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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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
16 AUGUST 1972
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 7 - 13 AUGUST 1972

<u>Moscow (2699 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1199 items)</u>		
Crimea Meeting of Soviet Bloc Party Leaders	(7%)	13%	Domestic Issues	(49%)	39%
Vietnam	(13%)	8%	Indochina	(17%)	19%
[U.S. Air Strikes	(4%)	3%]	[U.S. Air Strikes	(2%)	7%]
Soviet-Indian Treaty Anniversary	(--)	7%	[Sihanouk Tours PRC	(--)	4%]
China	(3%)	5%	Nonaligned Conference in Guyana	(--)	12%
Soviet-FRG Treaty Anniversary	(--)	2%	Thai CP Anniversary	(--)	3%
Middle East	(3%)	2%	Ecuador Independence Day	(--)	3%
			Bangladesh UN Seat	(--)	3%
			UN Secretary General	(--)	2%
			Waldheim in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi has continued to release virtually daily statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman denouncing U.S. air strikes, but there are fewer charges now of attacks on water conservancy projects, and current comment points to good progress in dike repair work. Further use has been made of comments attributed to former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clark and members of the International Commission for Inquiring into U.S. War Crimes to buttress claims that U.S. air strikes are aimed at civilian targets.

The DRV delegate at the 154th session of the Paris talks devoted most of his statement to a protest against U.S. bombing, while the PRG's Mme. Binh attacked the Thieu government and offered an explanation of the communist proposal for the formation of a government of national concord. Hanoi took disparaging note of Administration efforts to capitalize on "publicity about the secret Paris talks and rumors about a new U.S. peace proposal," but it did not report the 14 August Kissinger-Le Duc Tho meeting and has not yet mentioned Le Duc Tho's departure for Hanoi on the 16th.

While avoiding comment on issues affecting Chinese interests, Peking has again added its voice to charges that the United States is bombing DRV dikes. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 13th, seconding the 8 August DRV protest, expressed "burning indignation" over the U.S. bombing but made no mention of Chinese support for the war effort. NCNA has publicized statements about bombing of the dikes by various foreign visitors to the DRV, including Jane Fonda, but has yet to mention Ramsey Clark.

Routine Moscow comment has continued to assail the U.S. bombing of the DRV along established lines and to call on the United States to accept a political solution. Moscow has briefly reported the international investigating commission's activities in the DRV and during its stopover in the Soviet capital, noting some of the remarks by delegation members as well as some of the remarks Hanoi has attributed to Ramsey Clark condemning alleged U.S. strikes at dikes and other civilian targets.

INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TEAM MEETS PREMIER, CONCLUDES VISIT

Hanoi has continued to exploit comments attributed to former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clark and members of the International Commission for Inquiring Into U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam as the delegation wound up its two-week visit and left for home on

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12 August. Highlights of Clark's activities included a two-hour interview on the 10th with 10 U.S. prisoners of war and a two-day visit to Thanh Hoa Province, reportedly the target of recent severe U.S. bombings, where he listened to personal accounts of the air strikes. The team was also received on 11 August by Premier Pham Van Dong in his first reported public appearance in three months--an event which received frontpage attention in Hanoi papers, complete with "big-sized photos," according to VNA's review of the Hanoi press of 13 and 14 August.*

Clark's comments on the POW's, briefly quoted by Hanoi radio on 12 August, stressed that they were in good health, that they were getting regular medical and dental care, and that "there were no prohibitions or restrictions on the prisoners." The broadcast claimed that Clark contrasted the humaneness of the North Vietnamese to the "inhuman and brutal" treatment allegedly meted out to the Vietnamese people through the U.S. bombing of the North carried out on President Nixon's orders. Claiming that Clark had expressed determination to inform the American people of what is actually happening in the war, the report quoted him as declaring that "no matter what the reason or the objectives of the bombing, it is impossible to justify it before mankind's conscience."

Hanoi propagandists have portrayed Clark's 8-9 August visit to Thanh Hoa as a fact-finding mission to expose, on film and tape, the "barbarous crimes of the bloodthirsty Nixon clique." Hanoi radio on the 13th typically described Clark as astonished when confronted with evidence of American bombing of nonmilitary targets in Thanh Hoa. The same broadcast claimed that Clark was profoundly moved by the determination of the Vietnamese people to maintain "their beautiful way of life" in the face of the bombing, as well as by their friendly treatment of him, an American. Referring to the President's action in ordering the continuation of the bombing as a mistake which he has not yet realized, Clark stressed, according to the broadcast, that "several millions of Americans" are calling for an end to the bombing and for withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam.

* The premier also made a public appearance on 14 August when he received departing DPRK Ambassador Kim Pyon-sam and another on the 16th with GDR Ambassador Klaus Willerding. Prior to these appearances, the last Hanoi reference to an appearance by Pham Van Dong was on 10 June, in a report which said he had "recently" chaired a Council of Ministers meeting. See the TRENDS of 2 August 1972, pages 19-20.

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In an interview with a Hanoi radio reporter, recounted by the radio on the 14th, Clark was reported to have characterized U.S. bombing as not only inhuman but also "a very stupid act" which "cannot subdue the Vietnamese people." Remarks attributed to Clark at the beginning of the interview refuted Senator Goldwater's recent suggestion that some damage to the dikes may have been caused by North Vietnamese SAM's falling back on their own territory. Clark was quoted as asserting that "it is sheer nonsense to say that this damage has been caused by North Vietnamese missiles."

VNA on 11 August, reporting a press conference held by the team that day, attributed the following summary of the team's findings to former Irish parliamentarian Sean MacBride: 1) the bombings were intentional and deliberate; 2) the targets hit "would significantly affect the hydraulic system" and could cause flooding; 3) the areas being bombed are heavily populated agricultural regions; 4) the methods of destruction used "make effective repair difficult and unsatisfactory"; and 5) the damaged dikes observed by the team are not roads or part of a road network and are removed from military targets. MacBride reportedly concluded that these points "go far beyond the question of the legality of the bombing of North Vietnam. They involve flagrant violations of the laws of humanity and of The Hague and Geneva conventions."

HANOI CALLS FOR GREATER VIGILANCE, LAUDS DIKE REPAIR CAMPAIGN

The volume of attention Hanoi has given the dike issue diminished markedly during the past week. Except for a charge in the foreign ministry spokesman's statement of the 11th that three dike sections had been hit and incidental mentions in a few other articles, the only major propaganda attention to the subject came in two radio articles broadcast by Hanoi on the 11th--one in the domestic service and one in English to Southeast Asia. Both sounded a note of optimism, pointing with satisfaction to the nearly complete repair of all dikes and dams allegedly damaged by U.S. bombing.* The domestic broadcast cited the Chu and Ma river

* Positive evaluations of the campaign to repair water conservancy projects first emerged at the end of last month. A 25 July NHAN DAN editorial, for example, atypically predicted that the coming high water season could be dealt with satisfactorily and claimed that "because of the early work on the embankments, our dikes are now big, high, and solid." For a more detailed discussion see the TRENDS of 26 July 1972, pages 3-5.

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dikes and another dike in Thanh Hoa, as well as the system of dikes in the Nam Sach area of Hai Hung, as having been repaired; all of these dikes had been spotlighted in Hanoi propaganda as alleged targets of U.S. bombing raids. The English-language item, focusing on Haiphong and the southern provinces of the DRV, claimed repair of "almost all" dike sections as well as the building of a new sea dike in Quang Binh Province and said that Haiphong had completed its semiannual earthwork tasks five to 10 days early, with a fourfold increase over the amount of work done last year.

Both items urged continued vigilance despite these achievements. After stating that the water level halfway through the rainy season showed signs of not rising as high as it did last year, the domestic radio article stressed that the dikes must be reinspected and that rescue capability, stockpiling of materials, and projects to restore production after flooding as well as to prevent it in the first place must be carried out in a fighting spirit.

