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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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
3 OCT 1973

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# **TRENDS**

**in Communist Propaganda**




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## CHINA

### NATIONAL DAY EDITORIAL CONCENTRATES ON DOMESTIC THEMES

Peking's traditional joint editorial on National Day by PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY reflected a preoccupation with domestic themes, calling on cadres to study the 10th CCP Congress documents while preparing for the Fourth National People's Congress. Foreign affairs were virtually ignored in the editorial, a sharp contrast to last year when, on the heels of significant breakthroughs in relations with Japan and the West, the editorial trumpeted the successes of Chinese foreign policy.

Following practice since the Lin Piao affair in 1971, Peking skipped the once-traditional review by Mao from the Tienanmen rostrum in favor of leadership appearances in the parks of Peking. Besides Mao and ailing leaders Kang Sheng and Liu Po-sheng, only Chiang Ching among current Politburo members was not listed in NCNA accounts as having made a public appearance on the anniversary, although NCNA did report her presence at the foreign ministry reception on 30 September. Chiang's absence is particularly striking since the festivities in the parks included a "rich program" of cultural items, her particular field of interest, and since she was prominently featured last year, with Peking television even picking up a finger-wagging exchange between Chiang and Chou En-lai. NCNA carefully reported the presence of all provincial Politburo members and alternates at rallies throughout China, even taking pains to note that Chen Yung-kuei appeared in Kansu rather than in his Shansi base.

Focusing on ideological themes, the joint editorial broke no new ground in its discussion of political issues and ignored economic matters entirely. Presumably specific economic and social issues will be discussed at the forthcoming National People's Congress. The editorial reiterated the line of the 10th congress that party policy since the ninth congress has been basically correct and that the intervening struggles have been consistent with Maoist doctrine. The editorial's calls for continued line study seem designed to stress Chou En-lai's remark to the 10th congress that local cadres become so involved in daily routine that they sometimes ignore the general line, a theme picked up recently by many provincial radios.

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A new instruction from Mao released in the editorial seems designed to meet some of the complaints of those forced to attend cadre schools while ensuring the assignment of cadres to such schools. The instruction regularized the mandatory rotational study classes so that cadres attend a standard three month term of work and study. Mao's cultural revolution instruction on cadre schools had not specified the length of study, and cadres so assigned did not know how long they would remain or whether they would return to their posts.

FOREIGN POLICY Coming in the wake of Chou En-lai's definitive assessment of Chinese foreign policy at the 10th CCP congress, this year's editorial all but ignored international affairs, restricting substantive comment to a reaffirmation of Chou's congress warning against "surprise attacks" by the Soviet Union. Consistent with recent practice, there were no speeches by high-level Chinese leaders attending the usual receptions for foreigners sponsored by the Chinese foreign ministry, the International Liaison Department of the CCP, and the Chinese friendship association. NCNA noted the presence of Ambassador Bruce at the 30 September foreign ministry reception, lumping him together with, though ahead of, the deputy head of the Soviet border talks delegation, who as usual brought up the rear.

Concurrent Chinese coverage, however, has carefully pointed up Peking's differentiated approach toward the two superpowers. In particular, NCNA noted a "friendly" atmosphere at the National Day reception of the Chinese liaison office in Washington, and cited growing Sino-U.S. friendship in coverage of celebrations by friendship associations in the United States. A 28 September broadcast to Taiwan commemorating National Day reported that this year "Sino-American relations have taken a further step forward." In contrast, NCNA's report of the reception at the Chinese embassy in Moscow did not characterize the atmosphere; the report noted that the head of the Soviet delegation to the Peking border talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev, who has been absent from Peking since mid-July, attended the Moscow reception.

For the first time since 1966, the National Day editorial made no reference to Taiwan, though the issue was mentioned at a 29 September PRC State Council reception which, like last year, was attended by "compatriots" from Taiwan along with visitors from Hong Kong and Macao, and other Overseas Chinese. Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying once again led the Chinese leadership turnout, but his speech of last year was replaced by a toast by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, who reaffirmed Peking's conciliatory approach

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over the Taiwan issue and routinely urged the Taiwan populace to contribute to the liberation and reunification of the island with the mainland. He sidestepped Peking's recent call for "peaceful" unification, though the 28 September broadcast to Taiwan emphasized that it has become the "common wish of all Chinese people" and that "now is the time" for Taiwan compatriots to "take the road of the peaceful unification of the motherland."

