

10 JAN 1973

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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In Communist Propaganda


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10 JANUARY 1973

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 1 - 7 JANUARY 1973

Moscow (2742 items)

Vietnam	(17%)	14%
[Expanded U.S. Bombing]	(13%)	8%]
50th Anniversary of USSR, 30 Dec.	(40%)	9%
Brezhnev Meeting with French CP's Marchais	(--)	5%
China	(3%)	5%
14th Anniversary of Cuban Revolution	(2%)	3%
Kosygin New Year's Greetings to Soviet People	(1%)	3%

Peking (1114 items)

Domestic Issues	(32%)	44%
Vietnam	(36%)	25%
[Madame Binh in PRC]	(15%)	8%]
New Year's Day Joint Editorial	(--)	8%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

In the wake of the 30 December U.S.-DRV agreement to resume the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks in Paris on the 8th, Hanoi has sustained its vitriolic attacks on the President for the B-52 "terror" bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area and has cautioned that there is as yet no indication that the Administration is ready to sign the peace accord which Hanoi insists was "agreed on" last October. Le Duc Tho, in his statement upon arriving in Paris on the 6th, repeated the claim that it was possible to resume the talks because there was "a return to the situation prior to 18 December"--that is, the United States was "compelled" to stop strikes above the 20th parallel and to reduce those below the parallel. At the same time, there are repeated warnings of possible new "adventurous" U.S. actions, with a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 9th saying there have been "vile threats" of renewed bombings which show that "the U.S. aggressors" have learned nothing and "keep going round in a vicious circle--threat-escalation-defeat-threat."

Hanoi media have reflected the DRV's efforts to deal with the after-effects of the 18-29 December strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area: Hanoi radio on the 6th outlined the efforts of various ministries to help the bombing victims, and NHAN DAN's editorial on the 8th noted that the government "has adopted concrete policies" on meeting such urgent daily needs as food, clothing, and housing.

Low-level Moscow comment has welcomed the resumption of the U.S.-DRV talks in Paris while continuing to assail the massive bombings of North Vietnam. Moscow praises the DRV's "constructive attitude" at the talks and echoes Hanoi in saying that a favorable outcome of the talks depends on the United States.

Peking has reverted to a low posture on Vietnam developments, offering no authoritative comment while publicizing protests against U.S. actions from Hanoi and worldwide, including calls by U.S. Congressmen to cut off funds. Even in publicizing the protests Peking has taken care to soften the sharpest attacks on the Administration.

HANOI ASSAILS PRESIDENT FOR BOMBING, ATTITUDE AT PARIS TALKS

On 6 January, the day Le Duc Tho arrived back in Paris to resume the private talks, a NHAN DAN editorial discussed President Nixon's alleged double-dealing on the Vietnam question for the past four

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years and cautioned against optimism regarding a negotiated settlement. The editorial ridiculed the President's assertions over the years that specific U.S. military actions were aimed at ending the war--for example, the "invasion" of Cambodia in 1970, operations in southern Laos in 1971, and the mining and resumed bombing of the DRV in May 1972. But "the most brazen deceit," it said, was the President's contention before the election that peace was near and his subsequent "about-face" in the negotiations and use of B-52's against Hanoi and Haiphong. Declaring that "no one any longer believes" the President, the editorial said that, nevertheless,

vigilance is necessary, taking into consideration the state of the Paris talks at present. There is as yet no indication of any willingness on the part of the Nixon Administration to give up its high-handed demands and sign the agreement on ending the war and restoring peace mutually reached on 20 October.

Available summaries of the 6 January editorial--carried by VNA in English and by Hanoi radio in its domestic service--did not mention that the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks were resuming on the 8th, however. The only explicit references to the resumed talks came in the reports of Le Duc Tho's departure from Hanoi and his arrival in Paris, carried by Hanoi media on 3 and 7 January, respectively. The brief account of his statement upon arrival in Paris, carried by Hanoi radio's domestic service as well as by VNA, noted that Tho repeated the DRV's statement of the 3d to the effect that it was possible to resume the talks because the United States had failed in its scheme to intimidate the Vietnamese people and had been compelled to stop the bombing. The account of Tho's arrival statement also summarized his criticism of the massive U.S. bombing, but it did not report any of his remarks outlining his version of the status of the talks.

Le Duc Tho repeated the contention, first made in Hanoi's 3 January report that agreement had been reached to resume the talks, that "as of 13 December only a few problems remained." He went on to elaborate in a way which clearly implied that there had been a reversal in the U.S. position following the recess of the private talks on the 13th and Kissinger's return to Washington. Tho again repeated the 3 January Hanoi report

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when he said that during the private meetings between 20 November and 13 December the U.S. side had proposed many changes in the agreement "bearing on principles and substance." But he went beyond the report of the 3d when he explained that because "the DRV side perseveringly maintained the principles and at the same time made utmost efforts," by 13 December only a few unresolved questions were left. He added that both sides had agreed to report to their respective governments, to maintain contact, to continue the experts' talks, and--"as proposed by the United States"--not to reveal the substance of the private discussions.

