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6 JUNE 1973

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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
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# **TRENDS**

## **in Communist Propaganda**

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
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## INDOCHINA

In the opening days of the Peking sojourn of the DRV delegation headed by Le Duan and Pham Van Dong beginning on the 4th, the two sides have effusively praised one another's role and proclaimed their fraternal solidarity, but their divergent interests have also been evident. The Chinese have made a point of warning against outside involvement. The North Vietnamese for their part have stressed that their goals, including reunification, are "closely interrelated objectives of paramount importance" that are to be achieved "at all costs."

Propaganda on the 6 June anniversary of the founding of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam reflects a major communist effort to project the PRG into new prominence in the international arena and to buttress its claim to be the genuine representative of the southern people and an equal rival to the Saigon regime. A dramatic fillip to the PRG's international stature came with the announcement that several countries, including the Soviet Union and China, had sent ambassadors to South Vietnam to present their credentials. And comment on the anniversary called attention to the PRG's increasing emergence as an official government in the international arena. The unexplained absence of PRG President Huynh Tan Phat from the anniversary celebrations raises the possibility that he is out of the country on a mission to further press the claim to legitimacy.

Vietnamese communist media have ignored the U.S.-DkV talks which resumed this week in Paris, while continuing routinely to complain about alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of the peace accord. Canada's announcement that it was withdrawing from the ICCS was given little attention, but the Canadian ICCS delegation was sharply criticized in PRG and DRV foreign ministry statements charging it with going beyond the limits of the peace agreement in its investigation of the presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam.

## LE DUAN STAY IN PEKING: DIVERGENCIES SHOW BEHIND SOLIDARITY

The Peking visit of the DRV party-government delegation led by Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, now in its third day, has been shaping up along expected lines as a high-level display of solidarity and fraternity. The Chinese have warmly hailed the Vietnamese for their "great victory" in war against the United States, and

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the guests have reciprocated with effusive expressions of gratitude for Chinese aid. Judging from the composition of the DRV delegation, the terms of this aid in the new circumstances are a major subject on the agenda. On the second day of the visit the Vietnamese were received by Mao for what NCNA called "an extremely cordial and friendly conversation."

Behind the show of solidarity, however, there have been signs of persisting divergencies in the two sides' assessment of the situation. As Chou En-lai made clear in his speech at the welcoming banquet on the 4th, "a completely new situation" has appeared in Vietnam as a result of the peace settlement, and the principal task now is to shore up this settlement. While routinely demanding that Saigon and the United States observe the Paris agreement and end military intervention in Cambodia, Chou reserved his strongest language to warn against unspecified outside involvement, declaring that "no interference in Indochina, under whatever pretext and in whatever form, will be tolerated." Chou's warning was also underscored by a remark by Mao quoted in NCNA's account of his conversation with the visitors: "Vietnam belongs to the Vietnamese people, not to the reactionaries in Vietnam, still less to imperialism." As in Mao's remark to Romania's Ceausescu in June 1971, when he called for unity against "imperialism and all reactionaries," the Chinese mean the Soviet Union at least as much as the United States in referring to imperialism in such an open-ended context.

Apart from an extended expression of gratitude for Chinese aid, Le Duan's reply speech on the 4th took a significantly different direction. Taking a markedly less benign view of the U.S. role, Le Duan observed that his people had defeated "the most atrocious colonial war that has ever been conducted" but that the "U.S. imperialists," using "perfidious maneuvers and insolent threats," are continuing to impose "U.S. neocolonialism" on South Vietnam and to perpetuate the partition of Vietnam. Chou had avoided impugning U.S. motives.

Most notably, Le Duan came down hard on the importance the Vietnamese attach to their goals, including "peaceful reunification" of Vietnam. In language strikingly reminiscent of that used by Pham Van Dong when the DRV premier headed a delegation to Peking in November 1971, Le Duan stressed that these goals are "closely interrelated objectives of paramount importance to be achieved at all costs, even through a hard and complex struggle." On 20 November 1971, a few days after the suspension of the round of

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secret Kissinger-Tho talks that had been taking place, Dong had emphasized, in reference to the two basic military and political demands in the communists' seven-point plan, that these two points "of very essential significance" were "closely interrelated." Considering the subsequent pressure from Hanoi's big allies to loosen the link between the military and political issues, Le Duan's current formulation may have been intended as much for the instruction of Hanoi's allies\* as for its adversaries.