**PLA ROLE** For the second year in a row, the National Day editorial failed to mention the PLA's civilian role, a legacy of the cultural revolution. Instead, a 29 September joint PEOPLE'S DAILY and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial stressed restoration of the militia's traditional involvement in civil administrative tasks. The editorial invoked an old Mao instruction to buttress its argument that the militia should play an important role "in ideological, political and economic spheres" as well as in public security. Regular PLA commands up to the provincial-level were instructed to "put their main energy into militia work."

#### CHINESE UN ADDRESS ASSAILS SOVIET DETENTE POLICIES

PRC chief delegate Chiao Kuan-hua in his 2 October UNGA address launched a polemical broadside against Soviet detente policies and voiced the first explicit Chinese criticism of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. In playing up Peking's view of intensified international rivalry between the two superpowers, Chiao labeled the nuclear pact "a mere scrap of paper" that does not signify detente, but rather "rivalry for world hegemony." He criticized the United States as well as the Soviet Union over the agreement, asserting that its scope goes beyond their legitimate bilateral concerns, and warning, in a passage presumably addressed to Washington, that Peking "absolutely will not go begging for nuclear protection from any country." However, Chiao also underlined Peking's differentiated approach toward the superpowers by praising the principles of the Sino-U.S. Shanghai communique and by softpedaling charges about U.S. intentions in reaching the nuclear pact. In this connection, Chiao cited, without attribution, the "frank" observation of Dr. Kissinger last June that the U.S.-Soviet accord is only a general statement of policy, which contains no enforcement provisions.

While charging that the Soviet Union is attempting "to bind herself to the United States" in order more effectively to achieve world domination, Chiao confidently portrayed such a Soviet course as futile, pointing in particular to continued

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Soviet-U.S. contention over nuclear arms development. He also alluded to alleged Soviet involvement in the recent Afghan coup and alleged U.S. involvement in the turnover in Chile, as proof of the "increasingly fierce" superpower rivalry. Chiao reaffirmed Peking's view that Europe is the current focus of Soviet-U.S. competition, charging bluntly that the ongoing European security conference is "nothing but one of the forms of contention." While ignoring U.S. intentions, Chiao characterized the demands of European countries at the conference for an end to military blocs and withdrawal of foreign troops as a "direct blow" to "that superpower" which seeks to use the forum to consolidate its hold on East Europe and to expand toward the West.

Employing sharp sarcasm to castigate Moscow's recent stress on an Asian collective security plan, Chiao equated the proposal with the avowed anti-China goals of SEATO in the 1950s. "Has the ghost of John Foster Dulles gone to the Kremlin?" Chiao asked, adding facetiously that it would be more forthright for Moscow to attempt to expand the Warsaw Pact to Asia than to use the cover of its current security proposal.

On Sino-Soviet relations, Chiao listed a bill of historical Chinese grievances against the Soviet Union, including the withdrawal of experts, border clashes, and "subversions," but made no reference to the current border situation or to Brezhnev's recent disclosure of a Soviet non-aggression proposal last June at the Peking border talks. Rebutting Moscow's charge labeling China as an "opponent of detente," Chiao, echoing Chou En-lai's remarks at the 10th CCP Congress last month, challenged Moscow to prove its desire to relax world tension by withdrawing troops from Czechoslovakia or Mongolia, or by returning the disputed "Northern Territories" to Japan.

On other issues, Chiao:

+ Routinely criticized U.S. support for the "traitorous Lon Nol clique," affirmed support for Sihanouk's government, and demanded the expulsion of the Phnom Penh clique and the reinstatement of Sihanouk's representative in the United Nations.

