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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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4 OCT 1972

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
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**F B I S**

# TRENDS

## in Communist Propaganda

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
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 25 SEPTEMBER - 1 OCTOBER 1972

<u>Moscow (2745 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1520 items)</u>	
China	(4%) 7%	Domestic Issues	(40%) 38%
[PRC National Day	(0.1%) 4%]	[PRC National Day	(0.8%) 8%]
UNGA Session	(8%) 7%	Tanaka in PRC	(-- ) 29%
[Gromyko Speech	(-- ) 5%]	PRC-Togoland Diplomatic	(-- ) 7%
Indochina	(6%) 6%	Relations	
Ratification of SALT	(-- ) 3%	UNGA Session	(7%) 6%
Agreement by		Indochina	(4%) 2%
Supreme Soviet			
UNESCO International	(-- ) 3%		
Scientific			
Conference in			
Ashkhabad			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## CHINA

## NATIONAL DAY EDITORIAL ACCLAIMS FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSES

Peking marked National Day this year by triumphantly celebrating its achievements in foreign affairs during a period of major international changes and readjustments. Coming on the heels of significant breakthroughs in relations with Japan and West Germany, a joint editorial on the anniversary by PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY sang the praises of Chouist policies of flexibility and negotiation while excoriating the Soviets as being more dangerous than old-line imperialists. On the latter score, the editorial was notably soft on "U.S. imperialism" and used the occasion to put on record an approving assessment of President Nixon's summit talks last February.

As in the case of the 1 August Army Day, the release of a National Day joint editorial represents a return to normalcy after the sharp curtailment of anniversary celebrations beginning last National Day at the time of the Lin Piao affair. The once-traditional parade was again foregone in favor of festivities in various parks, a practice having the virtue that it makes Mao's absence less conspicuous than if he failed to review a parade.\* All of the currently active Politburo members were present either in Peking or their provincial bailiwicks, and the editorial struck a subdued note of consolidation in a discussion of the domestic situation that was overshadowed by the extensive review of developments in the international sphere.

Chou En-lai, making a triumphal return to Peking after seeing Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka off in Shanghai the day before National Day, had reason to bask in the glow of the touted foreign policy successes. In addition to the Tanaka visit, the announcement on 29 September that the PRC and West Germany had agreed to establish diplomatic relations was also well timed for the National Day celebrations. The editorial pointed to the "permissible and necessary" flexibility being practiced in foreign policy, and it invoked the doctrines of peaceful coexistence and of the "first and second intermediate zones" to explain that the Chinese "strive for the relaxation of international tension" and apply this flexibility across a wide

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\* Mao has made no public appearance outside his house since the January funeral of Chen I.

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range of countries, including those which previously had been hostile. Among the past year's developments the editorial cited President Nixon's visit, noting that the leaders of the two countries had held "earnest, frank, and beneficial" talks. This was the characterization offered last February, but Peking had not subsequently commented on the Sino-U.S. summit until National Day.

**SUPERPOWERS** The joint editorial cited various developments as evidence of growing resistance to superpower hegemony, such as Egypt's "sending away" of Soviet military advisers, the enlargement of the Common Market, and Japan's new diplomatic moves. The editorial observed, however, that the world is far from peaceful, noting that the United States has persisted in its military actions in Vietnam and that the situation remains tense in other regions as a result of contention between the two superpowers. Putting the stress on rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, the editorial dismissed their recent agreements as "superficial compromise" and reiterated Peking's judgment that the strategic arms limitation agreement is being followed by a new stage in the nuclear arms race. In an unusual formulation, the editorial said Moscow has played up the European security question "only to pinpoint Europe as the main area of its contention" with the United States.

The United States was let off lightly, with no disparagement of the Nixon Administration by name, but the editorial's account of superpower rivalry went on to deliver a bitter indictment of "the Soviet revisionist renegade clique" as "even more deceitful than old-line imperialist countries, and therefore more dangerous." With an eye to a new round of polemical exchanges at the United Nations on disarmament, the editorial dismissed the Soviet proposal on prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as "just so much humbug."

**DOMESTIC AFFAIRS** In its more generalized treatment of the domestic situation, the editorial summed up current policies with a lengthy quotation from Mao stressing a need for a balanced approach in which "there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness." According to the quotation, the aim is "to build a modern industry and agriculture at a fairly rapid pace, consolidate our party and state, and make them better able to weather storm and stress." The editorial called for current moderate policies on cadres, intellectuals, and the economy to continue to be implemented, and the injunction to be "both red

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and expert" was explained as meaning that people should "study vocational skill and technique and raise their educational level for the sake of the revolution."

The editorial avoided specific guidelines or projects, making no mention of the five-year plan or of convocation of the National People's Congress. It indicated that it "is still our cardinal task" to deepen the rectification campaign in the wake of the Lin affair and to further criticize the "swindlers." There was no reference to the PLA's civilian role, the editorial simply calling without elaboration for strengthened army-government and army-civilian unity.

**LEADERSHIP**      The leadership turnout followed expected patterns,  
**UNITY**              with no major former purge victim reappearing for  
                         National Day. Peking's increasing tendency to vary  
the rankings of leaders according to function and occasion seems to have confused even NCNA. An early list of leaders attending the festivities in the parks was led by Tung Pi-wu, Chu Te, and Chou, the order frequently used on state occasions, but a later account inserted Chou between the two octogenarians. Chiang Ching was listed next, ahead of Yeh Chien-ying, but Yeh preceded her in the group of leaders reported present when Chou returned to Peking the previous day. Yeh's role in the Tanaka visit might account for his higher status at the airport ceremony.

Most provinces held National Day rallies, but several in which the leadership situation is unstable--such as Szechwan, Yunnan, and Kiangsi--have as yet not reported leadership turnouts. Chekiang, where first secretary Nan Ping seems to be in trouble, did name the leaders present, not including Nan and several other secretaries who were also absent during the Iranian empress' visit a week earlier.

**TAIWAN**              The joint editorial contained only the ritualistic  
                         pledge to "liberate" Taiwan, but Peking took the  
occasion of National Day to make a pitch to the people on Taiwan at a time when the Chiang Kai-shek regime's international standing had suffered further erosion as a result of the PRC-Japanese settlement.\* Speaking at a National Day reception on 29 September in honor of "compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan compatriots, Overseas Chinese and foreign nationals of Chinese

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\* See the China-Japan section of the TRENDS.



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descent,"\* Yeh Chien-ying noted that "quite a number of Taiwan compatriots" toured the mainland in the past year and he welcomed more of them to come and visit their relatives. Yeh sought to play on sentiments of patriotism among Chinese on Taiwan and elsewhere, declaring that "patriots belong to one big family" and that no distinction should be drawn between "those who come forward first and those later." Striking a conciliatory note, he reassured "those with wrongdoings in the past" that they also will be welcome to the family.

The Fukien party chief and commander of the Fukien Front Command, speaking at a National Day rally broadcast by the Foochow radio, also extended a welcome to the "compatriots" on Taiwan, Quemoy, and Matsu to visit their relatives and friends on the mainland.

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\* There was a reception last year for "Hong Kong and Macao compatriots" and Overseas Chinese, but there was no mention of Taiwan compatriots.

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

### PEKING CONDEMNS "SHAM RELAXATION" PROMOTED BY SOVIETS

PRC National Day provided an occasion for Peking and Moscow to take stock of their relationship, with the result that the Sino-Soviet rivalry shows through with increasing clarity as the underlying force shaping Peking's broad-based moves in the international arena. Peking's National Day joint editorial, recounting "the great achievements" in Chinese foreign policy in the past year, summed up developments by placing them in a triangular context in which the Soviets are presented as the primary current adversary. According to the editorial, "the policy of those [meaning the United States] who dreamed of isolating China has gone bankrupt and the still extant counterrevolutionary schemes [of the Soviet Union] to encircle China are falling apart."

