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
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FBIS

TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC



Confidential

6 DECEMBER 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 49)

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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

7 December 1972

C O R R E C T I O N S

TO FBIS TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA, 6 DECEMBER 1972

In the Indochina section, page 2, second paragraph, line one should read: The editorial on the 3d echoed other Hanoi propaganda x x x (correcting the date).

Also in the Indochina section, page 8, the third line in the footnote should read: The massive attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong on 16 April prompted x x x (inserting the date). The third from last line of the same footnote should read: x x x government statement on 10 May. Foreign Ministry statements x x x.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention	i
INDOCHINA	
DRV Rejects Any Revision of "Basic Principles" in Peace Accord	1
DRV Foreign Ministry Assails U.S. Bombing for Past Month	7
Moscow Assails U.S. Delay on Settlement, Pledges Assistance	10
USSR-HUNGARY	
Brezhnev, Kadar Stress Unanimity, Score Rumors of Rift	12
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS	
Brezhnev Denounces Chinese During Visit to Hungary	16
Chinese Again Challenge Soviets to Withdraw Troops	17
EUROPE	
Brezhnev Asserts Optimism on Force Reduction Prospects	19
SALT	
Moscow Interprets U.S. Film as Direct Attack on SALT II	21
CUBA-USSR	
Raul Castro Says Military Ties Are Non-negotiable	23
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS	
Titarenko Protege Becomes Ukrainian Cadre Chief	26
CHINA	
Provinces Step Up Rebuilding of Young Communist League	28
Heilungkiang Broadcast Reveals Serious Discipline Problem	30
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE	
ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY: USSR Raises Concept in Connection with Iran, Persian Gulf	Sl

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1 -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 27 NOVEMBER - 3 DECEMBER 1972

<u>Moscow (2642 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1546 items)</u>		
Brezhnev in Hungary	(1%)	25%	Domestic Issues	(38%)	34%
[Brezhnev speeches	(--)	12%]	Albanian National	(--)	20%
50th Anniversary of	(11%)	11%	Day		
USSR, 30 Dec.			Indochina	(13%)	16%
Vietnam	(5%)	7%	[Vietnam	(9%)	12%]
China	(4%)	3%	[Cambodia	(3%)	4%]
European Security	(5%)	2%	UNGA Session	(21%)	6%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

Hanoi's determination to stand firm on the basic points of the peace accord, as summarized in the DRV Government statement on 26 October, was again indicated in a NHAN DAN editorial on 3 December, the day before the resumption of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho private talks after a nine-day recess. The paper said that if the Nixon Administration demands revisions on such principles as the unity of Vietnam and self-determination in the South, this would mean that the real U.S. intention is to scrap the agreement. Like the NHAN DAN Commentator article on 25 November which had acknowledged some of the issues in contention, the editorial ridiculed such demands by Thieu as those for a withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops and reestablishment of the demilitarized zone.

Also on the eve of the resumed private talks, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article assailing U.S. "double dealing" on the peace accord warned that the Nixon Administration should not count on military pressure to achieve its aims. The article observed that the Administration should remember its four-year history of failure "to drive the adversary's main force units" out of South Vietnam by military pressure.

Having gone on record on 29 November with Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's "important statement" voicing hope for a Vietnam settlement, Peking's only authoritative comment has been a 6 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article in support of a PRG statement accusing the Thieu government of intensified terrorism. Peking has not mentioned the current round of private talks, but Commentator demanded that the United States "cease beefing up" Thieu's army, halt the alleged repression in the South, and sign the draft agreement "as soon as possible." In another sign of support for Hanoi, Peking took the unusual step of replaying the full text of the 3 December NHAN DAN editorial on settlement terms.

Soviet support for Hanoi's demand that the United States sign the peace accord without delay was reiterated by Kosygin during a 2 December meeting with the DRV delegation in Moscow to sign the annual aid agreement. Moscow has avoided discussion of the issues in contention, while merely repeating routine criticism of continued U.S. military action and support of Thieu.

DRV REJECTS ANY REVISION OF "BASIC PRINCIPLES" IN PEACE ACCORD

As was the case with the daily private U.S.-DRV talks from 20 through 26 November, Hanoi has barely mentioned that the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 2 -

meetings resumed on 4 December. VNA reported tersely on 6 December that following the DRV-U.S. meeting on the 4th, Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy "held consultations" with Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh and other members of the PRG delegation. Characteristically, the 3 December NHAN DAN editorial, in criticizing the United States for wanting to renegotiate basic points of the peace accord, did not even mention the private talks.

The editorial on the 2d echoed other Hanoi propaganda in pointing to the DRV's "good will and initiative" in the private negotiation of the peace accord. Notably, however, the editorial emphasized U.S. modifications of previous positions: It said that the negotiations were able to proceed favorably and lead to completion of the text of the agreement because the United States finally recognized "the sacred inviolable national rights of the Vietnamese people and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, which the U.S. side had opposed tooth and nail for four years." The paper said that the peace accord contains fundamental principles which are indispensable prerequisites for a lasting peace, and that the first of these prerequisites is that "the United States respects the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 agreements." The editorial added further emphasis by observing that "in other words" the United States has finally agreed to make this pledge regarding Vietnam's territorial integrity and unity "after so many years of war of aggression in Vietnam."*

* Hanoi's stand that Vietnam is one country temporarily partitioned was dramatically illustrated in propaganda following the communist offensive in South Vietnam last March. Reacting to President Nixon's 26 April 1972 TV speech condemning the offensive, a 29 April NHAN DAN Commentator article took explicit issue with his charge that North Vietnam had crossed an international border to invade its neighbor. Commentator asked rhetorically "what neighbor, what border? On what international document did he base his statement that North and South Vietnam are two countries?" The article went on to list the articles in the 1954 Geneva agreement which provide for international recognition of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Vietnam. See the TRENDS of 3 May 1972, pages 7-8.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 3 -

The 25 November NHAN DAN Commentator article had also quoted point one of the draft summary, on U.S. respect for the unity of Vietnam, but had not gone on to say that it was basic to moving the negotiations forward. The editorial on the 3d insisted that the principles on the basic national rights of the Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese right to self-determination "are major and organically interrelated. They act as main pillars, the absence of one of which will cause the whole building, that is the agreement, to collapse." It had prefaced this declaration by quoting selectively from the points in Hanoi's summary of the peace accord, though without clearly identifying the passages as such:

+ It quoted from point two on U.S. withdrawal the stipulation that the United States "must terminate its military involvement in South Vietnam and its interference in South Vietnam's domestic affairs."

+ From point four on self-determination in the South, the editorial cited the passages noting that the South Vietnamese shall decide their future "through really free and democratic general elections"; that the United States "is not committed to any political tendency or to any personality" and "does not seek to impose a pro-U.S. government" in Saigon; that "democratic liberties" will be insured; and that "an administrative structure called the national council of national reconciliation and concord of three equal segments will be set up."

+ The editorial followed the above passage by quoting point five--reunification shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means--and then reverted to quoting the passage in point four stating that the question of the Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties, and that among the questions to be discussed "are steps to reduce the military numbers of both sides and to demobilize the troops being reduced. . . ."*

* VNA supplied the ellipses; the summary of the agreement goes on to say that the two parties shall sign an agreement on internal matters as soon as possible and try to do this within three months after the cease-fire comes into effect. The editorial did not cite the provision in point two of the agreement that a cease-fire would be observed throughout South Vietnam 24 hours after the signing of the agreement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 DECEMBER 1972

- 4 -

The editorial asserted that if the United States had respected "these approved principles" Vietnam would be on a path to peace by now, and it said the U.S. "about face" had aroused indignation throughout the world. Citing Thieu's demands--on North Vietnamese withdrawal from the South, restoration of the DMZ, and "a clear definition" of the council of reconciliation--the editorial rejected the notion that he had made such demands without U.S. backing. Like earlier comment, it sniped at the President's and Kissinger's comments, saying there is no denying that the agreement the United States should have signed on 31 October is the "right" one for the United States to achieve "peace with honor." While the editorial for the most part referred to the Nixon Administration throughout, it said at one point that "bellicose forces of aggression in the United States" are attempting to reverse the situation in Vietnam, adding that "they have not yet come to realize the Vietnamese people's determination to fight and their intensive strength." It concluded that if the Nixon Administration wanted to revise the basic principles laid down in the agreement, "then its real intention would be nothing other than to scrap all the commitments already made, in order to prolong its war of aggression in Vietnam and Indochina."