+ Opposed the U.S.-sponsored resolution on Korea, though admitting it contained "the positive element" concerning the dissolution of UNCURK. He duly demanded the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, and supported the DPRK stand that North and South Korea could only enter the United Nations as one state.

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† Maintained a firm position on Bangladesh, asserting that it could not be admitted into the United Nations until the recent agreements are carried out in accord with the 1971-72 UN resolutions on the issue.

† Dismissed Moscow's proposal for a 10 percent reduction in military budgets as "Khrushchev's old ware" which "has not deceived many people," and challenged Moscow instead to cancel its military debts, particularly with Arab countries, as a "more practical" method of assisting developing countries. He affirmed that disarmament should be first directed at the superpowers and reiterated that China would support a world disarmament conference only after the superpowers and other nuclear countries endorse a no-first use of nuclear weapons agreement and withdraw all conventional and nuclear forces from abroad.

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## INDOCHINA

## TRADITIONAL DRV CELEBRATIONS MARK CHINESE NATIONAL DAY

Hanoi observed the 24th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in standard fashion, with a 29 September "grand meeting," a message of greetings to Mao, Tung Pi-wu, Chu Te, and Chou En-lai, and a 1 October Chinese embassy reception. The "grand meeting" which has been traditional over the years had been downgraded in 1972 to a "gathering" without the usual participation at the Politburo level. As was customary in past years, the "grand meeting" this year was sponsored by the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee, the Vietnam-China Friendship Association, and the DRV Commission for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries. The Politburo was represented at the meeting by Hoang Van Hoan who had returned to Hanoi on 19 September, after a three-week stay in Peking.\*

Consistent with past practice, only lower-level officials spoke at the meeting. Central Committee member Hoang Quoc Viet, the president of the DRV-China Friendship Association, made an opening statement, and the main speeches were delivered by the Chinese ambassador and Nguyen Van Huyen, a vice president of the friendship association. Following a recital of Chinese achievements during the past 24 years, Huyen asserted that the Vietnamese have always enjoyed "the most adequate support and assistance" from China. Recalling the DRV party-government delegation's visit to Peking last June, Huyen reminded his audience that "the party, government, and people of China have affirmed their unshakable determination to continue to fulfill their international obligations and resolutely support the Vietnamese people's just cause until victory."

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\* Hoang Van Hoan also attended the anniversary meeting in 1971; the Politburo was represented by Le Thanh Nghi in 1970. The purpose of Hoan's recent stay in China was not announced; he has often made such unexplained visits to Peking and Moscow--see the TRENDS of 6 September 1973, page 16, for background.

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The first known mention in Hanoi media of internal Chinese party wrangling as revealed at the 10th CCP Congress occurred when Hanoi radio in Vietnamese broadcast the PRC ambassador's speech at the grand meeting, including his reference to the review at the Congress of the struggle "to smash the antiparty group of Lin Piao." The Vietnamese party Central Committee's message of greetings to the 10th congress made no mention of the struggle against Lin Piao, just as their message to the 9th CCP Congress had ignored its attacks on Liu Shao-chi.

The DRV leaders' congratulatory message on the occasion of the Chinese anniversary, as well as the holding of the grand meeting with Hoang Van Hoan in attendance, indicated some improvement in relations between the two countries since last October. This year's message revived the conventional description of the close friendship between the Vietnamese and Chinese as "a brotherhood based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism," a description absent from last year's message. On the other hand, reflecting the continuing impact of Peking's detente policy, the DRV message said nothing about Sino-U.S. relations. Over the years, the annual message has traditionally hailed Peking's anti-U.S. stance, an element which was still there, but in brief form, in 1971 and dropped in 1972 after the President's Peking visit. Like last year, however, the message credited Peking with aiding world revolutionary forces and the forces struggling for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism. And it praised the "brilliant achievements" of the Chinese people, and offered "sincere and profound thanks for their valuable support and assistance."