At one point Le Duan made the customary acknowledgment of the support provided by the Soviets and others as well as by the Chinese. Also, in one of his toasts he called for "the tightening of the solidarity" among the communist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. He did not, however, echo Chou's assertion that Sino-Vietnamese friendship is based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Since the July 1971 announcement of Peking's invitation to President Nixon, the North Vietnamese have on several occasions seemed to have expressed their pique by failing to acknowledge these as the existing basis--as opposed to a desired goal--of relations between Peking and Hanoi.

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\* Hanoi's objectives had figured in an unusual development involving Sino-Vietnamese relations several weeks ago. NCNA belatedly reported on 4 April that on 30 March Chou had received the DRV and PRG envoys for an account of the implementation of the Paris agreement over the first 60 days. Chou was quoted as expressing his belief that the Vietnamese would succeed in achieving "peace, independence, democracy, and national concord"--a formulation omitting the usual reference to reunification. Hanoi's accounts of Chou's remarks omitted this formulation altogether.

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## PRG MARKS ANNIVERSARY, WELCOMES AMBASSADORS TO SOUTH VIETNAM

The highlight of the PRG's celebrations on its fourth anniversary was a "grand meeting" of more than 7,000 people held at dawn in an area under PRG control in Quang Tri Province.\* Assuming the trappings of a conventional national day celebration, the meeting was attended for the first time by delegations from the DRV as well as foreign delegations from Cambodia, Laos, and Cuba and the newly appointed ambassadors from the USSR, PRC, DPRK, GDR, Poland, Hungary, Algeria, and Mauritania. With the usual speaker, PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, notably absent, "an important speech" was delivered to the meeting by Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the NFLSV and of the PRG's Advisory Council. The speech is not yet available in translation, but according to Liberation Radio's account of the meeting it dealt with the situation and tasks of the southern people and with the PRG's stand on the settlement of internal affairs in South Vietnam.

In addition to Tho, the South Vietnamese officials at the meeting included Vietnam Alliance chief Trinh Dinh Thao and PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh, who was reported by Hanoi media on 7 May to be on her way back to South Vietnam after a stopover in the DRV. The North Vietnamese representatives included a government delegation led by Vice Premier Nguyen Con, a member of the VWP Secretariat, and a National Assembly delegation led by Nguyen Xien, a vice chairman of the Assembly Standing Committee.

FOREIGN ENVOYS       The first announcement that a number of countries had sent ambassadors to South Vietnam came in a Liberation Radio report on 5 June which said that over a period of days ambassadors from the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and Algeria had presented their credentials to the PRG "in the liberated area of South Vietnam." Although the PRG has sent ambassadors to many of the 33 countries which have recognized it,\*\*

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\* This is the first time that the locus of the celebration has been specified. In previous years the ceremonies were described as being held in "a liberated area."

\*\* Liberation Radio on 3 June broadcast a list of countries, including the DRV, which it said had officially recognized and established relations with the PRG. The list included 29 nations as having made this move prior to the peace agreement and added that since then Uganda, Dahomey, Burundi, and the Republic of Guinea had joined their ranks.

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only Cuba had previously appointed an ambassador to the PRG. The announcement of the dispatch of ambassadors comes some two weeks after Hanoi and the PRG had belatedly criticized France for establishing ambassadorial relations with the GVN without making a similar move toward the PRG.\* It seems possible that the Vietnamese waited to criticize the French until after they had assurance that other countries would send ambassadors to the PRG.

The first indication of the new move was a 4 June TASS report that the Soviet ambassador to Burma, Aleksey Yelizavetin, had also been appointed ambassador to the PRG. NCNA the next day noted that Ambassador Wang Jo-chieh, who had left his post in North Yemen last December, left Peking on 28 May and presented his credentials to the PRG on 3 June. PRG reports on the activities of various ambassadors in some cases additionally noted the appearance of embassy secretaries and attaches, thus further suggesting the intention to establish a permanent presence in South Vietnam. The Cuban ambassador is now referred to as "dean of the diplomatic corps." He presented his credentials to PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh in Paris in June 1969 and later reportedly traveled to South Vietnam but did not remain there. His return to South Vietnam was first noted in a 5 June Liberation Radio report that he had been received by Mme. Binh "recently, in a PRG-controlled area."