Emphasis on maintaining and improving an adequate dike and dam system was evident in two earlier articles that have recently become available. A lengthy article by Minister of Water Conservancy Ha Ke Tan in the July issue of HOC TAP focused on the importance of fighting floods and flash floods, whether caused by natural forces or by the "barbarous acts of the Nixon clique." After touching only briefly on alleged instances of damage caused by U.S. bombing, Tan confidently asserted that such actions will "certainly not . . . intimidate our people [or] force them to agree to a solution beneficial" to the Nixon Administration. U.S. air strikes only increase the Vietnamese people's hatred and fighting spirit, Tan declared.

Tan then focused on more "practical and concrete" measures for dealing with the situation. All dikes and dams should be strengthened and measures should be taken to protect them from enemy attacks, he said, and river banks and beds are to be kept clear so as to drain flash flood waters rapidly. Tan urged that greater attention be given to properly organizing, training, and equipping the "dike-protection forces," and he chastised backsliders for tendencies toward complacency which, he claimed, had been responsible for the breaking of three dikes during last year's heavy floods.* Tan concluded that if the dikes do break this year, "Nixon must be held responsible for this genocidal crime."

* The TRENDS of 19 July 1972, pages 4-5, reviews evidence of DRV concern about the soundness of the vast water conservancy projects stemming from causes other than U.S. strikes.

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Stressing the importance of continuing to strengthen and repair the dikes around Hanoi, a HANOI MOI editorial on 28 July claimed that the capital "has successfully completed" dike repair tasks and that local dikes are "now capable of resisting such a water level as that of last year." But it said efforts should be intensified to maintain adequate communications among local dike-repair forces and to insure their level of training and preparation. Linking injunctions for greater mobilization to the claim that the United States is attempting to "sabotage our dikes," the editorial called for increased vigilance to protect the capital and to defeat the U.S. aggressors.

LAWYERS' COMMENT The only other significant attention given the dike issue in the past week appeared in parts II and III of a five-part recorded discussion on President Nixon's "war crimes" broadcast in Hanoi's domestic service from 9 through 12 August.* Citing statistics reported earlier by the Water Conservancy Ministry and "concrete proofs" provided by numerous visitors to the DRV, the two lawyers--allegedly specialists in international and criminal law--developed the thesis that President Nixon is a "poor lawyer" who ridicules the charges leveled against him or else refuses to answer them, thereby attempting to evade responsibility for his "crimes." Statements made by the President at his 27 July press conference--that it is not deliberate U.S. policy to bomb dikes or other civilian targets, that some of the DRV's dikes were improperly maintained, and that the United States has the capability, if it wished, of destroying the dike system within a week--were denounced by both lawyers.

Describing the President as "a ruthless executioner of our people who always threatens people and carries out brazen acts but denies his wrongdoings," the lawyers charged that he "obviously . . . plans to kill as many civilians as possible." Characterizing President Nixon as a "new Hitler" by comparing him to a former Nazi governor of the Netherlands who breached the dikes, the broadcast argued that the President is even worse than Hitler because, instead of waging war against an advanced industrial country, he attacks countries "whose agriculture and industry are underdeveloped" and which "have just regained their independence." The President was urged to heed the evidence of U.S. strikes at civilian targets gathered by Ramsey Clark, Joseph Kraft, and other visitors to the DRV.

* Part I is discussed in the TRENDS of 9 August 1972, pages 11-12.

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DRV ISSUES MORE PROTESTS OVER BOMBINGS, CLAIMS PLANES DOWNED

The Foreign Ministry spokesman issued five routine statements during the week detailing alleged U.S. bombing actions in the North and condemning these and "other acts encroaching on the DRV's sovereignty and security."

+ The statement of the 10th charged U.S. aircraft with bombing and strafing populated areas in Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces on the previous day. B-52's were said to have hit a number of localities in Quang Binh, and U.S. warships were charged with striking at Hon Me Island and a number of coastal villages in Thanh Hoa Province and the Vinh Linh zone. Civilian casualties and property damage reportedly resulted from these attacks, despite "the Nixon Administration's deceptive claim that it does not bomb civilians [in] North Vietnam."

+ The statement of the 11th protested "savage raids" on the 10th on Vinh city, the outskirts of Haiphong, the provincial capitals of Ninh Binh and Thanh Hoa, and populated areas in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. The statement also reported strikes by B-52's at localities in the Vinh Linh zone and by warships on coastal areas of Ha Tinh Province and the Vinh Linh zone. Specific targets said to have been hit include a junior middle school in Thai Binh and several dikes--the Tra Ly River dike in Thai Thuy district, the Dau sluice in Vu Thu district of Thai Binh Province, and the sea dam and a portion of the dike at Nghi Khanh village in Nghi Loc district of Nghe An Province. It was noted that these attacks occurred while "the Nixon Administration is still stubbornly denying that U.S. aircraft are bombing civilian establishments or deliberately striking at dikes and water conservancy works in North Vietnam."

+ The 12 August statement condemned air strikes of the 11th on populated areas in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area; B-52 attacks on Quang Binh Province; and strikes by warships at coastal villages in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. The statement charged that "these war acts of the Nixon Administration grossly encroached upon the sovereignty and security of the DRV and on every fundamental principle of international law, and constituted an arrogant challenge to public opinion in the world and in the United States."

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+ U.S. "criminal war acts" of the 12th were portrayed in the spokesman's statement of the 13th as "brazenly violating the pledge made by the U.S. Government in October 1968 to totally and unconditionally end the bombing and shelling of North Vietnam." The statement charged the United States with attacking populated areas in Quang Ninh, Hoa Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It also claimed that B-52's bombed a number of localities in the Vinh Linh area and Quang Binh Province and that U.S. warships shelled coastal areas in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. The strikes were said to have caused heavy civilian casualties and widespread destruction of economic and cultural establishments.

+ The statement of the 14th denounced strikes of the previous day on Vinh city, on the capital of Ninh Binh Province, and on populated areas in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. B-52's were charged with bombing localities in Quang Binh Province, and U.S. warships were said to have shelled coastal villages in Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces. The statement said that these attacks, launched "in defiance of strong condemnation by the world and American public," reveal the Nixon Administration's "utter obstinacy and bellicosity."

+ "Extermination bombings" on the 14th of Thanh Hoa city, plus bombing of the suburbs of Haiphong and Vinh city, were highlighted in the spokesman's statement of the 15th. Also reported hit were populated areas in Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. The statement further charged that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh Province and that U.S. warships bombed and shelled coastal areas in Nam Ha--all in "brazen violation" of the U.S. pledge "to totally and unconditionally end the bombing and shelling of North Vietnam."

Further comment on the bombing of Thanh Hoa city was carried in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 15th, according to the VNA press review for that date. A VNA report of the 14th provided further details on the nature of the targets allegedly hit: suburban hamlets, the cathedral area, and the pharmaceutical workshop, bakery, noodle factory, and municipal cemetery. The report claimed that weapons used in "close to 100 sorties" included dart bombs and 500- and 2,000-pound demolition bombs.

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PLANE DOWNINGS Radio reports from Hanoi claim a total of 14 planes downed in action this week over the North--two over Quang Binh, including one helicopter; one each over Ninh Binh, Haiphong and Ha Tay; two each over Hai Hung, Vinh Phu and Hanoi; and three over Thanh Hoa. As of 16 August, Hanoi claimed to have downed a total of 3,825 U.S. aircraft. Hanoi also claimed that five U.S. warships were set on fire since 4 August by the people and armed forces of Ha Tinh, Thai Binh, and Thanh Hoa provinces.

The achievements of the militia in downing planes with its "low-altitude firenet" were lauded in a NHAN DAN editorial of the 12th. Reminiscent of a similar editorial and a station article of the 7th, it claimed that a "seething emulation movement" was underway to down low-flying enemy aircraft. It praised the effective leadership of party echelons and regional administrations for heightening the people's enthusiasm for this task and for implementing the day-to-day chores involved in maintaining and improving the local air defense system.

