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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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19 JULY 1972

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
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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
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19 JULY 1972
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 10 - 16 JULY 1972

<u>Moscow (2957 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1198 items)</u>		
CEMA 26th Session	(1%)	13%	Domestic Issues	(42%)	34%
Vietnam	(7%)	11%	Indochina	(18%)	19%
Egyptian Premier in USSR	(--)	5%	[Sihanouk Tour	(2%)	12%]
[Joint Communique	(--)	4.5%]	[Vietnam	(14%)	5%]
Mongolian Revolution	(0.1%)	4%	Korea	(12%)	11%
Anniversary			[PRC-DPRK Treaty	(--)	5%]
China	(2%)	2%	Anniversary		
Gromyko Benelux Tour	(3%)	2%	Yemeni (Aden) Government	(0.3%)	6%
Iraqi Revolution	(0.1%)	2%	Delegation in PRC		
Anniversary			Albanian Army Day	(1%)	6%
			Iraqi Revolution	(--)	3%
			Anniversary		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

High-level reiteration of Vietnamese determination to continue the struggle came in a statement by DRV President Ton Duc Thang pegged to the 20 July anniversary of the signing of the 1954 Geneva agreements. Thang echoed other propaganda in condemning the U.S. resumption of air strikes against the North and the mining of DRV harbors, and he called on "brothers and sisters" throughout the world to demand that the United States stop its war escalation and negotiate seriously at Paris.

The resumption of the Paris talks on 13 July, after a two-month suspension, occasioned no unusual publicity. Hanoi media carried a standard cryptic account of the session which summarized the communist delegates' statements rejecting the notion of a cease-fire before a final settlement is reached. Hanoi duly reported Le Duc Tho's arrival back in Paris on the 15th after stopovers in Peking and Moscow, but at this writing his meeting on the 19th with National Security Adviser Dr. Kissinger has not been acknowledged.

Hanoi's denunciation of the U.S. air strikes against the DRV includes continuing, virtually daily protests from the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. Persistent stress on alleged strikes at North Vietnam's dikes is highlighted by a 17 July statement from the DRV Water Conservancy Ministry spokesman--the fourth statement from that ministry since the air strikes were resumed in April. Concern over the maintenance of dikes was also pointed up in instructions from the DRV Premier's office, released on the 16th, which charged that U.S. bombing has weakened them.

A Council of Ministers order on wartime mobilization, broadcast by Hanoi on 16 July, seemed to reflect the increased strain of current North Vietnamese manpower requirements as well as long-standing problems of labor management and productivity. It echoed a Council of Ministers resolution released in February 1970 when it referred generally to the need to mobilize all labor forces and to discipline those not willing to work. However, there seems to be heightened urgency in the more specific measures it spelled out and in its references to mobilization and deployment of manpower to meet natural calamities and "enemy-caused disasters."

DRV SAYS VIETNAMESE WILL NOT BE DETERRED BY U.S. AIR STRIKES

Reassertions that the Vietnamese are determined to persist in their struggle in the face of U.S. "escalation" include the appeal issued

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by President Ton Duc Thang on the occasion of the Geneva agreements anniversary. Hanoi released the text of the appeal on 14 July and on the 18th reported that it was endorsed in a resolution passed at a 17 July enlarged session of the presidium of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee.* The conferees as well as Thang in his appeal repeated the standard demands that the United States end its action in the North and the Vietnamization policy, withdraw all troops from South Vietnam, seriously negotiate at Paris, and "positively" respond to the PRG's seven-point proposal and its two-point elaboration. The President's appeal was also welcomed in a statement by the commander of the VPA air defense and air forces, broadcast by Hanoi on the 17th, which characterized it as giving new strength to the armed forces in general and to the air defense and air forces in particular.

CHARGES OF U.S.
STRIKES AT DIKES

The charge that U.S. raids against dikes and irrigation works along major rivers were more frequent and more intensive in the first half of July than during April, May, and June was pressed officially in a 17 July Water Conservancy Ministry spokesman's statement released by Hanoi radio on the 19th, the fourth protest from that ministry in the past two months.** It charged that during the first two weeks of July "20 dike portions and two important irrigation works" in Thanh Hoa, Nam Ha, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, and Ha Bac provinces as well as many other dike sections and sluices were attacked "several times in one day." It claimed that on 6 and 7 July raids were concentrated on three dike portions on the Ninh To River in Nam Ha Province and that many dike sections along the Thai Binh River in Hai Hung Province were bombed and strafed on the 9th. Attacks on the 11th were said to have destroyed four "vital" dike sections and sluices within the same province. The statement

* This is the first year that President Thang has issued such an appeal on the Geneva anniversary, although Ho Chi Minh had done so in 1965, 1966, 1968, and 1969. On the 15th anniversary in 1969, there was a "grand meeting" held under VFF auspices at which Premier Pham Van Dong read the text of Ho's appeal. Presumably an anniversary statement will be forthcoming from the DRV Foreign Ministry; ministry statements were issued on 19 July 1970 and 21 July 1971, and ministry memoranda on 12 July 1969 and 17 July 1968.

** Statements of 26 May, 16 June, and 1 July are discussed, respectively, in the TRENDS of 1 June 1971, pages 22-25; 21 June, pages 12-16; and 6 July, pages 5-8.

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claimed that foreign newsmen observing some of the attacks on the 9th and the 11th had "agreed that the U.S. imperialists could no longer deny that they were not attacking the dikes."

