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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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
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# TRENDS

## In Communist Propaganda

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
4 JANUARY 1973

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**N O T I C E**

The TRENDS was not issued on 23 December 1972 in view of the closing of Federal agencies that day. This issue covers developments for the past two weeks.

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 25 - 31 DECEMBER 1972

<u>Moscow (2401) items)</u>		<u>Peking (1117 items)</u>	
50th Anniversary of USSR 30 Dec.	(51%) 40%	Vietnam	(47%) 36%
[Brezhnev Report	(16%) 9%]	[Madame Binh in PRC	(--)] 15%]
Vietnam	(18%) 17%	Domestic Issues	(31%) 32%
[Expanded U.S. Bombing	(11%) 13%]	Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei in DPRK	(3%) 8%
[Suslov-Truong Chinh Talks	(--)] 2%]	Messages to Kim Il-Song on Election as DPRK President	(--)] 5%
Brezhnev Congratulations on AAPSO 15th Anniver- sary	(--)] 4%]	Dahomey Foreign Minister Alladaye in PRC	(--)] 4%
25th Anniversary of Romanian Republic	(--)] 3%]		
China	(2%) 3%		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi's highest-level official protest over the massive B-52 and other air strikes initiated in the Hanoi-Haiphong area on 18 December was a DRV Government statement on the 21st, a vehicle that had also been used to protest the resumption of full-scale air strikes against the DRV last April as well as the President's 8 May decision to mine its ports. Like other propaganda, the government statement charged that the Administration was trying to impose its peace terms through force, and it appealed explicitly to the USSR and China to "demand" that the United States sign the peace accord agreed on last October. Hanoi has kept up a barrage of comment since the 18th stressing that the Vietnamese will not be cowed by what it calls "unprecedented terrorism" against the civilian population.

The U.S. decision to again suspend strikes above the 20th parallel as of 30 December was acknowledged by Hanoi on 1 January. And on the 3d it said that since the United States "had been compelled" to halt the expanded bombing Le Duc Tho was leaving that day for Paris to resume the private talks on the 8th.

PRG Foreign Minister Binh's visit to Peking beginning on 27 December occasioned a major demonstration of Chinese support, highlighted by a strong leadership turnout at an anti-U.S. rally followed by a meeting between Mao and Binh. For the first time in over a year the Chinese revived their pledge to risk even "the greatest national sacrifice" in supporting the Vietnamese, but this did not appear until the joint communique issued on the 1st, the same day Peking carried the DRV statement on the curtailment of U.S. bombing and resumption of the negotiations. Peking showed restraint in reacting to the U.S. air strikes while reiterating its hope for a negotiated settlement.

Soviet reaction to the expanded U.S. bombings was highlighted by Brezhnev's 21 December remarks, in his address on the 50th anniversary of the USSR, condemning the U.S. actions and warning that events in Vietnam could adversely affect Soviet-U.S. relations.

### HANOI CALLS FOR SIGNING OF OCTOBER ACCORD WHEN TALKS RESUME

The 30 December statement by the DRV Paris spokesman on U.S. restriction of its bombing and the agreement to resume private

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talks, carried by Hanoi media on 1 January, observed that the DRV side "has declared many times" that only when the United States "returns to the situation prior to 18 December can the talks between the DRV and the United States resume." It added that now the United States has replied that it agrees to end all bombing and shelling above the 20th parallel and "on this basis" the DRV agrees to resume the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks as well as the experts' meetings.

Hanoi propaganda on the massive air strikes repeatedly stressed that they were aimed at imposing U.S. negotiating terms and underlined DRV unwillingness to modify its position in the face of the attacks. A VNA commentary on the 19th had promptly warned that the U.S. "big stick and bombing diplomacy would reduce the prospects for effective negotiations" and "gradually eliminate all the favorable conditions for the signing of the agreement." The DRV Government statement on the 21st observed that the United States had "insolently threatened" to continue the bombing in hopes of compelling North Vietnam to accept U.S. terms and said that the Vietnamese people who had fought for decades "would not shrink in the face of any cruel force nor fear any insolent threat." The statement, like other propaganda, also labeled Administration charges that the DRV was obstructing a Vietnam settlement as "tricks aimed at finding a pretext for escalating the war."

Hanoi radio on the 25th took issue with White House press secretary Ziegler's statement that the bombing and mining would continue until Hanoi resumed constructive peace negotiations, charging that it is the President who has rained bombs on "the spirit of negotiations" and who "has pushed far away the prospects for the restoration of peace in Vietnam, which the U.S. side once said was at hand." Hanoi also demonstrated its position that talks could not go on during the expanded bombing by its attitude on the experts' talks. And VNA on the 28th reported a message sent to the U.S. side the day before which recalled that Hanoi's position regarding the meetings of experts had been "clearly stated" on the 20th and 23d and declared that the DRV could not participate in the experts' meeting scheduled for the 27th. The report said that the meetings will be resumed "when the situation existing before 18 December 1972 has been restored."

Hanoi's report on 3 January that Le Duc Tho had left that day to return to Paris and resume talks on the 8th echoed the

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statement by the DRV Paris spokesman on the 30th in saying that progress depends on the U.S. side. The item on the 3d also echoed other propaganda when it said that the November-December private talks the United States had demanded modification of many articles of the peace agreement which involved basic principles agreed on in October. But Hanoi on the 3d went on to make the unique statement that "as of 13 December only a few problems remained." This optimistic assessment seems to contradict Xuan Thuy's remarks in his 19 December press conference, as reported by VNA, that up to 13 December the United States had introduced a total of 126 modifications to the nine points of the draft agreement and that with a few exceptions these modifications were basic in nature and went against the principles of the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese. Xuan Thuy gave no indication that the U.S. request for modifications had been withdrawn or otherwise disposed of.

Hanoi media while refuting Kissinger's account of the status of the private talks in his 16 December press conference acknowledged little of the substance of his remarks. Similarly, Hanoi has taken issue with his blaming the DRV for the failure to reach agreement but without acknowledging such specific charges as his assertion that the DRV had withdrawn from previous positions and that during the last three days of the talks had raised one "frivolous issue" after another. Xuan Thuy in a 24 December TV interview with ABC cited specific examples of modifications allegedly demanded by the United States, but Hanoi has not even mentioned the interview. According to Xuan Thuy, U.S. demands involved a phrase implying total withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces,\* the linking of the release of political detainees in the South to a DRV withdrawal, the demand that military as well as U.S. economic advisers be allowed to remain in South Vietnam, the elimination of references to the PRG, and the reduction of the functions of the national council of reconciliation and concord to conduct general elections.

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\* In his press conference on the 16th, Kissinger expressly ruled out Thieu's demand for removal of all North Vietnam troops, but he said that what the United States cannot accept is "the proposition that North Vietnam has the right of constant intervention." He said that the United States wanted something in the agreement, however allusive, however indirect, which would make it clear that the two parts of Vietnam would live in peace and neither side impose a solution on the other by force.

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The brief VNA account of Xuan Thuy's press conference on the 19th had ignored his remarks opposing the U.S. proposal for an international control commission composed of several thousand--a proposal discussed by Kissinger on the 16th.\*

Hanoi media also ignored DRV Paris spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le's 21 December press conference in which he said, among other things, that during the second phase of the talks beginning on 4 December it became clear that the more good will shown by the DRV the more the Nixon Administration's attitude became unreasonable. Le also said in that press conference that the U.S. side at the private meetings had repeatedly threatened to resume the escalation of the war in North Vietnam and break off the negotiations.

Hanoi's assertion in the report of Le Duc Tho's return for talks that "as of 13 December only a few problems remained" is the more striking in view of the item's concluding "demand," credited to world-wide opinion as well as the Vietnamese, that the United States "adopt a really serious attitude and sign the agreement it agreed on with the DRV side on 20 October." Thus, Hanoi seems to be holding out hope that agreement is possible on the basis of the October draft.

Since the announcement of the agreement Hanoi has stressed the matter of the "unity" of Vietnam. A short VNA commentary on the 2d entitled "Thieu's Scheme--Partition of Country" said that "now that there is a chance for the Paris talks to continue" Thieu has become "more confused and frightened." It added that his real intention in sending emissaries abroad is "to prepare for possible American revision of the peace treaty and for later sabotage." VNA quoted the Saigon paper TIN SONG as saying that Thieu has not changed his position that "the two Vietnams must be recognized as two countries who have sovereignty, independence and inviolable boundaries." And it added that Thieu's behavior has revealed that "sinister design" he is harboring when he presses for the restoring of the demilitarized zone, the turning of the temporary demarcation line into a national frontier to perpetuate the division of the country. This same line was pursued on the 3d in a Hanoi radio commentary and in an article

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\* Hanoi media had atypically broached this issue when a 2 December NHAN DAN article assailed Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik for expressing willingness to supply 2,000 troops to an international control commission. See the TRENDS of 6 December 1972, pages 5-6.

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in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, with the latter saying that "it is crystal clear" that Thieu opposes "the sacred national rights of our country, peace, and the basic contents of the agreement on ending the war . . . which was concluded by the U.S. side and the DRV side on 20 October." The paper added that the peace agreement "clearly stipulates that the United States should respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam."

Hanoi's position on the unity of Vietnam was also forcefully reiterated in VNA's 4 January report that the DRV Paris spokesman had refuted "a news agency story" on the 2d that "a compromise accord has been reached between Washington and Hanoi" and "Hanoi has agreed not to include in the peace agreement a sentence affirming that Vietnam is one country temporarily divided in two." According to VNA, the spokesman recalled that point one of the nine points "agreed upon with the United States" stipulates that the United States recognizes the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as provided for by the 1954 Geneva agreement.