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 3d set out to demonstrate the communists' determination and to document the claim that they are capable of successfully continuing the struggle in the South if necessary. Arguing that the major allied military initiatives during the Nixon Administration have all been thwarted, the army paper particularly noted the inability of the allies to drive the communists' main forces out of South Vietnam. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN claimed that the strength and victories of the resistance will grow if the war continues. Maintaining that this year's offensive had surpassed the 1968 Tet attacks, the article lauded it as "a new peak" in the resistance and "an unprecedentedly great and all-around strategic victory."

POLITICAL PRISONERS Persistent attacks on Thieu's "persecution and liquidation" of political prisoners culminated in a PRG statement on 3 December. And a supporting NHAN DAN editorial on the 5th recalled that the draft peace accord takes note of the people's democratic liberties and provides for the release of all prisoners. The editorial quoted the passage from the PRG statement to the effect that the "terrorist" campaign along with intensification of the war "is dimming the prospects of ending the war and restoring peace in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 5 -

Vietnam." The paper said it was necessary to emphasize the heavy U.S. responsibility for this "white terrorist campaign"-- a scheme, it said, for which more favorable conditions have been created by the U.S. delay in signing the peace agreement. The United States, the editorial declared, must be held responsible for "putting an immediate end" to the campaign of "torture and killing."

In the second instance since Hanoi's 26 October release of the summary of the peace agreement, the editorial noted that it provides for the release of all prisoners of both sides. The previous reference was the one in the 8 November NHAN DAN editorial: Elaborating on the 26 October summary, it explained that the detainees referred to in the peace agreement are "captured patriots and military men and the civilian internees-- meaning, according to provision 21b of the Geneva agreement, 'all persons who have in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties.'"

Point three of the summary of the agreement said tersely that "the return of all captured and detained personnel of the parties shall be carried out in parallel [song song] with the U.S. troops' withdrawal." The VNA translation of the NHAN DAN editorial of the 5th similarly rendered the passage as providing for the release of all prisoners "in parallel." However, a more accurate translation of the Vietnamese would be: There "would be a stipulated time for the return of all persons captured and detained by all sides with the withdrawal of U.S. troops."*

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION A 2 December NHAN DAN article reiterated Hanoi's criticism of Indonesia's stand on a Vietnam settlement previously expressed in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and NHAN DAN articles on 19 and 20 November, respectively. The current article went beyond other Hanoi comment since 26 October, however, when it discussed the

* The phrase "stipulated time" (thowif gian quy dqinhg) seems more ambiguous than "in parallel." Hanoi media never acknowledged an AFP report that Xuan Thuy had said in a 10 November interview that Hanoi believes the two sides should free prisoners at the same time, but that to show its good will it had accepted the U.S. view that the foreign military and civilian prisoners will be freed within two months and the South Vietnamese civilians within three months.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 6 -

international control commission called for in the draft agreement. NHAN DAN said that "on 29 November Foreign Minister Malik stated that Indonesia would become a member of an international control commission and was prepared to send in approximately 2,000 troops and officials to fulfill its obligation." The paper asserted that "this is a showy, precipitous, mean, and ill-willed attitude" and scored Indonesian officials for incorrectly giving the impression that peace was about to be restored.

The 2 December article still did not directly address itself to U.S. statements favoring efforts to insure that the ICC is in place to be activated at the time of the cease-fire. However, it may have been reflecting the issues in contention when it questioned why the Indonesians had to send troops to Vietnam and when it asserted that once the agreement is signed "the international commission of control and supervision would fulfill its obligation in conformity with the organizational system and obligations prescribed for it, and not as it pleases. No one asks or allows them [the Indonesian officials] to do what they stated."*

Another attack on Indonesian officials appeared in a 6 December LPA commentary, which similarly cited Malik's statement about readiness to dispatch troops to Vietnam as part of a control commission. The commentary did not discuss this point, instead concentrating its attack on a report in an Indonesian paper that the government would close the NFLSV representation in Djakarta once the peace agreement is signed and that the foreign ministry is preparing to repatriate the NFLSV representation. The commentary seemed to avoid condemning the government as a whole when it aimed its denunciation at "some people in the Indonesian ruling circles" who "have gone too far on the road of subservience to the United States."

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 7 -

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY ASSAILS U.S. BOMBING FOR PAST MONTH

Hanoi on 2 December broke its pattern of daily protests over U.S. bombing of the North by the spokesman of the DRV Foreign Ministry and issued a foreign ministry statement assailing attacks over the past month. Like earlier propaganda, the statement indirectly acknowledged U.S. restriction of the bombing to areas below the 20th parallel when it listed the four southern provinces and the Vinh Linh zone as being repeated targets of U.S. attacks during the last month. This is the first protest to be issued at this higher level since 11 October, when a foreign ministry statement assailed that day's bombing of Hanoi in which the French mission was destroyed and the French delegate general fatally wounded.

Since the statement is not pegged to any specific attack or incident it may have been issued at this level now to bolster criticism of the U.S. delay in signing the peace accord. The statement charged that the continued U.S. "crimes--more savage than those of the Hitlerite clique--" are not isolated acts. But, it said, the bombings have occurred "at a time when the Nixon Administration is prolonging the negotiations and plotting to ask for modification to the agreement," as well as stepping up military supplies to South Vietnam, intensifying bombings there, and supporting Saigon in "tens of thousands of police operations" to suppress and terrorize the people.

The statement reiterated Vietnamese determination to continue the struggle in standard fashion. And, in terms regularly used in the daily ministry spokesman's statements, it demanded that the Nixon Administration "stop at once the war of aggression in Vietnam, immediately end the bombing, mining and blockade of the DRV and all other encroachments upon her sovereignty and security." In keeping with most previous foreign ministry statements, the current one expressed thanks for the support of the socialist countries and various other governments and peoples and called on "friends in the five continents" to demand that the United States stop the war and sign the peace agreement, as well as to continue their support and assistance until the Vietnamese people achieve complete victory.

The issuance of the statement at the foreign-ministry level at this time is at variance with Hanoi's pattern of issuing only routine ministry spokesman's statements since mid-August despite intense bombing during September and October. It

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

6 DECEMBER 1972

- 8 -

might be conjectured that Hanoi did not issue ministry statements at that time because the peace negotiations were at a sensitive stage. There were no foreign ministry statements in September and it seems possible that the single one in October might not have been issued had the diplomatic missions not been hit.*

OTHER COMMENT
ON AIR WAR

Bombing and shelling during the past week was routinely condemned in statements by the foreign ministry spokesman, issued daily except for 2 December, the day of the higher-level statement. Further concern over the continuation of U.S. air strikes was expressed in a NHAN DAN editorial of 4 December which extolled the "vigilance, determination, and readiness" of the people and called for continued efforts in many tasks, including evacuation. Lauding the people's achievements in transportation and agricultural and industrial production while fighting at the same time "to punish the U.S. aggressors' aircraft and warships," the editorial stressed that they are prepared to continue the struggle in the face of further "aggression." NHAN DAN then cited the 2 December foreign ministry statement to bolster its charge that U.S. officials have "blatantly exposed their wicked intention to intensify military pressure in order to gain a position of strength in negotiations."

On 4 December, VNA reported on a "recent" communique by the DRV War Crimes Commission which condemned U.S. actions in both North and South Vietnam during the month of November. With respect to the North, the communique maintained that while U.S. strikes are "limited to regions further south," they are more concentrated than before. The communique also charged that U.S. aircraft continued to drop "water-mines and magnetic bombs" on major waterways, including the La, Lam, and Ben Hai

* The full-scale resumption of the U.S. air strikes last April was initially denounced in an 11 April DRV Government statement. The massive attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong prompted a joint DRV Party-Government appeal that day--unprecedented during the war except for one of December 1970 in the wake of large-scale air strikes and the abortive U.S. prisoner-rescue attempt. The President's 8 May decision to mine DRV ports brought a government statement on 18 May. Foreign ministry statements were issued periodically, peaking to four in July but with only two in August--on the 8th and the 17th.

CONFIDENTIAL

.. 9 -

rivers and the Le canal, and that "Marine gunships based on the USS Cleveland" made frequent raids on Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces.*

Reviewing the results of air defense work in the provinces south of the 20th parallel since late October, Hanoi radio on 1 December claimed that a total of 47 U.S. planes were downed during the period from 23 October to 28 November in Thanh Hoa, the provinces of the 4th Military Region, and the Vinh Linh zone. These included 19 F-4's, one F-105, 16 A-7's, five A-6's, three F-111's and three B-52's, according to the item. It also claimed 15 ships set on fire in this interval, and four "pilotless U.S. aircraft" downed over the outlying provinces of Ha Bac, Hai Hung, and Vinh Phu, and the city of Haiphong. As of 3 December, Hanoi claimed a total of 4,070 planes downed over the North.