The editorial's bitter indictment of Soviet "social imperialism" reflected Peking's resentment over Soviet military pressure along the border at a time when Moscow is professing a detente line. The editorial charged that with "a growing appetite" Moscow "is reaching out its hands everywhere." Making clear Peking's intention to persist in its anti-Soviet campaign, the editorial said the Chinese should "especially" expose "the Soviet revisionist scheme of sham relaxation but real expansion," adding that "only by doing so can international tension be truly eased and world peace safeguarded."

Taken together with Moscow's resurgent polemical attacks on the Chinese in recent weeks, Peking's policy statement hardly augurs well for an accommodation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Reports on celebrations of PRC National Day disclosed that the chief Soviet negotiator at the border talks, L. Ilichev, and Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov have been in Moscow. TASS reported that the two were among those attending the Chinese ambassador's reception in Moscow on 29 September, and NCNA reported that the deputy chief of the Soviet delegation at the talks was present at a 30 September reception in Peking honoring foreign guests and diplomatic officials.

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SOVIET TREATMENT OF ANNIVERSARY Moscow's treatment of PRC National Day followed lines similar to last year's, but developments in the triangular relationship in the past year were also reflected in Moscow's comment. In the pattern of recent years, there was an impersonal greetings message from the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers to the PRC chairman, the NPC Standing Committee, and the PRC State Council. As in 1971, PRAVDA carried an article by V. Viktorov and IZVESTIYA one by G. Pavlov.

The greetings message again expressed a ritualistic hope for an improvement of relations, but it added a wish that the Chinese people will have "success in defending the socialist achievements of the people's revolution." Implicit in such a statement is a hope that what the Soviets regard as more orthodox policies will take hold in the course of what the PRAVDA article called "the complex and contradictory processes in present-day China." Alluding to the latest convulsions in China centering on the Lin Piao affair, PRAVDA pointed with scorn to "the complete theoretical insolvency of Maoism" and said that the practical application of Maoism "is leading to serious complications and crises in China's development."

Both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA took exception to Peking's anti-Soviet line and expressed concern over the leverage accruing to third parties from the persisting Sino-Soviet conflict. In place of last year's reference to Chinese preparations for war, the commentaries this year complained that "imperialist" circles have propagated the notion of a Soviet threat to China in order to impede the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. Concern over the impact on Soviet interests of Peking's active foreign policy moves, particularly in view of last February's Sino-U.S. summit, was also reflected in Viktorov's charge that Peking has persisted in "splitting the anti-imperialist forces" while at the same time "reorienting its foreign policy toward rapprochement with the capitalist countries."

Both Viktorov and Pavlov cited the Soviet proposals to the Chinese aired by Brezhnev in his major 20 March address. Viktorov mentioned the proposal on nonuse of force as well as those on nonaggression and a border settlement. But Pavlov, quoting Brezhnev's speech, omitted the nonuse proposal, which had been included in the speech broadcast live over the radio but deleted from texts of the speech published in the Soviet press. As in 1971, the IZVESTIYA article mentioned the border talks--"which are continuing"--but PRAVDA did not. There was no attempt to portray any movement on the negotiating front.

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A TASS dispatch from Peking on 2 October pointed out without comment that this year, like last year, there was no parade marking National Day. The dispatch noted briefly that the joint editorial contained "slanderous anti-Soviet inventions."

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## CHINA - JAPAN

### PEKING AND TOKYO AGREE TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka's 25-30 September pilgrimage to Peking culminated in the establishment of diplomatic relations and a joint statement embodying the substance of Peking's terms for a settlement. In keeping with the accelerated pace of developments since Tanaka took office, the two sides decided to exchange ambassadors "as speedily as possible," and they agreed to hold negotiations on a peace treaty and to conclude agreements on such matters as trade, navigation, aviation, and fishery. Declaring that friendly relations between the two countries will "contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguarding of world peace," the joint statement said the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations "is not directed against third parties."

The "earnest and frank" talks between the two premiers and their foreign ministers\* produced a settlement that largely met Peking's terms while permitting the Japanese facesaving devices for handling the delicate Taiwan issue. In the joint statement the Japanese side said it proceeded from a stand of "full understanding" of Peking's three principles for establishing diplomatic relations, but the document contained a flat Japanese endorsement of only the principle that the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China. There was no mention in the joint statement of the Japan-ROC treaty, but Foreign Minister Ohira declared at a press conference in Peking on 29 September-- reported by NCNA--that the peace treaty signed with the Chiang Kai-shek regime "has lost the meaning of its existence and is declared to be terminated."

On the third issue, the status of Taiwan, the Japanese followed a roundabout path in acknowledging Peking's claim to sovereignty over the island. In the joint statement Japan said it "fully understands and respects" Peking's position and "adheres to its stand" of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam proclamation. As Ohira pointed out at his press conference, this article reaffirms the provisions of the earlier Cairo declaration, which

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\* The major role played in the PRC-Japanese rapprochement by Foreign Minister Ohira was reflected in the fact that the foreign ministers as well as the premiers signed the joint statement.

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stipulated that Taiwan be restored to the Republic of China. Inasmuch as Japan has now recognized the PRC as the sole government of China, the effect is to acknowledge Peking's claim to Taiwan. In fact, Peking's legal arguments on the Taiwan question have revolved around the Cairo and Potsdam statements as stipulating Taiwan's restoration to China; according to this logic, the recognized government of China therefore enjoys sovereignty over the island. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 30 September acclaiming the "fruitful" results of the negotiations triumphantly declared that the joint statement's position on the Taiwan question "is a hammer blow" to those advocating versions of a two-Chinas arrangement.

Peking formally renounced "its demand for war indemnities from Japan," and the Japanese side went on record as "deeply reproaching itself" for Japan's responsibility for past actions against the Chinese. There was no mention of Japan's security treaty with the United States or the U.S. bases it authorizes. The assurance that normalization of Sino-Japanese relations is not directed against third countries appeared in a clause repeating the section in the Sino-U.S. communique last February to the effect that neither country should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and that each is opposed to efforts by other countries to establish such hegemony. This parallelism in two documents to which it is a signatory helps explain Peking's relaxed posture in taking account of the U.S.-Japanese relationship at this juncture.

The jubilant PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 30 September hailed the "new page in the annals of Sino-Japanese relations." It praised Tanaka for having expressed his "full understanding" of China's three principles for the normalization of relations with Japan soon after his election as prime minister and for taking "many practical steps for solving the question of relations between the two countries." Portraying popular sentiment for normalizing relations as an "irresistible historic tide," the editorial confidently predicted that the development of friendly relations between China and Japan "has broad prospects" and that the people of both countries "can surely surmount all obstacles and remain friendly to each other from generation to generation."

Peking's coverage of Tanaka's activities after the release of the joint statement was clearly designed to convey popular Chinese acclaim for the settlement with Japan. NCNA reported that Tanaka, accompanied by Chou, was given a "warm" sendoff by more than 2,000 people as he departed Peking on 29 September for his trip

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to Shanghai, where he was greeted by Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao and more than 3,000 people. Chinese television coverage of the Shanghai banquet that night in Tanaka's honor ended with a shot of Chou and Tanaka, arms around each other's waists, smiling and waving as they walked among the tables. As Tanaka said his farewells at the Shanghai airport the next day, some "6,000 . . . well-wishers . . . sang and danced and shouted slogans to hail the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan" and to express "their wish that the great friendship between the peoples of the two countries would constantly grow."

NCNA portrayed Chou's triumphant return to Peking on 30 September as being witnessed by 6,000 people at the Peking airport in an atmosphere "alive with expressions of unity and vigor." Politburo members Yeh Chien-ying, Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan, and Li Hsien-nien headed the list of officials who "cordially shook" hands with Chou and others alighting from the plane "amid warm applause." Chou clapped and waved to the crowd of "jubilant people waving bouquets and colored streamers and cheering: 'Hail the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan.'"