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PRG DENIES CHARGES OF ATROCITIES, ACCUSES U.S. OF "CRIMES"

A 9 August PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement denounced President Nixon as "the biggest war criminal of our time" and rebutted allied charges that the communists had massacred government officials in areas they controlled in Binh Dinh and had deliberately killed civilians fleeing down Highway 1 from Quang Tri city.* The Vietnamese communists have responded publicly to previous allied charges of atrocities, though not usually at the foreign ministry level. For example, LPA announced on 13 May that it was authorized to deny charges that the communists had executed two French missionaries. The 9 August statement referred specifically to 4 and 7 August statements on the killings by a spokesman for the State Department and to remarks by President Nixon in his 27 July press conference, but it gave no indication of the details of the charges beyond an assertion that "the so-called 'massacres' and 'killings of civilians'" are "a sheer fabrication." The statement asserted that these "odious tricks of the White House" are aimed at misleading public opinion, covering up the U.S. policy of prolonging the war, and distorting the policies of the resistance; and it recalled the PRG's 10-point policy on GVN soldiers and officials, released on 25 January, as evidence of its humanitarian policy.**

More details of the charges were noted in a 10 August LPA commentary which scored President Nixon and "the State Department psywar machine" for "trotting out absurd allegations and slanders and cooking up the so-called 'massacres of civilians,' 'shellings of cities and wanton killing of refugees by the communists.'" LPA particularly noted that on 5 and 7 August "they invented stories claiming that the communists had intentionally killed from 1,000 to 2,000 people, including women and children who were fleeing from Quang Tri on April 29 and 30, and that 'the communists had executed hundreds of Saigon functionaries and arrested and put in jail thousands of others in Binh Dinh.'" Both the commentary and Mme. Binh in her statement at the 10 August Paris session decried the Administration's use of these "slanders" in an attempt to demonstrate that a bloodbath would follow a communist takeover.

* See the 9 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 14-15, for discussion of initial communist reaction to these charges.

** See the TRENDS of 2 February 1972, pages 21-23, and 9 February, page 14, for a discussion of the 10-point policy.

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The LPA commentary contrasted the PRG's 10-point policy with allied policies, noting the "irony" that the "slanders" were made public while "the traitor Nguyen Van Thieu had frenziedly ordered cruel agents in the so-called 'people's self-defense force' to 'wipe out the communist infrastructures,' including those whom he brands as 'communist' village and hamlet administrative personnel, tax collectors, and the like." On 11 August an LPA report cited "sources from Saigon" in charging that Thieu "recently ordered all provincial governors to secretly destroy all the so-called organizations of the NFL infrastructure right inside the puppet administrative machine," even "ordering them to eliminate all members of the village and hamlet administration suspected to be 'communist agents.'"

Communist charges that the allies have carried out "criminal" attacks on "liberated" areas continue, with VNA and LPA on 14 and 15 August carrying accounts of an 11 August statement by the people's revolutionary committee of Binh Dinh Province which charged that "wanton" air and artillery bombardments supporting ARVN counteroffensive operations in the province had caused more than 300 civilian casualties and destroyed thousands of homes. The statement cited specific air and naval attacks on populated areas and added that "along with extermination bombardments against villages, the U.S.-puppets also conducted air raids on dams and pumping stations on either side of the Lai Giang River, denying water to thousands of hectares of paddy-fields." A 3 August PRG Foreign Ministry statement on alleged allied "crimes" in North and South Vietnam had claimed that the United States had bombed three dams on the Lai Giang River on 20 July "in an attempt to strike directly at the life of the people" in Hoai An and Hoai Nhon districts.* The Binh Dinh revolutionary committee's statement also charged that Saigon forces, "directly commanded by U.S. advisers," had compelled civilians to act as a shield for them.

PAR'S TALKS: U.S. VIEWS SCORED, RUMORS ON SECRET TALKS DENIED

VNA's account of the 154th session of the Paris conference on 10 August omitted the details of Mme. Binh's extensive denunciation of the Thieu regime but included her restatement of the PRG's position toward the Saigon administration. Thus VNA reported her assertion that "as long as this administration exists, the war will

* The 3 August PRG Foreign Ministry statement is discussed in the 9 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 13-14.

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go on and the negotiations will remain in a deadlock" and her statement that to achieve a solution the United States must, along with withdrawing its troops, cease support for the Saigon "clique," Thieu must resign, and the Saigon administration must change its policy.

VNA also included the main part of her explanation of the PRG proposal for the formation of a national concord government. The explanation was presented as a response to the view that the United States does not have political responsibility and to the statement--contained in Ambassador Porter's remarks at the 3 August session--that the PRG proposal raised psychological and practical obstacles which stagger the imagination. Mme. Binh also rejected the contention that the proposed national concord government would be imposed undemocratically and would result in an arbitrary partition of powers and the installation of a communist government.

The PRG's "clarification" of its proposal was endorsed by Nguyen Minh Vy--speaking in place of DRV delegation head Xuan Thuy, who was said by the DRV spokesman at the post-session press briefing to be slightly indisposed. VNA omitted Vy's detailed charges about "deliberate" U.S. attacks on dikes and populated areas in North Vietnam but included his criticism of the United States for violating its 1968 pledge to halt the bombing and his attack on Thieu for advocating more U.S. bombing and the destruction of the North. It also cited his concluding remarks in which he called on the United States to stop all war acts and enter into serious negotiations and declared: "We are prepared to discuss immediately with the United States the key points which the PRG has pointed out and elaborated to rapidly achieve a solution satisfactory to the parties."

VNA's cryptic report of the allied remarks at the session appeared to reflect the discussion during the give-and-take portion of the session when Ambassador Porter recalled the 19 July HANOI MOI picture of an antiaircraft gun on a dike and questioned the North Vietnamese contention that there were no military installations near dikes.* In addition to declaring routinely that the U.S. delegate "kept pleading for the Saigon Administration's

* On 4 August Hanoi's domestic service responded to Voice of America broadcasts referring to the HANOI MOI picture. The Hanoi broadcast quoted a statement in the 4 August HANOI MOI by the photographer who took the picture, claiming that it actually showed a soil emplacement next to a pond, not a dike.

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policy of aggression and neocolonialism," VNA charged that he was "seeking new pretexts for the United States to continue its attacks on North Vietnam's dikes."

Allied calls at the Paris conference for a cease-fire were denounced in a 13 August Hanoi radio "article" which appeared to respond directly to Ambassador Porter's statement at the 3 August session of the talks when it rejected as "hypocritical" the view that the most urgent task is to end the killing and the notion that the communists should pay attention to the Vietnamese people rather than to their own political objectives. Pointing out that the war is being waged because of the conflicting political objectives of the two sides, the radio declared that "in solving the South Vietnam problem one cannot deal only with the military problem without speaking of the political problem." The article stressed the need to topple Thieu and held that as long as he remains as a "tool" of the United States, "the request for a cease-fire is itself meaningless." The article continued:

Such a cease-fire cannot eliminate the cause of the war. Instead, such a cease-fire will permanently maintain the factors for waging war against any time. No one naively believes that if there is a cease-fire, if the Americans withdraw their troops, and if the captured soldiers are released the Vietnamese people will be able to solve their own political problem, as Nixon boasted.

While not announcing the third of the recent private meetings between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on 14 August, Hanoi responded to rumors about the meeting in a 16 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article deprecating reports from "Western sources" that a new U.S. peace plan was tabled "at the Paris talks" on the 14th and a French newspaper report quoting Kissinger as saying the war would be over before the end of September.* According to the army paper, "the

* Hanoi promptly reported the first in the current series of private talks between Kissinger and the Vietnamese representatives in a brief VNA news item on 19 July, and again referred to it in the VNA account of the formal session of 20 July. DRV media did not report the 1 August private meeting, however. The DRV press spokesman, questioned at the 3 August post-session briefing about the absence of an announcement, explained that "the form of the meeting with the Americans is not very important, whether it is private or open."

