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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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20 JUNE 1973

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
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# **TRENDS**

**in Communist Propaganda**

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


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## U. S. - SOVIET SUMMIT

### MOSCOW EMPHASIZES LONG-TERM ASPECTS OF NIXON-BREZHNEV MEETING

Stressing the "working nature" of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks at the Washington summit, Soviet commentary has suggested that a good beginning has been made but has refrained from extensive substantive discussion of the issues. Soviet media have this far into the summit focused instead on the atmospherics of the event and the broader historical context. Ample coverage of the ceremonial aspects of the summit included live radio and television coverage of the official welcoming ceremony on 18 June. TASS carried the full texts of the Nixon and Brezhnev speeches on that occasion as well as those at the White House dinner that evening.

TASS described the first session of the talks on 18 June as "businesslike" and reported that the two leaders had positively assessed the progress in bilateral relations since the May 1972 Moscow summit and had discussed steps for further cooperation. IZVESTIYA's correspondents reported Brezhnev's remark that a "good beginning" had been made. TASS and Moscow Radio promptly reported the first series of agreements on 19 and 20 June. Moscow Radio's Zorin concluded that the signing of the agreements was important since in addition to their inherent value they deepen the cooperation of the two great states."

While awaiting the development of more substantive news, PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA representatives in Washington--including PRAVDA's Yuriy Zhukov and IZVESTIYA's deputy chief editor N. Polyanov--have concentrated on the historical context of the summit and on what they describe as the overwhelmingly positive attitude of Americans to U.S.-Soviet cooperation. They as well as other Soviet correspondents have gone to great lengths to emphasize the historical momentum behind the changes that are now occurring in U.S.-Soviet relations. While echoing Brezhnev's remark that an elimination of the consequences of the cold war will not be an easy matter, they have expressed optimism about the eventual outcome of the process. The historical legitimacy of U.S.-Soviet cooperation has been illustrated by references to antecedents from Lenin's and Roosevelt's days. In this perspective the cold war is seen as an aberration from the norm that should prevail in Soviet-U.S. relations. PRAVDA's Boris Strelnikov on the 14th went so far as to point out that Tsarist Russia had resisted attempts by West European imperialist powers to involve it in actions hostile to the young American nation. Throughout

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this commentary, the operative adjectives have been "large-scale" and "long-term."

Moscow has reassured the Soviet domestic audience about the favorable circumstances for Brezhnev's visit, portraying broad bipartisan support for President Nixon's foreign policy, even among those who disagree on internal issues, and emphasizing the isolation of his opponents. Interviews by Soviet correspondents with U.S. businessmen and political figures have portrayed a serious U.S. interest in expanded trade and cooperation with the USSR.

Moscow has also taken pains to reassure its allies--and preempt Chinese and third world charges of superpower collusion--by portraying the coordination of foreign policy within the socialist community and by emphasizing the linkage between U.S.-Soviet detente and the prospects for world peace. Reports of a 14 June meeting of Brezhnev with communist ambassadors accredited to Moscow were carried prominently in the central press on the 15th. While not mentioning the Brezhnev U.S. visit explicitly, these reports stressed the "coordinated action of socialist countries on the international scene." Moscow has also been careful about West European sensitivities, as underscored by a TASS announcement on the 17th that Brezhnev would visit Paris on the way back to Moscow. While Moscow has continued to criticize Chinese attempts to frustrate Soviet detente initiatives, it has not made any special attempt to take advantage of the visit to derogate Chinese policy.

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## EAST EUROPEAN MEDIA SAY SUMMIT PROVES SUCCESS OF USSR POLICY

Moscow's allies in Eastern Europe have echoed the themes that the Brezhnev visit registers another triumph for the Soviet peace program, demonstrates the "realistic" stance of the Nixon Administration, and is overwhelmingly favored by the U.S. public. The leading dailies of the orthodox allies gave front-page coverage to Brezhnev's arrival and his initial talks with the President. The Bratislava TV announcer for the 55-minute live relay, via Eurovision, of Brezhnev's arrival said that "all" the socialist countries were receiving the telecast. The Bucharest radio and the party daily SCINTEIA carried only brief reports on Brezhnev's departure from Moscow and arrival in the United States.

Where Hungarian and Czechoslovak commentaries had speculated in May on the possible impact of Watergate on the summit, only the Yugoslavs and Albanians explicitly mentioned the affair at the start of the visit. The Albanians charged on the 19th that "revisionist propaganda" was "protecting" President Nixon by treating Watergate as a plot by "reactionary" elements bent on sabotaging Soviet-U.S. detente. The Yugoslav press agency TANJUG on the 18th observed that the visit enjoyed overwhelming public support but that the main argument of those favoring canceling or postponing the visit was the "internal disturbance" in the United States provoked by Watergate. On the 17th, TANJUG had characterized the dominant public mood in the United States with the observation that "at the time of the Watergate affair, the opinion prevails" that Brezhnev should have been invited and that the internal American developments should not exert a "negative influence" on the results of the summit.