* See the TRENDS of 29 November 1972, page 10, for a charge in the War Crimes Commission communique of 24 November that helicopters were involved in an attack on Ha Tinh on 22 November; the previous communique of 21 November (22 November TRENDS, page 10) had claimed that helicopters were also involved in U.S. air attacks during the first 19 days of that month.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 10 -

MOSCOW ASSAILS U.S. DELAY ON SETTLEMENT, PLEDGES ASSISTANCE

Moscow continues to comment along established lines regarding a Vietnam settlement, taking the United States to task for postponing signing of the U.S.-DRV agreement while stepping up bombing in North and South Vietnam and increasing military supplies to Saigon. At the same time, commentators continue generally to avoid discussing any substance of the agreement. Moscow media duly reported, without comment, Kissinger's 3 December departure for Paris for his resumed talks with Le Duc Tho.

The 2 December joint communique on Brezhnev's visit to Hungary noted that the leaders of the two countries expressed their "unchanged solidarity" with the struggle of the Vietnamese people and Lao and Cambodian "patriots" against U.S. aggression. The communique made no explicit mention of the peace accord when it expressed support for the stand of the DRV and PRG "regarding the ending of the war and the restoration of peace in Vietnam" and opposed the U.S. "delaying tactics and continued aggression." On the other hand, explicit Soviet support for the DRV demand that the United States sign the accord "without delay" was voiced by Kosygin during a 2 December meeting with the DRV Government economic delegation led by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, which arrived in Moscow on 27 November to discuss aid for 1973. Moscow media's continued restraint in criticizing the United States was illustrated, however, when TASS' report of the meeting omitted Le Thanh Nghi's strong criticism of the Administration. TASS merely noted that Nghi "described the situation in Vietnam, the successes of the Vietnamese people in rebuffing the imperialist aggression and in socialist construction." VNA's longer account said Nghi also "denounced the obduracy and bad faith of the Nixon Administration and its attempt to prolong the U.S. war of aggression against Vietnam."

Both TASS and VNA reported that Kosygin stressed that the Soviet Union, "loyal to its political line," will continue to give "the necessary assistance in the strengthening of the DRV defense potential, in the implementation of important economic tasks, and in the efforts to restore peace in Vietnam." VNA's longer report also noted that Le Thanh Nghi thanked the USSR for its support and assistance and described the atmosphere of the talks as one of "close militant solidarity and fraternal friendship."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 11 -

Moscow's reluctance to discuss the substance of the peace agreement was illustrated in a Washington-dated dispatch in IZVESTIYA on 30 November which criticized the United States for retreating from Kissinger's 26 October statement that "peace is at hand," for procrastinating and for trying to obtain changes in the agreed nine points. The correspondent said that the way to a cease-fire is being blocked by Washington, but he mentioned no issues, merely citing speculation in the Washington POST that the difficulties stem from "revised U.S. demands" made by Kissinger at the Paris talks with Le Duc Tho. He noted that Washington is silent on the substance and scope of the differences. A participant in the 3 December domestic service roundtable discussion alluded to the issue of a political settlement in the South when he asserted that all of Washington's maneuvering and procrastination seems motivated by the hope of leaving behind in Saigon after a U.S. withdrawal a regime which would continue to be an "obedient champion" of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. But he said nothing about the peace accord provisions regarding a settlement in the South.

TASS carried a brief report of the 3 December HAN DAN editorial-- which had been carried in full by NCNA--criticizing the United States for its failure to sign the agreement. The TASS report reflected none of the substance of the editorial, which had discussed such basic points of the agreement as U.S. recognition of the "unity" of Vietnam and the issues of "Vietnamese" armed forces and political power in the South.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 12 -

USSR - HUNGARY

BREZHNEV, KADAR STRESS UNANIMITY, SCORE RUMORS OF RIFT

The lengthy communique issued at the windup of Brezhnev's 27 November-1 December visit to Budapest provided what was clearly deemed necessary at this juncture in the tense Soviet-Hungarian relationship--public certification of "complete identity of views" on a broad range of bilateral and international topics, buttressed by warm Hungarian praise for the Soviet example and by general approval from the Soviet side of the current Hungarian program of building socialism. Notably, however, the Soviet endorsement contained no direct reference to the Hungarian economic reform. Contrasting with the serene tone of the communique, the major speeches by Brezhnev and Kadar and the followup comment in the media of both countries defensively denounced alleged Western schemes to split the two Warsaw Pact allies through conjectures about disagreement over Budapest's five-year-old economic reform program.

PRAVDA's 4 December editorial, entitled "Fraternal Unity," underscored unanimity during Brezhnev's "official, friendly" visit and cautioned: "It should not be forgotten that imperialism seeks to retain its position by any means, resorting to aggression, provocation, and slander." The paper added that "our adversaries seek to hamper the successful development of our countries, to weaken our unity, but these attempts are futile." It went on to highlight Kadar's remarks at the 30 November friendship meeting in Budapest to the effect that Hungary's interests lay in strengthening its ties with the USSR.

Similarly defensive, NEPSZABADSAG's editorial on the 3d said on the score of Hungarian-Soviet relations that "it would be good if our enemies realized at last that neither their poison-blended 'objectivity' nor their fawning compliments or attempts to revive nationalist prejudices can be of any use." And the Budapest political weekly MAGYARORSZAG on 1 December remarked that "her political opponents urge Hungary to take 'a role in foreign affairs that is independent of the superpowers,' by which they mean disrupting her alliance with the Soviet Union."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 13 -

An apparently restrained reception given Brezhnev at the Csepel plant meeting on the 30th prompted the Budapest city committee daily ESTI HIRLAP to remark on 1 December that "it has cost us a bitter lesson, but luckily we have unlearned the repeated rhythmic clapping and the unceasing noisy ovations of the past." The paper described the atmosphere of the gathering as "ardent" if undemonstrative, attesting to "the stand of the Hungarian people and of their emotions."

BREZHNEV In his major speech at the Csepel plant on the 30th, Brezhnev gave a degree of attention to Soviet-Hungarian tensions which contrasted with his brief, passing assurance during Zhivkov's mid-November visit to Moscow that "nothing can cloud" Soviet-Bulgarian relations. In Budapest, where such a conclusion was not so clearly to be taken for granted, the Soviet leader noted that "the methods of influence by imperialism on the socialist countries are varied- from direct aggression, as in the case of the DRV, to the most refined, flattering methods calculated to revive nationalist prejudices and encourage any break." Brezhnev added pointedly that "sometimes there are promises of economic advantages addressed to one socialist country or another" and that "even if the imperialists write something true about us--and they can no longer avoid it--they will without fail add some poison, will write with poison." Such attempts to "weaken our unity," he declared, will receive "a resolute rebuff."

Brezhnev seemed at pains to drive home the point that any disharmony over economic or other internal matters should not be taken to indicate less than full unanimity in foreign policy, though his language notably fell short of claiming unqualified unity: In the "political cooperation of the socialist states," he said, there is "practically no single big event in the international arena in regard to which we are disunited."

Brezhnev studiously avoided any direct reference to the current Hungarian economic reform, confining himself to a general tribute to the MSZMP's achievements over the past 30 years and repeatedly reminding his hosts of the benefits of economic "cooperation." He remarked in this connection that "life is difficult for a lonely man." Presumably to avoid drawing attention to his silence on Hungarian economic affairs, Brezhnev refrained from any discussion of the Soviet economy either.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 14 -

KADAR On the same platform at the Csepel rally, Kadar was similarly preoccupied with offsetting the reports of tensions: "The mixed bag of imperialists, stubborn reactionaries, and their cart-pushers preoccupy themselves often and a great deal with" Hungarian-Soviet relations. "Obviously," he added, "our friendship does not please them, and they would like by all means to cast a shadow over it and if possible loosen it. As long as we know this, it doesn't matter, and in one way or another this is the corollary of the struggle." The two countries' friendship is "unbreakable," he continued, and "there is no force within or outside, no subversion or intrigue, capable of making our party, country, and people deviate" from the path of strengthening ties with the Warsaw Pact and CEMA states and "every socialist country."

