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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
14 MARCH 1973

F B I S

TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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
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14 MARCH 1973
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14 MARCH 1973

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 11 MARCH 1973

<u>Moscow (2974 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1237 items)</u>	
International Women's Day	(--)	12%	Domestic Issues (40%) 56%
Vietnam	(14%)	9%	International Women's Day (--) 20%
South Yemen Prime Minister in USSR	(--)	7%	Vietnam (32%) 4%
China	(7%)	5%	NCNA Condemnation of New USSR Place Names in Far East (--) 4%
Ponomarev Speech on 125th Anniversary of Communist Manifesto	(--)	3%	Pyongyang City Delegation in PRC (1%) 3%
Middle East	(4%)	3%	PRC-Spain Diplomatic Relations (--) 3%
Chile Elections	(1%)	3%	Cambodia (7%) 2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi and the PRG continue to complain about a host of alleged allied violations of the peace agreement, and U.S. operations to remove mines in North Vietnamese waters have been criticized as inadequate and too slow. Comment warning that the policies of the Saigon government prolong the danger of the outbreak of a new war includes a 9 March NHAN DAN editorial which belabored the GVN for alleged repression of opposition forces and asserted that the political and military questions cannot be separated. Vietnamese communist media have reported, without comment, the arrival in Paris of the DRV delegation to the U.S.-DRV Economic Commission talks, opening on the 15th, and the departure for France of a PRG delegation to the GVN-PRG Consultative Conference, due to begin on the 19th.

Moscow has continued to express satisfaction over the outcome of the 12-nation Paris conference and low-level comment persists in pressing the notion that the Vietnam peace agreement should pave the way for the establishment of a collective security system in Asia. Brief reports of DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's Moscow stopover en route to Hanoi from Paris routinely said that during a meeting with Politburo member Kirilenko views were exchanged on the further development of fraternal relations under the circumstances of the peace accord.

Peking has maintained its low profile on Vietnam developments. Routine publicity for DRV Foreign Minister Trinh's 10-12 March stopover in Peking en route home noted that at a reception on the 11th he thanked the Chinese for their support at the Paris conference and jabbed at the "U.S.-backed Saigon regime" for obstructing the Vietnam agreement. Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien was reported as having lauded the conference in standard terms and reiterated the stock promise of continued PRC backing.

DRV LINKS POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF PEACE AGREEMENT

The 9 March NHAN DAN editorial indicting the policies of the Saigon government stressed the importance of insuring democratic rights in South Vietnam and reiterated that the peace accord "has laid a stable and legal basis for the struggle for freedom and democracy." The editorial seemed to serve notice that the cease-fire cannot stand unless the political aspects of the accord are lived up to. Maintaining that "the political and

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military aspects cannot be separated from one another," it repeated the warning, voiced periodically in the past two weeks, that fighting might be resumed:

as long as the Nguyen Van Thieu clique clings to its fascist policy and uses violence to repress freedom and democracy and trample on our compatriots' right to live, conditions will be lacking for the South Vietnamese parties to implement the Paris agreement, the war situation will be prolonged, and the danger of an outbreak of war will remain.

The editorial raised the issue of U.S. responsibility only briefly, asserting that "the U.S. Government, which has placed the Nguyen Van Thieu clique in a position to run the neocolonialist ruling machinery in Saigon, also cannot shirk its responsibility."

Hanoi and the PRG have continued to publicize alleged GVN military actions in violation of the cease-fire agreement, and issued official protests about some specific incidents. Thus, VNA on the 9th reported that Dang Van Thu, deputy head of the PRG delegation to the central four-party Joint Military Commission (JMC), had sent a memorandum on the previous day to the U.S. and GVN delegations asking them to reply to a 6 March note requesting the investigation of an alleged GVN naval attack south of Cua Viet, Quang Tri Province, on 4 March, and subsequent air and naval bombardment of the area. The note on the 6th was not publicized although LPA on the 5th had reported the alleged incident.

The treatment of the communist delegations to the JMC has continued to draw fire, and GVN restrictions on newsmen attempting to meet with the communist JMC delegates were protested by the PRG delegation's spokesman. An 11 March Hanoi broadcast complained about the failure of the Saigon delegate to the JMC to agree to a joint appeal for the implementation of Article 4 of the cease-fire protocol--the article calling for commanders of the opposing military forces to meet in areas where the forces are in contact and reach agreements on temporary measures to avert conflict and to ensure supply and medical care. Declaring that the issue had been raised at JMC meetings since 7 February, the broadcast pressed the position that such meetings between commanders should generally be held at the basic levels of the company and battalion. It charged that Saigon had attempted to avoid such local consultations by proposing that meetings be held instead at the military region and division levels.

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VIETNAMESE PRISONERS Despite Saigon's move on 7 March to increase the number of POW's to be returned in the current phase, Hanoi and the PRG have continued to point to problems in the exchange of military prisoners.* They noted Saigon was to return the larger number of prisoners beginning on 8 March in Quang Tri, Bong Son, Duc Pho, and Tam Ky. However, a 10 March note from Tran Van Tra, the head of the PRG delegation to the JMC, charged that the ARVN had repeatedly attacked the Duc Pho and Tam Ky sites and raised the possibility that the scheduled 11 March POW exchange in those areas would be canceled. VNA on the 12th claimed that on the previous day a JMC fact-finding team visited Duc Pho, Quang Ngai Province, and "collected full evidence" on ARVN attacks on the PRG zone there. A 13 March VNA report indicated that the allied delegations on the previous day had refused to sign a statement on the results of the investigation but had agreed to ask the ICCS to send a team to the area.

The issue of Vietnamese civilian prisoners continues to be raised, with Hanoi and the PRG claiming that Saigon is detaining hundreds of thousands of political prisoners and is trying to avoid releasing them. A NHAN DAN commentary on the 11th asserted that "by deliberately delaying the return of captured civilian personnel, the United States and the Saigon administration are seriously violating the Paris agreement, and pursuing their scheme of establishing a fascist regime opposed to peace, national concord, and the aspiration of the Vietnamese people." In this same vein, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 7th had seen Saigon's policies toward civilian prisoners as part of allied efforts to "insure that only one power group exists in the South--that is, the fascist Nguyen Van Thieu dictatorship, a tool employed by U.S. neocolonialism."