#### DRV MEDIA STRESS NORMAL PURSUITS DESPITE "TERROR" BOMBINGS

Hanoi media reacted to the massive B-52 strikes with an outpouring of propaganda calculated to dramatize Vietnamese determination not to be cowed. Initial official protests--a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 19th and the government statement on the 21st--followed the pattern of initial reaction last spring when U.S. strikes were resumed throughout North Vietnam. At that time a foreign ministry statement was issued on 6 April and a government statement on the 11th; the B-52 strikes in the Haiphong area on 16 April, however, additionally prompted a DRV Party-Government appeal the same day. The April joint appeal--which has a single precedent in one of December 1970 following heavy strikes and the prisoner-rescue attempt--was notable for its revival of Ho Chi Minh's July 1966 statement that the Vietnamese would not be intimidated even if Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities and enterprises were to be destroyed. This pledge has appeared in some of the current propaganda including Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap's 21 December speech marking the army anniversary and in a message on the same day from the VPA High Command praising air defense forces' feats in downing U.S. planes.

Ho's pledge was not voiced, however, in the government statement on the 21st. Hanoi may have stopped short of repeating the pledge

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in the vehicle of a government statement because of the intensity of the ongoing attacks at that time. This possibility seems the more likely in view of the fact that the pledge was repeated in a foreign ministry statement issued on 29 December--at a time when Hanoi presumably was aware that a U.S. suspension of the strikes above the 20th parallel was imminent. After declaring that the Vietnamese "have, the necessary amount of resolve and enough strength to persist in and step up the struggle," the foreign ministry statement affirmed also that "Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities and enterprises may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese will not be intimidated. Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom."

Hanoi's leadership endeavored, throughout the period of intensive bombing, to rally the population against the attacks and to maintain an appearance of normalcy. Thus, a day after the first massive strike in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, Hanoi broadcast a letter from DRV President Ton Duc Thang which, on behalf of the party Central Committee and government, hailed the antiaircraft successes and called for further vigilance and efforts. In the following days Hanoi publicized a series of public appearances by DRV leaders, including Giap and Premier Pham Van Dong.

Propaganda stressing the North Vietnamese ability to cope with the attacks was typified by a 22 December commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. It said that everyone works tirelessly to keep the mode of life and combat in Hanoi uninterrupted, adding that "amid flames of bombs dropped by B-52's, huge transportation convoys camouflaged under leaves depart Hanoi day and night to reach the frontline." An editorial in the army paper on the 23d similarly said that convoys continue to move goods to the frontline.

Hanoi seemed particularly concerned to reassure the Vietnamese regarding the dissemination of news. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 22d said that in buildings where the lamps are covered "printers work all night so that the reports on our country's resounding victories over the U.S. aggressors can be disseminated promptly." Strikes at Hanoi radio were noted in a VNA commentary on the 19th which said that the United States was "deliberately carpetbombing the central radio station of the DRV in an attempt to stifle the voice of justice." Hanoi radio on the 25th broadcast a NHAN DAN editorial which noted pointedly that "the voice of the just cause and victory from the 'Voice of Vietnam' radio station in the capital city of Hanoi continues to

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broadcast news of victory throughout our country and the world and to severely condemn the U.S. war maniacs." On the 30th Hanoi radio broadcast a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of that day which said, among other things, that "every night Hanoi streets are still brightly lighted by electric lights, the light of victory, and from the pride-deserving capital our radio station and press unceasingly continue to relay news of resounding victories from all over the country." Hanoi's "victory" from 18-29 December is said to have entailed the downing of 81 planes, including 34 B-52's and five F-111's and the "wiping out" or capture of "hundreds" of airmen.

An editorial in the party organ NHAN DAN on the 26th, entitled "Hanoi, Capital of Human Dignity," cited a Cornell University study for the assertion that B-52 bombing is for psychological and strategic, rather than military, effect. The editorial said that since 8 May when DRV ports were mined "a huge U.S. psywar operation" has day and night threatened the use of B-52's. It added that "friends with sentiments of mutual understanding, coming to share the danger of bombs with us during the first months of the criminal U.S. escalation, asked us: 'What if the B-52's bomb Hanoi?'" (VNA rendered this as "some foreign friends who visited North Vietnam during the first months . . . .") The answer, NHAN DAN said, came from an ordinary militia woman who said "houses may collapse, but one thing shall not collapse, that is man."

An editorial in NHAN DAN on the 24th quoted an air force lieutenant colonel recently captured as "admitting" that because of their technical characteristics B-52's could only attack military complexes covering many square miles, and as saying that since such objectives did not exist in North Vietnam the use of B-52's to attack small objectives and densely populated areas was political and aimed at causing many losses to the people in an attempt to create pressure. The editorial asked how President Nixon can answer this admission by a man who has executed his orders.

Particular vitriol toward the President and the Administration appeared in editorials in NHAN DAN on the 27th and the 31st. Declaring that "Nixon has used to the fullest extent the strategic B-52 which he thinks everyone is afraid of," the editorial on the 27th said: "The bandits have invaded our home at night. They closed the door, gagged us, blocked off all contact with the outside world so that they could beat us while

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we could not scream until we dropped to our knees with blood oozing from our mouths." Asserting that the Vietnamese have in the course of the week "enhanced their historic reputation," NHAN DAN added: "The Nixon clique, which is inherently base, is all the more like an animal slithering on the ground and hiding under one's foot. The Nixon clique's posture is that of someone in a weakened, declining position and it will certainly be destroyed. Our strength is that of human beings with a just cause, progress and with an ascending historic tide." The editorial on the 31st--after the suspension of strikes above the 20th parallel--called the President an "international hooligan" intent on committing "murderous crimes" and criticized his silence on the issue of the war during the current escalation, and noted that he spent the Christmas holidays in Florida rather than Washington. It said this allowed him to concentrate his energies on "committing a perfect crime--that is, a quick, orderly, discreet and successful crime--and on thoroughly cleaning his bloodstained hands in preparation for holding aloft another green olive branch."

Other propaganda since the bombing restriction has pointed up Hanoi's caution regarding future U.S. action. Thus, on 2 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, entitled "Pour the Flames of Hatred on the U.S. Aggressors' Heads," said that President Nixon's action in using the B-52's over the cities "was an extremely horrible act which far surpasses that of the Hitlerite fascists," and that "Nixon is the most bloodthirsty leader of the 20th century." It concluded by saying that although the U.S. aggressors were duly punished, "we are not yet satisfied and our hatred for them remains unappeased."

**EVACUATION** Hanoi media on 30 December reported on a directive "recently" issued by the Premier's Office concerning the tasks faced by areas taking in evacuees, and a NHAN DAN editorial on 2 January, commenting on the directive, emphasized the importance of evacuation both as "a positive measure to protect the people's lives and preserve our force in order to prolong the fight until complete victory" and as a means of "creating conditions for our armed forces to fight and win." It said that evacuation must be thoroughly carried out in populated cities and towns and industrial sites, especially Hanoi and Haiphong. And it called for the implementation of a policy according to which "only people required for combat, combat support, production and for communications and transportation activities remain in the cities."

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Calls for evacuation have been a staple of Hanoi propaganda since the resumption of U.S. air strikes throughout North Vietnam last April, just as they were during the 1965-68 bombing of the North. Like the current NHAN DAN, these calls have periodically stipulated that all people not engaged in combat or production should be evacuated. For example, on 10 May, two days after the President had announced his decision to mine DRV ports, a NHAN DAN editorial called for evacuation of all those not engaged in combat or production, and this was repeated in an 11 May order from the Hanoi Municipal People's Air Defense Council. The call for the exodus of nonessential civilians appeared again in a 10 October resolution from the Hanoi Municipal People's Council--adopted a week after Hanoi had charged, in an appeal from North Vietnamese mayors, that the cities had become strategic targets for U.S. attacks.

According to Hanoi Mayor Tran Duy Hung the actual preparations for the evacuation of the city began after 5 August 1964 when U.S. planes struck North Vietnam during the Tonkin Gulf incident. In a January 1967 interview with a Czechoslovak correspondent, the mayor said that children and old people were evacuated in the first phase followed by those people "who were not necessary for production in and the defense of the city." Hanoi media usually have not cited statistics on evacuation, but Mayor Hung in an interview reported by TASS in December 1966 said that a third of the capital, including almost all the children, had been evacuated. Defense Minister Giap in a July 1969 speech reviewing activities during the war had said that "millions" of people had been evacuated to rural areas. After the resumption of full-scale bombing last spring, a 3 May editorial in the Hanoi city newspaper HANOI MOI noted that already "hundreds of thousands" of citizens, especially elderly persons and children, had left the capital.

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## DRV LEADERS VISIT BOMBED AREAS, MEET TO MARK ANNIVERSARIES

Hanoi reported that, beginning on 22 December, North Vietnamese leaders made a series of visits to air defense installations and areas in and around the capital which had been damaged in the air strikes. The visits by officials, including Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Politburo members Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Van Tien Dung, were reminiscent of similar publicized tours of damaged areas by Hanoi leaders in the wake of the extremely severe floods during the summer of 1971.\* In addition to visiting various localities, North Vietnamese leaders promoted the appearance of maintaining normal conditions during the attacks by attending as usual a 21 December meeting in Hanoi to commemorate the anniversaries of Resistance Day and the founding of the army. However, there was no report of a public meeting on the 19 December NFLSV anniversary, an annual function in past years attended by Politburo-level figures. Politburo members Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, and Tran Quoc Hoan did not make any publicized appearances during the period of the attacks; but Le Duan and Hoan did surface on 1 January to welcome Truong Chinh back from his trip to Moscow.\*\*

Publicizing the activities of the North Vietnamese leaders, Hanoi media reported that on 22 December Premier Pham Van Dong visited the headquarters of the army (VPA) antiaircraft and air force command, accompanied by Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung; Defense Minister Giap visited a missile unit and various localities in the Hanoi area; and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh toured "a number of areas recently bombed and attacked by U.S. aircraft." The radio report on Giap's activities indicated that the Bach Ma hospital was among the sites he went to and it claimed that "everybody expressed gratitude for the concern and care of the VWP Central Committee, the government and the army and promised that they would

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\* The leaders' visits to flood-stricken areas in September 1971 are discussed in the 15 September 1971 TRENDS, pages 1-3.