Further conforming with the pattern of previous years, the formal reception given by the Chinese ambassador was attended by Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Le Thanh Nghi--the same Politburo members who attended in 1972--as well as Hoang Van Hoan. Brief remarks by Pham Van Dong at the reception routinely hailed Chinese successes and expressed gratitude for the "great support and precious assistance accorded by the CCP and the PRC government and people" to the Vietnamese "in their struggle against U.S. aggression previously, in their socialist construction, and also in the present stage of their revolution." The reception was said to have proceeded in an atmosphere of "solidarity and friendship thoroughly impregnated with militancy"--a formulation similar to the one used last year.

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Editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN marking the anniversary both routinely hailed the "success" and "victory" of the Chinese revolution. NHAN DAN quoted at length from the joint communique on the DRV visit to China in June, recalling the PRC pledge of support and assistance. NCNA's summary of Hanoi's comment and reports on anniversary activities included NHAN DAN's recollection of the Chinese offer of assistance.

#### GVN MILITARY ACTION, U.S. SHIPS OFF DRV COAST DRAW PROTESTS

Extensive Hanoi and PRG comment followed their 26 September foreign ministry spokesmen's protests denouncing Saigon military operations in Pleiku and Kontum provinces and GVN charges that North Vietnamese troops overran the Le Minh ranger base in Pleiku. In addition, on 1 October the PRG spokesman issued a further protest and on the 2d the DRV spokesman assailed alleged U.S. naval activities off the DRV coast--activities linked in Hanoi press comment to the fighting in the South.

Saigon charges about the attack on the Le Minh base have been the subject of several radio and press commentaries, but the main thrust of the reaction has dealt with ARVN "ribbling" attacks throughout the central highlands. The PRG and DRV take the position that the U.S. and Saigon are merely using these charges to divert attention from more widespread military action they are instigating. A 27 September Liberation Radio broadcast declared: "While the United States and the Saigon administration were loudly lying that 'North Vietnamese regular forces have attacked and overrun Le Minh base,' a sizable Saigon military force supported by aircraft and artillery repeatedly launched nibbling operations in PRG-controlled areas in Gia Lai [Pleiku] and Kontum provinces. . . ."

A 29 September demonstration against the Le Minh attack, at the headquarters of the PRG delegation to the Joint Military Commission at Tan Son Nhut Airbase, and Thieu's 1 October speech at Pleiku prompted the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman statement on the 1st which rejected the "distorted and slanderous allegations by the U.S. and the Saigon administration" and denounced their "schemes, provocative acts, and threats."

The alleged presence of U.S. warships off the coast of North Vietnam was the subject of the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman

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statement on 2 October. According to the statement, "On 30 September the U.S. carrier Hancock appeared at a place approximately 120 miles east of the coast of Nghe An Province in North Vietnam." The statement further charges that six U.S. destroyers were also 60 to 80 miles off the same coast and that "a number of U.S. jet fighters swooped down very low over DRV fishing boats off the coast of Nghe An Province." Although the statement itself did not directly link the presence of the U.S. ships with military operations in the central highlands, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary the same day was quite explicit in this regard. In discussing Saigon's "nibbling" operations in Kontum and in the "Chu Nghe area" (the area surrounding the Le Minh base), the commentary declared: "They have massed hundreds of tanks and armored cars in this area in preparation for a new military adventure. Meanwhile, out at sea U.S. warships are lurking, ready to lend a hand to the Saigon army."

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## MOSCOW OPTIMISTIC ABOUT DETENTE DESPITE RECENT SETBACKS

Moscow is maintaining a bold front on the prospects for detente, despite signs of concern over the adverse Western reaction to the Soviet crackdown on dissidents and the recent actions of Congress on easing trade restrictions with the Soviet Union, accelerating Trident development and reducing U.S. forces abroad. In a lengthy and authoritative review of a new collection of Brezhnev's works on foreign affairs, PRAVDA on 30 September gave a positive assessment of Brezhnev's detente diplomacy and reaffirmed its basic goals. At the same time, in an apparent allusion to continuing opposition to detente, the PRAVDA editorial article pointedly denied that Moscow has ever harbored any "pacifist illusions" about the time and effort needed to bring about a fundamental change in relations with the West.