A moderate volume of comment in Polish, East German, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian and Hungarian media has uniformly stressed the favorable long-term prospects for the Washington summit, based on the positive results of the 1972 Moscow talks, and the harmonious atmosphere surrounding the initial White House discussions. Polish party leader Gierak hailed Brezhnev's trip at an East Berlin dinner on the first day of his "official friendship" visit to the GDR. According to TASS on the 18th, Gierak called the visit "eloquent proof of the successes" of Soviet policy, adding that the visit "would certainly make a big contribution to the consolidation of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems." The East German party daily NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 20th similarly stressed that the visit exemplified peaceful coexistence in action, noting as well "the great personal contribution of Leonid Brezhnev"

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in this regard. On the 18th, a talk carried by the East Berlin domestic service indicated that Brezhnev's trip was "no longer of a sensational nature" but was in line with the incipient "normalization" said to be taking place in Soviet-U.S. relations. This process, it added, was a prerequisite for achieving lasting peace "for many generations to come."

Both Czechoslovak party leader Husak and MPRP leader Tsedenbal praised Brezhnev's visit in their speeches at a friendship rally in Ulan Bator on the 18th. The Prague party daily RŮDE PRAVO on the 20th commented that "the first day of the Soviet-U.S. summit talks was a good day" and that "the official statements of both sides give rise to confidence in the success of the talks, as well as in the willingness and will to cooperate." The paper had adopted a sterner line in a commentary on the 16th which observed that the President's readiness to negotiate with Brezhnev was not due to any change in U.S. foreign policy aims but was instead "a reflection of objective reality" in which the West has been forced to abandon its "unrealistic" policy of "pushing communism back." The paper warned at the same time of the need for vigilance against "some circles" in the United States, such as "the military-industrial complex," allegedly opposed to the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. The same approach was taken in a commentary carried by the Bulgarian news agency BTA on the 19th. Recognition of realities, it observed, "has induced the governments of the most powerful nations in the West to embark on a course of realpolitik in international relations," concluding that, "despite the misgivings of the ill-wishers, there are very strong reasons for optimism" regarding the results of the current summit.

The comment from Budapest, underscoring the "realistic" aspect of Brezhnev's visit, was unique in leveling barbs at the Chinese.\* Thus, the U.S. correspondent of the party daily NEPSZABADSAG was quoted by MTI on the 16th as pointing out that Senator Jackson, who "opposed Brezhnev's visit," also maintains "close relations with the diplomatic bureau in Washington of the People's Republic of China." The "Chinese orientation" allegedly favored by the Senator, the report added, "would be a dangerous policy from the point of view of America's interests." The Hungarian Government daily MACYAR HIRLAP on the 17th, insisting that Soviet-U.S. cooperation was not aimed against "any third country," declared that "those who are spreading slanderous rumors about 'a conspiracy between the two superpowers' are simply refusing to take note of today's realities."

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\* Czechoslovakia is the only other East European country to have attacked the Chinese explicitly on the issue of the visit.

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## C H I N A

## FOREIGN MINISTER DECRIES "ILLUSORY" DETENTE ON TOUR ABROAD

Against the background of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit and ongoing movement toward East-West detente, Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei took the opportunity of his 6-19 June tour of Britain, France, Iran, and Pakistan to carry Peking's message of warning against "illusory detente" and of vigilance toward Soviet intentions. Though Chi in his criticism throughout the tour of "certain big powers" for their "expansive designs" did not mention either the Soviet Union or the United States by name, the context of his remarks and concurrent Chinese comment made clear that he was voicing Chinese concern over any expansion of Soviet influence in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. The Chinese foreign minister received high-level treatment throughout his visit, meeting with Prime Minister Heath, President Pompidou, the Shah of Iran, and President Bhutto. He took the opportunity to highlight bilateral Chinese relations with each state, noting in particular the planned visits to China of Heath and Pompidou, expressed support for Iran's defense posture in the Persian Gulf, and reaffirmed Chinese support for Bhutto's position on a settlement in the subcontinent.

EUROPE Striking the note of vigilance that was to mark his pronouncements on every stop during his tour, Chi responded to British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home's balanced assessment of European detente in a banquet speech on 7 June with a sharp warning against the continuing danger of big-power hegemonism. Where the British speaker had noted "a healthy trend in the world today" in which East-West differences are being settled through negotiations, Chi rejoined with Peking's line that "the world is still in turmoil and unrest," that "hegemonism and power politics are still menacing the independence and security of nations, and this is the root cause of international tension." The anti-Soviet implications of his remarks showed through in Chi's warning to the British not to be misled by a detente on paper: "If one talks volubly about detente but in practice actively prepares for expansion, his detente is nothing but a fraud." Taking up the same theme in an address at a reception given by the French Foreign Minister on the 13th, Chi stressed that only strict observance of the principles of peaceful coexistence and the elimination of hegemonism would allow for real international detente. He warned that these prerequisites have not yet been achieved and that "the specter of hegemony still haunts the world."