\*\* Politburo members Le Thanh Nghi and Hoang Van Hoan were both out of the country during the intensified bombing--Nghi in France and Romania and Hoang Van Hoan with Truong Chinh in the Soviet Union. Hoan took part in talks with Suslov on 29 December but his whereabouts has not been reported since. He may have remained in Moscow since the only available listing of Truong Chinh's delegation since it left Moscow--carried by Peking media--did not include him.

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turn hatred into strength, make their maximum contributions to the entire nation's common revolutionary undertaking and completely defeat the U.S. aggressors."

The theme of official concern for the suffering of the people was particularly reflected in a 26 December radio report on visits made by Pham Van Dong and other officials on 24 and 25 December. For example, Hanoi radio described in some detail the Premier's tour of bombed areas, noting how moved he was by statements by survivors and how he embraced and consoled a child who had just lost her mother and brothers. The radio reported that Dong instructed members of the party, army, and government to "pay great concern to the livelihood of orphans and to study and to motivate the people to love and take care of one another." He also called for the local administration to have plans to "rapidly stabilize the people's livelihood and restore production."

In addition to the activities of the leaders in the Hanoi area, the radio on the 26th reported that "recently" Haiphong air defense-air force cadres and combatants had been visited by Pham Van Dong, Giap, and Van Tien Dung.

ANNIVERSARY MEETING      Despite the initiation of the air strikes on Hanoi on the 18th, North Vietnamese media on the 22d reported that on the previous evening a solemn meeting had been held in the capital to commemorate the 26th anniversary of Resistance Day (19 December) and the 28th anniversary of the founding of the VPA (22 December). As was the case last year, the meeting was sponsored by Vietnam Fatherland Front organizations and the Defense Ministry and was attended by Politburo members Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Van Tien Dung. Also present were Central Committee members Col. Gen. Chu Van Tan and Lt. Gen. Song Hao, director of the VPA Political Department.

As is traditional, Giap delivered the major address before the anniversary meeting, after opening remarks by Pham Van Dong. Giap's speech followed the pattern of previous years in reviewing military developments in the past months. He predictably lauded the communist offensive, which he described as "a series of military attacks with very strong blows by the main force multibattalions which have coordinated their battles." According to Giap, the offensive "frustrated to a great extent" the Vietnamization strategy and created a basic turning point leading to far-reaching changes in the balance of forces" and an "extremely bright situation" for the South. Consistent with his reference

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to Ho's 1966 statement expressing resolve in spite of the possible destruction of Hanoi and Haiphong, Giap's discussion of the escalated U.S. air strikes in the North underlined DRV determination. He maintained that the people will "fight until final victory" even though "they still must undergo more sacrifices and difficulties" and he asserted: "In our glorious thousands-of-years-old history our Vietnamese people have never yielded to any aggressor enemy."

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## PEKING STRESSES SINO-VIETNAMESE SOLIDARITY DURING BINH VISIT

Peking made use of PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Linh's "official visit of friendship" from 27 December to 1 January to stage a major show of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity while pledging continuing Chinese support for the Vietnamese communists. (PRC media had reported Binh's stopovers in Peking in the past, but this was her first official visit.) The demonstration of Chinese support was highlighted by a strong leadership turnout of all the active Peking-based Politburo members at a rally on 29 December (broadcast and televised live) followed by a meeting between Mao and Binh. This high-level treatment paralleled that accorded the visit of DRV Premier Pham Van Dong in November 1971, which occasioned the last previous such rally.

While reassuring their allies of continuing support and deploring the heavy U.S. air strikes as a vain attempt at "military blackmail," the Chinese exercised restraint in reacting to the December downturn in Vietnam developments, pulling their punches toward the Nixon Administration and reiterating their hope for a negotiated settlement. Having gone promptly on record with a foreign ministry statement on 20 December seconding the previous day's DRV protest against the U.S. bombing, Peking failed to issue any further official statements on the air strikes. The 21 December DRV Government statement appealing to the USSR and China "to stay the criminal hands of the Nixon Administration" was delivered on the next day by the DRV ambassador to Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, who was quoted at some length by Peking as having denounced the "unjustifiable and perfidious" U.S. actions in bombing North Vietnam and "obstructing" a peace settlement. On one previous occasion, in September, Li had substituted for Chou En-lai in accepting delivery of Vietnamese statements.

Peking promptly carried the texts of official Vietnamese statements on the bombing, with the exception of the 29 December DRV Foreign Ministry statement which it sanitized to remove harsh invective against the Nixon Administration. During this period Peking also carried several reports on U.S. demonstrations against the bombing, including a dispatch on 21 December citing a protest by Congressmen that alluded to Kissinger's 26 October press conference and mentioned the presidential election. During the election campaign Peking had scrupulously avoided linking the campaign to Vietnam developments. In another sign of Chinese disappointment over the bombing, NCNA took the unusual

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step of reporting alleged statements by recently captured American airmen saying civilian targets had been bombed.

Peking's most direct assertion of Chinese interests affected by the U.S. bombing appeared in an "urgent statement" issued by NCNA on 21 December protesting damage to a Chinese ship docked at Haiphong and warning that the PRC Government "is closely watching the development of expanding U.S. war activities." The unusual recourse to a statement in the name of the news agency seemed to reflect Peking's reluctance to associate its security interests with the Vietnam conflict. There have been previous instances in which NCNA issued protests in its own name, but these have usually concerned matters involving NCNA itself or other journalistic affairs. Protests against damage to Chinese property in Indochina have formerly taken the form of statements in the name of government offices, though sometimes these were simply "the department concerned." Two previous protests in 1972 were issued as foreign ministry statements.

Peking has not commented on the U.S. curtailment of bombing and the agreement to resume the Vietnam negotiations, developments that have been reported in PRC media through pickups of DRV announcements. Thus, NCNA on 1 January disseminated the text of the DRV Paris delegation's statement on these developments, and on the 3d NCNA carried the text of the DRV announcement on Le Duc Tho's departure from Hanoi to resume the Paris negotiations.

CHINESE SUPPORT      Mutual satisfaction over Peking's reaction to recent Vietnam developments was reflected in the "identical views" recorded in the 1 January joint communique on Binh's talks with the Chinese. According to the communique, the two sides "noted with concern pertinent matters" and discussed the Vietnam situation and the question of "further strengthening the mutual support and assistance" between the Chinese and South Vietnamese. This formulation seems stronger than the one in the joint communique on Pham Van Dong's visit, which had referred more vaguely to "the strengthening of the friendly relations and cooperation" between the two countries and did not register an identity of views.

That Mao received Binh was not extraordinary in view of his practice of seeing representatives of friendly governments, including French Foreign Minister Schumann as well as heads of government. What was unusual, however, was that Mao's remarks

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to Binh were publicized by NCNA--a gesture whose only recent precedent was NCNA's account of his meeting with Romania's Ceausescu in June 1971. Binh was quoted as being honored to meet "Uncle Mao," who replied by saying, in keeping with the avuncular image, that China and "South and North Vietnam, and also Laos, Cambodia and Korea, are all of the same family. We support each other." This familial image, with its implication of Asian communist unity and exclusion of the Soviets, was partially incorporated in the joint communique's assertion that the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples "are of the same family."

The same passage of the communique contained the first revival in over a year of the Chinese pledge to risk even "the greatest national sacrifice" in supporting the Vietnamese. However, the Chinese avoided this warning in their various speeches and statements, including the rally speech by ranking military leader Yeh Chien-ying, a figure long associated with Vietnam developments. In contrast, this pledge--and a companion assertion, not revived on this occasion, to the effect that failure to aid the Vietnamese would be a betrayal of proletarian internationalism--had recurred in Chinese speeches during the exchange of visits by the PRC and DRV premiers in 1971 and during Li Hsien-nien's aid mission to the DRV in September this year.

In their speeches, Yeh and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei had recourse to stock Chinese pledges of support, invoking the frequently cited Mao quote on rear area support for the Vietnamese and--in Yeh's case--recalling Mao's 1963 statement in support of resistance to "the U.S.-Ngo Dinh Diem clique." While condemning the U.S. air strikes, which Chi called "unforgivable new crimes," the Chinese did not indicate that recent Vietnam developments endangered Sino-U.S. relations, and in fact they avoided criticism of the Nixon Administration by name. The broader implications of these developments were broached most directly not during Binh's visit but during Chi's stay in North Korea from 22 to 25 December. Chi declared that by its failure to sign the draft accord the U.S. Government "has forfeited its credibility before the whole world." In the communique on the visit the Chinese joined their hosts in expressing "still greater determination to give support and assistance" to their Indochinese allies.

