

13 SEPT 1972

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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
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**F B I S**

# **TRENDS**

## **In Communist Propaganda**

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
13 SEPTEMBER 1972  
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 37)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 4 - 10 SEPTEMBER 1972

<u>Moscow (2979 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1434 items)</u>		
Vietnam	(17%)	9%	Domestic Issues	(32%)	34%
[Solidarity Month, International Protest Day	(4%)	3%]	Asian Table Tennis Tournament, Congress Vietnam	(14%)	18%
[DRV National Day	(8%)	1%]	[DRV National Day	(15%)	11%
China	(9%)	8%	DPRK National Day	(13%)	5%
[Aleksandrov PRAVDA Article	(--)	4%]	Soviet, Egyptian Press Recriminations	(--)	9%
DPRK National Day	(0.1%)	7%		(--)	5%
Bulgarian National Day	(--)	5%			
Middle East	(3%)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

The 11 September PRG statement on a Vietnam settlement comes in the wake of authoritative Hanoi comment on the issue and coincides with the return to Paris of Le Duc Tho, the DRV's senior adviser to the four-power talks. The statement shows particular concern to appear forthcoming on the issue of a political settlement in South Vietnam, stressing that the proposed provisional government of national concord would be composed of three segments "of equal strength and on an equal footing." After months-long denials by Hanoi and the Front that they would attempt to impose a communist government on South Vietnam, the PRG statement now goes beyond those denials to say that should the United States seriously negotiate, "the PRG is prepared to reach agreement to the effect that neither a communist regime nor a U.S. stooge regime shall be imposed on South Vietnam."

The statement does not repeat the specific political demands in the February 1972 PRG statement, such as the call for President Thieu's resignation, although it does reaffirm that one component of the provisional government would be "the Saigon administration without Thieu." On the other hand, the statement reiterates the detailed stipulations in the February document on U.S. withdrawal and adds a new demand that "technical personnel" as well as troops, advisers, and military personnel be withdrawn from South Vietnam.

The PRG's 11 September statement was promptly carried in full by Peking, and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien expressed Peking's "firm support" for the PRG's stand when he received a copy of the statement during a meeting with the PRG ambassador on the 13th. Blaming the U.S. military actions for "the failure so far" to achieve a settlement, Li reaffirmed Peking's pledge to support the war effort as "a fixed policy." Further alining Peking with the Vietnamese communists' demands, Li introduced a call for the United States to end support for the Saigon regime that has been absent from Chinese statements recently.

Moscow's TASS has carried only a brief account of the PRG statement. A routine followup radio commentary called it "a reasonable stand" and repeated Soviet promises that aid to the Vietnamese will continue "until they win their just cause."

### PRG STATEMENT PRESSES U.S. WITHDRAWAL, PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Following extensive Hanoi discussion of the political settlement issue--in the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article and in DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's speech marking DRV National Day on

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2 September--the statement from the PRG seems calculated to point up its role in the negotiations. The return to the Paris talks of Le Duc Tho may have heightened the concern to cast the PRG in a leading role. Such concern had seemed evident last winter following the President's disclosure in his 25 January speech that the United States had been negotiating privately with the DRV on the basis of the latter's nine-point proposal and his release of the U.S. eight-point proposal which, he revealed, had been presented to the DRV last fall. Hanoi departed from its usual practice of immediately reacting authoritatively to a major U.S. pronouncement, while the PRG on 2 February issued its official statement containing the two-point elaboration of its seven-point proposal of 1 July 1971.\*

The current PRG statement was first monitored from a Liberation Radio broadcast at 2200 GMT on 10 September; it was repeated by Hanoi radio and appeared in VNA's English-language transmission at 0700 GMT on the 11th, which characterized it as an "important" statement. The VNA review of the Hanoi press for the 12th said that the papers "prominently frontpaged" the PRG statement along with "news of victories" of the South Vietnam liberation forces. Hanoi as yet has issued no followup comment, but an LPA commentary on the 11th paraphrased much of the statement and observed that the proposal for a three-component provisional government proves the PRG's good will.

U.S. WITHDRAWAL. VNA prefaced its transmission of the full text of the statement by quoting verbatim the two points--on ending a U.S. role and on a settlement in South Vietnam--described by the PRG as "the two requirements" the United States must meet. The first point essentially repeats point one of the PRG's February elaboration, but with an additional demand: To the call for a rapid and complete withdrawal of U.S. and allied "troops, advisers, and military personnel," it now adds "technical personnel." The statement goes on, using the language of the February statement, to demand the withdrawal of weapons and war materials and the liquidation of U.S. military bases in South Vietnam." It also echoes the February statement in calling for an end to U.S. military action in both North and South Vietnam.\*\*

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\* See the TRENDS of 2 February 1972, pages 1-6.

\*\* By way of taking note of current U.S. actions, the statement specifies that the United States must "end the bombing, mining, and blockade of the DRV" as well as end "all U.S. military activities in South Vietnam."

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Along with the new demand for the withdrawal of technical personnel, point one now includes other elements which have usually been brought up in the political rather than military contexts in formal proposals. Thus, point one prefaces its call for an end to U.S. military action with the assertion that the United States "must respect the Vietnamese people's right to true independence and the South Vietnamese people's right to effective self-determination." In the February elaboration, the phrase on self-determination was the first demand under point two on a political settlement. The current statement, after the call for a liquidation of military bases, injects another element that has normally been linked to political demands: Saying that the United States "must end all military involvement in Vietnam," it adds that Washington must "stop supporting the Nguyen Van Thieu stooge administration." The call for an end to U.S. support of the Saigon regime was expressed in a political rather than a military context in both the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article and Pham Van Dong's National Day speech.\* The interjection in the military context of the demand for an end to U.S. support of the Saigon regime, taken together with the new call for withdrawal of U.S. technical personnel, thus appears to harden the communist position as compared with the February statement.

Along with these additions, the statement deletes one element that appeared in point one of the February elaboration, although it had been repeated in the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article's recapitulation of the February statement: The current statement does not repeat the demand that the United States set a timetable for withdrawal and the assertion that this date would also apply to the release of prisoners. Moreover, it indicates that prisoners would be released only after an overall settlement: It says that if the United States ends the war, withdraws all U.S. troops, ends all military involvement in Vietnam and its support of the Saigon "puppets," and lets the South Vietnamese form a three-component government of national concord, "this will bring about an early release of all captured U.S. servicemen and an early restoration of peace in Vietnam." In another passage, the statement ridicules the President's withdrawal of U.S. ground combat troops in standard fashion, saying it is meaningless given the escalation of air and naval action.

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\* The NHAN DAN Commentator article and some aspects of Pham Van Dong's speech are discussed in the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 3-8.

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PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT      The PRG statement does not repeat the detailed stipulations of the February elaboration regarding a political settlement in South Vietnam. Instead it begins point two by saying: "A solution to the internal problem of South Vietnam must proceed from the actual situation that there exist in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies, and other political forces. It is necessary to achieve national concord, and all sides in South Vietnam must unite on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination\* in order to insure freedom and democracy for the people." It then adds merely that "it is necessary to form a provisional government of national concord with three equal segments to take charge of the affairs in the transitional period and to organize truly free and democratic general elections."\*\*

An earlier passage in the statement introduces some details regarding a provisional government, however. It observes that the three components of a provisional government of national concord would be "of equal strength and on an equal footing." It goes on to say that "the PRG and the Saigon administration without Nguyen Van Thieu will appoint each of its people to participate in the government. The appointment of people belonging to the third component will be made through consultations."

The assertion that the components would be equal and on the same level as far as position is concerned has appeared in recent propaganda, including Pham Van Dong's National Day speech. Dong

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\* The Vietnamese phrase which VNA translates as "elimination" is "thoon tinh." Hanoi's dictionary defines this term to mean the process by which a stronger country invades and takes over a weaker one, and it suggests "annex" as a translation in the illustrative sentence "Hitler annexed Austria."

\*\* Point two of the February elaboration specified that "Thieu must resign immediately, the Saigon administration must end its warlike policy, disband at once its machine of oppression and constraint, stop its pacification policy, disband the concentration camps, set free political prisoners and guarantee democratic liberties as provided for by the 1954 Geneva agreements. Then the PRG will immediately discuss with the Saigon administration the formation of a three-component national concord government in order to organize general elections, elect a constituent assembly, work out a constitution, and set up an official government."