Reemphasizing his contention that there was no stalemate at that time, Tho said that the DRV "stuck to these agreements," and "by 13 December the negotiations were still making progress and had prospects of arriving at an early conclusion." He declared that the United States "acted in complete contradiction to its agreement" and on 16 December "unilaterally made public part of the contents of the private meetings, distorted the truth, and slandered the DRV side for having created obstacles to the negotiations." He went on to charge that the U.S. side had placed the onus on the DRV in order to have a pretext to bomb the DRV and attempt to force it to accept U.S. demands.

Le Duc Tho concluded his statement by asserting that the Vietnamese problem can be settled peacefully and rapidly if the U.S. side has good will and matches the DRV's serious attitude; but he warned that if the United States keeps demanding "unreasonable changes bearing on principles and substance, prolonging and expanding the war," the Vietnamese people "are resolved not to give in to any pressure or threat" and will persevere in their struggle.

The unity of Vietnam is the only substantive issue mentioned in Hanoi propaganda since the 30 December U.S.-DRV agreement to resume the talks. Following the passage cited above on the absence of any sign of Administration willingness to sign the 20 October agreement, the 6 January NHAN DAN editorial added that there similarly has been no sign indicating withdrawal of U.S. support for Thieu--"the man who has recently raised the insolent demand that South Vietnam be recognized as a separate state." Thieu's stand on the maintenance of two Vietnam states and the 17th parallel as a national frontier had also been assailed in a VNA commentary on 2 January and in a Hanoi radio commentary and an article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 3d.* The cryptic charge that the President "still has

* See the TRENDS of 4 January 1973, pages 4-5.

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traitor Nguyen Van Thieu clamoring for partition of Vietnam" also appeared in an article in the 7 January NHAN DAN.

The vitriolic nature of the article on the 7th is indicated by its title--"The New Hitlerite Clique is Condemned to be Hanged." Both the article on the 7th and another in NHAN DAN on the 9th--that one titled "Worse Than the Chicago Gangsters"--observed that the President was again threatening to resume the bombing if the DRV did not negotiate seriously. The latter cited Presidential Assistant Herbert Klein as having said on NBC's Meet the Press on the 7th that the President does not rule out the possibility of resuming bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong if an accord is not reached in the Paris negotiations. The article also cited press reports that the President had told members of Congress on the 5th that the bombing pause above the 20th parallel would last only as long as Hanoi negotiated seriously. NHAN DAN observed that "to openly threaten us before the whole world" is another attempt to force the DRV to negotiate on U.S. terms, and it concluded by repeating the standard assertion that the Vietnamese cannot be cowed.

DRV CITES VIGILANCE, EMERGENCY MEASURES IN WAKE OF STRIKES

Since the 30 December announcement by the United States that it had suspended air strikes above the 20th parallel in North Vietnam, Hanoi has confined its official protests over the continuing strikes south of that line to virtually daily foreign ministry spokesman's statements. During the 18-29 December period of massive strikes by B-52's and other planes, in addition to routine spokesman's protests Hanoi had issued a government statement on the 21st and foreign ministry statements on the 19th, 27th, and 29th.

Hanoi claimed that during the bombing north of the 20th parallel the DRV had downed a total of 81 planes, including 34 B-52's. It has claimed an additional 14 planes downed since then, including five B-52's, for a total of 4,173 as of 10 January. Commendations for downing four of the B-52's were issued to Nghe An Province on 10 January by the VPA High Command, which praised the "armed forces and people" of the province for alleged downings on 4, 6, and 10 January. For the most part Hanoi has referred to Vietnamese casualties only in general terms, saying that "thousands" were killed and wounded. But a DRV War Crimes Commission communique on the 3d claimed a "tentative" total in Hanoi alone of 1,318 dead and 1,261 injured.

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Propaganda since the limitation of the bombing on the 30th has repeatedly called for vigilance against future "adventurous" U.S. actions. To bolster its charge that the Administration's word is not to be trusted, Hanoi has claimed that by its heavy bombing in the southern areas of the DRV since the 30th the United States has violated an alleged pledge not only to stop the bombing above the 20th parallel but to reduce it below that line. Thus, the spokesman's statement of the 5th claimed that the United States bombed a village in Tan Loc district of Hoa Binh Province--north of the 20th parallel--and continued to "carpet-bomb" areas below the 20th parallel, thereby violating its "recent" pledge to "end the bombing and mining in North Vietnam north of the 20th parallel and reduce the bombing and shelling south of the 20th parallel in order to resume the negotiations." Such a U.S. pledge to limit bombing had also been mentioned in the 3 January Hanoi report that Le Duc Tho was en route to Paris to resume the talks.

