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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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30 AUG 1972


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# **TRENDS**

**in Communist Propaganda**

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
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30 AUGUST 1972  
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FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

## CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . 1

### INDOCHINA

Hanoi Comments on Nixon Convention Speech, U.S. Elections . . . . 1  
NHAN DAN Announces Propaganda Drive to Mark Anniversaries . . . . 6  
Belated Release, Changes in DRV Slogans Follow Polemics . . . . . 7  
Paris: "Escalation" Assailed, GVN POW-Release Offer Ignored . . . . 9  
DRV Routinely Protests Air Strikes, Notes Dike Maintenance . . . . 12  
Peking Protests U.S. Sinking of Vessel Off DRV Coast . . . . . 18  
Moscow Denounces U.S. Bombings, Observes "Dike Day" . . . . . 20  
Pathet Lao Delegation Tours Several Communist Countries . . . . . 23  
Funeral, Pathet Lao Visit Prompt Leader Appearances in Hanoi . . . . 26

### MIDDLE EAST

Moscow Berates Cairo Critics But Claims Relations Unchanged . . . . 27  
PRAVDA Urges Palestinian "National Front," Political Program . . . . 30

### U.S. ELECTIONS

Moscow Cites Republican Views on Need for U.S.-Soviet Dialog . . . . 33

### USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Cinema Committee Chief Romanov Removed Under Fire . . . . . 36

### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Husak Assails Western "Progressive" Critics of Recent Trials . . . . 38

CONFIDENTIAL

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**30 AUGUST 1972**

- 1 -

**TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 21 - 27 AUGUST 1972**

<u>Moscow (2900 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1340 items)</u>		
Vietnam	(9%)	7%	Domestic Issues	(39%)	38%
[U.S. Air Strikes	(2%)	3%]	PRC Vessel Attacked	(--)	4%
[Solidarity Month	(2%)	2%]	Off DRV Coast		
Romanian National Day	(--)	6%	Indochina	(10%)	9%
Supreme Soviet	(--)	4%	[Vietnam	(5%)	5%]
Discussion of SALT			Romanian National Day	(--)	8%
Accords			Bangladesh UN Seat	(0.1%)	4%
Mars 2 & 3 Probes	(0.1%)	3%	Tunisian Delegation	(--)	3%
Middle East	(1%)	3%	in PRC		
China	(3%)	3%	Tanzanian Delegation	(--)	3%
			in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

30 AUGUST 1972

- 1 -

## INDOCHINA

Hanoi has departed sharply from its traditional portrayal of differences among U.S. political leaders as superficial disagreements over tactics and strategy. The conclusion of the Republican Party convention and President Nixon's 23 August acceptance speech prompted a flurry of propaganda attacking the Administration's policies and expressing approval of the Democratic Party's positions on Vietnam. Hanoi has initially reacted to the President's 29 August press conference with a radio commentary on the 30th denouncing his statement that bombing and mining of the North will continue unless there is substantial progress in negotiations and his remarks on the further withdrawal of U.S. forces.

In the wake of the 17 and 19 August NHAN DAN editorials, which lectured Hanoi's big communist allies and bitterly assailed policies of "reconciliation" and "compromise" with the United States, a NHAN DAN editorial on 24 August announced the launching of a large-scale drive to inform the populace about party policies. The editorial carried no echoes of the renewed polemic, but it did note that "recent important NHAN DAN editorials" will be among the documents studied in the current drive. Hanoi media had previously labeled the editorial of the 17th "important." The possibility that there was disagreement on the content of the annual slogans marking the anniversary of the August Revolution (19 August) and DRV National Day (2 September) is suggested by substantive changes and by the fact that they were released considerably later--on 25 August--than in any previous year. DRV leaders put on a show of unity, with Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong making concurrent public appearances for the first time in months.

The divergent interests of the communist powers have been reflected in reactions to Peking's 24 August charge that U.S. aircraft sank a lifeboat belonging to a Chinese merchant ship off the DRV coast on the 22d. While Peking made a point of insisting that the boat was not moving supplies to the North Vietnamese, Hanoi seized on the incident to portray a systematic U.S. challenge to China and other communist countries aiding the DRV. Moscow's reports were contrived to indicate that Peking is not letting the interdiction measures jeopardize its relations with Washington.

### HANOI COMMENTS ON NIXON CONVENTION SPEECH, U.S. ELECTIONS

In its attacks on Administration policies following the conclusion of the Republican Party convention, Hanoi has repeatedly cited the

CONFIDENTIAL

30 AUGUST 1972

- 2 -

Democratic Party's position on Vietnam in approving terms and has altered its standard line that there is no significant difference between the two U.S. political parties and their candidates.

Initial DRV reaction to President Nixon's 23 August speech accepting the nomination came in a radio commentary on the 24th which reiterated recent Hanoi criticism of optimistic statements attributed to Administration spokesmen on the possibility of a Vietnam settlement.\* Noting that the Republican platform endorsed the Administration's position on Vietnam and that the President's speech "reaffirmed the maintenance of Thieu" to prevent the imposition of a communist regime, the radio declared caustically that

with such an obdurate and warlike position,  
. . . it is clear that there is no basis for  
moving toward an end to the war as promised  
by the Nixon clique. On the contrary, we  
have adequate grounds to affirm that the  
Nixon clique is trying to prolong the Vietnam  
war of aggression and will only negotiate to  
end it when Nixon's impudent conditions are  
met . . . .

Like other propaganda on the subject, the broadcast went on to observe that the Democratic Party platform had "met the demands of the American people" for an unconditional end to the bombing, withdrawal of U.S. troops, and an end to support for Thieu.

The President's acceptance speech was discussed in detail in a 25 August Hanoi radio commentary which deprecated his remarks about achieving progress toward ending the war, traveling tens of thousands of miles to reach a negotiated settlement, and ending the U.S. ground combat role. It assailed his reiteration of the proposal for withdrawing U.S. troops following a cease-fire, noting that he had said nothing about the problem of the future government of South Vietnam and calling his proposal a scheme aimed at forcing the South Vietnamese people to lay down their weapons and approve the existence of the Thieu administration.

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\* Previous Hanoi comment on this subject is discussed in the TRENDS of 23 August 1972, pages 9-10.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 3 -

The 25 August commentary also dismissed the President's suggestion of elections under international supervision and with communist participation, protesting that such elections would be held "within the framework of the U.S. lackey-puppet administration's regime." Hanoi comment on allied peace proposals this year has not specifically noted the offer of communist participation in elections, but this offer had been reported in Hanoi media when it was proposed by Thieu in his 11 July 1969 speech.\* The President's pledges not to abandon U.S. POW's, allow the imposition of a communist government, or stain the honor of the United States were labeled by the radio "brazen 'turning black into white' arguments."

DRV criticism of the President's speech was repeated in the Hanoi press on 26, 27, and 28 August. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 26th accused him of "uttering hypocritical words about peace" while "having his subordinates hurl threats." Documenting the charge, the army paper cited Western news agencies as reporting, among other things, that "U.S. air commanders have brazenly shouted for continuing the bombing of North Vietnam for at least three more years." This may be an allusion to an interview with unidentified high-level U.S. Air Force officials on the 23d, which included a reference to the possibility that the bombing might go on for another three years as well as speculation that sizable amounts of outside aid were getting through to Hanoi. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN did not further identify the source of its quotation but went on to say that "they revealed that they had proposed to Nixon selected military formulas which would certainly cause thousands of casualties to civilians."

The most direct Vietnamese communist reaction to the President's remarks about the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and China came in a Liberation Radio commentary on the 29th which opened with the observation that "if anyone has dreamed of seeing a change in Nixon's extremely reactionary policy during the last months of his Presidential term, that dream is now surely lost." In an attack on the President's outline of the Administration's foreign policy, the radio asserted that the President

boasted about his perfidious maneuvers in getting a compromise and establishing a

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\* This aspect of Thieu's speech was noted, for example, in a 13 July 1969 NHAN DAN article--see the 16 July 1969 TRENDS, page 3.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 4 -

relationship with one country in order to have a free hand to cope with another country, and in sowing disunity among the socialist countries and other peace-loving countries in the world in order to make it easy for the United States to dominate the world.

The commentary charged that the President is pursuing "expansionist and aggressive designs based on the so-called U.S. strength," citing as evidence the Administration's "stubborn" opposition to a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe and to ending U.S. support of "reactionary administrations in Greece, Israel, and Taiwan on the illogical pretext that it is necessary to maintain the confidence of the U.S. allies." The issue of U.S. support for "dictatorial" governments had been raised in a 21 August NHAN DAN article by Nguyen Huu Chinh, which similarly held that the U.S. policy of detente was aimed at gaining a free hand to cope with the world revolutionary movement and to bully the small nations.\* Chinh asked: "How can one forget that the Nixon Administration has always been the intimate friend of the dictatorial fascist regimes in Greece, Spain, and Portugal?"