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did not mention the matter of selection of participants in the government, but this issue, along with references to "equality" in a provisional government, has been broached by the PRG delegate at the Paris talks since they resumed on 13 July after a two-month hiatus. For example, Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh said at the 20 July session that the provisional government "would be set up on the principle of equality and without constraint of each against the other." She went on to discuss the matter of selection at the 10 August session. In arguing against allied charges that the provisional government of national concord would be an "imposed" government or a communist regime which would not come to power through a democratic process, she said that the provisional government would not be appointed by the PRG but would be "set up through negotiations on the basis of equality and mutual respect among the various political forces." And at the 17 August session, she said the provisional government would include not only the component representing the PRG and one representing those who stand for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy, but also "the component of the Saigon administration, without Thieu, chosen by itself."\*

The PRG statement repeats what has become routine deprecation--at the Paris talks as well as in other propaganda--of U.S. contentions that Hanoi and the Front want to impose a communist regime on the South. It says:

The broad segments of public opinion support the seven points of the PRG, the two key questions of which have been elaborated. They regard them as a fair solution guaranteeing lasting peace in Vietnam and making it possible for the United States to get out of the Vietnam war in honor. President Nixon's claims that the U.S. negotiating terms are "very generous" and that the negotiating position of the PRG is tantamount to "imposing a communist regime" on South Vietnam are nothing but shameless tricks to fool public opinion . . . .

It is after this passage that the statement goes on to express readiness to "reach agreements" that neither a communist regime nor a U.S. "stooge regime" shall be imposed on South Vietnam.

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\* Only Mme Binh's remarks on 10 August were included in VNA's accounts of the Paris sessions.

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ATTACKS ON U.S. POLICY,  
APPEALS FOR SUPPORT

The PRG statement assails President Nixon's Vietnamization policy in standard fashion and at the same time claims that it is "irretrievably heading for its collapse." The statement does not acknowledge any of the substance of the President's proposals when it says that it appears from his 25 January 1972 eight-point proposal and his 8 May statement "that the United States obdurately demands from the South Vietnamese people a ransom for its aggression and acceptance of the Saigon stooge administration--which is tantamount to demanding the elimination of the PRG and the PLAF in an attempt to impose U.S. neocolonialism on South Vietnam." It adds that a correct political solution must proceed from present reality: "This reality is the existence of the people's power and armed forces which are developing in a victorious fight . . . ." Pham Van Dong in his DRV National Day speech had referred to the President's proposals without citing any of their substance, but the NHAN DAN Commentator article of 31 August recalled that the President's 8 May statement called for a cease-fire and release of U.S. prisoners and pledged a complete U.S. withdrawal within four months. Commentator had also noted that the U.S. eight-point proposal calls for a general election with NFLSV participation six months after a cease-fire to choose a president for South Vietnam.

The PRG statement concludes by expressing the belief that "the world's peoples" will not allow the United States to continue the war, to carry out the Nixon Doctrine in Vietnam and then extend it to the whole world. It claims to see increasing support for the Vietnamese struggle, but in expressing gratitude it fails to mention the socialist countries. Thus, the statement expresses "sincere and deep gratitude to the governments and peoples of peace- and justice-loving countries, the American people, international organizations, and the forces of peace and progress," and it calls on "all brothers and friends to urge the Nixon Administration to end its war of aggression in Vietnam as well as in Laos and Cambodia." A comparable concluding paragraph in the February statement had specifically included the "socialist" countries in such a listing and had gone on to appeal for "increased support and assistance." The February statement had not mentioned aggression in Laos and Cambodia in this context, although it referred elsewhere to aggression in the whole of Indochina.

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## CHINESE PROMPTLY EXPRESS "FIRM SUPPORT" FOR PRG STAND

Peking moved promptly to associate itself with the PRG's 11 September statement, carrying the full text on the day it was issued and voicing "firm support" for the PRG's stand two days later. During a meeting with the PRG ambassador and the DRV charge d'affaires on the 13th at which he received a copy of the PRG statement, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien reaffirmed continuing Chinese assistance in the war effort while assailing U.S. military measures in Vietnam as "the root cause" for the absence of a settlement "so far." On the terms of a settlement Li went an additional step in alining Peking with the Vietnamese communists' position by calling for the United States to end its support for the Saigon regime.

In receiving the Vietnamese representatives Li took the role previously played this year by Premier Chou En-lai.\* If the Chinese follow their practice at the time of the PRG's 2 February "elaboration" of its peace terms, they will follow up this meeting with a government statement and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, both of which appeared two days after the 2 February statement.

According to NCNA's account, Li had "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with the Vietnamese envoys when he received the PRG statement and expressed "firm support" for it in the name of the PRC Government. Li's demands that the United States withdraw its troops and "make earnest efforts" in response to the PRG's seven-point plan had been pressed by Peking in marking the 2 September DRV anniversary, but his call for the United States to stop supporting "the puppet Saigon regime" raised a key political issue that has been absent from recent Chinese pronouncements. This may represent a move by Peking to close ranks with its allies after the appearance of a major new statement on a settlement, particularly one issued in the name of the PRG and thus making the issue of support for the Saigon

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\* On 15 July Chou met the DRV ambassador and was handed a copy of the 14 July DRV appeal; on 16 April he saw the PRG charge d'affaires to receive a copy of the 15 April PRG appeal; on 12 April he met the DRV ambassador and was handed the 11 April DRV appeal; and on 2 February he met both the DRV and PRG representatives and heard their denunciation of President Nixon's 25 January peace plan. The 2 February PRG "elaboration" had not yet been released on the latter occasion.

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regime even more germane. It may also reflect a calculation by Peking--which, unlike the Vietnamese communists, has not been mentioning Thieu's role--that an accommodation could be reached on the issue of the U.S. relationship with Saigon.

In line with Peking's effort at the time of the DRV anniversary to reassure the Vietnamese of its unflagging backing, Li stressed that it is "a fixed policy" and "a bounden internationalist duty" of the Chinese to "support and assist" the armies and peoples of North and South Vietnam in their war effort. He declared that the Chinese "will make every effort" to support the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples until their "complete victory" over the United States. He also took the occasion to laud the "brilliant victories" recently won in both North and South Vietnam.

As in Chinese comment marking the DRV anniversary, Li assailed the U.S. military actions while avoiding any attack on the Nixon Administration by name. He criticized the "U.S. Government" for having "obdurately clung" to the Vietnamization policy, continued its "mining and blockade" of the DRV, and "stepped up" its naval and air attacks, "thus indicating that it still refuses to give up its aggressive stand." He said that it was this which "is precisely the root cause for the failure so far to achieve a settlement."

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### LE DUC THO SEES CHINESE, SOVIET LEADERS ON WAY TO PARIS

Le Duc Tho's fourth trip between Hanoi and Paris in as many months included the usual stopovers in Peking and Moscow before his arrival in Paris on 11 September. While again pledging aid and political support, the Soviets this time gave less play to military questions than during his previous stopover last month. As in August, the Chinese did not go beyond the minimum in their treatment of his stopover, having previously scaled down their expressions of support since Chou En-lai's forceful remarks during Tho's visit in April.\* In the latest visit Tho saw Prince Sihanouk, the first such meeting with a Cambodian leader since Tho's stopover in August 1971.

As usual, Hanoi's coverage of Tho's trip consisted of a single account reporting his arrival in Paris and taking note of his activities while passing through Peking and Moscow. Hanoi's report said that Tho's meeting with the Chinese leaders took place in an atmosphere of "solidarity and fraternal friendship." Its account of Tho's meeting with his Soviet hosts described a "fraternal and cordial" atmosphere.

Hanoi's report noted the presence of the Soviet and Chinese ambassadors when Tho arrived in Paris, but none of the available reports mentioned the presence of a Soviet representative when Tho departed from Peking en route to Paris via Moscow. According to normal protocol, the host country's announcement on his departure from the first stopover cites the presence of a representative from the next country on his itinerary. Thus, in the comparable situation in July, the Soviet charge d'affaires was reported by NCNA to have been present when Tho departed from Peking, and on Tho's return home last month the Chinese charge d'affaires was mentioned by TASS as being among those seeing him off in Moscow. The only previous exception to this pattern occurred in June when no Chinese representative was officially announced as present at Tho's departure from Moscow for Peking, though a VNA service message from Moscow to the Hanoi office noted the presence of the Chinese ambassador on that occasion.

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\* Tho's previous stopovers are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 August 1972, pages 7-8.

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**PEKING** The Chinese account of Tho's 8-9 September stopover followed in detail the one in August, again avoiding any indication of the substance of his talks with the Chinese leaders. Tho again had "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with Chou En-lai and Chang Chun-chiao, and he was given the usual banquet by Chang, who greeted and saw him off at the airport. This bare-bones treatment of his stopover, with no pledges of Chinese support or criticism of the United States, has been Peking's practice on the last three occasions and reflects the cautious approach Peking has been taking toward Vietnamese developments.

