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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

22 AUGUST 1973

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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
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INDOCHINA

RGNU, COMMUNIST POWERS MANEUVER IN NEW CAMBODIAN SITUATION

In the wake of the cessation of the U.S. bombing in Cambodia on 15 August, there have been complex cross-currents among the parties on the communist side as they position themselves for developments in the new stage. Sihanouk returned to Peking on the 16th after having issued a statement in Tientsin the previous day hailing the "day of gross disgrace for U.S. imperialism" and vowing to liberate Phnom Penh. Sihanouk's Vietnamese and Lao allies issued official statements expressing firm support for his front, but Peking has been conspicuously reticent about offering an assessment of the present situation. Meanwhile, Moscow has moved notably further toward endorsing Sihanouk's front and distancing itself from the Lon Nol regime, but the prince has felt constrained to deliver a sharp slap at the Soviets and to demand a fuller commitment to his movement.

In addition to Sihanouk's Tientsin statement, his government (RGNU) issued a strongly-worded statement in Peking on the 15th saying the U.S. bombing cessation "only marks a new stage of U.S. aggression" manifested by an increase in financial and military aid to the Lon Nol government, "more or less disguised interventions by Bangkok, Saigon, and other puppet troops," and the formulation of "plans for a possible direct intervention by U.S. troops." The statement reiterated that compromise with "the traitors in Phnom Penh" was out of the question.

There has been no further authoritative assessment of the new situation by RGNU leaders, and it was not until 21 August that the front's radio broadcast an appeal claiming that the insurgents "are launching offensives to liberate Phnom Penh" and government-controlled provincial towns. The appeal called upon Cambodians and foreigners in areas "under temporary enemy control" to "rise up and overthrow" the Lon Nol regime and to "invite" Sihanouk's government to assume power. It warned foreigners that their "lives and belongings are not secure" and asked them to leave. Such appeals for uprisings have been publicized in the past, but the latest one was unusually comprehensive and conveyed a greater sense of urgency.

PEKING, HANOI Although NCNA carried the statements by Sihanouk and his government on the U.S. bombing halt, Peking avoided originating any commentary on the situation and has refrained from authoritative comment on Cambodia since Chou En-lai's

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28 July speech expressing general solidarity with the insurgents. In contrast, expressions of support from Hanoi and the PRG were issued on the foreign ministry level, and the Lao Patriotic Front Central Committee released an official statement. Peking's caution was evident in its heavily edited account of the DRV statement, omitting the strongest anti-U.S. accusations and charges of plans for intervention in Cambodia by South Vietnamese and Thai troops.

Differences in stance between Peking and Hanoi were also suggested in VNA's treatment of talks DRV Premier Pham Van Dong had in Peking on 16 and 17 August during a stopover on his return home from the Soviet Union and East Europe. His talk with Sihanouk was characterized by VNA as "very cordial and friendly," but there was no description of the atmosphere of his meeting with Chou. NCNA said the two premiers had "a cordial and friendly talk," but even that characterization was a notch below NCNA's usual formula of "very cordial and friendly" meetings with Peking's close allies.

MOSCOW Moving to improve its position in the fluid Cambodian situation, Moscow has taken further steps toward according legitimacy to the RGNU, though the Soviets have refrained thus far from complying with Sihanouk's demand that they cut diplomatic ties with the Lon Nol government. On the day of the bombing halt, TASS carried a report on the press conference held in Peking that day at which the 15 August RGNU statement was released by Penn Nouth, identified by TASS as prime minister of the "National Unity Government of Cambodia"-- a formulation acknowledging a government position but omitting the "royal" from the title. TASS mentioned Sihanouk but did not call him head of state. There was no Soviet report of Sihanouk's 15 August statement in Tientsin, delivered at a banquet given by the Chinese.

It was also on the 15th that Sihanouk delivered his rebuke to the Soviets for failing to sever relations with the Lon Nol government. Sihanouk was reacting to a 12 August IZVESTIYA article which had accorded his front the status of "true representative" of the Cambodian people.* Taking note of this formula, Sihanouk zeroed in on the question of recognizing his government, charging that Moscow "obstinately" maintains diplomatic relations with Phnom Penh and has not given any

* See the TRENDS of 15 August 1973, pages 1-2.