Moscow has by no means swept the potential threats to its detente policy under the rug. The recent votes in Congress on the trade bill, on the Trident program, and on forces overseas have been promptly reported in Soviet media. But the coverage of these developments has been accompanied by commentaries stressing the significance of U.S.-Soviet cooperation. The limited comment on the reopening of SALT TWO, for example, has ignored the Trident vote and focused instead on the satisfactory implementation of the earlier SALT agreements and on the optimistic prospects for the current round. Past warnings that the acceleration of Trident development contradicts the spirit of SALT ONE, last expressed by USA Institute member Georgiy Svyatov in RED STAR on 23 March, have not been renewed. In this connection, Moscow has treated the Administration's role in the congressional debate in a gingerly fashion. Although one TASS commentator on the 27th cited U.S. press reports showing that the Administration had "intensively worked on" individual senators to back its position on troop reductions, the comment downplayed White House support for the Trident program and laid the blame primarily on the Pentagon.

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Only on the trade issue has Moscow chosen to counterattack, most recently in a 29 September IZVESTIYA article by Vikentiy Matveyev which termed the Jackson amendment a relapse to the positions of the cold war. Moscow has promptly reported remarks by Secretary Kissinger and President Nixon that emphasize the serious consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations which could ensue from a failure to extend MFN status to the Soviet Union. Even in the sphere of trade and economic relations, however, Moscow has continued to evince optimism that the current difficulties are transient in nature.

Recent articles by Soviet specialists on the United States have continued to find justification in U.S. developments for a policy of long-term rapprochement. USA journal editor-in-chief V. M. Berezhev in LITERARY GAZETTE for 29 August and in a September USA article and USA Institute members Anatoliy Gromyko and Andrey Kokoshin in the September issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS have all argued that the recent changes in U.S. foreign policy, from confrontation toward accommodation, are long-term and basic in nature. Gromyko and Kokoshin, for example, pointed out that the changes reflect a basic shift in strategy as well as in means and methods.

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## EAST-WEST RELATIONS

## CEMA OVERTURE TO EEC RECEIVES MIXED EAST EUROPEAN REACTION

There has been mixed East European reaction to the proposal for official talks between CEMA and the European Economic Community (EEC), a proposal made by CEMA Secretary General Fadeyev when he met EEC Council of Ministers Chairman Noergaard in Copenhagen on 27 August. The public response thus far suggests that most CEMA countries are concerned to preserve as much freedom of maneuver as possible in bilateral relations with EEC countries, and are uncertain as to the nature of the EEC's response to the Fadeyev overture. Moscow, on its part, has not acknowledged the proposal and has continued to issue warnings to East Europe highlighting the dangers of developing economic ties with the West on a bilateral basis rather than under the aegis of CEMA.

Only Poland, which under Gierek has increasingly acted as Moscow's spokesman on CEMA affairs, registered unqualified approval of the Fadeyev overture and urged acceptance by the EEC. Czechoslovakia and East Germany greeted the proposal with caution, underscoring basic differences between the two economic groupings and the self-sufficiency of CEMA. Hungary's Kadar, in an interview during a recent visit to Finland, indicated a preference for bilateral economic relations with Western countries over formal organizational ties. Bulgaria and Romania have not commented directly on the Fadeyev proposal.

**POLAND** An article in the 14 September issue of the Polish government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY by the paper's deputy chief editor Wasilkowski was sharply critical of the EEC for having publicly ignored the latest CEMA overture. Deploring the low level of trade and economic cooperation between the East and West European countries, the article viewed the Fadeyev proposal as another major move toward detente in Europe. It cautioned that "the two gravitational centers" in Europe might drift apart in the absence of negotiations and conjectured that it would be "surprising" if the EEC should reject the proposal outright in view of the improvement of the political climate in Europe.

