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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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
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# **TRENDS**

## **in Communist Propaganda**

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
7 FEBRUARY 1973  
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 29 JANUARY - 4 FEBRUARY 1973

<u>Moscow (2719 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1307 items)</u>	
Vietnam Peace Accord	(17%) 28%	Vietnam Peace Accord	(20%) 39%
[DRV Leaders in	(-- ) 10%]	[DRV Leaders in	(-- ) 12%]
Moscow		Peking	
30th Anniversary of	(-- ) 7%	Domestic Issues	(45%) 33%
Stalingrad Battle		Cambodia	(1%) 12%
25th Anniversary of	(-- ) 3%	Chile Government	(-- ) 4%
Soviet-Romanian		Delegation in PRC	
Friendship Treaty			
Soviet-Uruguay CP Talks	(-- ) 3%		
China	(2%) 2%		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi propaganda has continued to describe the peace agreement as a "victory" for the Vietnamese, who now must see that it is fully implemented. At the stage when only initial steps have been taken to implement the accord, Hanoi has avoided substantive comment. Thus, it has only briefly reported the announcement of Kissinger's impending visit to Hanoi from 10 to 13 February as well as the joint U.S.-DRV proposal that the international conference called for in the peace agreement be convened in Paris on 26 February. The importance of achieving "national concord" among the Vietnamese people was stressed in a 7 February NHAN DAN editorial, which maintained that national unity has historically been the path of survival in the face of foreign aggression.

Peking followed its strong endorsement of the peace settlement with a major show of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity during the stopover of the DRV's Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh. Both Chou En-lai and Chang Chun-chiao reaffirmed the Chinese "proletarian internationalist duty" to continue support and assistance to the Vietnamese in the aftermath of the war. Peking has replayed DRV announcements on Kissinger's visit to Hanoi and the convening of the international conference. Its own announcement on Kissinger's visit to China has been ignored by Hanoi.

Laudatory Soviet comment on the Vietnamese "victory" in achieving the peace agreement echoes Brezhnev's expression of hope--in his 30 January speech during Le Duc Tho's stopover--for a general relaxation of tensions. An IZVESTIYA article on 6 February made a plea for postwar cooperation and assailed both "imperialists" and "Maoist groups" who criticize Soviet aid and "vilify socialist solidarity."

### DRV, PRG NOTE POST-AGREEMENT DEVELOPMENTS, AFFIRM GOOD WILL

Hanoi and Front media have given selective publicity to efforts in South Vietnam to set up the machinery for supervision of the Vietnam cease-fire. The convening of the first meeting of the heads of the delegations to the four-party Joint Military Commission (JMC) on 2 February was duly reported, and the communist representatives' statements of the meeting were broadcast. Other JMC meetings have not been reported, although a 4 February Hanoi radio account of the first session did note that the delegations had agreed to meet again on the 4th. While there has been no publicity for the

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initial deployment of JMC regional teams on the 5th, VNA's announcement of the 2 February meeting noted that the disposition of the JMC at regional and local levels was one of the questions discussed. Both DRV delegation head Le Quang Hoa and the PRG's Tran Van Tra pledged at the initial meeting that the parties would cooperate with the International Commission of Control and Supervision, but activities of the ICCS have not been publicized.

The statements by the DRV and PRG military representatives were moderate in tone, emphasizing their sides' good will and refraining from charges of GVN cease-fire violations. Although scattered low-level propaganda continues to accuse the Saigon forces of violations, the last official protest was in a 1 February PRG Foreign Ministry statement endorsing the preceding day's DRV Foreign Ministry statement, which had charged Saigon with continuing military operations and hampering the work of the communist delegations to the JMC.\*

In describing the communist military delegations' arrival in Saigon, Hanoi radio and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 6th claimed that they were "joyfully" greeted by Saigon citizens despite the heavy GVN guard around them. In a rather incongruous reference to the communist assaults in Saigon during the 1968 Tet offensive, the radio observed that "the Saigon compatriots previously saw the revolutionary combatants during the marvelous strategic Mau Than offensive."

The 5 February meeting in Paris between representatives of the PRG and GVN was reported briefly in a VNA item which said the two sides had reached agreement on a number of questions and agreed to meet again on the 7th to settle the remaining--unspecified--"procedural questions." On the 4th Hanoi and Front media had reported the 3 February PRG proposal to convene the two-party meeting and the announcement that it would be held on the 5th.

ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S.      DRV media on 31 January carried without comment the announcement that Presidential adviser Kissinger would visit Hanoi from 10 to 13 February to discuss the postwar relationship between the two countries and other matters of mutual concern. With similar

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\* The DRV Foreign Ministry statement is discussed in the 31 January 1973 TRENDS, page 7.

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brevity, VNA announced on the 6th that a U.S. delegation concerned with the removal of mines from DRV ports had arrived in Haiphong on the previous day and had met with DRV representatives.

Hanoi's circumspect treatment of the Nixon Administration in the wake of the peace settlement was illustrated in a 2 February NHAN DAN commentary. As broadcast by Hanoi radio, the commentary complained that the size of the proposed U.S. military budget reflected President Nixon's policy of negotiating from a position of strength. But it went on to recall approvingly that the President had spoken in his inaugural address about restricting the U.S. role in the world and building a peace in which the rights of other nations are respected. By contrast, before the peace agreement was announced, the 22 January NHAN DAN editorial offering Hanoi's initial comment on the inaugural address had said the President "only spoke of empty philosophy and made vague promises on the so-called era of peace . . . ."

IMPORTANCE OF  
"NATIONAL CONCORD"

Hanoi and Front propaganda on the need for "national concord" was highlighted by a 7 February NHAN DAN editorial which said the thorough implementation of the peace accord requires that the concept of national concord be "correctly and fully reflected." NHAN DAN maintained that national unity has historically been Vietnam's "path of survival" in the face of foreign aggression and that only foreign invaders and those Vietnamese who cooperated with them have promoted divisive policies. The editorial appeared to reflect the communists' desire for active involvement of all political elements when it said that "national concord does not embrace only" the members of the NFLSV and the Vietnam Alliance and that "recently the voice of the third force advocating national concord has been heard more and more distinctly." It urged political forces that had sided with the Saigon regime in the past to "adopt a clearcut attitude, to advocate national concord or oppose it."

NHAN DAN's theme had appeared earlier--for example, in a statement on the peace accord by the Vietnam Alliance Central Committee broadcast by Liberation Radio on 4 February. The Alliance similarly held that unity and concord are "a precious tradition of our race" and that the policy of "sowing division and creating hatred is a wicked scheme of the foreigners, aimed at ruling us." Although the statement urged the Saigon government to hold consultations with the PRG to set up the Council of National

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Reconciliation and Concord, it also hinted that unilateral moves would be taken to set up the Council: The Alliance, it proclaimed, "is ready to side with all political parties, religious, cultural, and social organizations and groups, and notables and intellectuals at home and abroad in coordinating their action, organizing themselves into a broad front, and promptly holding consultations with the PRG so as to go ahead with setting up a Council of National Reconciliation and Concord at various levels, composed of three equal segments . . . ."

In keeping with the communists' avowed aim of seeking unity, both Hanoi and Front media have publicized statements on the peace accord by noncommunist Vietnamese living in France. LPA reported on 1 February that a group headed by former Saigon economic minister Au. Truong Thanh had released a statement calling on the South Vietnamese parties to restore democratic liberties, release political prisoners, and promptly set up the National Council. Hanoi media on the 3d and 5th reported that on 31 January a group of Vietnamese had presented a statement to the PRG delegation in Paris which urged the South Vietnamese "governments" to quickly set up the National Council and maintained that the Council, because of its representative character and "power," would "push ahead" the implementation of the agreement and the organization of elections. Hanoi listed some of the Vietnamese associated with this group, identifying them as follows: Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Chau, former head of the psywar directorate general in the Ngo Dinh Diem administration and former military attache in Washington; Cao Minh Chuyen, journalist, member of the "movement for the people's right of self-determination," and secretary general of the peace movement of 1965; Col. Do Khac Mai of the GVN air force; Pham The Truc, former Saigon opposition deputy; and Bonze Thich Thien Chau.