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military aid to the insurgents. The prince construed IZVESTIYA's call for a mobilization of all Cambodian parties as a "plot" aimed at swallowing the RGNU in a coalition government, and he objected to the paper's reference to establishing a "popular and democratic" regime as aimed at replacing the Kingdom of Cambodia. NCNA carried Sihanouk's statement, which was issued in Pyongyang and cabled to the AFP office in Peking.

The sequence of events suggests that Sihanouk's rebuke may have found its target, and that Moscow further adjusted its approach accordingly. On the 19th TASS carried an account of the 15 August RGNU statement, attributing it to the "Royal Government of National Unity of Cambodia." More notably, TASS on the 20th belatedly carried an account of the landmark "national congress" held in the "liberated area" last month, an event which had drawn authoritative comment from Hanoi and Peking but had been mentioned only briefly in the 12 August IZVESTIYA article. The TASS account's summary of the appeal to "friendly countries" adopted at the congress included its reference to Sihanouk as "head of state,"* its description of the RGNU and FUNK as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Cambodian people, and its demand for the overthrow of the "traitorous" Phnom Penh regime. The 12 August IZVESTIYA article had not mentioned Sihanouk or his government.

While taking a more forthcoming approach to the RGNU, Moscow has also downgraded the Lon Nol government. Thus, a RED STAR article on the 15th said the "patriots" are opposed by "reactionary forces in the person of Lon Nol's antipopular regime," and cited as an "apt description" a U.S. press account of the Lon Nol regime as "rotten and feeble" and "steeped in corruption." This goes beyond an 8 July RED STAR commentary which had limited itself to a negative assessment of the regime's future prospects.

DRV ANNIVERSARY EDITORIAL SHOWS CONCERN OVER DETENTE POLICY

In the course of warning against U.S. attempts to pursue a neo-colonialist policy, a 19 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the anniversary of the 1945 August Revolution again showed Hanoi's displeasure with the policy of detente pursued by its two big

* Moscow had carefully avoided ascribing this title to Sihanouk, though a 29 June TASS report on his visit to Romania did so indirectly by citing the Romanian press agency's reference to the prince as head of state.

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allies. The paper said that Washington is using "deceitful labels" to conceal its attempts, through "infiltration, domination, enslavement, aggression, and subversion," to "divide and weaken" the socialist countries and "curb the development of the world revolution." The most direct criticism, however, was aimed at the USSR, with the editorial reflecting dissatisfaction with the Soviet stand on the preventability of war and a policy of peaceful coexistence.

In effect contradicting Soviet professions of confidence that the danger of war is receding, the editorial accused the United States of attempting to attack and wear down small, weak countries as part of its preparations to "unleash a new world war." Suggesting DRV dissatisfaction with Moscow's preoccupation with detente, the paper contended that "the struggle to preserve peace and implement the policy of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems must contribute to accelerating and advancing the revolution for class and national liberation." Calling class and national liberation the basic goals of the revolution, it argued that the success of the struggle for these goals "is the firmest safeguard for a lasting peace."

Hanoi had endorsed Soviet policies aimed at implementing the principles of coexistence in the 16 July joint statement on the Le Duan delegation's visit to Moscow. But other authoritative Hanoi pronouncements have indicated concern lest Vietnamese interests be jeopardized by such policies. Thus, Politburo member Le Duc Tho, in his June 1972 speech at a Sofia conference marking the birth anniversary of the Bulgarian communist Georgi Dimitrov, had stressed the need for an international united front to check U.S. "schemes" and declared that "peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems cannot detract from this basic objective and motto or negate the principle that truly links nationalism with proletarian internationalism."*

* See the TRENDS of 21 June 1972, pages 8-10.