U.S. POLITICAL SCENE      Hanoi's new, differentiated portrayal of the views of the rival U.S. political parties had been foreshadowed in the 18 August "Chien Thang" article which noted the presence of "reasonable heads in U.S. political circles." A NHAN DAN article on the 28th made the change in Hanoi's appraisal explicit, stating that the two American political parties no longer offer virtually identical platforms. This and other commentaries on the subject do not make clear what Hanoi hopes to accomplish by airing its preference in the U.S. election. One article, the 27 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN discussion of the President's acceptance speech, took note of his statement that the American people will not tolerate any attempt by the enemy to interfere with their right to make their own decision on what is best for America; calling this statement "impudent, the army paper remarked that "obviously Nixon looked down on the level of consciousness of the American progressive, justice-loving, and freedom-loving public."

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\* See the 23 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 5-6.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 5 -

NHAN DAN on the 25th developed at length the contrast between Republican and Democratic views reflected in the two party platforms. On the Vietnam issue, the article said, the Democratic platform reflects "an effort to analyze the failures and errors the United States has committed in Vietnam and Indochina, and hence to find a way out." The Republican platform, according to the article, is "replete with distortions of facts and insults to the Democratic candidates" while "stirring the chauvinistic and conservative thoughts of a number of Americans." The article stated further that the Republican platform "obviously runs counter to the urgent needs of the Vietnamese and American peoples and stubbornly sticks to an aggressive and neocolonialist stand." It concluded with the charge that the Republican Party "represents the interests of the leading American capitalists and of American political forces cherishing many expansionist and aggressive ambitions," and that it is characterized by "hawkishness and conservatism."

Earlier Hanoi comment on the Republican convention had also referred to the Democratic platform in favorable terms. A 22 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN report on antiwar demonstrations in Miami observed that the Democratic Party, "faced with the U.S. imperialists' stalemate and serious setback in Vietnam, endorsed a platform containing positive factors to move toward a correct peaceful solution to the Vietnam problem--a solution consistent with the legitimate aspirations of the American people, who demand an early end to the war." Ngo Dien, head of the DRV Foreign Ministry's Department of Press and Information, had been reported by VNA on 27 July as stating--in much the same terms as QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 22d--that McGovern's position on Indochina "contains positive elements which would lead to a correct, peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the American people for an early cessation of the war of aggression in Vietnam."\* Ngo Dien saw McGovern's nomination as "mainly due" to this stand and as reflecting "a new trend in the United States." The point was carried to its full conclusion in the 28 August NHAN DAN article, which observed that "in past years during the various Presidential elections the American voters generally had to make a choice between political twins," whereas this time they have "a clearcut choice" between "two opposite paths and policies which are different from one another in many fields."

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\* The comment was made in reply to a question during a press conference at which Ngo Dien released a foreign ministry memorandum on alleged U.S. escalation of the war. See the TRENDS of 2 August 1972, pages 5-6.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 6 -

The NHAN DAN article claimed that the present rival candidates differ most strikingly in their positions on Vietnam, the budget, and the arms race. Citing McGovern's proposal for cutting defense expenditures, the paper said it reflects "the stand of a certain part of American capitalist circles" which believes that the United States cannot be attacked by any country in coming years and that savings from defense expenditures should be used to increase investments in industry and building, to strengthen the position of the dollar, and to restore the U.S. competitive position "in the international capitalist market." NHAN DAN went on to observe that the "McGovern phenomenon" has taken place under conditions in which "millions of Americans are associating their demand for the cessation of this unjust and costly war with the demands for many changes in the country along progressive and democratic lines."

Hanoi's traditional view of U.S. election politics was typified by a statement in a September 1967 article by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap:

Despite a possible change of presidents, the U.S. imperialists' aggressive policy cannot be changed in nature. The U.S. presidential elections are but a distribution of hierarchies among the personalities of the parties of the ruling capitalist class in the United States.

An unusually detailed exposition of the Marxist view of U.S. politics in the September 1967 issue of the DRV journal TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING) held that the two parties merely represented the views of rival "monopoly groups in the American capitalist class." As for politicians who criticized the war, the author maintained that "the hawk and dove blocs have two different strategies to resolve the war of aggression in Vietnam, but they basically still represent the viewpoint of the American monopoly capitalists."

#### NHAN DAN ANNOUNCES PROPAGANDA DRIVE TO MARK ANNIVERSARIES

Broadcast in Hanoi's domestic service, NHAN DAN's 24 August editorial heralded the launching of a large-scale propaganda drive to inform the North Vietnamese people about Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) policies. On the occasion of the August Revolution

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 7 -

anniversary and DRV National Day, the editorial said, the VWP Secretariat advocated the organization of "a political activity drive with the aim of clearly explaining the basic situation of the resistance" after the past four months of fighting. This explanatory drive, the editorial added, will enable "everyone to realize our great, overall, and steady victories, our position of initiative, and our ascending and certainly victorious posture and the enemy's passive, bogged-down, and defeated posture." Secretariat circulars released by Hanoi for the observance of past anniversaries have similarly called for propaganda campaigns. This year's directions from the Secretariat have not been released by the radio or press.

While the 24 August editorial did not echo Hanoi's recently renewed polemics against its big communist allies, it did note that "recent important NHAN DAN editorials" will be among the documents studied during the propaganda drive, thereby suggesting that the editorial of the 17th--previously labeled "important" by Hanoi media--will be the basis for an explanation to the people of Hanoi's problems with Moscow and Peking.

According to the editorial, the study drive will also review "the Politburo's resolution" and statements by the DRV, NFLSV, and PRC. The Politburo resolution was not further identified. An article by the editor of NHAN DAN, Hoang T. --published in the 8 July issue of the paper--had similarly noted widespread political activities including the study of various party documents, among them a Politburo resolution. The Hoang Tung article and the 24 August editorial both mentioned the role of a newly-organized network of "reporters" in propagandizing these documents and explaining the party line. Organization of such a network had been urged in the January-February issue of the journal TUYEN HUAN.

#### **BELATED RELEASE, CHANGES IN DRV SLOGANS FOLLOW POLEMICS**

The DRV's annual slogans to mark the anniversary of the August Revolution (19 August) and DRV National Day (2 September) were released belatedly on 25 August, and their content differs from that of previous years in several respects.\* The departure

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\* The slogans were publicized during the first week in August in 1970 and 1971 and have customarily been released no later than 19 August.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 8 -

from past practice are particularly noteworthy against the background of the 17 and 19 August NHAN DAN editorials, which sharply registered displeasure with Hanoi's big communist allies for pursuing policies of reconciliation and compromise with the United States, and they raise the possibility that there may have been disagreement about their content within the DRV leadership.

The slogans contain the traditional expression of gratitude for the sympathy and "wholehearted assistance" of the parties, governments, and peoples of fraternal socialist countries. However, the slogan thanking peace- and justice-loving people throughout the world for their sympathy and support for the first time in recent years does not specifically mention the "world communist and workers movement." This omission seems especially pointed in the wake of the NHAN DAN editorial on the 17th, which stressed the significance of the support Hanoi had received from the recently held nonaligned conference in Guyana.\* At the same time, the slogans omit the call--added during Hanoi's anti-China polemics last summer after the announcement of President Nixon's Peking visit--to "uphold the spirit of independence and sovereignty, rely mainly on ourselves," an omission that seems curious in light of Hanoi's recent polemical onslaught on its allies.

This year's slogans also omit the call for the "party, people, and army" to "unite around the Central Committee"--a phrase which appeared repeatedly in Hanoi propaganda following Ho Chi Minh's death in September 1969.\*\* This phrase was first used in slogans in January 1970 marking the 40th anniversary of the VWP, and it recurred in the August Revolution-National Day slogans in 1970 and 1971.\*\*\* The slogan which previously contained the unity appeal now leads off with a call for

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\* The 17 August NHAN DAN editorial is discussed in the 23 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 1-4.

\*\* The call for unity behind the Central Committee was made, for example, in a 29 September 1969 VWP Politburo instruction--see the 3 October 1969 TRENDS, pages 9-10.

\*\*\* For reports on these slogans, see the TRENDS of 21 January 1970, pages 13-14; 5 August 1970, page 13; and 11 August 1971, page 2.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

"compatriots and combatants throughout the country" to "be of one mind" and concludes by urging the implementation of Ho's testament and defeat of the "U.S. aggressors."

The impact of the stepped-up action in the North and the South in recent months is reflected in several of this year's slogans. Last year the fighting in the South was noted in a brief plaudit for the victories of the southern PLAF and people. This year there is an additional slogan asking "compatriots and combatants" in the South, "under the banner of the NFLSV," to "step up offensives and uprisings, win greater victories," and thwart Vietnamization and pacification in order to "achieve an independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous South Vietnam advancing to the peaceful reunification of the country." There is also a new slogan addressed to "patriots still in the ranks of the puppet army and administration," who are asked to join the fight to "defeat the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen."

The North's concentration on the war is reflected not only in new references to the military tasks of the North and the need to aid the South, but also in the omission from several slogans of previously standard references to nonmilitary domestic tasks. Thus, the opening slogan calling for implementation of Ho's testament does not include last year's reference to "building socialism," and the slogan on socialist assistance does not note that the aid is for "socialist construction" as well as for the war effort. The slogan on the duties of northerners includes a call for them to "continue to build socialism" while maintaining and boosting production and organizing their life well, but it leaves out the usual reference to the need to successfully fulfill the state plan.