Kadar went out of his way to assure Brezhnev that his party was resolute in shoring up weaknesses in the Hungarian economic reform. He recalled that the 14-15 November MSZMP plenum had called for imposition of "greater state and civic discipline"--through, among other things, tightening up the central planning mechanism and braking inflation--and "assured our Soviet friends . . . that the Hungarian people are going about their work in a state of awareness and are successfully marching relentlessly forward" to completion of socialist construction. At the same time, Kadar's lengthy tribute to the Soviet example and support wound up on an implicitly independent note: Declaring that the Hungarians "are true champions of the concept of socialism," he added that "therefore, going beyond historic and emotional motivation, they believe in and foster Hungarian-Soviet friendship out of principled conviction."

The 2 December joint communique juxtaposed praise by the Hungarian side for the USSR's "tremendous successes in communist construction" with a statement that "the Soviet side highly assessed the achievements of the fraternal Hungarian people, its successes in building a socialist society and the development of Hungary's economy, science, and culture," on the "sound foundation" laid by the 10th MSZMP Congress of November 1970.

KOMOCSIN ABSENCE MSZMP Politburo member and Secretary Zoltan Komocsin, the key Hungarian party spokesman on international affairs and a prime mover in the preparation of the June 1969 Moscow international party conference, was absent from the public proceedings during Brezhnev's visit for announced reasons of illness. MTI on the 27th listed Komocsin among those greeting Brezhnev at the Budapest airport, but it deleted his name in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 15 -

transmitting a similar report some four hours later. On the 29th, MTI, reporting a meeting that day between CPSU Secretary Katushev and MSZMP Secretary Pullai at Hungarian party headquarters, added that Katushev and Pullai "also met today with Zoltan Komocsin . . . , who is on sick leave." On 4 December, a Budapest broadcast in Hungarian to Europe reported that a meeting of the National Assembly's foreign affairs committee that day was chaired by Miklos Nagy "instead of the committee's chairman Zoltan Komocsin, who is on sick leave."

Komocsin was reported by MTI on 29 September to have held talks with an Indian CP delegation whose visit to Budapest ended that day. Since then he has been mentioned only in connection with the publication of a collection of his speeches and articles under the title "National Interests, International Objectives," reviewed by NEPSZABADSAG on 21 November.

The relative importance of national versus international interests of the socialist countries has been a preoccupation of Komocsin. In an article in the August 1972 issue of the Soviet journal RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNY MIR, reprinted in the July-August issue of the MSZMP theoretical journal TARSADALMI SZEMLE, he assailed the Chinese and, implicitly, the Romanians on the score of nationalism. In the September 1971 issue of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, on the other hand, he had stressed "different" approaches to economic management by the socialist countries and implied that Hungary should be allowed to pursue its economic reform without outside interference.*

* The articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 16 February and 2 August 1972, respectively.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 DECEMBER 1972

- 16 -

SINO - SOVIET RELATIONS

BREZHNEV DENOUNCES CHINESE DURING VISIT TO HUNGARY

Against a background of bitter Chinese invective directed against Soviet disarmament initiatives at the United Nations, Brezhnev's visit to Hungary from 27 November to 1 December produced a show of Soviet bloc unity in the face of what the joint communique called "the danger of Maoism." In a major speech on 30 November, Brezhnev explicitly acknowledged the bad relations between the Soviet Union and China, which he attributed to Peking's policies aimed at aggravating relations and splitting the communist camp. Briefly reiterating Moscow's line calling for normalization of relations with the PRC, Brezhnev pointedly invoked Hungary and the other fraternal countries as being in "full agreement" with Moscow on "this important matter." The joint communique condemned Peking for opposing the "common interests" of "the socialist community."

Condemnation of the Chinese at these communist summits has by no means been ritualistic in the past couple of years. During that period none of the joint communiqués on Brezhnev's meetings with bloc party chiefs--the most recent previous one having been the mid-November visit to Moscow by Bulgaria's Zhivkov--had referred to China directly. On the other hand, meetings between Moscow's allies have produced anti-Chinese statements, as in the communique on Zhivkov's talks with Poland's Gierk just before the former went to Moscow. The Soviets may have been stung into joining in these attacks as a rejoinder to Peking's recent polemical assaults, which have again brought the bitterness of Sino-Soviet relations into prominence. In addition, Brezhnev may have chosen Budapest as an appropriate site for stressing bloc unity against the Chinese. The PRC foreign trade minister concluded a visit to Hungary on 16 November as part of a tour that included two other East European countries, the independent-minded Yugoslavia and Romania.*

* Seeking to leave no doubt of his party's pro-Soviet loyalty, Kadar declared in his speech on 30 November that the Hungarians take a firm stand against "nationalism" in the communist movement and condemn the "chauvinist, anti-Soviet, schismatic, great-power policy" of Peking. Having played a central role in organizing the 1969 international communist conference, the Hungarians have long served as proxy spokesmen for Moscow in international communist affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 17 -

Brezhnev introduced his remarks on China by observing that Peking's hostility toward the Soviets and its activities in the international arena "perfectly suit imperialist reaction." Addressing a particularly sore point, he took the Chinese to task for propagating the "absurdity" that the Soviets are preparing to attack China. Moscow has long been sensitive on this matter, as reflected in a 23 September PRAVDA article denouncing Joseph Alsop for speculating about a Soviet preventive strike. Brezhnev may, in fact, have had in mind the fact that this insistent purveyor of such speculation is now visiting the PRC.

Brezhnev renewed the call for normal relations with the PRC in pro forma fashion, citing without elaboration the line formulated at the 24th CPSU Congress. Consistent with Soviet practice in recent months, he failed to mention the border talks, and he also neglected to recite the "concrete and constructive proposals" for improving Sino-Soviet relations which he first disclosed in a conciliatory speech last March during the period between the Peking and Moscow summits. That speech had coincided with one of the periodic returns to Peking of the chief Soviet negotiator to the border talks. Moscow has tended to make conciliatory gestures at the times its negotiator has gone to Peking, most notably Brezhnev's hopeful address a week after the talks opened on 20 October 1969. However, the return to Peking of Soviet negotiator Ilichev in mid-October this year has been followed by Peking's virulent portrayal of the Soviets as deceitful practitioners of military pressure behind a show of detente. Brezhnev's gloomy assessment of the state of Sino-Soviet relations now suggests a judgment that there is little hope for real improvement and that, in these circumstances, unity in the Soviet bloc is important in order to limit the effect on Moscow's interests.

CHINESE AGAIN CHALLENGE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW TROOPS

On the day before Brezhnev's foreign policy address in Budapest, the Chinese indulged in yet another withering denunciation of the "Soviet social imperialists" for "harboring murderous intent behind their smiles." PRC delegate Huang Hua, explaining his vote against a UNGA resolution on nonuse of force which he said was substantially the same as an earlier Soviet proposal, repeated the challenge to the Soviets to withdraw their troops from the Sino-Soviet border and from Mongolia if they truly oppose the use

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

6 DECEMBER 1972

- 18 -

or threat of force. In this connection Huang referred to Soviet representative Malik's earlier statement on Soviet readiness to restore good-neighborly relations with China in the absence of the threat of force.*

Huang pointed to the crux of Peking's objection to a general renunciation of force when he said that such a demand is tantamount to asking countries to "recognize the imperialist, colonialist, and neocolonialist aggression and military occupation as permanently legal." Taken together with Peking's position that the withdrawal of troops from abroad is the most fundamental need, this line reflects Peking's concern not only over its security interests but also over its right to redress territorial inequities and to regain sovereignty over areas it claims. At least juridically, this concern presumably covers Taiwan as well as contested areas along the Sino-Soviet border, but in the course of enunciating its line Peking has ignored the Taiwan question while repeatedly referring to the border conflict with the Soviets.

* See the TRENDS of 29 November 1972, pages 22-25, for a discussion of recent Sino-Soviet exchanges on nonuse of force.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 19 -

EUROPE

BREZHNEV ASSERTS OPTIMISM ON FORCE REDUCTION PROSPECTS

Brezhnev used his speech at the Csepel factory in Budapest on 30 November to make his most forthcoming statement on the issue of force reduction in Europe since 11 June 1971, when he stated in a preelection speech that the Soviet Union was "ready to discuss" limitations on both foreign and national armed forces.* Picturing a newly propitious climate for "getting down in real earnest" to the limitation of forces and armaments on the continent, he foresaw the possibility of "a useful and constructive solution" given good will on the part of the participants.

Brezhnev's comments in Budapest, while optimistic in tone, were couched in generalities. His fairly elaborate linkage of the force reduction issue to the European climate appeared to view progress on the issue as contingent on progress in the Helsinki multilateral preparatory talks on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). After mentioning the recent West German election and expressing support for the GDR in the international community, he took approving note of the Helsinki consultations and then looked "further ahead" to a continuing process of "improvement in the European political climate" that would in turn open prospects for serious progress on force limitation. The Soviet-Hungarian communique issued on 2 December at the close of Brezhnev's visit reflected the Soviet stand that force reduction negotiations must not encumber the CSCE: Declaring that both sides stressed the importance they attached to the problem of reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe, it added pointedly that this would be a "separate step" in the process of European detente.