Peking also reported that Tho had "a cordial and friendly conversation" with Sihanouk on the same day as the meeting with the Chinese. The only precedent for such a meeting during his stopovers was Tho's talk with RGNU Premier Penn Nouth on 1 August 1971 as Tho was returning home and at a time when Sihanouk was in Korea. That meeting took place against the background of the release during the previous month of the PRG's seven-point proposal and the announcement of Peking's invitation to President Nixon. The recent Tho-Sihanouk meeting took place at a time when the question of a political settlement has again become a subject of major attention, suggesting that Tho may have briefed the Cambodian on current developments.

**MOSCOW** During his 9-11 September stopover in Moscow--overlapping with presidential adviser Kissinger's arrival there on the 10th--Tho was met at the airport by party and foreign ministry functionaries Rakhmanin and Firubin and had talks with Politburo member and First Deputy Premier Mazurov. Politburo member and Brezhnev deputy Kirilenko, who saw Tho during his previous stopover in August, has reportedly been on vacation in Yugoslavia. Party Secretary Katushev, who has customarily been on hand for Tho's stopovers, was leading a CPSU delegation visiting North Korea. Mazurov had been the ranking Soviet official seeing Tho once before, during a stopover in August 1968.

According to TASS, Mazurov and Tho had talks in "a fraternal, cordial atmosphere" on "questions of further development of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the DRV." The TASS account said the Soviet side stressed again that "it will continue rendering to the Vietnamese people all the necessary assistance until the complete victory of their just cause," supported the "constructive proposals for peaceful settlement" advanced by the DRV and PRG, and "resolutely denounced the aggressive actions of U.S. imperialism."

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An English-language Moscow radio report added that Tho thanked the Soviet Government for "its all-round and effective help to embattled Vietnam."

The Soviet account of the most recent visit represents only the third report of all of Tho's stopovers in Moscow to indicate any of the substance of the talks, the previous instances being his August 1972 and July 1971 visits, both of which times he met with Kirilenko. However, the latest account came down less strongly on military issues than on those occasions. Last month Moscow reported that the two sides discussed not only the strengthening of "friendship and cooperation" but also "the development of the struggle of the Vietnamese people," and the Soviets specifically denounced the U.S. bombing and "mining and blockade" of the DRV. At that time, in addition to expressing support for the Vietnamese communists proposals for a peace settlement, the Soviets pledged to continue "economic and military aid" until the Vietnamese attain "complete victory."

#### PARIS: VIETNAMIZATION AGAIN TARGET AT 7 SEPTEMBER SESSION

Both PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh and DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy at the Paris session on 7 September repeated standard charges that the U.S. Vietnamization policy is incompatible with "serious negotiations." VNA's account reflected this stress, but it omitted both delegates' denunciations of specific U.S. negotiating positions and of President Nixon's statements, including those at his 29 August press conference.\* Thus, VNA did not report that Mme. Binh again said the President's 8 May proposals constitute an "ultimatum" or her allegation that the President's 23 August speech at the Republican Party convention and his press conference on the 29th "reaffirmed the U.S. scheme to keep U.S. troops in South Vietnam and maintain the Nguyen Van Thieu regime it has set up . . . ."\*\* But in reporting her defense of the PRG proposals,

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\* Front media, on the other hand, carried the full text of Mme. Binh's formal statement.

\*\* VNA's account of the 31 August session focused on the communist delegates' remarks on the President's 29 August press conference. Thus, it reported Mme. Binh's disparagement of the planned U.S. withdrawal of an additional 12,000 troops from South Vietnam by the end of November as well as the President's statement that the bombing and mining of North Vietnam will continue in the absence of substantial progress in the negotiations. VNA reported that DRV delegate Vy said, among other things, that the question of the return of U.S. prisoners is not the cause of the U.S. presence in Vietnam but a result of it. In his prepared statement, Vy made a point-by-point rebuttal of the President's press conference, describing it as "noisy propaganda" about the continued withdrawal of U.S. troops and alleged progress in ending the war.



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VNA noted her statement that unless the United States gives up its "scheme" to negate the role of the PRG and other "forces of peace and independence," there cannot be a political solution to the South Vietnam issue in particular or the Vietnam war in general."

The VNA account noted that Mme. Binh repeated the standard position that a Vietnamese solution must be an overall one, including both military and political questions. It truncated her recapitulation of some of the details of the PRG's two-point elaboration, but it did report her praise of the proposal for a provisional government of national concord and her reaffirmation that the PRG does not seek control over the political life of South Vietnam.

DRV delegate Vy in his prepared statement set out to demonstrate "the contradiction between words and deeds" on the part of the Nixon Administration. VNA glossed over much of his statement on U.S. attacks on North Vietnam, but it cited his reiteration of the charge that the resumption of the air strikes and the mining of DRV ports are a "serious war escalation." The account quoted him as claiming that U.S. proposals "in their approach as well as in their substance" retain a "colonialist position." But the account did not report the details of his attack on the United States for separating the military and political questions, particularly his denunciation of the President's 8 May proposal and his remarks at the press conference on 29 August. Vy said that judging from these statements, the U.S. solution of the military question turned out to be escalation of the war and then the posing of conditions: "As long as the adversary does not accept a cease-fire and the release of U.S. POW's, the United States will neither withdraw its troops nor stop all air and naval action." VNA did report Vy's concluding remarks that serious negotiations cannot go together with Vietnamization and that the United States must "agree to an overall solution on both the military and political plane" as provided in the PRG's seven points, the two main points of which have been clarified."

The VNA account of the session as usual omitted any mention of the GVN statement, which was presented by Nguyen Xuan Phong in place of Ambassador Lam. It dismissed Ambassador Porter's statement as making "slanders in a provocative manner in an attempt to cover the aggressive nature of the Nixon Administration," but it did not acknowledge that the Ambassador criticized Pham Van Dong's National Day address. The account also ignored the additional remarks by both sides, which included a lengthy rebuttal by Phong of the communist charges and repetition by Ambassador Porter of questions regarding Hanoi's failure to respond to the GVN's offer--advanced at the 24 August session--to repatriate 600 sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners.

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**DRV ROUTINELY PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES, PRAISES PLANE DOWNINGS**

Foreign ministry reaction to relatively heavy U.S. air raids has remained at the routine level of spokesman's statements since 17 August, the date of the last foreign ministry statement. That statement, which protested U.S. attacks of 14 and 16 August on Hanoi and Thanh Hoa cities, was in turn more muted in tone than the preceding statement of the 8th, which had vigorously lashed out at the President for asserting that it is not U.S. policy to bomb civilian installations.\* While large-scale attacks on Hanoi have frequently triggered an authoritative protest at the level of a foreign ministry statement, massive U.S. bombing of the Hanoi area on 10 and 11 September drew only routine comment at the spokesman's level. VNA in its news reports on the bombing echoed this relatively low level response. A VNA report of the 10th, charging that U.S. aircraft had "attacked many streets in Hanoi and populous areas in its outskirts," cited the chief areas hit as a sandbank in the middle of the Red River and the Gia Lam and Dong An suburban areas; on the 11th, claiming that the raid of that day was the 26th since 16 April, VNA reported damage in the Ha Ba Trung precinct within Hanoi.

Other areas reported by VNA as suffering damage in recent strikes include villages in several districts of Thai Binh and Hai Hung provinces, from 5 to 9 September; a school in an unidentified location in Tuyen Quang Province, on 7 September; a Catholic church in a hamlet in Tien Lu district of Hai Hung Province, on 8 September; a number of villages and a tea plantation in Bac Thai Province, on the 9th and 10th; and a college in Vinh Phu Province, on 10 September. VNA also reported that several hydraulic works were damaged in air strikes of the 10th, including the Tra Ly dike and Lan sluice in Thai Binh, hit by 12 and six demolition bombs, respectively; and a one-kilometer section of the dike along the Day River in Gia Khanh district of Ninh Binh Province.

Brief editorial comment on the recent bombings appeared in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 12 and 13 September, respectively, in connection with the claimed downing of the 3,900th plane over the North. And VNA's 13 September press review noted that NHAN DAN that day "denounced the savage war crimes perpetrated by the U.S. aggressors against North Vietnam in the early days of this month." NHAN DAN on the 12th, after citing damage to "many of our municipalities, cities, and heavily populated areas" since early April, reviewed the bombing of this week, which it claimed had

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\* For a discussion see the TRENDS of 23 August 1972, page 12 and 9 August 1972, page 2.

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incurred "an additional blood debt to our compatriots." Referring in addition to B-52 bombing of the DRV's southern provinces, NHAN DAN repeated standard charges that "the bellicose Nixon clique's crimes" exceed those of Hitler and "represent a stain on the United States' honor that can never be removed." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, commenting in general on the nature and extent of U.S. bombing, referred indirectly to the recent bombing in its mention of Lang Son, the province over which the 3,900th plane was reportedly downed; the army paper noted that this province is "on the Vietnam-China border."