A Hanoi radio commentary on the 18th said Secretary Laird "was forced to acknowledge" at his press conference on the 17th that U.S. aircraft "could have" hit dikes and dams in North Vietnam. The commentary quoted Laird to the effect that he did not rule out the possibility that "the dikes and dams and other water conservancy projects" may have been damaged by the attacks of U.S. aircraft. It of course ignored his explanation that this might have occurred if an anti-aircraft installation had been placed on a dam or dike or when there was a roadway or bridgework nearby. An article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, reviewed by VNA on the 18th, mentioned Laird in passing and said that U.S. attacks on dikes "can no longer be whitewashed by the Nixon clique." Hanoi media have also used actress Jane Fonda's current visit to North Vietnam to buttress its case regarding alleged U.S. attacks on the dikes. Hanoi radio on the 10th broadcast a statement attributed to her which said, among other things, that the President was trying to "trick" public opinion into believing he is trying to end the war at a time when more bombs than ever were being dropped, including those on the dikes of the Red River delta "endangering the lives of 15 million people and their crops and animals." On the 14th VNA reported that after visiting bombed dikes in Nam Sach district just east of Hanoi on the 13th, she had asserted that there was no military target in the bombed area.

A Hanoi radio commentary on the 15th had detailed charges of strikes at dikes in Thanh Hoa Province, claiming that dikes and irrigation projects there had been hit 29 times since April and that "many portions of dikes, sluices, dams, canals, and ditches have been destroyed." It said that if this results in damage from typhoons or floods, the President will be held responsible.

VNA on the 12th provided details on alleged strikes at dikes during the period 9-11 July. Focusing on dike systems within the "important rice producing provinces" of Thai Binh and Hai Hung provinces in the Red River delta, the commentary claimed that some "70 demolition bombs" had fallen on the Tra Ly dike near the provincial town of Thai Binh on 11 July. "Hundreds of dart bombs" were said to have fallen on the same site the previous day, "seriously" shaking the dike and killing or wounding many local inhabitants. The destruction of a "vital dike portion" stretching

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from Hop Tien and Hop Cat villa as in Hai Hung Province on 9 July was termed "most serious." It was claimed that blasts--resulting from "32 big-sized demolition bombs"--blew up many portions of the dike and caused cracks in others. VNA also charged that U.S. aircraft "dropped time-bombs which penetrated deep into the dike body."

INSTRUCTIONS ON Hanoi radio on 16 July publicized recently
MAINTAINING DIKES issued instructions from the premier on preventing and fighting floods. Local party committees were instructed to make regular checks on the condition of all dike embankments to "disclose the weak points in order to undertake repair measures in time, especially in the places that were recently struck by the enemy." The instruction stipulated further: All party units are expected to organize dike-protecting forces and to "constantly observe the dike situation during the flood and typhoon season"; materials for fighting floods--sandbags, buckets, and large rocks--are to be stockpiled and ready for use "in case of need"; all families living on river bank lands are expected to make plans "to evacuate themselves and their property if need be" and "not allow damage in human and material resources to occur." Indicating that some dike weaknesses were traceable to causes other than the claimed U.S. strikes, the directive instructed repair crews to also look for damage caused by "termites."

BACKGROUND: Hanoi has periodically shown concern about the soundness of water conservancy projects, particularly since the record floods last August. There were instructions from the premier on 26 August and 2 September as well as decisions regarding the floods by the party Secretariat and the Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers.* Another instruction from the premier was issued on 28 February this year; it revealed that many dikes, embankments, and dams damaged in the record-breaking floods of 1971 "had not been repaired well" and warned that this year's task of repairing dikes, embankments, and dams would be heavy. That a study program was underway was suggested by the fact that just prior to the release of the premier's 28 February directive,

* See the TRENDS of 9 September 1971, pages 3-8. Decisions regarding the floods by the party Secretariat and the Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers are discussed in the TRENDS of 15 September 1971, pages 2-3.

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NHAN DAN on 23, 24, and 25 February had carried in installments without explanation a 21 November 1963 Council of Ministers document entitled "Regulations on the Protection of Dikes." Among other things, it said:

. . . present dikes have many weak points; they are made of dirt, were built long ago, were originally small embankments and have many holes and termite nests, and their foundation has many weak portions. Moreover, because the dikes have been enlarged and built higher, their conduits have become relatively smaller and weaker. Because water currents have constantly changed and waves are strong during storms, dikes and protective walls have often eroded at their base or their upper parts have crumbled.

A 7 April directive from the premier on accelerating general construction work contained the frank admission that the campaign to repair dikes, dams, and bridges had been slowed because "a great amount of construction materials were damaged or lost and the labor force, materials, vehicles, and machines mobilized to support the fight against the flash floods was considerably wasted, thereby adversely affecting the implementation of the rainy season construction plan."

CIVIL DEFENSE,
MILITIA FORCES

Hanoi's attempt to insulate production forces from the effects of U.S. bombing raids was reflected in a 13 July NHAN DAN editorial. Stressing the need to protect production--"machines, equipment, material supplies, storage facilities, factories, and above all producers"--from U.S. air strikes, the editorial lauded a number of local factories for having "boldly given cadres and workers some days off to concentrate on consolidating trenches and shelters." In units where production cannot be interrupted, NHAN DAN said, "attention must be paid to the protection of workers whose duty requires them to be permanently at their working places to operate machines or furnaces, even during the bombing and strafing by enemy aircraft." The editorial added that "these workers must have shelters right beside their working places and even communication trenches to get outside if necessary." It maintained that "casualties caused by enemy air raids can be reduced if there are sufficient trenches and shelters."

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A 16 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial praised the antiaircraft firepower of local "self-defense militia forces" and claimed that "no matter how cunning and malicious the U.S. air pirates may be, they cannot avoid being downed in large numbers." All militia and self-defense units were called upon "to strive to train themselves to become skillful gunners" and to "blow to pieces many U.S. aircraft." As of 18 July, Hanoi claimed to have downed a total of 3,753 U.S. aircraft.