#### PARIS: "ESCALATION" ASSAILED, GVN POW-RELEASE OFFER IGNORED

At the 24 August session of the Paris talks the PRG's Mme. Binh enlarged on her remarks the previous week about the U.S. "error" of pursuing Vietnamization instead of entering into "serious negotiations." VNA, in its usual summary fashion, omitted most of the detail of her four-point discussion, focusing mainly on her charges of prolongation and expansion of the war and her rebuttal of U.S. charges that the Viet Cong are exhausted. Of her lengthy treatment of the 8 May proposal, VNA reported only her statement that it is "an ultimatum forcing the Vietnamese

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

people to accept what the United States has not been able to achieve by bombs and shells on the battlefields over the last four years." It also completely ignored her statement that the U.S. position on the Thieu government--which the White House "unfortunately" reaffirmed in the Republican Party platform--is "the root cause of this war," and her lengthy discourse on the nature of Thieu's "extremely warlike and fascist ruling group."

Omitting also Mme. Binh's charge that "serious negotiations" cannot proceed until the United States ceases its support to Thieu, VNA did cover her concluding remarks in which she reiterated the litany of basic Vietnamese communist demands-- withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops, cessation of support for the Thieu administration and the resignation of Thieu, and the formation of "a broad government of national concord."

In a prepared statement released upon her arrival at the session and reported in full by LA on the 25th, Mme. Binh remarked on President Nixon's acceptance speech at the Republican convention on the 23d, claiming, in the spirit of her remarks at the session, that it was an attempt to deceive the American people. Specifically, she criticized the President's mention of the distance he has traveled in order to try to bring the war to an end. "Why," she asked, "should he make a trip round the world to seek a solution while it is here at this conference and nowhere else?"

DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy--standing in for Minister Xuan Thuy, who is on a 10-day visit to the French Alps--took up the theme of U.S. presentation of a "false and distorted picture" of the situation in Vietnam and contrasted this with the communists' "good will" at the Paris conference. VNA provided only the briefest coverage of his remarks, reporting only his opening statement on U.S. intensification and expansion of the war, his charge that the United States is compensating for its withdrawal of ground troops by escalating the air war, and his concluding remarks on the PRG's "logical and reasonable" proposals for ending the war. The account omitted Vy's brief restatement of last week's "lost opportunities" theme, as well as his charges that the United States has "re-Americanized" the war while the Saigon government has proven itself unable to stand alone. Also unreported was his brief listing of recent U.S. attacks on the DRV and his condemnation of recent remarks by Secretaries Rogers and Laird.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PBS TRENDS

30 AUGUST 1972

- 11 -

Also unreported by VNA was the exchange following the GVN's offer to return 600 sick and wounded prisoners to the North. Mme. Binh and Vy, in rejecting this proposal, called it a "perfidious and well-worn maneuver" and a "meaningless stratagem." The PRC press spokesman, in post-session remarks which as usual went unreported by VNA, called the offer a trick designed to mislead public opinion. As usual, VNA totally ignored the GVN statement and dismissed the remarks of the U.S. side in one sentence, claiming that "the U.S. delegation . . . kept avoiding discussion of the basic points in the PRG's peace plan, thus preventing the conference from making any progress."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 12 -

### DRV ROUTINELY PROTESTS AIR STRIKES, NOTES DIKE MAINTENANCE

Hanoi has so far given only minimal attention to U.S. air strikes this week, issuing four routine foreign ministry spokesman statements. In addition, a series of short reports carried by VNA from 24 through 28 August condemned various military actions: the dropping of a canister bomb containing "hundreds of dart bombs" on a hamlet on the outskirts of Hanoi on the 24th; "savage attacks" by B-52's on the Vinh Long commune in the Vinh Linh area, near the demilitarized zone, on the 25th and 26th, and "tactical air raids" on peasants repairing dikes there; bombing of "many places in and outside Haiphong city" on the 26th; and the dropping of "hundreds of bombs" on a heavily populated sector of Lam Thao district in Vinh Phu Province, northwest of Hanoi, on the 27th. Typical targets reported hit included private dwellings, handicraft and agricultural cooperatives, two schools, a market, and a cemetery; several individual casualties were cited.

The low level of this reaction is unusual in view of the fact that U.S. planes on 27 August attacked supply depots and barracks in the Hanoi-Haiphong region in what U.S. officials termed the heaviest raids on the area in more than four years, while a naval "task force" of four ships shelled the Haiphong area in the first such attack since those of 9-11 May. Large-scale attacks on either of the DRV's two major cities usually provoke official reaction at the level of a foreign ministry statement within two or three days; in like manner, the earlier naval attack on Haiphong was protested in a foreign ministry statement of 11 May.\* The only references to the raids so far available appeared in the 28 August foreign ministry spokesman's statement which condemned the rocketing of a village in the suburbs of Hanoi and "tactical air raids" on populated areas in the suburbs of Haiphong, and in a routine VNA report on plane downings, datelined 28 August, which claimed that the armed forces of Haiphong had "set ablaze two marauding U.S. warships" on the previous day.

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\* The 11 May statement, discussed in the TRENDS of 17 May 1972, page 7, was described by VNA as a foreign ministry spokesman's statement and by Hanoi radio as a higher-level foreign ministry statement. The press account of the statement confirmed that it was issued at the more authoritative level.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 13 -

PLANES DOWNED, Hanoi's claimed total of U.S. planes downed  
PILOTS CAPTURED over the North reached 3,866 as of 28 August,  
with the reported downing during the week of  
planes over the provinces of Ha Tinh, Thanh Hoa, Lang Son, Hai  
Hung, Nam Ha, Hoa Binh, Quang Binh, Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, Ninh Binh,  
Bac Thai and Nghe An and the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. An  
unspecified number of "aggressor pilots" was reported captured  
in downings of the 25th and the 27th. Three U.S. warships were  
reported "set ablaze" on the 27th, two off Haiphong and one off  
Ha Tinh Province.

Hanoi utilized the occasion of the release of the names of 10  
"newly captured" U.S. pilots\* to aim a further blast at President  
Nixon's role in the U.S. "war of destruction" against Vietnam,  
especially at his escalation of the war in the North since April.  
A NHAN DAN editorial on the 26th, carried by Hanoi radio and  
VNA, portrayed the capture of the pilots as "eloquent evidence  
of Nixon's failure in using his air force to attack the northern  
part of our country." Attempting to document its contention  
that the general buildup of U.S. air and naval power over both  
parts of Vietnam has been considerably greater and "more savage"  
under President Nixon than during the Johnson Administration,  
the editorial pointed to the alleged bombing of dikes and  
population centers and also claimed that the Nixon Administration  
has been responsible for dropping three times as many bombs  
over both parts of Vietnam as the Johnson Administration. The  
editorial argued that President Nixon's "erroneous strategic  
policy" of escalating the war in the North is not only a military  
but also a political failure, since it has resulted in a loss  
of U.S. prestige and an increase in the number of pilots captured.

Referring to the upcoming U.S. elections, the editorial claimed  
that both the Republican Party and President Nixon have made  
clear their intention to hold to their "aggressive and bellicose  
viewpoint," and it urged the DRV armed forces and people to  
heighten their struggle against the "U.S. aggressors"--specifically,  
to down more U.S. aircraft, capture more pilots, and set fire to

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\* All listed as captured between 13 June and 11 July, the pilots  
were identified by VNA on 25 August as Air Force officers Gregg  
Ormar Hanson, first lieutenant; Richard Joseph Fulton, first  
lieutenant; George Alan Rose, captain; Peter Alfred Callaghan, first  
lieutenant; Thomas John Hanton, captain; Richard Henry McDow, first  
lieutenant; Kevin Joseph Cheney, captain; Donald Karl Logan, first  
lieutenant; Marion Anthony Marshall, captain; and Navy Lieutenant  
Commander Henry Deas Lesesne.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 14 -

more warships. The editorial, predicting military defeat for the United States in both the South and the North, claimed that the North has been able to maintain its support duties toward the frontline, as well as downing "nearly 400 U.S. aircraft" and capturing "hundreds of aggressor pilots."

Also pegged to the release of the names of newly captured pilots was a Hanoi radio commentary of the 25th, which claimed that U.S. air and naval power is "incapable of saving the puppet army from defeat [or] sabotaging and preventing our compatriots in the rear base from fulfilling their sacred duty toward their compatriots on the frontline." It warned that the more modern techniques the United States uses, the "more adequate, up-to-date techniques" and "more effective fighting methods" will be used against them. It praised the victories of the "Northern firenet" in downing U.S. planes and capturing their pilots, both by day and by night, as "proof of the latent strength and combat skills of our Northern armed forces and people."

