

2 MAY 1973

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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1 OF 1


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
in Communist Propaganda

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FBIS TREND
2 MAY 1973

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention	1
USSR	
Brezhnev Gains Authority, Endorsement of Summit Diplomacy	1
RED STAR Stresses Military's Role in Defense Policymaking	2
EUROPE	
Moscow Reserved, East Europe More Vocal on Kissinger Speech	4
CHINA	
Low-Key Celebrations Mark May Day; Most Leaders Appear	6
RED FLAG Explains Line on Conducting Rectification	7
INDOCHINA	
Hanoi Scores U.S. Note, Raises Doubt on Kissinger-Tho Meeting	9
PRG Offers Six-Point Program at Consultative Meeting with GVN	11
Massive Hanoi May Day Celebration Hails Communist "Victory"	13
Moscow Comment Centers on Consolidation of Vietnam Peace	16
Peking Reception Marks Indochina Summit Anniversary	18
CUBA	
Castro's May Day Speech Restates Foreign Policy Positions	20
NOTES: China-Philippines; Watergate Developments	22

CONFIDENTIAL

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 23 - 29 APRIL 1973

<u>Moscow (2886 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1623 items)</u>		
CPSU Central Committee	(--)	10%	Domestic Issues	(36%)	40%
Plenum			Indochina	(25%)	20%
Brezhnev Upcoming Visit	(--)	9%	[Indochina Summit	(--)	9%]
to FRG			Anniversary		
China	(7%)	5%	[Vietnam	(3%)	4%]
May Day	(6%)	4%	[Cambodia	(15%)	4%]
Lenin Birth Anniversary	(13%)	4%	[Laos	(3%)	3%]
Vietnam	(4%)	3%	Mexican President	(11%)	14%
Middle East	(4%)	2%	in PRC		
			PRC Friendship Delegation	(7%)	3%
			in Japan		
			Middle East	(5%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 1 -

U S S R

BREZHNEV GAINS AUTHORITY, ENDORSEMENT OF SUMMIT DIPLOMACY

On the eve of Brezhnev's projected visits to the West, the Soviet party leader has received strong endorsements of his detente policy and his role as a world statesman. The endorsements by the 26-27 April CPSU Central Committee plenum were appreciably stronger than those made on the eve of the Moscow summit at the May 1972 plenum. At the same time, the Kremlin shakeup approved by the plenum--the most extensive change of its kind in over a decade--served not only to consolidate Brezhnev's power but also to enhance the status of the bureaucracies which have been the instruments and supports of his policymaking leadership.

Brezhnev's role as architect of the Soviet "peace program" and his personal identification with the successes already claimed for that program were highlighted in the plenum resolution. In addition to acknowledging Brezhnev's "great personal contribution" to statesmanship, the resolution directed the Politburo to adhere to the "principles and conclusions" contained in his foreign policy report to the plenum. Such explicit praise for Brezhnev and such explicit acknowledgment of his policymaking leadership had been notably absent in the May 1972 plenum resolution. The current resolution also went out of its way to endorse the practice of personal diplomacy by the Soviet leaders.

Although the plenum did not break any new ground in foreign policy, it reflected the overriding emphasis which Moscow has recently placed on expansion of trade and economic relations with the West. The resolution singled out an "activization" of such links as an especially effective means of facilitating the normalization of international relations.

In a remarkable show of public support for Brezhnev and his detente policy, the plenum was addressed by eight Politburo members and three candidate members--by far the largest participation by Politburo members in a public party gathering in the post-Khrushchev period. The previous high of four members and three candidates was registered at the September 1965 plenum which approved the regime's industrial reform program.

Brezhnev's personal identification with Soviet foreign policy was further underscored by his reception of the Lenin Peace Prize,

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

announced in the central press on May Day. Moreover, his enhanced position in the leadership was reflected in a change in the Politburo listings occasioned by the elevation of Andropov to full membership in that body. In a departure from the standard alphabetical listings of Politburo members, a Moscow domestic radio broadcast of the May Day festivities in Red Square listed Brezhnev first among those on the reviewing stand atop the Lenin Mausoleum, followed by the rest of the Politburo in alphabetical order. Such a device for singling out the party leader was utilized sparingly even in the Khrushchev period, and it remains to be seen whether it will become regularized in the future.

RED STAR STRESSES MILITARY'S ROLE IN DEFENSE POLICYMAKING

In the first of a projected series of articles on Soviet military theory, RED STAR has taken a subtly partisan position on the critical issue of the military's role in the making of defense policy. Authored by Lt. Gen. I. Zavyalov, whose previous identifications suggest connections with the General Staff, the 19 April article goes over familiar ground in describing the main characteristics of Soviet military doctrine. It offers some new formulations, however, on the question of the authorship of Soviet military doctrine, suggesting that the military's role in this process is the primary one. It also suggests that the driving force behind the changes to be expected in Soviet military policy in the future will be a product more of military than of political inputs into the policymaking process. The elevation of Marshal Grechko to the Politburo should serve, at least, to strengthen any such tendencies.