HANOI COMMENT Hanoi greeted the PRG anniversary with more than usual fanfare, marking the event with a "grand meeting" on 4 June attended by Politburo members Truong Chinh and Nguyen Duy Trinh. No meeting was held last year, although Truong Chinh did pay an anniversary call on the PRG representation in Hanoi, and the anniversaries in 1970 and 1971 were marked with receptions given by the PRG and attended by DRV Politburo members. As usual, North Vietnam's government leaders sent a message to Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat and, as has been the case in most years, the anniversary was hailed editorially in the Hanoi press.

The Hanoi meeting was sponsored by the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the Hanoi Administrative Committee and was addressed by Foreign Minister Trinh and Nguyen Van Tien, head of the PRG's special

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\* Vietnamese communist comment on the French action is discussed in the TRENDS of 31 May 1973, pages 9-10.

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representation in the DRV; in addition, Truong Chinh offered brief opening and closing remarks. Both of the main speakers sought to demonstrate the PRG's increased stature: Trinh, for example, cited the recognition of the PRG by foreign governments and its participation as a member in the July 1972 nonaligned conference, and claimed that the peace agreement and the act of the international Vietnam conference "confirmed the decisive role" of the PRG in the settlement of internal affairs in South Vietnam and its "prestige and important position in the international arena." Trinh's routine allegations of U.S. and Saigon violations of the accord included the claim that Washington and Saigon were "going so far as to refuse to recognize and then to eliminate the PRG." Charging that "neocolonialism" continues in the South despite the peace accord, Trinh promised that the North must therefore continue to "perform its duty" to the South "until neocolonialism is completely wiped out of the southern part of our country and until our fatherland is reunified and the South and North are reunited."

Both Trinh and PRG representative Tien referred to the PRG as the only representative of the South Vietnamese people--a characterization that has been pressed since the peace accord. And Tien added that the PRG is the "supreme authoritative organ reflecting the will and deep aspirations of all strata" in the South. At another point, Tien also asserted that the "victories" in the past four years had "consolidated the role and great power and simultaneously reflect the stability and strength" of the PRG as "a government that is really of the people, by the people, and for the people and that the entire people strive to defend and build."

The 6 June NHAN DAN editorial reviewed the progress of the struggle in the South in past years and claimed that the Paris agreement had fulfilled the most important objectives mentioned in the NFLSV platform and the PRG's 12-point program of action. This "great victory" of the "national democratic revolution," according to the paper, has caused a great change in the balance of forces and "created conditions for advancing toward the achievement of other objectives." Echoing themes brought up in Trinh's speech, the editorial also lauded the PRG's international position and promised DRV backing until reunification is achieved.

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## PRG, DRV SCORE TWO-PARTY ICCS PROBE OF DRV TROOPS IN SOUTH

Foreign ministry statements from the PRG and DRV, on 1 and 3 June, respectively, assailed both the Canadian and Indonesian ICCS delegations for their investigations regarding the presence of North Vietnamese soldiers in the South. The statement pointedly noted that the Paris accord makes no mention of North Vietnamese troops and accused the Canadian delegation of misusing the ICCS to carry out activities that far exceed the limitations of the agreement. The statements did not go into detail about the activities of the Canadian and Indonesian delegates, instead cryptically referring to investigations and reports in the Da Nang area on the "so-called case of 'North Vietnamese prisoners of war.'" They held that the investigation violated Article 18 F of the agreement and Article 9 A of the protocol on the ICCS which stipulate that the commission shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity.

The Canadian delegation has been criticized by the communists since mid-April when Hanoi scored remarks by its chief, Gauvin, taking particular umbrage at a statement he made alluding to the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South.\* The Indonesian delegation has not previously come under attack, and the current statements carefully disassociated the action of the Indonesian ICCS team in Da Nang from the policy of the Jakarta government, citing a report that the Indonesian Foreign Ministry said its ICCS teams were not instructed to join the efforts of the Canadian delegation on this question.

Hanoi duly reported Canada's announcement on 31 May of its intention to withdraw from the ICCS. The only other allusion to the announcement came in a 1 June article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN which criticized the British Foreign Office for a statement that DRV and PRG refusal to cooperate with the ICCS compelled Canada to withdraw.