* In Tbilisi on 14 May 1971 Brezhnev had noted speculation by NATO spokesmen on whether the March 1971 CPSU Congress proposals on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe meant Moscow would include "foreign" as well as "national" forces. He challenged them to get the issue clarified by "starting negotiations." His statement on 11 June that the USSR was prepared to discuss both foreign and national forces was accompanied by censure of the Lisbon NATO ministerial session for not clearly answering the Soviet proposals. See the TRENDS of 19 May 1971, pages 20-22, and 16 June 1971, pages 18-20.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 DECEMBER 1972

- 20 -

Brezhnev's comments came in the wake of the NATO allies' 16 November invitation to the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Hungary to participate in initial talks on force reductions at the end of January. His choice of the Budapest platform, after having totally ignored the force reduction issue in public statements during Bulgarian leader Zhivkov's 13-18 November visit to Moscow, may have been designed to convey Soviet approval of Hungary's participation in the force reduction talks while leaving open the role of the Warsaw Pact "flank" states, Romania and Bulgaria. (The NATO "flank" states, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, are slated to play a more limited role than that of the chief participants on the Western side, the United States, Canada, Britain, West Germany, and the Benelux countries.) Nothing was said about the force reduction issue in the Soviet-Bulgarian communique.

Brezhnev commented in the Budapest speech that the problem of limiting armed forces and armaments in Europe is not a simple one and that, among the "many factors" to be taken into account, "due consideration must be given to the sovereign rights and interests of various states." One factor underlying the generalized nature of his remarks may have been a desire not to preempt a collective statement of position by the Warsaw Pact allies--perhaps forthcoming after the summit meeting which Western press reports say is to take place in Moscow prior to the USSR's 50th anniversary celebrations in the latter half of December. Any such statement may be expected to underscore Soviet bloc initiative.

At the same time, the Soviet leader's remarks appeared to be part of an orchestrated effort to pave the way for such a collective statement and for the official response to the 16 November NATO demarche. Where Brezhnev did not specifically state that the Soviet Union was ready to participate in exploratory talks in January, Soviet Ambassador to the FRG Falin, answering a question by a West German radio interviewer on 30 November on whether the USSR will accept the Western invitation, stated: "We will participate in such negotiations." And on the eve of Brezhnev's remarks, a Radio Moscow international service commentary stated that "today the question of talks on reducing the armed forces and armaments in Europe has become a factor of practical policy. An agreement in principle has been reached on that issue, and the negotiations are to start at the beginning of next year." The commentary was devoted entirely to the force reduction issue, which has seldom been the subject of a full Moscow radio or press commentary. It has been broadcast in a number of European languages over a period of several days.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TR LINES
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 21 -

SALT

MOSCOW INTERPRETS U.S. FILM AS DIRECT ATTACK ON SALT II

Moscow has belatedly attacked the film "Only the Strong" produced by the American Security Council, shown on television stations in the United States beginning this summer, as a direct attack on the SALT II negotiations that opened in Geneva on 21 November. An initial TASS report on the film in September had focused on film's "concoctions" about a Soviet military threat to the United States. A succession of recent radio and press commentaries, appearing just as SALT II was getting under way, has now used a Seymour Hersh article on the film in the 16 November New York TIMES as the peg for attacks on the film as a calculated effort by opponents of arms control to undermine the Geneva negotiations.

Although according to Hersh the film does not specifically attack the SALT I agreements or SALT II, the recent Soviet commentaries viewed the film and the Council's campaign for its dissemination as directed both in timing and in substance against SALT II. A 4 December commentary by Radio Moscow's Vladislav Kozyakov linked the film with a "new anti-Soviet campaign" by opponents of detente in the United States, noting that it appeared "just at the time when the strategic arms limitation talks have entered their second round in Geneva." Articles by V. Matveyev in the 30 November IZVESTIYA and by V. Bolshakov in the 1 December PRAVDA were more restrained, emphasizing that considerable opposition now exists within the United States itself to the film's message. Matveyev took pains to dissociate "official Washington circles" from any connection with the film and cited President Nixon's expression of confidence in a "successful outcome of the second stage of the talks" in his letter to the conferees in Geneva.

Moscow's sensitivity to the film may be traced to its expressed concern over the size of the U.S. military budget and the Defense Department's strategic weapons modernization program, both of which have been treated in Soviet comment as potential obstacles to a satisfactory outcome for SALT II. Bolshakov in PRAVDA, noting that the film's target was the "U.S. man in the street," concluded that its goal was "to enlist support from him for the militarist lobby which is trying to persuade Congressmen to vote for new allocations to the Pentagon."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 22 -

The showing of the film on U.S. television was first reported in a Washington dispatch by Vitaliy Chukseyev transmitted by TASS on 23 September, but the report was not picked up by other Soviet media at that time. Chukseyev had evinced no special concern about the impact of the film in relation to SALT; he had alluded to SALT only in noting that such "soberminded Americans" as Senator Fulbright had strongly condemned it for, among other things, ignoring the significance of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on limiting strategic weapons. The thrust of Chukseyev's dispatch was against the film's "crudeness," as illustrated in sequences in which "Soviet diesel submarines are presented as atomic submarines" and "the 'nuclear threat' from the USSR 'is confirmed' by photographs of the Vostok spacecraft." The recent commentaries have made no such efforts to rebut specific cases of misrepresentation, but they have similarly ridiculed the film as an effort to fabricate a threat to U.S. security from an imaginary "red danger."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 DECEMBER 1972

- 23 -

CUBA - U S S R

RAUL CASTRO SAYS MILITARY TIES ARE NON-NEGOTIABLE

In a 2 December speech marking the 16th anniversary of the founding of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), First Vice Prime Minister and FAR Minister Raul Castro declared that Cuban-Soviet political and military ties are non-negotiable and that Cuban ports will "remain open" to the Soviet fleet, "whether it be for training cruises or friendship visits that they make to the continental seas." Appearing against the background of the ongoing U.S.-Cuban negotiations on hijacking and widespread U.S. press speculation that an agreement on hijacking may be the precursor of a Havana-Washington detente, Castro's remarks may have been designed in part to reassure Moscow that Cuba will not weaken its ties with the Soviet Union for the sake of improving relations with the United States. At the same time, Havana media's handling of the speech and Castro's other comments suggest that the speech was intended in large part as a warning against any Cuban relaxation of vigilance.

Castro's statements on the inviolability of Soviet-Cuban ties and on continued Soviet naval access to Cuban ports have appeared to date only in two FAR programs broadcast by the Cuban domestic radio on 4 December. The most extensive available version of the speech, transmitted by Havana TV on 3 December, confined itself to quoting a cryptic observation that while the Cuban revolution is "firm as a rock" and the "economic and political blockade" is disintegrating, "there are still those who are attempting to foist conditions on us." Even these ambiguous remarks did not appear in a 2 December PRENSA LATINA dispatch, the only available Havana international transmission of the speech.

A 4 December TASS summary of the speech stressed Castro's effusive praise for Soviet assistance, but wholly ignored his comments on the non-negotiability of Soviet-Cuban ties and on the continuation of port privileges for the Soviet fleet.

In addition to assuring his audience, in effect, that Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union will not be altered as a consequence of negotiations with the United States, Castro appeared to be cautioning the Cuban military against premature conclusions that the alleged threat to Cuban security from the United States has receded. Declaring that Cuba will continue to strengthen its "defensive capacity," he

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 24 -

promised that Cuba "shall remain vigilant as long as we have before us a powerful, treacherous enemy opposed to the Cuban revolution." But Castro went on to make other statements that were more conciliatory toward the United States and more hopeful of an improvement in Havana's relations with Washington. Noting that several Latin American states are pursuing policies in defiance of U.S. tutelage, he declared:

This new situation raising its head in Latin America is occurring amid singular historical circumstances which are thrusting increasingly more realistic criteria upon various imperialist governments. Thus we observe how political forces which early in this decade were clamoring for a revision of the results of World War II and which encouraged the restoration of capitalism in the socialist camp countries by force now adopt and even encourage measures to ease international tension.

This change, Castro stressed, does not signify that "imperialism has changed its nature," but rather is a consequence of the formidable power possessed by the socialist camp. Castro also repeated the stock Cuban charge that the United States acts as a "gendarme" in Latin America, but in the available versions of his speech he did not pursue the line recently taken by his brother that U.S.-Cuban relations cannot improve until the United States abandons its "gendarme" role in the continent.