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA,** Three days later, an article in Prague's party  
**EAST GERMANY** daily RUDE PRAVO played down the Copenhagen meeting as merely explorative and amounting to "more or less mutual recognition of economic realities." Stressing fundamental differences between the two organizations, the article

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characterized CEMA as a purely cooperative grouping and the EEC as primarily a "protectionist" organization. It pointed out that the EEC was not the sole representative of European capitalist states and that CEMA was interested in trade with non-EEC members as well. The RUDÉ PRAVO article stated that the 27th CEMA session in Prague in early June had recognized the "reality" of the EEC, the communique on that session had in fact noted only in general terms that the CEMA states "reaffirm their readiness to develop economic contacts with other countries, regardless of their social and government systems," on the basis of equality and noninterference.

An East Berlin radio commentary on 28 August, the day after the Copenhagen contact, similarly played down the talks, stressing their "unofficial" and tentative nature. While conceding the possibility that the initial talks could lead to official negotiations, the commentary underscored CEMA's achievements independent of any assistance from the West.

**HUNGARY** Although Budapest did not comment directly on the Fadeyev proposal, Hungarian First Secretary Kadar deprecated the need for organizational ties between CEMA and the EEC in a Helsinki radio interview on 28 September, at the end of his four-day visit to Finland. In the interview, which was carried in full by MTI in English the next day, Kadar approved the establishment of "a certain amount of contact" between the two organizations, but he went on to assert, "In my opinion, there need not be any formal economic relations as such." Contacts on the organizational level, he continued, must serve the interests of promoting trade through the lowering of customs barriers. However, the stress should be placed on bilateral relations he argued, "for CEMA and the EEC do not of themselves have an economic background; this background is formed by the member countries."

**MOSCOW** Although Moscow has not acknowledged the Fadeyev overture, it has continued to stress the desirability of organizational ties between CEMA and EEC, as well as its readiness to develop economic ties with capitalist countries on a bilateral basis. At the same time, however, Moscow has warned CEMA member countries of the dangers of such ties. In an obvious allusion to Romania, for example, CPSU Secretary Katushev, writing in the August issue of the communist theoretical journal PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, declared that "even the socialist countries, especially the less developed ones," would be vulnerable to pressure from the capitalist countries "if they acted in isolation in the world arena." Under the protectorate of CEMA, he argued, even the small socialist countries can develop economic ties with capitalist countries "on a just and mutually advantageous basis."

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## THAILAND

## U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL DRAWS DIVERGENT COMMUNIST RESPONSES

The initial stage of U.S. military withdrawal from Thailand, following a U.S.-Thai agreement in August, prompted complaints from Hanoi and the Thai Communist Party about the U.S. intention to maintain a residual military force in the area. By contrast, limited Peking reaction to the move and sparse Moscow comment played up the positive aspects of the withdrawal.

HANOI Routine-level Hanoi comment predictably questioned U.S. intentions on withdrawal. A 27 August NHAN DAN commentary assailed the move as a "cunning trick" designed to assuage public pressure for total withdrawal, castigated the Nixon Administration and the U.S. "aggressive and interventionist design" against Indochina, and accused the "Thanom Kittikhachon reactionary administration" of tailing after the United States in an effort to make the Nixon Doctrine succeed in Southeast Asia. To underline its case against U.S.-Thai intentions, Hanoi noted that further withdrawals will depend on developments in Southeast Asia, and criticized Thanom's observation that the U.S. presence is designed to deter the communists in Indochina and to safeguard the peace agreements.

Subsequent Hanoi propaganda has mentioned the U.S. withdrawal in passing: A 21 September Hanoi broadcast on the action of U.S. planes in Cambodia, for example, complained that despite "propaganda" on the withdrawal, a large U.S. air force contingent has been "indefinitely" left there so as to maintain a capability for military intervention throughout Southeast Asia.

THAI CP The Thai CP clandestine station based in China has released a steady stream of harsh invective, assailing the withdrawal as a deception designed to appease public opinion, to ease U.S. military expenses, and to cover U.S.-Thai intentions to maintain a permanent U.S. presence. A 31 August commentary even noted that the United States is prepared to send additional troops if needed for the security of the Bangkok government. The reports have consistently assailed the "traitorous Thanom-Praphat clique" as a "100 percent U.S. lackey," and have let no opportunity pass in order to play up alleged U.S.-Thai perfidy. Notably, a 22 September report on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on Dr. Kissinger's nomination as Secretary of State noted his remarks on the U.S. presence in Thailand, as well as those

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of Deputy Defense Secretary Clements during a recent visit to Bangkok, as proof that the United States will not withdraw but will continue its policy of "controlling Thailand and the whole of Southeast Asia."