FOREIGN MINISTRY  
SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENTS

Foreign ministry spokesman's statements issued during the past week set forth the following specific charges:

+ The bombing of a hamlet on the outskirts of Hanoi and of populous areas in Ha Bac and Hai Hung provinces on 24 August was protested in a spokesman's statement of the same day. The statement also cited strikes of the 23d on Dong Hoi city and populous areas of Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone; charged B-52's with bombing localities in Quang Binh Province; and claimed that U.S. warships launched artillery attacks on coastal villages in Thanh Hoa. Among specific targets listed as hit were an elementary school in a village in Thanh Hoa Province and another on the outskirts of Hanoi, and a portion of the dike on the Red River in Son Thuy district of Nam Ha Province.

+ The statement of the 26th, citing alleged attacks of the 25th and 26th, claimed that the raids were part of a "vicious scheme of inflicting heavy civilian casualties, razing whole urban centres, and destroying dikes in the rainy season to force the Vietnamese people to accept the insolent terms of the United States." In support of this charge, it mentioned specifically the destruction of a portion of the dike surrounding Nam Dinh city and damage to a portion of the Day River dike in Ninh Binh Province. In more general terms, it condemned "extermination raids" of the 26th on Haiphong, as well as the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 15 -

rocketing of localities in and surrounding Hanoi, the city of Kien An near Haiphong, and a number of populous areas in Ha Tay Province. Alleged targets on the 25th included the cities of Nam Dinh, Vinh and Ninh Binh, the town of Ninh Giang, and populous areas in Lang Son, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. Also on the 25th, B-52's allegedly bombed a number of localities in the Vinh Linh zone. The statement concluded by asserting that President Nixon must be held fully responsible for these "savage crimes."

+ The spokesman's statement of 28 August protested the "many new war acts" of the previous day, which included the mining of Bai Tu Long Bay, the rocketing of a village in the suburbs of Hanoi, and "tactical air raids" on the suburbs of Haiphong and populous areas of Lang Son, Ha Bac, Vinh Phu, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone, as well as the shelling by U.S. warships of Do Son resort and a number of coastal areas in Quang Binh. Further bombing of the Day River dike, this time in Nam Ha Province, was reported to have occurred on 26 and 27 August, with "vast stretches" of the dike destroyed.

+ The statement of the 30th condemned the "barbarous strikes" of the 28th and 29th on Dong Hoi, the capital of Quang Binh Province; on the town of Can Loc; and on populated areas in Bac Thai, Ha Bac, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It also charged that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh zone, and that U.S. warships "wantonly shelled" coastal villages in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces. Among the targets reportedly hit was the Dien Thanh dam in Dien Chau district of Nghe An Province.

**DIKES** In addition to charges in the routine DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements of U.S. attacks on water conservancy facilities, attacks on dikes were mentioned in a VNA item on the 27th which claimed that "dozens of U.S. planes" bombed the dike on the Dao River in Nam Dinh city, blowing away two sections of the dike, causing craters below the water level of the river, and destroying a concrete pier. VNA called this attack the 57th on "river and sea dikes and other hydraulic works in Nam Dinh."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 16 -

Hanoi media gave extensive attention to the dike issue in connection with "dike day" (28 August), recently proclaimed by Cuba and endorsed by the World Peace Council on 21 August. DRV Water Conservancy Minister Ha Ke Tan offered typical comment in an interview with PRENSA LATINA, reported by VNA on 28 August. Tan denied U.S. charges that much of Hanoi's treatment of the dike issue was "communist propaganda," and cited as evidence 29 alleged strikes on the dike system in the first 25 days of August and the views of the members of the international war crimes investigation team which recently visited the DRV. In addition, Tan rebutted President Nixon's statements in his 27 July press conference that the dikes had been improperly repaired after the 1971 floods and that any bombing damage which might have occurred could be easily repaired. The minister claimed that the dikes "now would have the highest capacity to combat flash floods such as those of 1971 if Nixon were not deliberately bombing and destroying" them. Tan added that dike repair work was quickly organized and carried out, but that repairs to important positions and critical areas destroyed by "deliberate" attacks were difficult because of the magnitude of the undertaking. He listed the areas most frequently attacked as the provinces of Nam Ha, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh.

In the course of reviewing the history of dike building in the North, a background report by the Water Conservancy Ministry on the DRV's hydraulic system, reported by VNA on the 27th, referred to 1971 as "a year of tremendous trials." It claimed that, despite the highest water level in 100 years, the dike system along the Red River held firm. "Only the dikes of [the] Thai Binh River and Duong River were broken in two places," it said, but the damage was quickly repaired. The report, like Minister Tan, maintained that the repairs since the 1971 flood, "according to the estimates of hydraulic experts and the experience of the Vietnamese people," would have enabled the dike system to resist the biggest floods "had it not been bombed by U.S. aircraft."

Details of some of the alleged U.S. bombing were given by Vu Van Dinh, chairman of the Thai Binh administrative committee, in a talk on the status of the rice crop in his province, broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 25th. He claimed that the United States has struck at Thai Binh a total of 230 times since April and 54 times during the first 19 days of August. Thirty-five of these attacks, he charged, damaged dikes and sluices, while 180 others

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 17 -

were aimed at populated areas. Among the targets Dinh listed was the Lan sluice, struck 13 times and said to have been completely destroyed. Despite these attacks, the province official declared, the dikes were being satisfactorily repaired, the 10th-month rice crop was promising, flood and storm control preparations were under way, U.S. planes were still being downed, and the province was still sending youths to the frontline.

Similar claims were made in a 29 August NHAN DAN editorial, broadcast by Hanoi radio, on the role of the peasants in maintaining the dikes in the face of U.S. bombings. And a 26 August VNA report cited the premier as commending the provinces of Hai Hung, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, and Thai Binh for their "achievements in consolidating and repairing the dikes and hydraulic works bombed by the U.S." The report also stressed that "without the bombing" the work done by the four provinces "could guarantee the dikes against the biggest flood of the type which occurred last year."

Concern over another possible threat to the dikes, from the fourth typhoon of the season, was indicated by a directive issued by the premier on 28 August outlining seven steps for combating typhoons and floods, including reinforcement of dike-protecting forces, especially those guarding sea dikes. No reports have yet been monitored of any damage by the fourth typhoon, which struck the coast near Haiphong on the 29th and proceeded inland.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 18 -

## PEKING PROTESTS U.S. SINKING OF VESSEL OFF DRV COAST

The divergent interests among the communist powers have been reflected in their reactions to what Peking charged was the sinking of a Chinese lifeboat off the DRV coast by U.S. aircraft on 22 August. While Peking carefully narrowed the focus of its protest to register concern over the security of its own vessels and personnel, Hanoi seized upon the incident to portray "a systematic and premeditated plan of provocation and threat" against China and other communist countries aiding the Vietnamese. Moscow has avoided direct comment, but Soviet coverage of the incident has been designed to minimize any impression that the Chinese are risking their improved relations with the United States to help the DRV. Western press reports on the presence of a Chinese minesweeper at Haiphong harbor have not been acknowledged by Hanoi or its two big allies.

PEKING        A PRC Foreign Ministry statement on 24 August charged that U.S. aircraft on the 22d bombed a lifeboat belonging to a Chinese merchant ship anchored off Vinh, destroying the boat and killing the captain of the ship and four other crewmembers aboard. Calling this "a grave provocation" against the Chinese people and expressing "great indignation," the statement lodged "a strong protest" and demanded that the U.S. Government prevent the recurrence of such incidents.

Peking's protest was very similar to the foreign ministry statement it issued on 9 May charging that the United States had shelled Chinese ships near Vinh. In contrast to protests against similar incidents a few years ago, neither the May protest nor the recent one mentioned Chinese aid to Vietnam or raised politically charged issues affecting Sino-U.S. relations. Like the May statement, the latest one reserved the right to demand compensation for losses; it was even less tough in its demands than the May statement by omitting a warning that the United States must bear full responsibility "for all the grave consequences" arising from a recurrence of such incidents. The incidents last May were not recalled in Peking's latest protest.

The narrow focus of the Chinese protest was underscored by Peking's response to a statement by the U.S. military command in Vietnam on the 25th acknowledging that a boat had been destroyed but identifying it as a "supply craft." A statement issued on the 26th by the spokesman of the PRC Foreign Ministry's Information

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 19 -

Department replied by going into considerable detail to document the claim that the boat was clearly not moving supplies to the shore. An NCNA report accompanying the initial Chinese statement on the 24th had explained that the boat had been attacked while returning to the merchant ship to which it belonged after contacting another Chinese merchant ship in the vicinity. Thus, Peking's reaction has served to register concern over such incidents while in effect denying that the Chinese themselves were engaged in trying to penetrate the U.S. interdiction.

HANOI In contrast to Peking's carefully measured reaction, Hanoi saw in the incident an opportunity to raise the issue of aid from its allies and to depict the matter as a challenge posed by the United States to the PRC and "other" communist countries. NHAN DAN on 29 August, using the occasion to deliver a bitter denunciation of "the bellicose and arrogant Nixon clique" for seeking to interdict supplies to the DRV, reminded the Chinese that the United States is "the common enemy" of the two countries and held up the Chinese seamen's sacrifice as a shining example of heroic internationalist aid to the Vietnamese. Unlike Peking, NHAN DAN made a point of recalling the incidents last May in a passage asserting that the latest incident was not an isolated event but part of a systematic effort of "provocation and threat" directed against Hanoi's allies.