It was left to Binh, whose rally speech was punctuated with references to President Nixon by name, to put Vietnam developments in the wider context of big-power relations. She declared that the United States "is very afraid of the fact that China and other

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fraternal countries are stepping up their support and assistance" to the Vietnamese struggle, and she alluded to the Nixon Administration's moves toward better relations with Peking and Moscow by charging that one of Washington's "most vicious designs" is to "drive wedges" between the Vietnamese and the Chinese and other fraternal allies. In the course of praising Chinese aid she cited the two supplementary agreements signed in 1972 as well as the annual aid accord for this year.

**VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS** In her rally speech Binh went into greater detail than the Chinese in indicating the issues involved in the Vietnam negotiations, claiming that the United States had raised the questions of North Vietnamese troop withdrawal, restoration of the DMZ, and the South Vietnamese people's right of self-determination. On the same occasion Yeh charged in more general terms that the United States had raised "a heap of unreasonable demands," and he expressed Peking's support for the "correct stand" taken by the Vietnamese communists in the negotiations while placing the responsibility for the suspension of talks squarely on the United States. Yeh voiced the standard Chinese demand in calling on the United States to "speedily sign" the peace agreement "through negotiations," a formulation suggesting greater latitude in adjusting the terms of a settlement than the demands posed by the Vietnamese communists. The joint communique seemed to split the differences between the Chinese and Vietnamese formulations, calling on the United States to "sit down and negotiate earnestly and speedily sign" the agreement reached on 20 October.

**DRV VISITORS** NCNA on 3 January routinely reported that DRV negotiator Le Duc Tho arrived in Peking that day on the way to Paris. As usual, Tho was greeted at the airport by PRC Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao, who accompanied him at a meeting with Chou En-lai, feted him at a banquet, and saw him off on 4 January. In accord with its general practice, NCNA did not report on the substance of Tho's talk with Chou, merely noting in stock terms that they had "a very cordial and friendly conversation." During Tho's December stopover on his way home after the breakdown in the Paris talks, Peking had taken the unusual step of reporting on remarks made by Tho and Chou at their meeting.

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Peking had reported in standard fashion the 31 December-1 January stopover in Peking of DRV Politburo member Truong Chinh and his party, which had attended the USSR's 50th anniversary celebrations. As was the case during Truong Chinh's 16-18 December stop in Peking on the way to Moscow, he was met and seen off by Chang Chun-chiao, who hosted a banquet for him and accompanied him at a meeting with Chou on the evening of the 31st. NCNA routinely reported the meeting as having proceeded in an atmosphere of "fraternal cordiality and friendship." As during the December stop, NCNA did not report the substance of remarks made at the meeting or the banquet, but it noted that the banquet "overflowed with a warm atmosphere of fraternal friendship and militant unity." Truong Chinh was reported by NCNA and VNA as having separate discussions with Prince Sihanouk, RGUNC Prime Minister Penn Nouth, and "special envoy" Ieng Sary on the 31st.

On 1 January NCNA reported that DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban and the trade and experts delegation he heads left for home by train on 30 December. Ly Ban had arrived in Peking on 7 October to prepare for talks under DRV Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi leading to the signing on 26 November of the annual Sino-Vietnamese aid agreement. On 27 December Ly Ban signed the annual Sino-Vietnamese trade accord for 1973. The latter agreement was reported by NCNA in virtually identical terms as the 5 December 1971 accord for 1972: NCNA noted that an agreement on "mutual supply of goods and payments" and two protocols on the PRC's supply of "general goods" and "complete projects" in 1973 were signed, and that the protocols were in accordance with the recently concluded aid agreement.

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**BREZHNEV WARNS VIETNAM WAR COULD AFFECT SOVIET-U.S. CONTACTS**

On 21 December the Soviet line on the massive U.S. air strikes hardened when Brezhnev, in his address on the 50th anniversary of the USSR, strongly condemned the U.S. actions and warned that events in Vietnam could affect Soviet-U.S. relations. Moscow's initial reaction to the bombings north of the 20th parallel had been relatively cautious with the brief 19 December TASS statement couched in restrained language.\* At variance with the TASS statement, Brezhnev explicitly warned that "the question of ending the war in Vietnam" would affect the future development of Soviet-U.S. contacts.

Moscow has rarely broached the issue of the effect of Vietnam on Soviet-U.S. relations during the Nixon Administration, and this is the first time the topic has been mentioned since President Nixon's visit to the USSR. In his report to the 24th CPSU Congress in March 1971 Brezhnev did not explicitly mention Vietnam in discussing Soviet-U.S. relations. At that time, however, he did refer to "aggressive U.S. actions in various parts of the world" and observed that relations with the United States are complicated by "zigzags in American foreign policy." A February 1971 USSR Government statement condemning the incursion into Laos had specifically warned that U.S. actions in Indochina could affect Soviet-American relations, as did Kosygin in his June 1971 election speech.

Despite Brezhnev's harsh criticism in his speech on the 21st, he still avoided naming the President. Brezhnev observed that the Vietnam war is the longest and "dirtiest" in American history, and "indignantly condemned" the U.S. Government's "barbarian acts." He decried the latest "American imperialist crimes" in Vietnam and "unsavory maneuvers" to delay the conclusion of an agreement on ending the war. Brezhnev pointed out that the USSR gives the Vietnamese "active assistance in their efforts for a just peace settlement." Perhaps because Truong Chinh and Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh

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\* The TASS statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 December 1972, pages 10-11.

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among the international communist gallery represented at the meeting, Brezhnev added that the DRV and PRG leaders could speak more convincingly than the Soviets themselves of the USSR's "military, economic, and other aid."

The day after Brezhnev's speech, Soviet media publicized a Soviet party-government appeal on the USSR's 50th anniversary which condemned the United States for continuing its "disgraceful aggression in Vietnam," for deliberately delaying the signing of the peace agreement, and for resuming the "barbarous bombing raids" on the DRV. It added that the Soviet people "wrathfully protest against the crimes of U.S. imperialism on Vietnamese soil."\*

Consistent with Brezhnev's remarks, Kosygin's New Year's message, carried in Soviet media on the 31st, alluded to the effect of the Vietnam war on other international developments. He noted that "positive changes" have taken place in the international arena and a "turning-point" for settlement of a number of important problems had been reached, but he juxtaposed to these positive remarks a warning that imperialism has not yet abandoned its attempts to forcefully impose its will on others, citing the example of U.S. bombing in Vietnam. Kosygin expressed the Soviet people's condemnation "with anger and indignation" of the "piratical acts of imperialism in Vietnam," and he demanded the "earliest signing" of the U.S.-DRV draft agreement and restoration of peace in Vietnam. (This reference to the peace agreement was omitted, apparently inadvertently, from the initial Moscow domestic service report, but TASS and subsequent radio versions including repeats on the domestic service included it.)

On 25 December Kosygin had received the DRV Ambassador, who handed him a copy of the 21 December DRV Government statement during a "friendly and cordial talk." According to TASS, Kosygin expressed the Soviet people's "resolute condemnation" of the new acts of

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\* This version was carried on the 22d by Moscow radio's domestic service and TASS English. An hour earlier Moscow Radio's English-language service carried a version of the appeal that it called a text but which did not contain these passages. It included only brief, generalized remarks on the Vietnam war which did not mention the United States. It is possible that the description of the item in the radio's English service as "text" was erroneous. But it is also possible that the statement was rewritten to conform with Brezhnev's more critical remarks.

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"U.S. aggression" and charged the United States with "grave responsibility for brutalities." He expressed the Soviet Government's "expectation" that armed actions against the DRV would be immediately terminated and that the peace agreement would be signed, and he reiterated that the USSR, loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism, would continue to give the Vietnamese people "the necessary support and assistance." On the 29th TASS reported that Kosygin again received the DRV Ambassador that day for a talk "on questions of relations between the USSR and the DRV" in "a warm and comradely atmosphere in the spirit of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and fraternal solidarity," but the subject of the talk was not further elaborated.

Despite the top Soviet leadership's attacks on U.S. actions in the DRV, Moscow media showed some restraint regarding the air strikes. For example, there was no mention that a Soviet ship had been hit during the raid on Haiphong on 19 December, nor was there any mention of the reported bombing of the NOVOSTI news agency building in Hanoi on the 27th. A 27 December PRAVDA editorial on the USSR anniversary not only failed to echo Brezhnev's strong criticism but did not even mention the bombing of the DRV explicitly. It did express the Soviet people's "angry condemnation" of the United States' "dirty war in Indochina," but it also elaborated on the Soviet policies of peaceful coexistence and detente with the West including the United States.

Routine-level Moscow coverage has generally been confined to reportage on the bombing raids and pickups of foreign comment and protests. There have been reports of some low-level protest meetings in the USSR, and commentators stressed the nonmilitary nature of the targets and the civilian casualties, drawing analogies with Nazi atrocities and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Emphasizing the need to sign the U.S.-DRV draft peace agreement, commentators accused the United States of trying to make changes in the agreement and impose a settlement favorable to the United States through massive air raids.

Moscow's prompt reports of the cessation of the bombings preceded Hanoi's own acknowledgment. On 30 December TASS reported the White House announcement that bombings north of the 20th parallel had been ordered halted and that the United States agreed to resume the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks. Moscow on the 31st reported the DRV and PRG Paris representatives' announcement of agreement to resume talks. On the same day an English-language radio commentary assessed the bombing halt as a

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demonstration of the failure of the United States to dictate from a position of strength and asserted that there is "no other way" of settling the Vietnam problem than through peaceful, political means.

TASS on 3 January reported what it called a "special communique" of the DRV Foreign Ministry announcing the departure of Le Duc Tho from Hanoi for talks in Paris with Kissinger. Essentially echoing the report as carried by VNA and Hanoi radio, the TASS version in reviewing the course of the negotiations noted that although the United States had demanded changes in the draft agreement, the DRV upheld the agreed-upon principles. TASS also said that as of 13 December "there had been some other unsettled issues."