PEKING Peking's only acknowledgment of the reduction of U.S. forces in Thailand was a straightforward 25 August NCNA news report which appeared to reflect China's increasingly relaxed view of U.S. military intentions in Asia and its ongoing effort to improve relations with the Thai government. The brief report noted that the U.S.-Thai announcement stated that this was "the first step" of a U.S. troop withdrawal, that further U.S. pullouts would be discussed in later U.S.-Thai talks, and that the current U.S. strength in Thailand was 42,000 men and 700 aircraft. It made no mention of Indochina, U.S.-Thai intentions, or reports that the United States plans to maintain a permanent residual military presence in Thailand.

The Chinese reaction is consistent with Peking's general reticence on the issue of the U.S. military presence in Thailand following the Vietnam peace agreement in January. NCNA had duly reported, without comment, the transfer of U.S. air command headquarters from South Vietnam to Thailand last February; but its only recent reference came in a 15 August NCNA pickup of a Pentagon spokesman's announcement that U.S. combat planes would continue to be stationed in Thailand in the wake of the halt in U.S. bombing in Cambodia.

MOSCOW While Moscow media typically gave more attention than Peking to the reduction of U.S. forces in Thailand, Soviet comment also sidestepped sensitive issues. The U.S. move was reported by TASS on 25 August, and four days later a PRAVDA article by V. Skvortsov lauded the withdrawal as a "realistic step" in keeping with changes in Southeast Asia since the end of the Vietnam war. Unlike TASS, Skvortsov did not acknowledge there would be a residual U.S. presence in Thailand; he played up the initial withdrawal as the start of a more extensive U.S. pullout.

Consistent with Moscow's interest in maintaining good relations with the Thai government, Skvortsov called attention to the positive role played by Bangkok in the withdrawal decision, asserting that the initiative came largely from Thailand and that a "realistic viewpoint" in favor of ending the U.S. presence

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was gaining influence within the government. In this connection, a Moscow radio broadcast in Thai on 30 August went to unusual lengths to obscure the Thai government's close involvement with the U.S. military presence, alleging that Thanom had stated that the U.S. bases were constructed by the Pentagon in Thailand "without the knowledge and consent of the Thai Government."

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## NOTES

MOSCOW ON PRC NATIONAL DAY: Taking the cue from Brezhnev's recent Tashkent speech, Moscow's treatment of PRC National Day combined a gloomy assessment of the prospects for improved relations with an offer of normalization on Soviet terms. The current impasse was reflected in both the unusually terse Soviet government message of congratulations and in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA articles on the occasion, which reiterated the stock themes of recent Soviet comment on China. The IZVESTIYA article as well as radio broadcasts repeated Brezhnev's renewed offer at Tashkent to accept an improvement in relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. In a departure from previous practice, Moscow has to date not reported the reception of the PRC Embassy in Moscow.

KOSYGIN'S YUGOSLAV VISIT: The 24 September-1 October visit of Soviet Premier Kosygin to Yugoslavia reflected the gradual normalization of relations between the two countries since Brezhnev's September 1971 visit to Belgrade. Moscow's recognition of Belgrade's independent position was underscored in the final communique, which deleted the references to "socialist internationalism" and joint struggle against "imperialism" contained in the 1971 communique. The communique likewise stressed that relations between the two countries and parties were based on "sovereignty, equality, and noninterference," instead of on "internationalist traditions, friendship, mutual respect, and equality," as claimed in the communique adopted after Tito's June 1972 Moscow visit. In addition to expressing general satisfaction over the state of bilateral relations, the communique endorsed the "positive changes" in world affairs, hailed the results of the Algerian conference of nonaligned countries, and denounced the Chilean coup in strong terms without explicitly mentioning the United States.

