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
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
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ARAB - ISRAELI CONFLICT

MOSCOW EVASIVE ON IMMEDIATE ISSUES, NOTES DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

In a period of intense diplomatic activity on the Middle East involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab and Israeli parties to the conflict, Moscow continues to display reticence with respect to the immediate issues. The problems of POW exchange and controversy over the UN Emergency Force have been touched on obliquely in reportage on developments in the Middle East and at the Security Council, but these issues have been largely passed over in limited comment. Panelists on Moscow radio's weekly observers' roundtable on the 4th declined to predict the possible course of current and future negotiations in view of the "complexity and difficulty" of the talks.

Moscow continues to back up Egyptian insistence on observance of Security Council Resolutions 339 and 340 calling for the return of forces to the positions they held at the time of the 22 October cease-fire. Thus Kirilenko, in his October Revolution anniversary speech on the 6th, called Israeli withdrawal to the 22 October positions the "very first and necessary step" toward a political settlement of the crisis. TASS dismissed Mrs. Meir's counter-proposal, in a 1 November Washington news conference, for a "so-called 'mutual alinement'" of the cease-fire. Moscow had taken no note of what Israel has described as another pressing problem, the Arab blockade of the Bab el Mandeb strait at the mouth of the Red Sea, until TASS acknowledged the blockade in a 5 November dispatch from Paris on an Israeli fuel shortage. TASS said that since the Arab countries had set up a blockade of Bab el Mandeb no oil tanker had reached Israel from the Indian Ocean. Seemingly in an effort to obscure the issue of a Bab el Mandeb blockade, Moscow's domestic service on the 7th claimed that the arrival of a GDR merchant vessel in the Jordanian port of Aqaba refuted Israeli charges of an Egyptian blockade of "the Gulf of Aqaba."

Soviet media have reported, with virtually no comment, the separate talks held in Washington beginning last week by Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi and Israeli Prime Minister Meir with President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger and the latter's meeting with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Isma'il "at American initiative." TASS reported the itinerary for Kissinger's trip to the Middle and Far East beginning on the 5th, but had no

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comment other than to cite "local observers" in Washington for the view that recent U.S. diplomacy was due to the American desire to repair relations with the Arab countries and consolidate its deteriorating Middle East position. Soviet media also briefly noted Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov's meeting with as-Sadat in Cairo on the 2d and his 3-6 November visit to Damascus, as well as reporting the current round of inter-Arab contacts and Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban's arrival in Romania on the 5th for an official visit.

KIRILENKO SPEECH In his October Revolution anniversary speech on the 6th Kirilenko went further than other Soviet leaders have in the present crisis when he said that the Soviet Union has been rendering and "will continue to render the necessary aid and support" to the Arab states. While such statements have been made by Soviet leaders since the 1967 war,* elite pledges of support since the October fighting have been confined to expressions of sympathy with the "victims of aggression" (Brezhnev on 8 October) and of continued strengthening of solidarity with the Arabs (Kosygin on 15 October).

Kirilenko also made the first Soviet elite reference to direct Egyptian-Israeli contacts in Egypt in noting that these countries' representatives were meeting in the presence of UN representatives to discuss "questions of restoring the situation that existed on 22 October." Soviet media have noted these meetings in routine reportage on Mideast developments. Underlining the importance of an Israeli return to the 22 October positions, Kirilenko twice called this the first step toward settlement of the conflict as a whole. In this context he accused Israel of "gross and treacherous" violations of Resolution 338 calling for a cease-fire and declared that for this alone Israel deserved "the most stringent sanctions,

* Kirilenko himself said in April 1970 that the USSR had rendered and would render the Vietnamese and Arab people "such aid as is required"; in June 1970 Podgornyiy pledged to continue rendering the "necessary assistance" to the Arab countries; Ponomarev and Mazurov similarly pledged "comprehensive assistance" and "all-round aid" in speeches in July and August that year, and Kosygin promised "all necessary support" in a February 1971 speech.

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foreseen in such cases by the UN Charter." In only one other instance is a Soviet leader known to have called for Security Council sanctions against Israel--Shelepin in an October 1969 speech at a WFTU congress in Budapest--although Soviet delegates have from time to time raised the question during UN debates on the Middle East.

Kirilenko's remarks on the Middle East were otherwise routine: He reiterated the standard position that a stable peace in the Middle East must be based on liberation of "all" Israeli-occupied territories and on guaranteeing the Palestinians' "lawful rights." Without mentioning the United States, Kirilenko went on to say that it should be understood by the Israeli leaders and "those who support them" that a real solution to the Mideast problem could only be found in this way. And like Brezhnev in his 26 October speech, Kirilenko referred to Soviet contacts with the Arab states in declaring that the USSR had taken an active part in diplomatic actions aimed at terminating the war and settling the conflict. Kirilenko acknowledged the "full complexity" of the Middle East situation, but concluded on a positive note by stating that "there are now more favorable conditions" than ever for a stable and just normalization of the crisis in this region.