SPOKESMAN'S           The following statements were issued by the  
STATEMENTS           spokesman of the DRV Foreign Ministry during the  
                          past week:

+ "Extermination bombing" of Haiphong on 6 September, as well as strikes on the same day at the capital of Thai Binh Province and populated areas in Yen Bai, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces, were protested in the statement of the 7th, which charged that such bombardments were "ordered by the Nixon Administration against populated areas to massacre civilians." The statement claimed that such actions "have further exposed the Administration's bellicose and sanguinary nature and its deceitful claim to be 'ending' the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and to 'pursue' the course of negotiations for a solution to the Vietnam question."

+ The statement of 8 September protested bombing and strafing on the 7th of the outskirts of Haiphong and the capitals of Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa, and Quang Binh provinces, as well as of populated areas in Tuyen Quang, Hai Hung, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh. In addition, the statement charged B-52's with bombing a number of localities in Quang Binh and U.S. warships with firing "thousands of artillery rounds" on the coastal areas of the Vinh Linh zone.

+ The 9 September statement condemned "savage raids" of the preceding day on Cat Ba Island off Haiphong, the capital and several "chief towns" of Quang Ninh Province, the "chief town" of Ba Don in Quang Binh Province, and "many other populous areas" in Lang Son, Ha Bac, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces. It further claimed that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh and that U.S. warships shelled Hon Meï Island in Thanh Hoa. Listing specific targets hit in the air raids, the statement cited a leprosarium in Thai Binh, reportedly hit for the second time, and the Ben Ngu sluice in Pong Son district of Thanh Hoa Province.

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+ The 10 September statement protested the "frenzied and criminal acts of war" of the 9th and 10th which it claimed, among other things, to have "trampled upon every principle of international law and the morality and conscience of mankind" and to have "laid bare the deceitful claim that the United States is ending its involvement in South Vietnam and keeping to the path of negotiation to settle the Vietnam problem." Actions of the 9th cited in the statement included the bombing of Kien An municipality near Haiphong and Hon Gai municipality in Quang Ninh Province, as well as "many densely populated areas" of Lang Son, Bac Thai, Ha Bac, Vinh Phu, Ha Tay, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone; it also charged that U.S. warships had bombarded coastal areas of Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. Strikes on Hanoi and its suburbs--described as constituting the 25th attack since 14 April 1972--highlighted claims for the 10th, as well as the reported bombing and strafing of Phu Ly township in Nam Ha and Chuong My municipality and "many other areas" in Ha Tay Province.

+ Charging again that the United States is deceitfully claiming to pursue the path of negotiations while continuing its "frenzied and criminal war acts," the statement of 11 September protested strikes of that day against Hanoi and its outskirts, as well as attacks on populated areas of Ha Tay Province. It also condemned strikes of the 10th at populated areas in the provinces of Bac Thai, Vinh Phu, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Hoa Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh and in the Vinh Linh zone. Without mentioning any specific date, the statement claimed that U.S. warships had "indiscriminately bombed and shelled" coastal hamlets and villages in Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces. Specific targets reported destroyed by U.S. bombs and shells included an animal husbandry middle school in Hoa Binh Province, "dikes and dams, many irrigation projects," the Lai Trang sluice in Phu Ly township of Thai Binh Province, and the Lan sluice in Tuyen Hai district of Thai Binh. In addition, the statement charged that U.S. strikes had damaged "another dike portion near the Lan sluice," and "another dike portion of the La River" in Ky Anh district of Ha Tinh Province.

+ In addition to the strikes of the 11th mentioned above, the statement of the 12th protested other action of the previous day, including the bombing and strafing of Haiphong, the cities of Nghia Lo, Kien An and Phu Ky, and many populated areas in Yen Bai, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It further charged U.S. warships with "wantonly" shelling coastal villages in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces.

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**PLANE DOWNINGS** The air action over Hanoi was reflected in the reported downing of three planes over the capital on 10 and 11 September. Hanoi's total for planes downed as of 13 September was 3,910, with downings reported over Quang Binh, Quang Ninh, Vinh Phu, Nghe An, Bac Thai, Yen Bai, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Ha Bac, Lang Son and Haiphong as well as Hanoi. An unspecified number of U.S. pilots was reported captured as a result of the downing of five F-4 Phantoms over Lang Son on the 11th and 12th; one of the planes downed on the 12th was claimed to be the 3,900th U.S. plane shot down over the North. A B-52 was reportedly downed over Quang Binh on 6 September, and a Hanoi radio report of 12 September claimed that the armed forces and people of Vinh Phu Province set fire to two U.S. warships on 25 August.

As noted above, the downing of the 3,900th plane on 12 September received editorial acclaim in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of the 13th, available only in a brief VNA summary, offered conventional praise of the North Vietnamese armed forces, noting that "hardly 40 days had gone by since the downing of the 3,800th [plane]" and that "the USAF has received another fitting blow." It praised the victories of the antiaircraft and air force, as well as of the home guard and militia.

The NHAN DAN editorial, broadcast by Hanoi radio on 12 September, differed from previous reaction to the 3,800th and 3,700th plane downings, claimed on 6 August and 27 June respectively, in that it placed less emphasis than usual on the achievements of the North Vietnamese "armed forces and people" and more on the crimes and declining situation of the "Nixon clique." After reviewing U.S. strikes at cities and other populated areas, the editorial echoed other recent propaganda in its castigation of President Nixon, charging that he has made "deceitful statements that he would take steps to end the war before the presidential election, and that prospects for negotiation now were better than ever." It said that, in fact, the United States has clung to its "colonialist position" at Paris, and that U.S. policy will only increase North Vietnamese determination to fight and win. It added that "our victorious combat over the past five months is eloquent proof of the failure of the war Vietnamization policy," and praised the formation of "aircraft battlegrounds" throughout the North and the coordination between the self-defense forces and the air and rocket forces in "punishing the air brigands."

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The editorial charged that "during four years as President, Nixon has wasted an additional more than 640 aircraft, including more than 450 downed since April, with hundreds of aggressor pilots killed or captured." It then claimed that "re-Americanization" of the war will lead only to more disastrous defeats.

POW'S Further praise was accorded the North Vietnamese air force's skill in downing planes in Hanoi's accounts of the capture of six of the 10 pilots whose names were released on 25 August.\* During the past week, Hanoi radio attributed the downing of all six to missiles fired from North Vietnamese Migs; in the case of 1st Lieut. Donald Karl Logan, reportedly captured on 5 July, the plane was specifically described as a Mig-21. In other reportage on the recently captured pilots, both Hanoi radio in English to servicemen and VNA carried messages to their families, allegedly written by the pilots, in which they stressed the good treatment they are receiving and their hopes for an early end to the war. Several made oblique references to the November elections after criticizing President Nixon for being responsible for their capture; the message allegedly sent by 1st Lieut. Gregg Hanson to his parents, for example, urged them to vote for Senator McGovern. Lieut. Hanson reportedly said, "I feel confident that after George McGovern is elected President in November, it will be a matter of days until I will be able to return home . . . ." This is in keeping with comments attributed to other POW's in alleged interviews and messages of the last two weeks, which have also contained direct appeals to President Nixon and Congress to end the war.

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\* See the TRENDS of 30 August 1972, page 13.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW DENIES LINK BETWEEN MUNICH EVENTS, ISRAELI RAIDS

Continuing to play down the significance of the "tragic incident" at the Olympic games in Munich, Moscow seized on Israel's 8 September retaliatory attacks on Lebanon and Syria to focus attention on Israeli "aggression." Soviet commentators have repeatedly rejected Tel Aviv's "pretext" that the raids were reprisals for the Munich events, at the same time betraying sensitivity on that score in efforts to dissociate the Arab states and Palestinians generally from the Black September "extremists." The central theme is that the raids--"the biggest air raids over Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian territories" since the 1967 war--again illustrated Israeli expansionist ambitions and "sabotage" of a peaceful political settlement in the region.

Decrying the U.S. veto in the 10 September Security Council debate on the Israeli attacks, Moscow charged that the American action prevented the council from passing a resolution aimed at ending Israel's "aggressive acts." Commentators almost unanimously concluded that the situation requires a speedy political solution based on Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and recognition of the Palestinians' rights.

ISRAELI ATTACKS      TASS on the 8th reported official statements from Lebanon and Syria announcing Israeli attacks on "several camps of Palestinian refugees" in the north and south of Lebanon and Israeli bombing of "a number of areas" in Syria on the Mediterranean coast and near the Golan Heights and Damascus. On the 9th, TASS cited Damascus radio for a report that Syrian planes struck that day at Israeli positions on the occupied Golan Heights and that in the course of a dogfight two Israeli Mirages were shot down and the Syrians lost three planes. Moscow apparently failed to report the official Jordanian announcements on the 9th that a Jordanian village had been hit by rockets "during the Syrian-Israeli dogfight" that day. But on the 11th Soviet media inserted "a Jordanian populated area" among the targets, in effect accusing Israel of deliberately attacking Jordan--a specific charge the Amman announcements had carefully avoided.