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**HANOI MARKS LUNAR NEW YEAR, PARTY ANNIVERSARY**

Injunctions on the tasks ahead in consolidating the peace in the "new situation" pervaded Hanoi's observance of the lunar new year and the customary editorial comment in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN marking the 43d anniversary of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP).

**TET OBSERVANCE** From 31 January through 7 February, VNA and Hanoi radio reported the customary visits by the DRV leaders on the occasion of Tet. The largest number of reported visits was made by VWP First Secretary Le Duan, who visited citizens in the bombed areas of Hanoi, cadres of Hanoi radio, army units, representatives of various nationalities of the DRV, "southern compatriots," and foreign residents. Visits to various localities and army units were reported to have been made by President Ton Duc Thang and by all but one of the other Politburo members in the DRV.\* These included visits by Hoang Van Hoan in his first reported public appearance since he returned from the Soviet Union in late January,\*\* and by special advisor to the Paris talks Le Duc Tho, who was reported to have visited antiaircraft units on the day following his 3 February return to the DRV after stopovers in Moscow and Peking.

The leaders' speeches predictably welcomed the signing of the peace accord, offering praise and thanks to the people or units visited for their part in achieving the great "spring victory" and urging them to contribute to the building of socialism in the "new situation." In remarks to military units, Ton Duc Thang, Giap, and VPA Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung stressed the delicate nature of the peace, echoing the 28 January party-government joint appeal in cautioning that peace has not yet been consolidated. They urged the armed forces to maintain vigilance against any attempt by "the enemy" to sabotage the peace and at the same time to work toward developing a "modern" and "regular" army.

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\* No visit by Nguyen Duy Trinh was reported this year and Pham Hung continues his years-long absence from the DRV. For a report on Tet visits in 1971 and 1972, see the TRENDS of 16 February 1972, page 19.

\*\* Hoan, whose record of public appearances is erratic, was in the USSR from 18 December to late January; his departure for home was reported by PRAVDA on 26 January (TRENDS, 31 January 1973, page 21).

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The latter themes were treated in greater detail by Giap in a recorded new year's talk broadcast by Hanoi radio on 4 February concerning "the significance of the success inherent in the Paris agreement" and "the new situation and tasks." Citing the absence of foreign forces on Vietnamese soil "for the first time in 100 years" as creating conditions for Vietnam to move forward on its own initiative, Giap expressed confidence that the North Vietnamese are fully capable of repairing war wounds, building socialism, and creating "an increasingly firm base for the revolutionary struggle of our people countrywide." Likewise, he acclaimed the situation in the South, which he described as "strikingly different from the situation that prevailed after the Geneva agreements were signed." Under the leadership of the PLAF, the NFLSV, and the PRG, he asserted, "our compatriots in the South will certainly fulfill their revolutionary tasks and achieve victory" despite efforts to block them by "the warlike, bureaucratic, and militarist forces serving as a tool for foreign colonialism."

**PARTY ANNIVERSARY** NHAN DAN's editorial marking the VWP anniversary provided a relatively short, sober assessment of the current situation and tasks faced by the party now that "the greatest resistance in the history of our people's struggle against foreign aggression has ended successfully."

The editorial reviewed three stages in the party's history since its founding in 1930 and described the primary task facing the party in the fourth stage, just beginning, as the dual one of "stepping up socialist construction in the North and at the same time completing the historic tasks of the national and democratic revolution in the South." Stressing that this task will not be easy, the paper called on party cadres to devote all their "spirit and energy" to it, draw on their courage and resourcefulness, and participate actively in "writing the first pages of the fourth chapter." NHAN DAN emphasized the organizing and guiding role of the party and exhorted cadres to "really master all the new fronts of socialist construction." It observed that "modern industry must be a foundation for prosperity" and that "building a modern industry is the central task of our North." Reflecting the impact of the peace agreement on the party's goals in South Vietnam, the editorial pointed out that "the struggle to maintain peace, achieve independence and democracy in the South, and proceed toward the peaceful unification of the country is being waged by new methods in a new situation at home and in the world."

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Where the NHAN DAN editorial praised past and recent party triumphs but put primary stress on gearing to meet the future, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's anniversary editorial dwelt on the party's "glorious achievements," its "correct" Marxist-Leninist line, and its "clear-sighted leadership." The army paper had special praise for party members in the armed forces, declaring that "no honor is as great as that of being a communist combatant" and that "our party members in all fields of activity have upheld the lofty quality of the communist combatants, who fear no handicaps or difficulties, sacrifice themselves for their country and people, and struggle and make sacrifices for a great cause."

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**CHINESE EXTEND TRIUMPHANT WELCOME TO VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATORS**

Following its strong endorsement of the Vietnam peace settlement in a 29 January leaders' message and accompanying authoritative comment, Peking took the occasion of the stopover of DRV negotiator Le Duc Tho and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh to stage a major show of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity and support for the agreement. In contrast to Peking's usual treatment of such layovers in the past, the Vietnamese were given full honors comparable with those accorded PRG Foreign Minister Binh during her "official" visit at the turn of the year. They were received by Mao on 1 February, were honored at a banquet that evening hosted by Chou En-lai and attended by all the active Peking-based Politburo members, and were guests of honor at a 2 February rally (given live radio and television coverage) attended by the same Politburo contingent and over 10,000 people.

NCNA accounts of the proceedings were filled with especially warm and effusive language, as in noting that Chinese leaders embraced the two visitors at the rally and that prolonged applause "rocked the hall" during the exchange of banners. NCNA atypically disclosed the length of the meeting with Mao, noting that it lasted an hour and a half, and reported that Mao in welcoming the visitors "tightly clasped" their hands. Similar to its coverage of Binh's December meeting with Mao, NCNA provided a relatively lengthy quotation of Mao's remarks to them.

Tho was greeted on arrival on 31 January by Politburo members Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan and alternate member Chi Teng-kuei, and on the next day Trinh was greeted by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, Politburo alternate member Li Te-sheng, and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei; the combined Chinese contingent was present to see the visitors off for home on 3 February. Chou, Chang, and Yao went to the guest house on 31 January for "a cordial meeting" with Tho that NCNA said lasted nearly three hours. On the 1st Chou and Chi went to the guest house to see Trinh, with Tho also present, for what NCNA reported in standard fashion was "a very friendly and cordial conversation." Sihanouk's premier, Penn Nouth, was present at the banquet and the rally, and NCNA reported he had "a cordial and friendly conversation" with Trinh on the 2d.

Peking's all-out demonstration of support for the Vietnamese may have been designed with an eye to surpassing the Soviets,

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but its only anti-Soviet thrust in the Vietnam context during this period took the indirect form of NCNA's replaying on 31 January of passages from an Albanian editorial on the Vietnam agreement. As quoted by NCNA, the editorial derided the "Soviet revisionists" for seeking to represent Soviet aid as the decisive factor in the Vietnam struggle and charged that Moscow's policy on Vietnam has never gone beyond the framework of the preservation of Soviet and U.S. spheres of influence. However, NCNA duly noted the presence of the Soviet ambassador and representatives of the Soviet bloc members of the ICCS at airport ceremonies for Tho and Trinh in Peking.