The aid question was also raised in Hanoi's account of a memorial service for the Chinese seamen held by the DRV Ministry of Communications and Transport on the 27th. According to VNA, the Chinese were killed while engaged in "the heroic deed of helping the Vietnamese people fight the U.S. aggressors and build socialism." NCNA's account of the service, however, noted more cautiously that the seamen had "sacrificed their lives for strengthening the fraternal friendship and militant solidarity" of the two peoples.

A DRV Foreign Ministry statement on 25 August, seconding the Chinese statement of the 24th, did not specifically raise the aid issue but broadened Peking's demands on the United States by calling for an end to "all piratical acts" against merchant ships of China "and other countries which ply the DRV's harbors" and to the bombing of North Vietnam and the mining of its harbors. The Chinese statement did not mention other countries or call for an end to the bombing and mining.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 20 -

**MOSCOW** While avoiding comment on the incident, Moscow has carried brief reports indicating that Peking is not permitting Vietnam complications to jeopardize the improvement in Sino-U.S. relations. TASS on 25 August paired one-sentence dispatches, datelined Peking and New York respectively, citing the Chinese protest and the statement by the U.S. military command in Saigon. On the 26th TASS quoted a State Department spokesman as saying that PRC-U.S. diplomatic contacts are being maintained as usual despite the sinking of the Chinese vessel. TASS on the 28th repeated the reports on the statements by the U.S. command in Saigon and the State Department spokesman, adding an account of remarks by a Pentagon spokesman that there have been no Sino-U.S. incidents in connection with U.S. bombings in the DRV near the Chinese border and that Chinese aircraft and antiaircraft units have made no moves against the U.S. flights.

Also on the 28th, a Soviet broadcast to China renewed the charge that Peking still refuses to join with the Soviet Union and other communist countries in coordinating aid to the DRV. The broadcast pointed out that the need for such coordination is particularly significant at a time when the DRV's ports have been mined.

#### **MOSCOW DENOUNCES U.S. BOMBINGS, OBSERVES "DIKE DAY"**

Moscow's continued condemnation of alleged U.S. bombings of DRV dikes includes a 28 August PRAVDA editorial on the just-completed Soviet-Vietnam solidarity month\* as well as considerable propaganda on the 28 August "international day of protest against the U.S. bombing raids on the DRV's dikes," said to be sponsored by the World Peace Council.

The PRAVDA editorial attacked the "savage and cunning forms of military action in Vietnam" used by the "U.S. military," asserting that the war in the North and South "bears the stamp of genocide and ecocide, the destruction of everything that lives." Like the 5 August PRAVDA editorial article, it again

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\* The last previous PRAVDA editorial on Indochina, on 18 March 1972, had marked a "solidarity week." A 5 August PRAVDA editorial article lauded the Paris conference of communist and workers' parties which was held to pledge solidarity with Indochina.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 21 -

cited Brezhnev's strong 27 June condemnation of U.S. measures to "blockade" DRV ports and to bomb DRV economic targets and communication lines. But the editorial contained only stock demands for a U.S. troop withdrawal and for a "just political settlement," supporting the "constructive proposals" of the DRV and PRG. And in contrast to the editorial article's assertion that the Soviet Union had "recently increased its aid," the editorial did not go beyond routine pledges of assistance and support. It pointed out that Soviet workers' fulfillment of Vietnamese orders demonstrates their loyalty to "the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism." Noting that solidarity with the DRV is continually growing in other socialist countries, it said that they were organizing "economic and military aid" and recalled that aid and support were pledged at the communist party meetings in the Crimea and in Paris.

The editorial asserted that relations between the parties and peoples of the USSR and the DRV "have always been based on the principles of proletarian solidarity," and it concluded with a passage which may be read as an oblique rejoinder to Hanoi's recent polemical complaints that its big communist allies are engaging in a policy of "reconciliation" and "compromise" and are departing from the true revolutionary path. After stating that the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship is based on a "firm foundation," the PRAVDA editorial said that

the more the working class and people of Vietnam think of their heavy, demeaning, servile past, of the development and stages of their tortuous and selfless struggle--at the same time filled with glorious victories--the more they realize to what extent they are indebted to Lenin and the October Revolution.

The observance of "dike day" included a 27 August PRAVDA article by senior commentator Yuriy Zhukov, statements by various public organizations, and reports of low-level public meetings. The propaganda expressed the Soviet people's "indignation" at the U.S. "crimes" and "demanded" an end to U.S. aggression, but it did not go beyond stock pledges of continued Soviet assistance. Yuriy Zhukov, writing in his capacity as vice chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, said the dike day would contribute to the Soviet cause of "giving practical assistance" to the Vietnamese but went no further

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

22 -

than to cite statements of solidarity and to note monetary donations pledged at various low-level workers' meetings during the solidarity month.

Some routine-level Moscow broadcasts in Mandarin on dike day took the occasion again to attack Peking's splittist policies. A 28 August commentary, for example, denounced Peking for staying aloof from the growing international movement of support for Vietnam, noting that Peking media have failed to mention the Paris meeting of European parties or the WPC's dike day. The commentary once again took Peking to task for refusing to take joint action with the USSR and other socialist countries in coordinating aid to the DRV.

Although Moscow is currently playing down its aid to the DRV, Moscow and Hanoi media did report the signing in Moscow on the 25th of the annual "plan on cultural and scientific cooperation for 1972." The plan reportedly covers cooperation in education, the arts, the press, radio, health and sports, relations between scientific and teaching establishments, and continued Soviet assistance in "training cadres for the national economy." Last year's plan was signed in Hanoi on 5 June 1971, and a protocol was signed in December 1971 at the 10th meeting of the Soviet-DRV Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 23 -

## **PATHET LAO DELEGATION TOURS SEVERAL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES**

A Pathet Lao delegation led by Nouhak Phoumsavan, member of the NHLS Standing Committee, received high-level treatment during a 17-22 August visit to the DRV following a tour that included the PRC, the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The functions of some of the officials meeting the delegation during its tour indicate that aid was a major topic of discussion. The timing of the tour, coming after big-power summitry and in a period of reopened contacts between Lao Princes Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong on the question of a political settlement, suggests that the political future of Laos also figured in the talks. During the visit in the DRV the two sides agreed on the establishment of an NHLS "representation" in Hanoi, thus raising its official presence from the level of an "information office." Nouhak acclaimed this as "a historically significant" development of the friendly relations between the two peoples and a move that enhances the Pathet Lao's role and prestige in the international arena.

**VISIT TO DRV** The visit to the DRV was not reported by Hanoi and Pathet Lao media until after the delegation had left, an apparent security precaution that has become customary for Hanoi. The last high-level Pathet Lao visit to Hanoi was that of Prince Souphanouvong from 24 to 30 May 1971.\*

During its "official friendly visit" the delegation was received by President Ton Duc Thang, party chief Le Duan, and Premier Pham Van Dong. Although Le Duan had been present at many of the functions during Souphanouvong's 1971 visit, there was no report that he had a separate meeting with the Lao leader and he was not mentioned in the communique on that visit.

According to the current communique, the two sides reached "complete identity of views" on all questions raised in "cordial talks" with a group of DRV leaders headed by Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh and Vietnam Fatherland Front leader Hoang Quoc Viet. Also named was Maj. Gen. Nguyen Trong Vinh, a Central Committee alternate member not known to have made a public appearance since 1962. Taking part in some of the activities during the delegation's visit were the DRV foreign trade minister and various officials connected with economic affairs, such as marine products, geology, communications and transportation, education, health, and light

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\* See the TRENDS of 3 June 1971, pages 1-4.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 24 -

industry, as well as a deputy chief of the VPA general logistics department. Defense Minister Giap, who had taken part in talks during Souphanouvong's visit, did not appear this time. The communique on Souphanouvong's visit, which had similarly described the "unanimity" of the talks, had characterized the atmosphere even more warmly as one of "militant solidarity, fraternal friendship, and total mutual confidence."

The current communique routinely reaffirmed support for the political programs of the PRG, the NHL, and Bihanouk's RGNU while stressing once again that the three Indochinese peoples will step up their struggle to defeat the U.S. Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine. The question of a political settlement also figured in an exchange of speeches at a reception given for the Lao delegation on 21 August. Nguyen Duy Trinh denounced the Nixon Administration for seeking to create an impression that the Vietnam peace talks are making progress in order to appease antiwar sentiment in an election year. Taking a firmly negative stance, Trinh insisted that Washington is stubbornly prolonging the war and supporting the Thieu regime, which is "why the Paris peace talks can never progress."

The Pathet Lao leader echoed these uncompromising themes, charging that the Administration is fostering illusions about "a false compromise" as a ploy in the election campaign. On the Lao question, Nouhak claimed that the United States urged "the rightist clique" to follow "a more reactionary plan" in order to impede the talks between representatives of the Lao princes. In particular, he complained against an effort to separate the military issue from the political question. He did not, however, acknowledge that this proposal was made by Souvanna Phouma in a letter to Souphanouvong and was subsequently rejected by the latter in a message of reply.