During the escalation of the U.S. strikes, the DRV spokesman in Paris in a 26 December statement railed at the Nixon Administration for "continuing to disavow its pledges on halting the air raids against Hanoi, on refraining from bombing above the 20th parallel, and on reducing the bombing below the 20th parallel in order to create a favorable atmosphere for the negotiations."* A communique from the Paris delegation on 23 December had referred more generally to a U.S. agreement to "significantly reduce" military activities "in North Vietnam" and to stop the attacks north of the parallel; but most Hanoi references to U.S. bombing limitations have only noted the promise to remain below the 20th parallel.

EMERGENCY Hanoi radio reported on 6 January that emergency
MEASURES measures in the wake of the heavy bombing had
 been announced by the Premier's office and the
ministries of interior, public health, finance, internal trade,
and grain and food products and by local Hanoi organs. These

* U.S. Command announcements on the bombing indicate that after the opening of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks in Paris on 20 November, U.S. strikes--which were confined to the area below the 20th parallel--remained below 100 per day, although there had been no such limitation during the first half of November. U.S. announcements between 30 December, when strikes were again confined to the zone below the 20th parallel, and 6 January indicated that there were more than 100 strikes a day; the number dropped off sharply on the 7th, however, on the eve of the resumed talks.

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measures included emergency distribution of food, clothing, and medicine; care and housing for bombing victims; restoration and replacement of fields and domestic animals; and tasks of those concerned with carrying out the relief measures.

On 5 January Hanoi radio had announced that emergency measures were also discussed at an enlarged session of the presidium of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee held on the 3d. The session reportedly discussed specific tasks to be carried out by Front committees at various levels as well as by political parties and mass organizations comprising the Front. A resolution adopted by the session listed among the tasks of the Front continued enlistment of youths, air defense and evacuation, and assisting the frontline as well as maintaining a strong and stable rear area.

Evidence of concern regarding emergency and relief measures had appeared earlier in accounts of visits by DRV leaders to bomb-damaged areas. For example, reports of Premier Pham Van Dong's visits on 24 and 25 December indicated that he reminded cadres in areas of Hanoi that they were responsible for organizing and directing relief activities and restoring production and the people's livelihood. On 26 December a message from the Central Agricultural Commission to administrative and agricultural committees in the provinces expressed concern over damage to the fifth-month spring crop and urged repair of damaged fields. Truong Chinh, on a 5 January visit to bombed areas in Hanoi, referred to government instructions and urged that they be carried out promptly and thoroughly. Concern over the dikes was expressed by Tran Dang Khoa, vice chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, during a visit on the 6th to the Gia Lam district of Hanoi.

Emergency measures were also discussed by Minister of Internal Trade Hoang Quoc Think in an undated interview carried by Hanoi radio on the 7th. The trade minister cited examples of successful efforts to make products available despite enemy attacks and claimed that these achievements resulted "from our party's policies and lines, particularly from the 220th resolution* of our party Central Committee Politburo."

* Resolution 220 has never been released but has been referred to from time to time in Hanoi media since last summer. According to an article in the North Vietnamese monthly THANH NIEN (YOUTH) in September, the Politburo's resolution was dated 1 June and was on "changing the trend and stepping up all tasks in the North to continue to fight and defeat the U.S. aggressors."

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MOSCOW DECRIES AIR STRIKES, WELCOMES RESUMPTION OF TALKS

Soviet commentators have continued to praise the DRV's "constructive attitude" on the peace talks and to assail the United States for the massive bombings in the Hanoi-Haiphong area and for demanding "fundamental" changes in the peace accord. Moscow has reported opposition to Administration policy in the United States and has speculated on the "growing confrontation" between the President and Congress on the war, briefly noting reports on possible congressional efforts to cut off war funds.

Moscow contends that U.S. bombing, rather than breaking the DRV's will, has succeeded only in prompting worldwide protests. And it says that it was these protests along with high military losses which forced the United States to stop the massive bombing and return to the Paris talks. The substance of the peace accord is not discussed, however, and Moscow merely echoes Hanoi in saying that the outcome of the negotiations depends on the U.S. attitude. On the eve of the resumption of the Le Duc Tho-Kissinger talks, an international review in the 7 January PRAVDA recalled Brezhnev's 21 December warning, in his address marking the 50th anniversary of the USSR, that events in Vietnam could affect U.S.-Soviet relations. Most comment, however, has noted only that Brezhnev on that occasion reaffirmed the USSR's "principled position" on Vietnam and pledged continued solidarity.

Moscow media, as customary, briefly reported on the meetings in Paris between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on the 8th and 9th. Le Duc Tho's 4-6 January stopover in Moscow on his way back to Paris was treated in routine fashion. He was met at the airport by party and foreign ministry officials Rakhmanin and Firyubin and had talks with Politburo member Kirilenko and candidate member Katushev--the leaders with whom he has met most frequently during his stopovers, including his most recent one on 16 December.

During the Moscow talks Le Duc Tho reportedly stressed the Vietnamese people's determination to continue their "just struggle," and the Soviet side condemned the "barbaric" U.S. bombings as an attempt to "rudely pressure" the DRV. The reports also said the Soviets reiterated their pledge of "invariable solidarity" and supported the DRV's and PRG's efforts directed at the "speediest" signing of the peace agreement.