U.S. SCORED FOR PACE OF MINE CLEARING, SUPPLYING ARMS TO GVN

On 8 March, two days after U.S. mine-clearing operations began in the Haiphong area, Hanoi complained that the pace of the U.S. efforts was too slow, claiming that 20 U.S. vessels and dozens of helicopters had succeeded in exploding only one of the 8,000 mines. At the same time, Hanoi derided Secretary Rogers' remarks

* The dispute over the number of communist prisoners to be released is discussed in the 7 March 1973 TRENDS, page 3.

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before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 6 March suggesting that ships were able to depart from Haiphong because of the U.S. mine-clearing operations. Another Hanoi report on the 12th claimed that from 6 to 11 March only three mines had been detonated. Suggesting that North Vietnam will demand more thorough disposition of the mines, the report complained that "the Americans still avoid using methods to remove or deactivate mines permanently." Noting a 9 March Defense Department suggestion that the mines had become inactive, the report pointed out that "the Americans did not use any methods to prove that their mines had become permanently inactive."

Hanoi did not report the departure of six Soviet ships; however, TASS on the 5th and IZVESTIYA on the 6th reported they had left Haiphong and that four more were preparing to go. IZVESTIYA noted that a special staff of the Far East Maritime Steamship Line from Vladivostok is in charge of operations to get ships, irrespective of registration, out of the DRV ports. On 13 March Moscow's domestic service reported that a Soviet ship had docked in the harbor of Haiphong for the first time since the mining began in May 1972.

WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS, WEAPONS Hanoi and the PRG reported on 11 March that the JMC military subcommission had agreed to organize joint groups to supervise the withdrawal of U.S. and foreign troops. The absence of such supervision has been the subject of repeated communist criticism since mid-February. Not content with the agreement on supervising the troop withdrawal, the reports go on to score the United States and Saigon for failing to agree with a further PRG request that the joint group determine whether or not the withdrawing troops take along their weapons and other war materiel. They charged that allied refusal to meet this request indicates that the United States and Saigon are scheming to illegally leave the weapons in South Vietnam.

Another Hanoi broadcast on the 11th cited a Japanese report two days earlier that the United States was transporting ammunition from Japan to South Vietnam. The radio charged that such unilateral introduction of munitions prior to the formation of a government through elections and without supervision is a "grave violation" of Article 7 of the Paris agreement and is aimed at encouraging Saigon to violate the cease-fire. Similar views were set forth in a 17 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary which also labeled as

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"slanders" Pentagon charges that the DRV and PRG have "undertaken acts for military purposes." Hanoi and PRG have not responded directly to recent statements by U.S. spokesmen on communist infiltration of troops and materiel.

DRV CONFERENCE SETS FLOOD CONTROL, DIKE MAINTENANCE TASKS

Hanoi radio on 7 March reported on a "recent" conference called by the Premier's Office to discuss the tasks of dike maintenance and flood prevention and control for 1973. According to the broadcast, the conference also praised "great achievements" in dike maintenance during the previous year, claiming that the people had not only quickly repaired bomb damage to the dikes but had also "completed the dike building plan" and "finished the building of protective dikes according to planned norms." A similar conference last year, reported by Hanoi radio on 15 March 1972, had stressed the implementation of both short- and long-term measures for controlling floods, especially flash floods. This year's conference again emphasized the need to control "such great flood disasters as those of 1971." The general tasks remain the same as last year's-- strengthening the dikes, building diversionary and storage systems, and clearing river beds of obstructions.

In a speech to the conference, Vice Premier Do Muoi, who presided over last year's meeting, expressed concern over delays in carrying out this year's tasks. The vice premier suggested the nature of some specific problems when he urged closer guidance of work at local levels, careful implementation of Central Committee resolutions, mobilization of workers and the proper equipment to do the job, strict quality control, and adherence to regulations. Reflecting a perennial concern, he also reminded local levels that they must "resist the subjective thought that dikes have been built high in recent years, that there will be no big floods and typhoon this year, and so forth."

Do Muoi described the clearing of the river beds as "a great problem . . . requiring careful calculation" and called for intensive efforts to remove collapsed bridges and other obstructions. The report on the conference suggested that longer-range attention was being given to the problem of opening the river channels when it noted that the Water Conservancy Ministry had initially stepped up the tasks of exploring river beds, clearing soil deposits, and working out projects and concrete plans to dredge and manage river sections and river entrances clogged by soil deposits.

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CAMBODIA: SIHANOUK'S FRONT PRESSES HARD LINE ON SETTLEMENT

Following the show of flexibility by Prince Sihanouk's front in the wake of the Vietnam agreement, a hard line on a Cambodia settlement has been reflected in a subsequent spate of statements by three "ministers in the interior" as well as in pronouncements by the Peking-based contingent of the movement. Sihanouk had indicated after the signing of the Vietnam accord that his government (RGNU) was undertaking a reappraisal of its policy on the advice of its patrons, and statements issued by the RGNU had stressed a desire for a settlement while muting the uncompromising language that had previously marked its pronouncements. Beginning in mid-February, however, statements in the name of the three ministers on the front line--Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, and Hu Nim--have vehemently denounced the "sham peace" and "deceitful maneuvers about peace, cease-fire, and national concord" pursued by the United States and the Lon Nol government. The RGNU leaders in China later chimed in with similarly hardline pronouncements, including Sihanouk's latest "message to the Khmer nation" on 4 March.