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Portraying Israel's targets as peaceful villages and Palestinian refugee camps, the Soviet coverage included correspondents' eye-witness accounts of the destruction of small homes and shops. Moscow claimed that the raids resulted in "hundreds of civilian casualties." TASS on the 11th cited a report by UN observers on the consequences of the attacks in Lebanon which "confirmed" that the victims were "civilian without exception," and a Damascus datelined TASS dispatch on the 13th observed that the wounded children, women, and old people in Syrian hospitals "have nothing in common with the Palestinian guerrillas." Some commentators likened the attacks to Israeli bombings of the "civilian targets" of Abu Za'bal and Bahr al-Baqr in Egypt in February and April 1970.

MUNICH EVENTS      Moscow's denial of any connection between the Munich events and the 8 September Israeli raids is consistent with its past guarded treatment of fedayeen airline hijackings, which elicited reluctant and implicitly disapproving comment when they were acknowledged at all.\* A SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article on the 12th charged that the "Israeli extremists" were only "exploiting the Munich events for their own aggressive aims." Several commentators sought to exonerate the Arab governments and the Palestinians in general of any responsibility for the actions of a handful of "extremists" in Munich.

Viewing the latest Israeli raids against the background of Munich, Moscow domestic service commentator Ryzhikov on the 9th cited FRG Foreign Minister Scheel as having said in an "important statement" that the Arab states "were in no way implicated in the Munich events" and that "only a small group" of Palestinians was responsible. Ryzhikov also noted that the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) mission in Denmark had asserted at a press conference that the "extremist" Black September group had no connection whatsoever with the PLO and that the Munich action did not serve the Palestinian cause. Drawing on background by AFP, Ryzhikov said the Black September operated underground in the Arab world, "including Palestine." He added that its leaders, its headquarters, and the sources of its funds are not known.

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\* Moscow's treatment of the most recent such incident, at Lod airport on 30 May, is discussed in the 7 June 1972 TRENDS, page 25. The initial Soviet handling of the Palestinian hijackings in September 1970 and a resume of Moscow's reaction to previous hijacking incidents appear in the 10 September 1970 TRENDS, pages 14-16.

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In a similar vein, Ovchinnikov's international review in PRAVDA on the 10th quoted a joint statement by Arab ambassadors in the FRG "expressing regret" and asserting: "We did everything within our power to find a solution to the problem created by the seizure of the Israeli hostages." Directing the blame elsewhere, Ovchinnikov charged that "Arab reactionaries and Israeli agents" were pushing the Palestinians toward extremism in order to convince world opinion that the Arab partisans "are only fanatical terrorists." He deplored the efforts of "reactionary circles" to use the Munich events as a pretext for an anti-Arab campaign and for "intensifying military provocations" against the Arab countries.

One of the most vehement denials of any connection between Munich and the Israeli raids came from Moscow radio observer Rassadin in an 11 September foreign-language commentary. He denounced as "really monstrous" the "clumsy attempt by Israeli and American officials" to represent Israel's "crimes" as a kind of reply to the Munich tragedy. The purpose of this gambit, Rassadin asserted, was to accuse the Arab countries of complicity in the Olympic Village incident--"an out-and-out lie," since the Arab countries, first of all Lebanon and Syria, "have officially stated that they had nothing whatsoever to do with the actions of the terrorist group in Munich." Rassadin charged that the latest Israeli "acts of aggression" were planned well before the "tragic incident" at the Olympic games.

U.S. VETO        Registering indignation at American use of the veto in the Security Council, Moscow accused the United States of hypocrisy in professing to work for peace while protecting Israel. But there has been no particular emphasis on the veto, and the reaction has been relatively moderate--a restraint presumably imposed by Moscow's sensitivity to its own past use of the veto. The TASS account of the 10 September Security Council session decried the draft resolution submitted by U.S. representative Bush which "tried to justify" Israel's action against Syria and Lebanon by linking "the barbarous raids on peaceful villages" with the "tragic incident" in Munich. TASS attributed to the Washington POST a description of Bush's statement as "pro-Israeli to a greater degree than a statement by the Israeli representative himself could be." Soviet representative Malik rejected attempts to justify the "barbarous killing of Arab civilians by references to the actions of Palestinian resistance organizations."

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Subsequent Soviet reports and commentaries have noted Cairo press criticism of Washington's "unseemly" use of the veto, mentioned Tel Aviv's gratification at U.S. behavior, and called it significant that the U.S. delegate was the only one to vote against a proposal aimed at curbing Israel's "aggressive acts." Rassinin on the 11th saw no surprise in the fact that the United States had again "tried to rescue" Israel, remarking that Israel's "war machine" owed its very existence to American aid. A commentary in Arabic that day took the same tack, calling it unlikely that the United States would let Israel be condemned when it was supplying that country with "the most modern means of annihilation" as well as with "military airmen who are piloting the Phantoms and Skyhawks."

PRAVDA's New York correspondent Kolesnichenko, in an article reported by TASS on the 13th, declared that by blocking the draft resolution the United States demonstrated its support of Israel and encouragement of Tel Aviv's "military provocations." Kolesnichenko reserved his chief criticism for the U.S. draft resolution, from which the "main issue"--the bombing of "peaceful populated localities in Syria and Lebanon"--was, he said, conspicuously missing. He scored the American draft for suggesting condemnation of "a small group of private persons" who staged a terrorist act in Munich and for trying to blame the Arab countries for the present situation in the Middle East and specifically for the terrorists' actions in Munich.

WALDHEIM ON TERRORISM      There is no available Moscow report on UN Secretary General Waldheim's 8 September request that the General Assembly include on its agenda as an "important and urgent" item the consideration of "measures to prevent terrorism." But TASS on the 13th did report Waldheim's press conference on the 12th, noting that he expressed serious concern over the increased cases of terrorism and hoped the General Assembly would be able to take positive decisions to prevent a recurrence of such tactics. TASS also reported Waldheim's view that the assembly "should discuss specifically" the question of insuring the safety of diplomatic personnel in New York and elsewhere, as well as his remark that the United Nations must do everything in its power to solve the Middle East problem.

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### PRC DEPLORES "INCIDENT IN MUNICH," SCORES ISRAELI ATTACKS

Peking has touched only once, belatedly and without detail, on the 5-6 September incidents in Munich, in keeping with its habitual reticence on extremist actions of the Palestinian fedayeen. The sole Chinese references to the terrorist actions at the Olympics-- cryptic allusions, with no mention of any deaths--appeared in an 11 September NCNA report of the Security Council session held the preceding day to discuss Israel's raids against targets in Lebanon and Syria on the 8th.\* PRC delegate Huang Hua took the occasion to put Peking on record as opposing terrorist actions.

The Munich events were completely ignored in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 13th assailing Israel's new "crime" against Syria and Lebanon. At the same time, Peking has muted or avoided the theme of armed struggle by the Palestinians and, consistent with the recent softening of its attacks on the United States, has failed to press the line that Tel Aviv's actions are supported and instigated by Washington. This line appeared only in an NCNA pickup of a 10 September ZERI I POPULLIT editorial, and then in the context of superpower machinations: The Albanian paper charged that in its "hostile acts" Israel enjoys the "direct and indirect support of the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet social-imperialists."

UN DEBATE NCNA's report of the Security Council session said U.S. representative Bush "talked a lot about the abduction of Israeli sportsmen" at the Olympics, "trying to link the incident in Munich with the latest Israeli aggression against Syria and Lebanon in an attempt to whitewash Israel's armed aggression." The report added that the Guinean representative said Syria and Lebanon should not be held responsible for the "incident in Munich," and it noted that British amendments to the draft resolution submitted by Somalia, Guinea, and Yugoslavia "in essence equated" the Israeli attacks with the "Olympic incident."

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\* Peking had dealt in even more cryptic fashion with the 30 May incident at Lod airport, merely citing the Lebanese premier as saying that "whenever an attack took place inside Israel," that country started making threats against Lebanon.

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PRC delegate Huang Hua, in a speech after the voting, rejected as intolerable Israel's attempt "to use the Olympic incident as a pretext to expand its war of aggression" against the Arab countries. Deploring the "unfortunate" episode, Huang said "we have never been in favor of such adventurist acts of terrorism."