Hanoi's VNA as usual briefly reported Le Duc Tho's Peking and Moscow stopovers only in a single report of his arrival in

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Paris. VNA indicated none of the substance of the talks in either capital, merely noting that they took place in a "cordial and friendly atmosphere." TASS said the conversation took place in a "heartfelt and friendly atmosphere." Moscow had most recently used a similar characterization of "friendly and cordial" to describe the talks during Tho's stopover en route to Paris in November; a reference to "fraternity" had appeared in reports of his December stopover and of some earlier ones. According to TASS, views were exchanged on "problems" of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation as well as on "questions connected with the course of the Paris talks on Vietnam." Bilateral relations were not mentioned in reports of the December talks, but "questions of further developing" relations had been mentioned in November and on earlier occasions.

PEKING ASSUMES LOW POSTURE ON VIETNAM DEVELOPMENTS

Following its demonstration of support for the Vietnamese during PRG Foreign Minister Binh's visit ending on 1 January,* Peking has reverted to a low posture on Vietnam developments, offering no authoritative comment while devoting its coverage largely to reports of protests from Hanoi and worldwide. Peking took further note, still without comment, of the return to negotiations in Paris by replaying VNA's account of Le Duc Tho's arrival statement on the 6th. Peking has also given further publicity to protests by members of Congress against U.S. military actions in Vietnam. An NCNA dispatch on the 5th cited statements by Carl Albert, Mike Mansfield, Edward Kennedy, and others, including calls for Congress to cut off funds for the war.

While giving extensive publicity to protests against U.S. actions, Peking has also shown caution in its treatment of the United States. Thus, NCNA's account of the 5 January DRV protest against U.S. air strikes the previous day omitted the charges

* See the TRENDS of 4 January 1973, pages 13-17. On page 15, there should be a footnote after the first sentence of the second paragraph to say that the Chinese pledge to risk the greatest national sacrifice had also appeared in Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua's wide-ranging UNGA address on 3 October 1972. Rather than being pegged to Vietnam developments as such, however, Chiao's reaffirmation of this commitment was made in a broad context of Chinese support for the Indochinese peoples.

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that the continued bombing violated Washington's commitment to curtail the strikes and that these actions have revealed the Nixon Administration's "extremely cruel and crafty nature" and its "deceitful arguments on peace and good will." Earlier, NCNA had sanitized the 29 December DRV Foreign Ministry statement by rewriting one sentence to remove a comparison of the heavy U.S. bombing with Guernica and other infamous incidents, and by deleting a passage calling the Nixon Administration "the most savage murderer of the present time."

In keeping with this caution, Peking gave only minimal attention to the alleged damaging of a Chinese ship on 20 December by U.S. bombing. Apart from the NCNA protest statement, the only reference to this incident was luried in a 6 January NCNA dispatch from Hanoi reporting a visit to Haiphong on the 5th by foreign correspondents. NCNA noted that the correspondents viewed the damage to a Polish freighter and a Chinese vessel. Peking has not mentioned a 3 January message from the PRC Public Health Ministry, broadcast by Radio Hanoi on the 8th, which expressed support for a 23 December statement by the DRV Public Health Ministry denouncing the bombing of the Bach Mai hospital in Hanoi.

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ROMANIA

NEW DEFENSE LAW RULES OUT ACCEPTANCE OF "FOREIGN OCCUPATION"

The 25th anniversary of socialist Romania was used by Bucharest to publicize, on 29 December, a new national defense law which in effect puts the country's independent stance on a legal basis and--with the 1968 Czechoslovak events obviously in mind--bans any "acceptance" of a foreign occupation of Romania. The new law, carrying strong overtones of Yugoslavia's "all-people's defense" system, replaces and officially abrogates a whole series of Romanian regime decrees and decisions on military service and recruitment dating back to 1954. It is to go into effect on 31 March. Hailed by Ceausescu in his Bucharest speech on the 25th jubilee, the law was ignored in the brief anniversary message from the Soviet leaders and in the moderate volume of comment carried by Soviet media on the occasion.

After declaring repeatedly at the outset Romania's identity as a "sovereign" state, the new "Law Concerning the National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania," published in full in the 29 December SCINTEIA, asserts that

it is banned to accept or recognize any action of any foreign state or any situation, regardless of its nature, including general capitulation and the occupation of the national territory, which, in times of peace or war, would infringe upon the national sovereignty and independence and territorial integrity of the Socialist Republic of Romania or which would in any way weaken its defense capacity.

Nullifying in advance any "invitation" to Soviet troops to enter the country, like the one allegedly extended by Czechoslovak ultra-conservatives in August 1968, the Romanian law states that "any such act of accepting or recognizing [a foreign occupation] is null and void as being contrary to the state regime and the supreme interests of our socialist nation." At the same time, it adds a vague assurance that in setting up the defense system and "carrying on battle actions against the aggressor, the provisions of international agreements" to which Romania is a party "shall be respected." It goes on to stipulate that war will be declared only in the event of "armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Romania or against another state" toward which Romania "has mutual defense obligations undertaken by international treaties."