Zavyalov's assignment of a primary role to the military in the formulation of Soviet military doctrine is indirect but unmistakable. He begins with an obeisance to party authority by noting that military doctrine is in "complete accordance" with party policy and that, indeed, its substance is set forth in the specific decisions of the party on military matters. He then goes on to state, however, that the "discovery and generalization" of the propositions on which party decisions are based is the task of "our military-scientific thought."

Far from leaving the matter at this level of logical innuendo, Zavyalov goes on to reinforce the implications of his definition by identifying Soviet military thought with the reigning Soviet

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 3 -

orthodoxies of the moment. He describes Soviet military doctrine as "scientific," as based on "really existing conditions," and as representing a considered "teaching" on war that has been "adopted in our country and its armed forces." Moreover, as if to place his definition beyond the reach of criticism, he asserts that "a correct, scientific interpretation of the concept of military doctrine"--presumably the one he had just given--is an outstanding expression of the creativity of Soviet military doctrine.

The connection between these scholastic formulas and the practical issues of policymaking lies in the peculiar Soviet concept of military doctrine. The Soviets have consistently presented military doctrine as virtually indistinguishable from military policy itself. Thus in crediting the military with a primary role in the formulation of military doctrine, Zavyalov is assigning them, in effect, a corresponding responsibility for the formulation of military policy. According to his own definition, which corresponds in this respect with that of other Soviet writers, the military-technical aspect of doctrine--that is, the part that would seem to fall peculiarly within the province of the military's professional expertise--includes the problems of determining the strategic nature of a possible future war, the means of waging it, how to use these means, how to equip the armed forces, and so on. In sum, it includes all the issues on which the military might be expected to have a particular institutional interest to press.

The bias toward the military which Zavyalov has introduced into his treatment of these subtle formulas is far from unprecedented in Soviet military writings. Military writers during Khrushchev's regime also tinkered with these formulas to record the military's claim to a share of responsibility for determining the nature and scope of the reforms that were then being carried out. In more recent years, there has been little evidence of military agitation on this score. The orthodox position during these years seems to have been reflected, for example, in an article by Major General Sulimov in RED STAR on 15 January 1970. Ascribing the leadership in all military affairs to the party, Sulimov went on to say that among the party's functions was "the formulation of a military doctrine in which the state's official views on the nature of a possible future war, and the conditions and means of insuring victory, are expressed." Whether Zavyalov's new formulation reflects a new military assertiveness on doctrinal and policy issues may be clarified by the subsequent installments of RED STAR's new theoretical series.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 4 -

EUROPE

MOSCOW RESERVED, EAST EUROPE MORE VOCAL ON KISSINGER SPEECH

Limited comment from Moscow and more vocal reaction from its East European allies on Presidential adviser Kissinger's 23 April speech at the annual Associated Press meeting has pictured it as an acknowledgment of the failure of NATO cold war policy under the pressure of the foreign policy of the socialist countries. Highlighting passages in which Kissinger referred to Western disagreements over economic questions and over sharing the burden of defense expenditures, Moscow and its allies have also sought to portray the speech as another U.S. effort to force economic concessions from West Europe by linking the question of the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe with the forthcoming trade and monetary negotiations.

Moscow has conveyed this view, however, largely by quoting Western comments selected to highlight alleged frictions between Washington and West European capitals. Negligible direct Soviet comment included a claim on 29 April, in the Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable, that the speech demonstrated the failure of NATO policy.

The East European allies, on the other hand, have commented at some length on the speech, emphasizing the alleged U.S. linkage of economic and military issues to wrest concessions from West Europe. Typical was the comment of the deputy chief editor of Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO, Donev, who wrote on the 28th that the point of Kissinger's "trial balloon" was a search not for a "new charter" but for "new forms to pursue the old policy of domination" by the United States.

EAST-WEST TALKS The suggestion that Kissinger's speech was in some way intended to influence the results of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was raised explicitly in a Bratislava radio commentary on the 25th. Asserting that West European capitals had received the speech with "considerable reserve," the commentator asked rhetorically if Kissinger wished to "limit the function of the European security charter, which is likely to emerge as one of the results of the CSCE."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 5 -

The Helsinki talks have not been mentioned in available Soviet comment on the speech. In fact, aside from brief references by PRAVDA's Mayevskiy on the 15th and IZVESTIYA's Matveyev on the 19th, in general articles on international developments, the talks were largely ignored by Moscow in any context during the 6-25 April adjournment. However, on the 25th, the day the talks resumed, IZVESTIYA's Goloshubov discussed at length the progress made at Helsinki, labeling the fourth round the "concluding phase" of the talks. He reviewed all the major agenda topics and noted in conclusion--as Matveyev had done on the 19th--that "certain NATO countries" want to slow down the multilateral talks in order "to force the Soviet Union to make more concessions in Helsinki."