## PATHET LAO STAND ELABORATED IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMORANDUM

The Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) Central Committee marked the passing of 100 days since the signing of the cease-fire agreement by issuing a lengthy, 31 May memorandum on the status of the LPF-RLG

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\* See the TRENDS of 18 April 1973, pages 4-5.

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negotiations. The memorandum differs from an LPF Central Committee statement of 23 April--60 days after the cease-fire agreement--in its detail regarding LPF proposals during the prolonged talks with the RLG. Substantial detail regarding the LPF positions was first supplied in a series of four Pathet Lao radio commentaries from 17 through 20 May, and the memorandum now elaborates on those broadcasts.

The memorandum, which was released at press conferences in Vientiane, Sam Neua, and Hanoi on 1 June and disseminated by LPF media on the same day, was notable for its explicit criticism of Premier Souvanna Phouma. While propaganda in the past has referred critically to "reactionaries," the memorandum now said that Souvanna Phouma and other RLG negotiators have tried to avoid discussion of "essential questions" and have "shown no sincere desire for a settlement." They were accused of changing their minds "too often," modifying proposals "again and again," and advancing "very absurd claims."

The memorandum also castigated the United States and the RLG for violating the cease-fire provisions of the February agreement and attacked the United States for instigating the RLG to procrastinate in the negotiations. The document accused the United States of engaging in "perfidious maneuvers" to ostensibly transfer Air America and the Lao "Special Forces" to RLG control in an attempt to circumvent stipulations in the agreement for their disbandment. It also revealed that on 7 May a U.S. serviceman had been captured by LPF forces while engaged in a mission to direct groups of commandos introduced into the zone under the control of the "patriotic forces" to conduct acts of sabotage. Pathet Lao media have not yet identified the serviceman but Hanoi and East German media have quoted an LPF official in Hanoi as saying that he is a major attached to "the U.S. Special Forces in Laos."

LPF POSITIONS            In addition to repeating the negotiating positions outlined in the May series of Pathet Lao radio broadcasts,\* the memorandum offered new information which can be summarized as follows:

+ The International Commission for Supervision and Control should not be granted powers not assigned to it under the 1962 Geneva

\* The TRENDS of 23 May 1973, pages 7-9, discusses four Pathet Lao radio commentaries from 17 through 20 May which revealed LPF positions on the possible creation of a deputy premier post, the distribution of ministerial portfolios, the functions of the proposed "National Political Coalition Council," and the neutralization of Luang Prabang and Vientiane.

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agreement. The RLG wants an enlarged commission to assume additional duties, which would be "incompatible with the sovereignty of Laos."

+ Territorial areas in contention between the two sides should be delimited "to avoid further conflict on the basis of respect for the regions controlled and administered by each side." The RLG "wants to take advantage of the absence of boundaries and cease-fire lines to avoid the recognition of the existence in Laos of two zones controlled by two sides."

+ The RLG should allow "hundreds of thousands" of civilians held in "so-called refugee camps" to return to homes they left as a result of U.S. bombing and RLG military operations. By refusing to grant approval for their return, the RLG is denying their "economic and political" rights and "democratic liberties." (With the future elections in mind, the LPF obviously wants to bolster its vote-getting position by enlarging the electorate in areas it controls with released refugees.)

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## U S S R - C H I N A - U . S .

## SOVIETS DENOUNCE WESTERN REPORTS THAT THEY THREATEN CHINA

With Brezhnev's visit to the United States in the offing, Moscow has again expressed acute sensitivity to having its China problem put in a triangular context that could limit its leverage in big-power relations. A statement issued by the Soviet embassy in Washington and supported by press comment denounced Western press reports concerning a Soviet threat to China. Concurrently, Moscow has chosen this time to present a wide-ranging critique of Chinese foreign policy, including a warning that Peking's raising of territorial questions could trigger a chain reaction which would undermine the international system that has emerged since World War II. Earlier, a Soviet broadcast to China offered a notably gloomy assessment of Sino-Soviet relations, flatly asserting that no progress has been achieved in the border talks.

The Soviet embassy statement,\* released on 1 June, denied what it said were recent reports in the American press that "diplomatic intervention by the United States has averted an inevitable nuclear attack" by the Soviets on China. In an allusion to ongoing East-West negotiations, the statement closed by observing that such "provocative" reports "have nothing in common with the interests of international detente and peace." It also noted that these reports are similar to remarks made recently by an unnamed Chinese leader to American journalists. The Soviets may have been prompted to issue this denial by reports on the book by John Newhouse on the SALT negotiations that is being serialized in the NEW YORKER. These reports have highlighted the book's assertion that the Soviet Union had approached the United States concerning joint steps to forestall any military actions by the Chinese.