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## INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist comment on a political settlement continues to argue that the reasonable solution would be an agreement on a tripartite provisional government made up of equal components selected from the PRG, the Saigon administration "without Thieu," and other political forces. Hanoi's concern to dispel the notion that there had been dramatic progress in the negotiations was evidenced when it atypically reported DRV Paris delegate Xuan Thuy's 28 September remark to reporters that there was no foundation for rumors that agreement had been reached on many questions during private talks he and Le Duc Tho had held with Kissinger. Hanoi insists that President Nixon's support of Thieu is the main obstacle to progress, and one commentary claimed that the President "recently" went so far as to say that "abandoning Thieu would be an immoral thing to do."

Propaganda on PRC National Day reflected the strains in relations with the DRV over the past year, during which Hanoi has continued periodically to sharply voice its concern over Peking's accommodation with Washington. While its observance of the anniversary was superficially correct, Hanoi again took the occasion to call attention to China's obligations. The traditional PRC joint press editorial routinely affirmed support for the Vietnamese, but in replaying Hanoi's comment Peking deleted the most pointed statements on cooperation between the two countries. Minimal and belated support for the PRG's 11 September statement came with Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's 30 September response to the appeal by the PRG's Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh on the 15th.

Foreign Minister Gromyko also has belatedly responded to Mme. Binh's letter. According to a brief 3 October TASS report, Gromyko merely asserted that the USSR has "firmly and consistently supported" the Vietnamese struggle for a settlement, including the PRG's "latest diplomatic actions." Pro forma support for the Vietnamese was also voiced by Kosygin at a 2 October dinner for the visiting Malaysian Prime Minister. Judging from available summaries, Kosygin promised continued "cooperation" with Vietnam in the struggle against aggression and expressed support for the PRG's "well-known proposals" for a fair settlement. He also said that "the world is convinced" that the Vietnamese will become "complete masters" of their country and that no outside forces can stop them from reaching that goal.

## DRV, PRG PRESS FOR PROVISIONAL "NATIONAL CONCORD" GOVERNMENT

Hanoi and Front propaganda on a political settlement has had a time-marking character with no notable new substance since the 25 September

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NHAN DAN Commentator article introduced the notion that there could be guarantees for an agreement that neither side would impose a regime in the South.\* This idea has not been repeated; the communist statements at the Paris talks on the 28th as well as other propaganda reverted to the argument that it is the United States, not the communist side, that wants to impose a government on South Vietnam and is blocking a settlement.

Hanoi's apparent concern to stress the differences between the two sides and to counter speculation in the West that a dramatic breakthrough might be imminent was indicated by both the handling and the content of the article in the September issue of the theoretical journal HOC TAP. The VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY's international service in English transmitted the text of the HOC TAP article, which detailed the differences between the allied and communist negotiating positions, and Hanoi radio broadcast excerpts of the article in its English-language international service. However, the article was not carried in Vietnamese-language transmissions. Thus, Hanoi clearly demonstrated its interest in presenting its version of the two sides' positions to foreign audiences along with the reiteration of the charge that the Nixon Administration is "spreading illusions" when it suggests that a solution may be near.\*\*

Hanoi took a further step to quash speculation about current progress when it interjected into its otherwise routine account of the Paris session on the 28th the report of Xuan Thuy's remarks to reporters on his way to the session. According to VNA, he said there was no foundation for rumors that agreement had been reached on many or most of the questions during private talks with Kissinger. Consistent with Hanoi's practice of not reporting the specific private meetings, there was no indication that the most recent talks had taken place on two consecutive days on 26 and 27 September.

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\* The NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 25th went beyond the PRG's call, in its 11 September statement, for an agreement that neither a communist nor a "U.S. stooge" regime shall be imposed on South Vietnam: The Commentator article suggested that the United States can agree with the parties concerned on the necessary measures aimed at "insuring" that no party controls the political life of South Vietnam. See the TRENDS of 27 September 1972, pages 1-3.

\*\* See the 27 September TRENDS, pages 1-2.

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CRITICISM OF  
THE PRESIDENT

Hanoi has recently broadcast a flurry of comment assailing President Nixon personally for "maintaining" the Saigon regime. The most sweeping attack came in a radio commentary broadcast to the Vietnamese audience on 2 October which said the President's "contentions" in a 28 September campaign speech in Los Angeles showed that the U.S. stand and the "correct, fair, and reasonable stand" of the PRG as outlined in its 11 September statement "are still worlds apart." The commentator asked how the President can, as he suggested in the Los Angeles speech, end the U.S. commitment and end the war when he persists in "sticking to his stand of maintaining the Thieu puppet administration" and in showing no regard for the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. The broadcast called the President's remarks about U.S. honor "a deceitful cover to hide dark, evil designs of aggression" and described him as "a shameless swindler who greatly underestimates the American public." It concluded with the observation that "Nixon's obstinancy and bellicosity dovetail with the negative and unconstructive U.S. response to the PRG's 11 September statement."

Another radio commentary, in Hanoi's domestic service on 30 September, said that although the latest PRG statement is "extremely fair and reasonable," the Nixon Administration has not stopped rehashing allegations that the PRG wants to impose a communist government in the South. Calling such allegations "perfidious," the broadcast said that "if Nixon would tell Thieu to resign or would declare an end to his support for the Thieu regime, the ending of the Vietnam war would be easy and rapid. This is also the key for him to bring captured U.S. military men home and save the U.S. honor which he has stained." The commentary observed that in fact the President, in his support of the Saigon regime, "even went so far as to say recently that abandoning Thieu would be an immoral thing to do." The Hanoi commentator may have been alluding to the President's 27 July press conference in which, without mentioning Thieu, he observed that "it would be the height of immorality for the United States at this point to leave Vietnam and in leaving to turn over to North Vietnam the fate of 17 million South Vietnamese who do not want a communist government."\*

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\* The President similarly mentioned neither Thieu nor the Saigon government on other recent occasions when he stated that the United States would not be a party to the imposition of a communist government in South Vietnam--for example, in his 23 August speech at the Republican Party convention and in his 29 August press conference. The President had spoken critically about a coalition government in his 29 June press conference, however, when he said: "We will not negotiate with the enemy for accomplishing what they cannot accomplish themselves, and that is to impose against their will on the people of South Vietnam a coalition government with the communists."

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A NHAN DAN article on the 30th, also broadcast by Hanoi radio that day, said that the Paris talks are stalemated because of the U.S. stand and cited the New York TIMES to bolster its claim that the President had not lived up to his word on reaching a settlement on Vietnam. Without mentioning that the TIMES' item was the editorial endorsing Senator McGovern's candidacy for the Presidency, NHAN DAN quoted the passage which said that the Nixon Administration "appears to be without basic philosophy, without deeply held values. It is an administration whose guiding principle is expediency and whose overriding purpose is to remain in office."

PARIS SESSION        PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh at the 28 September Paris session repeated the line that there cannot be a correct political solution to the South Vietnam issue as long as the United States "maintains" the "puppet Thieu administration" and persists in its denial of the PRG and its opposition to forming a tripartite provisional government of national concord. DRV delegate Xuan Thuy--attending the session for the first time since 17 August, and on the day after his and Le Duc Tho's two meetings with Kissinger--similarly assailed U.S. support for the Saigon regime and its opposition to a provisional government. He also explicitly defended the notion of general elections for a constituent assembly rather than for a president, as proposed by the United States and Saigon.

Xuan Thuy repeated the position that since there are two administrations and two armies in South Vietnam, it is necessary to have a three-component government during the "transitional period." He described this period as being between cease-fire (nguwngf bawns) and the forming of an official government. This language differed slightly from that used in a similar passage in the NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 25th. NHAN DAN had described the transition period as "from the restoration of peace" (khi hoaf binhf laapj lai) to the organization of free and democratic general elections. Thuy may have used "cease-fire" merely as a synonym for "restoration of peace," but the variation would in that case be a departure from the communists' normal careful adherence to set formula.

The VNA account of the session typically dismissed Ambassador Porter's remarks with the observation that "the U.S. delegate gave a false interpretation of the DRV's recent release of three captured American pilots and remained opposed to the PRG's 11 September proposals."