FOREIGN MINISTRY
SPOKESMAN STATEMENTS

Foreign ministry spokesman's statements protesting U.S. bombing during the past week included the following specific

charges:

+ A statement issued on 13 July condemned U.S. bombing actions of the 12th which allegedly damaged "populous sectors" of Haiphong and Nam Dinh, as well as the outskirts of both cities, and "populous areas" of Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces. The statement also charged that B-52's dropped bombs on a number of localities in the Vinh Linh area. Among the economic and cultural establishments reported hit was a section of the dike surrounding Nam Dinh. The statement charged that strikes at such establishments were part of the Nixon Administration's "intentional" bombing and strafing of populous areas, industrial plants, and the dike and sluice system of North Vietnam.

+ The United States' "frenzied war acts" of 13 July were protested in a statement on the 14th, which reported strikes on Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. Specific areas reported as suffering damage were the Bai Chay summer resort and Hon Gai city, both reportedly nearly destroyed by previous bombing in June; Cat Bai island in Haiphong harbor; and a 120-meter section of dike in Nam Duong village, Nam Dinh district of Nam Ha Province, which was described as "seriously cracked." The statement said such war acts prove that the United States cherishes illusions about using its military might to strike at populous areas and dikes in the DRV--behavior which it cannot deny and which only bares its "extremely cruel, aggressive nature" and exposes its "deceitful allegations about peace and good will."

+ Continuing strikes on the 14th at Cat Ba island and Nam Dinh city were protested in the spokesman's statement of the 15th, which also

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listed Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area as being affected by the bombing. Dwellings, pagodas, factories, and dikes and dams were among the cultural and economic establishments reported hit; the targets allegedly included a section of the dike on the Ninh Co River in Nghia Hung district, Nam Ha Province, which was said to have crumbled as a result of the bombing. Adding that a number of civilians, mostly women and children, were killed or wounded, the statement went on to charge the Nixon Administration with grossly encroaching upon the DRV's sovereignty and security and "all elementary principles of international law," as well as violating the U.S. commitment to "completely and unconditionally" halt the bombing.

+ "Sternly condemning" U.S. air strikes of the 15th, the spokesman's statement of the 16th cited populated localities in Ha Tay, Hai Hung, Nam Ha, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area as the areas hit. B-52's were said to have "carpet bombed" hamlets and villages in the Vinh Linh area and in Quang Binh Province, and U.S. warships were said to have struck at fishing boats and populated sectors along the coast in these areas. Civilian casualties and destruction of economic and cultural establishments, including a middle school in Hai Hung Province, were cited as crimes further exposing the "cruel and aggressive nature of the U.S. imperialists" and the Nixon Administration's "claims about peace and good will."

+ Bombing and shelling on the 18th of various localities in and surrounding Hanoi and Nam Dinh were protested in a spokesman's statement the same day. The statement also reported air attacks of the 17th on "populous areas" in Lang Son, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Haiphong, Hai Hung, Nam Ha, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, and Ha Tinh provinces and charged that B-52's had dropped bombs over hamlets and villages in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh area. It alleged that such attacks, together with the "intentional massacre" of innocent people and the destruction of economic establishments which serve the livelihood of the Vietnamese people, "reveal the extremely cruel and aggressive features of U.S. imperialism." World public opinion, the statement asserted, demands that the Nixon Administration end escalation of the war in the North, end the Vietnamization policy, and "enter into serious negotiations" in Paris.

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DRV COUNCIL OF MINISTERS GIVES GUIDANCE ON WARTIME LABOR DUTY

Hanoi on 16 July released what it called a "recent" Council of Ministers order on wartime labor duty which focuses new attention on North Vietnam's manpower problems and appears to reflect added urgency in the face of heightened military requirements and the possibility of floods in the coming months. At the same time, Hanoi radio also reported that the Ministry of Labor had "recently" held a conference to publicize the order. Its injunction that every able-bodied adult be mobilized for the war effort and for "building socialism" has been pressed repeatedly in North Vietnamese propaganda in past years, as has its demand for the enforcement of labor discipline. However, the publication of specific guidance on labor problems suggests that Hanoi views problems in the current situation as more critical. A NHAN DAN editorial on the 17th noted that the obligation to work has been a long-standing duty but added that the resistance is now entering "an urgent and fierce stage" and that "more than ever before," every able-bodied citizen must be "mobilized to devote all his intellectual and physical ability to totally defeating the U.S. aggressors."

Stressing the importance of putting everyone to work, the order noted that the state may call back some employees who have retired for health reasons but are still able to serve. It cited specific penalties for those refusing to work, saying that they will be assigned to work from six months to two years in accordance with "regulations on mandatory labor duty." The order went on to spell out the responsibility and methods for deployment of labor, noting among other things the procedure for "urgent mobilization of manpower to prevent or combat natural calamities and enemy-caused disasters" in accordance with "procedures to urgently mobilize local human and material resources as outlined in Council of Ministers Decree 232-TP of November 1965." The order also warned against incorrect implementation of mobilization and waste of manpower, errors Hanoi has criticized over the years. The NHAN DAN editorial of the 17th underlined the need for labor discipline--working a full day and carrying out orders--and stated that those who do not comply with assignments may have their pay stopped or be subject to disciplinary measures. The application of the labor order to agriculture was touched on in an undated NHAN DAN

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editorial, also broadcast on the 17th, which noted that children and old people as well as persons in poor health can be utilized in agricultural work.*

Further information on the Council of Ministers order was provided on 18 July when Hanoi broadcast an interview with Labor Minister Nguyen Huu Khieu. In response to a question about the "legal foundation" for the order, Khieu noted that the constitution required participation in labor and that a National Assembly Standing Committee resolution dated 21 April 1965 had "entrusted the Council of Ministers with the task of drawing up partial mobilization plans and leading the implementation of these plans." The minister drew a distinction between the usual projects for which the state mobilized workers and "emergency tasks" which require "prompt action." The former, he indicated, include water conservancy tasks, dike repair, construction of roads and storage facilities, and support of combat troops "in accordance with the wartime corvee (dan cong) and mandatory labor statutes." The emergency tasks, he said, include protection of storage facilities and dikes, overcoming the consequences of enemy bombardment, and supporting local combat troops--tasks falling under "the system of emergency mobilization of local manpower and material resources."