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fact is that the United States is intensifying the war and has done nothing to end it." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN cited an AFP report for the view that the Nixon Administration is using "publicity about the secret Paris talks and rumors about a new U.S. peace proposal to serve its election campaign," and it declared that "the so-called 'new peace plan' of Nixon is obviously a mere psywar move"

Hanoi media have been routinely reporting Democratic criticism of the Administration's position on Vietnam, and on 15 August VNA picked up the charge by Vice Presidential candidate Shriver that President Nixon lost a chance for peace in 1969. A 16 August VNA report noted remarks on the issue by former U.S. chief delegate to the Paris conference Harriman. VNA quoted Harriman's criticism of the Administration for supporting Thieu rather than negotiating a settlement, but it did not note his view that the communists had signaled their willingness to reach a settlement when they withdrew combat troops from South Vietnam's northern provinces.

Hanoi again registered its opposition to the reconvening of a Geneva-type conference on Vietnam in an article which VNA on the 15th said had appeared in "the biggest Hanoi paper." The article scored the British for raising the question of a conference last May, noting that the Indian Government was approached at that time but "refused to cooperate in this inglorious venture." It criticized Britain's actions in its role as cochairman and complained that "each time the United States lands in a new difficulty in Vietnam, the British Government unfailingly flies to its rescue by calling for a reconvening of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam." Hanoi's motive in recalling the British proposal at this time is unclear; the article may have been prompted by the 25th anniversary of Indian independence, marked in the Hanoi press on the 15th. The call for a Geneva conference had previously been scored in a 17 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which accused the British Government of "lending a hand to the Nixon Administration in its military adventure and perfidious diplomatic moves."

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PEKING MUFFLES SENSITIVE ISSUES WHILE DECRYING BOMBING

Consistent with its cautious approach in recent weeks, Peking has muffled comment on sensitive issues affecting its interests in the Vietnam conflict while again adding its voice to the chorus of protest against alleged U.S. bombing of North Vietnamese dikes. Chinese leaders' statements on the international situation have all but avoided the subject of Vietnam, as in the exchange of speeches at the 12 August banquet welcoming UN Secretary General Waldheim. Though Waldheim cited Vietnam as one of the persisting problem areas, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei made no mention of Vietnam while focusing on the struggle against superpower hegemony. Chi did refer to "continuous new victories" in Indochina during a speech on the 13 welcoming the Cameroon foreign minister, but Peking's only recent pledge of support for the war effort was contained in a 10 August speech by a Shantung provincial leader who welcomed Princ. Sihanouk to Tsinan by declaring that it is the PRC's "bounden internationalist duty" to "support and assist" the Indochinese.

Peking's extensive coverage of the non-aligned nations' conference in Guyana included PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles on 13 and 15 August hailing the decision to accept the delegation of Sihanouk's government as the sole legal representative of Cambodia and the PRG as a full member of the conference. NCNA accounts of the conference have reported a resolution on Indochina and the Georgetown Declaration expressing support for the PRG's seven points, but Peking has been avoiding the question of a Vietnam settlement in its own comment.

U.S. AIR STRIKES Following the precedent of the 4 August PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial seconding DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry protests against U.S. military actions, another editorial on the 13th supported the 8 August DRV Foreign Ministry statement denouncing U.S. air strikes and expressed "burning indignation" over alleged U.S. attacks on DRV dikes and "densely populated areas." Unlike the DRV statement, the editorial avoided attacking President Nixon for having denied that it is U.S. policy to bomb such targets; the editorial referred impersonally to the U.S. Government, charging that it is U.S. policy to force the North Vietnamese to cease supporting "their compatriots in the South" and that it is the U.S. intention to cause floods during the rainy season.

As in the case of Peking's previous backing for Hanoi's charges concerning the alleged bombing of dikes, the editorial made no

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mention of Chinese support for the war effort or of a political settlement, though it called for an end to "indiscriminate" American bombing in Vietnam. As reflected in the editorial's title, "The Iron Will of the Vietnamese People Is Unshakable," Peking again took the occasion to express confidence that the Vietnamese can cope with the situation. But where the DRV statement asserted that neither bombing nor "perfidious political and diplomatic maneuvers" of the Nixon Administration could shake Hanoi's will, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial referred more vaguely to "outrageous means and intrigues" in this context.

As part of Peking's replaying of Vietnamese and other foreign reports on bombing of dikes, NCNA on the 11th carried accounts by foreign visitors in the DRV, including a report on Jane Fonda's accusations, but PRC media have yet to refer to the visit of Ramsey Clark. Peking belatedly on 10 August began picking up VNA accounts of late July and early August concerning casualties suffered by Overseas Chinese from U.S. air strikes in the Haiphong area. In its own name Peking has limited itself to a two-sentence NCNA dispatch on the 10th reporting that a Chinese embassy official had called on the vice president of an Overseas Chinese association in Vietnam on 4 August to express "indignation" and "deep concern" for the victims and their families.

HANOI, PEKING HAIL SEATING OF PRG, RGNU AT NONALINED PARLEY

Hanoi and Peking hailed as a significant victory the seating of the delegations of the PRG and of Sihanouk's government (RGNU) as full members at the 8-12 August conference of foreign ministers of nonaligned nations in Guyana.* Moscow, however, consistent with its failure to recognize the RGNU, barely acknowledged the admission of the two delegations at the end of an 11 August TASS report on that day's session of the conference. On the 12th TASS briefly reported a speech by the PRG delegate, but there was no further Soviet mention of the RGNU delegation.

* The two delegations were not admitted as full members to the September 1970 Lusaka conference of heads of state and government of nonaligned countries. The PRG was admitted as an "observer," and the question of which delegation was to represent Cambodia was shelved. The seating issue accordingly received little attention in communist media.

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A 12 August NHAN DAN editorial acclaimed the admission of the PRG and RGNU delegations as a "victory of great significance" for the anti-U.S. struggle in Indochina and for the "militant solidarity" of the "oppressed people and progressive mankind" with the Indochinese peoples. The Nixon Administration and "a handful of lackeys" have tried to "slander and divide" the Indochinese people, according to NHAN DAN, which called the Guyana conference decision "a bitter and ignominious failure for the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys."

The editorial cited an AP reporter as speculating that the decision "may further strengthen the posture of the Vietnamese communists at the Paris peace conference because they will have the moral support of 66 nonaligned countries." NHAN DAN added that the "deplorable attitude" of the Indonesian, Malaysian, and Lao representatives at the conference--they walked out to protest the admission of the PRG delegation--shows "the seamy side of the so-called ASEAN solution to the Vietnam problem which was recently rejected by our government and people."* NHAN DAN also took the occasion to claim that the decision to seat the delegations proves that "the U.S.-Thieu clique can deceive no one with its false accusation that the PRG is plotting to set up a communist regime in one-half of Vietnam." The conference's decision, the editorial said, confirms that the PRG's policy of "peace, independence, neutrality, and national concord" is reasonable.

Pegging its comment a notch lower than an editorial, Peking acclaimed the decision to seat the PRG and RGNU delegations in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 13 August. The article was mainly devoted to puffing the cause of Peking's Cambodian client, claiming that the conference's decision is proof of the RGNU's "rising international prestige" and denouncing the Lon Nol

* Kuala Lumpur radio on 16 July quoted the Malaysian deputy premier as reporting that at the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Manila a definition of a Southeast Asian "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality" had been agreed upon and that the conference agreed to contribute all it could toward an Indochina settlement. The deputy premier said that "secret overtures" rather than "open contacts" would be necessary to this end. On 10 August VNA reported that a DRV Foreign Ministry official called in the Indonesian charge d'affaires and rejected "the absurd proposal of the ASEAN regarding the settlement of the Vietnam issue," but VNA did not disclose the content of the proposal.

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regime as a "handful of national scums" that destroyed Cambodia's policy of nonalignment. Commentator also took the occasion to claim that the nonaligned countries constitute an important force in the struggle against the superpowers.

The seating of the two delegations was singled out as particularly noteworthy in another PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, on the 15th, hailing the results of the conference. The article said the decision provided "vigorous support" to the Indochinese struggle against "U.S. imperialist aggression." Unlike the NHAN DAN editorial, neither Commentator article raised the question of a political settlement in Indochina.