USSR, YUGOSLAVIA ON U.S. SUPPORT FOR SAIGON: In a departure from Moscow's posture in recent months, the 1 October joint Soviet-Yugoslav communique stated that both sides denounced violations of the Paris agreement perpetrated by Saigon "with the support of U.S. imperialism." Since the January Vietnam peace agreement, Moscow on its own authority has refrained from claiming U.S. involvement in breaches of the accord.

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However, a 19 September TASS report of the DRV-Cuban communique, signed at the conclusion of Castro's Hanoi visit, noted that it had accused both the United States and Saigon of violating the peace agreement. Official Soviet criticism of Saigon had been voiced most recently in a 21 September joint communique on Brezhnev's visit to Sofia. Saigon had also been charged with violations in a 4 April communique on PRC Foreign Minister Binh's visit to Moscow. But other official Soviet statements this year, including the 16 July USSR-DRV statement on North Vietnamese First Secretary Le Duan's visit to Moscow, have side-stepped the question of violations--instead expressing support for the implementation of the agreement.

BREZHNEV CULT: The Brezhnev cult received another boost at the 24 September awards ceremony in Tashkent, where in the presence of Brezhnev and dignitaries from six republics the organizers of the Uzbek gathering elected an honorary presidium composed of the CPSU Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev. The controversial title was not bestowed on the Soviet party leader at the two previous awards ceremonies he attended this summer--in Kiev on 26 July and in Alma Ata on 15 August--and it has been used sparingly elsewhere in the Soviet Union. As if to correct the oversight committed in Alma Ata, Kazakh party boss Kunavev, a longtime Brezhnev protege, also referred to Brezhnev as "head" of the Politburo in his address to the Tashkent gathering. Brezhnev's contributions to Soviet foreign policy were also singled out for praise in a lengthy 30 September PRAVDA editorial article reviewing the latest collection of his speeches and writings on foreign affairs.

USSR-CHILE RELATIONS: The arrest by the military junta of Chilean communist leader Luis Corvalan prompted a 29 September CPSU Central Committee statement, the same vehicle with which Moscow on 13 September had reacted to the coup. Moscow has contrasted its support of the Chilean communists and its rupture of diplomatic relations--announced in a Soviet Government statement on the 21st--with China's failure to break relations. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast on 26 September labelled the attitude of the Chinese leadership as "pseudo-revolutionary," and condemned its failure to denounce the military junctce as a "betrayal of the anti-imperialist movement."

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CHINESE EDUCATION: NCNA on 24 September revealed that 153,000 new students were enrolled in institutions of higher learning this year, a notable increase over the 200,000 figure for the previous three years which NCNA had announced on the 19th. Provincial reports indicate that the PRC's August campaign to stress political as well as educational criteria did not signify the abandonment of intellectual criteria in student selection. Local party committees throughout Hupeh, for example, were lauded by Wuhan radio on 25 September for selecting "the best from among the good, thus ensuring good quality in enrollment." The radio noted that new college students were admitted after passing "appropriate cultural examinations in accordance with the requirements for morality, intellectual standard and physique."

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 24 - 30 SEPTEMBER 1973

<u>Moscow (2833 Items)</u>			<u>Peking (1206 items)</u>		
Chilean Coup	(18%)	18%	Domestic Issues	(45%)	49%
[CPSU Central	(--)	5%]	[10th CCP Congress	(8%)	3%]
Committee Statement			Egyptian Vice President	(6%)	8%
Tashkent Award	(--)	13%	Ash-Shafi'I in PRC,		
Ceremony, Brezhnev			DPRK, DRV		
Speech			Indochina	(7%)	6%
Kosygin in Yugoslavia	(--)	9%	1st Anniversary of	(--)	5%
Soyuz 12 flight	(--)	5%	PRC-Japan Diplomatic		
UNGA Session	(10%)	4%	Relations		
[Gromyko Speech	(--)	2%]	Taiwan	(1%)	5%
China	(5%)	3%	UNGA Session	(3%)	4%
			Argentine Election	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.