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## PRC NATIONAL DAY COMMENT REFLECTS SINO-VIETNAMESE DIFFERENCES

Strains in relations between Hanoi and Peking were again reflected in their propaganda on the PRC's 23d National Day. Hanoi marked the anniversary with the usual leaders' message, and several high-level DRV leaders attended the Chinese embassy's reception; however, the traditional Vietnamese-sponsored meeting was held at a lower level than in the past, and Hanoi statements pointed up DRV dissatisfaction with PRC policies. Chinese comment on the anniversary offered only routine affirmations of support for Vietnam, and Peking media characteristically edited Hanoi comment on the anniversary before replaying it.

The DRV leaders' message reflected the cooling of relations between the two countries since this time a year ago when Peking was going to great lengths to reassure Hanoi of its support and to allay DRV concern over the Sino-U.S. rapprochement. In the week prior to PRC National Day last year, Li Hsien-nien went to Hanoi to offer emphatic assurances to the Vietnamese and to conclude the annual aid agreement; Hanoi's propaganda on the anniversary suggested that those Chinese efforts had met with some success. The subsequent deterioration of relations between the two countries was reflected in this year's DRV message: It omitted phrases used last year linking the Chinese with Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and it failed to repeat last year's reference to "Mao Tsetung thought" and praise for Mao as a "bosom friend" of the Vietnamese. The message also dropped last year's reference to Chinese achievements in the struggle against "U.S.-led imperialism and colonialism," although it did, unlike the message last year, credit the Chinese with contributing to the strengthening of world revolutionary forces in the "struggle for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism."

In past years there has always been a "grand meeting" in Hanoi attended by a North Vietnamese Politburo member and sponsored by the Vietnam Fatherland Front, the Vietnam-China Friendship Association, and the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. This year there was only a "gathering" held by the Vietnam-China Friendship Association which rated no Politburo-level appearance. Although it would seem that Hanoi downgraded the meeting to again show its pique, high-level DRV leaders did make their usual appearance at the Chinese embassy's anniversary reception. As was the case last year, the embassy anniversary reception was attended by Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Le Thanh Nghi. Politburo member Hoan Van Hoan, who was at the reception last year, did not attend.

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The treatment of the question of Chinese aid in the anniversary comment is particularly notable in the light of Hanoi's seeming concern about foreign support expressed in the 17 August NHAN DAN editorial, which had warned against socialist countries abandoning their "internationalist duty."\* Hanoi's dissatisfaction with Peking's performance on the aid issue was suggested in the 1 October NHAN DAN editorial, which recalled the Mao dictum that Peking had used last year to reassure the Vietnamese: "If anyone among us should say we should not help the Vietnamese people in their struggle, that will be betrayal of the revolution." This statement was first quoted by Chou En-lai during his March 1971 visit to Hanoi and was repeated in major Chinese statements during September-November 1971. Prior to its citation in the NHAN DAN editorial, it had appeared neither in Hanoi nor in Peking propaganda since that time.

At the same time, Hanoi used the occasion of the anniversary to claim for the first time--both in the message and in editorial comment--that "recently, in the face of the extremely serious war escalation of the U.S. imperialism in both zones of Vietnam, the Chinese Government has taken measures to increase the assistance to the Vietnamese people." It is not clear what action Hanoi was referring to. No such formulation was used following the conclusion on 28 June of a Sino-Vietnamese supplementary aid agreement. It is possible that the statement alludes to Chinese efforts to facilitate the delivery of supplies to Vietnam. Hanoi's Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, who had arrived in the PRC on 4 May, departed for home on 23 August; his prolonged stay may have been related to the coordination of aid efforts in the aftermath of U.S. interdiction moves. Soon after, Western press agencies on 4 September reported Prince Sihanouk as claiming in an interview

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\* NHAN DAN on the 20th published a correction to this passage, which it said had been "hard to understand." As originally published, the passage warned that if a socialist country's efforts to carry out peaceful coexistence are aimed only at its own interests, that country will not only harm revolutionary movements but will bring itself losses and "give up its lofty internationalist duty." The corrected version warned more directly that if a nation is concerned only about its own interests and abandons its internationalist duty, it will not only harm the revolutionary movement but bring losses to itself.

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in Peking that the USSR and China had reached an agreement on the transport of arms and material to the DRV.\*

Chinese reports of Hanoi's comment on PRC National Day included the references to "measures to increase assistance," but Peking did not make such a statement on its own authority. The joint editorial scored the United States for retaining its forces in Vietnam while reinforcing naval and air bombardment and "blockading" Vietnam, and it routinely affirmed PRC support for the war. NCNA's account of the 1 October NHAN DAN editorial omitted its recollection of Mao's warning about aiding Vietnam as well as its praise for Chinese who had been injured or killed while delivering supplies to the DRV. NCNA also excised NHAN DAN's claim that Chinese supplies had "greatly encouraged" the Vietnamese to "dash forward to seize new victories."

Chinese anniversary propaganda again illustrated Peking's circumspect treatment of the Nixon Administration. For example, at this year's gathering in Hanoi hosted by the Vietnam-China Friendship Association, the PRC ambassador avoided criticism voiced last year concerning the "Nixon Doctrine." At the same time, an NCNA review of the military situation in Indochina contrasted sharply with a similar review at this time last year which had accused the Nixon Administration of engaging in "counterrevolutionary dual tactics" in the peace negotiations and paying "lip service" to a solution of the war. This year's review also failed to echo NCNA's disparagement of U.S. power as a "paper tiger" and its portrayal of the "irreversible crises" of the Nixon Administration.

PEKING RESPONSE TO BINH LETTER            Consistent with Peking's recent low posture on Vietnam, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's belated 30 September response to Mme. Binh's appeal\*\* offered only minimal support for the 11 September PRG statement on a settlement. Taken together with Peking's only

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\* Hanoi's current unexplained reference to Chinese measures to increase assistance is somewhat similar to a statement in a 5 August PRAVDA editorial article, which said without elaboration that the Soviet Union "has recently increased its aid to the Vietnamese people still further." See the 9 August 1972 TRENDS, page 22.

\*\* A Hanoi radio report on 20 September disclosed that Mme. Binh had sent letters and copies of the PRG statement "to foreign ministers of the socialist countries, other countries having diplomatic relations with the PRG, and other nonaligned countries" as well as to "many antiwar politicians and personalities" in the United States.

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other authoritative endorsement of the PRG plan, in remarks by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien when he received Vietnamese representatives on 13 September, Chi's pro forma support underlines Chinese reluctance to discuss issues which are the subject of detailed debate between the United States and the Vietnamese. Thus, the foreign minister sidestepped the substance of the proposals on political and military issues raised in the 11 September statement, promising "resolute support" by the Chinese for the "solemn stand" of the 11 September proposal. In endorsing the Vietnamese war effort he pledged merely to "do our utmost" to support it, adding that this is a "bounden internationalist duty" of the PRC.

#### DRV CONTINUES CRITICISM OF U.S. REACTION TO RELEASE OF POW'S

Hanoi's continuing reportage and comment on the return home of the three released U.S. prisoners, Lieutenants Gartley and Charles and Major Elias, sustained the stress on charges of U.S. Government "interference" and claimed that they were "arrested" upon their arrival in New York. Hanoi radio on 29 September reported their press conference during their stopover in Copenhagen as well as efforts by the U.S. charge d'affaires to "intervene" during the group's Moscow stopover. The only allusion to the Peking stop came in a 30 September English-language broadcast which noted the pilots' return home after an air journey "across Asia and Europe."

On the 29th, Hanoi radio's domestic service cited "foreign sources" for the report that upon the pilots' arrival in New York the "U.S. military authorities" immediately "arrested" them, pushing them into automobiles which sped away leaving a "melee" at the airport between the pilots' families and Defense Department officials. The report said this "arrest" was "consistent with Secretary Laird's recent threat" that the pilots could possibly be prosecuted.