APPEALS FROM THE INSURGENTS The three ministers in the interior have issued five appeals since 10 February calling on monks, youths, soldiers, officials, and common people under Phnom Penh's control to make a clean break with the Lon Nol regime and denouncing "peace tricks" designed to bring about a compromise between the insurgents and the regime. Typifying this approach, the three ministers' 13 February appeal to "compatriots" under Phnom Penh's rule characterized recent peace and cease-fire moves as designed to persuade "all the patriots to lay down their weapons and extend their necks for the traitors to behead them." It went on to draw a sharp distinction between the insurgents and the Lon Nol government, concluding a harsh diatribe against the Phnom Penh leaders by asserting that "we, the patriots, do not want to hear the names of traitors Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, In Tam and consorts. Nor do we want to coexist with them. As U.S. imperialist lackeys in Cambodia, they must be completely overthrown."

The appeals have been accompanied by an outpouring of commentary by the insurgents' radio and press agency portraying mass meetings at which participants voiced support for the appeals and rejected a cease-fire. The insurgents' media disseminated a 25 February communique from the office of Khieu Samphan declaring that "liberated" areas have now expanded to 90 percent of the territory

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of Cambodia and include 5.5 million people, an upward-revised claim that underscores the intransigent line toward the Lon Nol government.* A 4 March radio commentary pointed to the expanded insurgency as demonstrating that "the fate awaiting traitors Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, and In Tam in Phnom Penh and a handful of provincial cities is unnatural death and total and final collapse. They cannot escape from this fate despite frenzied military and diplomatic maneuvers by U.S. imperialism."

SPOKESMEN IN CHINA Sihanouk and RGNU officials in China were all but silent during the initial weeks of the campaign in the interior, but recently they made moves to keep pace by taking a tougher line on the settlement question. In this period Sihanouk has disappeared from public view, his last reported appearance taking place on 16 February when NCNA announced that he had left Hainan Island for Shanghai by plane that day. There has been no report that he in fact arrived in Shanghai, though his 4 March message as reported by NCNA on the 6th was datelined Shanghai. Earlier, an unusual statement to be issued in Sihanouk's name alone was transmitted by NCNA under a 27 February Peking dateline. The statement charged that the United States, contrary to the commitments assumed under the Paris agreement, has continued to supply military aid and to provide air support for the Phnom Penh regime. Demanding that the United States immediately implement Article 20 of the Paris agreement (dealing with Cambodia and Laos), the statement made no direct reference to negotiations on a cease-fire but asserted that the problem of peace in Cambodia "is not difficult to solve."

If that statement represented a move by Sihanouk to leave the door ajar for negotiations with the United States, his 4 March message--Sihanouk's only other recent pronouncement--pointedly excoriated Lon Nol and his associates as "despicable traitors" and "dogs of the worst species" and took a tough stance against negotiations with Phnom Penh. Sihanouk asserted that "the Khmer people do not and will never need to negotiate with the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-In Tam gang." Stressing the present "large-scale, violent, and incessant attacks" by the insurgent armed forces against Phnom Penh, Sihanouk asserted that "the whole world should know" that the "dirty 'republic' and the pitiable army of Lon Nol cannot escape being thoroughly wiped out soon" and that the insurgents "will carry out their struggle, arms in hands, with no retreat, compromise, or negotiations." Warning those

* The figures in use since June 1972 had been 85 percent of the territory and 5 million people.

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still working for Lon Nol to "immediately quit the sinking boat" and cross over to the insurgents, Sihanouk said that those who insist on serving Phnom Penh "will soon die an ignominious and inevitable death."

Statements recently issued in the name of the RGNU Foreign Ministry spokesman in Peking routinely protesting U.S. military actions in Cambodia have also reflected a hard line concerning a settlement. Dated 27 February, 3 March, and 8 March, the statements affirmed a determination to pursue the struggle for the goals set forth in Sihanouk's March 1970 five-point declaration on a settlement, but the latter two went further in pointedly criticizing alleged U.S.-sponsored maneuvers to bring about a compromise settlement. Peking-based RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth meanwhile, has issued only one recent statement, in the form of a 25 February message to the DRV Premier thanking him for a pledge of support for Cambodia in a 20 February report to the DRV National Assembly and attacking the "U.S. imperialists and their accomplices and lackeys" for using every means to bring about "a lame U.S. styled peace."

Peking has duly carried recent RGNU pronouncements, including shortened versions of the appeals of the ministers in the interior that included passages highly critical of a compromise settlement. In its own name, Peking has limited itself to seconding Sihanouk's 27 February statement with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 1 March charging that the United States has violated the Paris agreement by providing military aid to the Lon Nol regime and bombing the "liberated zone" in Cambodia. Commentator echoed Sihanouk's statement in saying that a settlement would not be difficult provided that the United States ceases its intervention.

Recent Moscow comment has, as usual, been restricted to brief TASS dispatches and replays of Vietnamese comment concerning American military actions in Cambodia.

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SINO - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW REACTS WITH RESTRAINT TO KISSINGER CHINA VISIT

During a period of restraint in its treatment of the China question, Moscow reacted in a low key to Dr. Kissinger's 15-19 February visit to China, giving the impression that the Soviets are taking the accelerated movement in Sino-U.S. relations in stride while needling Peking for making concessions to Washington. The Soviets have made a point of citing Washington's avowals that normalization of relations with Peking is not directed against third countries. At the same time, however, Moscow has again reflected its sensitivity to interpretations of Sino-U.S. developments as being responsive to a Soviet threat to China.

Apart from reaction to the Kissinger China visit, Moscow has been largely quiescent on the China question since delivering harsh polemical attacks on Peking in early February. Elite comment has ignored China, with the exception of a brief ideological swipe at the "Maoists" by Politburo member Shcherbitskiy in a 27 February speech in the Ukraine. Brezhnev avoided the China question during his 22-24 visit to Czechoslovakia, in contrast to his denunciations of Peking during a visit to Hungary in late November and in his keynote speech on 21 December at the USSR's semicentenary celebrations. Soviet commentators have been drawing on the latter speech as well as Brezhnev's major 20 March speech last year in expounding Moscow's line on Sino-Soviet relations.

For its part, Peking has shown little inclination to adopt a conciliatory posture toward the Soviets. In particular, Peking has engaged in polemical forays on two sensitive fronts, the border question and the Brezhnev leadership's performance.