UNEF, UN OBSERVERS,
22 OCTOBER POSITIONS

Soviet reportage has not spelled out the nature of the difficulties arising over composition, financing, and Security Council control over the UN Emergency Force. Moscow did indicate some of the problems in noting that Secretary General Waldheim's second report on the establishment of the UNEF was submitted without consultation with Security Council members and that the principle of "just geographical representation" in the formation of the UNEF had not been duly complied with. TASS on the 3d reported the 2 November council consensus--without so identifying it--which accepted Poland to balance Canada, giving the two countries responsibility for logistic support. There has been no Soviet stress on Polish participation, TASS merely reporting on the 4th the Polish decision to comply with the Security Council request.

A TASS report in RED STAR on the 4th suggested that the representation issue had still not been resolved to Soviet satisfaction: Soviet UN delegate Malik was reported to have called the council decision a step forward in that "artificial restrictions" on the participation of socialist and nonaligned

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states in the UNEF had been removed. But Malik added that the council would have an opportunity in the future to examine application of the principle of fair geographical distribution "for the purpose of further improving" the composition of the UNEF.

Moscow has underscored the point that the UNEF has the duty to obtain the return of forces to the 22 October cease-fire line. Soviet media have cited Malik as stating that the UN forces must take "appropriate measures" to insure that troops participating in the conflict are withdrawn to their 22 October positions. And Moscow has reported statements by UN spokesmen in New York and Cairo that the United Nations has had no response from Israel to queries about withdrawal. TASS, in reporting Mrs. Meir's Washington news conference on 1 November, noted her "cynical refusal" to comply with the Security Council decisions on a pullback to the 22 October positions, adding that she "alleged it was 'not known' where the cease-fire line was on 22 October." Moscow has apparently not yet reported the Egyptian military spokesman's statements on the 5th and 6th claiming that the 22 October positions could be determined by referring to Israeli officials' statements made on 22 October and an Egyptian military communique issued on the 24th defining Egyptian positions.

The matter of U.S. and Soviet "observers" in the Middle East has been broached in only a few instances since Brezhnev announced in his 26 October speech that the USSR had sent "representatives" to Cairo in response to as-Sadat's 24 October request for U.S. and Soviet troops and President Nixon said in his 26 October press conference that the United States would send observers if this was requested by the UN secretary general. Since then Moscow has twice indicated that American as well as Soviet observers have already been sent to the Middle East--possibly alluding to the fact, not spelled out, that eight Americans have been serving with the UN Truce Supervision Organization. Thus a Mikhaylov article in IZVESTIYA on 30 October asserted that at as-Sadat's request the USSR, "and, subsequently, the United States, sent their representatives" to supervise implementation of the Security Council decisions. And a panelist in Moscow radio's weekly observers' roundtable on the 4th made the same claim, "reminding" listeners that "there are UN observers and also Soviet and American representatives in the former area of hostilities."

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POW ISSUE Moscow has suggested Israeli concern over the POW problem only by indirection, TASS on the 2d reporting that an emergency session of the Knesset had been held to discuss the question. However, TASS focused on an Israeli Communist Party statement calling for an Israeli withdrawal to the 22 October positions to speed a solution to the POW question. Moscow has generally touched on the problem of the POW's only in the course of media roundups of various Mideast developments. Egypt and Syria have been depicted as willing to comply with international conventions concerning treatment of civilians and prisoners of war, and Moscow has reported Arab countercharges of Israeli maltreatment of POW's and civilians under their control. Thus, Soviet media on the 4th reported Egyptian spokesmen as stating that Egypt had agreed through the International Committee of the Red Cross on an exchange of wounded POW's "which the Egyptian side has started to fulfill," but that Israel was "sabotaging" this agreement. And TASS on the 1st reported Syrian readiness to hand over lists of Israeli prisoners to the ICRC and "give a possibility" for visits if Israel also agreed to "follow generally accepted norms."

SITUATION IN Soviet media in the past few days have EGYPT, SYRIA reported dispatches from their Cairo and Damascus correspondents noting continued tension, with intermittent firing on the cease-fire lines, but portraying Egypt and Syria as already engaged in plans for reconstruction. However, Moscow radio correspondents on the 4th said that in view of Israeli calls for military preparedness, Egypt was maintaining vigilance and tightening defenses at industrial establishments. A TASS dispatch on the 1st noted that along with plans to reopen the Suez Canal and rehabilitate cities in the canal zone, Egypt also had to "strengthen the country's defense potential," requiring considerable efforts from the national economy. That explained, TASS said, rationing of some foodstuffs and measures to economize on water, electric power and fuel.