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A 9 June NCNA report on the conclusion of the preparatory talks on a European security conference ran parallel to Chi's analysis and set forth a somber Chinese view of the talks as a forum for the participants to pursue their narrow interests. NCNA took note of Washington's "new Atlantic charter" proposal as designed to adjust the U.S. relationship with West Europe and to enable the United States along with West Europe to contend with the Soviet Union over East Europe. It also portrayed anxiety among the West Europeans over Soviet-U.S. "behind-the-scenes bilateral contacts," and played up efforts by "small and medium-sized countries" like Romania to resist big-power domination. However, the sharpest thrust of NCNA's account was focused on Soviet policy: Moscow was depicted as fostering "a false sense" of detente while expanding its military power to pave the way to "infiltration and expansion" into West Europe, and its plan for a European collective security system was interpreted as an effort to consolidate Soviet hegemony in East Europe while trying to "squeeze out U.S. influence" in the West. NCNA also referred to the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty of East European countries as the target of Western insistence on inclusion of the principle of self-determination on the agenda. NCNA concluded by quoting a French paper's observation on the "massive" Soviet military buildup: "So long as this formidable and mute Soviet military hegemony lasts, people do not see how the problem of European security can advance one step."

A 15 June NCNA account of the NATO foreign ministers' session on 14-15 June more forcefully expressed Peking's anti-Soviet line through selective replays of remarks by Western spokesmen. NCNA noted NATO Secretary General Luns' observation that NATO cannot yet afford to relax vigilance in the face of still expanding Soviet power. It cited warnings from Secretary Rogers and others against being misled by "euphoria over the possibility of detente," and noted particular NATO concern over the importance of maintaining U.S. troop strength in Europe and over Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean. The report duly cited Rogers' assurance that the U.S.-Soviet summit would not prejudice NATO interests, but it also noted European uneasiness over U.S.-Soviet "backroom bargaining." NCNA subsequently replayed remarks by FRG Defense Minister Leber on 17 June which bluntly warned against the "powerful military potentiality of the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact" in noting that "Western Europe, being the neighbor of a world power which is by nature expansionist, needs the close support of the United States."

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IRAN, PAKISTAN In an address in Teheran on 14 June, Chi focused his warnings on the situation in the Persian Gulf, noting that "intensified expansion, infiltration, and rivalry by certain big powers" are gravely menacing security there. Telling the Iranians that "you have every reason to feel uneasy at this situation," Chi expressed support for Iran's defense measures and for the position that the region's affairs should be settled only by the Persian Gulf countries. In this connection he quoted the Shah as having once said "the situation both east and west of Iran" provides a strong warning to the country--an apparent allusion to Moscow's treaty ties with India and Iraq. Later, speaking in Pakistan on the 18th, Chi alluded to the Soviet role in attributing the "still unsettled" situation in South Asia to infiltration and subversion by "certain expansionist forces."

Peking reinforced its anti-Soviet message with a 13 June NCNA account of the 10-11 June CENTO ministerial conference that represented a notable departure from the critical line on this alliance taken by the Chinese in the past. NCNA noted that Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Britain attended the conference and that the United States was represented by an observer, but it failed to identify Secretary Rogers as that observer or to note the accommodating line he set forth on East-West relations. NCNA chose rather to highlight the strong warnings regarding Soviet motives voiced by the other participants. It took favorable note of the members' resolution to maintain their guard in the face of the "large-scale increase in Soviet armaments," and depicted CENTO apprehension over Moscow's expansion in the area as a result of the August 1971 treaty with India and its April 1972 treaty with Iraq. Peking's decision to break its silence on the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, taken together with the show of support for Iran's defense measures, suggests that the Chinese are willing to cultivate anti-Soviet sentiments even at the expense of Arab sensitivities.

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## INDOCHINA

The 14-point joint communique on a Vietnam settlement, signed in Paris on 13 June at the conclusion of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations, has been described as reaffirming the peace accord and called a "new legal" basis for continuing the struggle. As in the period following the signing of the accord in January, comment has indicated that while Hanoi and Washington have been able to reach agreement on many points, serious differences remain between the PRG and Saigon. Hanoi treats the United States circumspectly for the most part, limiting sharp criticism to U.S. intentions to continue bombing in Cambodia. The PRG, on the other hand, has repeated charges that the United States is continuing a "neocolonialist" policy in South Vietnam.

Peking used a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 17th to endorse the joint communique as "a new victory" of the Vietnamese people's struggle for thorough implementation of the Paris agreement and as "entirely necessary" in view of the "still unstable" situation. The editorial noted that the communique proceeded "once again from the reality" of two administrations and zones of control in stipulating measures for guaranteeing the cease-fire, adding that this is of "positive significance" in contributing to a settlement in South Vietnam. The editorial also called on the United States to "scrupulously honor" its commitments to the DRV specified in the joint communique. In keeping with Peking's mild treatment of the United States, Chinese accounts of Vietnamese comment have deleted attacks on U.S. intentions.

Moscow lauded the communique in a 16 June PRAVDA article by A. Serbin, which held that it was a "new and important step" toward real peace in Vietnam and praised it for recognizing the "reality of the political situation" in South Vietnam in which there are two administrations, two armies, two zones of control, and three political forces. Le Duc Tho, stopping over in Moscow on his way home from Paris, was assured in a meeting with Kirilenko and Katushev on the 18th that the Soviet Union will continue to give help and support to Vietnam to ensure "peace and stability."