TRUONG CHINH, MME. BINH  
IN SOVIET UNION

Moscow treated the DRV's Truong Chinh and the PRG's Ng'uyen Thi Binh, in the Soviet Union for the USSR anniversary celebrations, with proper protocol but did not go out of its way to demonstrate any exceptional support. On 29 December, the same day that Kosygin saw the DRV Ambassador, Truong Chinh was received by Politburo member Suslov.\* This meeting, some 10 days after Chinh's arrival in the Soviet Union and the day before he departed, took place in an atmosphere of "fraternal friendship and cordiality," according to TASS. The Soviet side again pledged "all the necessary aid" until the Vietnamese people's "just cause triumphs," and "strongly condemned" the U.S. bombings of the DRV. The Soviet side "demanded" the immediate ending of U.S. armed operations against the DRV and the signing of the draft peace agreement.

Mme. Binh was received on 26 December by her counterpart, Foreign Minister Gromyko, just prior to her departure. TASS' brief report noted only that "questions related to the struggle of the Vietnamese people on the military, political and diplomatic fronts" were discussed in an atmosphere of "friendship and cordiality." Moscow did not report, as did a service message from VNA's Moscow office to Hanoi headquarters, that Mme. Binh

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\* The North Korean representative, Choe Yong-kon, party Politburo member and president of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, had been received by Podgorny on 23 December.

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informed Gromyko of the state of the Paris negotiations which had been "sabotaged" by the United States and of the "Nixon Administration's extremely serious step" of intensifying the war in the North and the South. VNA also reported that Gromyko "strongly condemned" the U.S. war escalation and affirmed support and assistance to the Vietnamese cause, remarks that were also omitted by TASS.

#### MEETING IN SOUTH COMMEMORATES 12TH NFLSV ANNIVERSARY

The bombing of Hanoi apparently prevented the annual ceremonies there marking the 19 December anniversary of the NFLSV, but the usual anniversary meeting was held in South Vietnam, according to Liberation Radio broadcasts that day. As was the case in the past, the meeting was attended by NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, Vietnam Alliance Chairman Trinh Dinh Thao, and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat. Among others on the presidium of the meeting, Liberation Radio also listed Vo Chi Cong, vice chairman of the NFLSV Presidium and a representative of the Vietnam People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)--the communist party in South Vietnam. Vo Chi Cong is not known to have appeared in public since November 1966 and his appearance at this meeting may have been a deliberate move to put to rest a 25 November LE MONDE article detailing an alleged armed coup against the NFLSV/PRG leadership on 10 November and claiming, among other things, that Vo Chi Cong had been sentenced to 20 years in a concentration camp for his part in the coup. At the time of the LE MONDE story, LPA issued a statement denouncing it as "a sheer fabrication."

As in previous years, Nguyen Huu Tho delivered the main address at the anniversary meeting. He routinely praised the accomplishments of the communist offensive this year and reiterated the formulation initiated prior to the offensive that "it is obvious that we are in an ascending, winning position whereas the enemy is in a declining, defeated position." Tho dealt with the diplomatic situation in standard terms, noting that the United States had been forced to agree to the draft peace accord but had sabotaged the signing of the accord "in hope of gaining a position of strength and maintaining the U.S. neocolonialist system in South Vietnam." Later Tho called on the armed forces and people to "step up their offensive and uprising movement on all battlefields in coordination with the struggle on the diplomatic front" in order to "completely frustrate the Americans' Vietnamization scheme and compel them to sign the approved peace agreement."

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## YEAR-END REVIEWS CLAIM VICTORIES IN FIGHTING IN SOUTH

Vietnamese communist media have not yet released the usual PLAF Command communique tallying military achievements in the past year; however, the progress of the war in South Vietnam during 1972 has been discussed in comment since the end of December.\* While the propaganda praises 1972 achievements and expresses optimism about the present situation, it does not suggest that there will be an escalation of attacks in the near future. By contrast, comment on the fighting a year ago had anticipated the 1972 offensive with claims that the PLAF was capable of defeating the ARVN, and a prediction of the outbreak of "new concerted uprisings."

LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) on 30 December carried a commentary detailing statistics on alleged allied losses in 1972 and reviewing the course of the fighting. LPA predictably hailed the communist offensive beginning at the end of March and maintained that allied counterattacks since mid-June, with the participation of massive U.S. air and naval forces, had been successfully countered. According to LPA, the "liberation forces" have continued to hold their positions and, "while the puppet main forces have been driven, pinned down, and wiped out by big chunks," the "revolutionary war has vigorously developed in the densely populated plains."

Like other propaganda in recent months, the LPA commentary claimed that the 1972 offensive is continuing, ending the year with unprecedented "steady allsided and big victories." It added that "this is a new step in the bankruptcy of the Saigon administration and army and a very serious setback of the U.S. 'Vietnamization of the war' policy." LPA concluded that 1972 "marked a new period of development" in the war and that "at present, the position of the South Vietnam PLAF and people is steady and fine."

The fighting throughout Vietnam in 1972 was lauded in editorials in Hanoi papers on 1 January, with NHAN DAN claiming that "1972 was a year of the greatest victories in the history of our anti-U.S. national salvation resistance." NHAN DAN went on to list two "basic victories" this year: the "foiling" of Vietnamization

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\* Last year's PLAF command communique was dated 24 December 1971 and was made public on 3 January 1972. The communique and accompanying propaganda are discussed in the 5 January 1972 TRENDS, pages 18-20.

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by the southern offensive and the "breaking" of the policy of re-Americanizing the war with U.S. air and naval forces. It maintained that 1972 "victories" have "a very important strategic significance" and have "considerably changed the balance of forces between us and the enemy in our favor and have profoundly modified the war picture." According to NHAN DAN, the allied situation on the battlefield is irreversible and "can only continue to worsen rapidly."

The 1 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial commented that the South's "most significant victory in 1972 was its victory in gradually changing the war situation, driving back the Americans and their puppets to an extremely significant degree, and creating for ourselves a new, strong, and firm strategic posture." While claiming that "our armed forces and people definitely have the determination, forces, experiences, and advantageous military and political posture to attack the enemy on all fronts," the army paper also warned that the "struggle still must go through many new trials and remains very violent and complex." Underlining communist determination, the editorial declared: "Even if we have to fight for many years we will remain undaunted."

**BATTLE STATISTICS** Detailing alleged communist victories in the South over the past year, the 30 December LPA report claimed that 480,000 allied troops had been put out of action--a figure topped by the communist claims for 1968 and 1969 when over 600,000 allies were said to have been killed, wounded, or captured. The increase in main-force attacks this year was reflected in the news agency's claim that eight ARVN divisions and 35 regiments, brigades, and tactical groups had been "knocked out or heavily decimated." Annual statistics in previous years have not claimed that divisions have been put out of combat and the highest number of regiments claimed was seven in 1968.

As was the case with the casualty figures, the statistics this year on the destruction of allied materiel were also lower than in some previous years, including the 1968-70 period. LPA claimed the destroyed equipment included 11,000 military vehicles, 2,850 of them tanks and armored cars, as well as 1,500 artillery pieces, and 2,500 aircraft.

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## USSR ANNIVERSARY

## BREZHNEV, FOREIGN LEADERS ADDRESS 50TH ANNIVERSARY MEETING

In the latest of an almost annual series of major international gatherings of communist party leaders in Moscow, the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the USSR drew delegations from 11 ruling parties and 65 other CPs.\* Opening the celebrations on 21 December, Podgorny welcomed delegations of one sort or another from "more than 100 countries." The only communist countries not represented were China and Albania, and among the delegations of ruling parties only the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, and Yugoslavs were not headed by party chiefs.

The absent Chinese loomed large in CPSU chief Brezhnev's 21 December keynote address, a comprehensive review of Soviet domestic and foreign policies. In his criticism of China and in his condemnation of the U.S. bombing of the DRV taking place during the celebrations, Brezhnev tailored his remarks for the international communist gallery to demonstrate how Soviet policy is a proper "class policy." He also stressed that in present conditions the need for socialist camp unity and cooperation becomes greater rather than diminishing.

Moscow's orthodox allies chimed in with the expected expressions of fealty to the Soviet Union and to the dictates of unity under the Soviet banner. Also characteristically, the more independent parties made clear their own interests where those diverge from the Soviet line, especially on the China question. Truong Chinh, heading the North Vietnamese delegation instead of party chief Le Duan, who normally represents Hanoi at these conclaves, followed the North Vietnamese practice of citing both China and the Soviet Union in hailing international aid for the Vietnamese. Romania's Ceausescu voiced his party's standard line in stating that it develops friendly relations with "all" communist parties. The line of independence was pressed most forcefully by the North Korean representative, Choe Yong-kon, who warned that new problems will arise in the international communist movement unless the principles of complete equality, independence, and noninterference are observed by the parties.

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\* Other comparable occasions include the CPSU congresses in 1966 and 1971, the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in 1967, the international party conference in 1969, and the Lenin centennial in 1970.

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CHINA Speaking before this array of foreign party leaders, Brezhnev delivered his second denunciation of the Chinese in three weeks. As in his 30 November speech in Budapest, Brezhnev again sought to portray Peking's anti-Soviet policies as directed against the interests of the entire "socialist community." Also as in his Budapest speech, Brezhnev made a point of dismissing Peking's allegations of a Soviet threat to China, and he took this occasion to confirm that Moscow had offered to conclude a bilateral treaty renouncing the use of force. The question of nonuse of force has been the focus of bitter Chinese attacks on Moscow's detente policies generally and its military posture toward China in particular.