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There is no mention of the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet-Romanian 20-year friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance treaty renewed on 7 July 1970. The law goes no further on this score than to note that the RCP's defense policy is to strengthen friendship and alliance with the socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and to promote peaceful coexistence with "all" states, regardless of social system, on the basis of equality and independence.

In line with past assertions by Ceausescu in the same vein, the law declares that "the right to decide on the problems of defense" of Romania "is a sovereign attribute of the Romanian state." The Romanian leader did not emphasize this point, however, in his speech at the 25th anniversary meeting on the 29th, presenting the law instead in low key as a call for "patriotic" defense of the country by all citizens and referring specifically to military cooperation with "the Warsaw Pact member-states" as well as with "all socialist countries." The country's sovereign right to decide on its own defense had been asserted strongly by Defense Minister Ionita in his presentation of the draft of the law to the National Assembly on the 27th. Ionita had also emphasized that "for the first time" the law ruled out "acceptance or recognition" of any violation of Romania's territorial integrity.

The law declares that just as the Romanian people have "always" defended their independence "with weapons in their hands," now also "all the country's citizens must be ready to fight, even at the cost of their lives," to safeguard "the Fatherland's sovereignty and integrity." It adds that national defense "is a sacred duty of each Romanian citizen, man or woman, regardless of nationality"--the latter presumably alluding to the Hungarian minority in Transylvania.

Moscow had shown its aversion to such all-people's defense concepts--patently aimed at an external Soviet threat--in the Yugoslav context in its treatment of a speech by Tito on 9 October 1971 at the close of nationwide military maneuvers: TASS' report of that speech ignored Tito's references to "all-people's defense" and "self-management" and to the participation of "auxiliaries" and "territorials" in the exercises and treated sarcastically the Yugoslav leader's call for struggle against external "enemies" of the Yugoslav socialist system.

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SOVIET MESSAGE, COMMENTARY The 25th anniversary message from Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin to Ceausescu and Maurer on the Romanian holiday was brief for such a milestone occasion. Published in PRAVDA on the 30th and in SCINTEIA the next day, it "conveyed "friendly congratulations" to the Romanians and promised that the Soviet party and people would "strengthen in the future too the alliance and comradely relations" with the Romanian party and people. In restrained terms, it called for "development" of cooperation in the framework of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. It wished the Romanian leaders "new successes" in socialist construction. The 30 December PRAVDA also carried a brief report that Ceausescu had spoken at the Bucharest anniversary meeting the day before, with no details of the content.

Similarly ignoring the new Romanian defense law, an N. Aleksandrov article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the 29th, keyed to the Romanian anniversary, instead pointedly recalled that "the presence of the Soviet Army on Romanian territory" at the end of World War II had forestalled "interference by U.S. and British imperialists in the Romanian people's internal affairs." The article stressed at length the Soviet contribution to Romania's economic development and noted that the basis of the two countries' relations was the renewed 20-year friendship treaty of 7 July 1970. It cited the low-keyed statement in Ceausescu's speech at the 22 December session of the Kremlin meeting on the 50th anniversary of the USSR to the effect that Soviet-Romanian relations would "continue to develop and strengthen still further."

POLISH MESSAGE While the anniversary messages from Moscow and from most of the East Europe allies were largely pro forma, the one from Poland's Gierak, Jablonski, and Jaroszewicz appeared to lecture the Romanian mavericks: After recalling that the Romanians had joined forces with the nascent socialist community at the start of the postwar period, the message added that, "as then, the current efforts to strengthen the unity of the socialist community" and the cooperation among "all" its member countries "are the basic conditions for the further successes of the entire community and each country" in the struggle for peace and socialism. Gierak, recently awarded an Order of Lenin on his 60th birthday, had been accorded the most prominent treatment of the East European leaders at the Moscow gathering on the USSR's 50th anniversary: He was the first to address the meeting after Brezhnev and the first to have a bilateral conference with Brezhnev, and he spoke on behalf of the other leaders in responding to Brezhnev at a reception.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

ECONOMIST PROPOSES REVISIONS IN REPUBLIC BORDERS

Economist V. Kistanov, writing in the December **QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS** on the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, has proposed that republic borders be altered in the interest of more efficient economic development. Citing Lenin to the effect that economic factors are just as important as nationality in determining republic borders, Kistanov argued that many republic boundaries established in the 1920's and 1930's have become obstacles to efficient economic planning and should be rearranged. As an example, he pointed to the irrationality of having the Fergana Valley cotton complex divided among Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, and Tadzhikistan instead of placing it under a single administration.

The Kistanov article, like other jubilee articles on the nationality question, indicates that the current discussion of nationality problems centers largely on economic relationships between Moscow and the periphery.* Under Khrushchev the debate over the nationality question also involved language, culture, and education.