Hanoi has not, of course, reported the Defense Department spokesman's 29 September denials that the pilots were coerced and his assertion that they voluntarily agreed to return to U.S. military control, or his statement that the pilots said North Vietnam had imposed no conditions on their release. Hanoi media have repeatedly quoted Senator McGovern as commenting that the Nixon Administration's "interference" in the release of the pilots stemmed from fear that the pilots will tell the "awful truth" that it is the bombing that keeps them in prison. A Hanoi broadcast in English on the 29th attributed

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such a statement to Senator McGovern and cited former attorney general Ramsey Clark as warning that the release of other U.S. captives could be endangered if the U.S. military does not keep its hands off the three released men. A 2 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary cited Senator McGovern on the Administration's "fear" and added that because of this the Administration tried repeatedly to "kidnap" the pilots and finally "arrested" them upon their arrival home. The army paper said the pilots' statements about their good treatment contradicts "Nixon's slanderous argument" that he must continue the war until the last prisoner is released. The article said "U.S. public opinion" has "warned him" that the way to release the prisoners is to end the war, and it once again referred to a statement by Senator McGovern that the bombing delays the repatriation of the prisoners.

Other Hanoi coverage has included reports of various statements made by the antiwar activists who accompanied the pilots home, including Dellinger's assertion that the release was a "peace initiative" by the DRV to which the United States failed to respond.

#### HANOI PROTESTS ALLEGED U.S. BOMBING OF CIVILIAN TARGETS IN DRV

In addition to releasing routine protests by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman against U.S. bombing, Hanoi has publicized several statements scoring the Administration for alleged attacks on civilian targets. This complaint was pressed in a statement by the War Crimes Commission and in an appeal from DRV mayors, released at a press conference in Hanoi on 3 October, which claimed that DRV cities had become strategic targets for U.S. attacks. Alleged air strikes against North Vietnamese schools were protested in a 28 September statement from the Ministry of Education, and alleged attacks on dikes and other hydraulic works in the southern part of the DRV were decried in a 27 September statement by a spokesman of the water conservancy ministry. An alleged 20 September attack on a pensioners' home in Kim Bang district of Nam Ha Province was singled out for criticism in a 28 September statement by the Interior Ministry's Department of Social Security.

ATTACKS ON CITIES VNA on 3 October reported on the press conference held that day concerning "extermination raids" said to have been carried out by the Nixon Administration against towns, cities, and "other population centers" in the DRV. Presided over by Col. Ha Van Lau, standing member of the DRV Commission for Investigation of U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam, the conference was attended by the chairmen of the administrative committees (mayors) of Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Dinh, and Hon Gai. According to the report, the mayor of Hanoi read an appeal by the mayors of 37 cities and provincial capitals in the DRV to peoples and governments of socialist and other countries and to mayors and city dwellers around the world, condemning the U.S. bombing.

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Criticizing the attacks of the past five months, the mayors' appeal charged that the DRV's cities and other population centers have become "strategic targets" of the U.S. Air Force and Navy. The appeal stressed the peaceable nature of these cities and the age and cultural value of their buildings and monuments, as well as the strictly utilitarian nature of their public works facilities. It cited several cities which it claimed had suffered extensive damage, including Haiphong, Vinh, Thanh Hoa, Dong Hoi, Hanoi, Hon Gai, Nam Dinh, the special municipalities of Thai Nguyen and Viet Tri, and several other provincial capitals. The appeal charged that the "U.S. aggressors" are using sophisticated weapons and other technological means to deliberately destroy such targets as schools, hospitals, creches, residential quarters, stores, and recreational facilities. It followed these charges with the standard defiant claim that such "wanton" destruction will never accomplish the Nixon Administration's goals and will only increase Vietnamese determination to win.

On 4 October, VNA carried accounts of a document, apparently released at the same press conference by the DRV Commission for Investigation of U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam, which likewise condemned "the crimes perpetrated by the Nixon Administration against population centers in North Vietnam" since April. Claiming that the Nixon Administration has committed "hundreds of Son My-type massacres" in the North since April, the document charged that the President has "gone much farther than his predecessor on the path of crime." Specifically, it leveled the following charges:

By the end of August, U.S. aircraft and warships had violently taken under fire 19 provinces, the Vinh Linh area, all the six [special] cities including Hanoi and Haiphong, 19 provincial capitals, 37 townships, and hundreds of villages. All the 23 communes in Vinh Linh, six districts of Quang Binh Province, and eight districts of Ha Tinh Province were attacked without letup. All of the four inside precincts and the four suburban districts of Hanoi have been assaulted; so have been all the three inside precincts and six of the seven outlying districts of Haiphong, where the aggressors have even used B-52 bombers against the population. In Vinh Linh, not a day has gone by without some bombardments.

The document then proceeded to a detailed account of damage to specific cities and other civilian establishments and a description of various U.S. weapons allegedly used in the attack.

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MINISTRY STATEMENT ON  
ATTACK ON SCHOOLS

The 28 September statement by the Ministry of Education followed considerable Hanoi propaganda about attacks on schools, including a 14 September statement by the Ministry of Higher Education and Vocational Secondary Schools. The 28 September statement charged that since the resumption of bombing the United States has attacked more than 150 general schools, in addition to kindergartens, and accused the Administration of trying to "destroy the offspring of the Vietnamese people" in order to "shake our people's combat determination." The statement cited some specific incidents, among other things charging that in Nghe An Province alone as many as 62 schools had been attacked and 12 teachers and 181 students killed. The day the Education Ministry's statement was released, VNA carried a detailed report on alleged strikes against two schools in Hoa Binh Province on the 27th.

The Education Ministry statement was followed on the 30th by an article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN which charged the United States with deliberate and premeditated extermination attacks on populous areas. The article claimed that the United States carried out successive attacks on the water conservancy system before and during the rainy season and then "recently concentrated attacks on schools, killing hundreds of teachers and pupils and destroying thousands of classrooms and hundreds of laboratories."

PLANE DOWNINGS

The downing of an F-111 on 28 September was claimed by Hanoi on the 30th in a report which credited the achievement to the Yen Bai provincial antiaircraft forces and said this was the fourth F-111 to be shot down. A radio commentary on the 30th and articles in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and NHAN DAN on 1 October noted that the F-111's had just returned to a base in Thailand after having been withdrawn from Indochina combat more than four years ago. The commentaries predictably lauded the reported downing and maintained that the F-111's will not succeed in their new mission. The 3 October U.S. acknowledgment that an F-111 had been lost was promptly reported by Hanoi that day.

The North's antiaircraft achievements in recent months were hailed in a 2 October Hanoi broadcast which claimed that 86 aircraft had been downed in September alone. (Hanoi's total of planes allegedly downed over North Vietnam stands at 3,964 as of the 2d.) On 3 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN published a commentary lauding antiaircraft efforts and calling upon the armed forces to attempt to proceed rapidly to downing of the 4,000th U.S. plane. Underlining the DRV's determination

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and depreciating some of the specific attributes of the F-111's, the article declared:

No matter at what high rate the U.S. aggressors commit their air force, what modern aircraft they may use, including B-52's and swing-wing planes, or what formations, in groups or separately, their aircraft may adopt, night and day we are determined to achieve close combat coordination, spread our dense firenet very widely, and fight well and fire accurately to down many U.S. aircraft and capture many pirate pilots.

SPOKESMAN'S U.S. air actions over the North were protested in the  
STATEMENTS following routine statement by the spokesman of the  
DRV Foreign Ministry:

+ The statement of 28 September charged that on the previous day U.S. planes struck at the capital of Quang Binh Province and the outskirts of Haiphong, as well as at populated areas in Lang Son, Nghia Lo, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It also said B-52's bombed localities in the Vinh Linh zone. Specific targets reported hit included the Lan sluice in Thai Binh Province, which the statement charged has been hit "dozens of times."

+ U.S. attacks on the 28th on the capital of Thanh Hoa Province, the outskirts of Haiphong and Hanoi, and other "densely populated areas" were scored in a statement on the 29th. The statement also charged that U.S. aircraft struck at populated areas in Vinh Phu, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Hoa Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone; that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh and the Vinh Linh zone; and that U.S. warships "indiscriminately shelled" coastal villages in Thanh Hoa and Ha Tinh provinces. The targets specified in the statement included a middle school, a church, and the Lan sluice. Summing up the damage, the statement charged that in the past three weeks the school has been hit three times, the sluice five times, and the Thanh Hoa capital city five times.