## VIETNAM AGREEMENT

In keeping with Peking's initial endorsement of the Vietnam agreement, Chou En-lai's banquet speech and Chang Chun-chiao's rally speech acclaimed the settlement as a great victory creating conditions in which the Vietnamese can settle their own affairs free from outside interference. Thus, Chou called the signing of the agreement "a major event which brings joy to the people of the whole world" as well as a brilliant example for the national liberation movement. At the same time, the Chinese have stressed the importance of strict implementation of the agreement and pointedly linked prospects for easing tension in the Far East with observance of the terms of the settlement. Both Chou and Chang voiced Peking's "hope and demand" that the United States and "particularly the Saigon authorities" will refrain from "procrastination, expansion and sabotage" and will strictly carry out the agreement. In Peking's first direct charge of violation of the agreement, Chang complained that the "Saigon authorities" were continuing military activities "to nibble" at the liberated areas and "setting up obstacles" to the functioning of the Joint Military Commission, but he did not directly implicate the United States. Peking's accounts of DRV and PRG protests have discreetly deleted charges that the United States as well as Saigon is responsible for recent alleged obstruction.

Neither Chou nor Chang dwelt on the question of the political evolution in South Vietnam, having recourse to generalized expressions of hope for a peaceful, independent, democratic, and prosperous South to develop under the leadership of the NLF and PRG. The Chinese continue to characterize the PRG as the "authentic representative" of the South Vietnamese but have refrained from following the Vietnamese communists' revival of the claim that the PRG is the "only" such representative.

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Chang reaffirmed Peking's view of the agreement as calling for reunification of Vietnam to take place on a peaceful, step-by-step basis free from foreign interference.

Peking has remained silent on its future role in an international conference, though it has replayed Hanoi's announcements on the date and site of the conference and on Kissinger's visit to the DRV. NCNA's announcement on the impending Kissinger visit to Peking was virtually identical to the one on his last visit, with no direct reference to Indochina.

Peking avoided authoritative comment on Cambodia and Laos in the wake of the Vietnam agreement until 1 February, when a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article endorsed the RGNU's 26 January statement on a Cambodian settlement and Chou interjected comments on the subject during his banquet speech acclaiming the Vietnam settlement. Chou also endorsed the RGNU statement and complained that the United States "has not yet stopped its war of aggression" against Cambodia and Laos. He made no reference to a Laos settlement.

**PRC SUPPORT** As the highlight of expressions of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity that pervaded the visits, NCNA quoted Mao as saying during his meeting with the visitors that the Chinese and Vietnamese have "helped each other all along." In acknowledging Le Duc Tho's expression of gratitude for Chinese aid in the war, Mao struck a note of modesty that may have been intended to contrast with Moscow's claims in behalf of Soviet aid as a factor in the Vietnamese struggle. Mao remarked that Chinese aid has been "very little" and that it has been the Vietnamese who have helped the Chinese by fighting the United States for more than 10 years.

Both Chou and Chang reaffirmed Peking's "proletarian internationalist duty" to continue support and assistance to the Vietnamese in the aftermath of the war, and Chang invoked an image that has been prominent recently in saying that the Vietnamese and Chinese "are one family." Chang cited the personal authority of Mao and Ho Chi Minh as a source of Sino-Vietnamese friendship, adding that it is built on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The Vietnamese speakers were also forthcoming in characterizing this friendship while lauding Peking's past assistance and expressing confidence of receiving "still greater" Chinese support. In notable contrast to the failure of Vietnamese speakers in the

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past year to reciprocate Peking's invocation of Marxism-Leninism as the basis of PRC-DRV relations, Tho on 2 February affirmed this as the foundation of unity between the two parties and peoples.

**SOUTHEAST ASIA** During this period Peking has shown interest in the future alinement of the broader Southeast Asian area. NCNA on the 1st cited without comment part of an Australian-New Zealand communique that expressed the two governments' "understanding and support" for the desire of ASEAN states to limit outside interference in the affairs of Southeast Asia and sympathy for their efforts to make the area a zone of "peace, freedom, and neutrality." Earlier, NCNA on the 29th cited passages from a Burmese Government statement on the Vietnam agreement that stressed the need for Rangoon to move out of its traditional isolation and work together with nations in the area to insure a durable peace.

While Peking has muted criticism of a continued U.S. military presence in areas adjoining Indochina, the PRC-based clandestine radio stations that broadcast in the name of the Maoist Southeast Asian CPs have given increased attention to the American presence, particularly in Thailand. Thus, the Thai CP's radio has been issuing daily attacks on the "Thanom-Praphat clique" for allowing a continued U.S. military presence in the country, for colluding with Vang Pao, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and "U.S. lackeys in Laos," and for warmly welcoming Vice President Agnew, "the messenger of death sent by Nixon," on his current Asian tour. The Malayan CP's radio has called critical attention to Lee Kuan Yew's recent trip to Thailand, charging in a 30 January commentary that the two governments are stepping up efforts aimed at becoming "U.S. bodyguards" in carrying out the Nixon Doctrine in Asia. Peking has not replayed these comments or mentioned the Agnew and Lee trips.

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### MOSCOW PRAISES PEACE ACCORD, EXPRESSES HOPE FOR DETENTE

Soviet commentators have echoed the sentiment expressed in Brezhnev's 30 January speech, during Le Duc Tho's and Nguyen Duy Trinh's stopovers, that the peace agreement should lead to a general relaxation of international tension. Most notably, Moscow radio on 6 February widely summarized for Asian communist and other foreign audiences an IZVESTIYA article by Kudryavtsev pointedly titled "Favorable Possibilities."

Kudryavtsev stressed the importance of the DRV's socialist path in "victoriously" achieving the peace treaty, and he added that the victory also shows the effectiveness of "the internationalism of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries." He called it deplorable that "Maoist groups"--not further identified--have not only joined "imperialist" propagandists in attempting to discredit Soviet aid but are doing everything to "vilify socialist international solidarity." To bolster his argument that Soviet aid leads to the strengthening of the recipient's independence, Kudryavtsev observed that the peace agreement "logically entails the establishment of relations between the United States and the DRV on principles of coexistence." He went on to ridicule "imperialist and Maoist propaganda" charges that Soviet aid leads to the infringement of the national independence of recipient countries.

Kudryavtsev echoed Brezhnev in saying that the ending of the war creates a favorable atmosphere in Southeast Asia for easing tension and went on to say--as have some other commentators--that the prospects for the creation of a collective security system in Asia are becoming more favorable. He also echoed Brezhnev in observing that aid to the DRV for postwar reconstruction will be forthcoming from countries regardless of their social system.

Although Kudryavtsev brought up the notion of an Asian collective security system which Peking has assailed in the past, he carefully avoided indicting Peking directly when he attributed censure of the USSR vaguely to "Maoist groups." At the same time, with the Paris conference in the offing, to be attended by both the Soviets and Chinese, Moscow seemed to be signaling good will and a cooperative attitude by taking the unusual step of replaying Peking comment: PRAVDA as well as TASS carried excerpts of the 28 January PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial which congratulated the Vietnamese on the peace agreement and reported Chou En-lai's remark, during the stopover of Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh, that the peace accord was a "common victory for the peoples of the whole world."

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### COMMUNIQUE ON SIHANOUK'S HANOI VISIT RECORDS "UNANIMITY"

Against a background of efforts by Prince Sihanouk to give a new look of moderation to his stand on a Cambodian settlement in the wake of the Vietnam agreement, a joint communique on 7 February recorded a "unanimity" of views on all questions discussed during Sihanouk's visit to the DRV from 30 January to 7 February. Taking note of "the new situation obtaining in Indochina," the communique cited the RGNU's 26 January statement--issued in the name of Sihanouk, Premier Penn Nouth, and deputy Khieu Samphan--asserting that a Cambodian settlement can be based only on Sihanouk's 23 March 1970 five-point declaration.\* The communique also invoked a 28 January statement attributed to three RGNU ministers in the "interior," Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, and Hu Nim, as reaffirming the Front's stand, and it recalled statements issued by the DRV and the PRG on 1 and 2 February respectively in support of the RGNU statements.