The embassy statement has been followed by press comment similarly directed at rebutting the portrayal of a Soviet threat to China. On 3 June PRAVDA carried a commentary by N. Sablin taking exception

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\* Several statements and protests have been issued by the embassy in Washington in recent years, most of them dealing with Jewish activities directed against the Soviets in the United States. A statement issued on 6 June denied reports that the Pentagon papers had been handed over to the embassy.

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countries. As summarized in a Soviet broadcast to China on 5 June, the article complains that the Chinese are advancing claims to Soviet territory and have opposed all constructive proposals by the Soviets for normalizing relations. As in the Apal'n article, it cites the CPSU April plenum resolution's indictment of the Chinese for opposing communist cohesion and damaging the cause of detente. These invocations of the resolution suggest that the polemical lines being elaborated against the Chinese reflect the plenum's gloomy assessment of Sino-Soviet relations at the present stage.

Such an assessment was offered in unusually explicit detail in a 24 May broadcast to China charging that the Chinese have not the least interest in improving the atmosphere by responding positively to Soviet proposals on expanding economic, cultural, and other ties. Acknowledging that the border talks have failed to register any progress, the broadcast claimed that the Chinese have evaded discussion of Soviet proposals at the talks. In this connection the broadcast took exception to a remark attributed to Chou En-lai to the effect that the Chinese can be patient at the talks.

The 24 May commentary contained the first acknowledgment in Soviet media that the sessions of the Sino-Soviet border river navigation commission this year and last year failed to achieve any results. As in 1972, NCNA reported (8 March) that "no agreement was reached on the questions discussed" at the 18th session held from 5 January to 5 March. Pointing to the crux of the problem, the broadcast said the Chinese advanced demands on the border question rather than discussing measures for insuring normal navigation.

**BORDER GUARDS DAY** Following the practice of recent years, articles in the Soviet central press observing border guards day avoided direct references to the Sino-Soviet border situation. Among the articles was one in the 27 May PRAVDA by the border guards chief, Lt. Gen. V. Matrosov, who was the original deputy head of the Soviet delegation at the Peking border talks. His article contained the usual praise for the border guards' efforts along with an appeal for greater vigilance.

A two-part article extolling the border guards in RURAL LIFE on 26 and 27 May contained a vivid account of an undated but evidently recent encounter between two border guards and two armed intruders in which one guard and the two violators were

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apparently killed. The incident described in the article, which was datelined "Southern border," took place in a mountainous area which could as well be along the Soviet borders with Iran or Afghanistan as in the Pamir region of the disputed Sino-Soviet border.

Though the central press continued its cautious approach on this occasion, at least some of the people in the border regions were reminded directly of the Sino-Soviet border conflict. An article by Maj. Gen. A. Gafarov in KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA on 27 May recalled "the heroic exploits of Soviet border guards during the defense of the sacred borders in the vicinity of Damanskiy Island and the settlement of Zhalanashkol." Major fighting took place over the island in March 1969, and Zhalanashkol is near the site of a skirmish that took place on 13 August that year along the border east of Lake Balkhash in Central Asia.

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## FRG - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## PRAGUE AND ITS ALLIES HAIL FRG-CZECHOSLOVAK ACCORD

Prague and its Soviet and East European allies, in welcoming the conclusion of the FRG-Czechoslovak draft treaty resulting from the 23-30 May Goetz-Frank negotiations in Bonn, have emphasized the new prospects for normalized FRG relations with other East European states. The text of the treaty, scheduled to be initialed in Bonn on 19 June and signed in Prague during the summer, has not yet been published, but a fairly detailed account of it has been released by West German sources. This account indicates that the major concession leading to the agreement was made by Prague: The condemnation of the 1938 Munich agreement does not contain the phrase "ab initio," which Prague had demanded and Bonn had resisted on the grounds that it would have raised legal complications for West German citizens who had lived in the German-occupied regions of Czechoslovakia after the Munich pact was signed.

