528 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1138 items)</u>	
Brezhnev in India	(4%) 15%	Domestic Issues	(41%) 33%
China	(8%) 7%	Indochina	(9%) 31%
Middle East	(8%) 6%	[PRG Leader Nguyen	(5%) 25%]
Guinea-Bissau Leader	(--)	Huu Tho in PRC	
Cabral in USSR		Korea UN Debate	(5%) 8%
Brezhnev Meeting With	(--)	Middle East	(6%) 2%
French CP Secretary			
General Marchais			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.