HIJACKING NEGOTIATIONS In the available versions of his speech Castro made no reference to the hijacking negotiations. The only recent reference in Havana media to the progress of the negotiations appeared in a 5 December domestic service broadcast by Guido Garcia Inclan, who has on occasion in the past been used as an official conduit. Employing his "Letter from Freddy" format (Freddy is a mythical Cuban expatriate working as a journalist for a U.S. newspaper), Garcia Inclan declared: "It is my understanding that agreements will be reached to avert the diversion of planes. Though secret, the talks are going ahead."

BACKGROUND While Raul Castro's affirmation that Soviet warships may continue to use Cuban ports appears to be the first such statement by a key regime spokesman, the notion that Havana will not bargain away its ties with Moscow for the sake of a rapprochement with Washington has been underscored by Fidel Castro on several occasions over the last two and a half years.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 25 -

He made this point several times during his swing through Eastern Europe and the USSR earlier this year. For example, speaking at a Cuban embassy reception in Moscow on 3 July with Kosygin present, he alleged that the Nixon Administration sought a severance of Cuban links to the USSR and a renunciation of Cuban support for revolutionary movements as prerequisites for improved relations. Castro promised that Cuba would "never" make such concessions "running counter to our principles, our loyalty and gratitude to the Soviet Union." After his return home, in his 26 July speech, he objected to a statement in the U.S. Democratic Party platform that Cuba cannot become a foreign military base.

Castro's comments in Moscow and elsewhere appeared to reflect concern that in the wake of improved U.S.-Soviet relations the USSR might press Cuba to make unpalatable concessions in order to normalize relations with the United States and that Moscow and Washington might reach an understanding on Cuba which would be presented to Castro as a fait accompli and which might be inimical to Havana's interests.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 26 -

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

TITARENKO PROTEGE BECOMES UKRAINIAN CADRE CHIEF

G. K. Kryuchkov, a protege of Ukrainian Central Committee secretary for industry A. A. Titarenko, has become head of the Ukrainian Central Committee party organizational work section, filling the vacancy left by Ukrainian First Secretary V. V. Shcherbitskiy's protege A. A. Ulanov, who was demoted to the post of Voroshilovgrad obkom secretary in July. The new appointment seems to be aimed at checking Shcherbitskiy's power, since Titarenko has been a close associate of Shcherbitskiy's main rival, Premier A. P. Lyashko; it probably also represents a tradeoff for the promotion last July of I. S. Grushetskiy, a probable Shcherbitskiy ally, to the post of Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman.

Kryuchkov, previously identified as a deputy head of the Ukrainian party organizational work section, was listed in the 25 November RADYANSKA UKRAINA as head of an unnamed section while meeting a Czechoslovak people's control delegation along with Second Secretary I. K. Lutak, who supervises the cadre section. Kryuchkov is from Zaporozhe, where he served as oblast Komsomol secretary in the late 1950's and rose to cadre section chief by the mid-1960's.

Although the Zaporozhe organization is probably friendly to Brezhnev, who headed it after the war, it appears closer to Premier Lyashko than to Brezhnev's protege Shcherbitskiy, since Lyashko's longtime colleague Titarenko and the latter's protege M. N. Vsevolozhskiy have headed it during the last 10 years. After serving as second secretary of Donetsk oblast under Lyashko, Titarenko was transferred in 1962 to the post of first secretary of Zaporozhe. Soon afterward, he promoted Zaporozhe oblast cadre section head Vsevolozhskiy to oblast second secretary and chose Kryuchkov as his successor. Titarenko was promoted to Ukrainian Central Committee secretary for industry in 1966 succeeding his colleague Lyashko, who became second secretary, and by September 1970 his assistant Kryuchkov had become Ukrainian cadre section deputy head.

Kryuchkov's promotion thus appears to be part of a carefully negotiated balance between Shcherbitskiy and Lyashko in the wake of Shelest's ouster in May. In late July I. S. Grushetskiy, who as a onetime Brezhnev associate in Dnepropetrovsk is probably allied with Shcherbitskiy, became chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and full Politburo member, while Lyashko's protege

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 DECEMBER 1972

- 27 -

V. M. Tsybulko, Kiev first secretary, was promoted to Politburo candidate member and Ulanov was removed as leader of the cadre section.

The next major change occurred in October, when cultural hardliner V. Yu. Malanchuk replaced Shelest protege F. D. Ovcharenko as ideology secretary and Politburo candidate member. Malanchuk's election presumably was welcomed by Shcherbitskiy's russified Dnepropetrovsk following and also by Grushetskiy. As Lvov first secretary during 1950-51 and 1961-62, Grushetskiy must have known Malanchuk, who was elected oblast Komsomol secretary in 1950 and who worked in the party obkom apparatus from 1951 to 1963, rising to head the sensitive science and culture section. Lyashko's attitude toward Malanchuk is harder to assess, since he and his Donetsk colleagues were not prominent in the cultural crackdown, even though they represent one of the most russified oblasts.

With Kryuchkov's promotion, Ukrainian cadre work is now in the hands of officials independent of, if not hostile to, First Secretary Shcherbitskiy. Lutak, an apparent Shelest ally, continues to supervise cadre work as second secretary, while the cadre section is directly headed by a protege of Titarenko and perhaps of Lyashko as well. The present situation is similar to that faced by Shelest during his last years as Ukrainian party chief, when his rival Lyashko served as second secretary and the proteges of Lyashko and Shcherbitskiy successively headed the cadre section.

The turmoil in the Ukrainian leadership has been clearly reflected in the appointment of three new cadre chiefs during the past four years. Although prior to 1969 the post had been held by one man for about 13 years, Lyashko's Donetsk cadre assistant V. M. Tsybulko, appointed in the spring of 1969, lasted only a year; Shcherbitskiy's Dnepropetrovsk protege A. A. Ulanov, appointed in the fall of 1970, lasted only a year and a half.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 28 -

CHINA

PROVINCES STEP UP REBUILDING OF YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE

A spate of recent provincial reports indicate that rebuilding of the Young Communist League (YCL), destroyed during the cultural revolution, is now underway in line with central directives. The central media have not yet mentioned these directives, which have been cited in several provincial radio reports on meetings dealing with YCL developments. The bellwether has been Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao's Shanghai, a provincial-level municipality that has held a preparatory meeting for a YCL congress to be convened next year. Kweichow and Shansi have held provincial YCL forums and Kirin has conducted a YCL work conference. There have also been reports on YCL rebuilding in Yunnan and Shensi. A common thread running through these reports has been a stress on the party's leading role together with condemnation of efforts by "swindlers"--meaning Lin Piao and his followers--to lead youth astray.

The Kweichow radio announced on 16 November that from 7 to 14 November the political department of the provincial revolutionary committee had held a forum on strengthening youth work and YCL building. Warning that the struggle "to win over the younger generation is extremely severe," the forum decided--"in accordance with the spirit of the relevant instruction of the center"--to set up preparatory organizations for YCL congresses at provincial, regional, and county levels. YCL committees at all levels will be established "gradually," according to the forum. The Shansi forum, held from 13 to 17 November but not announced until the 29th, pointed up provincial achievements in youth work over the past year and called for further efforts to establish YCL organs at all levels.

The Kirin YCL work conference was held from 6 to 11 November, according to the provincial radio on the 19th. Besides repudiating "revisionist fallacies" spread by the swindlers, the conference praised model upper-level areas which had already established YCL committees and laid plans for establishing YCL committees at the county and regional levels "in a well-planned and well-guided way this winter and next spring." The conference revealed that 90 percent of the basic YCL branches and 85 percent of the basic-level committees have already been established, and that during the three years of rebuilding thus far 280,000 new members have

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 29 -

joined the YCL while 25,000 YCL members have been admitted to the party. Acknowledging that the struggle against those trying to "spread their rotten ideas and way of life" among the young is still sharp, the conference emphasized the need for training YCL cadres who can lead the struggle against "the revisionist line." YCL organs were instructed to strengthen their leadership among children through the Little Red Soldiers and to organize youth in various activities such as sports, scientific experimentation, and cultural activities.

According to a 25 November Yunnan broadcast reporting a YCL congress in a Kunming district, four counties in the province have held YCL congresses thus far this year. The broadcast called on youth to observe discipline and continue class struggle. A 3 December Shensi radio report on a county YCL organization that was established in April 1971 pointed out that YCL committees formed some time ago must continue the struggle and that local YCL organizations "had been engaged in daily routine work and had failed to grasp class struggle tightly." The county party committee, however, was said to have engaged extensively in youth work and to have revitalized the youth organization.