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DISARMAMENT

MOSCOW: WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE WILL NOT REPLACE SALT

Moscow has again stressed the importance of holding a world disarmament conference (WDC) but has made abundantly clear that such a gathering cannot replace the negotiations by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva or the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the United States. The Soviet position on these matters was outlined in an article in the 28 July issue of the weekly *NOVOYE VREMYA* (No. 31) by Nikolay Arkadyev, a commentator who has become the unofficial foreign affairs weekly's principal spokesman on disarmament. The article apparently foreshadows the Soviet position on WDC to be forwarded to the UN Secretary General, in response to the UN General Assembly resolution of 16 December 1971 advising member states to forward their suggestions by 31 August. Arkadyev wrote that "the preparation for a conference and its convening must not in any degree detract from the significance of those forms and channels for negotiations on disarmament which are being used at the present time," and he went on to specify both the Geneva talks and SALT.

Reviewing what he labeled a general trend in international support for the "Soviet initiative" to convene a world conference on disarmament, including "a change in the U.S. position" as reflected in the joint Soviet-U.S. communique on President Nixon's visit, Arkadyev cited the Mexican Government's June memorandum on WDC as containing "a number of positive and rational opinions." In particular, the article listed the Mexican proposal that there be universal participation, that the conference convene in 1974, that such conferences be held "periodically" thereafter, and that "a special preparatory organ be created" in which "appropriate geographical and political representation would be guaranteed." Underscoring his approval of the Mexican memorandum, Arkadyev again stated that it "included many useful thoughts and ideas." Prefacing his statement that a WDC "must not" detract from the CCD and SALT, he recalled the Soviet proposal at last year's General Assembly session that a world disarmament conference should become "a forum operating on a long-term basis and convened periodically" to assign topics "to smaller working organs for negotiations."

Arkadyev said there was "no need to discuss in detail" the fact that "all nuclear powers must participate" in any arrangement regarding nuclear disarmament; he reminded his readers of the 1971 Soviet proposal to convene a conference of the five nuclear powers,

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a proposal which, he pointed out, only the French Government "actively supported." Acknowledging indirectly that the PRC had taken a negative position on such a five-power gathering, a fact repeatedly recalled in routine Soviet polemics against the Chinese, he observed that "true, not all the nuclear powers reacted positively" to the proposal to hold such a conference but added optimistically that the USSR "does not believe the final word has been uttered concerning this question." Arkadyev argued that a five-power conference "could also promote effective work by a WDC," but that "at the same time it would be incorrect to make a preliminary meeting of the five nuclear powers a necessary condition for holding a world conference."

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW CONVEYS APPREHENSION OVER PEKING'S EUROPEAN POLICY

With preparations for a European security conference scheduled for Helsinki in the fall and against a background of active Chinese interest in Europe, Soviet bloc media have intensified a carefully orchestrated campaign to discredit Peking's European policy. Articles in IZVESTIYA, the GDR's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Warsaw's IDEOLOGJA I POLITYKA, and Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG--the latter two widely broadcast by Radio Moscow--make the case that despite Peking's efforts to normalize relations with some European countries, it is persisting in its hostility toward the Soviet Union while seeking to isolate Moscow from its allies and to counter the Soviet detente campaign in Europe.

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND,
IZVESTIYA ARTICLES

Concern over the prospect of Peking-Bonn ties was reflected in Soviet bloc comment on the recent visit to Peking by the West German "shadow" foreign minister, Gerhard Schroeder. Typically, East Germany's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, in an article on 26 July viewed the Schroeder trip with alarm, characterizing it as "the beginning of a phase of open cooperation between the Peking leadership and the imperialist forces of the FRG." It went on to interpret the trip as confirmation that the

diplomatic activities pursued by Peking are obviously dictated by scarcely hidden hostility toward a European security conference and by the attempt to subvert the visible successes of the policy of peaceful coexistence and thus to frustrate the coming of peace and security to our continent.

Taking a slap at the Brandt-Scheel government, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND went on to ask how in the face of Schroeder's obvious motives for visiting Peking "is one to understand the fact that FRG Chancellor Brandt, as stated by his spokesman Ahlers, received Schroeder officially for full talks, that he supported Schroeder's plan from the very beginning and gave him necessary references for his talks."

In contrast to the GDR party organ's criticism of Brandt, the article in the 12 August issue of IZVESTIYA, by M. Mikhaylov, praised the efforts of the Brandt-Scheel government for "playing

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its part in the favorable processes taking place in Europe." The article limited its criticism to "Schroeder and his sympathizers from the CDU/CSU who are acting in a diametrically opposite direction." Mikhaylov went on to charge that Schroeder was invited to Peking precisely because of his "machinations" against European detente and his opposition to improved FRG relations with the Soviet bloc countries. In this context, Mikhaylov cited an AP correspondent for the view that by wooing Schroeder, Peking hopes to "bring the opposition back into power in West Germany and to slow down Bonn's implementation of its Ostpolitik."

A Grigoryev dispatch from Bonn in PRAVDA on the 6th had similarly tied Schroeder's Peking trip to the upcoming Bundestag elections, remarking that it was designed to enable the "CDU/CSU bloc to obtain its own Eastern policy topic for the election campaign." The dispatch added that "the nearer the election approaches and the more acute the election struggle becomes, the more frequently and blatantly the Chinese argument will be advanced in the discussion of Eastern policy."

NEPSZABADSAG
ARTICLE

In keeping with Budapest's role as a leading proxy spokesman for Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute, NEPSZABADSAG's 10 August article, entitled "China's European Policy," charged that Peking's wooing of the Bonn "conservative opposition in the person of Gerhard Schroeder" is only part of its European policy, which sees capitalist Europe and NATO as providing a political and military counterbalance to the Soviet bloc. Broaching a subject generally avoided in Soviet media, the article sought to counter the notion that Moscow would attempt to exploit a European detente by devoting greater attention to the Chinese problem. Thus the article rejected the idea allegedly advanced by the Chinese in their negotiations with the West to the effect that Soviet involvement in Europe "represents a relief for China's defense." China, the article concluded, "is not threatened by the Soviet Union, but by imperialism."

IZVESTIYA
REPRINT

Reflecting Moscow's effort to dissuade other communist states from being receptive to Peking's diplomatic overtures, IZVESTIYA on 11 August reprinted an article from the Polish journal IDEOLOGJA I POLITYKA warning that despite its more flexible tactics toward some states Peking still considers the USSR "enemy number one." In passages buttressing the case that the Chinese have not relented in their anti-Soviet intransigence, the Polish article made a passing reference to the Sino-Soviet border talks: "Despite the Soviet

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delegation's numerous initiatives, the Peking negotiations, which have lasted nearly three years, have not been brought to a successful conclusion." (Just four days earlier, IZVESTIYA had indicated that the progress of the border talks was less than reassuring by seizing on the publication of a new Chinese atlas to charge that the Chinese are continuing to lay claim to Soviet territory.) Maintaining that "anti-Sovietism" still remains the core of Chinese policy toward Eastern Europe, the article warned that Peking is using "differentiating" tactics toward various countries in the hopes of fomenting "nationalistic tendencies" and ultimate "disintegration" of the Soviet bloc.

PEKING PUTS USSR AT BOTTOM OF LIST OF SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES

The differentiated line to which Moscow takes exception was in evidence during Peking's commencement of its Army Day on 1 August. NCNA carried a series of reports on Chinese embassy receptions marking the anniversary in various countries. Both the order in which the reports were carried and the atmospherics they portrayed were designed to provide a carefully calibrated reading of Peking's relations with these countries. Bringing up the rear were the Soviet bloc countries, and among these the Soviet Union was at the very tail (the order was Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union; Romania was of course accorded a high status outside this group). Alone among this group of countries, the atmosphere at the Moscow reception was not characterized as friendly.