Sihanouk held talks with a DRV delegation headed by Premier Pham Van Dong and including the defense and foreign ministers. Declaring that the victories achieved by the two sides have confirmed the "extremely great effect" of their solidarity and friendship, the communique expressed their resolve to strengthen solidarity and mutual support. The communique also declared that support from the socialist countries and other progressive people constitutes "an extremely important guarantee" for victories in the future as well as in the past. The Cambodians hailed the "great victory" by the Vietnamese in achieving the Vietnam agreement, while the hosts reaffirmed that Sihanouk represents "the legality, legitimacy, and continuity" of the Cambodian state and his government is "the only and unique legal and legitimate government."

Before and during his visit to Hanoi, Sihanouk had indicated that the front was "reexamining" its policy on the advice of "friends" who warned against appearing to be a warmonger at a time when "peace is being built." In a 31 January interview carried by AFP, Sihanouk said his new policy includes an "overture" to the United States, a reduction in military actions by the insurgents, and a general amnesty in Cambodia. He reiterated his refusal to hold talks with the Phnom Penh regime and demanded Lon Nol's removal. Sihanouk emphasized that his policy has the "total support" of Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong.

In a 6 February AFP interview in Hanoi, Sihanouk denied that a meeting with Kissinger had been arranged and expressed the opinion that any Cambodian settlement would be attained through the mediation of the PRG and the DRV rather than through direct contacts.\*\*

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\* See the TRENDS of 31 January 1973, pages 23-25.

\*\* Sihanouk went from Hanoi to Canton for "an official friendly visit" to Kwangtung province.

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He added that Chou and Dong would tell Kissinger that a Cambodian settlement depends on recognition of the RGNU by the United States, and he warned that the PRC and DRV would leave the forthcoming international conference if representatives of the Lon Nol government were invited.

Sihanouk had indicated particular sensitivity to the views of the insurgents fighting in Cambodia, whose inclinations may diverge from his own, and those of his patrons in Peking and Hanoi at the present stage of developments. Before leaving Peking for Hanoi he had said that the views of the insurgents in the interior would be decisive in the policy reappraisal and that no joint communique would be issued on his visit unless this reappraisal was completed before the end of his stay. In the event, the joint communique incorporated the two RGNU statements dated before his trip as well as the DRV and PRG statements pegged to those pronouncements. Citing the 28 January RGNU statement by the three ministers in the interior, the communique spelled out the front's demands as calling for total withdrawal of all U.S. and allied military personnel and advisors, termination of all U.S. support and aid to the Phnom Penh regime, and "total elimination" of that "clique of traitors."

The status of the representatives of the "interior" has been enhanced during recent developments, as reflected in the inclusion of Khieu Samphan with Sihanouk and Penn Nouth in the 26 January statement as well as the prominence given the statement issued in the name of Khieu Samphan and the two other ministers in the interior. In addition, the "special envoy" of the interior, Ieng Sary, who again accompanied Sihanouk during his trip to Hanoi, was reported by VNA to have had a separate meeting with the DRV premier.

RGNU STATEMENTS        Much like the 26 January statement, the one dated the 28th and broadcast by the front's radio on 2 February stressed the front's desire for peace and a settlement based on Sihanouk's March 1970 declaration. While taking note of the Vietnam settlement, the statement declared that the Cambodian insurgents "must carry on their struggle" because the United States continues its "aggressive activities" and its support for the "traitors" in Phnom Penh. Echoing the 26 January statement, the one of the 28th appealed to the Vietnamese, Lao, Chinese, and Korean peoples and those of other friendly countries to demand that the United States withdraw from Cambodia and end its "diplomatic tricks and activities." However, the statement did not elaborate on these diplomatic activities, did not directly reject a cease-fire or negotiations, and did not repeat past calls for offensives to take control of the whole country.

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Lon Nol's unilateral cease-fire declaration, which had been criticized in earlier routine-level comment, drew strong condemnation in the form of a statement dated 29 January by the RGNU spokesman. The front's press agency AKI issued the statement under the dateline "Cambodia, 1 February," presumably an attempt to attribute the statement to the insurgents in the interior rather than to the Peking-based segment. The statement dismissed Lon Nol's cease-fire move as an attempt to cover up an inability to launch an offensive and a "perfidious" maneuver to deceive world opinion. Taking a hard line in the question of a settlement, it asserted flatly that "no compromise is possible" with the "traitorous clique" and said "peace will be restored in Cambodia only when all the objectives of the Cambodian people's struggle are realized." These goals were defined in terms similar to those incorporated in the joint communique on Sihanouk's Hanoi visit.

PEKING The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 1st endorsing the RGNU leaders' 26 January statement pledged that the Chinese "will continue to firmly support to the end the just struggle waged by the Cambodian people" under Sihanouk's leadership. Chou in his 1 February banquet speech also endorsed the 26 January statement while charging that the United States "has not yet stopped its war of aggression" against Cambodia and Laos.

Peking has not commented on the statements by the RGNU ministers in the interior or by the RGNU spokesman, though NCNA duly reported these statements as well as those by the DRV and the PRG.

MOSCOW Consistent with its failure to recognize Sihanouk's government, Moscow has virtually ignored the recent spate of authoritative statements on a Cambodian settlement. TASS briefly reported the PRG statement but noted only that it expressed support for "the just struggle of the fraternal Cambodian people and their just and reasonable position on the question of a political settlement." TASS did not mention Sihanouk or his government. Moscow is not known to have reported the DRV statement.

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## EUROPE FORCE CUTS

### MOSCOW'S ALLIES TAKE ISSUE WITH NATO CONCEPT OF "BALANCE"

Comment from some of Moscow's orthodox East European partners since the Vienna preparatory talks on force reductions opened on 31 January has been aimed chiefly against NATO's concept of "balance" in force cuts by the two rival military blocs in Europe. Moscow itself has refrained from authoritative comment on the talks since they opened, confining itself to routine-level comment focused on the need for reductions in central Europe and tracing Soviet "initiatives" on this score. While this comment has avoided the pivotal issue of what constitutes "balance," Moscow's proxy spokesmen--Hungary in particular--have taken it up in press, radio and television comment.

Budapest's comment has carefully avoided any reference to the specific role Hungary may play in force reduction talks. Budapest TV's Moscow correspondent Kulcsar on 1 February, referring to the "various strategic, geographical, and other" arguments raised by NATO since 1968 in calls for "balanced" reductions, charged that NATO's motive has been to gain a "unilateral advantage" and added: "In principle, the USSR does not oppose a proportionate or balanced troop reduction. On the contrary, it is in favor of this, but not in the form as proposed" by NATO. Kulcsar did not elaborate on the "form" of balanced force reductions Moscow would accept, but an article in the Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG by J. Nemes on the 3d was more explicit in defining the Pact's interpretation of "balanced" force reductions. Nemes wrote that a quantitatively and qualitatively equal reduction of armed forces and armaments would not change the "prevailing military balance of power." Addressing himself to the numbers involved in any future force withdrawals, a subject rarely discussed in Soviet or East European media, Nemes went on to argue that a hypothetical "mutual withdrawal of 100,000 soldiers each would not 'disproportionately' diminish the security of either side, while it cannot be denied that European detente would only gain by the fact that fewer soldiers were confronting each other."