Brezhnev's lengthy diatribe against the Chinese overshadowed the complications he cited as arising from recent Vietnam developments\* and underscored the intractability of the China problem at a time when the Soviets see progress on several other important fronts. Censuring the Chinese for laying claim to Soviet territory, sabotaging efforts toward detente, and attempting to split the communist camp, Brezhnev identified the "sole criterion" of Chinese policy on any major issue to be the objective of inflicting the greatest possible damage to the USSR and to the interests of the socialist community. Having thus linked Soviet interests with those of the communist camp generally, Brezhnev sought to undercut Peking's portrayal of a Soviet threat by disclosing again that Moscow had repeatedly proposed to the Chinese since 1969 that the two sides undertake nonaggression commitments toward one another. Seeking to document Moscow's sincerity, he revealed in particular that the Soviets on 15 January 1971 had submitted a draft treaty renouncing the use of any type of force, including conventional, missile, or nuclear.

Brezhnev had first referred to proposals of this sort in his conciliatory speech on 20 March last year, in the period between the Peking and Moscow summits. There was some indication at that time of second or conflicting thoughts over disclosing the proposal on nonuse of force. In his speech broadcast live over Radio Moscow, Brezhnev had referred to proposals on nonaggression, nonuse of force, settlement of border issues, and improvement of

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\* Brezhnev's remarks on Vietnam are discussed in the Indochina section of the TRENDS.

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relations, but the published text deleted the reference to renouncing force. The specific details given on this proposal in the 21 December speech--duly included in the published text--indicate that the inhibiting counsels or considerations had been overcome. In still another reference to nonuse of force in the recent speech, Brezhnev followed up the UNGA resolution on this issue by declaring Moscow's readiness to undertake formal commitments with any of the nuclear powers on renouncing the use of force, including the banning of the use of nuclear weapons against one another.

Brezhnev indicated firmly that Moscow would continue the China policy enunciated at the 24th party congress, telling his audience that the Soviets are convinced that this policy is correct. He also took the occasion to recall the good old days of Sino-Soviet relations, making a rare reference to the 1950 treaty of alliance and citing the "tremendous aid" rendered by the Soviets to the Chinese during the period of close relations. Brezhnev left it to the Chinese and the laws of history to return China to a state of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev's repeated references to the territorial question--his mention of "absurd" claims to Soviet territory in listing the elements of Peking's foreign policy, his remark that the Soviets have no territorial claims against China, and his reference to the inviolability of Soviet territory--suggest that the border dispute remains as intractable as ever.\* Border tension also seemed reflected in a KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA article two days earlier honoring border guards in connection with the USSR's 50th anniversary. The article indicated that there had been a border skirmish and apparently a death in the fall of 1971, and it played on the memory of the fighting and deaths in the Central Asian border area in August 1969. The border detachment involved in the 1971 incident was the same one as was engaged in the major clash on 13 August 1969.

All of Moscow's East European allies except Romania carried the full text of Brezhnev's speech. A summary of the speech in the Romanian party paper omitted all references to China. Following Brezhnev's lead, four of the East European party chiefs--Gierek,

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\* A recent review of Soviet foreign policy by V. Petrov in KOMMUNIST (No. 17, signed to press 30 November 1972) complained of Peking's territorial claims and said the border talks "are not making any headway because of the schismatic and hostile positions" of the Chinese.

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Honecker, Kadar, and Zhivkov--referred critically to Peking's anti-Soviet policy. Romania's Ceausescu predictably and Czechoslovakia's Husak inexplicably avoided the subject. At the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971 Husak had belabored Peking more vigorously than any of his East European counterparts, and he had associated himself with an attack on Peking as recently as late September 1972 in a joint communique with Honecker.

Consistent with indications of persisting border problems, the Mongolian Tsedenbal voiced the sharpest criticism of Peking. Zeroing in on Peking's "nationalism and great-power chauvinism," Tsedenbal condemned the Chinese leaders for practicing sinification and forced assimilation of national minorities--which, of course, inhabit the borderlands and have long been caught up in the Sino-Soviet struggle. Coming against the background of recent Chinese polemical sallies directed against the Soviet troops in the MPR, Tsedenbal's denunciation of Peking contrasted with his praise for the MPR's mutual defense alliance and "inviolable friendship" with the Soviets.

SALT Brezhnev's speech contained his first public reference to the second round of the SALT negotiations and the first Soviet elite-level discussion of the SALT II agenda. Brezhnev cited "ways of turning the provisional agreement into a permanent one" as one of the aims of the current round. And he recommended two further agenda items: discussion of means to proceed from limiting armaments to gradually reducing them, and establishment of limitations on their qualitative development. Brezhnev's remarks coincided with the publication of the communique on the first session of SALT II which, in addition to disclosing agreement on a permanent consultative commission as foreseen by the ABM Treaty signed in May, announced only that an "understanding" had been reached on the general range of questions to be discussed in forthcoming sessions.

Brezhnev's remarks were more detailed than elite-level comment on the first round, which generally avoided mention of specific agenda items. Suslov is the only other Soviet leader to have publicly broached the second round: In alluding to the Senate debate over the Jackson amendment at the SALT I ratification discussions in the Supreme Soviet Presidium on 29 September, he criticized those in the United States who hoped to conduct further negotiations from a "position of strength."

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The problem of U.S. forward-based systems in Europe (FBS) is the only SALT II issue that has been mentioned in infrequent routine-level Soviet comment surrounding the opening of the second round; however, G. A. Trofimenko, in a 5 September overview in IZVESTIYA of the process leading to the SALT I agreements, did suggest that qualitative limitations "could" be discussed in SALT II.

Since Brezhnev's report, comment on SALT in Soviet media, as well as a rare discussion of the negotiations in the GDR media--in the 23 December NEUES DEUTSCHLAND--have repeated Brezhnev's proposals for the SALT II agenda. The head of the Soviet SALT delegation, Vladimir Semenov, in a TASS-dispatched statement made on leaving Geneva for Moscow 24 December, cited Brezhnev's remarks on SALT but referred specifically only to the goal of transforming the interim agreement on offensive systems into a permanent agreement. While TASS carried the complete text of the communique on 21 December, there has been no follow-up comment to date in either Soviet or East European media on the communique or the month-long first session.

**DISARMAMENT** Brezhnev's speech also featured his first comments on general disarmament issues since his address to the 15th trade union congress last March. Although he reaffirmed Moscow's interest in further partial arms control measures as well as the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, the only specific proposal was his declaration of Moscow's readiness to "implement" the just adopted UNGA resolution on nonuse of force and a permanent ban on the use of nuclear weapons (NUF) by concluding bilateral NUF agreements with "any of the nuclear powers." Brezhnev's remarks were the first elite-level Soviet pronouncement on the new NUF package proposal, and they may signify Moscow's decision to aim for bilateral NUF agreements with other nuclear powers in recognition of the failure of the proposed five-power nuclear conference to evoke support from any country other than France.\*

Follow-up comment on his proposal has been light. Georgiy Svyatov, a member of the USA Institute, in a Moscow radio broadcast to North America on 30 December, cited Brezhnev's remarks on NUF and emphasized that "the Soviet Government suggests going further" than the UNGA resolution. He singled out the United States as a desired partner in a bilateral NUF treaty, although Peking may well be the primary target of this Soviet gambit, for reasons both of military security and propaganda advantage.

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\* The UNGA initiative and its background are discussed in the TRENDS of 20 September 1972, pages 30-32, and 27 September, pages 25-26.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY Brezhnev expressed the hope that the European conference on security and cooperation (CSCE) would begin not later than the middle of 1973 and routinely listed the principles on which the USSR and its allies consider European security should be based. On the contentious issue of the movement of ideas and people between East and West, Brezhnev declared: "We, too, are in favor of this if, of course, such cooperation is conducted with respect for the sovereignty, the laws, and the customs of each country, and if it promotes mutual spiritual enrichment of the peoples, greater confidence between them, and the ideas of peace and good-neighborliness." Stating that the USSR favors wider tourism and professional exchanges on either a collective or individual basis, Brezhnev declared that agreement on this issue could be reached if it is approached "in a spirit of mutual respect and noninterference in each other's affairs and not in a cold war spirit."

On force reductions in Europe (MBFR), Brezhnev refrained from acknowledging the Western invitation for exploratory talks, noting briefly that, "as we know, talks also lie ahead on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe, first and foremost in central Europe," and adding that Moscow is in favor of "serious preparations and efficient handling of these talks." Although there was considerable speculation in the Western press over whether there would be a response from the Warsaw Pact countries to the NATO allies' invitation, there was no formal public acknowledgment of any such response during the anniversary celebrations in Moscow.

While there was no public indication that the Warsaw Pact countries met jointly in Moscow, Brezhnev did meet individually with all the East European leaders. The Soviet reports on these meetings, published in PRAVDA on the 23d and 24th, clearly reflected the isolation of Romania vis-a-vis the other Warsaw Pact members: Brezhnev's meetings with Gierek, Husak, Honecker, Zhivkov, and Kadar were reportedly held in an atmosphere of "cordial friendship and complete unity of views," whereas his meeting with Ceausescu was described as one of "friendship and frankness." On the other hand, the Bucharest media tried to soften the public acknowledgment of differences with Moscow. The AGERPRES account in English said "friendship and sincerity" prevailed at the meeting, choosing to translate the Romanian word "sinceritate" used in the SCINTEIA report as "sincerity", even though it may also be translated as "frankness." TASS did not hedge in its translation of the Russian; it used the word "frankness."