In the communique the two sides expressed gratitude for "the vigorous support and great assistance the socialist countries and progressive mankind" have given, but the USSR and China were not named as they were in the communique on Souphanouvong's visit. The only mention of these two countries by name was made by Nouhak at the 21 August reception when he said that his "friendly visits" to the PRC, the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia had achieved "satisfactory success in consolidating the militant friendship" between the peoples of Laos and these countries.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 25 -

The communique recorded each side's gratitude to the other for its "resolute support and devoted assistance," and the Lao side praised Vietnamese aid in "the economic and cultural construction and development in the liberated zone of Laos--particularly in the training of technical personnel and the supply of materials, specialists, and skilled workers." The communique also praised "the exchange of delegations and the signing in the past years of economic and cultural cooperation agreements," and it noted the agreement on the establishment of an NLHS "representation" in Hanoi. The communique's discussion of Vietnamese aid to the Pathet Lao was unusually detailed, contrasting with the more vague and generalized language in the communique on Souphanouvong's visit.

TOUR OF OTHER  
COUNTRIES

The Lao delegation was received warmly in Peking twice, on its way to and from the USSR,\* but the visits got less publicity than the stay in the DR<sup>V</sup> and no communique was issued, perhaps in deference to Peking's diplomatic interests in Vientiane. The delegation had first visited the PRC from 27 June to 5 July, with Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien serving as the ranking host. It returned to Peking on 5 August for a second visit, on this occasion seeing the top Chinese military official, Yeh Chien-ying, as well as Li and a group that included officials involved with aid. The delegation left Peking via Nanning on 14 August, arriving at Hanoi's Gia Lam airport on the 17th.

The visits to the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia, which maintain more distant relations with the Pathet Lao, received little publicity. Unlike Peking and Hanoi, Moscow is represented in Vientiane by an ambassador. The delegation arrived in Moscow on 5 July and met with Politburo candidate members Ponomarev--who handles relations with communist and leftist parties--and Ustinov as well as other officials. On 12 July TASS reported that during a meeting the Soviets said that solidarity with the Indochinese people was "a highly principled policy" of the CPSU and the Soviet people and that the USSR "consistently supports the just struggle of the Lao patriots for a peaceful, neutral, and independent Laos." According to the TASS account, the Soviets said they shared the views of the NLHS, "which is working for a political settlement

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\* The delegation's first stop in Peking and its arrival in Moscow are discussed in the TRENDS of 12 July, 1972, pages 20-22.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

30 AUGUST 1972

- 26 -

through talks" between the sides in Laos, and demanded that the United States stop all interference and bombing in Laos and allow the Laotians to settle their own affairs.

The delegation's visits in East Germany and Czechoslovakia were given minimal publicity beyond reports that it was received in East Berlin by Politburo member Albert Norden and in Prague by Presidium member Vasil Bilak. The delegation left Prague to return to Moscow on 26 July, but the second stop in Moscow received no further mention until PRAVDA's 5 August report that the group had departed the previous day.

#### FUNERAL, PATHET LAO VISIT PROMPT LEADER APPEARANCES IN HANOI

The funeral in Hanoi of a PRG leader and the visit of the Pathet Lao delegation prompted appearances by the DRV's top three leaders, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong.

+ In his first public appearance since Podgorny's 15-18 June visit to Hanoi, Le Duan met with the Pathet Lao delegation during its 17-22 August visit, although the 23 August VNA report did not give the exact date of the meeting. According to VNA, he appeared on the 23rd at the funeral of Nguyen Cong Phuong, a member of the PRG Advisory Council who died on 21 August "in Hanoi at the age of 84 after a period of illness and treatment in North Vietnam."

+ Truong Chinh, who appeared at the funeral, has been making regular appearances. He did not, however, participate in the visit of the Pathet Lao delegation.

+ Pham Van Dong, who attended the funeral and also met with the Pathet Lao group, has been appearing regularly since 11 August, when he received former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clark-- Dong's first reported activity in two months.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 27 -

## MIDDLE EAST

### MOSCOW BERATES CAIRO CRITICS BUT CLAIMS RELATIONS UNCHANGED

The Soviet-Egyptian press polemics were taken a step further in a 28 August attack by Mikhaylov in IZVESTIYA directly accusing AKHBAR AL-YAWM chief editor al-Quddus of joining the "campaign" against Soviet-Arab friendship and cooperation. This followed an implicit rejoinder to AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal in a 24 August SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article by Nikiforov, along with continuing complaints in Soviet media that Arab "reactionaries" were joining intrigues against Soviet-Arab friendship plotted by imperialist and Zionist circles. Articles in IZVESTIYA on the 22d and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the 24th warned as well of a Saudi Arabian role in the campaign against "progressive currents" in the Middle East. The latter paper additionally professed to see stepped-up activity by "ultraleft forces" advocating partisan warfare and "individual violent actions" and thus influencing some Arab circles to reject a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Soviet commentators have defensively rejected "slanders" and "fabrications" about changes in Soviet-Egyptian relations deriving from the ouster of the Soviet military personnel from Egypt, insisting that Moscow-Cairo friendship is unblemished.\* A concurrent theme has been the vital importance of the socialist countries' support for the Arabs, by no means in the military realm alone: Nikiforov in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA pointedly reminded the Arabs that "as a result of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states, the Arab countries have received what no imperialist state will give them--an opportunity for an all-round development."

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\* Peking has now openly congratulated the Egyptians on their decision to oust the Soviet military personnel. Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, speaking at a 24 August banquet honoring the visiting Tunisian foreign minister, remarked that "of late the Egyptian Government has adopted measures to safeguard the sovereignty of its country, measures which are an expression of the Egyptian and other Arab peoples' strong determination to decide their own destiny and carry their anti-imperialist struggle to the end."

CONFIDENTIAL



- 28 -

Moscow has defended the Soviet position on various counts spelled out in Arab charges:

+ A broadcast in Arabic on the 25th explained the Soviet-U.S. accords in indirect reply to Egyptian complaints that Moscow and Washington had both assigned a lower priority to the Middle East question, in effect freezing the no war, no peace situation.

+ The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article on the 24th, by Simoyan, denounced "slandorous fabrications" that the USSR "is not offering sufficient weapons" to the Arabs because it wants to perpetuate this in-between situation. Simoyan seemed in effect to be telling the Arabs to solve their problems themselves: He claimed that the Arab peoples "have everything necessary" to thwart new imperialist and Zionist intrigues, and he added that "no doubt" they will do this, "making full use of their national resources" and "relying on the friendly support" of the USSR and the other socialist countries.\*

+ Former PRAVDA Middle East specialist Primakov, in the domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 27th, insisted that the Soviet experts' departure from Egypt introduced "nothing extraordinary" in Soviet-Egyptian relations; rather, this friendship "is reinforced" by the Soviet position, which supports a political settlement and not "preservation of the state of affairs existing today."

+ In a similar vein, an Observer article in IZVESTIYA on the 26th declared that perpetuation of the status quo in the area was "fraught with a grave threat to world peace and security." The article expressed the hope that Ambassador Jarring's "new efforts" to achieve implementation of Resolution 242 would lead to progress in a settlement. Observer recalled that the USSR had repeatedly expressed support for the Jarring mission and for a just settlement on the basis of Resolution 242, and it pledged that the Soviet Union was ready "to do all it can" to help achieve concrete results--a pledge repeated in a Potyomkin article in PRAVDA on the 28th.

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\* A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 29th cited Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party leader Junblatt as declaring that a Middle East solution "is not in the hands of the great powers, as some believe; it is in the hands of the Arab East countries, which have obtained quantities of arms exceeding what Israel has obtained."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 29 -

MIKHAYLOV IN IZVESTIYA The assault on AKHBAR AL-YAWM's chief editor by Mikhaylov in the 28 August IZVESTIYA scored al-Quddus for putting Soviet-Egyptian relations on the same level with those between the United States and Israel. According to TASS, Mikhaylov said one is led to believe that the difference "is merely that the United States is warring on Israel's side, while the Soviet Union restricts itself in Egypt to 'expansion.'"

Mikhaylov was further incensed by al-Quddus' 19 August article questioning Moscow's observance of its obligations under the Soviet-Egyptian treaty: He "has the cheek to malign the Soviet Union," the article declared, by alleging that it has failed to honor the military cooperation clause in the treaty. In fact, Mikhaylov explained, such cooperation is provided under the treaty "on the basis of appropriate agreements" and the Soviet side has implemented all these agreements "to the letter."

According to TASS' account, Mikhaylov apparently ignored al-Quddus' complaint that Moscow failed to honor Article 7 of the treaty--stipulating regular consultations between the two parties on important matters affecting the two states' interests--when it failed to consult with Cairo "before or after" the Moscow summit. Al-Quddus also indicated that Moscow had failed to observe Article 9 of the treaty, which stipulates that the contracting parties will not enter into alliances or take part in measures directed against either party; the Moscow-Washington agreement might not be considered an alliance, al-Quddus said, but "it has been interpreted as 'peaceful coexistence'" and "we do not coexist peacefully with the United States." Obliquely responding to this charge, Mikhaylov dismissed al-Quddus' argument with a cryptic reference to his "similarly absurd" attack on the policy of peaceful coexistence, "although this policy has become a reality in international politics."