As it has often done since the Sino-Soviet border talks began in October 1969, Peking used the occasion of an anniversary reception--on 31 July marking Army Day--to take note of the presence of the Soviet negotiators. NCNA reported that chief negotiator Ilichev and his deputy, Gankovskiy (who has returned after a period during which another person served as deputy chief of the delegation), were present at the reception. The Soviets also brought up the rear in this report, being named at the very end of a list that put all other foreign guests at the top.

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CHINA - JAPAN

PEKING EXTENDS FORMAL INVITATION TO TANAKA TO VISIT CHINA

A month after issuing an informal invitation through intermediaries shortly after the installation of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka, Peking on 12 August formally invited Tanaka to visit China. The announcement of Tanaka's formal acceptance on 15 August stated that details of the trip would be disclosed simultaneously by both sides after the timing of the visit is set. Chinese advance publicity for the trip has been carefully designed to imply that the visit will take place at Japanese urging, not as a result of an informal Chinese invitation in July which apparently speeded up Tanaka's own timetable for establishing relations. Though Peking's treatment of Japan since Tanaka's accession marked a dramatic shift from its previous hostility,* the Chinese have been at pains to avoid giving the impression that they are the supplicant party in arranging the visit.

Peking's first reference to the possibility of a Tanaka trip was contained in a 24 July NCNA dispatch reporting Tanaka's speech to the first meeting of the LDP's council for normalizing PRC-Japanese diplomatic relations. Tanaka was quoted as saying that "as to the visit of the foreign minister and me to China, it should be decided" by the council. On 4 August NCNA quoted the LDP council chairman as telling Tanaka that he "should visit Peking personally to have a frank exchange of views with the Chinese leaders." On 9 August NCNA noted that the council had "unanimously adopted a decision in favor of a visit." NCNA reported on the 11th that Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira "told the Chinese side officially" that Tanaka had decided to visit China to discuss normalization of relations.

The formal Chinese invitation was finally released on 12 August in the form of an announcement by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei that Chou En-lai "welcomes and invites" Tanaka. Continuing to portray Japanese eagerness, the announcement noted Ohira's talk with Chinese officials in Tokyo at which he stated that Tanaka "wishes" to visit China. The announcement suggested high hopes for the success of the trip, stating that Chou's invitation is for the purpose of "negotiations and settlement" of the question of normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. On 15 August NCNA carried an account of Tanaka's meeting that day with Chinese officials to formally accept the invitation. Again Japan was presented as the beseecher, with Tanaka quoted as expressing "heartfelt thanks" for the invitation and the "hope" that the talks prove fruitful.

* See the TRENDS of 26 July 1972, pages 31-32.

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CHINA - THAILAND

PEKING MUTES ANNIVERSARY OF THAI COMMUNIST INSURGENCY

Contributing to the improved atmosphere surrounding Sino-Thai relations highlighted by the impending visit to Peking next month of a Thai table tennis team accompanied by an important official, Peking chose to mark the seventh anniversary on 7 August of the communist-led insurgency in Thailand in a lower key than in previous years. The Thai team's visit has been announced by Bangkok but not Peking, which often awaits the arrival of a foreign delegation before publicizing a new venture in people's diplomacy. Peking's subdued treatment of the insurgency anniversary this year has been typical of its practice in recent years in developing a more differentiated and flexible line following the diplomatic chaos of the cultural revolution.

As the dating of the insurgency and Peking's past treatment indicate, Sino-Thai relations have to a considerable extent been affected by the Indochina war, and particularly the U.S. and Thai involvement. This factor has been reflected in the slower pace at which Peking's relations with Thailand have improved as compared to its relations with such other countries in the area as Burma and Malaysia. Recent indications suggest, however, that Peking is prepared to follow the pattern shown in the case of Burma and Malaysia by reducing its hostility toward the Thai regime while leaving it to the communist clandestine radio to promote the insurgent line.

The Indochina factor was much in evidence on the anniversary of the Thai insurgency two years ago, when Peking sharply attacked the Bangkok regime as a traitor to Thailand and an accomplice in the U.S. war effort in Indochina. Shortly thereafter, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 15 August 1970, warning Bangkok against sending additional troops to Cambodia, treated the Thanom government with the same hostility as shown Lon Nol, assailing it as "a faithful running dog in the pay of U.S. imperialism." In marking the anniversary in 1971 Peking dropped the connection with the Indochina war, though the Thanom government was repeatedly denounced by name on the score of having sold out Thai sovereignty to the United States. One of the NCNA reports on the occasion strongly endorsed "armed struggle" in Thailand as the correct road to seize power, citing the authority of Lenin to stress the need for "violent revolution."

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The sole Peking-originated report on the anniversary this year was a 7 August NCNA account of the Thai insurgency that contained only one reference to the "Thanom-Prapath clique," otherwise referring more vaguely to "Thai reactionaries." Although NCNA duly hailed the seven years of "people's war," it did not repeat last year's categorical endorsement of armed struggle as the sole correct path. It also concluded by taking note of "extremely difficult conditions" under which the insurgents are operating. Earlier, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 28 June assailing American military deployments in Thailand avoided any pejorative reference to the Thanom government, and a 27 January PRC Foreign Ministry statement on the Thai-Cambodian border security arrangement reflected Peking's more differentiated approach by denouncing the "Lon Nol-Sirik Matak traitorous clique" while less provocatively referring to "the reactionaries of Thailand."

Peking's more flexible line has also been reflected in divergences between its approach and that taken by the Thai communists--paralleling developments in Peking's relations with Burma and Malaysia. Thus, where the NCNA report marking the Thai insurgency anniversary said the Thai communists are "integrating Marxism-Leninism with the revolutionary practice of Thailand," an article on Chinese Army Day broadcast by the clandestine "Voice of the People of Thailand" claimed that the Thai CP is "integrating Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought with the revolutionary practice" in the country. The broadcast also added the label "traitorous" to NCNA's less hostile formula "Thanom-Prapath clique."

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CHINA

RED FLAG CRITICIZES LIN'S ROLE IN NORTHEAST CAMPAIGN

An article in RED FLAG No. 8, reprinted in PEOPLE'S DAILY and broadcast by Peking on 15 August, marks the first effort to denigrate Lin Piao's major achievement as a Chinese communist leader, his command of the Northeast campaign which shattered the KMT defenses in 1948. The article does so by giving total credit to Mao's strategy as having been carried out even though "swindlers like Liu Shao-chi overestimated the enemy's strength and underestimated the people's strength." Credit for the general strategy of the campaign has always been given to Mao in official CCP accounts, and his telegrams giving strategic instructions were republished in his SELECTED WORKS. But there has never been any indication until now that Lin opposed any of the strategy. He presumably did have a voice in determining strategy in addition to carrying it out brilliantly.

The RED FLAG article in effect portrays Lin as having opposed Mao's basic idea that the main attack during the early stage of the campaign should be directed against the rail lines linking Peiping with the northeast, at the city of Chinchou, which would seal off the KMT forces from retreat. Mao is said to have turned down "the mistaken proposal made by swindlers like Liu Shao-chi that Changchun be attacked first," a proposal "made at the critical moment when the disposition of our forces for the attack on Chinchou had been completed." The article indicates that Lin thought the plan too ambitious and wanted to attack the enemy piecemeal, allowing many to escape.

That the article is to be joined soon by other attacks on Lin's military leadership is suggested by its call for further study of Mao's military writings and for further criticism of "the revisionist political and military line pushed by swindlers." Lin has previously been criticized for lacking confidence in the Red Army. Articles have recalled Mao's 1930 letter to Lin later entitled "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire," a letter probably intended at the time as fatherly advice but recently used to show Lin's early errors.

While Lin's role in the Northeast campaign is now under attack, Peking has made a point of indicating that the attack does not extend to the Fourth Field Army he commanded. The joint editorial by PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY for Army

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Day on 1 August cited a quotation from Mao specifically praising the troops who participated in the Chinchou offensive for their exemplary discipline in refraining from eating apples grown and harvested by the people. The Mao quotation noted that consciousness of the people's need "is the basis of our discipline" and the "result of the leadership and education by our party." The current implication of the quotation, which was prominently displayed in the press on Army Day and amplified in a PEOPLE'S DAILY article that day by the party committee of a unit that had participated in the campaign, seems to be that the troops also remained loyal during the recent Lin affair. As the PEOPLE'S DAILY article put it, "swindlers" have sought to turn the troops into a "tool for a handful of careerists."