PRAVDA correspondents reported on the 3d and 4th the Syrian people's determination during the war and their current concern to restore damaged enterprises. While applauding the solidarity of Syria's population around the Progressive National Front, PRAVDA at the same time cautioned against the "internal enemy" opposing the country's socialist orientation. PRAVDA's correspondents made Moscow's only known reference to the evacuation of Soviet citizens from the Middle East in observing that at the Euphrates hydropower site, about 1,000 "of our specialists (women and children were evacuated)" and over 12,000 Syrian engineers and workers remained after the beginning of military operations.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

SOVIET CONTROVERSY OVER DETENTE-DEFENSE ISSUE CONTINUES

The apparently ongoing controversy in the Soviet leadership over the political uses of military strength has again surfaced in the Soviet central press in the wake of the Middle East confrontation.* In editorials on the just-concluded World Peace Congress in Moscow, PRAVDA and RED STAR diverged sharply over the principal reasons for the general improvement in East-West relations in recent years. Where PRAVDA emphasized the decisive role of Soviet diplomatic initiatives in bringing about the change in the international climate, RED STAR stressed the growth of Soviet military and economic might as the principal causal factor. The latter line was also evident in Politburo member Kirilenko's 6 November keynote address on the October Revolution anniversary and Defense Minister Grechko's traditional Red Square speech the following day.

The differences between the PRAVDA and RED STAR editorials were characteristically expressed in esoteric terms, but they were clearly defined. PRAVDA asserted that the "radical turn from 'cold war' to detente and collaboration became possible thanks to the general change in the correlation of forces in the world in favor of the forces of peace and progress." The editorial went on to emphasize that "these positive changes are connected primarily with the principled and consistent peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist states." This was the same view forcefully expressed by USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov in PRAVDA last July, as well as by other Soviet commentators on foreign affairs.

By contrast, the RED STAR editorial reiterated the hardline argument advanced in that paper last August by its propaganda department head Col. I. Sidelnikov. Rephrasing the first part of the PRAVDA statement, the editorial

* The earlier signs of this dispute were analyzed in the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 23 August 1973, "Soviet Debate Over Role of Military Power During Detente," and in the TRENDS of 26 September 1973, pages 3-4.

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asserted that "the radical turn now occurring from 'cold war' to detente is primarily the result of the changed balance of forces in the international arena in favor of socialism." It then went on to emphasize the role of military power as an instrument of Soviet detente diplomacy, saying: "The might and authority of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist commonwealth are steadily strengthening and at the same time their influence on the development of world events is growing."

A similar hardline position on the role of military power in international affairs was asserted in Kirilenko's address commemorating the 56th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Paraphrasing a formula used by Sidelnikov, Kirilenko declared: "The stronger and more cohesive the commonwealth of socialist states, the greater its economic and defense potential, the more powerful its influence on the progress of world development, the more successful the people's liberation struggle, and the more reliable the great cause of peace for which all progressive mankind is fighting." Consistent with this view, Kirilenko also called for strengthening the Soviet armed forces and the maintenance of Soviet defenses "at the necessary level" as a means of countering Western "enemies of peace." Not surprisingly, Defense Minister Grechko likewise urged a "high degree of vigilance" and the strengthening of Soviet economic and military might, as he had in last year's Red Square speech.

MOSCOW PUBLICITY ON NATO RIFT AVOIDS DETENTE LINKAGE

Moscow has continued to give moderate publicity to the rift in NATO ranks exposed by the exchanges of criticism between the United States and its European allies over the Middle Eastern crisis and the U.S. military alert. Basing its coverage mainly on West European press criticism of the U.S. actions, Moscow has focused on the intra-alliance implications of the affair, suggesting that relations between the United States and its NATO partners have been badly strained. While thus presenting U.S. actions in an unfavorable light, it has avoided any suggestion that the overall context of U.S.-Soviet relations has been damaged. Indeed, it has suggested that the actions of the European countries in opposing U.S. policy in the crisis testify to the vitality of the forces favoring a relaxation of international tensions.

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This mixture of criticism and optimism was typified by Moscow radio's observers' roundtable on 4 November. Criticizing U.S. media for dramatizing the crisis and U.S. officials for making "rather ambiguous statements" about its causes, the commentators expressed optimism both about U.S. public opinion and about the prospects for detente. "We see," said one of the speakers, "how gradually the policy of peaceful coexistence, the course toward international collaboration and detente are gradually gaining the upper hand." An article in IZVESTIYA on the preceding day struck much the same tone. Referring favorably to European resistance to U.S. policy, it said that this showed Europe had become aware of the benefits of the "transition from confrontation to cooperation" and would not sacrifice it for the sake of "so-called Atlantic solidarity."