SHANGHAI MODEL Shanghai became the first provincial-level area to indicate its readiness for a YCL congress, in the process prefiguring the nature of the body that is to emerge. According to a Shanghai radio report on 25 November, a congress preparatory meeting was held from 20 to 22 November under the auspices of the municipal party committee and chaired by Shanghai chief Chang Chun-chiao. The meeting studied "important instructions on consolidating and building the youth league issued by Chairman Mao and the CCP Central Committee" and nominated members of the congress preparatory group. According to the meeting report, basic-level YCL organizations have "in the main" been established in Shanghai, and district and county levels have formed their committees.

Organizational rules prescribed by the municipal party committee for the preparation of the congress outline with some precision the composition of the congress and of the YCL leadership organ that is to be formed "gradually." There are to be 1,500 delegates, with at least 40 percent of them women and with an average age not to exceed 27. The number of more senior party leaders in YCL leadership positions is to be high, though the instructions set outer limits by stipulating that the total number of CCP members

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 30 -

on the municipal YCL committee should not exceed 70 percent and the number of committee members who hold government offices should not exceed 25 percent. The once powerful--and destructive--Red Guards are to be put in their place by being limited to 300 middle school representatives attending the congress as "observers."

In line with the current push to make use of experienced officials, the new committee is to include "some of the members of the last municipal YCL committee," though "the majority" of its members are to be drawn from the ranks of cultural revolution activists in order to "maintain contacts" with the masses of youth by a process of cooptation. Similarly, delegates to the congress are to include some instructors of Little Red Soldiers, and the total number of committee members is to be larger than before the cultural revolution and they will remain in their units among the masses.

A joint WEN HUI PAO-LIBERATION DAILY editorial broadcast over the Shanghai radio on 26 November noted that much ideological preparation is still necessary before the congress is convened "at an appropriate time in 1973." The major task of youth organizations in the coming months is to be "thorough criticism of the crimes of swindlers" who have "frenziedly contended" with the proletariat for influence over the younger generation. Young people were told to carry forward the revolutionary traditions of their parents in building the motherland and to study vocational skills for the revolution, becoming both red and expert.

HEILUNGKIANG BROADCAST REVEALS SERIOUS DISCIPLINE PROBLEM

A Heilungkiang broadcast on 3 December aired in remarkably frank terms the regime's problems in securing disciplined responsiveness from local officials after the repeated leadership convulsions of recent years. The broadcast sharply criticized those party members and organizations in the province whose failure to carry out the directives of higher units has "affected the implementation of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and damaged the party and the revolutionary line as well." Though the broadcast did not name specific individuals or units, it made painfully clear the problems bedeviling the province, where the party first secretary has been absent from public view for nearly a year, the second secretary since July, and where the revolutionary committee chairman was apparently purged two years ago. The broadcast indicated that there are serious problems with cadre morale and discipline in the province and that the economy has been adversely affected.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 31 -

In attributing the breakdown in control to the "remaining influence" of "swindlers like Liu Shao-chi," the broadcast indicated by its charges of "a lack of discipline and a state of anarchism" and its reference to the effect of "sectarianism" on party unity that the aftermath of the cultural revolution and the purge of Lin Piao have seriously complicated the restoration of party command and control. Some organizations were said to have failed to carry out instructions from higher levels while in other cases individuals were said to have disobeyed their organizations. The broadcast located the problem not among the masses generally but in the party itself, indicting "party members and cadres within the party" as responsible for violating discipline.

Though the broadcast skirted most specific issues, a major point of contention seems to lie in the area of economic policy, with some cadres apparently refusing to accept such recent policies as the easing of restrictions on using work-points to determine labor remuneration. Though pointing out that most party members are observing economic and labor discipline, the broadcast singled out the economic front in lamenting "a relatively serious lack of organization and discipline among a small number of party members and cadres." These were said to have used "industrial products, materials, and machinery to carry out projects not under the state plan," thereby adversely affecting planned construction. Other provinces have also called for abandoning some of the small industrial plants set up outside the state plan during the cultural revolution, when the masses were said to be capable of almost any sort of economic initiative and Liu Shao-chi was being attacked for closing down plants after the Great Leap. Other provinces have not, however, indicated serious opposition to recent measures to restrict such plants or to moderate other economic policies. The Heilungkiang broadcast went so far as to imply some coordination of illegal economic activities through "barter transactions" in order to circumvent the state plan.

The crackdown on disobedient cadres has apparently been impeded by uncertainty over the stability of the central line and resistance to the dictates of current policy. The new cadres who rose during the cultural revolution and are now the main target of attack are apparently still a source of resistance, while the old cadres they replaced but who have now been rehabilitated seem to fear that the pendulum might swing again and thus are loath to undertake effective action. The Heilungkiang broadcast sought to cut through this impasse with the advice to old cadres that they need not fear that "they would be charged with attacking others in retaliation." While they may "offend some people, hurt certain people's dignity, and cause dissatisfaction," cadres were told to remember that what is hurt is the "bourgeois clannish style," a formulation suggesting that beleaguered cadres are banding together for mutual support in uncertain times.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 8 1 -

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY: USSR RAISES CONCEPT
IN CONNECTION WITH IRAN, PERSIAN GULF

Several Moscow broadcasts in Persian beginning on 19 November have advocated the idea of an Asian collective security system as being in line with the national interests of Iran. Soviet support for such a system, first advanced by Brezhnev at the June 1969 world conference of communist and workers parties in Moscow,* was reiterated authoritatively by Podgorny in his 10 October speech at a dinner honoring the Shah. Podgorny remarked on the "positive features" of Soviet relations with the northern tier states--Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey--and "other states" of the adjacent region. Looking toward settlement of the Indochina and Middle East conflicts, normalization of the situation in the Hindustan peninsula, and improvement of inter-state relations in "other parts" of Asia, he asserted that such developments would "make for a practical realization of the idea of creating a collective security system" in the Asian countries.

The Shah, for his part, indicated some receptiveness to the idea in his reply speech. Saying it was a pleasure to observe "the process of activation of efforts to insure European security," he asserted that Iran greeted with satisfaction the FRG treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland and added that "perhaps with time it will be possible in Asia, too, to consider something resembling the steps that have been taken in the European continent." He went on to express hope for a speedy settlement of the Pakistani-Indian dispute.

The joint communique at the conclusion of the Shah's visit said the two sides "exchanged opinions" on the situation in Asia and were of the opinion that renunciation of the use or threat of force, respect for sovereignty and inviolability of frontiers, noninterference in the internal affairs of others, and extensive development of all-round cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit were an effective way to

* After discussing collective security in Europe, Brezhnev had expressed the opinion that "the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- S 2 -

establish peace. The sides concluded that "it takes joint efforts and cooperation by all countries of Asia to insure peace and security in the area."* A 19 November Persian-language commentary pointedly cited Brezhnev as stating at the 15th Soviet trade union congress on 20 March this year that a collective security system should be based on just these principles.

An Observer article in IZVESTIYA on 31 October, "highly evaluating" the Shah's Soviet visit, seemed to set the stage for future propaganda on "collective" relationships. Along the lines of Podgorny's 10 October speech, Observer declared that the relations which are evolving in a spirit of friendship, good neighborliness, and cooperation between the USSR and its southern neighbors--Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, and "the other states of the contiguous region"--benefit both these countries and the cause of general peace.

In raising the subject recently, Moscow may have viewed the opening of the Helsinki talks on European security and cooperation on 22 November as a propitious occasion to pursue the companion concept in Asia. A Persian-language commentary broadcast on 24 November opened by referring to the Helsinki talks and went on to recall that in the joint communique on the Shah's visit the USSR and Iran had outlined the need for peace in the East as well as in the West. They concluded, it said, that to preserve peace and security in the area it was necessary for the region's countries to cooperate. A talk broadcast in Persian on 21 November had maintained that the climate of trust stemming from good-neighbor relations between the USSR and Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey had brought about a favorable situation for future extension of "multilateral cooperation" between the Soviet Union on the one hand and its southern neighbors and "other countries in the area" on the other.

Moscow may be pressing the idea with Iran in light of the Shah's willingness to go as far as he did in conceding, in his Moscow speech, that "with time" such a concept might be considered for Asia and in subscribing in the communique to the notion of Asian cooperation to insure peace and security. Turkey and

* No such passage appeared in the 31 March 1970 communique on Podgorny's visit to Iran.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 DECEMBER 1972

- S 3 -

Afghanistan have apparently not been the target of Moscow propaganda extolling a collective security system, and comment on the subject beamed to east Asian audiences has generally been less explicit in recommending the advantages of such a system for any given country.