BACKGROUND: A Council of Ministers resolution on labor released on 12 February 1970, when the North was not being bombed, addressed itself to less urgent questions than those taken up in the current order. That resolution announced a decision to launch a "productive labor movement" primarily aimed at increasing production.** It resembled the present order in pointing out that everyone must be mobilized to participate in productive labor, and it noted cryptically that "those who oppose labor" must be "reeducated." But the 1970 resolution was aimed chiefly at guiding a broad movement to insure the fulfillment

* The use of children and the elderly in agriculture has been advocated previously. For example, an article on labor mobilization in the March 1967 HOC TAP, by Politburo member Pham Hung, pointed to the advantages of drawing agricultural workers from labor forces outside the standard age brackets.

** The productive labor movement is discussed in FBIS Special Report No. 301 of 7 August 1970, "North Vietnamese Problems and Policies as Outlined in Le Duan's February 1970 Article," page 27.

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of the state plan and did not raise the question of emergency mobilization to cope with natural calamities and disasters caused by the war.

Propaganda has indicated that the productive labor movement did not succeed in mobilizing all potential workers. For example, a January 1971 HOC TAP article by Vice Premier Do Muoi noted that there were still able persons who were not carrying out their labor duties and who should be mobilized. Similarly, a party Secretariat instruction issued on 15 January this year deplored the fact that "the labor productivity movement has effectively been altered, and no seething revolutionary movement has developed among workers and personnel to mobilize them to actively improve their cultural and technical knowledge and emulate in increasing labor output and economic effects in order to build the country and socialism." Difficulties in obtaining laborers during the disastrous floods in North Vietnam late last summer were mentioned in some propaganda; an editorial in the November issue of HOC TAP noted, among other things, that during the struggle to combat the floods some people "refused to actively participate in collective labor." The current Council of Ministers order is probably aimed at avoiding any such breakdown under the pressure of bombing or floods this year, as well as at enforcing general labor discipline in normal work.

PRG, DRV PRESS MILITARY, POLITICAL SOLUTION, REJECT CEASE-FIRE

At the resumed Paris talks on 13 July both DRV chief delegate Xuan Thuy and PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh indicated that progress was dependent on "new" U.S. proposals--a position that had also been reflected in Xuan Thuy's remarks upon his arrival back in Paris.* The VNA account of the session, as usual, obscured the fact that the allied delegates spoke first and reported no details of the remarks by Ambassadors Porter and Lam. It said only that "the Saigon administration's" delegate "rehashed the so-called eight points which had already been turned down by the Vietnamese people. The U.S. delegate, too, did not produce anything new, only repeating what Nixon had already said in his 8 May 1972 statement."

* See the TRENDS of 12 July 1972, pages 1-2.

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Xuan Thuy in his prepared statement did acknowledge the substance of the 8 May proposal when he recalled that the President had repeated it at his 29 June press conference. Thuy said: "Mr. Nixon said that in exchange for total U.S. troop withdrawal within four months and for the cessation of all U.S. military activity, the Vietnamese people must agree to observe a cease-fire and release the prisoners of war." Thuy thus obscured the fact that the President had called for a cease-fire throughout Indochina. He claimed that the proposal meant that the United States would keep its "neocolonialist" regime in South Vietnam intact while the Vietnamese would have to give up their struggle. The VNA account did not report these remarks, but it did note Thuy's reassertion that the PRG's seven-point proposal provides that after military and political problems have been discussed and agreed upon, "there will be a cease-fire."

Mme. Binh, for her part, said that military and political problems must be solved simultaneously. While reporting this statement, VNA did not mention that it was preceded by an attack on the President's 8 May proposal. Mme. Binh said: "A so-called immediate cease-fire before agreement is reached on military and political matters is only an arrogant and illogical ultimatum. Such a cease-fire . . . would legalize the Thieu administration and the military presence of the United States, and at the same time would deprive the Vietnamese of their right to defend themselves."

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PEKING OFFERS RESTRAINED COMMENT ON VIETNAM DEVELOPMENTS

In accord with its wait-and-see reaction to President Nixon's announcement of the resumption of the Paris conference and its call for a negotiated settlement, Peking has been proclaiming only minimal support to its Vietnamese allies while muffling criticism of the United States. As usual avoiding direct comment on the Paris negotiating sessions, Peking replayed the VNA account of the 13 July session, including the communist delegates' invocation of the PRG's seven-point plan and the demand for a simultaneous settlement of the military and political questions. For its part Peking has continued to sidestep any explicit endorsement of the communist peace plan and has refrained from comment on the U.S. position at Paris. The Chinese routinely reaffirmed support for the war effort when Chou En-lai received the DRV ambassador on 15 July and in a joint communique with a visiting delegation of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) dated the 17th.