+ The statement of the 30th scored alleged U.S. attacks the previous day, listing among the areas hit the outskirts of Hanoi, the capital of Quang Binh Province, Ho Xa township in the Vinh Linh zone, and "several other densely populated areas" in Yen Bai, Vinh Phu, Hoa Binh, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces. In addition, B-52's were charged with bombing areas in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh zone.

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+ Alleged strikes during September were summed up in the spokesman's statement of 1 October, which charged that during the preceding month U.S. aircraft had struck at "five cities, 13 provincial capitals, and dozens of townships and district capitals, destroying 30 schools of various levels, dozens of hospitals, many pagodas, churches, and many sections of dikes and hydraulic works in North Vietnam." Actions of 30 September were said to have included the bombing of the capitals of Thanh Hoa and Nam Ha; strikes at populated areas in Ha Bac, Hoa Binh, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces; and B-52 bombing of localities in Quang Binh. Among the targets reported hit were an agricultural middle school in Hoa Binh, two sluices in Nam Ninh district of Nam Ha Province, and the Ngoc Hien sluice in Thanh Oai district of Ha Tay Province. The statement said the strikes were "deliberate and systematic," aimed at "exterminating various cities, provincial capitals, and densely populated areas [and at] destroying the economic and cultural establishments of the DRV."

+ Extermination attacks" of 1 October were protested in the statement of the 2d, which charged U.S. aircraft with dropping "hundreds of bombs" on three downtown and suburban districts of Haiphong as well as on the capital cities of Quang Binh and Quang Ninh provinces and "many other densely populous areas" in Son La, Lang Son, Yen Bai, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, and Ha Tinh provinces. It also said B-52's "pounded various places" in Quang Binh.

+ The statement of the 3d protested alleged attacks of the preceding day on Vinh city and on populated areas in the provinces of Lai Chau, Yen Bai, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh and in the Vinh Linh zone. It further claimed that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh.

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**COMMUNISTS CLAIM SUCCESSES IN FIGHTING SOUTH OF SAIGON**

Hanoi and Front propaganda has highlighted the alleged achievements of communist forces in central Nam Bo--the provinces immediately south of Saigon--and western Nam Bo--the provinces in the extreme southern part of the country. Comment on central Nam Bo was pegged to a 22 September communique from the regional PLAF command, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 29th, which tabulated alleged military feats in the area since the start of the offensive, claimed that there was an "extremely favorable situation," and called upon the PLAF in the area to continue the offensive. A statement attributed to a PLAF commander in the area, also broadcast by the Front radio on the 29th, commented that the offensive had changed the quality of their movement and "created the ability to develop by leaps and bounds in the coming period." At the same time, however, some dissatisfaction was suggested when he commented that the change in the balance of forces "is not yet uniform."

According to the central Nam Bo PLAF command communique, communist forces in that area since the beginning of April have put out of action 84,379 troops--killing 37,465, capturing 1,500, and causing the "disintegration" of 26,000. Evaluating these alleged successes, the communique claimed routinely that the balance of forces had shifted advantageously and added that the fighting also assisted communist forces in the Mekong Delta since government troops had been pulled out of the delta to cope with fighting in central Nam Bo.

The communique also claimed that government control in the area had been seriously challenged during the offensive. It asserted that the government had been forced to withdraw from 569 military posts, and that 80 villages and 1,074 hamlets, with one million people, had been "liberated." A supporting 30 September QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial indicated that central Nam Bo has a population of more than two million people so the communists would appear to be claiming control of nearly half the population in the area. (Communist statistics on achievements in the offensive in all of South Vietnam have claimed a total of 2.5 million people "liberated.") Like other propaganda, the communique reflected communist reprisals against government personnel when it reported that the PLAF and the "compatriots" have "punished many cruel villains and spies," but it also said that "thousands of others" had been "warned or reeducated."

Alleged communist achievements in western Nam Bo were reviewed by Front media on 1 October and lauded in a 2 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial. The communists claimed that their offensive in this

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Mekong Delta area has put 46,000 troops out of action, of whom 29,000 were killed, wounded, or captured and 17,000 "disbanded." According to the communist reports, over 700,000 people in the area "rose up to seize control" of 800 hamlets and 268 villages and hamlets were "completely liberated." Stressing the efforts to oppose government control at the local level, a Liberation Radio roundup of action in western Nam Bo claimed that more than one-third of the civil defense corpsmen in the area have participated in guerrilla activities and that many of them have assisted in "punishing and educating thousands of wicked puppet administrative agents, spies, and pacification agents." It reported that 253 "puppet administrative agents" and "tens of pacification groups" had been "annihilated or disintegrated."

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## S A L T

## USSR PRAISES, APPROVES ACCORDS, SETS STAGE FOR SALT II

In praising and ratifying the strategic arms limitation accords at the proforma 29 September session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Soviet spokesmen sought to project a firm public negotiating stance for the next round of SALT. Approving references to the "overwhelming majority" in the U.S. Congress that support the accords were qualified by strong rejections of "the various far-fetched 'conditions' and 'interpretations' attached to the agreements which had already been signed" and of any U.S. attempt to negotiate "from a position of strength." The speakers included First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, representing the Soviet Government; fourth-ranking CPSU Politburo member Suslov, speaking for the two foreign affairs committees; Defense Minister Grechko, and Presidium Chairman Podgornyy.

Echoing in general the statements made at the 23 August joint meeting of the Supreme Soviet foreign affairs commissions,\* the speakers stressed repeatedly that the accords are based on the principles of insuring equal security for the USSR and the United States and of the inadmissibility of military advantages for either side. There were also reassurances, for domestic and Soviet bloc consumption, that the agreements do not weaken the defense capability of the USSR and its allies. Suslov pointedly cited the Central Committee report to the 24th CPSU Congress in March of last year to the effect that "strengthening the Soviet state means strengthening its armed forces too, and enhancing the defensive capability of our motherland in everyway" (the emphasis was PRAVDA's in its 30 September report of Suslov's speech; IZVESTIYA's version did not put "armed forces" in boldface). In the most explicit Soviet elite-level statement since the Moscow summit on the USSR's position on the modernization of ABM systems allowed under the treaty, Grechko declared that the treaty "imposes no limitations on the performance of research and experimental work aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country against nuclear-missile attack".

Where Kuznetsov, alluding to the Jackson amendment, denounced U.S. "political figures" for attaching unnecessary "far-fetched interpretations or conditions" to the agreements with the intention

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\* See the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 29, and 23 August, pages 18-20.

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of obtaining "one-sided advantages for the United States," Suslov directly linked his denunciation of this alleged U.S. "position of strength" policy with the next round of SALT:

It is essential to say bluntly that those people who amuse themselves with illusions about the possibility of talking with the Soviet Union "from a position of strength" in future negotiations on strategic arms limitation are profoundly mistaken. These people are simply losing their sense of reality. The Soviet Union will not consent to any kind of infringement of the principle of equal security of the sides. We are profoundly convinced that the American people are interested in limiting the arms race to no less degree than the Soviet people. . . .

Stating that an international treaty is "viable only when it is conscientiously and unswervingly observed" by the sides concerned, Podgorny summed up the session's discussion of the agreement by declaring that the "the Soviet Union and --we hope-- the United States, too, will be guided unswervingly by this principle with respect to" the agreements. Regarding the next round of SALT, Kuznetsov said that the "positive experience" gained in SALT I "makes it possible to hope" that the discussion of a further limitation of strategic offensive weapons will be continued "in a constructive spirit and produce specific positive results."