Significantly, Moscow did not air the rebuttal of al-Quddus' treaty violations charges in a version of the Mikhaylov article broadcast to Arab audiences on the 28th, although this version was described as "text of an article published in IZVESTIYA." The Arabic version did note in conclusion, as did an earlier short TASS summary of the article, that the USSR is "profoundly confident" that Egypt is striving to continue developing friendly Soviet-Egyptian relations, which are not subject to "conjectural fluctuations."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 30 -

NIKIFOROV IN SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Nikiforov's 24 August SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article implicitly replied to needling by AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal, making the target apparent when he borrowed a phrase used by Haykal in an 18 August article. Nikiforov berated the "reactionary press" for trying to play on "the nationalistic feelings of certain sections in the Arab countries and on the sentiments of their leaders," depicting friendly aid from the socialist countries "as the derogation of national sovereignty and even as 'expansion.'" He asserted that Arab-Soviet friendship is "not like an ornament" which can be replaced when one feels like changing it for something new, but is "vitaly important" for both sides.

Haykal had explained the Egyptian decision on the ouster of Soviet military personnel against the background of the Moscow summit; he declared that the two "superpowers'" agreement to exclude all local disputes from their bilateral relations meant that the Soviet military presence in Egypt no longer had any practical effect as far as the United States and Israel were concerned, "as if it had become a mere ornament which is decorative but not functional." Also likening the Soviet presence to an artillery piece without "serviceable ammunition," Haykal went on to say that, leaving aside the similies, the Soviet military presence had become, "or so it appeared," a matter "connected more with the prestige of the Soviet Union and the spread of its international influence" than with the liberation of occupied Arab territories.

#### PRAVDA URGES PALESTINIAN "NATIONAL FRONT," POLITICAL PROGRAM

PRAVDA on 29 August carried a highly unusual analysis of the Palestinian resistance movement, containing a call--unprecedented in the Palestinian context--for the formation of a "national front" with a "political program." The article, by Mideast commentator Pavel Demchenko, asserted that such a program should take into account the "diversity of situations and forms of struggle" and should facilitate work among Palestinians in the occupied territories and among the refugees, especially in Jordan, because "without a mass basis the movement cannot develop."

Moscow's routine, repetitive pledges of support for the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians customarily appear in the course of comment on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Soviet press comment from time to time has contained passing criticism of Palestinian "extremist" actions, deplored fedayeen disunity,

CONFIDENTIAL

- 31 -

and conveyed reservations about the movement's methods of struggle. Sporadic articles in the monthly MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN have dealt with the Palestinian refugee problem at somewhat greater length but scarcely any more substance. The appearance of an article in the central press devoted entirely to the Palestinian resistance movement, its methods, and its organization thus represents a noteworthy departure.

In offering a critique of Palestinian failings and suggesting remedies, Moscow may be moving to exploit increasingly evident Palestinian unease over Egyptian policy--betrayed in strident diatribes over the "Voice of Palestine," which broadcasts clandestinely as well as from Cairo and Baghdad. These broadcasts have deplored recent Cairo moves as signs of accommodation, capitulation, and defeatism and have registered concern over rumors of a separate Israeli-Jordanian peace. The PRAVDA article also appears against the background of reports in Arab media of efforts by some Arab governments to replace Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir 'Arafat with a "moderate" leader and pave the way for participation by the Palestinian resistance in a Middle East settlement. It is possible that the Demchenko article was designed in part to reinforce advice which may have been given to the PLO delegation led by 'Arafat that had talks in Moscow last month.

At the same time, the article may have been contrived to register Soviet pique at the recent vocal Arab criticisms of Moscow's policies by ostentatiously displaying support for the Palestinians. In this connection, Moscow may have wished to set the record straight following the publication on 26 June, in the Beirut paper AR-RAYAH, of a document purporting to set forth Soviet criticisms of the Syrian Communist Party draft program, including caustic remarks on the Palestinian question. AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal on 18 August, citing passages from the purported Soviet document, had singled out some "strange and astounding" views. For example, he quoted the document as saying: "It is clear that the draft program gives more attention to the Palestinian question than is necessary. There is also a stress on armed struggle without considering any other solution. It is not permissible to view all the Arab world questions through the Palestinian eye."

Demchenko's article reviewed the history of the PLO since its establishment in 1964, when it lacked a "clear political program and an ideological foundation" and possessed only

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

30 AUGUST 1972

- 32 -

limited financial and material resources. Turning to the situation of the resistance movement after the 1967 war, Demchenko again stressed the absence of a political party or a united mass organization "capable of combining, in a clear program, the armed struggle with political action among the inhabitants of the occupied territories and the refugees." He noted that divisions among the resistance organizations had intensified and that the lack of unity among the Arab countries "had a bad influence" on the movement.

Going beyond the standard vague Soviet criticism of "extremist" groups which pursued "mass terror tactics," Demchenko specifically assailed "acts of desperation" such as plane hijackings, "blowing up nonmilitary targets," and "committing terrorism inside Jordan." He lectured that such "adventurous and unstudied actions" harmed the movement's reputation, deprived it of international support, and provided opportunities for Arab reactionaries to raise obstacles to political and organizational unity.

Referring cryptically to recent open activity by "imperialist" and "reactionary" forces, Demchenko observed that this activity had created new difficulties for the movement and had brought to the fore "a number of radical problems presently being discussed" by Arab progressive public opinion. One such problem, Demchenko said, was how to define the position and role of the Palestinian movement in the peoples' "general front" on the basis of "actual strengths." He called for formulating slogans and tasks which would conform with every stage of the Arab struggle--"namely, distinguishing between strategic and tactical tasks." Reiterating Moscow's standard position, Demchenko asserted that the Palestinian question could only be solved within the framework of the general Arab liberation struggle. He reminded the Palestinians that their "natural allies" were the Arab and "international progressive" forces and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

30 AUGUST 1972

- 33 -

## U. S. ELECTIONS

### MOSCOW CITES REPUBLICAN VIEWS AND NEED FOR U.S.-SOVIET DIALOG

As usual giving the rival parties and candidates about equal time in limited, routine-level coverage of the U.S. election campaign, the Soviet central press confined its comment on the Republican convention in Miami--as on the earlier Democratic one--to correspondents' dispatches. Like the Democratic conclave, the Republican convention drew less than one percent of Radio Moscow's comment during the week it was in progress. And as in the case of comment on the Democratic convention, there were suggestions that election-campaign promises in general are suspect.\* Notably, however, Moscow approvingly highlighted the statements both by the President and in the Republican platform on the efficacy of the U.S.-Soviet dialog. Sustaining Soviet media's generally circumspect treatment of the President personally, commentators played up the remarks on the Moscow summit in his acceptance speech while citing the party platform to air stock criticisms of U.S. policies in Vietnam, the Middle East, and armaments.

Predictably publicizing the antiwar demonstrations outside the convention hall, Moscow's reportage played up the tight security measures and clashes between police and demonstrators. TASS reported on 21 August that FBI agents, Marines, and National Guard units were brought to Miami to contain the protesters. Radio Moscow, reporting the concluding convention ceremonies on the 24th, said that Miami looked like a "battlefield" and that "the arms of the law dealt savagely with demonstrators protesting the continuing slaughter in Vietnam."

Scrupulously abstaining from speculation about the outcome in November, a panelist in the 21 August domestic service commentators' roundtable typically declined to "go into the fine points of the election campaign or analyze the chances for success of the Republican and Democratic tickets." He went on to observe vaguely that "the whole struggle for a place in the sun" will develop over "the American military" aggression in Vietnam and... the question of how to resolve U.S. "economic difficulties"--the two focal points of Moscow's comment on the election campaign.

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\* See the TRENDS of 19 July 1972, page 26, "Moscow Reacts Cautiously to Senator McGovern's Nomination."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FEIS TRENDS

30 AUGUST 1972

- 34 -

**PARTY PLATFORM ON  
VIETNAM, MIDEAST**

The platform adopted by the Republicans, a dispatch in PRAVDA said on the 24th, outlines the party's plan "to impose its own settlement terms on the Vietnamese people to end the war" and "says frankly that if the U.S. terms of settlement are rejected, peace will be achieved with the help of Vietnamization--in other words, by military means." In commenting on the Democratic convention, Moscow had cited Senator McGovern's Vietnam position as a major factor in his nomination but avoided comparing it with the President's, rather setting out to impugn pre-election promises in general.

With respect to the Middle East, TASS on the 21st took note of the platform's "support for Israel's policy in the Middle East," including the call for continuing aid in the form of "aircraft, training, and modern and sophisticated military equipment." Reporting on the Democratic convention, Moscow had noted McGovern's advocacy of continued military aid to Israel and consequent encouragement of "the Tel Aviv extremists."

**THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH**

The initial TASS account of the President's acceptance speech on 24 August emphasized his comment to the effect that "the Soviet-American talks had made a big contribution to peace." Noting that he said the SALT accords constituted a first step in limiting the arms race, TASS went on to observe in a more negative vein that "at the same time he opposed a reduction in the U.S. defense budget, declaring that the United States must be second to none in the world." TASS also cited his comment on the need for the United States to be strong enough and intelligent enough to assume responsibilities of leadership in the world. Reporting that the President "sharply criticized the platform of the Democrats," TASS added that "the speech was obviously an electioneering statement." Moscow's sensitivity over the triangular dimension was reflected in TASS' failure to report the President's comment on China. TASS also ignored his recounting of the "Tanya" story.

Radio Moscow's domestic service account of the President's address on the same day, playing up U.S. economic problems for home listeners, said that despite "the glowing picture" portrayed in the speech and in the Republican platform, the Administration is concerned about high unemployment, continuing inflation, and the war in Vietnam. While noting that the convention expressed

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

30 AUGUST 1972

- 35 -

support for the "bankrupt" policy in Vietnam and for an increase in U.S. military might, it pointed approvingly to the positive appraisal of U.S.-Soviet summitry:

At the same time, taking into account the country's mood, the Republicans have admitted the need to seek realistic ways to relax tension, and President Nixon's address and the party's election platform highly appraise the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Moscow, noting the importance of the agreement reached in the realm of disarmament and emphasizing the need to continue talks in this direction.

VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES      Moscow reported the nomination of Vice President Agnew without comment, as it had initially reported that of the Democratic Vice Presidential candidate. But Soviet commentators seized on events surrounding Senator Eagleton's resignation as the Democratic nominee in an effort to discredit the American electoral process and to forecast that Senator McGovern's chances for election in November faced new complications. Radio Moscow's Valentin Zorin on 1 August interpreted the "campaign" waged against Eagleton as typical of the "dirty methods" used in U.S. elections, and a dispatch from New York over Radio Moscow on 2 August said that the "hasty choice of Eagleton demonstrated the imperfection of the American electoral system in the eyes of even its most ardent supporters." The dispatch added that "there is no doubt that the Eagleton affair has done definite damage to the Democratic Party, which faces a desperate struggle with the ruling Republican Party."

A brief dispatch in IZVESTIYA, also on 2 August, suggested that Eagleton had been forced to relinquish the Vice Presidential candidacy because of "rightist" pressures: Although Senator McGovern initially resisted "the opposition's onslaughts," the paper said, he had to face the possibility of a party split on the eve of the election and "was forced to reckon with the opinion of the party's majority." Moscow media carried brief, straightforward reports of the subsequent choice of Sargent Shriver.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 36 -

## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## CINEMA COMMITTEE CHIEF ROMANOV REMOVED UNDER FIRE

Simultaneous with the publication of a Central Committee decree criticizing the Committee for Cinematography for poor supervision of the film industry, the committee's longtime chairman A.V. Romanov has been replaced by the Central Committee's cinema supervisor, F.T. Yermash (PRAVDA, 22 August). Yermash, who appears to have ties with Central Committee Secretary A.P. Kirilenko, earlier this year exposed an "ideologically harmful" Ukrainian film and apparently organized the ouster of the Ukrainian cinematography committee chairman for sanctioning production of the film.

The decree on the film industry complained in general terms about poor handling of nationality questions, patriotic themes, and other ideological subjects and criticized the cinematography committee for poor leadership, lack of demandingness, and application of low ideological standards "in a number of cases." None of the ideologically delinquent films was named in the decree, and remarkably few complaints of this sort have appeared in the central press this year. A 16 March SOVIET CULTURE article by Romanov on the state of the film industry in the period following the 24th party congress gave no hint of unusual difficulties in this sphere. However, the official furor over the Ukrainian film "A Long Farewell," which was investigated by Yermash earlier this year and which led to the ouster of Ukrainian film chief S.P. Ivanov in April, may have contributed to Romanov's downfall.\* The film had been condemned for ideological shortcomings similar to those cited in the Central Committee decree.

Romanov, a longtime deputy Agitprop chief before assuming his post as head of the film industry, has long appeared vulnerable. In the spring of 1970 his removal was rumored along with that of Agitprop chief V.I. Stepanov, Radio-Television Committee Chairman N.N. Mesyatsev, and Publishing Committee Chairman N.A. Mikhaylov, but unlike the others he survived. However, Romanov has appeared infrequently in public since that time and was last identified in connection with his 16 March SOVIET CULTURE article.

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\* For background to Ivanov's ouster, see the TRENDS of 19 April 1972, pages 47-48.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 37 -

Yermash's career may have been aided by ties with Kirilenko. He was Sverdlovsk city Komsomol secretary in the mid-1950's during Kirilenko's tenure as oblast party first secretary. In February 1965 he was identified as head of the Central Committee's sector for the cinema and in March 1971 as deputy head of the Central Committee's culture section.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 38 -

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## HUSAK ASSAILS WESTERN "PROGRESSIVE" CRITICS OF RECENT TRIALS

Czechoslovak party leader Husak's first public comment on the recent series of political trials, in the course of an interview for the September issue of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, was published in the party organ RUDE PRAVO on 18 August--two days after the paper indicated that the series had ended on the 11th and that President Svoboda had pardoned several youthful offenders. Husak used the interview to briefly denounce critics of the trials, and in a 26 August speech he took Western "progressive" critics to task in the most pointed indictment of the vocal French, Italian, and other West European parties yet to appear in Czechoslovak media.

**BRATISLAVA SPEECH** Speaking on the 26th on the occasion of the anniversary of the 1944 Slovak National Uprising, Husak portrayed a "normal, peaceful" attitude toward the trials at home and decried the uproar over the proceedings in "propaganda channels abroad." He went on to observe that "unfortunately, certain representatives of the progressive forces in the West played into the hands of this bourgeois anticommunist campaign against socialist Czechoslovakia, showing themselves to be astonishingly indifferent to objective information about Czechoslovakia." Charging that the progressive forces had "added their voices to the bourgeois slanders of Czechoslovakia," he remarked that "we are sorry about this--not with a view to developments in Czechoslovakia, because no bourgeois campaign can change anything in this; we are sorry with regard to the objective informing of the working class and progressive forces in the West, with regard to the success of the anti-imperialist and progressive front." He wound up with a rebuke to the Western parties: "The position I am speaking of cannot help the common class struggle."

TASS' prompt summary of the speech made Husak's attack sound somewhat stronger than it came through live over Prague domestic television: TASS rendered his "unfortunately" as "we deeply regret" and his remark that the progressive forces' position "cannot help" as "far from helps" the common class struggle.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 39 -

PROBLEMS OF PEACE &  
SOCIALISM INTERVIEW

Husak's first public comment on the trials, in a brief passage in his wide-ranging interview for the Prague-based international communist monthly PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, was in the context of a discourse on the country's return to "Marxist-Leninist" principles since the 1968-69 episode and an attack on "rightists," "counterrevolutionaries," and "adversaries" who "today accuse us of reverting to the 1950's, to political trials." He went on to complain that such statements "are especially voiced by those people whose counterrevolutionary intentions were not brought to realization." He added the standard Prague rationale that while "no staged illegal political trials" are being held or contemplated, "violators of the laws must bear the responsibility"--a principle which "our adversaries do not like."

## RUDE PRAVO ARTICLE

While there was no formal announcement of the conclusion of the trials, a lengthy defense of the proceedings by Dolezal in the 16 August RUDE PRAVO appeared to signify that the series was over by noting at the outset that trials had been held in Prague and Brno "between 17 July and 11 August 1972." The article said they involved "nine groups," a total of "46 accused," who were "sentenced to imprisonment for organized illegal subversive activities in the period from 1970 to 1971--and some even at the beginning of 1972--with the purpose of weakening the socialist state system and establishing conditions for its overthrow." In a conciliatory gesture highlighted in CTK's summary, although it appeared near the end of the published article, RUDE PRAVO disclosed that "for 10 persons, barely exceeding the juvenile age, whom Doctor of Philosophy Jaroslav Sabata had irresponsibly induced to engage in criminal activities," President Svoboda had "used his prerogative" and ordered the charges dropped.

The article was devoted largely to a review of the alleged criminal activities of the principal defendants--Sabat, Milan Silhan, Milan Huebl, Jiri Mueller, and Jan Tesar. It devoted particular attention to alleged contacts between Huebl, the former director of the Higher Party School, and the former director of Czechoslovak Television Jiri Pelikan, an emigre in Italy since the August 1968 invasion. It reiterated the charge that the intermediary between Huebl and Pelikan had been the Italian journalist Ochetto, whose arrest at Prague airport in January 1972 was publicly protested by the Italian Communist Party.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
30 AUGUST 1972

- 40 -

The article appears to portend difficulties ahead for the top leaders of 1968-69, as well as for the middle-level figures involved in the recent trials: It said a letter written by Huebl and taken from Ochetto on his arrest at Prague airport revealed that Huebl had helped draft the interview with the leading liberal Josef Smrkovsky--still residing in Prague--which appeared in the Milan paper GIORNO VIE NUOVE in September 1971. Smrkovsky had said in the interview, among other things, that only about 10 percent of the Czechoslovak people supported the Husak regime.

CONFIDENTIAL