The DRV ambassador handed Chou a copy of the 14 July appeal issued by DRV President Thang on the occasion of the 18th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva agreements on Indochina.* In contrast to his last such reported meeting with a North Vietnamese envoy on 12 April in which the DRV charge d'affaires handed Chou the text of an 11 April DRV Government statement on U.S. bombing, the Chinese premier was this time notably more reserved in pledging support. Whereas in April he had promised "all-out support and assistance" for the war effort, adding the warning that "the Chinese government and people are closely following" U.S. attacks on North Vietnam, Chou at the recent meeting merely reaffirmed in bland terms that the PRC "will, as always, firmly support" the Vietnamese struggle. According to NCNA's account, Chou had a "very cordial and friendly" conversation with the ambassador--Peking's standard characterization for meetings with its close allies, but one which it had avoided using for recent Sino-Vietnamese contacts until Le Duc Tho's stopover en route to Paris. Chou echoed the Vietnamese appeal--carried textually by NCNA on the 14th--by accusing the United States of having "thoroughly violated" the Geneva agreements.**

* Last year the Geneva accords occasioned a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 20 July, the date of the anniversary.

** Continuing to publicize support from abroad, Hanoi on the 17th replayed Chou's pledge of support and his criticism of the United States, adding a passage not in the NCNA account that the premier had dismissed "as complete nonsense" the U.S. charge that North Vietnam had invaded the South.

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Apart from Chou's minimal response to this DRV initiative, authoritative PRC comment on Vietnam has been limited to only passing references to the war in recent speeches by Chou and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei and in the joint communique with the PDRY delegation. At a 17 July banquet welcoming a delegation from the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), Chou hailed the YAR's support for the Indochinese war effort and its recognition of Sihanouk's Cambodian government. In documenting his view of the "increasingly favorable" international situation, he claimed in stock terms that the Indochinese are winning "continuous new victories." On the previous day, in a speech at the Iraqi embassy celebrating Iraq's national day, Chi Peng-fei mentioned Indochina only in voicing appreciation for Iraq's support for the Indochinese struggle. In neither speech did the Chinese reaffirm Peking's backing for the war effort. The Sino-PDRY communique used a stock formula in saying the two sides "firmly support" the three Indochinese peoples in their struggle against "U.S. aggression and for national salvation."

Consistent with this low-key approach, coverage of the war in PRC media has been restricted largely to pickups of foreign comment carefully sanitized to accord with Peking's own interests. NCNA on the 13th omitted a critical reference to the Nixon Administration's "deceitful arguments of peace and goodwill" in picking up a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the date, while strident Vietnamese invective personally assailing the President has been routinely dropped in PRC coverage. NCNA on 12 and 13 July carried LPA reports on the establishment of the "People's Revolutionary Committee of Quang Tri Province," but there has been no Chinese comment on this development. Peking had previously shown itself to be reluctant to play up Vietnamese communist claims to have established an administrative structure as a result of this year's offensive.

MOSCOW SCORES U.S. AIR WAR, STRESSES NEED FOR TALKS

Routine Moscow comment on Vietnam continues to focus on the U.S. war of "genocide" against the DRV, the alleged bombings of dikes and dams and "meteorological" warfare to cause torrential rains. Moscow continues to cite eyewitness reports to refute U.S. denials that bombing of dikes is taking place. A foreign language commentary on the 13th, taking issue with Secretary Laird's contention in his 6 July press conference that bombings

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of dams and dikes were "accidental and sporadic," claimed that the U.S. "criminal actions" are in fact "of a premeditated and intentional nature." And TASS on the 17th briefly reported Secretary Laird's conference that day, citing him as having "admitted" that U.S. planes bombed DRV dikes and dams and that irrigation structures were "possibly damaged." On 18 July the Moscow domestic service, reporting a statement by White House press secretary Ziegler the previous day, noted his remark that official U.S. policy excludes the bombing of DRV dikes and dams and that any damage has been "accidental," but asserted that his remarks differ from earlier statements in which he "categorically denied" the possibility of U.S. strikes against DRV irrigation installations.

Moscow reiterates that the United States will fail in "breaking the will" of the Vietnamese and cannot attain a "military solution." Peace talks are the "only" means to reach a settlement of the Vietnam problem, the "basis" of which is to be found in the "well-known" PRG and DRV proposals, the commentators repeat. In noting the 13 July resumption of the Paris talks, commentators repeat that the talks provide the United States with the only realistic and honorable way out of the war. A 14 July domestic service commentary complains that Washington apparently does not intend to put forward any new proposals at Paris, referring to unspecified comments by Secretary Rogers. The American attitude is shown, says the commentator, by the U.S. intention to keep the Thieu regime in power, and he claims that the South Vietnamese aspiration for a "coalition government of national concord" is "outlining itself more definitely."

Moscow commentators also take the occasion to question Senator McGovern's promise, if elected, to withdraw immediately from Vietnam. A panelist in the 16 July domestic service roundtable discussion, for example, expressed kepticism over U.S. pre-election promises, recalling that before he was elected President Nixon had also promised to end the war in Vietnam. Instead, says the panelist, it appears that the U.S. leadership is now concentrating on a "military solution" in Vietnam, "pushing into the background" a political settlement through negotiations.

Apart from routine reassertions of continuing support and assistance, Soviet aid to the Vietnamese receives little publicity. On 13 July a Moscow radio news item reports that Deputy Premier Novikov saw the DRV ambassador to discuss "problems relating to Soviet-Vietnamese economic cooperation," but there has been no further elaboration.

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Moscow thus far has given the anniversary of the signing of the 1954 Geneva agreements minimal attention, although TASS promptly reported Ton Duc Thang's appeal. On the 18th TASS briefly reports that Gromyko received the DRV ambassador, who delivered a copy of the appeal, for a conversation in an atmosphere of "friendship and cordiality."* On the 17th a brief PRAVDA item reports the arrival the previous day of a Vietnamese-Soviet Friendship Society delegation to take part in a "solidarity month," and an AUCCTU message, reported by TASS on the 18th, expresses support for the Vietnamese in connection with "international Vietnam day." These observances are presumably related to the Geneva agreement anniversary, having been standard features of the anniversary in past years.