Current East European press discourse on the NATO concept of "balanced" reductions in effect rehashes the only recent serious Soviet comment outlining Moscow's position on force reductions--the articles by European disarmament specialist Yuriy Kostko in the June and September 1972 issues of MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA.\* A

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\* See the TRENDS of 12 October 1972, pages 17-19, for a review of the two Kostko articles.

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commentary in the Bratislava PRAVDA on 31 January in fact used Kostko's arguments almost word for word, without attribution, in rejecting the NATO view that reductions in Warsaw Pact and NATO forces must be asymmetrical in order to make up for the geographical advantage enjoyed by the USSR.

The Slovak paper drew directly from the Kostko articles in noting that the USSR has a vast territory which it must guard "not only in the west, but also in the south and the east" and that the Urals and Lake Baykal are farther from central Europe than New York is from London. The Slovak paper went on to say that a military conflict in central Europe could not be restricted to that area alone but would inevitably involve air force, missile, or naval units outside "the rather small territory of central Europe," and thus "this entire problem logically does not concern only a narrow group of states." The paper also echoed Kostko's argument that because there are no "objective" means of comparing different types of conventional weapons, it becomes "impossible to separate the correlation of forces in conventional weapons from the correlation of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, or to separate the local correlation of forces in central Europe from the all-European and global correlation in general."

#### ROMANIA AND BULGARIA

The difference between the NATO and Warsaw Pact states on who should participate in the force reduction talks was acknowledged explicitly only in a brief Warsaw domestic radio broadcast on the 6th. Where Soviet and all the other East European media have remained silent on the role of Romania and Bulgaria in any future talks, the Polish radio reported that the reason a plenary session--tentatively planned for the 5th and then for the 6th--had failed to materialize was the inability of members of the two blocs to reach agreement on whether Romania and Bulgaria would be admitted as negotiators "with full rights or only as observers."

Bucharest media continue to refrain from any direct comment on the talks. However, Bucharest did publicize comments made by the Romanian delegate in Vienna on 31 January to the effect that the preliminary discussions on "military disengagement and disarmament in Europe" should have the "direct contribution" of all European states. Avoiding the terminology used by NATO or the Warsaw Pact to describe the force reduction talks, the Romanian delegate at the Helsinki talks on the 2d used the same long-standing Romanian formulation calling for "military disengagement and disarmament in Europe" and added that the discussion of such issues should have the participation of "all the countries concerned."

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Sofia media have not directly addressed the issue of Bulgarian participation, but Sofia comment has publicly asserted Bulgaria's interest in the talks. In a commentary entitled "Bulgaria Is Vitally Interested in Them," Sofia's BTA on 31 January noted the presence of the Bulgarian delegate in Vienna and went on to say that Bulgarian participation in the preparatory talks "is conditioned by the fact that Bulgaria is a member of the Warsaw Treaty and is a state which directly borders on the southeastern NATO flank." BTA said there are "no foreign troops stationed on Bulgarian territory, but as a European country and as a constituent part of the socialist community, Bulgaria is vitally interested in the further warming of the European climate." This flexible language could easily be compatible with virtually any arrangement reached in the current Vienna consultations.

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## USSR - ROMANIA

## DIVERGENT INTERESTS UNDERScoreD ON Treaty ANNIVERSARY

Moscow's concern for unity under the Warsaw Pact and Bucharest's independent stance pervaded the publicity for the 25th anniversary of the two countries' first treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance of 4 February 1948. The anniversary fell in a period in which Romanian representatives were asserting their country's influence at the multilateral talks in Helsinki and Vienna. In the recent background was Bucharest's adoption, at the end of December, of a new defense law which, among other things, transparently outlawed any application to Romania of the Brezhnev doctrine asserting the USSR's right to "defend socialist gains" in any allied country where they are threatened.

**MOSCOW OBSERVANCE** Moscow devoted a substantial propaganda effort to the Soviet-Romanian treaty anniversary--publicity comparable to its observance of the 25th anniversary of the first Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship pact in December 1968, in the immediate aftermath of the Warsaw Pact invasion of the CSSR, but considerably in excess of the normal play for the quinquennial anniversaries of the USSR's friendship treaties with its orthodox partners. Notably, although the 20th anniversaries normally get more publicity than the 25th, Moscow's attention to the current Soviet-Romanian treaty anniversary considerably exceeded its publicity for the 20th.

The message from Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin to Ceausescu and Maurer, broadcast in Romanian on 3 February, conveyed "cordial congratulations" to the Romanian leaders and reminded them that the 1948 bilateral treaty was based on "true equal rights" and had played a key role in "strengthening the gains of socialism in Romania." Regarding the new 20-year pact signed in Bucharest on 7 July 1970, after a delay of more than two years, the message said it reflected the "changes" that had taken place in "the international situation" and went on to declare that the CPSU and the Soviet Government were working unswervingly for the solidarity of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA member-states and would "continue to exert efforts" to insure that Soviet-Romanian relations "grow in strength and develop on the principled basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." In summarizing the Soviet leaders' message, the Bucharest radio on the 4th omitted the references to the Warsaw Pact and CEMA and

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to the strengthening of socialist gains in Romania. Where the Moscow version said the Soviets would continue efforts to strengthen "fraternal" relations, the Bucharest summary referred to "comradely" relations.

An article in IZVESTIYA on the 3d, keyed to the treaty anniversary, stressed at the outset that the pact was "a firm foundation" of Soviet-Romanian friendship "within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance." It went on to point out that for the young Romanian People's Republic the treaty with the USSR meant "the consolidation of its international positions, its independence." Also on the 3d, a Radio Moscow commentary broadcast only in Hungarian underscored the "political" importance of the pact with Bucharest "because the Soviet-Romanian treaty is a component part of the comprehensive system of treaties" between allies of the socialist community.

In similar vein, a Radio Moscow talk by Mikhaylov on 31 January reminded Romanian listeners: "You know, of course, that the bilateral treaties between the socialist countries, together with the Warsaw Pact, form a vast and well-knit system of pledges made by states both to one another and to the entire socialist community." It recalled that Brezhnev, at the USSR's 50th anniversary on 21 December, had called for unity in order to deal "a resolute rebuff to all aggressive plots of imperialism, to all attempts to infringe on the interests of socialism."

**BUCHAREST OBSERVANCE** The Romanian leaders' message, carried by AGERPRES on the 3d, conveyed "most cordial congratulations and a hearty comradely salute" to their Soviet counterparts. Predictably, it portrayed developing cooperation on an equal basis between the two countries since the signing of the original treaty in 1948 and the new one in 1970, on the basis of "socialist internationalism, observance of national independence and sovereignty, fully equal rights, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage." It forecast further development of friendship and "comradely solidarity" between the two parties and states "in the spirit of the meetings and talks we had with you last year"--in the Crimea on 1 August and in Moscow in December--to the benefit of bilateral and world communist unity and world peace. TASS' summary of the message the same day included all of these points.

A Stoian article in SCINTEIA on the 4th, after recalling that "the Soviet Union made a decisive contribution" to the victory over the Nazis in World War II, stressed that the 1948 treaty provided "a

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legal form" for Soviet-Romanian ties on the basis of independence, sovereignty, and noninterference. Highlighting contacts between Brezhnev and Ceausescu and bilateral economic cooperation, the article noted that the two "socialist, neighborly, and friendly" states had expressed their intent to "consistently militate to strengthen the forces of socialism, thwart imperialist policy, safeguard people's independence and freedom," and promote peaceful coexistence.

Bucharest's publicity for the treaty anniversary omitted any reference to the Warsaw Pact and CEMA or to the new Romanian defense law. Its restrained view of the current degree of warmth of its relations with Moscow was further in evidence on the 6th when the Bucharest radio reported "a comradely talk" between Ceausescu and USSR Ambassador Drozdenko, at the latter's request. There was no indication of the subject. The only other figure reported present at the meeting was RCP Secretary Stefan Andrei.