CONFIDENTIAL

2 MAY 1973

- 6 -

CHINA

LOW-KEY CELEBRATIONS MARK MAY DAY; MOST LEADERS APPEAR

May Day celebrations in Peking followed the low-key style set last year, indicating that this may now be pro forma. Except for attending Chen I's funeral in January 1972, Mao has not been reported appearing outside his study in two years. As in 1972, there was neither a May Day editorial nor a central fireworks display. In the new style, all the active Politburo members based in Peking "joined the masses and foreign friends in the capital in gala activities in the parks." Leaders were listed according to mixed party-state rankings, with Chou En-lai at the top followed by NPC Chairman Chu Te. PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu, ranked immediately after Chou last May Day, was absent this time. Chiang Ching was listed third ahead of Yeh Chien-ying, who had been given precedence over her for the second time when she last appeared on 12 March. Politburo members Chen Hsi-lien and Hsu Shih-yu appeared at their regional bases.

With Tung's absence probably the result of ill health, the turnout among state and government leaders conveyed an impression of growing normalcy in Peking. The presence among NPC vice chairmen of Saifudin, who usually appears only in his Sinkiang bailiwick, may indicate that consultations involving the NPC have taken place. The recently rehabilitated Teng Hsiao-ping was listed with two other vice premiers who lost their Politburo status during the cultural revolution, Chen Yun and Li Fu-chun. In a telescoped view of the turbulent recent years, an NCNA account of the festivities said the celebrants hailed the country's "tremendous victories" in the cultural revolution and the "new victories in all fields of work thanks to the movement to criticize revisionism and rectify the style of work." The criticism and rectification movement has been directed against the deviations associated with Chen Po-ta and Lin Piao.

The absence of a May Day editorial does not in itself indicate leadership or policy problems, least of all in internal affairs. May Day editorials have traditionally dealt with foreign policy issues, and even before Lin's fall the regime had not felt that an editorial on this occasion was obligatory. There was no May Day editorial in 1969, but a joint editorial was issued three days later to mark the 50th anniversary of the May Fourth movement. Last year, after failing to issue a May Day editorial, Peking produced a joint editorial on 23 May to commemorate the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 7 -

30th anniversary of Mao's Yanan Talks on literature and art, which had been delivered at another time of rectification. That editorial called for "deepening the criticism of and struggle against . . . political swindlers" and denounced "pseudo-Marxist swindlers" who "waved red flags to oppose the red flag."

RED FLAG EXPLAINS LINE ON CONDUCTING RECTIFICATION

The authoritative journal RED FLAG's April issue, which coincided with the reappearance of Teng Hsiao-ping, has reflected the regime's problems in coping with the effects of the Lin Piao affair and in overcoming bewilderment and uncertainty among the cadres and masses. One article, pegged to a 1948 Mao work at another time when there had been successive campaigns against rightist and leftist deviations, explains the policy of rehabilitation and seeks to reinvigorate hesitant cadres by distinguishing shortcomings from the mortal sin of "opportunism."* Still another article, attributed to a low-level party committee and broadcast by Radio Peking on 24 April, pursues a similar aim by arguing that "criticism of revisionism" is directed only at high-level leaders who betrayed the party but that these conflicts at the top should not be reproduced in recriminations and fear at lower levels.

The second article elaborates a line, first appearing around the turn of the year, that the heresy of Lin and his cohorts ("swindlers like Liu Shao-chi") was "ultrarightist" no less than that of Liu Shao-chi and the main targets of the cultural revolution ("Liu Shao-chi and his company"). Reflecting the regime's anxiety to control the impact of the Lin purge, the criticism and rectification campaign has been conducted with the caveats that criticism must come first and only then rectification, that the target of uncompromising attack is only the narrow group of plotters for power, and that a distinction must be made between contradictions among the people and those between the people and the enemy. The RED FLAG article makes the point that the latter conflicts were concentrated at the top and must not be confused with shortcomings at lower levels. Thus, the article warns against becoming "entangled with the minor problems of the basic-level units and making the trivialities among the people themselves the target of criticism."