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In their public pronouncements, the Romanians have maintained that European security and military issues should not be the responsibility of the two opposing military blocs and that not only Bucharest but also "all European states" must be allowed to participate in any force reduction talks. This position has been particularly stressed in public statements since the beginning of the CSCE preparatory talks and was reiterated as recently as 29 December, six days after the Ceausescu-Brezhnev meeting, by the Romanian leader in a speech honoring the 25th anniversary of communist rule in Romania. Moreover, in an interview given to a Cairo paper on 28 November but not publicized by Bucharest media until 29 December, Ceausescu even invoked the Warsaw Pact Prague Declaration of January 1972 to support his argument for Romanian participation in force reduction talks, citing the Declaration to the effect that the solving of this problem "must not be the prerogative of the existing military-political alliances in Europe."

COMMON MARKET-CEMA      In his remarks on trade relations between East and West Europe, Brezhnev conveyed Moscow's interest in establishing formal institutional contacts between the Common Market and CEMA: "Can a basis be found for some form of businesslike relations between the interstate trade and economic organizations of CEMA and the EEC?" Answering this rhetorical question in the affirmative, Brezhnev said "apparently, yes it can" provided the EEC "states" do not discriminate against "the other side" and if they assist "the development of natural bilateral ties and all-European cooperation." In making this proposal, Brezhnev went considerably beyond his March 1972 watershed statement acknowledging the "reality" of the Common Market. In that statement Brezhnev had stressed Soviet trade relations with the "participants" of the EEC as opposed to the Common Market as an entity; now Brezhnev coupled his implicit proposal for negotiations between the two blocs with a somewhat ambiguous statement stressing the development of "natural bilateral ties" in commerce.

Brezhnev's remarks on links between the EEC and CEMA followed by a week a statement made by Hungarian Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Valyi to the Hungarian National Assembly on 13 December which also took note of a future relationship between the two blocs. Arguing that there should be no discrimination in international trade relations against CEMA, Valyi declared that "the establishment of ties between the EEC and CEMA could contribute to this, if it is done at an appropriate time and in a suitable form." Brezhnev's remarks in effect lent the weight of his authority to Valyi's speculation about ties between the EEC and CEMA.

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## CHINA

## NEW YEAR'S EDITORIAL SHIFTS EMPHASIS TO DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

For the first time since the Ninth CCP Congress in 1969 formally consolidated the political changes wrought by the cultural revolution, the New Year's Day joint editorial by PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY gave priority to domestic affairs. While claiming "great victories" during the past year, the editorial's generally restrained tone reflected recent political and economic problems while expressing "confidence and determination" regarding the new year. The editorial indicated no new major departures, continuing to allot political priority to the persisting campaign against Lin Piao's deviations and stressing agricultural development as the most important economic task. Bringing Mao's authority to bear on ongoing efforts, the editorial unveiled a Mao instruction to "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony." Continuing the trend since Lin's fall, the PLA received relatively little attention, though it was credited with "new progress politically and militarily" and was enjoined to "undertake rigorous training."

Certifying a line set forth recently in provincial media, the joint editorial asserted that "criticism of revisionism comes first and only then rectification of the style of work," indicating that the ideological campaign against Lin and his disgraced followers should be pressed without expanding the target of attack against a broad range of officials. Despite indications of problems in insuring the proper responsiveness from officials, the regime evidently is concerned to prevent a new wave of recriminations between local factions which, as in the cultural revolution, the center would find difficult to manage.

The problem of centralized control was given major attention in the editorial, which reiterated that "the party committee at the highest level in a given area, under the leadership of the party central committee, exercises centralized leadership over all sectors." The editorial also stressed that decisions must be made by party committees as a whole rather than by the top men. Given the dominant role of PLA officers in local party committees, the emphasis on collegiality serves to strengthen the hand of civilian members during a period in which the regime is loath to resort to large-scale purges or transfers.

Concern for strengthening party control over the army was also reflected in this year's New Year and Spring Festival circular--issued by the State Council and the party's Military Commission--on supporting the

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army. In contrast to last year's much longer statement, the 1973 circular contained no reference to the PLA's civil administrative role--a function the army inherited from the shattered party apparatus during the cultural revolution--and omitted several of the plaudits given to the PLA in last year's circular. Most notably, the previous claim that the PLA "is loyal to the party and to the people" was dropped from this year's document.

In the context of party control over all activities, the joint editorial called for further efforts to revive various mass organizations, including the YCL and other youth groups, the trade unions, and peasant and women's organizations. Recent provincial reports have indicated that the YCL is well on the way to being reconstituted this year, but there had been no previous signal that the trade unions were to be formally rebuilt in the near future. Revival of these organizations signifies a further retreat from the cultural revolution, during which the unions were criticized and disbanded for devoting undue attention to economic issues. But while indicating progress on these fronts, the joint editorial this year avoided mentioning the convocation of the long-delayed National People's Congress, a body that would ratify changes in the top structure of the regime.

The grain crop failures of the past year have apparently caused no changes in the economic line. Claiming a "good" harvest despite "serious natural disasters," the editorial continued the policy of stressing "all-round development in crop production" in contrast to the cultural revolution's emphasis on grain crops. Industry was again enjoined to assign priority to increasing raw materials and power supplies as a base for industrial expansion.

**FOREIGN AFFAIRS** As in 1972, the New Year's Day editorial this year used the formula that the world is undergoing changes through a process of "great upheaval, great division and great realignment," but there was no attempt to convey the heightened sense of expectancy that heralded last year's major breakthroughs. The superpowers received brief criticism for practicing power politics, and the December downturn in Vietnam developments prompted inclusion of a passage condemning the heavy U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and pledging continued Chinese support for the war effort.

Growing confidence on the Taiwan question seemed reflected in the absence this time of last year's denunciation of two-China schemes and of the call for the United States to withdraw from the island. In keeping with the line Peking has taken toward Taiwan in recent months, the editorial expressed "deep concern for our compatriots" in Taiwan and in the same context mentioned "our compatriots" in Hong Kong and

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vacao and overseas. A reduction of Peking's concern over the juridical status of Taiwan has been accompanied by an effort to play on nationalist sentiments among Chinese in areas claimed by Peking but outside the regime's control.

### PRC BLAMES NATURAL DISASTERS FOR DECLINE IN GRAIN HARVEST

On 28 December NCNA released preliminary grain crop statistics for 1972, revealing a decline of approximately four percent from the record 1971 crop. Production was estimated at 240 million tons, about the same as in 1970. The announcement attributed the drop in production to "the worst drought in years and other natural disasters." Reflecting changed priorities which have placed greater emphasis on non-grain crops, an NCNA report on 30 December claimed significant increases last year for several industrial crops, though admitting that "because about half the acreage suffered natural adversities" cotton output had declined. None of the NCNA or local harvest reports drew any connection between the decline in grain output and the shift in emphasis from grain to balanced agricultural development, nor was there any indication of a shift in land allocation back to grain.

The 28 December report made a point of portraying the well-being of China's people in spite of the disasters, comparing the situation under communist rule to that in 1920 when a major drought, but one not so bad as this year, resulted in famine affecting 20 million people in North China. Two of the five northern provinces hardest hit this year were said to have actually increased outputs in spite of the drought. While the worst problems were apparently in the north, parts of southern China were also said to have suffered "fairly serious natural disasters," though 14 provincial-level areas had "excellent" harvests.

That the preliminary figures may be revised is indicated by statistics given for last year's grain crop. The preliminary report for the 1971 harvest estimated a yield of 246 million tons, but the revised figures for 1971 now being used claim that the 1971 crop totaled 250. Claiming that China has "a certain surplus" in grain production, the 28 December report noted that China imported 5 million tons "chiefly to meet the needs of friendly countries and balance the people's diet." The report also claimed that 3 million tons of rice were exported this year, an amount which would, at normal prices, more than pay for the wheat imports. This figure is considerably greater than the amount China had been thought to export.

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## CUBA - U S S R

### RAUL CASTRO RAILS AGAINST ANTI-SOVIETISM IN CUBA

Speaking on 22 December at Havana ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the USSR, Cuban First Vice Minister Raul Castro discoursed on the evils and perils of anti-Sovietism. Although he was rather vague about specifying the target of his diatribe, his comments were probably intended as a warning to Cubans harboring reservations about Havana's close ties with Moscow, particularly Cuba's economic dependency.

The speech was made the day before Fidel Castro and Brezhnev signed a series of economic agreements in the Kremlin. Describing the accords in a 3 January Havana Radio and TV address, the Cuban Premier went out of his way to laud Soviet largesse and to describe the accords in unprecedented detail.\* In spelling out the terms of the new accords, Castro may have sought to dampen the Cuban anti-Sovietism that was a major concern of his brother's speech.

22 DECEMBER SPEECH      After effusively praising Soviet achievements and expressing gratitude for Moscow's support, Raul Castro assailed "the whole throng of revisionists and false Marxists" who "distort the character" of Cuban-USSR relations. Here, and in follow-up remarks in the speech, he was referring chiefly to K. S. Karol and Rene Dumont, two erstwhile friends of his brother who became persona non grata in Cuba after they published

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\* According to Castro, the agreements included: deferment on payment of existing Cuban debts to the USSR until 1986 and repayment over a period of 25 years "without any interest"; extension of credits to cover Soviet-Cuban trade imbalances for 1973-75 with repayment to begin in 1986 without interest; provision of technical and economic assistance for 1973-75 amounting to 300 million rubles, mainly for investments in textile and nickel production, electric power, and rail transport; a Soviet commitment to purchase Cuban sugar and nickel during 1973-80 at prices substantially in excess of current world prices. Castro said that Moscow had agreed to pay about eleven cents per pound for Cuban sugar as against the current world price of about nine cents.