LE DUC THO Moscow's reports of Le Duc Tho's 13-15 July stopover
STOPOVER on route to Paris note that he was met at the
 airport by Party Secretary Katushev, Central
Committee official Rakhmanin, and Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin.
TASS reports that Tho had talks with Katushev in an atmosphere
of "fraternal friendship and solidarity."

During Tho's June and April stopovers, there were no reports that he had talks with any Soviet leaders, but in each case the stopover coincided with Soviet-DRV talks taking place in Hanoi. On those occasions he was met and seen off by Rakhmanin and deputy foreign ministers. The only time Katushev's presence was reported at Tho's departure was in April, just after Katushev had returned from his visit to Hanoi. When Tho stopped in Moscow in July 1971 en route home from Paris he had "warm and cordial" talks with Politburo member Kirilenko, and in June 1971 en route to Paris he met with Kirilenko and Katushev. There were no reports that he met any Soviet leaders during a stopover in January 1970. During earlier trips he met with Kosygin and once with Mazurov.

* Moscow has not recently acknowledged that the DRV ambassador has been delivering copies of North Vietnamese statements in his meetings with Soviet leaders. VNA, but not TASS, had reported that during Xuan Thuy's meeting with Kosygin in May during a stopover in Moscow en route from Paris to Hanoi, the DRV ambassador handed Kosygin a copy of Hanoi's 10 May government statement denouncing the U.S. mining of DRV ports. The DRV ambassador had been received by Brezhnev, Kosygin, Grechko, and Katushev in April. The timing suggests that the DRV envoy at these meetings had presented the 11 April DRV Government statement and the 16 April DRV Party-Government appeal protesting U.S. bombings, but neither Moscow's nor Hanoi's reports mentioned this.

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ACTION IN QUANG TRI PROMPTS FURTHER PRG CHARGES OF "CRIMES"

Intensive allied bombing and shelling in support of the Saigon counteroffensive in Quang Tri Province prompted a second PRG Foreign Ministry statement, released on 18 July. Like the first statement, dated 11 July,* the one on 18th warns of "necessary military and political measures to punish the U.S. imperialist aggressors for their war crimes." The statement particularly scores intensive bombing and shelling from 1 to 17 July and charges specifically that on 17 July alone B-52's made more than 100 sorties, dropping 2,500 tons of bombs on Quang Tri city and its outskirts. It also decries bombing of the citadel in Quang Tri city from 10 to 17 July and the use of "many 'smart' bombs" against the citadel on 12 and 16 July "in an attempt to destroy it."

Following up the claim in the earlier statement that bombs and shells containing toxic chemicals had been used on 8 and 9 July, the current statement asserts that "between 8 and 14 July the U.S. imperialists on 31 occasions used bombs and shells containing toxic chemicals in their strikes at Quang Tri city and Nhan Dieu and La Vang villages" south and southwest of the city. It adds that "after dropping bombs containing toxic chemicals the U.S. imperialists dropped bombs that killed the poisoned people." A 13 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement supporting the 11 July PRG statement had repeated the PRG's charges about toxic chemicals and had rejected statements by U.S. authorities that the allies have only used tear gas in the campaign. And a 19 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement, on the 18 July PRG statement, charged that "many" have died from chemical weapons and declared that "this utterly heinous crime of the U.S. authorities cannot be covered by their claim that they were using 'tear gas' only." (PRG press spokesman Ly Van Sau at the briefing after the Paris session on 13 July, when asked whether the chemical involved was tear gas, DDT, or something new, responded with the claim that "as everyone in South Vietnam knows, the United States is using C.S. in a form which is 100 times more concentrated than what is used in the rest of the world, and this gas is used in such conditions that it becomes a deadly poison gas." Consistent with general practice, Vietnamese communist media have not reported the post-session briefings.)

* The 11 July statement was discussed in the 12 July TRENDS, pages 11-12.

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Graphically portraying the extensive nature of the alleged attacks, the PRG Foreign Ministry statement maintains that "the U.S. imperialists have massively used tens of thousands of tons of bombs and hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds in bombarding an area less than 36 square kilometers wide with the aim of destroying an entire city in a newly liberated area." But it concludes that bombs and shells cannot reverse the allies' "defeated situation" or save Vietnamization and that the liberation forces will persevere in advancing to total victory.

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USSR - EGYPT

MOSCOW SILENT ON CAIRO OUSTER OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS

Egyptian President as-Sadat's 18 July announcement to the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) Central Committee of the decision to terminate the mission of Soviet military experts and advisers "as of 17 July" has drawn no reaction in Soviet media as yet. TASS and a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 18th carried identical two-sentence reports on the opening of the ASU meeting, chaired by as-Sadat, noting that Egyptian papers pointed to the "great significance" of the session.

For the Soviet home audience, a Moscow broadcast late on the 18th--well after reports of as-Sadat's move had begun to circulate abroad--conveyed a picture of business, friendship, and cooperation as usual in blandly reviewing preparations for the coming celebration of Egypt's 20th revolution anniversary on 23 July. It noted that preparations for the third session of the ASU National Congress, scheduled for the 23d, were being discussed at a Central Committee session under as-Sadat's chairmanship and that Prime Minister Sidqi was to report on the results of his recent visit to the Soviet Union. The broadcast added that the Egyptian press had been publishing "many materials these past days on the development of Egypt's economy and culture and on the aid rendered by the Soviet Union." It went on to cite the Cairo AL-AKHBAR as saying that "as a result of the Moscow talks" a decision had been taken to accelerate the completion of the Helwan metallurgical combine, and it noted an AL-AHRAM report that a week of Soviet-Egyptian friendship would be held in Egypt concurrently with the anniversary celebrations.