One passage in Podgorny's speech echoed the line, adopted on the eve of the Moscow summit, which sought to rationalize the Soviet leadership's reception of President Nixon at a time of increased U.S. military actions in Vietnam. Podgorny said: "We unswervingly proceed from Lenin's tenets which demand consideration for current tasks and long-term objectives, a combination of principle-mindedness and flexibility, and the ability, when necessary, to find reasonable compromises dictated by actual conditions and in keeping with socialism's interests." He went on, in a statement having clear polemical overtones aimed at possible domestic or foreign critics, to say that "today only an obviously prejudiced politician would dare claim that the world situation has deteriorated rather than improved with the reaching of agreements in the sphere of disarmament." It is noteworthy that this statement appeared in the TASS account of the ratification session carried in PRAVDA but was absent from the abbreviated TASS account published in RED STAR.

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WASHINGTON CEREMONY      Moscow reported the exchange of ratification documents in Washington on 3 October with President Nixon, Secretary Rogers, and Gromyko in attendance. TASS and Radio Moscow cited the comments made by Gromyko and the President, with TASS carrying at length the President's remarks calling the SALT accords a "first step" in limiting the arms race and pointing out that there remains "a significant number" of categories in the nuclear field that are not covered by the present accords.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW USES NASIR DEATH ANNIVERSARY TO STRESS AMITY WITH CAIRO

In comment in PRAVDA and for Arab audiences over Radio Moscow, the Soviet Union has used the 28 September anniversary of Nasir's death to put pointed stress on the deceased leader's faithful pursuit of a policy of friendship with the USSR, underscoring the efficacy of that policy and suggesting, through references to the Egyptian people's continuing "struggle," that such a policy is as necessary as ever for Cairo.\*

PRAVDA's commemorative article on the 28th, by Ye. Dmitriyev, mentioned Egyptian President as-Sadat only once, recalling that he had said Nasir "laid the foundations of Soviet-Arab friendship on the most solid basis" as exemplified in "the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and Egypt, of which we are very proud." The article in effect drove home the lesson for Egypt's present leadership in declaring that throughout his life Nasir "was an ardent advocate of the development and deepening of the relations and cooperation" between Egypt and the USSR and was convinced that Egypt "could not count on support and understanding from the capitalist West."

In a broadcast to Arab listeners, Lakif Maksudov, a secretary of the Soviet Committee of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization and deputy chairman of the Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Africa, asserted that Nasir "bequeathed the task of completing the great mission which he had begun to his true successors, to those who place the interests of the homeland and the aspirations of the people and their socialist ideals above everything else." Maksudev conspicuously failed to mention as-Sadat. He added that "the Egyptian people" would continue the struggle despite the "Zionist-imperialist aggressors" and the intrigues of "Arab reactionaries," and he warned about "voices" demanding the severance of Arab-Soviet "friendly relations" and casting doubts on the "fraternal help" of the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries.

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\* Moscow had marked the first anniversary of Nasir's death with a PRAVDA article paying tribute to his achievements and a message from Podgorny to an international commemorative symposium.

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Soviet media have yet to acknowledge the Egyptian ambassador's return to Moscow at the end of September and Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov's return to Cairo on 3 October--both duly reported by Cairo, which had announced on 25 September that both diplomats would soon return to their posts. TASS announced in a single-sentence report on 2 October that Prime Minister Sidqi would visit the Soviet Union on the 16th, with no indication of the purpose of the trip.

RELATIONS WITH SYRIA      Soviet media have reported without amplification the "short and unofficial visit to Moscow" of Syrian President al-Asad in late September. Moscow has not, of course, acknowledged the reported Soviet airlift of military equipment to Syria, but a PRAVDA article of 29 September--summarized by TASS and by Radio Moscow for Arab audiences--said Syria is being "supplied with the latest weapons for its armed forces and receives help in the training of military cadres."

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## IMF SESSION

## MOSCOW SEES U.S. MONEY REFORM PLAN AS MOVE TO MEET "CRISIS"

Moscow followed standard propaganda lines in limited press and radio comment discussing the U.S. plan for international monetary reform presented by Treasury Secretary Shultz on 26 September at the annual meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Soviet commentaries did not get into the details of the U.S. six-point program that would end the special reserve role of the dollar and define rules to bring about necessary changes in currency exchange rates. They discoursed instead on the doctrinaire theme of "contradictions" in the capitalist financial system and traced the U.S. plan to the inability of the United States to extricate itself from a "deepening economic crisis" exacerbated by domestic inflation and the war in Vietnam. President Nixon's address to the IMF session on the 25th and Secretary Shultz' the following day were treated as part of a futile attempt to "force the partners of the United States to make sacrifices to save the dollar."

Soviet commentators drew selectively from foreign press reaction to develop the theme that the U.S. proposals were coolly received both at the IMF session and by observers abroad. A pervasive theme was that the meeting took place in an atmosphere of deepening differences symptomatic of "acute crisis" in the financial system of the capitalist countries. In this vein, a PRAVDA article on the 29th said the general reaction to the U.S. plan was manifested in "a new round of infighting between the 'partners' in the capitalist currency arena." A corollary theme was that IMF failure to reach agreement on basic issues attested to "the growing financial-economic contradictions among the major powers in the capitalist world." This line was typified in a 30 September TASS dispatch from Washington which reported that the five-day IMF session ended in "deadlock" as the result of failure to reach accord on "concrete arrangements as to ways to solve the pressing problems."

Sparse comment from the Soviet bloc in East Europe was on similar lines, picturing the American initiative as a move to get other countries to share the burden of coping with the United States' monetary difficulties. Bulgarian media were the most vocal. A Czechoslovak press commentary said "none" of the other IMF members

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backed the U.S. plan, and an East Berlin press commentary pronounced Washington's move to shift the burden of its difficulties "onto the 'partners' of the United States" a failure. Poland's government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY carried a brief account of the U.S. plan, but there has been no available comment on it in Warsaw media. Romania, too, has yet to comment on the U.S. proposals.

Typically lobbying for the interests of the "small" countries, the Yugoslav press complained that Secretary Shultz devoted "only a single sentence" in his speech to the developing countries. Belgrade faulted the United States for focusing on the rich countries at the expense of those "with the greatest needs."

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## MZHAVANADZE REMOVED IN DISGRACE AS GEORGIAN FIRST SECRETARY

A 29 September Georgian Central Committee plenum announced the retirement of 70-year old Politburo candidate member V.P. Mzhavanadze as first secretary of the Georgian Central Committee and the selection of E.A. Shevardnadze as his replacement. Although Mzhavanadze reportedly resigned at his own "request" because of old age, his retirement was clearly forced by the CPSU Central Committee's recent exposure of corruption and nationalist deviations in Georgia and by the longtime hostility between Mzhavanadze and Brezhnev. The involuntary nature of Mzhavanadze's retirement is also indicated by the choice of his successor; all his longtime colleagues and proteges were bypassed in favor of the young former Georgian police chief, Shevardnadze, who only two months ago took over the corruption-ridden Tbilisi organization. Mzhavanadze will presumably be dropped from the CPSU Politburo at the next Central Committee meeting, becoming the first Politburo retiree since 1966.

Mzhavanadze's political disgrace was graphically displayed by a public snub on his 70th birthday last week. Although he had been at odds with Khrushchev in 1962, PRAVDA had marked his 60th birthday by featuring a large picture of him on its front page and publishing a Central Committee message addressing him as a "prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state"; the paper also published a Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase noting his "big services" to the party and state and awarding him the title Hero of Socialist Labor, an Order of Lenin, and a Hammer and Sickle medal. In contrast, on his 70th birthday PRAVDA on 23 September merely published a Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase awarding him the Order of the October Revolution for "services" to the party and state.

**FRICTION WITH BREZHNEV** In the early post-Khrushchev struggle between Podgornyy and Brezhnev, Mzhavanadze appeared to support the more conservative Brezhnev. His late June 1965 speech calling for increased party discipline and upholding elitism foreshadowed the 20 July 1965 Central Committee decree which condemned Podgornyy's Kharkov proteges for laxness in admissions to the party and initiated a more restrictive policy. While post-Khrushchev articles on Leninist principles of leadership had been stressing the predominance of the collective and playing down the need for individual leaders, Mzhavanadze's deputy, Second Secretary P.A. Rodionov, was the first public figure to attempt to justify Brezhnev's ascendance--in an October 1965 PARTY LIFE article acknowledging the "enormous significance of the role of leaders."