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FRG - EAST EUROPE

WEST BERLIN ISSUE STALLS WINDUP OF TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

Bonn's insistence that the future FRG embassy in Prague should also represent institutions, as well as citizens, of West Berlin has been denounced by Prague as a "pressure" move based on the calculation that the Czechoslovaks will agree rather than accept postponement of Chancellor Brandt's announced visit to Prague on 6 September to sign the treaty. In the separate negotiations between the FRG and Hungary and Bulgaria, respectively, for which no completion schedules have been announced, Budapest and Sofia have merely noted, so far without invective, continued disagreement on the issue of the FRG's ambassadorial representation of West Berlin. As a new round of negotiations with Prague began in Bonn on the 20th, a West German government spokesman was quoted by DPA as insisting that "legal aid requests by West Berlin courts, authorities, and institutions must be routed via Bonn's future embassy in Prague."

BONN-PRAGUE TALKS Following the 9-10 August round of negotiations in Prague, Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Goetz in an interview in the 14 August RUDE PRAVO reiterated the view that the West German stand goes beyond the provisions of the 1971 four-power agreement on Berlin. The paper reported the interviewer as inquiring whether West German media support for Bonn's position indicated "that a form of pressure is being exerted upon the Czechoslovak side in this manner" and Goetz as agreeing that "such an explanation is offering itself." Goetz added that West German media were "threatening that if agreement on the representation of West Berlin is not reached" in the bilateral talks, "the visit of Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt to Prague early next month is jeopardized."

While Moscow has studiously refrained from commenting adversely on Bonn's pending negotiations with Prague, Budapest, and Sofia, PRAVDA on the 17th reported the main points of the Goetz interview with RUDE PRAVO, including his assertion that the Czechoslovak position is based on "a precise interpretation of the four-power agreement on West Berlin." PRAVDA's report closed on the note that Goetz had termed the conjectures in West German media on the Brandt visit as "an attempt to exert pressure on Czechoslovakia."

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A Prague-dated dispatch carried by the East Berlin domestic service on the 21st similarly avoided invective on the currently stalled talks between Bonn and Prague, tying the negotiations instead to the fifth anniversary of the 20 August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. "Despite all difficulties and problems," the dispatch commented, the current negotiations are evidence of "the change" in international relations since 1968 when internal and foreign "reactionary" forces allegedly tried to separate Czechoslovakia from the Soviet Union and its allies. "August 1968," it added, "caused many Western politicians to adopt more realistic views."

TALKS WITH
BUDAPEST, SOFIA

Treatment by Budapest and Sofia of their respective negotiations with Bonn--similarly without result on the issue of representation of West Berlin--has been free of the kind of acrimony that has emanated from Prague. Thus the Hungarian delegation's communique on the 13-16 August "first phase" talks in Bonn on establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries said merely that "a preliminary agreement has been reached on several questions," that the talks would "continue in the near future," and that they had taken place "in a constructive atmosphere." The next day, the Budapest radio reported a statement by the chief Hungarian negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Janos Nagy, indicating that the negotiators had "failed to reach agreement on one question"--the issue of Bonn's responsibility for the "permanent residents and authorities of West Berlin."

In the wake of 30 July-2 August "preliminary" talks between Bonn and Sofia in Bonn, the Sofia radio on the 2d noted that the joint statement had characterized the talks as having taken place in a "good atmosphere" and as having produced "positive results." The broadcast added that the establishment of diplomatic relations would occur during the Sofia visit of Foreign Minister Scheel, the invitation for which had been extended personally by Foreign Minister Mladenov during the CSCE in Helsinki. The next day, a dispatch from BTA's Bonn correspondent conjectured that the establishment of diplomatic relations would be consummated "almost automatically" during Scheel's visits to Sofia and Budapest, quoting an FRG Foreign Ministry official to the effect that Scheel's visit to Sofia "could" take place in late August or the first half of September. On the unresolved question of West Berlin, the dispatch merely quoted the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG to the effect that "irrespective of certain differences in views" on West Berlin "no more obstacles exist" to establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Sofia in the near future.