Moscow has also obviously been concerned not to stress NATO disarray to the point of suggesting the military threat from the West is no longer a source of danger. This concern was stated explicitly in the roundtable discussion. "It would be wrong," said one of the commentators, "to exaggerate the cracks appearing in the Atlantic bloc," since its "aggressive essence" and its "aggressive machinery" continue to function. The same concern probably accounts for the fact that RED STAR has been remarkably taciturn about the U.S.-NATO rift. After reporting President Nixon's press conference and giving a brief roundup of European press reactions on 28 October, it has not commented on the issue through its first three November issues.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW INDICATES THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD PROVE GOOD FAITH

In the wake of recent U.S. actions in the Middle East crisis and on bilateral trade, Moscow has assumed a more cautious stance regarding relations with the United States. Moscow has continued to express optimism about the process of detente as a whole and restated its desire to continue on a course of normalizing relations with the United States. But it has in recent days treated U.S. intentions toward the USSR in a much more conditional tone, suggesting that it is now up to the United States to prove its good faith and its intention to continue pursuing an improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Politburo member Kirilenko, in his 6 November speech on the occasion of the October Revolution anniversary, was correct but distinctly cooler in his assessment of relations with the United States than other recent official statements, including that by Brezhnev on 26 October in his speech to the World Peace Congress in Moscow. Kirilenko noted that Soviet-U.S. relations had "begun to develop in the direction of detente." He reaffirmed Soviet intentions to adhere to recently concluded U.S.-Soviet agreements, but was cautious in his characterization of U.S. intentions: "We proceed from the supposition that the American side too will act in the same manner in accordance with the spirit and letter of the agreements concluded." He did not refer directly or indirectly to the U.S. military alert ordered in connection with the recent Middle East fighting.

The more conditional assessment of official U.S. attitudes toward U.S.-Soviet relations was also reflected in Moscow's belated response to the Administration's decision to delay requesting most-favored-nation status for the USSR. Although the media reported Administration claims that it was maintaining its commitment to Moscow on the issue, IZVESTIYA's political observer Vikentiy Matveyev on 3 November implied that Moscow was reserving judgment on the validity of those reassurances. "The American press offers various suggestions regarding the motives behind this decision by official Washington. The near future will show how things stand in this respect."

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WATERGATE Moscow's handling of the Watergate affair has also reflected a more cautious assessment of Washington's intentions. The linkage of Watergate with the U.S. military alert marks an abrupt change from Moscow's previous practice of downplaying the affair. The weekly foreign affairs journal *NEW TIMES* in its 2 November issue carried a brief, unattributed report which for the first time in Soviet media discussed the issue of impeachment. The *NEW TIMES* report, however, contained no direct criticism of the President and, in pointing to the partisan Democratic party factor in the Congressional proceedings, implied, as Moscow has consistently, that the Watergate revelations are heavily influenced by party politics and thus not necessarily evidence that the President is guilty of anything atypical of U.S. political practice. For this reason, the *NEW TIMES* report, as yet the only item of its kind in Soviet media, may have been intended as a precautionary move alerting the Soviet public to the possibility of sensational developments in the U.S. domestic political situation, rather than as a display of pique over the Middle East.

U.S. ALERT While Moscow has clearly shown distress over recent U.S. actions, it has continued to avoid any suggestion that events surrounding the U.S. military alert amounted to a full-blown crisis. Its linkage of the alert with Watergate has implied that the alert was more a domestic than a foreign policy decision.

Furthermore, Moscow has continued to convey the impression that the outcome of the Middle East war was a vindication of detente rather than an indictment. The weekly domestic radio roundtable on international affairs on 4 November, for example, told listeners somewhat defensively that "if detente were as shaky and illusory an affair as Peking continues to portray it, it would hardly have withstood such a test" as the Middle East war. Radio-TV observer Mikhail Mikhaylov went on to deny explicitly that there were any grounds for comparing recent events to previous U.S.-Soviet confrontations, such as the Cuban missile crisis. Mikhaylov argued that before the onset of detente there had been "more than one such local crisis in the postwar history of mankind which quickly grew into a most serious international crisis threatening world peace . . . Any local crisis or military conflict had a tendency to grow almost instantaneously into a dangerous confrontation between our country and the United States. Peace hung by a thread. This did not happen this time."

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INDOCHINA

HANOI, PRG JUSTIFY MILITARY OPERATIONS AS "PUNITIVE ACTIONS"

Consistent with the aggressive public posture assumed in mid-October when the PLAF Command order threatened counterattacks to Saigon's "acts of war," Hanoi and PRG media have made no attempt to obscure their initiative in recent military action. Thus, they greeted with exultation the PLAF capture of ARVN bases in western Quang Duc Province on 4 November and their shelling of Bien Hoa airfield on the 6th.