MOSCOW ON KISSINGER CHINA VISIT

Moscow's most authoritative comment on the latest Kissinger visit to China came in a 27 February SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article by L. Zamyatin, the director of TASS and a frequent commentator on international affairs. Striking a dominant theme in Moscow's reaction, Zamyatin drew on Kissinger's press conference to argue that the United States does not intend to withdraw its forces from Taiwan even though the condition of reduced tension cited in the February 1972 Shanghai communique has been met by the Vietnam and Laos cease-fires. Subsequent Soviet comment has given considerable play to the Taiwan issue as one on which Peking made a major concession by permitting the exchange of liaison offices with

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a capital where the ROC retains its diplomatic presence. Thus, a roundup of world reaction carried in the weekly LITERATURNAYA GAZETA on 7 March highlighted the view that the agreement to exchange liaison missions represents "a considerable climbdown" from Peking's formerly adamant position and in effect amounts to acceptance of two Chinas. Soviet broadcasts to China have forcefully driven this point home.

Zamyatin raised the sensitive issue of the implications of Sino-U.S. rapprochement for the triangular relationship by charging that there are those using the press and other media to give an anti-Soviet background to Sino-U.S. developments, particularly by portraying a Soviet threat to China. Significantly, Zamyatin avoided questioning Washington's motives in this context and made a point of noting "straightaway" that Kissinger stressed that normalization of relations with Peking was not directed against a third party and that the President had made the same point previously. Zamyatin added that the Soviet leaders have stated clearly that Moscow has "no territorial or economic claims" on the PRC--the reference to economic claims presumably having been inserted in response to the announcement that there were to be talks on frozen Chinese assets in the United States and private American claims on the PRC.

As for the "mythical" Soviet threat to China, Zamyatin took particular note of "certain journalists" who have visited China and "spread these lies." Zamyatin evidently had in mind the likes of Joseph Alsop, whose writings on this score have drawn Moscow's polemical ire. In this context Zamyatin referred scornfully to a "Cairo editor," clearly meaning AL-AHRAM's Haykal, whose reports on his recent China visit have elicited a spate of Soviet attacks.* Echoing Brezhnev's 21 December remarks, Zamyatin challenged the Chinese to respond to Moscow's offers to undertake bilateral nonaggression commitments if they are really worried about a Soviet threat.

Zamyatin closed his article with the complaint that Peking tries to put any Soviet peace initiative on its procrustean bed of collusion between the two superpowers. He noted wryly that Peking's normalization of relations with the United States represents an acknowledgment of peaceful coexistence by those who had branded the Soviets as revisionists for pursuing detente policies.

* See the USSR-Egypt section of the TRENDS.

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PEKING DERIDES BREZHNEV'S "SOCIAL-IMPERIALIST" POLICIES

Having taunted the Brezhnev leadership in early February for making Politburo member Polyanskiy a scapegoat for Soviet agricultural failures, Peking returned to the attack with further denunciations that have touched on the sensitive border issue and have directed scorn at Brezhnev personally. Also during this period, the stalemate at the border negotiations was reflected in Peking's announcement on 8 March that no agreement was reached at the 18th session of the Sino-Soviet joint commission for border river navigation. The session was held from 5 January to 5 March in the Chinese town of Heiho. The two sides agreed to hold the 19th session in the Soviet Union at a date to be determined later. The failure to reach an agreement reflects the effect of the territorial dispute on the deliberations of the commission, which deals with technical matters concerning navigation.

Moscow has not reported the commission's meeting. At the end of the commission's 16th session, which lasted from 10 July to 19 December 1970, a TASS report was phrased in such a way as to suggest that some accord had been reached, but NCNA reported four days later that no agreement was registered. That was one of several instances at the time in which Peking undercut Soviet efforts to portray improvement in bilateral relations. In the case of the 17th session (6 December 1971 to 21 March 1972), as on the latest occasion, Moscow left it to the Chinese to announce the results of the session.

Two days before NCNA's 8 March announcement on the 18th session, an NCNA correspondent's article seized upon Moscow's "despicable trick" of changing place names in the Soviet Far East from Han and Manchu to Russian names as evidence of the "ambitions for aggression" of "Brezhnev and his like." After giving linguistic and historical background on several place names changed by a decree of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, NCNA cited the New York TIMES as having gone "right to the heart of the matter" in explaining the Soviet move as aimed at removing evidence that the region was once Chinese. NCNA also sarcastically noted that place names "glorifying the Tsarist aggressors" are "invaluable national treasures which must never be changed."

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The region in question comprises the areas north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri rivers that were incorporated into Tsarist Russia as a result of what Peking brands as "unequal treaties." Though the NCNA report charged that the Brezhnev leadership has manipulated place names in the interest of its "social-imperialist policy," the territorial question as a subject of current negotiations was carefully skirted. Thus, NCNA referred to "the Chinese territory occupied by Tsarist Russia" but avoided any formulation asserting Peking's present territorial claims.

The Brezhnev regime's "social-imperialist policy of aggression and expansion" figured in another NCNA correspondent's article, on the 13th, which assembled data to show that Moscow's plans for expanding the production of consumer goods have been falling well short of target. Brezhnev was repeatedly cited by name for having failed to deliver on his promises to improve the standard of living. Reflecting Peking's resentment over the Soviet buildup during the period of Brezhnev's leadership, NCNA noted that Soviet military expenditures have reached a record high since he came to power and that tens of billions of rubles have been allocated to nuclear and missile development. The article did not, however, refer to the Soviet military buildup opposite China.

Repeating the pattern of recent years, Moscow reported that the Chinese again refused permission for Soviet embassy representatives to go to towns in northeast China to lay wreaths at graves of Soviet servicemen on the occasion of USSR Armed Forces Day (23 February). As in 1972, Peking reported that Chinese provincial officials laid wreaths at the Soviet graves in those towns. In addition, this year NCNA reported that representatives of local branches of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association participated in the wreath-laying ceremonies. This organization, one of the victims of the cultural revolution and its shattering effect on Sino-Soviet relations, had all but disappeared from view. In a rare previous reference, Radio Peking's Russian service on 8 December 1971 carried a message from the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association to its Moscow counterpart expressing condolences on the death of the chairman of the Soviet organization. However, that message had not been carried by NCNA.