## DRV, PRG CALL KISSINGER-LE DUC THO COMMUNIQUE A "NEW VICTORY"

Beginning on 14 June, Hanoi and Liberation Radio for several days broadcast the text of the Paris communique along with a PLAF Command cease-fire order issued on the 14th. Both the DRV and the PRG on the

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14th issued foreign ministry statements lauding the communique as a new "victory" in their efforts to insure implementation of the January peace accord.

In the foreign ministry statements as well as subsequent comment, Hanoi has been much more restrained than the PRG regarding the United States, avoiding direct criticism of the Nixon Administration and even failing to mention Kissinger by name when assailing his remarks that U.S. bombing in Cambodia would continue.

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement cited the obligations undertaken by the signatories of the communique but did not single out the United States, or Saigon, in urging implementation of the Paris agreement as reaffirmed in the communique. By contrast, the PRG Foreign Ministry statement scored past U.S. and Saigon actions, specifically demanded that the United States halt "aggression" in Cambodia and "intervention" in Laos, and called for resolute struggle against "plots and acts of the U.S. Government and the Saigon administration violating the Paris agreement."

Similar differences were reflected in 15 June DRV and PRG notes to participants in the February international conference on Vietnam. The DRV Foreign Ministry note merely urged the recipients to contribute to the implementation of the Paris agreement; but the PRG note specified that the recipients should demand the U.S. Government and Saigon administration strictly implement all the provisions they have agreed upon and signed.

Hanoi's restraint toward the United States, as compared with PRG comment, was even more striking in follow-up comment. A NHAN DAN editorial on the 15th in complaining about delays and possible future plots to sabotage the communique explicitly cited the Saigon administration but avoided mentioning the Nixon Administration; NHAN DAN referred only vaguely to "bellicose" forces in the United States. Similarly, a NHAN DAN article on the 17th focused on alleged Saigon statements and actions contrary to the provisions of the communique and did not mention the United States in charging that "the Saigon administration has no intention of seriously respecting its signature and is still unwilling to satisfy the people's urgent demands." By contrast an editorial issued on 16 June by the PRG's news agency LPA dredged up the stock charge that the United States "has not yet given up its design to impose neocolonialism in South

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Vietnam and to prolong the partition of Vietnam." While this charge was routine in Hanoi propaganda prior to the signing of the communique, it has not appeared in comment on the communique.

The most critical Hanoi comment on the United States since the signing of the communique has been in connection with statements by Administration officials--Kissinger's 13 June press conference statement that the communique did not bar bombing in Cambodia and a similar remark by Defense Secretary-designate Schlesinger. The editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 15 June failed to mention Kissinger when they deplored the remark by the U.S. "representative." The editorials went on to call on the United States to respect Article 20 of the Paris agreement--reaffirmed in Point 13 of the communique--which pledges an end to foreign military activities in Cambodia and Laos. The army paper said that the U.S. "distortion" should be "sternly denounced and condemned" and charged that "this proves that the United States still maintains its erroneous attitude, speaking about one thing while doing another, and still pursues its dark schemes."

A 20 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article in assailing Schlesinger's remarks before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 18th acknowledged both his reaffirmation that bombing in Cambodia would continue and his remark that resumed bombing of the DRV could not be totally ruled out. Departing somewhat from Hanoi's restraint, the army paper viewed his remarks as evidence of the "evil design" of the Nixon Administration. The article observed that his statements came "just after the signature of the Paris joint communique and against the background of the continued U.S. bombing in Cambodia and the sword-rattling by Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon."

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DRV-U.S. ISSUES      Some Hanoi comment on the communique has drawn particular attention to the future course of U.S.-DRV relations. Both the DRV Foreign Ministry statement and Le Duc Tho, in a 14 June press conference, declared that the strict implementation of the peace agreement is a condition for the normalization of relations between the United States and North Vietnam. A month earlier, when Le Duc Tho first arrived in Paris for the talks which led to the communique, he had similarly stated the terms for normal relations with the United States, thus suggesting that this point was to be raised in his meetings with Kissinger.

The 13 June communique not only pledges the United States to give up moves taken last April to pressure Hanoi, but also clarifies U.S. obligations under the Paris agreement:

+ Point 1 of the communique requires that the United States cease "immediately, completely, and indefinitely" aerial reconnaissance over the DRV, "in conformity with Article 2" of the Paris agreement. The communique thus codifies Hanoi's long-standing contention that reconnaissance over the North is among the military activities which the United States pledged to eschew last January. Despite the fact that Article 2 of the agreement made no mention of reconnaissance, a 11 March Hanoi radio commentary--following the first alleged U.S. air intrusions on 12 and 13 March--flatly stated that the pledge to end military action included reconnaissance. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest, the day after the first acknowledged U.S. overflight on 19 April, for the first time suggested that there was a private understanding on this point when it referred to an unspecified U.S. commitment; and a 20 May protest on alleged overflights during the time of the Kissinger-Tho meetings in Paris explicitly claimed that there had been a U.S. commitment to halt reconnaissance flights over the DRV.