Peking's handling of the U.S. veto, reflecting its careful treatment of the United States, may have also betrayed some sensitivity to its own recent use of the veto to forestall Bangladesh's admission to the United Nations. NCNA noted that the U.S. representative "unreasonably" vetoed the draft resolution and went on to report Huang Hua as pointing out "with regret" that as a result of the veto "by a permanent member," even such a "minimum" draft resolution failed to carry. Huang concluded by reasserting the PRC's firm support for the "just struggle" of the Palestinian people and the Arab governments and people to restore their right to national existence, recover their lost territories, and defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Prior to the Security Council debate, NCNA had reported official Egyptian and Syrian statements condemning the Israeli attacks. The only reference to the Palestinian armed resistance in propaganda relating to the 8 September strikes was attributed to a Fatah member: An NCNA dispatch from Damascus on the 9th reported a "leading member" of that fedayeen organization as expressing the Palestinians' resolve to persist in armed struggle and as stating that the commandos were emulating the fighting spirit of the Vietnamese.

PEOPLE'S DAILY      The 8 September Israeli attacks were protested in a 13 September PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which registered "most strong" condemnation of the "war provocations" and said it was not Israeli security which was being threatened but that of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. Commentator dismissed as a "sheer lie with ulterior motives" Israeli assertions that once the Arab people ceased supporting the Palestinian guerrillas, the time would be ripe for peace.

Commentator saw no distinction between the Palestinians' struggle to regain a lost homeland and national rights and that of the Arab countries to recover their lost territories: The two "are an integral whole." The article affirmed that the Palestinian and other Arab peoples naturally sympathize with and support each other and "have come to realize that they must strengthen their unity."

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Again subduing the theme of U.S. influence on Israel's behavior, PEOPLE'S DAILY merely echoed Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's remarks, at a 24 August banquet for the visiting Tunisian foreign minister, in accusing the superpowers of trying to maintain and exploit the "no war, no peace" situation to realize their "plot to carve out spheres of influence." While Chi had pointedly mentioned Egyptian Government "measures to safeguard the sovereignty of its country" in an implicit reference to the ouster of Soviet military personnel, PEOPLE'S DAILY simply expressed conviction that the Arab and Palestinian peoples, "upholding independence and keeping the initiative in their own hands," would certainly win "one victory after another" in their just cause.

#### DRV BLAMES BLOODSHED ON "AGGRESSORS," SEES U.S. HAND IN RAIDS

An article in Hanoi's NHAN DAN on 12 September used the "bloody incident" in Munich as the point of departure for a broadside against the "brutal nature and perfidious schemes" of the United States and Israel, and a commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN the next day claimed that the Israeli air raids again exposed "the obstinate and utterly bellicose features of the U.S. imperialists and Israeli reactionaries." Both articles betrayed sensitivity to the methods used by the terrorist group in Munich, suppressing the details of the attack on members of the Israeli team. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN referred to "the bloody incident at the Munich Olympic games" only in asserting that the "U.S. imperialists" took advantage of the incident to "whip up anti-Arab hysteria."

NHAN DAN, rather than praising the Palestinians, sought to exculpate them by shifting the blame to "the aggressors," quoting Algiers radio as commenting that the bloodshed resulted from Israeli and West German treachery. Claiming that the bloodshed "could have been avoided," NHAN DAN charged that the "aggressive" elements who could have prevented the deaths of the 11 Israelis were "whipping up a chauvinistic hysteria in Israel" and fomenting a protest movement "within the so-called 'civilized world' to vilify" the Palestinian people's struggle and threaten and split the Arab countries.

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, focusing its charges on the United States, accused Washington of "creating the 'Israeli republic,'" shoring up the Israeli administration, and training and equipping its army as a shock force in defense of U.S. interests in the Middle

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East. The paper noted the U.S. veto in the Security Council of the draft resolution "submitted by the Arab countries" in condemnation of Israel's "aggression."

Hanoi media have generally ignored past Palestinian extremist actions, confining comment to standard expressions of support for the Palestinian cause on such occasions as the June 1967 war anniversary and the "international day of solidarity with the Palestinian people" observed in May. Israeli raids in southern Lebanon earlier this year also prompted comment, and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN last March assailed King Husayn's plan-- "masterminded by U.S. imperialism"--for a federated United Arab Kingdom, calling it an effort to obliterate the Palestinian partisans. DRV references to Palestinian guerrilla actions have been undetailed, in the general context of comment associating the Palestinians--and the Arabs in general--with the Vietnamese as victims of "imperialist aggressive" policies.

#### **BULGARIA, ALBANIA: MUNICH ACT DID NOT HELP PALESTINIANS**

Sofia, after a cautious start, has joined the other East European capitals in criticizing the "extremist" action in Munich. Tirana, while denouncing the act as failing to help the Palestinians' struggle, has expressed continued support for their "just cause."

**BULGARIA** RABOTNICHESKO DELO's sports page on the 6th had a fairly objective news report accompanied by a commentary which, after referring at the outset to the 5 September "incident in Olympic Village concerning the group of Israeli athletes," was largely devoted to the alleged failure of West German security precautions against such standard foes as "pro-fascist" and "anti-Soviet" elements. The news report on the incident, while cautiously referring to the "armed persons" and "attackers," did cite the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY to the effect that the Palestinian "Black September" had taken responsibility for the incident. The paper also noted that the attackers demanded the release of 200 Palestinian prisoners.

On the 7th the news agency BTA reported condemnation of the "act of terrorism" at Munich in a statement by the Bulgarian Olympic delegation, and RABOTNICHESKO DELO the same day denounced the "Palestinian extremist organization" Black September for its "senseless act, from the political point of view," against the Israeli delegation. Like other East European reaction, the Sofia

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paper declared that terrorism is the last thing that could contribute to a solution of the Palestinian problem, and claimed that "a series of Arab countries along with the main force of Palestinian resistance" also condemned this act of political terrorism.

ALBANIA In a 7 September ATA dispatch, Tirana reported the deaths of the 11 Israelis as a result of the Black September action and said the Albanian people condemned the "terroristic" act as one which did not serve the Palestinians' "just struggle against the Zionist aggressors." But a BASHKIMI article, reported by Tirana's domestic service on the 10th, assailed President Nixon for "shedding crocodile tears" for the victims and Jordanian King Husayn for "expressing contempt for the Palestinian patriots." Although the methods used by the Black September in Munich and the "extremes of some minor group" were to be condemned, the paper said, the Palestinian cause was just and would be supported by the Albanian people.

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## SALT AND DISARMAMENT

### MOSCOW QUESTIONS U.S. SUPPORT FOR "EQUAL SECURITY" PRINCIPLE

Implicitly calling into question the Administration's continued support for the "principle of equal security" to which both sides subscribed at the Moscow summit, an article in the Soviet foreign affairs weekly NOVOYE VREMYA further blurred the thin line Moscow has drawn between the view of the Administration and of the "military-industrial complex" in the controversy surrounding the Senate debate on the SALT agreements.

Entitled "A Game on Beaten Trump Cards?--On the Principle of Equal Security and Relapses into the 'Policy of Strength' in Washington," the article was signed by V. Larionov, a USA Institute section head who has written hardlining articles on U.S. military and nuclear strategy for the journal USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY. The NOVOYE VREMYA article, in issue No. 37 published on 8 September, appeared as the Senate debate remained stalemated on the U.S.-Soviet Interim Agreement on limiting offensive weapons and just before Presidential adviser Kissinger's arrival in Moscow for talks on the 10th. NOVOYE VREMYA has frequently been used as a vehicle for comment on international issues that are avoided or treated more warily in the central daily press.

Reviewing the Congressional debate on the SALT accords and the Defense Department appropriation proposals submitted to Congress for the 1972-73 fiscal year, the article stated that an arms race "disguised" by an effort to improve the quality of armaments takes advantage of the letter of the SALT accords, which proscribe the buildup but not the modernization of strategic weaponry, in order to contravene their spirit. The proposed new U.S. weapons programs, Larionov said, could provoke a new round in the arms race "and consequently impede the consolidation of trust" between Moscow and Washington.

The thrust of Larionov's article, more pointed than in prior Soviet comment, was to caution the Administration against leaning toward support of "Pentagon" demands that are out of harmony with the principles espoused in Moscow. Larionov argued that the SALT agreements were concluded strictly on the basis of "the realism and readiness of the U.S. leaders to adhere to the principle of equal security." If the Administration believes it reached the accords on the basis of a "position of strength"

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stance vis-a-vis the USSR, he contended, then "shortsighted decisions by the Administration could step up" the arms race. Larionov imputed "precisely" such views to Secretary Laird, saying Laird testified before Congressional committees "that the favorable outcome of the first phase of the [SALT] negotiations proved possible solely because the United States acted throughout 'from a position of strength' and that it 'must continue to maintain this position' if it wants 'to insure success in the next phase of the negotiations.'" Pointing out that both the USSR and the United States have repudiated such views, Larionov cited remarks by Brezhnev and the President, quoting the latter's 23 May Moscow dinner toast calling for "agreements based on mutual respect and reciprocity."