The Persian-language broadcasts did suggest an effort to dispel Iranian concerns vis-a-vis Moscow's treaty relationship with Iraq, with whom the Shah has long been feuding, and also possibly with India. Thus a 20 November commentary maintained that neither the Soviet-Iranian treaty on economic and technical cooperation, signed during the Shah's October visit, nor the Soviet-Indian friendship and cooperation treaty and those with Egypt and Iraq involve any threat to the interests of other countries. The commentary preceded this assertion with a rebuttal of "unfounded suspicions about a collective security system for Asia" voiced by "imperialist quarters and Peking's leaders." The broadcast claimed that the Soviet-Iranian treaty as well as the Soviet treaties with Egypt and Iraq reflect a mutual confidence and a confidence in the future which "could presumably serve as a foundation for a collective security system in Asia."

TURKEY In citing the Soviet agreements with Iran, India, Egypt, and Iraq as possible bases for a collective security arrangement, the recent Persian-language commentaries did not refer to the Soviet-Turkish declaration signed during Podgorny's visit to Turkey last April. Two recent Moscow commentaries broadcast in Turkish, without specifically mentioning the collective security concept, defended Soviet policies in the Middle East and the Mediterranean and claimed that Soviet-Turkish political cooperation plays an increasing role in European and Asian affairs.

Podgorny had broached the collective security idea in a dinner speech during his April visit to Turkey, remarking that world developments put the question of Asian collective security "on the order of the day." While the topic was not reflected in the joint communique on that visit, the "Declaration on the Principles of Good-Neighbor Relations" between the USSR and Turkey embodied most of the points which Podgorny said in his speech "might be" the principles of collective security. The points he listed were those later incorporated in the Soviet-Iranian communique on 21 October in the passage on the "situation in Asia."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 4 -

An article in NOVOYE VREMYA (No. 17, 21 April), summing up Podgorny's Turkish visit, said that the Soviet Union and Turkey were "vitally interested also in strengthening of security in Asia" and described the Soviet-Turkish declaration, "like other international documents pertaining to the USSR's relations with Asian countries," as a "weighty contribution" to peace in Asia in general and its western part in particular.

A Moscow broadcast in Turkish on 29 November defended Soviet policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, asserting that the USSR "is not after a presence or hegemony in this or that area" and that interference in other states' affairs and "so-called export of revolution" are contrary to Soviet policy. The broadcast added that a stable peace opened possibilities for all countries "for liberation from the control of such military blocs as NATO and CENTO." A 2 December Moscow radio commentary in Turkish, after a passing reference to the Helsinki talks, underscored the increasing role in European and Asian affairs, "in terms of strengthening security and peace," played by the political cooperation between the USSR and Turkey as the only countries with territory in both continents. The commentary recited the same set of principles--peaceful coexistence, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, rejection of the use of force, noninterference in internal affairs, constructive contacts--as the bases of Soviet-Turkish relations. Charging "imperialist circles" with trying to involve Turkey in war preparations through its NATO and CENTO membership, the broadcast also defensively rejected "imperialist" allegations that the Soviet Union tries to dictate to its southern neighbor.

AFGHANISTAN The question has also been raised with Afghanistan. At a luncheon on 14 March this year Kosygin, addressing the visiting Afghan prime minister, suggested that measures taken by the Asian states to insure collective security in the region would help consolidate peace. He mentioned three principles on which such a system could be based--nonviolence in resolving questions between states, peaceful coexistence between states with differing social systems, and the development of mutually advantageous cooperation. He added the assurance that these principles were in no way directed against any state. (Podgorny similarly assured the Turks that the idea of Asian collective security was not directed against any state.) The Soviet-Afghan communique issued at the conclusion of the prime minister's visit stated that in the course of a discussion of the

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 5 -

situation in Asia "it was noted" that an effective way to establish stable peace in the region lay in adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence, renunciation of the use or threat of force, respect for national sovereignty, equality of all countries and peoples, and the development of broad, mutually profitable cooperation in accordance with national interests.

PERSIAN GULF Moscow has also been cautiously injecting the collective security notion in connection with the Persian Gulf in recent commentaries broadcast to Iran. These talks made the usual charges that Britain and the United States are continuing to pursue neocolonialist policies in the gulf region to assure capitalist exploitation of the area's oil resources. They defended Soviet policy in the gulf, citing the position spelled out in the 21 October communique on the Shah's visit. That document expressed the belief of both sides that questions relating to the gulf should be settled "in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter by the states of the area themselves without any interference from outside."

The 31 October Observer article in IZVESTIYA, after referring to Moscow's good-neighborly relations with the northern tier states, rhetorically asked who would not wish for friendly relations and mutually advantageous ties between these countries and for settlement of disputed questions between them by political means. Observer added that "this fully applies, for example, to the zone of the Persian Gulf."

A talk in Persian broadcast by Moscow on 29 November agreed with a view attributed to the Iranian paper KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL that a permanent presence of Western warships in the Indian Ocean would not help stabilize the area, and that to forestall such a course of events "the coastal countries should undertake collective measures forthwith." The broadcast concluded that the principles proposed by the USSR and Iran--in the 21 October communique--"constitute the foundation of such collective measures." A Persian-language commentary on 28 November declared that all questions relating to the Persian Gulf should be settled through peaceful means, on the basis of respect for the rights and legitimate interests of all countries of the area, and that all foreign military bases should be removed. It went on to assert that "these principles were explicitly noted in the joint Soviet-Iranian communique."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- 8 6 -

Moscow's position that the gulf countries alone have the right to determine their fate had been set forth authoritatively in a TASS statement of 3 March 1968. The statement had focused on alleged efforts by the United States and Britain to create a military bloc of Persian Gulf states and claimed that Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Turkey had "declined proposals for the establishment of the so-called 'joint defense system.'" Subsequently, joint communiques issued by the Soviet Union with Iraq and South Yemen generally affirmed the right of the peoples of the gulf to determine their own destiny without foreign intervention. At least four such documents additionally called for abolition of all foreign military bases in the gulf--a call not repeated in the most recent Iraqi and PDRY communiques, of 19 September and 26 November, respectively; it was of course not contained in the Soviet-Iranian communique on 21 October.

BACKGROUND The Middle East in general and the northern tier states in particular have only rarely been cited in Soviet propaganda since Brezhnev propounded his Asian collective security scheme.* Terse references to Iran are known to have appeared a few times in 1969, however. For example, PRAVDA's Belyayev in a 17 August commentators' roundtable broadcast on Moscow's domestic service explained that "when we speak about a collective security in Asia we have in mind the struggle for a political settlement in the Middle East and the abolition of those hotbeds of trouble which still exist." He argued that the Middle East is "also Asia if, of course, one discounts North Africa." Belyayev explained that by strengthening political independence and fostering the national economy of Asian countries that part of the world could become a tranquil region where the idea of peace would triumph. He went on to suggest that, "for instance, countries like Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and to a certain extent Iran" could reach agreement on important issues such as transit trade. "If an

* The only known reference to regional security systems in a Soviet-Arab communique appeared in the 17 July 1970 document at the conclusion of Egyptian President Nasir's last visit to the Soviet Union. The communique recorded the two sides' view that "the creation of effective systems of collective security in Europe, Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world" would help ease tensions and establish fruitful international cooperation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972

- S 7 -

alliance" which would prompt the solution of the transit trade problem "were to come about," this would benefit the organization of good relations among the Asian countries.*

Another reference appeared in a 21 September 1969 radio commentary broadcast in English to South Asia after Gromyko had presented the Soviet draft appeal on regional security systems to the UN General Assembly. Discussing Asian concern for means of collective efforts for peace and security, the commentary said that the Soviet people would like to see India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, and other Asian countries develop friendly relations among themselves. Three days later, another broadcast to South Asia pegged to the Gromyko proposals pointed out that the Middle East crisis directly affected the Asian countries by depriving them of the shortest trade route. Noting interest in the collective security system in Malaysia and Ceylon, the broadcast added that Iranian media were also focusing attention on Gromyko's UNGA speech and the idea of collective security for Asia.

* Article 5 of the Soviet-Iranian economic and technical cooperation treaty signed during the Shah's October 1972 visit says the parties "express readiness to facilitate the realization of the idea of regional cooperation in the fields of economy and trade, as well as of transit transportation, taking into account the interests of all countries sharing and supporting this idea."

CONFIDENTIAL