+ Point 2 of the communique commits the United States to resume the mine-clearing operations in North Vietnamese waters which were halted on 17 April as one of the U.S. moves to induce communist compliance with the peace accord. It specifies, among other things, that the United States shall supply the DRV with "means which are agreed to be adequate and sufficient for sweeping mines in rivers." This provision is in line with Article 5 of the protocol on mine clearing which gave the United States responsibility for clearance of inland waterways, but stated that the DRV would actively participate, with the means of surveying, removal, and destruction and technical advice supplied by the United States. Hanoi had

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charged, as early as mid-February, that the United States was attempting to evade responsibility for removing mines in DRV waterways, and a DRV spokesman at a 1 March press conference in Hanoi had complained specifically that the United States had failed to supply adequate means to the DRV to remove the mines.

Hanoi media on 19 June reported that the United States had proposed to return its minesweepers to resume mine-clearing operations and that on 18 June a U.S. minesweeping delegation arrived in Halphong.

+ The final, 14th, point of the communique stipulates that the U.S.-DRV joint economic commission will resume its meetings within four days and complete the first phase of its work within 15 days thereafter. No deadline for the commission's efforts was publicly announced when it began its meetings on 15 March; however, a DRV press communique on the 19 April U.S. suspension of the talks claimed for the first time that the commission, "by common agreement," was to complete its work on 30 April--"60 days after the commission was set up." Hanoi media have reported the return to Paris of their delegation to the economic talks and the resumption of the talks on 18 June.

CEASE-FIRE Point 3 of the Paris communique, calling for both South Vietnamese sides to issue new cease-fire orders, was promptly implemented by the communists, with Hanoi as well as Liberation Radio on the 14th broadcasting a cease-fire order from the PLAF Command. At the same time, the DRV and PRG have complained that Saigon has not disseminated a cease-fire order. Thus, for example, Le Duc Tho, in his 16 June statement upon his departure from Paris, charged that "reports" reveal that the Saigon administration "still refuses to widely publish the cease-fire order and continues its military operations, including air attacks against many places." Other comment has cited Western press reports in complaining that Saigon has not broadcast its cease-fire order and that some ARVN officers have not heard of it.\*

The DRV and the PRG have accused the ARVN of numerous cease-fire violations and have denounced Saigon charges that the communists

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\* While Saigon radio has been heard to refer to a cease-fire order, no text of such an order has been monitored. This is at variance with the period immediately following the peace accord: Saigon radio broadcast the original cease-fire as well as a 17 February cease-fire appeal issued by the four-party JMC.



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have violated the cease-fire as "abusers" and "fabrications." A 20 June Liberation Radio broadcast revealed that on the previous day the PRG delegation to the JMC had received the Canadian delegation to the ICSS and specifically denied reports that PRG forces had fired on ICSS aircraft flying between Saigon and An Loc on the 17th.

+ Point 4 of the communique repeats Articles 2 and 3 of the January cease-fire protocol which indicated what actions were prohibited and what allowed. Among other things, Article 3 forbade restrictions on "civilian supply, freedom of movement, freedom to work, freedom of the people to engage in trade, and civilian communication and transportation between and among all areas in South Vietnam." The stipulation on trade almost immediately became a point of contention with a statement in a broadcast interview with GVN Lt. General Pham Quoc Thuan, head of the GVN delegation to the JMC, explaining that "no trading activities or contacts will be allowed."

+ Point 5 reiterates the stipulation of Article 3 B of the peace agreement that the two-party JMC should determine areas controlled by the two parties, adding that the commission should also discuss movements necessary to accomplish the return of the armed forces of the two parties to the positions they occupied at the time of the 28 January cease-fire. References in points 4 and 5 to the areas of the two sides would appear to be among the provisions of the communique alluded to by Hanoi and PRG comment on the document which has contended that it recognizes that in South Vietnam there are "two administrations, two armies, two areas of control, and three political forces." The contradiction between this view and Saigon's position--that the communist zone is not political but merely a troop stationing area--was pointed up in a 17 June Hanoi broadcast which scored GVN spokesmen for "deliberately and erroneously" explaining that "the determination of the areas controlled by each of the two parties involves only military zones of control."

+ Point 6 repeats the stipulation of Article 4 of the cease-fire protocol that the commanders of opposing forces at places where they are in direct contact shall meet, following the cease-fire, to reach agreement on measures to avert conflict and insure supply and medical care for the forces. The communique does not resolve the opposing contentions of the two South Vietnamese sides on this question--the communists holding that such meetings should take place at all levels, and Saigon maintaining that meetings should

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be restricted to higher levels. These divergent views were pointed up in a 15 June Liberation Radio commentary which criticized GVN Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam's remarks at a press conference on the 14th; the radio charged that Lam "stubbornly continued to demand that the meetings between the commanders of the opposing armed forces . . . be held only at the divisional level or at the regimental level."