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The revival of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association's role marks a step toward normalization of relations, but Peking's denunciations of Brezhnev's stewardship of Soviet affairs hardly augur well for a breakthrough on fundamental issues. The reconstitution of the friendship organization follows a general trend toward reconstruction of organizations in China that were destroyed during the cultural revolution.

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MOSCOW ASSAILS HAYKAL FOR "ANTI-SOVIET" CHINA ARTICLES

Egyptian editor Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, who has long irritated Moscow with his analyses of Soviet-Egyptian relations, has now provided the last straw in his recent series of AL-AHRAM articles on his Far East trip and the publication of a lengthy interview with Chou En-lai. While Moscow in the past has responded with implicit criticism of the AL-AHRAM chief editor,* Haykal's China articles prompted a campaign in Soviet media seemingly designed to defend its Middle East policies to the Arabs in reply to Haykal's "tendentious, lying, unfriendly statements," his "slander" of Soviet policy toward the Arabs, and his publicity for "Chinese propaganda fabrications."

Haykal's articles on 21, 23, and 25 February, including the Chou interview on the 23d, first drew blood in a Moscow broadcast in Arabic to Algeria on 5 March, followed in quick succession by a Borisov article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA on the 7th and an Osipov article in IZVESTIYA on the 10th. Both articles have been broadcast in Arabic, and that in IZVESTIYA was summarized in a Mandarin broadcast on the 10th. Still another article, by Yuriy Potomov in the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM, was reported by TASS on the 8th and briefly summarized in Arabic the same day.

With such publicity aimed at Arab audiences, Moscow displayed obvious concern over the influence Haykal's articles might have on Arab opinion. At the same time, the Soviet commentators were at pains to demonstrate that he does not speak for the Egyptian Government or for public opinion.

The propagandists conceded Haykal's prestige but attacked him personally as well as denouncing his opinions. In IZVESTIYA, Osipov acknowledged that Haykal was a prominent figure in Egypt and it was "perfectly natural" that his "Frankly Speaking" column should be popular, since one should know the views of "one of the leading Cairo papers on questions related to the Middle East crisis." Osipov accused Haykal of vanity, "exaggerated self-importance," and indulgence in the luxury of making definitive judgments on any subject. Potomov in

* SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA had obliquely replied to Haykal last August, in a period of Soviet-Egyptian press polemics following the expulsion of the Soviet military personnel from Egypt in July. See the 30 August 1972 TRENDS pages 27-30.

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ZA RUBEZHOM complained that it was one thing for the editor's "personal" views to be expressed in his office and "quite another thing" when outlined on the pages of a mass-circulation newspaper "taking part in the formation of public opinion in the country." Potomov registered a "legitimate protest" at Haykal's attempts to distort friendly Soviet-Arab relations and to present the USSR's Middle East policy as "allegedly based on expansionism, on a striving for domination and strengthening Soviet presence." Borisov's article entitled "Parroting," in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, claimed that while Arab public opinion saw the USSR as the firm bastion of the national liberation movement, Haykal, "who claims the role of spokesman of the Arab public's views and even almost that of its leader," was trying to resist the development of Soviet-Arab relations.

The commentators distinguished between Haykal's views and the position of the Egyptian Government, pointing out that while Haykal's articles were in preparation and publication, official Soviet-Egyptian contacts were taking place in Moscow and Egypt was "extensively celebrating" the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Egyptian economic and technical cooperation agreement. Further making the distinction, the articles cited statements by President as-Sadat and other officials in praise of Soviet-Arab friendship and the "firm principles" of Egyptian-Soviet ties.

Osipov made clear in IZVESTIYA that the Soviet irritation with Haykal was no new development when he said that Haykal had sometimes offered Washington the key to a solution of the Middle East crisis, sometimes denied it the key, sometimes put it in the hands of West Europe, and "sometimes kept it in his pocket." Osipov added that Haykal sometimes praised friendship with the Soviet Union and sometimes called for a "frank dialog" with Moscow--as he did last August, for example, in the wake of the expulsion of the Soviet military advisors. He warned that Haykal's "rude distortions" of Soviet policy harmed the Egyptian people first of all, the more so since "they are often accompanied by an open expression of doubt" about the victory of the Egyptian people's just cause.

"PARROTING" OF Moscow was incensed by Haykal's repetition of
CHINESE LINE "Chinese propaganda fabrications" about the
"so-called danger to China posed by Russia."

Borisov complained in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA that Peking propaganda theses were increasingly appearing in AL-AHRAM, without attribution, and singled out the "notorious thesis of the 'two superpowers.'"

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Citing the Lebanese CP daily AN-NIDA' as stressing that the Chinese leaders were trying to separate the Arabs from their allies, Borisov charged that Haykal was trying to publicize "precisely this activity of the Maoist leadership." Moscow also took offense at Haykal for "joining Chou En-lai in allegations" that the USSR was seeking leadership of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement.

The articles accused Haykal of contradicting his own previous positions with respect to Egypt's relations with both the USSR and the PRC. Borisov cited Haykal's recent book "The Cairo Documents" to show that the "hegemonistic actions of Peking with regard to Egypt and President an-Nasir" had been "eloquently described" by Haykal. And he went back to 1963 in selecting declarations of gratitude by Haykal for Soviet assistance to the Arabs, additionally quoting an-Nasir since 1958 to illustrate his contention that an-Nasir was scarcely dead before his "closest fellow fighter" had rejected the late president's heritage and called for revising or abandoning his views.

Moscow showed itself equally irked that Haykal, employing his "favorite journalistic technique" of presenting his views by quoting others, cited "biased and untruthful statements" by Chinese officials regarding the nature of Soviet military aid.