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books criticizing growing Soviet influence in Cuba and Fidel's personal style of rule.\* He quoted from Fidel's April 1970 Lenin Day address which had obliquely exoriated his former friends as self-appointed "superrevolutionaries" who are implacably hostile to the Soviet Union.

Although Raul Castro did not elaborate on the nature of the "distortion" of Cuban-Soviet relations, his remarks appeared aimed at allegations that Cuba had paid for Soviet assistance in the form of lessened independence. Noting that Cuba had been unflinching in the face of "imperialist" threats, he observed defensively: "This determined attitude of revolutionary intransigence has made us deserving of the support of the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist nations." Later, after warning against "anti-Soviet tendencies that are sugar-coated with a superrevolutionary phraseology," he expressed particular concern about "imperialist" attempts to divide the international communist movement by "sowing distrust among people struggling for economic and political liberation regarding Soviet aid and experience."

The source of Castro's concern was reflected in an unusual Havana TV report of 13 November on the sentencing of an unspecified number of "counterrevolutionaries" in Pinar del Rio on the grounds of "destroying or damaging machinery and other tools obtained from socialist countries." The culprits were said to have been motivated by a desire to "develop attitudes of looking down on the technology of the socialist camp countries." To accomplish this, Havana TV said, "they would point up technical defects and other shortcomings, which they themselves premeditatedly caused." The report twice repeated the stiff terms of their sentences, "ranging from eight to thirty years' loss of freedom." In concluding his speech, Raul Castro warned that "those who cast gloom over or weaken the ties uniting" Havana and Moscow "will find themselves in the trash can of history or crushed by their unavoidable fate."

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\* Karol is a French Marxist journalist whom Castro in the past had favored with exclusive interviews, and Dumont is a French agronomist who served as an adviser to the Cuban leader. The works criticized were Karol's "Guerrillas in Power" and Dumont's "Cuba, Is It Socialist?," both published in 1970. In a 6 June speech Raul Castro had directly attacked these works as "totally anticommunist" and described their authors as "CIA agents."

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BACKGROUND      The tenor and content of Raul Castro's remarks bore a close resemblance to the comments made in his 6 June speech marking the 11th anniversary of the Cuban Interior Ministry. However, Havana media's treatment of the 6 June speech--in which Castro went into greater detail in describing manifestations of anti-Sovietism--was unusually circumspect. The only lengthy version of the speech appeared more than six weeks after its delivery, in the 23 July issue of the Cuban armed forces organ VERDE OLIVO. Havana radio confined itself to broadcasting a short report of the VERDE OLIVO version which omitted all of Raul's allusions to anti-Sovietism. The fact that the speech was delivered while Fidel Castro was in Eastern Europe and was not published until well after his 6 July return to Cuba may indicate that even this kind of restrictive coverage required Fidel's personal sanction. In contrast, the 22 December speech was carried live by Havana radio and TV, and Raul Castro noted that his remarks "represent the opinion of our Politburo."

In his 6 June remarks, Castro left no doubt that the forms of anti-Sovietism that concerned him were linked with domestic criticism of Soviet-Cuban economic relations:

The enemies of the revolution also employ the old trick of anti-Sovietism in connection with their ideological diversionism. They launch rumor campaigns and comment in which they maliciously tie our difficulties in with efforts made by the Soviet technicians and technicians from other socialist countries as they try to help us emerge from underdevelopment.

Turning to specifics, Castro noted the vulnerability of Cuban officials to the attempts by "the missions of capitalist companies accredited in Cuba" to divert Cuban "purchasers toward capitalist areas . . . to the detriment of Cuba and the socialist camp." Cuban government officials, he said, have on occasion been victims of "bribe" attempts by capitalist representatives and have been guilty of "engaging in criticism of the quality of technology of the socialist countries." Castro urged the drafting of new laws "providing for criminal responsibility for those who engage in actions of ideological diversionism," including "punishment of any crime committed against any other worker state."

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U.S.-SOVIET      In what may have been an indication of Cuban  
DETENTE            discomfiture over the recent improvement in U.S.-  
Soviet relations, Castro in both speeches castigated  
"imperialist" efforts to "build bridges" between East and West and  
to propagate the "theory of convergence." In his 22 December speech,  
Castro described "the building of bridges" and "the theories of  
convergence" as being part of an "imperialist" effort to subvert  
the unity of the socialist camp, with "anti-Sovietism" being the  
"main ideological weapon" toward this goal. While TASS'  
23 December report of the speech noted Castro's condemnation of  
anti-Sovietism and of those who distort Cuban-Soviet relations,  
his caustic references to bridge-building and the convergence  
theory were not reported. In his 6 June speech--which came on  
the heels of President Nixon's trip to Moscow\*--Castro condemned  
the Western policy of "peaceful penetration" of the socialist camp  
and warned against the perils of succumbing to "imperialist"  
stratagems:

In essence, the policy of "bridge-building" is the  
continuation of imperialist adventures and is nothing  
more than a tactic designed to provoke the ideological  
breakdown of the socialist countries. We still have fresh  
in our memories the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 as a  
clear example of the danger inherent in walking across the  
bridges which imperialism builds.

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\* The President's Moscow talks drew almost no comment from  
Havana and only sparse and selective news coverage. On 20 July,  
a Cuban CP Central Committee resolution on Castro's trip to the  
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Africa implicitly registered  
continuing reservations about Soviet summitry when it took  
special note of a Castro statement that "genuine revolution"  
must be based on "full awareness that imperialism's apparent  
cooperation with any truly revolutionary process is deceptive  
and false in the long run."

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## APOLLO 17

## MOSCOW GIVES APOLLO MISSION ROUTINE COVERAGE

Moscow's coverage of the Apollo 17 moon mission 7-19 December followed the pattern established during the last several Apollo missions. The central press ran brief daily progress reports by TASS, with PRAVDA additionally carrying several colorful reports on the mission by its correspondent B. Strelnikov.\* Radio Moscow's domestic service also broadcast brief daily progress reports. (By contrast, GDR coverage of the mission was politically colored, as was the case in the past. For example, East Berlin's domestic service on 6 December carried an Arno Friedmann commentary that emphasized Ronald Evans' previous career as a bomber pilot in Indochina and cited U.S. critics who drew unfavorable comparisons between expenditures on the Apollo program and other U.S. domestic programs.)

During the space shot, Soviet media carried several items on U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, reporting the results of a 7-15 December meeting in Moscow of technical experts working on the Apollo-Soyuz docking experiment scheduled for 1975 and citing U.S. spokesmen on Soviet-American cooperation. On the day of the launch both PRAVDA and Radio Moscow's domestic service carried a 7 December TASS report of an interview with NASA Director James Fletcher in which he "stressed the great significance of Soviet-American cooperation in the exploration and conquest of outer space for peaceful purposes."

Soviet media have thus far not offered any general assessment of the Apollo 17 flight or the Apollo program as a whole. As with Apollo 16, Podgornyy and Ceausescu were the only bloc leaders to send telegrams of congratulation upon successful completion of the flight.

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\* For Apollo 16, PRAVDA as well carried only TASS reports. Apollo 11 received by far the most extensive coverage in Soviet media.

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## UKRAINIAN 'COAL LOBBY' CONTINUES SQUABBLE OVER INVESTMENTS

The increased investments for the Donbas coal mines gained as a result of former Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest's special pleading at the 24th CPSU Congress have apparently been pared down in the newly revised economic plan.\* As a result, Ukrainian Premier Lyashko and Ukrainian industry secretary Titarenko--both former Donetsk leaders--expressed alarm at the 19 December Supreme Soviet session over the effects of the apparent investment cutbacks on Donbas coal production. Although the leaders of the Donetsk faction are lobbying in defense of the Donbas coal industry, Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy has conspicuously ignored their cause and has even criticized unnamed officials for defending local economic interests.

Titarenko expressed alarm over the future of the coal industry because of the postponement of "earlier planned" schedules for opening new Donbas mines and modernizing of old mines. He and Lyashko cited the Donbas coal industry's overfulfillment of coal production and labor productivity plans as justification for faster reequipment of the mines.

Shelest, seconded by Donetsk First Secretary Degtyarev, had complained at the 24th Congress of the lack of investment in Donbas coal. After noting that only two new mines had been opened in the last five years and that modernization of existing mines had been sharply cut, Shelest assailed "some people" for asserting that the coal industry should be slighted in favor of gas and petroleum. A subsequent CPSU Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree, "On Measures to Further Develop the Coal Industry of the Donbas," doubled investments in new mines and equipment. Degtyarev in the 18 April 1972 PRAVDA UKRAINY disclosed that seven new mines with a capacity of 13.1 million tons would be opened by 1975. Shelest and other Ukrainian leaders gave considerable publicity to the additional investments.

Thanks to the Ukrainian successes in boosting coal output, the coal production targets for the USSR were raised considerably after the adoption of the five-year plan in 1971. Gosplan Chairman Baybakov's report at the recent Supreme Soviet session

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\* For background, see the TRENDS for 28 June 1972, pages 41-42.

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stated that, "in accordance with the five-year plan," USSR coal production would reach 665,300,000 tons in 1973. The original plan had called for only 651,500,000 tons in 1973. Most of the increase may be credited to the Ukrainian drive to boost coal production above planned goals. During 1971, according to Ukrainian Coal Minister M.M. Khudosovtsev in the 18 February 1972 RADYANSKA UKRAINA, the Ukraine produced 8 million tons above the plan.

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