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CZECHOSLOVAK TRIALS

ITALIAN PARTY CHARGES "PERSECUTION"; PRAVDA BACKS PRAGUE

With the Italian Communist Party (PCI) leadership now following the French CP in formally censuring the current Czechoslovak political trials, Moscow finally weighed in on 14 August with its first original comment on the controversial proceedings--a signed article in PRAVDA vigorously backing the Czechoslovak justification for the trials. Signed by Ivan Dmitriyev and entitled "There Is No Limit to Hypocrisy," the article ostensibly took only "bourgeois propaganda" to task for "hypocritical remarks" and interference in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs. But it betrayed clear sensitivity to the vocal, sustained criticism of the trials that has come from the West European communist parties when it complained that "reactionary" elements are using "concoctions about Czechoslovak political trials" to "sow hatred among progressive forces and to cause friction in the communist and workers movement."

Soviet central media had previously confined their coverage of the trials to brief reports on the proceedings and sentencings, usually citing Prague sources. The first comment in the central press was taken from the Czechoslovak party daily RUDE PRAVO: On 9 August PRAVDA reprinted without comment the 2 August RUDE PRAVO article in which the Prague leadership adamantly defended the trials and rebutted Western "bourgeois" criticism, and the weekly LITERATURNAYA GAZETA reprinted the same article on the same day with prefatory remarks pointing up the nature of Moscow's concern. The weekly noted that according to RUDE PRAVO, one of the aims of the Western press allegations about the trials was "to frustrate the trend toward unification of left forces which is beginning to show in certain West European countries." It cited the "alliance of left forces" in France--which includes the Communist Party--as a case in point.

The PRAVDA article evinced apprehensiveness over the effects the public uproar over the trials might have on the European political scene at a time when the protracted Soviet effort to bring about a conference on European security and cooperation is finally bearing fruit. Taking issue with the London TIMES in particular, charging it with playing the role of an "ordinary blackmailer," PRAVDA said the London paper maintains now that "all proposals on the normalization of relations with the West and routine reciprocal dealings in the field of science and culture have become

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pointless"; the TIMES' editors "and their protectors," the article added, "needed another pretext in their attempt to hamper the further relaxation of tension in Europe, and they hurried to invent one." Saying RUDE PRAVO had "correctly" argued that the people brought to trial were "hostile to socialism, violated the law, and created a threat to the peace and security of the state and its citizens," PRAVDA went on to say that "in cases of criminal activity in general and on this occasion, too, when the wider interests of socialist society are threatened, no compromise is permissible."

In a passage aimed in part at the French and Italian CP's, PRAVDA declared: "A principled class approach can give only one assessment of the current anti-Czechoslovak and anticommunist campaign; this assessment is that the campaign is a continuation of frenzied attacks by reactionary propaganda against socialism in 1968 when, with the assistance of their loyal friends, the Czechoslovak people rebuffed the pressure of antisocialist forces." As if to drive home the point that no true communist could view the trials in any other way, the article lectured that "the class approach gives a clear understanding of the overall importance of current efforts by Czechoslovak workers led by the CPCZ to overcome critical manifestations." Saying it is "patently clear" that the CSSR is "absolutely determined not to permit individuals to systematically violate socialist order and laws, carry out antistate activities with impunity, or make the building of a new society difficult," PRAVDA concluded pointedly that "all friends of socialist Czechoslovakia clearly perceive and resolutely unmask the anticommunist aims of the hypocritical instigators of the commotions raised over the 'political trials' in the CSSR."

PCI POLITBURO STATEMENT A week earlier, the PCI had escalated the level of its public criticism of the trials from unsigned articles in the party daily L'UNITA to that of a Politburo statement. Released on 9 August and published in L'UNITA on the 10th, the document was adopted at an 8 August Politburo meeting held to discuss "the staging of a number of political trials in Czechoslovakia." Questions "of interest" to the CPSU and the PCI, presumably including the trials, had been discussed on the 7th in Moscow by PCI Politburo member Novella and CPSU Politburo candidate member and Secretary Ponomarev, whose bailiwick is relations with the nonruling communist parties.*

* Novella had also participated in a PCI delegation which had discussions with the French CP in Paris on 12 July.

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Reporting that meeting, Moscow radio on the 7th and PRAVDA the next day described the atmosphere as "cordial and friendly." If the trials were discussed, the result was manifestly a stalemate. The Soviet papers reprinted the 2 August RUDE PRAVO article on the same day the PCI released a formal statement of condemnation.

The PCI Politburo used notably explicit terms to criticize the Czechoslovak leadership. The statement said that the "political trials" raise "new grave questions" concerning the situation in Czechoslovakia four years after "the August 1968 military intervention" and concerning "the principles on which the building of socialism should be based." The statement was equally clear on the PCI's concern over the impact of the trials on its own political fortunes in Italy:

. . . these are questions which cannot fail to affect every communist party, and--lacking, among other things, full information and convincing explanations--it is therefore both legitimate and a duty to raise reservations and express clear opinions, while at the same time rejecting the course of interference in the domestic life of another country and bearing clearly in mind that every party must be responsible for its own actions and positions.

In earlier comment in L'UNITA the PCI had been insistent on the point that the trials exceeded the bounds of a purely internal Czechoslovak affair and that in censuring them the PCI was therefore not violating the principle of noninterference. The statement pulled few punches in rendering the PCI's judgment of the proceedings:

The recent resort to methods of judicial persecution regarding people who until 1968 were qualified leaders of the CPCZ and of Czechoslovak culture, and who moreover had already been deprived of the possibility of being active in public life and had even been removed from their professional jobs, draws attention to the lasting seriousness of the situation in Czechoslovakia. What is particularly grave is the pursuit of a logic of revenge to its ultimate conclusion, in all fields, with respect to the leaders of the political "new course" which asserted itself in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Hence the renewed dissent and reprobation which the PCI Politburo intends to show.

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The statement went on to reiterate the Italian party's position on the use of laws to control the expression of opinion, emphatically reminding the Italian electorate and other political parties that if it were to participate in an Italian government, the PCI would stand by its pledges to guarantee freedom of opinion and expression and open political and ideological debate.

BRITISH, BELGIAN
COMMUNIST COMMENT

The central organs of the British and Belgian communist parties have also leveled strong criticism at the Czechoslovak trials. An editorial in the 10 August London MORNING STAR, following the general line of the arguments presented by the French and Italian parties, questioned the "evidence of the alleged violations and the nature and interpretations of the law itself." Noting the "limited information" available on the trials, the British CP paper said that the defendants' "political differences with the Czechoslovak Government" should be dealt with "by political means, and not by trials and imprisonment." The Belgian Communist Party (PCB) paper LE DRAPEAU ROUGE carried an article on 4 August which quoted from the French CP statement of 23 July censuring the Czechoslovak leadership and added: "We subscribe unreservedly to that statement." The author of the PCB paper's article, Jet Turf, mentioned "the public disapproval of the trials."

REBUTTALS FROM PRAGUE

Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 11th sought to counter such criticism and to convey a picture of foreign communist support for the trials by publishing a letter from one Francois Bailly in Belgium which represented the Belgian CP as supporting the Czechoslovak leaders' actions. The letter maintained that the PCB had reprimanded a former member of the Prague radio service for making anti-Czechoslovak statements on Brussels radio, leaving it unclear when the reprimand was delivered and in what context. At the same time, clearly alluding to the criticism of the trials by the West European communist parties, a Prague domestic radio commentary on the 12th observed that "unfortunately some progressive and honest people" in the West may have been taken in by "false" interpretations of the proceedings.