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## POLITBURO MEMBER POLYANSKIY DEMOTED TO AGRICULTURE MINISTER

PRAVDA on 3 February announced the removal of the Politburo's agricultural overseer D.S. Polyanskiy as First Deputy Premier and his demotion to the post of Agriculture Minister, replacing V. V. Matskevich. Unlike the recent demotions of Voronov, Shelest, and Mzhavanadze, Polyanskiy's was preceded by no advance indications, and his position appeared to be especially strong following the eclipse of his rival Voronov in 1971. Polyanskiy's recent activities have appeared normal; he was accorded his customary ranking at the October Revolution anniversary and at the December Supreme Soviet session and 50th anniversary ceremony. Nevertheless, his removal as one of Kosygin's principal deputies and his transfer to a position below that of Kulakov, Central Committee agriculture secretary and junior member of the Politburo, are the latest indications of high-level differences over agriculture.

By contrast, Matskevich's fall was presaged by numerous signs of slippage. In the last year the leadership of his ministry has been shaken up, and the ministry has been under heavy pressure to reform. Indeed, shortly before his ouster, Matskevich had just returned from a four-day visit to Moldavia to study the new forms of agricultural organization promoted by Moldavian First Secretary I. I. Bodyul. According to SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA on 13 January, Matskevich visited various inter-kolkhoz enterprises, agro-industrial complexes, and production unions and heard Bodyul's detailed explanation of the "effectiveness, special features, and future prospects for these new forms." Matskevich's ministry was sharply criticized last year for resisting new forms of organization, and his removal may foreshadow changes in agricultural administration and greater receptivity to innovation.

**RESOURCE DEBATES** Polyanskiy's demotion may be linked to controversy over resource allocation in the aftermath of last year's agricultural debacle. In 1967 his outspoken advocacy of increased allocations to agriculture carried him to the point of publicly challenging official policy, and it is possible that he, like Voronov, breached the limits of collectivity arguing his case. In the spring of 1970 when the draft five year plan was under consideration, Polyanskiy authored an article in the April SOVIETS OF WORKERS DEPUTIES urging that the new plan favor agriculture. With Brezhnev's support, he won an appreciable shift of resources to agriculture at a May 1970 Politburo meeting.

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Nevertheless, the new plan fell short of the goal set by Polyanskiy in his October 1967 **KOMMUNIST** article--that allocations to agriculture should reach one-third of total investment. Brezhnev's agricultural assistant V.A. Golikov complained in a July 1972 **QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY** article that the "growing needs" of agriculture were still not being "fully" met. More recently, an editorial in the January **PLANNED ECONOMY** indicated that in 1973 agriculture would receive 27 percent of all investments in the economy -- well below the level advocated by Polyanskiy.

The revised 1973 plan presented to the December 1972 Supreme Soviet session by Gosplan Chairman Baybakov contained virtually no increase in agricultural investment over the level previously planned. In his concluding speech to the session on 19 December Baybakov noted that several speakers had "raised the question of the need to allocate additional material resources for the needs of agriculture," but he replied that the plan already allotted "big funds" to agriculture and that the main problem was to "ensure rational use of these funds." The alleged appeals for more funds, however, were deleted from the published versions of speeches at the Supreme Soviet session.

**SIGNS OF DISFAVOR** The retirement of Matskevich, at age 63, removes a seemingly permanent fixture of the Soviet scene. Though a constant target for complaints and pressures, Matskevich has occupied the agricultural post for a total of more than 13 and a half years--longer than anyone else.

While owing his advancement in the agricultural hierarchy to Khrushchev, both in the Ukraine and later in Moscow, Matskevich fell at odds with his patron in the late 1950's and was exiled to the virgin lands as Tselinnyy Kray executive committee chairman. Following Khrushchev's ouster, he was recalled to Moscow to head a new, more powerful agriculture ministry.

Matskevich appeared firmly entrenched until early 1972, when the ministry came under fire for resisting innovation, some of its agencies were restructured, and some new deputy ministers were appointed.\* Matskevich's position was further undermined when one of his assistants, the deputy chief of the ministry's

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\* See the **TRENDS** of 5 April 1972, page 36; 3 May, page 43; 1 June, pages 39-42; 14 June, pages 27-29; and 28 June, pages 38-41.

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secretariat, was arrested for taking bribes and the ministry's leadership was blamed for permitting such abuses. Matskevich personally acknowledged the accuracy of the charges in the 16 August PRAVDA. Although Matskevich's position has shown signs of weakening, there has been no public attempt to hold him or any other official responsible for the 1972 agricultural failures.

#### AGRICULTURAL OFFICIAL REMOVED IN AFTERMATH OF SCANDAL

The removal of a third agricultural official was also announced last week but appears unrelated to the demotions of Polyanskiy and Matskevich. According to PRAVDA on 31 January, S.V. Shevchenko, chief of the RSFSR Agricultural Equipment Association since March 1961, was removed "for violation of state discipline," a charge suggesting personal guilt for financial abuses rather than administrative or operational shortcomings.

Shevchenko had no career ties to Polyanskiy and Matskevich; he was, on the contrary, a protege of Polyanskiy's rivals. A longtime associate of K.G. Pysin in the Altay, he was transferred to Moscow in early 1961 along with Pysin after Voronov had become RSFSR Bureau deputy chairman. With the 1971 demotions of RSFSR Premier Voronov and his first deputy Pysin, Shevchenko's position was obviously weakened.

Shevchenko's downfall may be linked to the scandal involving one of his top assistants. In the October PARTY LIFE, it was reported that the Party Control Committee had exposed "violations of party and state discipline" by V.P. Zhavoronkov, deputy chief of the RSFSR Agricultural Equipment Association's main administration for supply of machinery. Zhavoronkov was charged with having misused his position to build himself a dacha. He was fired and expelled from the party, and Shevchenko was censured for having ignored signs of Zhavoronkov's misconduct.

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## CUBA

### HIJACKING ISSUE RAISED IN COMMENT ON FISHING BOAT ATTACK

Havana comment on the 28 January attack on a Cuban fishing boat in Bahamian waters used the incident to underscore the need for a hijacking agreement that would encompass all forms of "piracy." Cuban accounts of the incident alleged that a boat "bearing a Miami registration" carried out the assault, that one Cuban fisherman was wounded, and that unlike past forays, which were limited to "acts of intimidation," the intent this time was to "murder" the six crewmen.

While the raiders were described by one Havana commentator as "pirates at the service of U.S. imperialism," stress was placed on the responsibility of U.S. naval authorities. For example, the Cuban party organ GRANMA charged in a frontpage article on 1 February that "counterrevolutionary bands" are launching attacks from U.S. territory "with impunity" and with "U.S. naval officials' approval and support." In stressing a U.S. role, Havana appeared to be underscoring the Cuban view that it is the responsibility of the U.S. authorities to bar exile forays against Cuban vessels and territory.

Comment linking the incident to the hijacking issue came in two broadcasts by the authoritative Havana domestic service commentator Guido Garcia Inclan, whose broadcasts have contained Cuban media's only comment on the U.S.-Cuban hijacking negotiations since the release of the 14 November Cuban Government statement urging rapid bilateral agreement to resolve the hijacking problem.\* In a 2 February broadcast discussing the fishing boat incident, Garcia Inclan urged that "these pirates. . . be arrested and returned, just as the United States wants us to do with the persons who hijack its planes and come to Free Cuba." Referring to the hijacking negotiations, he stressed that "when it comes to pirates, let us remember those of the land and of the sea."