CAPTURE OF BASES Liberation Radio on 5 November openly lauded the capture of Saigon positions in Quang Duc Province. According to the radio, the PLAF had "recovered the Bu Bong liberated zone" in Quang Duc on 4 November in direct compliance with an order dated that day from the central Trung Bo PLAF Command to "recapture the areas illegally occupied by Saigon troops" as well as with the 15 October PLAF Command order. By contrast, propaganda following the capture of Saigon positions in September had been much more circumspect in describing the action and only indirectly alluded to the communist initiative by quoting U.S. and Saigon charges. For example, when the communists overran the Le Minh base in western Pleiku on 22 September, propaganda implied that they had only responded to Saigon encroaching operations and deprecated U.S. and Saigon charges that North Vietnamese forces had attacked the ARVN base.

The attack in Quang Duc seemed clearly to have been coordinated with the central Trung Bo Command order which specifically declared that since 18 October many of Saigon's infantry and armor battalions have "conducted land-grabbing operations" in western Quang Duc. Although the order from the PLAF's central command on 15 October was more general than the regional command--stating, for example, that communist forces should counter "war acts" in a "fitting manner"--a radio commentary on that day had specified that communist forces would not only retaliate in areas in which they were attacked but "also directly attack" Saigon's rear bases.

SHELLING OF BIEN HOA Hanoi and PRG comment on the 6 November artillery attack on Bien Hoa airfield promptly claimed that the action was punishment for Saigon "acts of war" during the past nine months, in compliance with the

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15 October PLAF Command order. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 7th elaborated on the motivation for the PLAF's "punitive shelling." The paper complained about specific GVN programs, such as pacification and police operations, and charged that "Saigon has become particularly frenzied since early in October" and that, "under Thieu's instruction for 'pre-emptive' measures," its air force and artillery have made "intensified attacks on areas deep in the liberated zone." In addition, the paper accused Saigon of "cynically provoking representatives of the PRG in the Joint Military Commission." Justifying the Bien Hoa attack as an act of "legitimate self-defense," QUAN DOI NHAN DAN asserted that under this concept the communists have the "right" to "take resolute counter-measures to defend the liberated zone and recuperate whatever part of it has been nibbled away by the Saigon army."

OFFICIAL PROTESTS A flurry of official communist protests of alleged U.S. and Saigon violations, issued in the first three days of November, may have been calculated to buttress subsequent justifications for the communist attacks. Among the official documents publicized were a 1 November communique by the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman listing "typical" cease-fire violations Saigon has supposedly committed since last January; an undated communique by PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman, broadcast on the 2d, denouncing U.S. assistance to the Saigon government; a 3 November PRG Foreign Ministry statement condemning recent "acts of war" on the part of Saigon and the United States; and a 3 November DRV Foreign Ministry statement alleging violations of the Paris agreement.

The spokesman's communique of the 1st claimed that in the last nine months, Saigon, "with U.S. assistance and encouragement, has seriously, comprehensively, and systematically violated all the principal provisions" of the Paris agreement and 13 June joint communique. It described as "most serious" Saigon's alleged "large-scale military operations across South Vietnam." The undated spokesman's communique broadcast on the 2d by Liberation radio was directed primarily at the United States for continuing its "military involvement" in South Vietnam.

The more authoritative PRG Foreign Ministry statement of the 3d was ostensibly in reaction to Thieu's national day speech and to recent comment by the commander of the U.S. Air Force in the Pacific on the possibility of resuming U.S. bombings in Vietnam.

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The statement repeated complaints of "illegal" U.S. aid to the Saigon government and of the latter's mobilization of its armed forces to conduct "tens of thousands of nibbling operations" against PRG-controlled areas. It warned: "All violations of the agreement by the United States and the Saigon administration will be duly punished. If they continue to plunge along the path of military adventures and sabotage peace and national reconciliation and concord, they will certainly sustain heavy defeats."

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement of the 3d likewise deplored "massive U.S. aid" to Saigon and Thieu's "clamouring for war." The DRV statement did, however, strike one new note in officially acknowledging the 26 October U.S. State Department note protesting the introduction of war materiel and troops into the South by the DRV. Hanoi's statement echoed earlier, lower-level comment in claiming that the "U.S. allegations are clearly aimed at nothing but misleading public opinion, covering up the violations of the Paris agreement..., and seeking a pretext for new military adventures." A 31 October Liberation Radio report and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN newspaper article, as reported by VNA on the 1st, had characterized the note as resorting to the tactic of "thief crying stop thief" to cover up U.S. aid being given to the Saigon government.

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DRV ARMY JOURNAL EXAMINES CONDUCT OF MILITARY CAMPAIGNS

A series of articles in the North Vietnamese military journal, TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, over the past five months indicates the communists are reviewing the results of their 1972 offensive to lay the groundwork for improving their forces and operations.

Following articles early in the year generally lauding the 1972 achievements, the journal in June began a comprehensive series of articles under the heading "Studying Several Matters on the Art of Campaigns" reflecting a more detailed examination of the past year's experience. This series, opening with articles discussing offensive, counteroffensive, and defensive campaigns, has continued at least through the October issue. The articles in July and August covered such subjects as tactical leadership and the role and organization in an offensive campaign of the rear services, artillery, political activities, antiaircraft forces, tanks and armor, and signal communications.