* See the TRENDS of 18 April 1973, pages 12-14.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

2 MAY 1973

- 8 -

RED FLAG registers the center's dissatisfaction with the development of the anti-Lin campaign, indicating that some good had been achieved in arousing "the indignation of the masses" but that "some comrades" went astray in addressing concrete issues and in mistakenly interpreting the problem as a matter of leftist and rightist views. According to the article, some comrades regarded Lin-type swindlers as ultraleftists, but they came to realize that Lin and Liu both in essence were ultrarightist. In this context the article criticizes the "two unhealthy tendencies" that resulted from an incorrect reading of the successive purges. At one time, when Lin's line was in the ascendancy, production and technical work were sacrificed to the highly politicized interests of the cultural revolution. But in early 1972, the article indicates, the attacks on Lin's line caused an overreaction in the other direction, causing cadres to relax their efforts on the ideological and political fronts. It is presumably in the interest of combating the latter tendency that Lin's heresy was redesignated one of ultrarightism in a few months ago.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

2 MAY 1973

- 9 -

INDOCHINA

With the Vietnam cease-fire entering its fourth troubled month, Hanoi continued to blame the United States and Saigon for the failure of the Paris agreement to bring peace and gave no public sign of readiness to modify its position in order to stop the fighting or encourage implementation of the political aspects of the accord. Hanoi predictably used the third monthly anniversary of the agreement, 27 April, as the occasion for an authoritative airing of its intransigent response to U.S. moves to induce communist compliance. A DRV Foreign Ministry statement that day rejected the U.S. note on communist violations, made public three days earlier, and maintained that there must be a change in U.S. policies in order to guarantee peace in Vietnam and allow the normalization of U.S.-DRV relations.

The uncompromising communist position on the situation in South Vietnam was set forth in detail in a six-point PRG proposal, presented at the 25 April session of the GVN-PRG consultative conference in Paris, which gave priority to the creation of a favorable climate in South Vietnam for the political struggle against the GVN.

Hanoi's resolve to pursue its long-standing goals was reaffirmed by DRV leaders in speeches before an audience gathered in the North Vietnamese capital for an unprecedented May Day extravaganza. Premier Pham Van Dong and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap routinely extolled the "great victory" represented by the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

HANOI SCOT'S U.S. NOTE, RAISES DOUBT ON KISSINGER-THO MEETING

The 27 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement, summing up Hanoi's view of the first three months since the signing of the Paris agreement, charged that "very serious and systematic" U.S. and Saigon violations of the accord have caused peace in South Vietnam to be "directly threatened" and have created an increasingly strained situation in Indochina. Like the DRV Foreign Ministry's 16 April note to the participants in the 12-power international conference on Vietnam, the foreign ministry statement recounted alleged U.S. and GVN violations and, in routine fashion, accused the United States of refusing to end its military involvement in Indochina and give up the scheme of carrying out the Nixon Doctrine and "imposing neocolonialism." Providing Hanoi's official response to the U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 11 -

Politburo member Le Duc Tho in mid-May. Hanoi's apparent failure to agree to the higher-level consultations was made clearer on the 28th, when Hanoi media publicized a "communique" from the DRV embassy in Paris which said the embassy had no information on the press reports of the Kissinger-Tho meeting and charged that "this is a case of unilateral information by the United States."

The continued exacerbation of U.S.-DRV relations in the wake of the 27-30 April meetings between Sullivan and Thach was pointed up on 2 May when Hanoi reported that the DRV delegation to the U.S.-DRV economic talks had left Paris for Hanoi. The delegation had stayed on in Paris since the suspension of the talks on 19 April, presumably in hopes that they would resume.

PRG OFFERS SIX-POINT PROGRAM AT CONSULTATIVE MEETING WITH GVN

The 25 April GVN-PRG consultative meeting in Paris, held two days before the end of the 90-day period suggested in the Paris agreement for the resolution of political issues, provided a forum for both sides to put their platforms on the record. Starting with the general framework of the Paris agreement, each spelled out its respective program to deal with outstanding problems in such a way as to assure the advancement of its paramount interests. The PRG's six-point proposal gave priority to achieving conditions in South Vietnam suitable for the pursuit of a political struggle and made it clear that the communists do not wish to participate in general elections, called for in the Paris accord, until the situation in the South has drastically altered.

The PRG's first point, calling for strict implementation of the cease-fire, routinely placed the onus on Saigon for the continued fighting. Thus, it stated that both parties must cease hostilities, but then specified that the GVN armed forces must "end at once all their land-grabbing operations, all bombing and shelling, all hostile acts, all terrorism, coercion, and reprisals, and immediately bring back their units to the positions held before 28 January 1973."

The return of civilian prisoners ranked next in the PRG's list, underlining the importance the communists have consistently given this issue. The contrast between communist and GVN priorities was stressed in a 29 April commentary in NHAN DAN, pegged to the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 12 -

GVN's statement at the 25 April meeting, which scored Saigon for failing to "say a single word about the two major and urgent problems in South Vietnam at present--that is, an effective cease-fire and the complete return of the civilian personnel detained by the Saigon administration."