PEKING REACTION Peking has taken note of Moscow's campaign in the usual indirect fashion in an NCNA report of editorial comment in the Kuwaiti paper AR-RA'I AL-'AMM. NCNA on 11 March quoted the paper as remarking that the Soviet Union was concentrating its attacks on Haykal, who had been accused by the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM of saying that Soviet policy in the Middle East was based on expansionism and strengthening the Soviet position in the region. The Kuwaiti paper expressed skepticism that the USSR had invested billions of dollars in the area "only for God's sake," according to NCNA, and it wondered how the Arabs could believe in "gratuitous" Soviet friendship when it opened the door for emigration of Jews to Israel. NCNA also cited the editorial as observing that the Arabs viewed the Soviet Union as almost the same as America; both stand opposed to the Arabs, for while the United States supplies weapons to Israel, the USSR supplies the manpower, which is "more dangerous."

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PALESTINIAN QUESTION

USSR APPEALS TO JORDAN FOR CLEMENCY, OUTLINES REFUGEE "RIGHTS"

Moscow has to date offered only minimal comment on the seizure of the Saudi embassy in Khartoum on 1 March and the killing of three diplomats by members of the Palestinian Black September Organization. But while one major commentator again deplored "such excessive manifestations of extremism" as the Khartoum incident, Moscow has at the same time chosen to underline its general support for the Palestinian cause. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, according to Moscow domestic service on 8 March, appealed to King Husayn on "humane grounds" to save the life of "the noted figure of the Palestinian resistance movement, Abu Dawud, and the arrested Palestinians condemned to death." TASS had reported three days earlier the Jordanian Government decision confirming death sentences meted out to Fatah leader Abu Dawud and other Palestinians arrested last month while infiltrating into Jordan in an attempt to stage a coup d'etat, and reportage on the Khartoum events had noted the Black September demands for the release of this group. TASS on the 11th reported a telegram of "profound gratitude" from Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir 'Arafat to the Supreme Soviet for its appeal.

A second gesture to the Palestinians came in a commentary broadcast in Arabic on 5 March which called for restoration of the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian Arab people. The author, Doctor of Law Igor Blishchenko, secretary of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, has occasionally in the past discussed aspects of the Middle East problem from the standpoint of international law.* This commentary preceded two others by Blishchenko on the downing of the Libyan airliner by Israel and the Israeli attacks on Lebanon, broadcast in Arabic on the 6th and 12th, respectively.

Blishchenko's views on the Palestinian people's struggle are notable for providing some definition of what Moscow consistently--and vaguely--supports as the Palestinians' "just" or "inalienable" rights--primarily, said Blishchenko, "the legitimate rights of the Arab refugees to return to their homeland, to receive compensation

* For instance, in a 28 June 1967 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article Blishchenko discussed the international legal aspects of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Tiran Straits.

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for the damage done to them, and to recover their property." The most important of these rights, he added, is that of determining their own destiny as they wish and without external interference. He explained that the Palestinians themselves "can deal with the question of the form of exercising their right to determine their own destiny"--a position consistent with Moscow's general evasiveness on the matter of a possible Palestinian state or a federated kingdom of Jordan as proposed by King Husayn last March.*

KHARTOUM EVENTS Followup attention to the Black September operation in Khartoum has been confined to TASS reports on the activities of PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat. On the 8th, TASS noted a telegram sent by 'Arafat to Egyptian President as-Sadat in which he called attention to attempts to "liquidate" the Palestinian resistance movement following the "feverish and astonishing" campaign launched by Sudanese President Numayri and King Husayn. TASS added that Numayri had charged the Fatah branch in Khartoum with complicity in the Saudi embassy seizure and the murder of three diplomats, pointing out that Fatah representatives had refuted this accusation and called the Black September responsible for the Khartoum incident. TASS the following day reported that 'Arafat had sent messages to the heads of Arab states warning that "forces hostile to the Arabs" were trying to exploit the Khartoum events to "step up the campaign" against the Palestinian peoples. Fatah, TASS said, had issued a statement urging Sudan to stop its anti-Palestine campaign and calling for a "direct bilateral dialog" to avoid aggravation of relations between the Sudanese and Palestinian peoples.

The only comment came in the weekly commentators' roundtable broadcast by Moscow's domestic service on the 11th. Former PRAVDA Middle East expert Primakov, just returned from a visit to Iraq, concluded a discourse on the Middle East conflict by trying to strike the usual balance on the question of Palestinian fedayeen activities: "We must bear in mind," he said, that Israel is occupying Arab territories and trying to thwart a settlement of the Palestinian problem, and this is "causing a growth of extremism" in the Palestinian ranks. But even so, he pointed out, "we do not justify by any means such excessive manifestations of extremism--individual terrorism aimed at nonmilitary, civilian objects and civilians." He added Moscow's customary admonition that such actions by individual elements of the Palestinian movement would harm the common Arab struggle against Israel.

* Moscow's cautious reaction to Husayn's proposal is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 March 1972, pages 32-33, and 29 March, pages 21-22.

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FRENCH ELECTIONS

USSR GIVES MIXED ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS, PRC SLIGHTS FRENCH CP

Moscow has reacted to the 11 March final round of the French parliamentary elections along the lines of preelection comment. While clearly conveying satisfaction over the continuation of the Gaullist orientation in French foreign policy, the comment has generally supported the French Communist Party (PCF) and its left-wing allies without explicitly endorsing their electoral program.

Echoing post-election statements made by the PCF leadership, TASS correspondents and Moscow radio commentators labeled the outcome a "big success" for the PCF and the leftwing parties. They reiterated the point made by the French leftwing spokesmen that despite the "reactionary" nature of the electoral system the left considerably strengthened its position in the National Assembly at the expense of the Gaullist party which, in fact, lost its absolute majority.

Moscow's attempt to have it both ways is reflected in a pair of commentaries on the 12th. Moscow radio's Lev Korolev described the election as a "great defeat" for the reactionary forces, demonstrating the advantages of "unity of action" tactics for the leftwing parties. On the question of the implications of the vote for French policy, however, he limited himself to the observation that the electorate wanted changes "in many spheres of domestic life," saying nothing about foreign policy. TASS commentator Yrasikov gave much the same mixed assessment, noting the good showing made by the opponents of the present Gaullist government, but citing, with evident satisfaction, a report that "circles close to President Pompidou" have made clear that "there will be no changes in the main orientation of French foreign policy."