The September and October issues of TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN are not yet available, but a Hanoi radio review of the October issue reported it continued the series with an article on staff tasks in an offensive campaign written by Maj Gen Tran Quy Hai, a vice minister of defense, deputy chief of staff, and alternate member of the Central Committee. The positions of authors of the series were not indicated by the journal, and most are not well known; however, other authors included Sen Col Nguyen The Lam, who has written previously on the use of armor, Sen Col Luong Nhan, a deputy chief of the General Department of Rear Services, and Col Pham Nien, who has written previously on signal communications.

Maj Gen Tran Quy Hai had indicated the need for a review of the 1972 experience in an article published in the May TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN; and the stage was set for the series by the lead article in the June issue of the journal written by Trung Dung--a regular contributor to the military journal and the party journal HOC TAP and a proponent in early 1971 of the big-unit tactics employed in the 1972 offensive. Trung Dung's June article hailed the 1972 "victory" as proof of the superiority of Vietnamese military science and art and, in a broad discussion of strategy, pointed out the importance of "skillful campaign organization."

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DONG ENDS ALBANIAN VISIT, RETURNS HOME VIA MOSCOW, PEKING

The DRV delegation led by Premier Pham Van Dong concluded its tour of East European countries with an official visit to Albania and returned home after stopovers in Moscow and Peking. During the 28 October-2 November stay in Albania Dong was received by First Secretary Hoxha and welcomed at the customary ceremonies by Premier Shehu. Tirana and Hanoi reported that an agreement was signed on Albania's "gratuitous economic aid" to the DRV for 1974. In the joint statement issued at the end of the visit the Albanian side joined the Vietnamese in "severely condemning" the United States for its "arrogant encroachments" on the Paris agreement and in maintaining that the United States was "heavily responsible" for Saigon's violations. The statement acknowledged Albania's recognition of the PRG as the "true and sole representative" of the South Vietnamese people, but did not include an endorsement of the PRC's 28 June six-point proposal.

MOSCOW, PEKING During the Moscow stopover Kosygin, Katushev, and Novikov met on 3 November with Dong and Nguyen Duy Trinh, the other Vietnamese Politburo member in the delegation. TASS reported that during the meeting, which was held in a "cordial, friendly atmosphere," the sides discussed DRV-Soviet relations and exchanged views on "measures aimed at ensuring a strict implementation" of the Paris agreement. The Soviets were said to have reaffirmed their "all-round assistance" and support to the DRV for economic reconstruction and the development of socialism.

Peking gave Dong subdued treatment during his 4-6 November stay in the Chinese capital. NCNA reported that he was greeted at the airport by Chou En-lai and feted by Chou that evening at a dinner, but there was no description of the atmosphere or speeches at the dinner. Peking's only other report on Dong's stay was a straightforward NCNA report that Yeh Chien-ying saw him off. Last August, when Dong stopped off in Peking on the way home from visits in the Soviet Union and East Europe, NCNA reported that Chou attended both the arrival and departure ceremonies at the airport, feted Dong at a dinner, and later had a "cordial and friendly" conversation with the DRV premier.

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CAMBODIAN INSURGENTS PLAN OFFENSIVE, REJECT COMPROMISE

Coincident with the end of the rainy season in Cambodia, authoritative statements by spokesmen for Sihanouk's Front have reverted to a hard line, abandoning the insurgents' low posture during the previous two months when some comment had suggested flexibility regarding a settlement. A birthday greeting to Sihanouk from his chief minister in the interior--Khieu Samphan-- broadcast on 30 October, an RGNU spokesman's statement publicized the following day, and a 3 November appeal by Khieu Samphan broadcast on the 5th have stressed the need for armed struggle and reaffirmed an uncompromising stance on a political settlement.

Khieu Samphan's message to Sihanouk (dated 26 October, although not broadcast until the 30th) said that during the dry season the insurgents would launch "without retreat or compromise" "more fierce offensives in all regions" to "dislodge" the United States and annihilate the Phnom Penh government. Asserting that the Cambodian struggle is entering "a decisive and irreversible phase that will inevitably lead soon to total victory," the message underlined Front determination to fight for achievement of Sihanouk's five points. Samphan's appeal on the 3d, which was carried by the insurgent press agency AKI on the 5th, laid out plans for wide-ranging attacks during the dry season, claiming that the Front's present "superior" strength will allow it to launch "even more powerful attacks" against Phnom Penh, "all the main strategic routes," and "provincial areas still under the enemy's temporary control."