PRAVDA commented on 3 June that "the successful completion of the talks" in Bonn "shows once again that, given good will and taking into account the realities of our day, even the most difficult problems can be solved." It attributed to "the FRG public" the view that the FRG-CSSR treaty now opens the way for establishment of relations between the FRG and Bulgaria and the FRG and Hungary. Panelists in the Moscow domestic service roundtable, also on the 3d, noted that the treaty negotiations had been complicated and that, as one observer expressed it, the conference table "had to be cleared of quite a few vestiges of the past before a mutually acceptable settlement" could be reached. On the 4th, a Moscow radio commentary in Czech and Slovak pointed out that "in the preamble and the first article of the agreement, the invalidity of the shameful Munich treaty is noted."

The Prague party daily RUDE PRAVO on 1 June noted in a similar vein that despite difficulties which continued "right up to the last day," the results were satisfying to both sides and foreshadow improved relations between the socialist countries and the FRG. The chief Czechoslovak negotiator, deputy foreign minister Jiri Goetz, remarked in a 31 May interview in Bonn with RUDE PRAVO and CTK that he was "on the whole satisfied" with the results of the talks. Goetz added that "the moral-political condemnation of Munich, expressed in the draft treaty's

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preamble, "is satisfactory for us" and was achieved only after much experimentation with phraseology. He complained that the FRG side had "tried during the talks primarily to weaken as much as possible the moral-political condemnation of the Munich agreement and to win for itself advantageous wording that would rule out the consequences" of the nullity of the Munich pact. Goetz went on to remark that, after CSSR foreign minister Chroupek initials the treaty in Bonn this month, the Czechs "will certainly be pleased to welcome" Chancellor Brandt in Prague for the formal signing "after the summer recess," an act which will "start the process of normalization" of the two countries' relations.

The Budapest daily NEPSZABADSAG on 1 June typified Soviet bloc reaction in stating that the Bonn agreement resulted from the "coordinated peace policy of the socialist countries" and "makes possible the intensification of the process of settlement" between the FRG and the socialist countries. It added that "the realistic foreign policy line of the government of Bonn is properly appreciated."

Tirana seized on the Czechoslovak concession regarding the Munich pact formulation to denigrate Soviet bloc compromises in the interests of detente. Pointing out that the Bonn treaty did not reject the Munich accord from its inception, the party organ ZERI I POPULLIT on 2 June called the treaty a blow to the Czechoslovak peoples' dignity. It surmised that Brezhnev, during his 18-22 May visit to Bonn, had been asked by Chancellor Brandt to speed up the agreement and that "the chieftain of the Moscow revisionists" had then seen to it that "his Prague vassals made haste to conclude the agreement." The treaty, it concluded, constitutes "another high treason of the Husak clique" to the interests of the CSSR, the GDR, and the other European states.

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## HONECKER REVIEWS FRG RELATIONS FOLLOWING BREZHNEV VISIT

In a 28 May report to the SED Central Committee plenum reviewing the results of Brezhnev's visits to East Berlin and Bonn, East German party leader Honecker reiterated the GDR's hard line positions on two critical issues affecting the character of the FRG-GDR relationship. Rejecting the concept of a "special relationship" between the two German states which Brandt has persistently advanced, Honecker repeated the familiar GDR arguments, asserting that the only special relationship the GDR recognizes is the one that it enjoys with the Soviet Union. He was similarly blunt about the status of West Berlin, insisting that there was no basis for the pretension that the city remained linked with West Germany. Calling it a "capitalist island," "a creation in the heart of the GDR," he declared that it was "not a constituent part of any state." He went on to say that all questions affecting West Berlin, "including the treaties that regulate its relations with the outside world," have been settled on the basis of this condition.

Coming on the heels of the massive propaganda coverage of the Brezhnev visit,\* Honecker's report seemed calculated to reassure the party that the GDR leadership remained committed to its previous positions. Honecker may also have been speaking with the Soviet Union in mind. At one point he seemed to throw back at Brezhnev an apparently double-edged remark that the latter had made in East Berlin on 12 May: Virtually paraphrasing Brezhnev's statement that the USSR always carries out its treaty obligations "strictly and fully," Honecker asserted that the GDR fulfills its agreements "consistently and punctually" and counts on the other side to do the same.