Larionov outlined three arguments used by "the Pentagon and its advocates in Congress" in their demands for "colossal appropriations for the development of strategic arms systems":

+ "New programs are necessary 'to reinforce' the accords"--a position Larionov ascribed to Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer. Secretary of State Rogers, the article noted, has sought to refute this by stating publicly that the agreements are "reliable and verifiable."

+ "New arms systems are 'a strong bargaining chip' for the new stage of the negotiations with the USSR"--a replay, Larionov remarked, of arguments advanced earlier in support of deployment of the Safeguard ABM system.

+ The new arms programs "provide for the modernization, not the buildup, of strategic forces, and this is not prohibited by the agreements signed in Moscow." Here Larionov cited the New York TIMES for the view that this approach brings into question "the atmosphere of trust" established at Moscow.

Directing an implicit admonition at the Administration and the President on the last point, Larionov said "many senators have drawn attention to the disparity between the Pentagon's demands and the provisions of the document on the Basic Principles of Relations Between the USSR and the United States." Moscow has made a special point since the summit of noting that the document bears the signatures of Brezhnev and the President personally.

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The Larionov article went beyond the 23 August remarks by CPSU Politburo member Suslov, who labeled as "absurd" the "illusion" that the U.S. "military-industrial complex" could conduct the forthcoming round of SALT negotiations with the USSR "from a position of strength" and warned that the USSR would follow the attempts of these forces "to distort the spirit and letter" of the SALT accords. The article also went beyond the 5 September Trofimenko IZVESTIYA article which called on the United States to observe "not only the letter but the spirit" of the accords, pointing out that "without formally violating the letter of the Moscow agreements, it is possible through unilateral actions to violate the common spirit of agreement so gravely and sharply as to endanger the effectiveness of the agreements themselves."

#### POLISH ARMY PAPER COMMENTS ON "DIFFICULT" SALT AGENDA

In the most forthcoming treatment of the agenda for the next round of SALT to appear in either the Soviet or East European central press since the Moscow summit, the Polish army paper ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI on 5 September discussed the "difficult" issue of NATO's nuclear potential and the "greatest difficulty" of getting Britain and France to agree to let the United States "represent them" in the next SALT round. The article, signed by Jerzy Rulicz and entitled "Before the Second Round of SALT," appeared the same day as the Trofimenko IZVESTIYA article on SALT--on the eve of the resumption of the Senate debate on the Interim Agreement.

In markedly harsher terms than Moscow has used, Rulicz took issue with alleged Administration attempts to exploit "loopholes" in the SALT agreements for the modernization of strategic arms. Regarding prospects for halting the arms race, he stated flatly that "much depends on the good will of the sides concerned," but that "as the information to date shows, this good will on the part of the American side had better not be expected."

Predicting that the second round of SALT "will certainly be far more difficult than the first," Rulicz said the new round "will cover more complicated areas on which agreement will be more difficult." The problem of "the nuclear potential of NATO," in his view, is complicated by unwillingness on the part of Britain and France to let the United States speak for them and by a resistance in NATO to "all ideas of denuclearization."

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Linking the future of SALT with the projected European conference on security and cooperation, the ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI article observed that if progress is made in preparing the European conference, the "atmosphere of relaxation" will grow and "will no doubt exert an additional impact" on the SALT round in Geneva. Trofimenko's IZVESTIYA article had likewise linked the SALT accords and European security issues, saying the U.S. press had stressed that the accords have "created a good basis for solving the problem of troop and arms reduction in Europe, in Central Europe in the first place, as well as favorable conditions for progress along the road of establishing an all-European security system." Regarding the next SALT round, Trofimenko merely cited U.S. press accounts indicating that the discussion "could center" on converting the Interim Agreement into a permanent agreement, "as well as on the expansion of limitations to cover all kinds of offensive weapons and the problems of controlling the technological --qualitative--aspects of the arms race." In very limited comment, Moscow has made clear its view that the "important problem" of force reductions in Europe "must become the subject of independent discussion" rather than serving as a precondition for the European security conference.

The Warsaw press has on occasion in the past elaborated substantive issues under consideration at the strategic arms talks which Moscow has approached cautiously in its own name. Notably, a TRYBUNA LUDU article on 17 February 1971 examined in some detail the issue of U.S. forward bases which a PRAVDA article had broached in more general terms two weeks earlier; the Polish article acknowledged in the process that Washington had rejected two Soviet proposals advanced in Helsinki.\*

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\*See the TRENDS of 24 February 1971, pages 33-35.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA - FRG

## CSSR OFFICIAL SIGNALS POSSIBLE CONCESSION ON MUNICH PACT ISSUE

A possible concession on the issue of the 1938 Munich agreement, a continuing stumbling block in the Prague-Bonn exploratory talks on normalizing relations, seemed indicated in Prague reports of 3 September remarks in which CSSR Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek called for FRG recognition of the invalidity of the agreement without adding the standard "ab initio." The stipulation that the agreement must be recognized as invalid from its inception has been a staple of Prague's long-standing formula on the issue. The West German position, maintained in five rounds of the exploratory talks, has been that to recognize the invalidity of the Munich pact from the beginning would have the effect, among other things, of invalidating civil acts involving Germans in the Sudetenland following Hitler's takeover of the area; Bonn grants that the agreement is invalid today but argues that it was merely "unjust"--not invalid--at its inception.

Prague has made one clear concession. The initial Czechoslovak formula called for FRG recognition of the invalidity of the Munich pact ab initio, "with all the consequences arising therefrom." The Czechoslovaks dropped the final phrase on consequences, which had left the West Germans no room for maneuver on the issue, in a concession signaled when the formula appeared without that phrase in the communique of the 7 August 1971 Crimea meeting of Soviet bloc first secretaries. Subsequent Prague statements have adhered to the Crimea formulation.

Whether Chnoupek's apparent further dilution of the formula represented a trial balloon or foreshadows a softening of Prague's negotiating position is unclear. No text of his speech has been publicized, but summaries by the Prague domestic radio, CTK, and four Czechoslovak newspapers all dropped the "ab initio" phrase--heretofore an ingredient of the formulistic position Prague media have always expressed with the utmost care. At the same time, the central party daily RUDE PRAVO carried a terse report of Chnoupek's remarks which did not quote him at all on the subject of relations with Bonn; instead the paper highlighted a speech by another leading Czechoslovak figure who used the standard formulation complete with "ab initio."

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And Moscow, after totally ignoring Chnoupek's speech, quoted him in a TASS interview four days later as repeating the standard formula, including "ab initio."

CHNOUPEK SPEECH      Summaries of Chnoupek's 3 September speech, delivered in Ostrava to mark the anniversary of the 1944 Slovak National Uprising, were carried by the Prague domestic radio and CTK on the 3d and printed on the 4th in the Prague dailies MLADA FRONTA, PRACE, and LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE as well as in Bratislava PRAVDA. Chnoupek was reported as stating, on the score of "normalizing" relations with Bonn, that "the settlement of the question of FRG recognition of the invalidity of the Munich agreement would undoubtedly have a favorable influence on the general atmosphere in Europe."

Indirectly recalling the impasse at the fifth round of bilateral talks held in Prague in June, Chnoupek reportedly added that "even this question could be brought to agreement acceptable to both sides without any 'breaks for reflection' and delays." The FRG representative, State Secretary Frank, had noted at the end of the June round that the two sides had agreed to recommend to their respective governments "a pause for reflection" before resuming the deadlocked discussions. Subsequent Prague comment criticized pessimistic estimates of the status of the talks by the West German "reactionary" press.

Chnoupek also remarked that in the exploratory talks Prague had said "it was ready to oblige" in settling questions concerning "the legal security of persons" and was prepared to give "suitable guarantees" on this point, adding that "such a solution could still be reached before the West German parliamentary elections even if they should be held this year"--an optimistic view that had also been expressed in the party organ RUDE PRAVO on 8 July, just after the end of the latest round of the talks.

RUDE PRAVO's report of Chnoupek's Ostrava speech was notably brief and undetailed. On an inside page of its issue of the 4th, the paper noted that the speech was delivered to mark the Slovak anniversary and added that Chnoupek "also dealt with the current international situation and praised the unified peaceful policy of the Soviet Union." The same issue of the paper gave frontpage attention to a harvest festival speech in Nitra by Slovak CP First Secretary Lenart which included the standard call for FRG recognition of the invalidity of the Munich pact ab initio.

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On the 10th, however, the Prague domestic service, reporting a speech by CPCZ Presidium member Kapek in the city of Cheb on the border with West Germany, said Kapek "again stressed the necessity of annulment of the dishonorable Munich agreement"--without the "ab initio" stipulation. Czechoslovak First Secretary Husak, in a harvest festival speech in Hradec Kralove broadcast live on the same day, brushed broadly over the Prague-Bonn relations issue in the statement that "we are striving for normalization, for a reasonable resolution to the problems we have with neighboring West Germany, Austria, and other states."