The notion that any bilateral agreement will have to deal with all kinds of "piracy," not just skyjacking, has been a pervasive feature of all of Garcia Inclan's commentaries on the subject. For example, in an 11 January commentary he claimed that a U.S.-Cuban accord had been "delayed somewhat" because Washington

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\* Garcia Inclan's comment in the wake of the 14 November statement is reviewed in the TRENDS of 22 November 1972, pages 26-28.

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wanted to confine the agreement to skyjacking, "restricting it to what is convenient to them." He argued that in the Cuban view, "piracy is everything: It does not matter if it takes place in the air, at sea, or on land."

Using his standard "Letter from Freddy" format, built around missives from a fictional Cuban expatriate newsmen in Miami to an old crony, Garcia Inclan again brought up the fishing boat attack in a broadcast on 5 February, this time implying that the ongoing hijacking negotiations were having a sobering effect on Cuban "counterrevolutionaries." Noting that "every one of them" wanted to claim credit for the incident, he declared that none dared to do so for fear of reprisals by U.S. authorities. The letter from "Freddy" in Miami continued:

They know that some of the turncoats who arrived here in a stolen sailboat or launches have been arrested. These are being held at the immigration department. This is because everything hinges on the negotiations for a pact governing the diversion of planes, which is being discussed, or, as a State Secretary said here, are nearing conclusion.

This is Havana media's first allusion to three Cubans who commandeered a fishing boat and landed in Florida in December and who are under investigation by immigration authorities.

**U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS** Recent "Letters from Freddy" touching on the hijacking negotiations have depicted growing political pressure in the United States for "normalization" of relations with Cuba, sometimes even suggesting that such a move may be in the offing. Thus the one on the 5th reported that a group of U.S. Senators had just "asked President Nixon to reestablish relations with Cuba, and the exiles . . . have become fit to be tied." The topic of "peaceful coexistence with Cuba," the broadcast alleged, had become a subject of frequent public comment. A broadcast on 20 January had said "it is evident that U.S. foreign policy will be very different within two or three months" and cited a statement by Senator Kennedy favoring a change in U.S. policy toward Cuba.

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## HAVANA MEDIA CIRCUMSPECT IN COVERAGE OF GUERRILLA LANDING

Initial Cuban reaction to the reports of a guerrilla landing on the southern coast of the Dominican Republic on 5 February has been very cautious, wholly ignoring Dominican Government charges that the invaders came from Cuba and noting without comment foreign media reports of rumors that the guerrillas are led by Colonel Francisco Caamano, leader of the 1965 Dominican revolt. Some Havana radio news items, quoting AFP and UPI, cited reports implying that the operation is a government-inspired hoax. This reference has been made to an "alleged" landing of an expeditionary force "supposedly" led by Caamano and to allegations by the opposition Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) that the affair has been fabricated by the government as a pretext for banishing opposition leaders from the country and for intensifying repression prior to the Dominican presidential elections. No Cuban comment on the landing has been monitored so far.

**CAAMANO AND CUBA** The closest Havana media have come to acknowledging Caamano's reported involvement was in a 6 February TV newscast which observed that "the rumors all point to Caamano's leading the group." While the telecast went on to note that Caamano had "vanished mysteriously" in 1967 from his post as Dominican military attache in London, it did not mention the widespread reports that he had subsequently been in Cuba.\*

With Cuban media totally silent on Caamano's whereabouts, Fidel Castro responded warily to a question on the subject in an interview published in the Dominican paper AHORA in January 1971. Asked about the reports that Caamano was in Cuba, Castro replied:

What do you want: that I issue a certificate saying Caamano is in Cuba? I have to refrain completely from commenting on that because possibly the enemies of the revolution may be interested in knowing where Caamano is. . . . Really, I am not willing to cooperate with the enemy in any way by giving information.

As in earlier speeches, Castro was unstinting in his praise of the Dominican revolutionary, remarking that he had "the attributes necessary to lead a revolution." Describing Caamano as "a great

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\* A Venezuelan newspaper alleged on 19 January that Caamano had died in Cuba, estranged from the Castro regime--a report ignored in Havana media but promptly denied by the PRD secretary general.

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leader" of the Dominican people and a peerless "hero" of the 1965 revolt, Castro observed that "many Dominicans" shared this assessment.

In the months prior to the reported landing Havana media alluded to Caamano rarely, and then only in quoting Dominican CP Secretary General Narciso Isa Conde. For example, when Isa Conde was in Havana in August 1971, the party organ GRANMA published an interview in which he lauded Caamano's leading role in the 1965 revolution and concluded that "many people in Santo Domingo" believed Caamano could "greatly contribute" to surmounting the difficulties facing the country. In a May 1971 interview carried by PRENSA LATINA, Isa Conde alleged that Caamano's example continued to provide impetus to "the nationalist movement among the armed forces."

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## SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

### DRV ANNUAL AID AGREEMENTS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES CONCLUDED

DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi returned to Hanoi on 28 January after leading an economic delegation on a two-and-a-half-month tour of communist countries to sign the annual aid agreements. The tour represents a return to the pattern followed since 1965 in concluding most of the annual aid agreements. Last year had been an exception, when most of the communist countries had sent delegations to Hanoi to sign the accords. In an obvious effort to reassure and mollify the DRV in the wake of plans for President Nixon's trip to China, Li Hsien-nien had headed a Chinese economic delegation which went to Hanoi to conclude the agreement in September 1971; and the Soviet-DRV agreement was signed during President Podgorny's official visit to Hanoi in October of that year.

Le Thanh Nghi's delegation left Hanoi on 15 November for Peking where an agreement was signed on the 26th. The agreement with the USSR was signed in Moscow on 10 December.\* Nghi and some members of his delegation then attended the French CP Congress, held from 13 to 17 December, after which the group went on to tour East Europe. After visiting all of Moscow's European allies, the delegation stopped off briefly in Moscow before proceeding to North Korea, and then visited Peking en route to Hanoi.

The delegation's final stopover in Peking coincided with the conclusion of the Vietnam peace agreement. According to a VNA report, Nghi at a banquet hosted by Li Hsien-nien on 27 January observed that "the Soviet Union and China have made enormous contributions" to the "victory" in concluding the peace agreement. As if concerned to give his two big communist allies even-handed treatment, Nghi cited the PRC first when he went on to express the belief that in carrying out the "heavy task ahead," the Vietnamese people "will enjoy the great and vigorous support and assistance of China, the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries." VNA also reported that during a meeting with Nghi on the 27th Chou En-lai pledged "all-out support and assistance for the Vietnamese people in fighting as well as in

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\* These agreements are discussed, respectively, in the TRENDS of 29 November 1972, pages 6-8, and of 13 December, pages 6-7. The usual separate PRC-DRV trade protocol, signed in Peking on 27 December is discussed in the TRENDS of 4 January 1973, page 17.

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peaceful construction." In contrast to the final stay in Peking, there were no substantive reports regarding the delegation's 20-22 January stopover in Moscow during which Nghi had what TASS characterized as a "friendly" talk with Soviet Vice Premier Novikov.

As usual, the propaganda has given only general indications of the nature of the agreements. DRV Vice Minister of National Defense Tran Sam was reported as having participated in the negotiations in Peking and Moscow but not in the other countries. His whereabouts were not mentioned from 10 December, when he was present at the aid agreement signing ceremony in Moscow, until 4 January when a brief NCNA report said that he had been feted at a Peking banquet given by a PRC vice defense minister upon his arrival on the 3d after visiting "some East European countries." Propaganda is not known to have mentioned him since then.