Both of Samphan's pronouncements pointedly condemned efforts to reach a compromise settlement. In the birthday greeting he pledged to "smash the military, political, and diplomatic maneuvers of the enemy, which are aimed at getting the FUNK to meet the Phnom Penh traitors halfway." The appeal explicitly warned against the continuing maneuvers by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger designed to overcome their "defeat" in Cambodia, find "a way out," and shore up the Phnom Penh government.

The 30 October RGNU spokesman's statement, issued to denounce the formation of the new In Tam government in Phnom Penh, was more categorical in rejecting a compromise settlement. The statement, transmitted by AKI on the 31st, pointedly derided Phnom Penh efforts to achieve "reconciliation and national concord" and asserted bluntly that "by no means, under no

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circumstances, at no place, and under no pretext will the FUNK and RGNU agree to make the most minor contact, let alone negotiate, with the traitorous Phnom Penh clique, its emissaries, or its accomplices." The spokesman echoed Samphan in declaring that the war is reaching "its decisive and irreversible stage" and that the Front is resolved to an "ever uncompromising and unretreating pursuit of sacred combat," including "simultaneous and smashing offensives in the course of the new dry season."

These pronouncements and attendant lower-level comment indicate a return to the hard line that had characterized insurgent comment prior to the failure of Front offensives around Phnom Penh and Kompong Cham in late August and early September. Since then there had been few major pronouncements on the situation in Cambodia, and the question of an offensive had not been raised. In fact, authoritative Front statements released during this period had suggested some flexibility in the Front's position. Notably, Sihanouk's national day message to PRC leaders in late September played down the need for uncompromising armed struggle and did not criticize the leaders of the Phnom Penh government by name.

Sihanouk, who has been quiescent since late last month, has thus far not echoed the current hard line statements. Khieu Samphan's birthday message to the "head of state," which was markedly longer than his message last year, hailed his efforts as the Front's representative abroad and referred favorably to Sihanouk's trip to the Cambodian "liberated zone" last spring. In what may be an effort to acknowledge the importance of the existing division of labor in the Front between Sihanouk's Peking entourage, which is chiefly responsible for foreign affairs, and the interior minister, who are responsible for the conduct of the war, Samphan noted that "thousands of kilometers" separate the two groups of Front leaders. In a speech for Sihanouk during his tour in Cambodia last spring, Samphan had similarly stated that Sihanouk was stationed "far away from us" in the performance of his "mission abroad."

PEKING While Vietnamese and Soviet media have thus far not reacted to current hard line Cambodian statements, Peking has replayed carefully edited versions of the Front pronouncements and lower-level comment. Though giving ample coverage to passages on insurgent resolve to continue the struggle, NCNA has presented a less optimistic view than the Front about prospects for the offensive by pointedly dropping

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Front claims that the coming drive will be "decisive" and will soon lead to "total victory," and by softpedaling claims concerning the Front's "superior" strategic position and the imminent collapse of the Lon Noi government. Peking also continued to mute harsh criticism of U.S. leaders by deleting all references to the repeated attacks against the settlement "tricks" of President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger contained in Khieu Samphan's 3 November appeal, and it has sidestepped indications of Chinese support for the Cambodian war, notably dropping a passage in Samphan's birthday message lauding Peking as the insurgents' "reliable rearguard." In this connection an NCNA replay of a 31 October AKI commentary, condemning President Nixon's request for supplementary aid to Cambodia and noting that "captured weapons" represent the bulk of Front armaments, seems particularly revealing of Peking's current line. The Chinese version discreetly muffled anti-U.S. charges while it focused on the CPNLF's determination to adhere to the "firm line" of "people's war" by using captured weapons as "their main source of equipment."

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST RELATIONS

WEST GERMAN CP CALLS FOR WORLD PARTY CONFERENCE

The first public call in Soviet or East European media for a new world conference of communist parties appeared on 3 November in the PRAVDA and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reports of the keynote address delivered to the West German communist Party's (DKP) congress by newly elected chairman Herbert Mies.

The Moscow-oriented DKP and its congress are apparently being used as a Soviet stalking-horse to launch a public campaign for convocation of a world party conference. Mies clearly indicated the Sino-Soviet dispute would be a factor in such a gathering by juxtaposing a diatribe against the Chinese leadership and the call for a world conference. Thus, after claiming the "Maoists" have broken with Marxism-Leninism and have become "enemies of the world communist movement," Mies recalled the previous party conference held in June 1969 and suggested the "time is ripening" for convening another world conclave. The PRAVDA summary of his report noted both Mies' attack on the Chinese leaders and his appeal for the need to hold a world meeting of communist parties.

The call for a new world conference comes at a time when the West European communist parties have decided to convene a regional party conclave of their own. This decision was made at a consultative meeting in Stockholm on 27 and 28 September attended by 20 West European communist parties, including the French and the strongly independent Italian party. Moscow did not participate in the Stockholm meeting, which received only passing notice in Soviet and East European media.