The PRG's third point, advocating the assurance of democratic liberties, provided a communist interpretation of Article 11 of the Paris agreement, which calls in very general terms for the guarantee of basic freedoms such as the freedom of movement, speech, political activities, and the press. Spelling out conditions the communists undoubtedly view as necessary to the pursuit of a political struggle, the PRG proposal specified, for example, that freedom of movement must encompass the right to move between the zones of the two sides, that there must be freedom to "engage in political activities" in both zones, and that censorship must be ended and "newspapers of different trends" be allowed to circulate in both zones. The 29 April NHAN DAN article deprecated the Saigon proposal on this score, noting that it merely suggested restoring the freedoms that had been limited by the war and charging that the GVN was "ignoring" the liberties defined by the Paris agreement.

The PRG's evident concern to guarantee protection for the activities of Saigon's opponents was also reflected in the fourth point, which called for the formation of the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. This point summarized Article 12 of the accord on the establishment of the council and went on to advocate agreement on its structure, membership, working regulations, and the "inviolability of the council members."

The PRG proposal underlined the priority of the first four points by presenting them as the "first stage" in a settlement and by stipulating that they must be "fully implemented" before the beginning of the second stage, which would include the final two points: general elections and the question of disposition of armed forces. The importance of assuring democratic liberties prior to elections was also pressed again in the proposal's fifth point on elections.

The fifth point reaffirmed the PRG's willingness to reach an agreement with the GVN on the institutions to be set up through general elections; but it glaringly reflected the difficulty in doing so when it recalled the PRG's former proposal--adamantly

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

2 MAY 1973

- 13 -

rejected by Saigon--for general elections for a constituent assembly to work out a constitution and set up a new government. This proposal has not been advocated in Vietnamese media since last October, prior to the start of the U.S.-DRV negotiations leading to the Paris accord.

The PRG's six-point program offered no time frame for the proposed elections; by contrast, the GVN proposal at the 25 April meeting suggested a precise timetable for steps leading to general elections on 26 August 1973--seven months after the conclusion of the Paris accord. Prior to the signing of the peace agreement, DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, in an 18 October 1972 interview with NEWSWEEK, and PRC Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh, in a 4 December 1972 interview with TIME, had both indicated that it would be "reasonable" to have a six-month delay between a cease-fire and elections. Neither interview was publicized in Vietnamese communist media.

The PRG's sixth point, dealing with "the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam," is a concession to Saigon's repeated demand that the two sides deal with the problem of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. The proposal merely repeated Article 13 of the Paris agreement stipulating that the two sides should settle the question of Vietnamese armed forces in the South and that their discussions include such questions as measures to reduce military effectives and to demobilize troops being reduced. The 29 April NHAN DAN commentary on the GVN proposal reiterated the communists' opposition to the demand for the withdrawal of forces, calling it "at variance with the spirit and letter of the Paris agreement."

MASSIVE HANOI MAY DAY CELEBRATION HAILS COMMUNIST "VICTORY"

Hanoi's May Day celebration gave every appearance of a calculated effort to present a united leadership and to boost public confidence in the situation in Vietnam. Exultation over the "great victory" in resisting the United States provided the keynote for the unprecedented festivities. Commentaries pointed out that the celebration came at a time when, for the first time in 115 years, Vietnam had been "freed from all foreign aggressor troops"; and this theme of historic victory was underscored in the rally speech by Premier Pham Van Dong and the Order of the Day address by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap. This is the first time that Giap has addressed a May Day meeting and the first time in a decade

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

2 MAY 1973

- 14 -

that the main speaker on this occasion was a Politburo member. (Truong Chinh delivered the main address in 1963 and Pham Van Dong last had this role in 1962.)

The rally also prompted a turnout of all the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Politburo members currently in North Vietnam and other high-level officials.* The VNA report on the rally gave unusually high praise to the top echelon of Hanoi's government and party leaders, noting that "outstanding comrades-in-arms and successors of President Ho Chi Minh, veteran revolutionaries steeled in the fire of struggle," were on the reviewing stand. Those singled out by the report were President Ton Duc Thang, Vice President Nguyen Luong Bang, and the top members of the Politburo: Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Le Duc Tho, and Nguyen Duy Trinh. Hanoi is not known to have previously used such plaudits for its leaders on such occasions, although Ton Duc Thang and Nguyen Luong Bang have previously been referred to as comrades-in-arms of Ho.

VNA claimed that the May Day rally was attended by nearly 100,000 people from all over the country--the largest turnout since the U.S. air strikes in 1965 prompted the curtailment of such gatherings. In another departure, Hanoi staged a massive parade of military and civilian components, viewed by "hundreds of thousands" of people. Hanoi has not held a May Day parade since 1960 and is not known to have ever staged a military parade to mark the occasion.