NCNA REPORT Reflecting the poor state of relations between the PCF and the Chinese Communist Party, NCNA's account on the 12th of the election results scornfully omitted any reference to the French CP when, in summarizing the new National Assembly makeup, it said "the 'Leftwing Alliance' which consists of the socialist and other parties won 176 seats." Speaking at the 22d PCF Congress last December, French party leader Marchais had strongly denounced the Chinese party for its "harmful" and "anti-Soviet" policies and revealed that the Chinese, in addition to the Albanian party, had rejected a PCF invitation. NCNA's disdainful treatment of the PCF is all the more notable when contrasted with the explicit mention it made of the Chilean CP in reviewing the gains made by the Popular Unity government in the 4 March legislative elections in that country.

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EAST EUROPE

PRAGUE IMPROVES RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA

Recent high-level contacts between Czechoslovakia and two staunch critics of the August 1968 intervention, Romania and Yugoslavia, mark a further step in the detente between the orthodox Warsaw Pact countries and the two communist mavericks which began with Brezhnev's landmark visit to Belgrade in September 1971. The "unofficial" visit of Ceausescu to Prague on 6-7 March was the first by a Romanian leader to a Warsaw Pact country for purposes other than formal diplomatic functions since 1968.* Similar visits in the reverse direction had been undertaken earlier, by Husak in March 1971 and by Zhivkov in August 1972.

On a lower level, Prague sent its foreign minister Chnoupek to Bucharest on 4-9 December and to Yugoslavia on 5-8 March. This was the first visit by a foreign minister of the orthodox Warsaw Pact countries to Belgrade since 1968, thus underlining Tito's recent statement, in his interview published in VJESNIK on 23 February, that the disagreements provoked by the 1968 intervention had been "outgrown" and no longer posed difficulties for Yugoslavia's foreign policy. Also giving point to this atmosphere of reconciliation was the fact that the visit went smoothly despite obvious Yugoslav displeasure over an article in Prague's RUDE PRAVO on 3 March commemorating the anniversary of the 1878 San Stefano Treaty--a sore memory for Yugoslavia, since the treaty laid the basis for subsequent Bulgarian pretensions to historical rights over Macedonia.

Soviet media carried brief reports on Ceausescu's visit, including a Prague-dated TASS summary of the final communique in PRAVDA on the 10th under the heading, "In the Interests of Cooperation."

* The previous visits were occasioned by the signing of friendship treaties or the meeting of Warsaw Pact member states. Thus, Ceausescu visited Sofia to sign a new 20-year treaty in November 1970 and hosted, for such treaty signing in Bucharest, the USSR's Kosygin in July 1970, Hungary's Kadar in February 1972, and the GDR's Honecker in May 1972. Ceausescu's brief trip to Moscow in May 1970 for unspecified "talks" was evidently related to the treaty signing which took place in Bucharest in July.

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CEAUSESCU IN PRAGUE The statement issued at the close of Ceausescu's Prague visit, carried in **RUDE PRAVO** and **SCINTEIA** on 8 March, described the talks between Husak and Ceausescu as "comradely and cordial." The two leaders' talks in Bucharest in March 1971 had been described less warmly as "sincere and comradely."

The Prague talks, like the earlier ones in Bucharest, were attended by hard-lining CPCZ Politburo member and secretary Vasil Bilak. Also present this time were Romanian Foreign Trade Minister Patan and CSSR State Planning Commission Chairman Hula--underscoring the economic aspect of the deliberations. The communique was obscure on international issues, referring only to an exchange of views on "certain topical questions of the current international situation and the international communist and workers movement." It made no claim that the talks had produced a unanimity of views, but it said they had contributed to bilateral cooperation between the two parties on the basis of "Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." The statement concluded with an announcement that the Romanian leader had "renewed" an invitation to Husak to pay an "official" visit to Bucharest.

Although there was no mention in the statement of the phrase "equality, sovereignty, and independence" in international communist relations--the codeword in Romanian usage for independence from Moscow's domination--this omission was partially amended in an article on the visit in the 9 March **SCINTEIA** which added the words "equality and mutual respect" to the qualities specified in the communique as characterizing the two countries' mutual relations.

CHNOUPEK IN YUGOSLAVIA The communique issued at the end of Foreign Minister Chnoupek's visit to Yugoslavia hailed the "positive" developments which had been registered in bilateral economic relations. It admitted the existence of continued differences in both domestic and foreign policy but said these differences should not hinder increased cooperation "in all fields of mutual interest." It also said the two foreign ministers informed each other "about their assessments and stands" on international topics and detailed aspects agreed upon in regard to Indochina, the Middle East, and a European Security Conference.

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Using terminology absent in the Ceausescu-Husak communique, Chnoupek and Yugoslav foreign minister Minic agreed on adherence to "equality, independence, sovereignty, and noninterference" in bilateral relations. The communique noted that Minic had been invited to make an "official" visit to the CSSR, and Prague radio on the 8th reported that at a meeting that day between Chnoupek and Tito a visit by Husak to Yugoslavia "was agreed upon and should take place not later than this year."

The CPCZ party daily RUDE PRAVO had struck a sour note on the eve of the visit by publishing an article on 3 March effusively commemorating the anniversary of the 1878 San Stefano Treaty. The article did not directly mention that the San Stefano settlement had awarded Macedonia--now part of Yugoslavia--to Bulgaria, a move that was nullified only four months later when the Treaty of Berlin in July 1878 restored Macedonia to Turkish rule. Bulgaria's persistent commemoration of San Stefano, with unmistakable overtones of a claim to continued rights to Macedonia, has regularly given rise to public protest on the part of Belgrade.

The authoritative Belgrade BORBA on the 8th complained that the RUDE PRAVO article "provoked astonishment among the Yugoslav public," coming as it did "immediately prior" to Chnoupek's visit. The CSSR foreign minister, the paper added, had expressed "regret" over the article, during his bilateral talks in Belgrade, and gave assurances that the article, by RUDE PRAVO's Sofia correspondent Stano, "does not represent official CSSR views."