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\* Soviet media coverage of Brezhnev's visit to Bonn was comparable to that given his October 1971 visit to Paris -- the heaviest coverage given a Soviet leader's visit since the Khrushchev era. One distinctive aspect of the coverage was the authoritative character of the commentaries. For example, the daily PRAVDA articles on the visit were authored by the authoritative commentator Yuriy Zhukov, by the paper's main correspondent in the FRG Ye. Grigoryev, and by the paper's deputy chief editor V. Nekrasov. The main IZVESTIYA series was signed by three correspondents, including the German specialist and deputy chief editor N. Polyanov.

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WEST GERMAN EMISSARIES      The impression of a more relaxed mood in the East German leadership was conveyed by an event that took place a few days after Honecker's speech—a visit to the GDR of two West German parliamentary leaders, reportedly at the invitation of the SED. Apparently arranged to provide reassurance to the East German leadership concerning the pending Constitutional Court test of the constitutionality of the FRG-GDR treaty, the visit had some unusual features. First, it was a party-to-party consultation rather than a regular state visit. Secondly, one of the West German emissaries was Herbert Wehner, parliamentary leader of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which has long been anathema to East German Marxists. If this was not enough to demonstrate the East German leadership's capacity to sacrifice ideology to expediency, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND provided the clinching evidence in its handling of Wehner's report on the visit after his return home. Publishing the text of this report without editorial comment, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND let stand without rebuttal such statements as the following: that Germany was "divided," that this was a "painful" situation, and that the status of Berlin was the "responsibility of the four powers." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND had shown similar forbearance once before, on 5 April, when it published an interview given by a member of the FRG chancellor's office, which included the statement that the FRG cannot consider the GDR a "foreign country."

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## U S S R

## DECREE CLAMPS DOWN ON CONTROVERSIAL FARM SUBSIDIARIES

IZVESTIYA on 30 May announced a new Council of Ministers decree assailing abuses by kolkhoz and sovkhos subsidiary enterprises and ordering a crackdown. The right of farms to build factories to process agricultural produce had been endorsed in a 1967 decree, despite strong objections that "private entrepreneurs" would take advantage of the situation to enrich themselves. Although local officials have repeatedly criticized the subsidiaries for various abuses since then, the present decree is the first government move to take action on the complaints.

The decree complains that the subsidiaries have harmed both agriculture and industry. It charges that farms have sometimes neglected their main agricultural work in pursuit of the relatively higher profits afforded by their subsidiaries' production. It charges, moreover, that the subsidiaries have drawn workers away from industry by high wages and have diverted scarce materials from industrial use by illegal means. To correct these abuses, the decree calls for restricting production largely to the processing of agricultural materials and for stricter controls over prices and production.

**BACKGROUND** The drive to establish subsidiaries began shortly after Khrushchev fell and was attended by controversy from the beginning. The September 1967 decree authorizing the farms to set up subsidiary enterprises specified that the new enterprises should not divert the farms from their agricultural activity and should be restricted largely to the processing of agricultural products. It also granted considerable latitude to the farms, however, allowing them to set production plans and prices without approval from above.

Although Brezhnev and Kosygin had endorsed the idea of farm subsidiaries at the 23d CPSU Congress, opponents warned that the subsidiaries would become a form of "private enterprise" and that the farms would abuse the new privileges to enrich themselves. Criticism was particularly sharp in Moscow oblast, where local officials provoked national controversy in 1967 by putting several farm leaders on trial for abuses of the law.\*

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\* For a particularly interesting case of local resistance to central pressure, see the FBIS SURVEY of 24 April 1969, pages 21-24, recounting a dispute between the Moscow oblast paper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA and IZVESTIYA over the latter's criticism of local officials.

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The Baltic states also became a focus of criticism. According to an article by Latvian First Secretary A. E. Voss in a December 1971 PARTY LIFE, an April 1970 Latvian Central Committee decree ordered a crackdown on abuses, and the republic agriculture minister was later censured for taking a purely "commercial" view of the subsidiaries' activities. An 11 June 1971 RURAL LIFE article reported that Estonian First Secretary I. G. Kebin had punished an Estonian kolkhoz for neglecting agricultural work to push its more profitable industrial production. Kebin also assailed farms for diverting labor from agriculture in his speech to the Estonian Central Committee plenum reported in SOVIET ESTONIA on 15 June 1971.

No other attacks on the program have been noted recently. According to a 1971 book by F. T. Zemlyanskiy, reviewed in the 1972 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, the subsidiaries now employ some two million workers and produce some eight billion rubles' worth of products. The review praises the book for its judgment--directed specifically at "foes" of the movement--that the subsidiaries are not simply a survival of the past, "used just to somehow occupy idle hands on the farm," but a new form of industrial production.