Pham Van Dong's speech routinely reaffirmed that the DRV and PRG "have always strictly respected and scrupulously implemented the Paris agreement," and he repeated charges of U.S. and Hanoi violations. However, the main thrust of his speech conveyed jubilation over the withdrawal of U.S. troops and certainty of eventual victory. On the sensitive issue of foreign assistance, Dong maintained that "we will always rely mainly on our own forces while striving for assistance in various fields from the Soviet Union, China, and the other fraternal socialist countries."

* Among the officials present at the rally was VWP Secretariat member Nguyen Van Tran who, according to a report in the 28 April PRAVDA, just concluded an 18-27 April visit in the Soviet Union. He met with Grishin and, according to the report, "acquainted himself with the CPSU's work experience in the field of party leadership of industry and municipal services." Available Hanoi media did not mention the visit.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 15 -

Reiterating a point made in his National Assembly speech in February, Dong added: "We are prepared to cooperate in the economic field with all countries desiring to cooperate with us on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty, equality, and mutual benefit." Dong's concern about aid was again reflected in his brief closing statement to the rally which included an appeal to socialist countries and the world's peoples for "greater sympathy, support, and assistance."

As in other comment in recent months, Giap's Order of the Day credited the communists' "victory" primarily to the party's "correct and creative political and military lines." He went on to note routinely that it also represents "a success of international support and solidarity." The editorial on May Day in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN not only praised the party's role but also struck a decidedly nationalistic note, claiming that "Vietnam's victory" was a triumph for Marxism-Leninism and a contribution "to further enriching the proletariat's treasure of revolutionary theories and further enriching the proletarian military science." Alluding to the indebtedness of Hanoi's communist allies, the editorial also claimed that the Vietnamese "victory" has "created more favorable conditions for the fraternal socialist countries to carry out economic construction and development and the development of national defense in peace"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 16 -

MOSCOW COMMENT CENTERS ON CONSOLIDATION OF VIETNAM PEACE

Moscow has sustained a low-key stance on events in Vietnam, offering only routine support to the DRV-PRG charges of U.S. violations of the peace agreement. Recent Soviet official pronouncements on Vietnam have stressed that the war is over and that Soviet support will be forthcoming for the consolidation of peace. While Soviet media have continued to report the Vietnamese communist charges of violations, the Soviet leadership has displayed reluctance to react to these charges directly.

The 28 April PRAVDA editorial on the recently concluded CPSU Central Committee foreign policy plenum addressed by Brezhnev made only passing mention of the communist "victory" in Vietnam and the "all-round" assistance provided by the Soviet Union. The editorial stated that the USSR "will facilitate in every way the establishment of peace in Indochina." The plenum resolution, adopted on 27 April, listed among the positive trends in world affairs the termination of "the imperialist aggression against Vietnam" and again stressed Soviet dedication to peace. These themes were reiterated in Brezhnev's May Day speech in Red Square which also recalled the "powerful" support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for the Vietnamese communists.

While focusing on an improved situation in Vietnam, the official statements relating to the plenum and the May Day festivities notably avoided any reference to violations of the peace agreement. In keeping with this stance, Moscow has to date still failed to respond officially to the DRV note of 16 April and PRG memorandum of 14 April, addressed to the participants in the 12-nation Paris conference, which detailed alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of the peace agreement.

BACKGROUND The Soviet leadership's emphasis on the positive aspects of the situation in Vietnam was clearly evident at Kosygin's 5 April press conference in Sweden. According to a report in NEW TIMES on 13 April, Kosygin, in response to a question on the possibility of renewed U.S. intervention in Vietnam, pointed to the President's statements calling for strict observance of the Paris agreements. Asked if Sweden had leveled "sharper and more critical accusations" against the United States than the Soviet Union had made, Kosygin skirted the question by noting that for many years the Soviet Union had "waged an active struggle" against aggression in Vietnam and had given great aid and support to Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 17 -

A similar reluctance to focus on alleged U.S. violations of the accords was displayed by Podgorny in remarks during PRG Foreign Minister Binh's official visit to the Soviet Union. In presenting Madame Binh with an award on 28 March, Podgorny referred only to Saigon's violations and its "attempts to sabotage" the agreement. The joint PRG-USSR communique issued on 2 April likewise avoided any reference to U.S. violations. A similar stance was taken in Ustinov's Lenin anniversary speech on 20 April.