The Prague radio's international service on the 12th brought up the case of the arrest of the Italian journalist Ochetto in Prague last January--and thus obliquely aimed its comments at the PCI, which had vocally objected to the treatment of Ochetto. The broadcast for the first time named Milan Huebl, former Prague Higher Party School director who drew a sentence of six and a

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half years in a Prague trial on 1 August, as the Czechoslovak citizen who had given Ochetto documents to smuggle out of Czechoslovakia to former Prague TV director Jiri Pelikan. The broadcast also cited reports appearing in the Western press in January which noted that Karel Kyncl, Jaroslav Sabata, Jan Tesar, "and others" were "involved" in the Ochetto affair. Kyncl, Sabata, and Tesar were all found guilty in the recent trials. Like Huebl, none of them had been linked by name to the Ochetto case in Prague media in January. RUDE PRAVO on the 16th further detailed the "conspiratorial" activities of these defendants with their foreign "contacts."

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CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP

PRAGUE MEDIA EFFUSIVE IN TREATMENT OF HARDLINER BILAK

Extensive and laudatory treatment of the staunchly pro-Soviet Vasil Bilak in Czechoslovak media on the occasion of his 55th birthday seems to strengthen the possibility that the conservative CPCZ Presidium member and secretary could be elevated to the first secretaryship if Gustav Husak should replace the ailing General Svoboda as CSSR president, or that Bilak himself could become president. The post of CSSR "President of the Republic," long held by Novotny, is somewhat more prestigious than the counterpart positions of chairman of the parliamentary presidium or state council chairman in the USSR and the other East European countries.

The tributes to Bilak include a front-page picture and article in the 11 August RUDE PRAVO on his receipt from Husak of the Order of the Republic. While there has been no monitored observance of the occasion in Soviet media, the paeans to Bilak in the Prague press uniformly underscore his steadfast loyalty to the USSR during and since the critical 1968-69 period.

Attacked by liberals in 1968-69 for having allegedly colluded in the August Warsaw Pact invasion, Bilak was given the honor of greeting the foreign party delegations--including Brezhnev--by name at the 14th CPCZ Congress in May 1971. He had been the architect of the "Lessons" document, adopted by the December 1970 CPCZ plenum and released in January 1971, which stated officially for the first time that the invasion was in response to "requests" from the Czechoslovaks. At the May 1971 Slovak CP Congress in Bratislava, which preceded that of the CPCZ, Husak bestowed lavish praise on Bilak--his predecessor as Slovak CP first secretary--rejecting the liberals' criticism of Bilak's conduct during the invasion period and dismissing speculation about "differences" between himself and the number-two CPCZ figures.*

RUDE PRAVO on 11 August, reporting the presentation of the Order of the Republic by Husak in the presence of CPCZ Presidium members and candidates, termed Bilak "a class-conscious workman,

*See the TRENDS on 19 and 26 May 1971.

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antifascist, internationalist, and patriot," recalled his participation in the 1944 Slovak National Uprising, and detailed his rise to the leadership of the Slovak CP and to membership in the CPCZ Presidium during the 1950's--a period during which Husak was in prison for "bourgeois nationalism." RUDE PRAVO said Bilak "has always been a realistic and cool-headed politician who continuously bears in mind the interests of the Czechoslovak workers class," people, and party. It added that he has consistently "linked their interests" with the international communist movement and the socialist camp and with "the development of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship as the guarantee of our national and state security." And it stressed that Bilak had "fully professed this creed of his life in the most difficult moments of our social crisis--in the years 1968 and 1969, when he fully proved his loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."

CTK on the 11th, the day of Bilak's birthday, and RUDE PRAVO the next day reported a congratulatory letter from the Presidium of the Slovak CP. In the longer account in RUDE PRAVO, the Slovak party's letter recalled that "in the complex period of 1968-69 you displayed unwavering loyalty to the workers class, the CPCZ, socialism, and proletarian internationalism." The letter added that "you have proved in practice that our place is at the side of our great ally and friend, the Soviet Union," and observed that Bilak had devoted all his strength "to see to it that our country has again become a firm component part" of the socialist camp.

Prague domestic television on the 10th carried a quarter-hour program on Bilak's life and activities. The program included recordings of his speeches, including his address to the 14th congress, in which he praised the USSR and its "equal" treatment of Czechoslovakia in bilateral relations. It also included recorded remarks by Husak praising Bilak at last year's Slovak CP congress. The announcer stressed that Bilak "always ardently expounded and defended the party policy regardless of the posts assigned to him by the party; he never concealed his internationalist class views and always consistently implemented them in practice." The personality-cult treatment also included the showing of his school certificates on the screen.

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The inevitable implicit comparison with Husak himself which pervaded the build-up of Bilak on his birthday was most pointed in a biography published on the 11th in the trade union daily PRACE, the youth daily MLADA FRONTA, the People's Party daily LIPOVA DEMOKRACIE, and, in shorter version, the agricultural daily ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY. The latter included a quotation from the foreword by conservative CPCZ Secretary Oldrich Svestka to the collected articles and speeches of Bilak. The widely published biography included the remark that Bilak's principled stance gives him a place among the politicians "who have had nothing to correct in their positions before 1968, during that time, or in later years." This was prefaced by a statement that because Bilak "never betrayed his class and international principles, he became the target of attacks on the part of the right wing in 1968-69, on the one hand, and on the other hand became one of the speakers most in demand since he always told people the truth."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PRESS AIRS DIVERGENT VIEWS ON PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

The notorious inefficiency of public services in the USSR has given rise to controversial proposals for the legalization of private enterprise in this field and the establishment of an incentive system of wages for sales clerks, waiters, and other state service personnel. Proposals along these lines were made by Aleksandr Levikov in a 2 August discussion article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, a paper which in recent years has served as a forum for debate on controversial reforms. At the same time, calls for a crackdown on private enterprise have continued to appear in the press.

The Levikov article advocated the legalization of individually or collectively operated shops, cafes, and other services to supplement and compete with state service enterprises. Such enterprises, he pointed out, could be run by persons not otherwise employed by the state--pensioners, housewives, and invalids. Levikov noted that Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress had approved such private enterprise and had urged changes in legislation to encourage it. As further justification he pointed to the gold mining collectives in Kolyma, which rent mining equipment from the state and sell gold to the state, and to the experience of East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, "where the individual under certain conditions and under state economic control is given certain freedom of action in the sphere of services."

To improve the efficiency of state service enterprises and make them more responsive to public needs, Levikov also proposed the introduction of an incentive system of wages that would open the door to higher earnings for service personnel and attract more and better qualified people in this sphere. He proposed that the earnings of waiters be made dependent on tips and the wages of sales clerks on commissions. Such incentives, he argued, would stimulate competition between individuals employed by the state and also between state service enterprises. Recognizing the controversial nature of his proposal, Levikov offered it as an experiment: "Don't rush to start throwing stones at me--after all, I'm not asserting this in this instance but only asking: why not try it out?" As a precedent, he pointed to the agricultural workers in mechanized links whose wages were based on the final results of the harvest and who consequently had greater motivation to work responsibly.

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By contrast, an 8 August article in RADYANSKA UKRAINA called for a crackdown on another widespread form of private enterprise--the so-called "shabashniki" or unemployed migrants who perform construction and other odd jobs for kolkhozes under contract. Describing the "shabashniki" as an "ugly phenomenon" which should be stamped out, correspondent I. Tsiganok complained that they were able to make high earnings of up to 800 rubles monthly despite their violations of labor discipline and parasitic existence. He called for a reduction of the legal period--currently four months--during which a person could remain without permanent employment.

The "shabashniki" had been persecuted under Khrushchev, but the official attitude began to change with the appearance of a 20 November 1966 PRAVDA article by agricultural journalist Yuriy Chernichenko calling for a new, positive attitude toward the migrants. Politburo member Voronov took the unusual step of endorsing Chernichenko's article in PRAVDA on 6 January 1967, and since then occasional articles have treated the "shabashniki" sympathetically--for example, Georgiy Radov's article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of 3 February 1971.

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