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UN SECURITY COUNCIL

CUBA SUGGESTS BROAD AGENDA FOR PANAMA CITY MEETING

In a departure from earlier commentary, two recent PRENSA LATINA commentaries have indicated Havana's interest in broadening the agenda of the UN Security Council session scheduled to meet in Panama City on 15-21 March beyond the issue of the U.S. presence in the Canal Zone. The commentaries have urged discussion of other "colonial" enclaves in Latin America and have intimated that questions concerning the U.S. Guantanamo naval base and the "U.S. commercial and financial blockade" may be raised. Previously, Havana comment on the meeting had focused exclusively on the Canal Zone issue, stressing that the conclave would serve as a useful international forum for denunciation of the U.S. "colonialist occupation" and that Panama had placed the United States on the defensive by gaining approval of the meeting in the face of U.S. reservations.

An 8 March PRENSA LATINA commentary argued that Panama, in raising the issue of the Canal Zone and "protesting the colonial regime imposed by the United States in this militarily and economically occupied strip of land," had opened "a debate that will go beyond geographical boundaries." It went on to assert that "other colonial cases" in the hemisphere should be raised at the meeting. The first among these was the independence of Puerto Rico--a cause long championed by Havana at international forums. Other colonial enclaves mentioned as worthy of consideration by the Panama City session were Belize, Surinam, French Guiana, and islands of the Lesser Antilles under European control.

The following day a PRENSA LATINA commentary by Lionel Martin hinted at other issues that might be raised at the Security Council session by the so-called "little entente" of Latin American states comprised of Cuba, Panama, Peru and Chile. Alleging that the "little entente" seeks to keep Washington "on the defensive until a whole host of questions is solved," Martin observed:

The Panama question is only one. There are also the problems of the U.S. Guantanamo naval base on Cuban territory and the U.S. commercial and financial blockade, presented so poignantly by President Allende of Chile in his recent UN speech.

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Defining the members of the "little entente" as states which had "won the wrath of the United States and suffered some retaliatory punishment" and had demonstrated a "disposition to fight back," Martin predicted that Washington would be "confronted at every turn" by the grouping which could well "end the decade by being not so little." Another PRENSA LATINA commentary the same day alleged that the Central American states were "alarmed" by the prospect of the upcoming meeting and as "pawns showing solidarity with the king" would back the United States on the issue of the Canal Zone. It concluded, however, that Panama could "count on the solidarity of Cuba, Chile and Peru."

MOSCOW AND PEKING Routine Soviet comment on the meeting has touched only on the Canal Zone issue, upholding the legitimacy of Panamanian claims. Peking has not commented on the subject, but NCNA has carried items reporting the Panamanian position on the Canal Zone. Neither Moscow, Peking nor Havana has touched on issues that may be raised in Panama City on which they take divergent stands: the 200 mile territorial water limit and the Latin American nuclear-free zone.

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U S S R

MOLDAVIA STRENGTHENS KOLKHOZ COUNCIL ON EXPERIMENTAL BASIS

Having gained the approval of the CPSU Central Committee, Moldavia convened a republic congress of kolkhozniks ahead of schedule, assigned control of kolkhozes and interkolkhoz organizations to the republic kolkhoz council, and removed the latter from under the control of the agriculture ministry. The decision to strengthen the kolkhoz councils was approved as an experiment, according to Bodyul's speech at the congress, suggesting that the Moldavian innovation will not be introduced immediately or widely in other republics. Nevertheless, its national significance was underscored at the 5 March session of the USSR Kolkhoz Council, which heard a report on the Moldavian "experiment in improving leadership of kolkhoz production" and elected Agriculture Minister Polyanskiy as new council chairman.

The CPSU Central Committee apparently approved the Moldavian innovation in January--about the same time it decided to remove Agriculture Minister Matskevich, a longtime opponent of any transfer of power from his ministry to elective kolkhoz agencies. Following Matskevich's removal, the Moldavian kolkhoz council met on 6 February to approve an "initiative of kolkhozes and interkolkhoz enterprises backed by the CPSU Central Committee" granting the kolkhoz councils power over kolkhozes and interkolkhoz associations. The meeting also decided to convene rayon conferences of kolkhozniks on 20-25 February and a republic kolkhoz congress in early March, according to the 8 February SOVIET MOLDAVIA. The following day Bodyul addressed a kolkhoz report-and-election meeting to support the innovation and announce its approval by Moscow. At this meeting and at subsequent local conferences, the notion of making the councils "single organs" with "full responsibility" for administration of kolkhozes and interkolkhoz organizations was endorsed.

Nothing was said about the future role of the agriculture ministry and other agricultural agencies, but Bodyul indicated in a speech reported in SOVIET MOLDAVIA on 3 March that the councils would have wide ranging authority. He explained that they would decide all questions of kolkhoz life, receive plan assignments from the state and levy them on farms, set norms and pay scales, distribute equipment, manage the seed, insurance, fodder and food funds and investments for interkolkhoz development. His speech also revealed

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that the councils would assume control over the liquid assets and fixed capital owned by the 217 interkolkhoz enterprises and associations in the republic.

Although Bodayul described the reorganization as a move to more "democratic" forms of management, the newly elected leadership of the councils simply represented a shift away from exclusive domination by the agriculture ministry. For example, Moldavian Agriculture Minister I.N. Berezhnoy delivered the report at the congress but was not reelected council chairman or even a member of its 12-man presidium, and at some rayon conferences kolkhoz chairmen replaced rayon agricultural administration heads as chairmen of the rayon councils. The new republic council chairman is Moldavian Deputy Premier N.M. Zaychenko, his first deputy is a raykom first secretary, and the five deputy chairmen include the head of the republic agricultural equipment association, two deputy ministers of agriculture, and the head of the republic interkolkhoz construction association. The presence of a party official at the level of first deputy chairman of the council is particularly noteworthy, since the party previously had been represented only by three kolkhoz party secretaries on the 83-man council.

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