#### ARMENIAN LEADERSHIP HITS NATIONALISM, MISMANAGEMENT

Apparently concerned to correct the conditions that led to the fall last November of the republic's premier, agriculture secretary, and KGB chief and to the subsequent removal of the second secretary, the Armenian leadership has begun a campaign of criticism of various shortcomings in the republic. The picture that has emerged is one of persistent economic mismanagement, widespread corruption, and rampant nationalism.

First Secretary Kochinyan began the process of exposure in two speeches in April. At a 4 April aktiv meeting, he complained that some Armenians "underrate the need to fight against nationalistic attitudes," and he noted with disapproval that the press, radio, television, and books show "national narrowmindedness" in praising past and present Armenian figures "irrespective of their class and ideological positions." He noted that the Armenian journal SOVETAKAN GRAKANUTYUN had been punished by the Armenian Central Committee bureau for publishing stories with "hostile" concepts. At a 23 April Armenian Central Committee plenum Kochinyan revealed that Armenian industry had failed badly in 1972, with output growing less than half

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as fast as planned and with labor productivity declining in early 1973. He also exposed large-scale embezzlement and illegal construction of dachas, and he criticized the Armenian MVD for failing to root out thievery, bribery, and speculation.

Following Kochinyan's criticism of poor cadre work, the plenum ousted longtime Central Committee cadre section chief A. A. Stepanyan, who on 17 April had been demoted to timber industry minister. Stepanyan's supervisor, G. A. Ter-Gazaryants, had been removed as second secretary in late March and was named ambassador to Senegal and Gambia on 30 April. On 15 May the Armenian Central Committee announced a decision condemning illegal dacha building, and on 16 May TRUD carried an expose of Armenian dacha construction written by an Armenian correspondent.

A new--apparently pro-Russian-- education minister was named on 15 May. The new minister, rector of Yerevan State University S. T. Akhumyan, is a specialist in Russian language and literature, according to the 18 May Beirut Armenian paper AZTAG. Russians recently have replaced Armenians in the key posts of republic second secretary and KGB chief, and the 24 April plenum confirmed a Ukrainian, N. S. Karpenko, as head of the Armenian Central Committee's agriculture section.



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## NOTE

TROFIMENKO ON SALT TWO: USA Institute military specialist G. A. Trofimenko, writing in the 5 June PRAVDA, has taken a cautious view of the immediate prospects for further agreements at the SALT negotiations in Geneva. Trofimenko observes that the "difficulties" being encountered at Geneva are partly a result of the more complex technical issues involved in this phase of the talks as compared with SALT ONE. But he assigns blame also to the "barrier of mistrust" created by the long years of cold war. He accuses the Pentagon of ignoring the spirit, if not the letter, of the SALT ONE agreements by stepping up the qualitative technological race, and he implies that these efforts work to sustain mistrust in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States. He balances his assessment of U.S. attitudes by noting the increasing influence of those in the United States who oppose the Pentagon's approach.

Trofimenko's article is the first commentary on SALT TWO to appear in the central press since the talks got underway last fall. Its tone is notably less optimistic than that of current articles on other aspects of Soviet-U.S. relations, such as those that have recently celebrated the anniversary of the Moscow summit. Though mentioning Brezhnev's forthcoming visit to the United States, Trofimenko avoids any linkage between the summit and the SALT negotiations, implying that the problems of the latter are soluble only over the long run.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 28 MAY - 3 JUNE 1973

<u>Moscow (2883 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1108 items)</u>	
Brezhnev Visit to FRG	(33%) 13%	Domestic Issues	(43%) 48%
China	(5%) 9%	OAU 10th Anniversary,	(14%) 15%
[IZVESTIYA 2 June	(-- ) 2%]	African Liberation Day	
Article		Cambodia	(14%) 11%
[Soviet Denial of	(-- ) 2%]	[Sihanouk Tour of	(7%) 4%]
Threat to PRC		Africa, Europe	
Vietnam	(-- ) 3%	Vietnam	(-- ) 5%
Egyptian Foreign	(-- ) 3%	[DRV Leaders' Visit	(-- ) 3%]
Minister in USSR		to PRC	

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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