Although TASS has duly reported the DRV and PRG charges of U.S. violations, comment on the charges has been routine and low-level. Following Xuan Thuy's meeting with Suslov on 11 April, PRAVDA reported that the latter expressed Moscow's support of the statements by the DRV on 30 March and by the PRG on 1 April criticizing the United States for violating the accords. In a TASS summary of a 29 April PRAVDA article by Valerian Skvortsov, the PRG's six-point proposal was called an "important initiative" which "opens up new possibilities for clearing the barriers that still stand in the way of the fulfillment of the agreement on Vietnam." While stressing the positive aspects of the proposal, the PRAVDA article noted that Saigon has still not released its political prisoners and that "Seventh Fleet aircraft carriers" continue to bomb Laos and Cambodia and to make overflights of the DRV territory.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

2 MAY 1973

- 18 -

PEKING RECEPTION MARKS INDOCHINA SUMMIT ANNIVERSARY

The Peking observance of the third anniversary of the Indochinese summit conference, which occasioned the usual PRC leaders' message and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial,* was rounded out by a reception on 25 April hosted by RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth and attended by Sihanouk, a strong contingent of Chinese leaders headed by Chou En-lai, and diplomatic representatives of Sihanouk's Indochinese and Korean allies. Also attending was DRV negotiator Xuan Thuy, stopping over in Peking on his way home; on the same day he had "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with Chou and Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao. In their speeches at the reception Penn Nouth, ranking Chinese military leader Yeh Chien-ying, and the PRG and DRV envoys joined in warm salutes to Sihanouk's recent tour of the Cambodian "liberated zone" while expressing each side's views on the current Indochina situation.

Penn Nouth's speech reaffirmed the FUNK's current hard line, denouncing the Phnom Penh leaders by name and deriding their "serious cabinet crisis," condemning the United States for bombing Cambodia and supporting an alleged "new massive invasion" by Saigon and Thai forces, and reiterating the FUNK's determination to continue the struggle "without compromise or retreat." This line was amplified in a FUNK radio editorial the same day denouncing President Nixon as an "international criminal chieftain" and pledging a continued armed offensive until the United States is driven out and "the gang of traitors Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, and In Tam is overthrown and completely destroyed." The Vietnamese speakers used the occasion to charge U.S. and Saigon violations of the Vietnam agreement and to invoke Indochinese solidarity as a counterweight to "perfidious schemes" and "insolent threats" by the United States and its allies to thwart the Indochinese struggle.

Yeh Chien-ying took a rather gloomy view of the situation, noting that the Indochinese "are still faced with arduous fighting tasks" and that the Vietnam and Laos agreements have been beset with "continual obstruction" by the United States and Saigon. Yeh mentioned the U.S. suspension of minesweeping and resumption of reconnaissance over the DRV, and he pointed out "in particular" that the United States "is still stepping up its armed intervention"

* The message and editorial are discussed in the TRENDS of 25 April 1973, page 6.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

2 MAY 1973

- 19 -

in Cambodia. He demanded that the United States and Saigon respect the Vietnam and Laos agreements and end "all armed intervention" in Cambodia and Laos, but he made no mention of the Lon Nol government or of a Cambodian settlement. According to NCNA's account, Yeh offered a rather bland pledge that the Chinese will "firmly support" the Indochinese struggles. VNA quoted him as reaffirming Peking's "close militant friendship and great solidarity" with the Indochinese and as promising assistance for their struggles.

Although Yeh leveled charges against the United States in some detail, the Chinese have been careful not to portray American actions as endangering the Indochina accords. Thus, NCNA's account of the 25 April NHAN DAN editorial on the summit anniversary omitted passages charging that U.S. violations were threatening the peace agreements and accusing Washington of attempting to intimidate the DRV. While carrying the text of the six-point proposal presented by the PRG representative in Paris on 25 April, NCNA deleted the charge in his introductory remarks that the United States is creating an "extremely serious" situation in Indochina. While muffling some of the anti-U.S. criticism, Peking has replayed comment on Moscow's relations with Phnom Penh that has accused the Soviets of attempting to sabotage the Cambodian struggle.

PHNOM PENH REORGANIZATION In addition to Penn Nouth's reference in his reception speech, the recent formation of a four-man council in Phnom Penh has drawn critical attacks in FUNK and PRG media that have traced the development to U.S. pressure and to General Haig's trip. A FUNK radio editorial on 24 April dwelled on the prospects of continuing dissension in Phnom Penh and called for uprisings to "trample and bury the group of traitors Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, In Tam, Cheng Heng, and their clique forever." A Liberation Radio broadcast on 30 April derided the new council as a monster given birth by the United States.