While upholding the predominance of economic interests, Kistanov sought to allay fears that the interests of individual republics would be ignored under his proposals. Thus, although calling for the creation of new agencies to supervise economic regions encompassing several republics, he hastened to exempt the republics themselves from such supervision. This exemption was apparently aimed at avoiding the antagonism caused by the creation of such ill-conceived entities as the Central Asia Bureau in the Khrushchev era.

Kistanov recalled that the borders of republics had occasionally been changed in the past by joint agreement, and he said that his proposal was thus not as unusual as it appeared. He was evidently referring to changes that occurred in 1971 involving Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, and Tadzhikistan. In May 1971 a large part of Uzbekistan's Syrdarya Oblast--enough to form

* For background, see the **TRENDS** of 28 June 1972, pages 41-42; 8 November, page 24; and 22 November, pages 37-38.

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six new Kazakh electoral districts--was transferred to Kazakhstan. The shift appeared designed to reunite the Golodnaya Steppe, which had been split between the two republics since the 1950's when the region was transferred to Uzbekistan. In October 1971 part of Uzbekistan's Andizhan Oblast was transferred to Kirgizia, and in November 1971 territory was exchanged between Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan. The purposes of these changes were never explained, and in some cases the republics apparently never published the ukases in the local press nor publicly confirmed them at republic Supreme Soviet sessions.

There have been hints of opposition to such revisions in Central Asia. A 7 December SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA article, for example, attacked a prominent Kirgiz scholar for "absolutizing" the rights of the Kirgiz SSR and for writing about the possibility of "forcible" border changes. In an article published shortly after the 1971 border changes, Professor K. Nurbekov in LITERATURNYY KIRGIZSTAN, No. 4, 1972, had warned that "forcible" changes of republic borders would be tantamount to "annexation" and "violation of the principle of self-determination of nations."

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

PEKING'S EVOLVING APPROACH TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION

In the wake of its major diplomatic advances at the expense of the ROC's international standing, Peking has begun fashioning an approach to the Taiwan issue that reflects the enhanced confidence born of recent successes while fostering an atmosphere conducive to overcoming the hostility and uncertainty toward the mainland regime felt by people on Taiwan. In addition to the steady succession of diplomatic recognition agreements eroding the ROC's standing, President Nixon's visit to Peking last February--during which the United States went on record as not challenging the position that Taiwan is a part of China--and the establishment of relations with Japan has significantly reduced major sources of Peking's concern over Taiwan's juridical status in the international community. Though the U.S. and Japanese positions on the Taiwan question fell short of the PRC's preferred terms, Peking welcomed these breakthroughs as giving major impetus to its diplomatic momentum. As explained in the 30 September PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on Prime Minister Tanaka's visit, the position taken by Japan on the Taiwan question delivered "a hammer blow" to those advocating schemes that would perpetuate the island's alienation.

Complementing its more relaxed approach to Taiwan as an international question, Peking has been making a pitch to the people on Taiwan by playing on a sense of Chinese national unity and patriotism. Breathing new life into the appeal for the separated "compatriots" to return to "the warm embrace of the motherland," Peking has made several gestures of inviting the people on Taiwan to visit the mainland and hinting that their relationship to the PRC might evolve into one comparable to that of the Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao. To underscore this message, PRC broadcasts to Taiwan have extensively publicized comments by visiting Overseas Chinese on the friendly treatment they have received and their favorable impressions of life on the mainland. This propaganda effort has also focused on cases of ROC officials who passed over to the communist side, as in a recent broadcast to Taiwan referring to former ROC President Li Tsung-jen's return to the mainland and his reception by Mao in 1965.

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For its part, Taipei has exhibited acute sensitivity over the PRC effort and has recently taken steps to discourage visits to the mainland by Chinese on Taiwan and elsewhere. Taipei's news agency CNA on 18 December released a "secret document" in an attempt to show ulterior motives behind Peking's policy toward visiting Overseas Chinese, charging that while the communists are outwardly smiling they are "sharpening knives to murder those Overseas Chinese who come over to them." In his New Year's message for 1973, President Chiang Kai-shek pointedly denounced the "adverse current" among Overseas Chinese who are "shouting the slogan of so-called unification and collaborating with the bloodstained assassin of our national culture."

TAIWAN'S STATUS The train of recognition agreements having been set off in October 1970 with the compromise Canadian formula in which the other country "takes note" of Peking's claim to Taiwan, the moves in the past year toward dissolving the stickier problems brought new variants for handling the Taiwan question. In the joint communique on President Nixon's visit, the United States "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait" maintain that Taiwan is a part of China, a position the United States "does not challenge." Peking's apprehension over sentiments favoring an independent Taiwan must have been assuaged in part by this statement, and in fact Peking has not pursued its criticism of the Taiwan independence movement since early last year.