While Mies mentioned the West European communist conference, he also called for an all-European meeting of communist parties as a preparatory step for the world gathering. PRAVDA did not report these portions of Mies' remarks.

Moscow has reason for concern over a purely West European communist party conference, whose discussions might prove embarrassing to Moscow, given the strongly independent and liberal views of some of these parties, particularly the

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Italian. The West European communists' view of their upcoming conference, which a 19 October PRAVDA report said would convene in Brussels 26-28 January 1974 is that it would deal primarily with West European economic problems. The Stockholm meeting's communique, reported by the Danish party organ LAND OG FOLK, stated that the agenda also includes such contentious issues as "national independence" and "cultural freedom."

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NOTES

CHINESE LEADERSHIP: Since PRC National Day on 1 October there have been few reported public appearances by usually active CCP Politburo members. The sparsity of leadership appearances probably signifies that top leaders are presently occupied with conferences preparatory to convening the 4th National People's Congress (NPC). The fact that this pattern has occurred at a time when the drive to criticize "Confucius" has been intensified, however, raises the possibility that the target of the anti-Confucius campaign may be a currently active leader.

Notably absent since National Day are the three remaining leaders who were members of the old cultural revolution group--Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan, and Chang Chun-chiao. Chang was the only one of the three to be raised to the Politburo Standing Committee at the party congress. Also absent since 1 October are new Politburo members Chi Teng-kuei and Wang Tung-hsing; Hua Kuo-feng last appeared on 6 October. Other active Peking-based Politburo members have made more frequent appearances, but none showed up from 19-25 October, the period of Li Hsien-nien's longest absence. Premier Chou En-lai made only one public appearance between 15 and 26 October, at the interment of Edgar Snow's ashes on the 19th. Of the new party vice chairmen, Wang Hung-wen was out of sight between 13 and 25 October, Li Te-sheng was absent from 12-25 October, and Yeh Chien-ying did not appear between 16 October and 6 November. Peking chief Wu Te made no reported appearances from 13-31 October.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: Peking's traditional greetings message to the USSR on the October Revolution anniversary this year included for the first time specific reference to the Sino-Soviet border question, reiterating Peking's call to solve the issue through peaceful negotiations "under conditions which exclude any threats." First carried by Peking's Russian service on 6 November, the message--as usual addressed impersonally from the NPC Standing Committee and State Council to their Soviet counterparts--reaffirmed Peking's belief in continuing friendship between the "people" of the two countries and expressed its desire to normalize relations despite "disputes over questions of principle." Notably dropped from this year's message were contentious phrases of previous messages concerning Chinese support for the Soviet people's "struggle" to safeguard the fruits of the revolution.

The unprecedented reiteration in such anniversary greetings of Peking's position on border negotiations follows recent high-level Soviet complaints about Peking's lack of responsiveness to Soviet initiatives in the talks and the continued absence from the talks of the chief Soviet delegate, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev. (Ilichev was most recently reported to be in Moscow on 2 November, welcoming DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, according to the 3 November PRAVDA.) Perhaps reflecting the unusual character of the Chinese message, NCNA thus far has not reported it, in contrast to its prompt replay of past anniversary greetings.

LE DUAN VISIT TO LAOS: North Vietnamese communist party leader Le Duan has paid a unique "friendship" visit to the headquarters of the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) in northeastern Laos 2-6 November. This is apparently the first time ever that a North Vietnamese delegation headed by a Political Bureau member has been reported publicly to have visited Lao territory controlled by the LPF. Le Duan's trip to Sam Neua was not given advance notice, and initial reports by the Pathet Lao news agency and Hanoi radio on 7 November mention only the welcoming ceremonies attended by LPF Chairman Prince Souphanouvong and most of the top-echelon LPF members, and the DRV delegation's return to Hanoi; no speeches were reported. The last announced meeting between Souphanouvong and North Vietnamese leaders occurred in 1971, when he visited Hanoi.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, Peking BROADCAST STATISTICS 29 OCTOBER - 4 NOVEMBER 1973

| <u>Moscow (2741 items)</u> | | <u>Peking (1106 items)</u> | |
|---|-----------|---|-----------|
| World Peace Congress in Moscow, 25-31 Oct. | (31%) 40% | Domestic Issues | (41%) 39% |
| [Brezhnev Speech | (15%) 9%] | Middle East | (42%) 21% |
| Middle East | (17%) 6% | [UNGA, Security Council | (21%) 8%] |
| DRV Premier Pham Van Dong Stopover in USSR | (--) 4% | Debate | |
| Ethiopian Emperor Selassie in USSR | (--) 3% | Australian Prime Minister Whitlam in PRC | (--) 18% |
| China | (5%) 3% | Indochina | (5%) 5% |
| Bulgarian First Secretary Zhivkov in USSR | (--) 3% | Turkish National Day | (--) 3% |
| Algerian Revolution 19th Anniversary | (--) 3% | | |

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.