NCNA on 27 April carried an account of the reorganization that made no mention of the United States and pictured the moves as a desperate effort by Lon Nol to enlist his "political enemies" in a last-ditch struggle against the insurgents. NCNA quoted an AP report for the judgment that the reorganization will have little or no effect on the regime's "bleak prospects for survival." Peking's cautious treatment of the Phnom Penh leadership situation was reflected in the omission of Penn Nouth's remarks on the matter from the account of the 25 April reception carried in NCNA's international service.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 20 -

C U B A

CASTRO'S MAY DAY SPEECH RESTATES FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS

In a May Day speech devoted mainly to Latin American regional affairs and generally devoid of inflammatory rhetoric, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro restated established positions on relations with the United States and on trends in the hemisphere. Adamantly denying Western press reports that Cuba had softened its terms for restoration with relations with the United States, Castro insisted that the Cuban position had actually "hardened." However, the Guantanamo issue was notably muted in his speech, and the "unconditional" lifting of the U.S. "economic blockade" and the cessation of U.S. efforts to act as a "gendarme" in Latin America were again cited as Havana's conditions for normalization of relations with Washington. In his only reference to events outside the hemisphere, Castro praised the Vietnam settlement as a Vietnamese victory imposed on the United States.

On the issue of Guantanamo, which the Cuban premier had treated in notably truculent terms in his May Day speech last year, Castro said merely that the issue was overshadowed by Havana's concern over the "common problems" of Latin America. It was in this context that he declared that such problems must take precedence over Guantanamo in any discussion between Cuba and the United States and that relations between the two countries could not improve "as long as the United States insisted on creating a gendarme power in Latin America."

On trends in the hemisphere, Castro's remarks were marked by cautious optimism over the prospects for lessening U.S. influence and promoting the emergence of independent regimes. While reaffirming the socialist credentials of the Cuban revolution and inviting others to follow its lead, Castro welcomed the appearance in Chile, Peru, and Panama of independent though ideologically divergent governments which he characterized as having embarked on a "decisive new path." Without minimizing the difficulties facing such regimes and others in Latin America seeking to defend their "national interests vis-a-vis Yankee imperialism," he spoke hopefully about developments in Argentina, where the Peronists had achieved a "popular-type victory" and an "important" political change. Castro's acceptance of ideological diversity

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 21 -

was also evidenced by his offer of support to the Venezuelan government in the event of a "serious conflict" over the nationalization of its oil resources.

Castro restated the familiar Cuban positions on relations with the OAS. Disavowing any Cuban desire to return to the OAS and pointing to signs of growing opposition to the United States in that body, he observed that the debate was no longer over Cuban readmission but over the very existence of the organization in its present form. Calling for the formation of a new organization composed exclusively of Latin American countries and English-speaking Caribbean states, Castro declared: "There is no reason for the United States to be a member of that regional organization."

Castro reserved his sharpest criticism for developments in Brazil, where he alleged that the United States was attempting to establish an "imperialist enclave" for the purpose of suppressing the "liberation movement" in Latin America. He also castigated the United States for "dumping its surplus capital" in Brazil and for developing a "capitalist model" for economic exploitation in Latin America.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973

- 22 -

NOTES

CHINA-PHILIPPINES: A 29 April NCNA report on a visiting Philippine trade delegation, led by members of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce, represents Peking's first coverage of contacts with the Philippines since the declaration of martial law by the Marcos government last September. The report said that the group was visiting China under the auspices of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, that it had attended the Canton trade fair, and that it had been feted at a banquet in Peking on 29 April hosted by a vice chairman of the council and attended by representatives of the foreign trade and foreign affairs ministries. There was no description of the atmosphere surrounding the visit. While eschewing any inflammatory propaganda, Peking had conveyed mild disapproval of the Marcos government's declaration of martial law in a lone NCNA report last September that replayed foreign press comment critical of Marcos and called attention to demonstrations against his regime. Peking at that time also suspended its reporting of "friendly" exchanges in Sino-Philippine people's diplomacy.

WATERGATE DEVELOPMENTS: Neither Moscow nor Peking has mentioned the White House staff resignations or President Nixon's 30 April address on the Watergate affair. Peking has been silent from the outset, and Moscow's earlier coverage was negligible. The last monitored mention in Soviet media was on 29 April, when PRAVDA carried a TASS report on FBI Director Gray's resignation. Other communist media have shown less reticence. Reports of the latest events have been monitored from all the East European countries except Albania and Bulgaria. Some harsh comment has come from East Germany and Czechoslovakia in particular, playing up the involvement of top-level White House officials and reporting dissatisfaction in the United States over the President's handling of the affair. By and large, however, East European media have treated the President's personal role in a gingerly fashion. Vietnamese communist media, by contrast, have cited Western sources to depict the President's national leadership role as "threatened." Hanoi radio on 1 May cited the BBC in observing that "the future of some high-ranking officials, and probably that of President Nixon himself, seems to be at stake." Havana has commented caustically and at length, with PRENSA LATINA saying on 1 May that the affair had by no means reached its culmination and that evidence implicating the President himself was likely to emerge.

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