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U S S R

GEORGIAN LEADER ADMITS POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND UNREST

At a 27-28 July Georgian Central Committee plenum Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze conceded that Moscow's purge of the republic has given rise to bureaucratic resistance and popular unrest. While defending his own leadership, Shevardnadze detailed a sharp decline in living standards and deplored the upsurge of rumors about riots in Tbilisi. He and other plenum speakers indicated that, in addition to the serious problems of corruption, nationalism and economic stagnation inherited from the past, the republic now faces severe food shortages and a rising rate of violent crime.

At the 27 July session Shevardnadze concentrated on the drastic drop in industrial and agricultural production since 1971, but subsequent speakers--apparently in response to growing pressure from below--raised questions about the purge of Georgian officials, the drive against corruption, Moscow's intervention in Georgia, popular unrest, and the drop in the standard of living. Apparently regarding these matters as too serious to ignore, Shevardnadze took the unusual step of delivering a second speech on the 28th almost as long as his report, discussing these issues and defending his leadership at length.

POLICY PROBLEMS Shevardnadze responded to a statement by Georgian economics institute director V.I. Melkadze that "a certain part" of the population of the republic did not have confidence in the new "course of correcting the mistakes of the past" and were critical of Shevardnadze's cadre policy. The First Secretary insisted that "the course dictated by the CPSU Central Committee in its well-known decree on the work of the Tbilisi Gorkom" serves the interests of "the absolute majority" of Georgians and is therefore supported by them. While claiming that only a "few" oppose the new policy, Shevardnadze indicated that disputes have arisen over "tactics and methods of introducing order." And he asserted that complaints that he was too slow in taking decisions and not harsh enough have "no foundation."

Other speakers at the plenum hinted at unrest and even disorders among the public at large. Second Secretary A.N. Churkin complained that the June local soviet elections had been marred by unspecified incidents "caused primarily by the irresponsible

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attitude of some party committees to the question of selecting candidates and in general to the whole complicated and important matter of selecting cadres for the soviets." He warned that repetition of "such cases" must be prevented in the coming trade union, Komsomol and party elections. Tbilisi First Secretary P.G. Gilashvili complained of malicious persons spreading "sensational rumors" and interpreting the Georgian Central Committee's measures as "too harsh."

RIOT RUMORS Noting Gilashvili's complaint, Shevardnadze called for a concerted struggle against such persons. At the same time, he repeated in unusual detail rumors that 10,000 people had rioted in Tbilisi and had burned down party headquarters, that the city had been surrounded by troops and cut off from the outside world, and that 1,500 "nationalistically inclined" party leaders, writers, journalists and youths had been arrested.

Although Shevardnadze ridiculed these rumors as "slander," his speech indicated that there were good grounds for public unrest but that his cleanup of corruption should not be blamed for these hardships. He went to unusual lengths in citing statistics to show that housing conditions and worker and peasant income were declining under Mzhavanadze and only began to improve in 1973, after he had assumed office. He chose not to compare past and present food supplies, however, on grounds that under Mzhavanadze the practice of padding figures was so widespread that a "true picture" of the situation could not be obtained. He pledged that improvement of food supply was now "one of the main orientations" of his regime, and he capped this pledge with a strong statement:

We communists always must remember that talk of raising the material welfare of the workers not backed up with new rubles for the family budget, new kilograms of bread, meat and milk . . . , with new housing space, with a rise in the quality and lowering of the price of goods, and also with other social benefits . . . is nothing other than blather, demagogy and the truest deception of the workers.

FOOD SHORTAGES Despite Shevardnadze's assurances, conditions in Georgia appear ripe for trouble. ZARYA VOSTOKA on 26 June reported that the Georgian Central Committee bureau had discovered food shortages in Georgian cities to be so serious that the population was forced to buy food at private kolkhoz markets. The

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Georgian trade minister and his top deputy were fired as a result. As Shevardnadze explained in his 28 July speech, the food shortage drove up prices in the kolkhoz market to the point where local authorities unwisely tried to use "administrative measures" against the markets, with the result that prices rose further and only "economically privileged elements" with illegal "big incomes" could afford to make purchases.