+ Point 7 deals with the restrictions on the introduction of military personnel and equipment which were contained in Article 7 of the Paris agreement. Among other things, it adds that military equipment may transit the demilitarized zone only if introduced into South Vietnam as replacements pursuant to Article 7 and through a designated point of entry.

PRISONERS        Point 8 of the communique calls for the return, without delay, of any remaining military prisoners, and asks the two South Vietnamese parties to do their utmost to return all detained civilians covered by the agreement within 45 days. Both sides claim that all military prisoners have not been returned to them. Hanoi repeated its views on this issue in the 15 June NHAN DAN editorial which held that a "major part" of the communist military personnel had been returned and that "the adversary received all its military personnel."

The provision on civilian prisoners in the communique goes no further than that in the Paris agreement which also suggested a deadline--in that case 90 days--for their exchange. Although the January agreement, like the communique, placed responsibility for this provision with the South Vietnamese, the communists have claimed--for example, in a 14 April PRG memorandum--that the United States had made a commitment to the effect that the majority of the civilian personnel would be returned in 60 days and the rest within 90 days. The communique does not broach the issue of the number of civilians actually detained by either side. The 15 June NHAN DAN editorial and other comment has reiterated the communist contention that Saigon is illegally detaining "hundreds of thousands" of civilians.

Point 8 also repeats the agreement's call for Red Cross inspection of detention sites within 15 days. And it reiterates Article 8 B of the agreement on cooperation in gaining information on missing in action and the location of graves, adding that "for this purpose, frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made between Saigon and Hanoi."

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POLITICAL SETTLEMENT      Points 9 and 10 of the communique deal with the search for a political settlement in South Vietnam. Point 9 quotes Article 11 of the Paris agreement on achieving national concord and insuring democratic liberties. It offers no resolution of communist and Saigon differences on the timing of the implementation of these provisions and these differences were pointed up in a 17 June Hanoi broadcast which scored a Saigon spokesman for "brazenly" stating that the GVN "reserves to itself the right to maintain restrictions on democratic freedoms."

Other aspects of Chapter 4 of the Paris agreement--dealing with South Vietnamese self-determination--were summarized in Point 10 of the communique which covers the formation of the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord and the holding of general elections. The communique calls upon the two South Vietnamese parties to attempt to sign an agreement on the internal affairs of South Vietnam as soon as possible--if they can, within 45 days. The Paris agreement had called for efforts to sign such an agreement within 90 days. Regular consultative meetings between representatives of Saigon and the PRG to reach such an agreement opened outside Paris on 19 March and were highlighted by the presentation of concrete proposals by both sides at a 25 April session--two days before the expiration of the 90-day deadline. The meetings, which had been held weekly, have not continued during the month of June--presumably delayed until the conclusion of the Kissinger-Tho talks. The chief PRG representative at the meetings, Nguyen Van Hieu, complained in a 14 June press conference that on the previous day Saigon had rejected his proposal that the meetings resume the following week to attempt to meet the 45-day deadline. According to Hieu, Saigon's representative suggested that the next meeting be held in two weeks.

The final paragraph in Point 10 reiterates Article 13 of the Paris agreement calling for the South Vietnamese parties to settle the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam. The six-point PRG proposal at the 25 April consultative meeting had repeated this provision, specifically relegating it to the last in its list of problems to be solved. By contrast, Saigon has indicated that it wants the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops--matched with a demobilization of Saigon forces--prior to the holding of the general elections.

JMC, ICCS      Point 11 addressed problems in the functioning of the JMC and Point 12 pledged assistance and cooperation with the ICCS. The provisions on the JMC include the stipulation that Articles 16 and 17 of the cease-fire protocol dealing with the

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position and privileges of JMC representatives shall immediately be implemented, along with the 11-point statement of privileges and immunities agreed upon by the four-party JMC. Since the first meeting of the two-party JMC on 29 March, the communists have been complaining about Saigon's failure to recognize the points on privileges and immunities of the JMC delegates previously agreed upon by the four-party JMC. In line with the provision in Article 17 of the Paris agreement on separate logistics for each JMC delegation, the communique also notes that "frequent and regular liaison flights" shall be made between Saigon and the headquarters of regional commissions and other places in South Vietnam, and between Saigon and Loc Ninh.

Another persistent communist complaint was met with the provision that the headquarters of the two-party JMC will be located in Saigon proper or at an agreed-upon location in an area dividing territory controlled by either side. Point 11 also calls upon the two-party JMC to agree within 15 days on the locations of the headquarters of the regional two-party commissions. Liberation Radio reports on 15 and 18 June JMC meetings have charged that Saigon has persistently demanded that the PRG agree to locate regional JMC headquarters in military bases and has balked at discussing the selection of regional sites in accordance with the procedures defined in the 13 June communique.

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## DRV CREATES NEW BUILDING MINISTRY, SHIFTS SEVERAL OFFICIALS

The DRV National Assembly Standing Committee on 14 June announced the formation of a new Ministry of Building and revealed several shifts among ministerial-level personnel. These are the first such shifts since the signing of the peace accord and presumably reflect the changing priorities of the reconstruction period. Ministry realignments were previously announced in December 1969, when the Ministry of Heavy Industry was subdivided and a Ministry of Food and Foodstuffs was established, and in April 1971, when the Agriculture Commission was formed by the merger of several organs.