The 28 February 1972 Sino-U.S. communique helped prepare the ground for the PRC and Britain to break their impasse on the Taiwan issue the next month and to raise their relations to the ambassadorial level--a move long blocked by Peking because the British had "left their tail behind" on Taiwan in the form of a consulate. According to the PRC-British joint communique (in the English version, faithfully reproduced by NCNA's English service), the British Government, "acknowledging" Peking's position that Taiwan is a province of the PRC, declared its decision to remove its official representation from Taiwan. There was some linguistic juggling involved here, however, as the Chinese version used the same term, "cheng jen," both for Britain's "acknowledgment" of Peking's claim to Taiwan and for British "recognition" of the PRC Government as the sole government of China. The Chinese version thus gave the impression of a less equivocal British accession to Peking's terms and obscured the fact that the British had made use of a key term appearing in the Sino-U.S. communique. The Chinese version of the Sino-U.S. communique had used "jen shih tao" for the U.S. acknowledgment of Peking's view on Taiwan.

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The British formula, complete with the linguistic twists, was also used when two Commonwealth partners, Australia and New Zealand, announced their establishment of relations with Peking in separate joint communiques with the PRC released on 22 December. NCNA's English version of the 24 December PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial hailing these two recognition agreements let the linguistic cat out of the bag by saying Australia and New Zealand had "recognized" the PRC Government as the sole legal government of China and "recognized" Peking's position on Taiwan, although NCNA's English versions of both joint communiques used "acknowledged" on the latter count. Earlier, in a 14 October joint communique, the more pliant--or less witting--Maldives Government said it "recognizes" both the PRC Government and the claim to Taiwan.

Notwithstanding these legalistic niceties, Peking's more relaxed posture toward the Taiwan question has been reflected in its less shrill and obsessive concern over the issue. In contrast to his lengthy discourse on the issue in his 1971 UNGA address, chief PRC delegate Chiao Kuan-hua ignored the matter in his main address at the 1972 session. Similarly, Peking's observance of the anniversary of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan in June was in a much lower key last year than in 1971. The 1973 New Year's Day joint editorial, while ritualistically calling for the liberation of Taiwan, failed to repeat the previous year's denunciation of two-Chinas formulas and the demand that the United States withdraw its forces from Taiwan. Expressing "deep concern for our compatriots" on Taiwan, the 1973 joint editorial went on to refer to "our compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao" and "our compatriots overseas." Peking may intend for Hong Kong and Macao to become a model for Taiwan's future relationship with the mainland: Peking has consistently avoided acknowledging that the two colonies have been juridically alienated from the PRC or that their legal status is indeterminate, but it has not indicated an intent to challenge existing administrative and economic arrangements.

In the meantime Peking has softened its approach toward the Chiang Kai-shek government, the last commentary in central media criticizing ROC policies having been a 13 March NCNA attack on an ROC bank charter revision that had the effect of blocking PRC legal claims to assets currently under Taipei's control. While maintaining the position that Chiang's government is not a legitimate one and continuing to characterize it as a "clique" and a "gang," Peking has been avoiding references to the regime, or to Chiang himself, in such terms as "traitor" or "political corpse"--epithets that remained in currency until early 1971. Characteristically, it

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has been left to hardline allies to take up the slack, as in PRG Foreign Minister Binh's revival--in her Peking rally speech on 29 December--of the formulation that Chiang is "the rotten political corpse long since repudiated by the Chinese people."

GESTURES TOWARD TAIWAN Peking has sought to promote an ecumenical spirit of Chinese unity to attract the people on Taiwan and elsewhere. The 106th anniversary in 1972 of the birth of Sun Yat-sen received a fanfare on the mainland not seen in recent years. NCNA reported meetings on 12 November at the former bases--Canton, Shanghai, and Nanking--as well as celebrations in Peking sponsored by the fellow-traveling Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, the CCP's United Front Department, and the National Committee of the CPPCC. The anniversary had not been marked since 1967, when only celebrations in Peking were reported. A broadcast to Taiwan on the occasion quoted one of Sun's contemporaries now residing on the mainland as pointing to the CCP leadership as the rightful heir of the mandate once held by Sun's Kuomintang.

A gesture signaling Peking's current approach appeared last summer in connection with the Asian ping-pong championships hosted by the PRC. NCNA reported on 27 August that the Asian Table Tennis Union executive committee had expressed readiness to welcome a Taiwan team to the 2-13 September tournament provided it participated in the name of "the Taiwan provincial team." On the same occasion Hong Kong and Macao "regional" (ti chu) teams were treated to a warm welcome at the Peking tournament.

The 1972 PRC National Day celebrations provided the stage for an authoritative gesture toward Taiwan. Speaking at a reception on 29 September in honor of "compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan compatriots, and Overseas Chinese and foreign nationals of Chinese descent," senior military leader Yeh Chien-ying noted that "quite a number of Taiwan compatriots" had toured the mainland in the past year, and he welcomed more of them to come and visit their relatives. (In recent years there had been no mention of Taiwan compatriots at this reception.) Yeh made a pitch to sentiments of patriotism among the Chinese on Taiwan and elsewhere, declaring that "patriots belong to one big family" and that no distinction should be drawn between "those who come forward first and those later." Striking a conciliatory note that was particularly relevant to ROC officials, he reassured "those with wrongdoings in the past" that they will be welcome to join the family. Premier Chou En-lai lent his authority to the gesture by receiving the Taiwan and other compatriots for a "cordial talk" on 6 October.