SOVIET BLOC REPORTS      PRAVDA on 5 September, having ignored Chnoupek's Ostrava speech, reported Lenart's speech in Nitra and a speech delivered by conservative CSSR Federal Assembly Chairman Indra at Namest nad Hana on the same day Chnoupek spoke. On the 7th TASS carried an interview with Chnoupek by its Prague correspondent in which the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister reiterated virtually all the points he had made on Prague-Bonn relations in the Ostrava speech and, in the passage in FRG recognition of the invalidity of the Munich pact, restored the element of the formula dropped in the Prague reports. He declared in the interview, TASS said, that FRG recognition of the Munich agreement "as null and void from its very inception" would improve the general atmosphere in Europe. The TASS interview was reproduced in PRAVDA on the 8th.

In the 13 September morning IZVESTIYA, however, an article on the FRG-Czechoslovak talks by V. Novikov begs the question of the "ab initio" proviso, to judge from two passages quoted in TASS' summary of the article. TASS quotes Novikov as recalling that at the last round of the bilateral talks the CSSR delegation "demonstrated good will by pointing out a possibility of solving the question concerning the invalidity of the Munich agreement." It also quotes him as observing that "most states have long ago announced that they regard the shameful deal in Munich as invalid." The appearance of a Soviet press article devoted to the Prague-Bonn talks at this juncture is noteworthy in itself: Moscow seldom discusses the talks in its own name, normally confining itself to citing Prague, and comment on the subject in the central press has been extremely rare.

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East European reporting of Chnoupek's 3 September speech has not clarified the status of the Czechoslovak formula on the Munich agreement. A brief PAP account of the speech in the Polish party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on 5 September obscured the situation by citing Chnoupek's remarks on the Munich agreement twice, first including the phrase "from the very beginning" and in the next paragraph omitting it. The East German party daily NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, on the other hand, in a brief report on the 4th attributed to ADN's Prague correspondent, used the same formulation that appeared in the Prague dailies, omitting "ab initio."

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## YUGOSLAVIA

### TITO PLEDGES CONTINUING PURGE, DEP-ORES "HUE AND CRY" ABROAD

In a wide-ranging series of speeches during a tour of Croatia and Bosnia, Tito vigorously defended the continuing campaign against nationalism in Yugoslavia and reaffirmed his pledge to purge party members and other dissidents who do not live up to their responsibilities. With foreign and possibly also domestic critics in mind, Tito admonished his audiences against letting themselves be influenced by the "hue and cry" which Yugoslavia's "enemies" were raising over the anti-nationalism campaign. At the same time, however, he warned centralist, hardline elements against waging "witch hunts"--injunctions reflecting concern over the destabilizing internal impact of such actions and the adverse international effects they would have at a time when political trials in Czechoslovakia are being widely assailed as neo-Stalinist manifestations.

Tito's decision to take to the provinces to defend the clampdown came against the backdrop of trials of government and party officials and intellectuals in Croatia and other republics in the aftermath of last December's crisis over the Croatian nationalist movement. The current trial of four former student leaders for "counterrevolutionary" actions, on charges arising out of the student strike last November, is being given ample coverage in Yugoslav media. Where Soviet media have approvingly reported Tito's tightening of party discipline, Western reports have portrayed a mood of bitterness and alienation in Croatia resulting from the crackdown and have raised questions about the direction in which Yugoslavia is moving politically.

In an address to shipyard workers in Rijeka on 4 September, reported by Radio Belgrade, Tito set the tone of his tour by seeking to mobilize worker support for the anti-nationalist crackdown. Attacking the nationalist danger along stock lines to develop the rationale for the action against dissidents, Tito praised the workers for opposing nationalist manifestations during the November-December crisis, noting that even in Zagreb nationalist elements had "not won support from workers." He added pointedly: "It was different there with segments of the intelligentsia."

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In the Rijeka address and in subsequent speeches Tito exploited the "enrichment" theme--the charge that unnamed persons have been amassing wealth through "various speculations" at the workers' expense. Addressing a group of Zagreb worker organizations on the 8th, he stressed that "those who are unjustifiably acquiring what the workers create cannot be in the League of Communists." He also called for a purge of communists who continue to disregard party directives. Pointing out that the party's first task is "to clean up our ranks, he rebuked critics with the remark that "nobody has the right to reproach us and to interfere." In this context he urged workers to ignore "the hue and cry raised by our enemies outside the country the moment we put pressure on somebody."

In a lengthy speech in Bosnia on the 10th--broadcast live by Radio Belgrade--on the anniversary of the Kozara battle, Tito again called for energetic action against "opportunists" in the party and indicated concern about the orientation of the youth in particular. Declaring that the struggle against nationalism must extend to all republics, he again in effect defended the methods being used:

We must point out that there is no room for compassion, compromise, or sentimentality in our ranks when such a dangerous enemy as the class enemy is involved. Such communists cannot remain in leading posts.

Despite the uncompromising language, Tito again declined to name names and cautioned against the waging of "a witch hunt and who knows what else" under the banner of the anti-nationalist struggle. Since the crackdown began last winter, the party leadership has continued to direct such warnings at hardline centralist elements who have called for even harsher actions against dissident elements, including the trial of the ousted Croatian party leadership.

Laying propaganda groundwork for the third youth conference in November, Tito returned to a familiar theme in assailing professors who "poison" the youth with anticommunist, anti-self-management ideas. He went on to dwell on the need for "reinstating" Marxism at all levels of education and thundered: "No autonomy of any kind of the university can prevent us from doing this! We must do this!"

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TASS' prompt summary of the speech highlighted those portions stressing the need for party unity and discipline. It noted that Tito said the main task now is "to purge the ranks of the LCY" and to fight the "class enemy not only within the country but abroad as well."

**CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM** In the 10 September speech, dwelling on the "outside enemy" in an effort to shore up internal unity, Tito assailed anti-Yugoslav terrorist groups and the sources--unnamed--that finance them and took West Germany, Sweden, and Australia to task for "tolerating" them. He went on to observe that the Yugoslav people's task is "to welcome such groups nicely and let them vanish here"--a critical allusion to the treatment of 19 Croatian emigre guerrillas who were reportedly killed by the Yugoslav police after entering Croatia in June.

Tito wound up his provincial tour with an indictment of "terror in general," including the Munich killings, Israel's retaliatory actions against the Arabs, and the bombing in Indochina. In contrast to the more cautious Yugoslav stand on earlier terrorist acts by Arab extremist groups, Tito declared that "it is now necessary to learn some lessons from what happened in Munich and to do something through the United Nations to insure that terrorism will no longer exist on a world scale." Tito's remarks on this score may have been responsive to Secretary General Waldheim's 8 September call to UN members to put an "important and urgent" item dealing with terror on the agenda of the next General Assembly.

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## KOREA - USSR - CHINA

### KATUSHEV VISIT, NATIONAL DAY OBSERVANCES REFLECT RELATIONS

A Soviet party delegation led by Secretary Katushev, who is in charge of relations with ruling parties, visited the DPRK from 3 to 11 September on a "friendly visit" at the invitation of the KWP Central Committee. Party relations were discussed, but the precise purpose of the visit was not specified. The visit came against a background of warm Sino-Korean relations centering on convergent interests in recent developments concerning Korean unification. Moscow has been notably reserved toward these developments, perhaps reflecting pique over not being sufficiently informed as well as concern over their implications for the German question.\*

The last high-level Soviet delegation to visit the DPRK was a party-government delegation led by Politburo member and First Deputy Premier Mazurov which attended the celebrations in July 1971 of the 10th anniversary of the Soviet-DPRK treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. Mazurov had led a similar delegation to Pyongyang in August 1970 to attend the observance of the 25th anniversary of Korean liberation.

Comment on the Katushev visit reflected something less than a complete meeting of the minds between the two sides. The visit was highlighted by a meeting with Kim Il-song, which both sides' media as well as the joint communique described as having taken place in "a cordial and friendly atmosphere." A TASS report added that "questions of party cooperation" and "other questions of mutual interest" were discussed. According to TASS, Katushev said at a Soviet embassy reception that his talks with Kim were "useful and fruitful" and that there was a "thorough exchange of opinion."

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\* It is possible that the Soviets were briefed on the North-South Korean contacts when a foreign ministry delegation comprising M.S. Kapitsa, head of a Far Eastern affairs department, and the vice director of the ministry's international organizations department visited in June, though that visit's primary purpose was presumably to discuss the handling of the Korean question in the forthcoming UNGA session. Moscow's reserved treatment of the 4 July North-South Korean joint statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 23 August 1972, pages 25-27.

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