The Ministry of Building, formed by a merger of the former Ministry of Construction and the Commission for Capital Construction, will be headed by Do Muoi, deputy premier and former chief of the Commission for Capital Construction. Do Muoi's appointment may be aimed at supplying some new push to the reconstruction effort. Bui Quang Tao, Construction Minister since 1958, will be given unspecified "new tasks." In an article broadcast by Hanoi on 29 March, Tao had noted the new "great tasks" of peacetime construction and had called on the construction branch to "rapidly remedy the shortcomings in production."

In other personnel actions, the National Assembly Standing Committee announced that Deputy Premier Nguyen Con has been moved from his post as director of the State Planning Commission to work in the Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers. He will be replaced as planning commission director by Nguyen Lam, a vice chairman of the planning commission since 1969. Some dissatisfaction with the progress being made in water resources seems indicated by the reassignment of Ha Ke Tan from the Ministry of Water Conservancy to become minister in charge of the Da River dam construction. Taking over the Ministry of Water Conservancy is Nguyen Thanh Binh, director of the State Inspection Commission.

On 17 June Hanoi broadcast an article by Binh which stated that an investigation in May by the State Inspection Commission had found that in the area of dike preservation "a number of localities have some weaknesses." Binh noted that the implementation of the regulations on the protection of dikes has progressed slowly, and revealed some impatience in pointing out that "this problem has been reiterated many times since 1969." And a NHAN DAN article on 8 May had laid major blame on inefficiency at the center for major failures in water conservancy projects, failures which meant "that 30 to 40 percent of their capacity has been wasted."

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## U S S R

## ECONOMISTS CHALLENGE OFFICIAL DOCTRINE ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES

Two Soviet economists specializing in capitalism have openly challenged official doctrine on economic priorities and advocated that the Soviet Union, as a full-fledged industrial power, should emulate western economic practice in granting priority to consumption over investment. Writing in the April issue of QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, A. I. Shapiro, head of the sector of future economic development of capitalism at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and V. M. Kudrov, a specialist in the U.S. economy at the same institute, claimed that the Marxist doctrine on the preferential growth of the means of production applies only to the early stages of industrialization and not to the present stage when the Soviet Union possesses an abundance of capital goods. Charging that allegations about the universality and immutability of this doctrine are "mistaken," the economists declared that "in all industrially developed countries, after reaching a certain industrial maturity, the non-production sphere of the economy begins to grow significantly faster than the sphere of material production."

The economists' line of argument is clearly open to attack, since it not only challenges one of the basic shibboleths of the Soviet system but does so on the basis of capitalist experience. Despite the fanfare in recent years on improving welfare, party leaders and professional economists have continued to uphold the validity of the doctrine that production of "the means of production" must always grow faster than production of "the means of consumption" and to assert that this doctrine has been strictly observed in the current five-year plan.\* The doctrine, which historically

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\* Since the announcement of the plan, Soviet spokesmen have consistently maintained that it preserves the traditional relationship between capital goods production (subdivision I) and consumer goods production (subdivision II), while at the same time providing a slightly faster growth rate for light industry (group B) than for heavy industry (group A). Actually, despite the five-year plan, the growth rate of group A exceeded that of group B last year, and the 1973 plan scheduled a continuation of the traditional relationship between the two sectors of industry.

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has been used as justification for forced industrialization and economic austerity, has in more recent times been defended as a means of promoting scientific and technological progress, as well as ensuring steady improvement of public welfare.

Although the doctrine on economic priorities has often been challenged in the past, such challenges have usually been couched in esoteric terms, only to be exposed and condemned vociferously by party or economic spokesmen. The forthrightness and timing of the present challenge suggest that it is intended as a trial balloon connected with deliberations now under way on the long-range economic plan for 1976-1990.

#### GRECHKO IN KOMMUNIST STRESSES PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH THEME

Defense Minister Grechko's first major statement since becoming a Politburo member clearly reflects his departmental interests rather than his broader responsibilities in the leadership. Writing in celebration of the 28th anniversary of victory in World War II, in KOMMUNIST, No. 7, Grechko provided what amounts to a defense lobbyist's tract on the practical lessons to be derived from the experience of the war. While making pro forma bows to the regime's current peace initiatives, he laid greater stress on the theme that the bedrock foundation of party policy should be a strong defense posture.

Asserting that the study of World War II provides an important means for implementing the 24th CPSU Congress' injunction to raise the defense might of the country, Grechko ticked off the practical lessons: that the party outlines and implements all the necessary measures for consolidating the state's defense might, that strengthening the Soviet state means also strengthening its "armed forces," (Grechko's emphasis), that a "well developed military-economic base" is a firm guarantee of security, and that military cooperation among the socialist states is an objective necessity at the present stage "since there is a real danger of imperialist aggression." The list could be extended, but in quantitative terms alone, Grechko's collection of militant propositions probably constitutes a record of sorts for Politburo-level statements, at least since the "peace program" has become the focal point of public discussion.