Soviet treatment of Sidqi's 13-14 July visit to Moscow gave no intimation of fresh difficulties in Soviet-Egyptian relations, although Cairo papers on 18 July said the visit was "closely connected" with the "positive decisions" to be announced by as-Sadat that day, and the Beirut AL-ANWAR, as reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) on the 19th, said that the decisions had been adopted 10 days ago and that "Cairo political leaders had communicated them to Soviet officials." Persisting Soviet-Egyptian frictions were reflected, however, in further defensive rebuttals of Egyptian criticism of Moscow. Thus, along with TASS and PRAVDA pickups on the 15th of Cairo press comment

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hailing the visit as fresh evidence of Soviet-Egyptian friendship and cooperation, TASS on the 17th cited the Cairo weekly ROSE AL-YUSUF as affirming that the Soviet Union "does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries" and "continues to reject the idea of 'exporting revolution.'" And a Moscow commentary in Arabic on the 16th, pegged to the joint communique on Sidqi's visit, claimed that this document provided a "stern reply" to "fabricated lies of imperialist and Zionist propaganda" implying that the Soviet Union "is interested in continuing the 'no peace, no war' state" in the Middle East. Podgorny, in a banquet speech honoring the visiting Syrian president on 6 July, had rejected allegations that the USSR was interested in preserving this situation.

Sidqi's visit came close on the heels of the Soviet-Syrian talks in Moscow, following which President al-Asad had immediately gone to Cairo for talks before returning to Damascus. The apparently hastily arranged Sidqi visit was announced in Cairo on the 11th, with MENA reporting that Sidqi had met twice that day with Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov.

AS-SADAT
DECISIONS

After reviewing Soviet political, military, and economic support for Egypt as well as Soviet-Egyptian differences, as-Sadat declared that having received Moscow's explanation of the U.S.-Soviet summit talks he felt the need for "a pause with the friend." Asserting Egypt's full appreciation of the USSR's "big assistance" and concern for its friendship, "while we are at the threshold of a new stage of this friendship," he announced his decisions: to terminate the mission of Soviet military experts and advisers as of 17 July; to consider all military equipment and installations set up within Egyptian territory since June 1967 the sole property of Egypt and under the administration of its armed forces; and to call, within the framework of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, for "an Egyptian-Soviet meeting on a level to be agreed on for consultations regarding the coming stage."

President as-Sadat added that these decisions in no way affected the essence of Soviet-Egyptian friendship, and AL-AHRAM underlined this point on the 19th in stating, according to MENA, that the new steps do not affect the Soviet-Egyptian treaty and that Egypt "is eager for the provisions of this treaty to remain in force." AL-AHRAM also explained that termination of the Soviet military advisers' mission "does not apply to Soviet training personnel" who are helping the Egyptian armed forces.

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COMMUNIST REACTIONS The GDR news agency A/N is the only monitored Soviet bloc source to take note of Egypt's action so far. A factual report on the 19th, datelined Cairo, cited MENA for an account of as-Sadat's three decisions, noting that the withdrawal of Soviet experts and Egyptian takeover of installations was completed and that consultations were in progress to find the right method for future effective Egyptian-Soviet cooperation. Warsaw domestic service newscasts on the 18th reported that as-Sadat had addressed the ASU Central Committee but did not mention his decisions.

Yugoslavia's TANJUG, in a dispatch from its Cairo correspondent on the 19th, reported that speculation on a crisis in Cairo-Moscow relations was "very much on target" with the announcement in Cairo that the Soviet military advisers' mission had ended "on the very eve of Egyptian-Soviet friendship week, which starts today." Noting as-Sadat's explanation that friends and allies can have disagreements but remain good friends, the correspondent pointed out that this is the interpretation of only one side, while the other is refraining from any comment. He claimed that the USSR had not waited for as-Sadat's statement but "three days earlier had ordered the withdrawal of its people." As for the Egyptian president's call for a Soviet-Egyptian meeting, the correspondent thought it unlikely such a meeting would occur "in the foreseeable future." He noted that the crisis has been laid to Soviet failure to deliver promised offensive weapons and equipment, as well as to "the impossibility of Soviet military personnel and their Egyptian counterparts finding a common language."

The first monitored Arab communist comment, reported by the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY on the 19th, is the Lebanese CP organ AN-NIDA's observation that the Egyptian decision was a "grave retreat" before the "reactionary-Zionist-imperialist onslaught" designed to force the Arabs to capitulate.

MENA on the 18th reported that a DRV delegation had arrived in Cairo on a tour of African states to explain the Vietnamese situation "especially after the escalation of U.S. aggression against Vietnam." The report added that the delegation would attend the 23 July revolution celebrations and would "discuss increasing cooperation between the two countries."

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SIDQI'S "FRIENDLY WORKING VISIT" TO USSR PRECEDED CAIRO MOVE

Apart from publicity for the joint communique on Egyptian Prime Minister Sidqi's 13-14 July Moscow visit, Soviet media gave relatively little attention to a visit variously described as a business or working trip, an official friendship visit, and simply a friendship visit. Moscow was silent on the scheduled duration of the talks; Cairo media displayed some confusion, initially announcing that they would last several days and reporting Sidqi's departure for a "three-day" visit. But Cairo's AL-AHRAM, reporting the start of the talks on the 14th, said that while "according to the initial program" the talks might end the same day, "sources close to the talks" indicated that the visit might be extended one or two more days, with a number of delegation members staying behind to discuss details.