The food shortages apparently stem from a combination of low production, mismanagement, corruption, and speculation. At the plenum the new first deputy minister of trade complained that "bribery in the trade ministry had acquired a socially dangerous character" and that the dining halls of enterprises in Tbilisi and other cities are short of food. The food shortage is apparently also worsening because peasants have been smuggling large amounts of food out of Georgia to sell at higher prices. At the plenum Abkhaz First Secretary V.G. Kobakhiya spoke of measures to prevent the export of food from the republic but complained that many police officials were being bribed to allow speculators to smuggle out food.

Another symptom of the Georgian malaise was revealed by Churkin's unusual admission that during the first half of 1973 the number of crimes in the republic "significantly rose," especially those "against the life, health, and dignity of citizens."

AGRICULTURE MINISTRY TO ISSUE PROPOSALS ON MECHANIZED LINKS

Under the pressure of press criticism the USSR Agriculture Ministry has committed itself to taking a stand on the controversial link system of farming. PRAVDA on 15 August reported Deputy Agriculture Minister A.P. Chubarov's acknowledgment of a 10 June PRAVDA article berating the ministry for not preparing recommendations on the organization and wages of mechanized links. Chubarov declared that such recommendations are now being prepared and will be issued to local agencies in the near future.

The 10 June PRAVDA article had complained that the ministry's new guidelines for mechanized links were supposed to have been issued in a mass printing at the beginning of 1971 but that the ministry had allowed this "important matter" to drift. In 1968 First Deputy Agriculture Minister I.P. Volovchenko revealed that the ministry was studying mechanized links, and in 1970 the All-Russian Institute for the Organization of Labor and Wages in Agriculture came up

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with recommendations which IZVESTIYA later claimed were of no "practical use." Subsequently, a group in the Institute of Agricultural Economics studied the problem for two years, but, as director of the All-Russian Institute for the Organization of Labor and Wages in Agriculture V.A. Tikhonov complained in the June 1973 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, it produced recommendations no better than those of his institute. The Agriculture Ministry finally created a group within the ministry to study mechanized links in early 1972, according to a 19 April 1972 IZVESTIYA article which urged the ministry and scientists to take a stand on the issue.

The 10 June PRAVDA article was a follow-up to a discussion of problems facing mechanized links begun in that newspaper on 8 May. In that discussion, which included link pioneers V. Pervitskiy and A. Yerkayev, the Agriculture Ministry, Gosplan and a number of state committees were criticized for failing to prepare guidelines for mechanized links.

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CZECH INVASION ANNIVERSARY: The fifth anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia occasioned a vitriolic diatribe from Peking against the "Brezhnev clique" for continuing the Soviet military "occupation" and thus revealing "the ugly features of social imperialism." Peking had ignored the anniversary since 1970. Its decision this year to mark the anniversary with a lengthy NCNA commentary on 19 August reflects Peking's current effort to counteract Moscow's detente policy in Europe and to portray the Soviets in the most menacing terms. Significantly, NCNA cited a remark by a Soviet spokesman at the Helsinki session of the European security conference as revealing that Moscow would not rule out another action like the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Chinese attack elicited a Soviet response in the form of a 20 August broadcast in Mandarin accusing NCNA of having distorted the August 1968 events and stressing in standard terms that the invasion was justified by the "counter-revolutionary situation." Apart from reacting to the Chinese, Moscow maintained its usual silence on the anniversary. Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 18th editorialized routinely on the event, hailing the country's political and economic "consolidation" since the "timely internationalist assistance" by the USSR and its allies.

CHINESE RED GUARDS ANNIVERSARY: For the first time since 1968 Peking has commemorated the 18 August anniversary of the first Red Guard rally in 1966. PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 18th carried three articles, which were also broadcast over the Peking radio and summarized by NCNA, praising Red Guard achievements in the cultural revolution and blaming their mistakes on the "swindlers" who fomented factionalism and reactionary trends through their "May 16th clique." Indicating that a primary purpose in the new attention to the Red Guards is to serve the current rustication program, the articles stressed that youth must "integrate with the workers, peasants, and soldiers." As portrayed in an 18 August Tsinan broadcast, the Red Guards now seem to be a mass organization for maintaining liaison between the schools and other institutions such as factories and government bodies.