Grechko's military bias was cast into sharper relief by the minimal attention he gave to the regime's peace program. While referring

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to the April plenum and acknowledging that the regime's "enterprising international policy" is contributing to "positive changes in the world situation," he avoided elaborating on these themes with the now customary optimistic rhetoric. Indeed, he made a point of balancing such references with reminders that a strong defense posture is an essential ingredient of success in foreign policy.

Another unusual feature of Grechko's article was its extensive discussion of military doctrine -- a subject rarely discussed in leadership articles. The subject is currently under debate in RED STAR, with the focus on the respective roles of the army and the party in formulating Soviet military doctrine.\* Grechko's article was perhaps deliberately ambiguous on this score, stating that the doctrine "proceeds" from the party's policy, "accords" with Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, and "embodies" progressive military-technical thinking.

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\* For a discussion of the RED STAR articles, see the TRENDS for 2 May 1973, pages 2-3, and for 13 June 1973, pages 22-23.

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## NOTES

CHIANG CHING WITH AMERICANS: Against the background of Brezhnev's visit to the United States, Chinese Politburo members Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan, reputedly the most radical and anti-American Peking leaders, on 19 June attended the opening matches played by the American men and women basketball teams now touring the PRC. The presence of Mao's wife and Yao was marked by unusual publicity, with Peking radio and television carrying the event live and NCNA issuing two separate reports noting that the Chinese and their guests had a "friendly" conversation. According to NCNA, the games took place "in an atmosphere of friendship between the people and sportsmen of China and the United States." NCNA also noted the presence of David Bruce, the chief of the U.S. liaison mission.

In addition to the reassuring gesture to the United States, Peking's treatment of the event also served to align Chiang and Yao with the policy of Sino-American detente. Chiang, whose appearances in recent months had been rare, may have been under a cloud. On 8 March Chou En-lai, in her presence, called on Chinese women to "thoroughly eliminate big-power chauvinism" and "actively expand friendly contacts" with foreign countries. Four days later Chiang was listed after Yeh Chien-ying, but she has since been given her normal position ahead of Chou's close associate Yeh.

CHINA AGRICULTURE: Persisting drought in North China was acknowledged in a 19 June NCNA account of the visit of Sihanouk's Prime Minister Penn Nouth to the China-Cambodia Friendship People's Commune on the Peking outskirts. The chairman of the commune's revolutionary committee was quoted as having told Penn Nouth that there is "a more serious drought this year than last." A similar assertion in a 30 May NCNA article about drought in Hopei Province (which surrounds Peking) seemed to have been the cause for NCNA's withdrawing it from publication and replacing it with a more optimistic report.

The need to concentrate efforts on agriculture in the face of bad weather was strongly emphasized by a 17 June Foochow broadcast praising a commune which reorganized enterprises serving agriculture in order to release manpower for the fields, and which closed down "enterprises not serving agricultural production." While the closure of such enterprises has been advocated since the cultural revolution's fervor for self-sufficiency was spent, there have been few previous signs that localities had any enthusiasm for abandoning their small industries.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY TALKS: Moscow and its East European allies have all but ignored the issue of a time linkage between the scheduled 3 July Helsinki convening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the setting of a firm autumn date for the formal start of the Vienna negotiations on European force reductions (MBFR). Since the 3 July date was announced at the final plenary session of the fourth round of the Helsinki preparatory talks on 8 June, Soviet bloc comment has adopted a relatively low-key posture on the conference; however, the commentary has resorted at times to the usual hyperbole about the onset of an entirely new "historical era" of European cooperation. The most direct reference to a linkage was made in the 20 May East Berlin daily DER MORGAN, which observed that any "basic decisions" to come from the future Vienna negotiations "can be made only when the results" of the CSCE "are on the table." This remark is consistent with the longstanding public Soviet bloc position that any force reduction talks can take place only after the proper atmosphere of trust has been determined by the CSCE. A unique remark by a member of the GDR Helsinki delegation, Bock, may reflect Moscow thinking on the duration of the CSCE. In a 14 June NEUES DEUTSCHLAND interview, Bock said that the socialist bloc "will endeavor to conclude the security conference before the end of this year."

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 11 - 17 JUNE 1973

<u>Moscow (2911 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1203 items)</u>	
Brezhnev Visit to U.S.	(3%) 17%	Domestic Issues	(29%) 41%
Soviet Local Elections,	(4%) 7%	Vietnam	(47%) 19%
17 June		[DRV Leaders in PRC	(27%) 11%]
China	(7%) 5%	[Kissinger-Tho Joint	(-- ) 6%]
European Security	(2%) 5%	Communique	
Brezhnev Meeting With	(-- ) 4%	Cambodia	(6%) 7%
Communist Ambassadors		[Sihanouk Tour of	(4%) 4%]
CEMA Meetings in	(7%) 4%	Africa, Europe	
Prague		PRC Foreign Minister in	(4%) 7%
Vietnam	(8%) 3%	Europe, Iran	
Middle East	(5%) 3%	European Security	(-- ) 3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.