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Later, however, Mzhavanadze appeared more concerned about preventing Brezhnev from accumulating too much power. His deputy became the leading spokesman for collective leadership, and Mzhavanadze rivaled Estonian First Secretary Kebin and Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest in avoiding praise of Brezhnev's speeches and activity. When PRAVDA on 20 January 1971 printed the Dagestani leader's statement that Brezhnev "headed" the Politburo, only Georgia and Belorussia deleted the formulation from their papers.

At the February 1971 Georgian party congress Rodionov was removed and demoted to deputy director of the Marxism-Leninism Institute in Moscow. He later was dropped from the Central Committee at the 24th CPSU Congress. In his CPSU Congress speech Mzhavanadze, even while praising Brezhnev's report, appeared to take issue with Brezhnev's increasing power. He noted that the Politburo's operations and Brezhnev's report had indicated that the "role and responsibility of the leader" must grow "immeasurably," but he also stressed that the leader must be an example in observing discipline and in listening to criticism. When Brezhnev announced the new Politburo elected at the end of the congress, he listed Mzhavanadze last despite his seniority.

During the April-May 1971 republic supreme soviet nominations, the Georgian press carried less praise of Brezhnev than of Podgorny and Kosygin; and at the 14 May Georgian 50th anniversary celebration Mzhavanadze introduced Brezhnev without the enthusiastic epithets used by the Kazakh, Azerbaydzhani, and Armenian first secretaries at their anniversary ceremonies.

Brezhnev moved against Mzhavanadze in early 1972 when the Central Committee summoned Tbilisi First Secretary O.I. Lolashvili to Moscow and subsequently issued a decree condemning the Tbilisi organization for a wide range of shortcomings, including corruption and nationalist deviations.\* Mzhavanadze at first attempted to protect his protege, expressing confidence in Lolashvili's ability to rectify the situation, but Moscow apparently was dissatisfied with Mzhavanadze's handling of the situation. A 5 June Georgian plenum fired Mzhavanadze protege N. Sh. Tskhakaya as secretary in charge of industry, and Lolashvili was removed as Tbilisi first secretary on 25 July and as Georgian Central Committee bureau member on 28 July.\*\*

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\* For background see the TRENDS of 8 March 1972, page 40.

\*\* See the TRENDS of 2 August 1972, pages 48-49.

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Lolashvili's successor as Tbilisi first secretary was 44-year old MVD chief E.A. Shevardnadze, whose meteoric rise to Georgian first secretary two months later bypassed 60-year old Premier G.D. Dzhavakhishvili, 62-year old President G.S. Dzotsenidze, and other old cronies of Mzhavanadze. As republic MVD chief since 1965 Shevardnadze worked under a longtime Brezhnev protege, USSR MVD chief N.A. Shchelokov.

#### ALTAY AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTE RETURNS TO OFFICIAL FAVOR

Brezhnev's visit to the Altay Scientific Research Institute of Agriculture in late August restored the formerly disgraced institute to full official favor. In the 1960's the institute, headed by G.A. Nalivayko, became Khrushchev's favorite by developing the so-called intertilled system of farming, but it was widely blamed after Khrushchev's fall for the 1963 crop failure and disastrous erosion. After the appointment of a new director in early 1967, the institute developed new anti-erosion techniques and shunned publicity. The press began to publicize the Altay innovations in 1971, and during his recent tour of the virgin lands Brezhnev visited the institute and praised its work. Following the tour, a 24 September PRAVDA article depicted the institute and its leaders in glowing terms.

**FALL FROM GRACE** The Altay agricultural institute gained acclaim in 1960 when it won Khrushchev's support for its hastily developed and poorly tested intertilled system of farming based on the cultivation of corn, beans, and peas as against clean fallow, grasses, and more traditional crops. Khrushchev promoted Altay Kray First Secretary K.G. Pysin to first deputy agriculture minister and later agriculture minister, hailed institute director Nalivayko as a national agricultural authority, and forced widespread adoption of the intertilled system even in clearly unsuitable areas. However, after Khrushchev's fall the institute fell into disgrace when the intertilled system was held largely responsible for the 1963 crop failure and the unprecedented erosion.

Altay First Secretary A.V. Georgiyev continued to publicly defend Nalivayko until March 1967, when the Politburo adopted a decree on anti-erosion measures following a visit by Polyanskiy to the Altay kray. Nalivayko, probably the main target of the decree, was quietly removed in that month and Georgiyev subsequently reversed himself, attacking Nalivayko and leading a delegation of Altay farmers to the north Kazakhstan agricultural institute of Nalivayko's arch-rival



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A.I. Barayev to study the anti-erosion techniques developed at that institute. Reporting the visit, an 8 August 1967 KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA article noted that Georgiyev had been "quite recently against everything" recommended by Barayev's institute, including the use of clean fallow and moldboardless plowing, but that the Altay was now joining the rest of Siberia in applying Barayev's methods.

A.N. Kashtanov, an instructor in the Central Committee's Party Organizational Work Section, was sent from Moscow to become director of the Altay institute and reorient its work. Writing in the August 1972 ZVEZDA, Yuriy Chernichenko described the new director as "restrained and tactful" and recalled how he had delivered Kashtanov's first article to PRAVDA. That article, which appeared on 18 September 1969, was notably different in tone from former director Nalivayko's hard-sell articles.

RETURN TO FAVOR      Following the completion of testing, Kashtanov publicly unveiled his institute's new methods of cultivation in late 1971--in the 3 August PRAVDA, the 4 August RURAL LIFE, and the November issue of the journal AGRICULTURE OF RUSSIA. In the journal article he described the 1967 reorganization of the institute and the adoption of a new system of anti-erosion measures involving forest belts, contour plowing, Barayev's moldboardless plowing, strip farming, clean fallow, and perennial grasses. In reporting the successful application of these measures by Altay farms, Kashtanov gave Barayev's institute much of the credit for his new system. Georgiyev also sent his rayon first secretaries on numerous inspections of Barayev's "glorious" institute, according to LITERARY RUSSIA of 16 June 1972.

Georgiyev, once the apparent protege of Brezhnev foes Voronov and Pysin, has recently become notably solicitous toward Brezhnev. At the 24th CPSU Congress he praised Brezhnev's "brilliant" report as a "model of creative Marxism-Leninism" and lauded the handling of agriculture by the Politburo and Brezhnev. And in the 16 June LITERARY RUSSIA he praised the "titanic work" of the Politburo and Brezhnev "personally."

The apparent official rehabilitation of the Altay institute was reflected in a recent Central Committee decree on the Altay kraykom's handling of agricultural specialists. Published in PRAVDA on 27 July, the decree commended the Altay for combatting the previous "harmful theories, subjectivism, and hasty, unchecked conclusions" and for applying the new anti-erosion measures. In RURAL LIFE on 29 July, Georgiyev wrote that it had taken more than five years to eliminate the discredited habits and apply the new anti-erosion measures.

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During his recent tour of the virgin lands, Brezhnev spent three days in the Altay, addressing a kraykom plenum and visiting the Altay institute. While inspecting the institute and its fields he was reported to have given a "high evaluation" of its work (PRAVDA, 24 September). Georgiyev praised Brezhnev's "brilliant" speech and claimed that his advice was "based on splendid knowledge of the situation in industry and agriculture" (SOVIET RUSSIA, 13 September).

PRAVDA writer Anatoliy Ananyev subsequently toured the institute with deputy director F.P. Shevchenko, who also was Nalivayko's deputy director and who, as a fervent supporter of the intertilled system, had risen to kray agricultural administration chief under Khrushchev. As reported in PRAVDA on 24 September, Ananyev gave a glowing account of the institute and the application of its system in the kray, noting that director Kashtanov was described in the kraykom as "a remarkable man, scientist, and organizer."