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Peking's attempt to project an image of solicitous concern for the people on Taiwan was reflected, atypically, in one of the series of PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials hailing recognition agreements. The 18 November editorial on the establishment of relations with Luxembourg interjected an assertion that the PRC "is concerned about the living conditions and democratic rights of the compatriots" on Taiwan.

BROADCASTS TO TAIWAN Radio Peking and the PLA Fukien Front transmitter each beam about 20 hours of programs daily to Taiwan and the offshore islands. Most of the programs are in Mandarin, but both stations together carry over 50 hours a week of broadcasts in the Amoy dialect used on Taiwan, and Radio Peking also beams seven hours of programs weekly in the Hakka dialect. In contrast to Peking's international services, which draw almost completely on the general file of NCNA and other central media, these stations originate a considerable amount of material tailored for their particular audiences as well as carrying material from the central file. Thus, for example, the Fukien Front radio carries a "Program for KMT Military and Political Personnel" consisting of material specifically tailored for ROC officials.

Mirroring Peking's general line, the broadcasts to Taiwan have accented the positive by portraying the good life on the mainland while softpedaling attacks directed personally at Chiang Kai-shek or other members of his government, and completely ignoring the Taiwan independence movement. Criticism of the ROC has generally been in a low key, appearing in the context of comparing conditions on Taiwan with those on the mainland. Thus, the Fukien Front on 16 November broadcast a talk by a Hunan taxi driver who cited the number of traffic accidents on Taiwan in contrast to the "good socialist condition" of PRC traffic safety (somehow failing to factor in the higher per capita number of cars on Taiwan). The economic situation seems to occasion the sharpest criticism of conditions on Taiwan, reflecting Peking's concern to undercut the fears among people on Taiwan regarding the effect on their prosperity of union with the mainland. Broadcasts to Taiwan have attempted to convince the people there that the average man is not benefiting from the island's economic growth. Thus, an 8 October Fukien Front commentary, entitled "Expose Lies of Industrial Development on Taiwan," argued that the Taiwan economy is mostly foreign-owned and therefore provides little profit for the island's people, and a 12 October broadcast rebutted the ROC's claims to improving living standards by citing statistics about heavy taxes, inflation, and unemployment that cut into family incomes on Taiwan.

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A characteristic device used in these broadcasts is for former ROC officials and other noncommunist personages to comment on the dramatic differences between conditions prior to the communist takeover and those prevailing now on the mainland. Typifying this approach, Radio Peking on 21 November broadcast a talk by a professor of agricultural economics at a Nanking university who acknowledged that prior to liberation he had been doubtful about the CCP and had prepared himself to drive a tractor in case he was compelled to abandon teaching. To his surprise, he recounted, he was promoted in his academic department and even became a member of the Nanking people's conference. His case history provided a parable of the PRC's treatment of patriotic intellectuals.

Former capitalists have also been put into service in this propaganda campaign, as in a 10 November broadcast in which a businessman from Hunan explained the more favorable economic consumption pattern of the masses and his own happy life under communist rule. Others making their contribution have been a former ROC admiral and a diplomat who defected from the ROC embassy in Senegal. There may be a less than adequate stable of these spokesmen, however, in view of the repeated appearances of some of them, such as a nonagenarian who was a former colleague of Sun Yat-sen and makes frequent appearances despite his age and his accent.

In keeping with Peking's recent gestures toward Taiwan, a number of talks by such spokesmen have urged their "old friends on Taiwan" to come and visit the mainland and see their friends and relatives. Replays from Western and Hong Kong media--the communist paper TA KUNG PAO is a favorite--of comments on conditions in China and treatment of visitors by such diverse recent travelers to the mainland as former U.S. diplomat John Service and Chinese-American scientists and intellectuals have become standard fare in broadcasts to Taiwan.

Other recent accounts have made a point of invoking authoritative sanction for the current invitation. A 9 November Fukien Front commentary mentioned a meeting of the author with Mao at which the chairman stressed his "great concern for the Taiwanese people," and an 11 December broadcast quoted Mao's remarks to Li Tsung-jen in 1965 promising a warm welcome and good treatment to all like Li who are willing to reunite with the motherland. This broadcast prefaced Mao's remarks with a notation of "the drastic change in

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the international situation during the past year" that had "greatly shocked" people of all strata on Taiwan, causing them to "long for a change" and inclining them toward the great socialist motherland. It cited instances of people on Taiwan transferring funds and sending family members abroad in the wake of the ROC expulsion from the United Nations, and it observed that a large number of people on Taiwan had traveled to the United States to visit relatives who had recently been to the mainland and could tell them about the situation there.

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