Shanghai has marked the anniversary every year, while other province-level units have commemorated the event some years and ignored it at other times. The national attention accorded the

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anniversary this year seems part of a general effort to reconstitute mass organizations to assist the party in exercising mass control and supervision. The rebuilding of the CYL--for older youth--has already been accomplished in all provinces.

MOSCOW, CAIRO ON DETENTE: Moscow and Cairo are continuing their polemic over the effects of international detente on the Middle East situation. Moscow broadcasts in Arabic have defended detente, arguing that it brings various benefits to the Arab struggle, is disliked by Israel, and should be welcomed by the Arabs. An Arabic-language broadcast on the 18th complained that "unfortunately," some people, including members of the Egyptian assembly, were trying to cast unfavorable light on the influence of detente on the settlement of Arab problems. At the same time, Moscow has maintained that a Mideast settlement must be actively pursued by the Arabs themselves in a common effort. A commentary on the 20th pointed out that the Arabs have the means--citing oil reserves and monetary assets derived from these resources--which could "drastically change the balance of power" in the struggle against Israel "if combined with unity of Arab action" which, "regrettably," is lacking.

A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 21st, depicting Tel Aviv as apprehensive about current inter-Arab efforts to overcome various differences, cautioned the Arabs about "hostile propaganda" aimed at insinuating the idea that the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict lay outside the Arab world. The commentary referred cryptically to a 20 August UPI report "clearly intended to inspire inaction among the Arabs." Apparently referring to the same report, Cairo's Voice of the Arabs on the 21st said that UPI had cited "communist diplomatic sources" in London to the effect that the Soviet Union had decided to leave the problem of finding a solution to the Middle East stalemate to the United States. Noting that the USSR in the past had attacked U.S. attempts to solve the crisis unilaterally, the radio commentary added that "we greatly miss this attitude now."

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REACTION TO SCHLESINGER'S COMMENTS ON SOVIET MIRVS: Moscow has so far failed to report Defense Secretary Schlesinger's 17 August remarks on the Soviet MIRV program. This silence reflects a long-standing position on SALT-related issues as well as a more recent effort to soft-pedal disagreements with the United States on a wide range of nuclear issues, particularly since the June summit. On MIRV, Moscow has maintained a complete embargo on discussion in the central press since the Moscow summit last year, although the U.S. MIRV program has been discussed briefly in the more specialized literature.

Moscow's East European allies have followed its lead in ignoring Schlesinger's remarks. Peking, on the other hand, has played on the U.S. expression of concern about Soviet MIRVs to emphasize the rivalry that continues between the two countries in spite of recent summitry and to reaffirm its recent unabashed advocacy of a continued strong military posture by the West in face of an alleged Soviet threat. NCNA promptly reported Schlesinger's remarks in an 18 August dispatch, highlighting his affirmation of the need for U.S. action to counter Soviet weapons development. On the 20th, NCNA reported Western press reaction to the remarks, singling out suggestions that Soviet MIRV development will impede the SALT negotiations and severely test the new U.S.-Soviet relationship.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 13 - 19 AUGUST 1973

<u>Moscow (2591 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1204 items)</u>		
Kazakh SSR Award Ceremony, Brezhnev Speech	(--)	15%	Domestic Issues	(60%)	48%
China	(5%)	7%	Cambodia	(8%)	20%
World University Games, Moscow	(--)	6%	[Sihanouk in DPRK, Tientsin	(--)	9%]
Israeli Interception of Lebanese Plane	(--)	4%	Israeli Intercep- tion of Lebanese Plane	(--)	5%
DPRK Liberation Anniversary	(--)	3%	Vietnam	(2%)	1%
Indochina	(2%)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.