Most of the accounts described the agreements as being for "economic and military" aid. And there were reports that during the Nghi delegation visits regular meetings were held by the joint commissions for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation which were set up between the DRV and East European countries over the past few years.\*

**ROMANIA** Both Hanoi and Bucharest media reported the signing on 30 December of agreements on Romania's "economic and military aid" to the DRV in 1973 by Le Thanh Nghi and Vice Premier Radulescu. At the same time other members of the delegations signed an accord on "goods exchange and payments" and a protocol on the first session of the Romanian-Vietnamese joint commission for economic, technical, and scientific cooperation, which had been established when the aid agreements were signed last year. Since 1967 both sides have acknowledged that the agreements include military as well as economic aid.

**HUNGARY** The aid agreements with Hungary, signed by Le Thanh Nghi and Vice Premier Lajos Feher on 5 January, according to both Budapest and Hanoi reports, covered "economic and military assistance" to the DRV for 1973, "goods exchange," and a protocol on the third session of the Hungarian-Vietnamese

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\* Last year's agreements were discussed in a Supplementary Article in the TRENDS of 5 April 1972.

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joint commission on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. The commission was set up at the time of the signing of the aid agreements in January 1971. It held its first meeting at that time and the second meeting when the aid agreement was signed last year.

Hungarian reports gave some details on the nature of the aid, emphasizing economic assistance. Last year, Hungarian speakers stressed military assistance, elaborating to some extent on the weaponry and equipment being supplied. Budapest had referred frequently to military aid in previous years as well. This year, speaking at the signing ceremony, Feher indicated that "longer-term economic cooperation" was agreed upon, with food assistance already under way and increased assistance in economic reconstruction envisioned after a cease-fire. A Budapest domestic service report said that "apart from military aid" the assistance would include "complete installations, small factories, power generators, and medicines," and that Hungarian experts would aid in exploiting the DRV's bauxite deposits and in irrigation construction. Other assistance would include help in animal husbandry and corn production. The report said that "essentially, cooperation will continue at an unreduced level in the same fields as before."

**EAST GERMANY** The aid agreements with East Germany were signed on 9 January by Le Thanh Nghi and Vice Premier Gerhard Weiss. According to the joint communique as published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the agreements covered "material aid and support, mutual goods exchange, and further cooperation in the economic and scientific spheres" in 1973. The fourth meeting of the joint commission for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation was held. This commission has held meetings at the time of the signing of the aid agreements each year since it was established in October 1969. VNA specified that the agreements covered "economic and military aid" as well as economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and goods exchange.

The joint communique listed industrial, transport, and construction equipment which the GDR was to send the DRV in trade, and noted that medical and educational aids and equipment financed from public donations would be sent. An agreement on the construction of small repair and construction workshops in the DRV was signed, and measures were discussed to help economic recovery in the fields of agriculture, forestry, light industry, and construction and transport. The communique noted the fulfillment of past agreements on the education and training

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of DRV citizens in GDR enterprises and added that such training would be continued in professions "of particular importance for overcoming the consequences of the war."

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA** The aid agreements with Czechoslovakia were signed on 12 January by Le Thanh Nghi and Vice Premier Jan Gregor. Hanoi media reported that the accords covered Czechoslovakia's "economic and military aid" for 1973, and included a document on the establishment of a joint commission for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation, and a trade agreement signed separately by other members of the delegations. Last January, when the aid agreements for 1972 were signed, both sides reported that it had been "agreed to set up" a joint commission but there were no specific reports of a document being signed. Last year's "agreement" was apparently formalized with the signing of the document this year.

Available Prague reports of the agreements noted the signing of accords on Czechoslovak "assistance" to the DRV in 1973 as well as on the establishment of the joint commission and on trade. Prague gave some details, noting that Czechoslovakia would provide "trucks, medical apparatuses and materials, machine tools, pumps, and machinery spare parts," but there was no specific mention of "military" aid. Last year, when the agreements were signed in Hanoi by a visiting Czechoslovak delegation, both sides said the agreements covered "economic and military aid."

**BULGARIA** On 16 January Le Thanh Nghi and Vice Premier Mako Dakov signed the Bulgarian aid agreements. According to Sofia media they included an agreement on "the granting of long-term credits to the DRV in 1973," a protocol on Bulgaria's "free aid" to the DRV for 1973, and a protocol on the second session of the joint commission for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. The joint commission had been established when aid agreements were signed in November 1970 and held its first meeting at the time of the signing of last year's accords in December 1971. Also signed this year was an agreement on trade exchange and payments, and BTA reported that decisions were made on cooperation in agriculture, engineering, and scientific and technological activity.

VNA described the agreements as covering Bulgaria's "economic and military aid to Vietnam for 1973" as well as for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and goods exchange.

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**POLAND** Aid agreements signed on 19 January by Le Thanh Nghi and Vice Premier Jozef Tejchma, according to VNA, covered Poland's "economic and military aid" for 1973 and economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. Warsaw media referred to Poland's "assistance to Vietnam in 1973" and said the agreements include a protocol providing for the development of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation as well as a trade agreement signed by other members of the delegations. The third session of the joint commission for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation was held. The commission, formed at the time of the signing of the annual agreements in 1969, did not have its first meeting until the aid accords were signed in 1971.

**NORTH KOREA** The aid agreement signed on 26 January by Le Thanh Nghi and Vice Premier Kim Man-kum in Pyongyang covered North Korea's "free aid to the DRV for the latter's economic development and increase of national defense capacity" for 1973, according to KCNA. An agreement on "commodity exchange and payments" was signed separately by other members of the delegations. VNA's report of the signing of the accords described them similarly. Last year both sides reported that separate economic assistance and military aid agreements were signed by different officials in the two delegations. In previous years both sides normally characterized the agreements as covering "military and economic aid."

**AGREEMENTS WITH CUBA, MONGOLIA, ALBANIA** The accord for Cuba's 1973 aid to the DRV was signed in Hanoi on 20 September by the DRV minister of foreign trade and a visiting Cuban vice minister of foreign trade. According to VNA, the agreement covered Cuba's "non-refund aid" and trade. Last year's agreement, signed in Havana on 30 December 1971 at the same ministerial level, had been described as covering Cuba's "economic aid" and trade. Similar agreements had been signed in previous years alternately in Havana and Hanoi.

The 1973 trade agreement with Mongolia was signed in Hanoi on 15 December by vice ministers of foreign trade. The VNA report said that under the agreement the DRV would supply Mongolia with consumer goods in exchange for agricultural and industrial products. There was no specific mention of aid but on 4 January VNA reported that DRV Vice Premier Nguyen Con received the Mongolian ambassador to thank Mongolia for its "economic aid for 1973."

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In January 1973 Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh had similarly conveyed to the ambassador gratitude for Mongolia's economic aid for 1972, and a NHAN DAN article thanked Mongolia for its "non-refund economic aid" for 1972, but there was no available report on the negotiation of an agreement. Reports of Vietnamese gratitude constituted the only available references to aid in January 1971, although the assistance then was described as also including "military aid." Trade agreements were the only accords specifically reported in 1969, 1968, and 1967, but in July 1968 NHAN DAN also praised a "letter on Mongolia's economic and military aid to Vietnam" reportedly brought from Premier Tsedenbal by a Mongolian friendship delegation. Le Thanh Nghi visited Mongolia in 1966 and signed an agreement for "non-refundable material aid."

Hanoi and Tirana media reported the signing in Hanoi on 6 February of agreements on Albania's "non-refund economic aid" and goods exchange and payments. The agreements were signed by vice trade ministers, the Albanian delegation having arrived in Hanoi on 29 January. Last year a DRV group visited Albania to sign what Tirana described as agreements on "gratuitous aid" and trade and which VNA specified as "economic" aid. Previous agreements had been signed alternately in the two capitals and had similarly been characterized as providing "economic" aid.

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