TASS on the 14th listed those present for the talks that day, reporting that views were exchanged on a wide range of "questions of bilateral relations" in an atmosphere of "friendship and mutual understanding" and in the spirit of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty. Special attention, TASS added, was given to the Middle East situation, and the two sides expressed satisfaction with the relations of "traditional friendship and fruitful cooperation." AL-AHRAM, reporting the results of the "quick visit" on 16 July, said the full delegations met for a three-hour session on economic relations; after that, "some members of both sides withdrew," leaving on the Soviet side only Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gromyko, and Grechko to discuss military and political questions. This session, AL-AHRAM said, lasted five and a half hours. Cairo radio's press review on the 15th noted that Brezhnev interrupted his summer vacation to participate in the talks. In reporting the opening session, Cairo on the 14th said Sidqi conveyed as-Sadat's greetings to the Soviet leaders, "inquired about Brezhnev's health,"* and invited him to visit Egypt--an invitation not recorded in the communique. (The communique on as-Sadat's February visit to Moscow, but not the April one, noted Brezhnev's acceptance of an invitation to visit Egypt.)

* As-Sadat's solicitous inquiry would seem to represent a dig at Brezhnev for failing to greet and see off the Egyptian president on his April visit to Moscow. In his May Day speech as-Sadat had remarked on "our enemies' pleasure" at this omission and carefully explained that Brezhnev had had two long meetings with him despite a "39-degree-centigrade temperature."

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The program of the visit included a dinner for Sidqi--considerably delayed, according to AL-AHRAM, by the extended political-military discussion. Moscow's coverage of this function was confined to a brief TASS report noting that it was held in a "warm and friendly atmosphere" and that Kosygin and Sidqi "exchanged toasts." While Moscow gave no indication of the substance of the remarks, Cairo media publicized Sidqi's speech and AL-AHRAM on the 16th briefly reported Kosygin as stressing the USSR's friendship for Egypt and as adding: "Please convey to President as-Sadat what Brezhnev said, that we are not exchanging Egypt's friendship for another friendship, and also tell him that the Soviet Union's friendship with Egypt is a strong one and we will struggle for this friendship and victory will be ours." Sidqi, as reported by Cairo radio on the 15th, responded that "campaigns of misrepresentation and misleading" would not make the Egyptian people doubt their "sincere friends." He asserted Egypt's determination to put an end to Israeli "aggression" and expressed the confidence of "our people" that "you Soviet brothers stand with them with all your hearts and with all kinds and forms of support and backing in the various fields."

BILATERAL RELATIONS Like TASS' earlier report on the talks, the joint communique noted that an atmosphere of "friendship and mutual cooperation" prevailed--somewhat more subdued than the atmosphere of "full trust and mutual understanding" in which as-Sadat's February and April discussions were said to have been held.* The communique recorded both sides' resolve to "further coordinate their efforts" in the struggle against imperialism and reaction and for peace, freedom, and social progress. References to the Soviet-Egyptian treaty were patterned after similar formulas in the February and April documents.

The economic aspect of the talks was underlined in a Moscow Arabic broadcast on the 13th, welcoming Sidqi, which pointed out that his name was connected with the economic field, "one of the most effective fields" of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation. But the communique made no mention of any further economic agreements, although AL-AHRAM on the 16th reported that the sides had agreed to expand economic cooperation, including the signing of a new agreement in September when an Egyptian delegation would go to Moscow to draft the final text and specify the projects in which the USSR would participate.

* Radio Moscow gave the communique considerably more publicity than it had given other Soviet-Arab communiques this year.

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In the military field, the communique contained no Soviet pledges of further assistance, with the sides merely confirming their intention to strengthen relations in the political, economic, military, and other fields. The February and April communiqués on as-Sadat's visits had indicated further steps in strengthening Egypt's defense capacity and in Soviet-Egyptian military cooperation. But in the later military discussions, the differing Cairo and Moscow versions of the communique on Grechko's May talks in Egypt and the absence of a communique on Egyptian War Minister Sadiq's return visit to the USSR in June had suggested something less than a meeting of minds in this area, as as-Sadat himself had indicated in a 24 April question-and-answer session with members of the ASU Central Committee.

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT The communique contained the usual passage condemning Israel for its refusal to withdraw its forces and for pursuing an annexationist policy, also adding a complaint that Israel has been obstructing "all the steps proposed up to now" aimed at settling the conflict.

The communique also contained a new version of the passage introduced in the April as-Sadat communique, which had declared that the Arab states "have every reason to use other means" to regain the occupied lands. The Soviet side, the current document said, shares the opinion of Egypt and other Arab states that in conditions of Israel's rejection of a just political settlement on the basis of Resolution 242, Arab states "have every reason to use all the means at their disposal!" for the liberation of the territories seized by Israel and for insuring the rights of the Arabs, including the Palestinians.

The absence of any reference to the Jarring mission is notable in view of the endorsement of the UN envoy's activities in the Soviet-American communique on President Nixon's Moscow talks. While as-Sadat and the Soviet leaders had strongly urged resumption of the mission in the communique on the February visit, there was no reference to Jarring in the April communique. Sidqi's visit to Moscow came on the eve of UN Secretary General Waldheim's 17 July arrival there for talks, and on the heels of Waldheim's Geneva meeting with Jarring and his 11 July announcement--reported by TASS--that the Swedish ambassador would arrive in New York early in August to continue consultations with Waldheim and the opposing sides. Moscow had greeted this news with "satisfaction" and attributed to Cairo the same response, while noting Israel's "cold reception" of the development. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Africa on the

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12th, welcoming the prospects for renewal of the mission, resurrected--apparently for the first time since January--the essence of the Soviet proposals for a MidEast settlement, claiming that Soviet diplomats had worked out a "complete and realistic plan" for establishing peace in the Middle East. The broadcast concluded by urging that the Jarring mission be given the broadest international backing.

Cairo, for its part, evinced something less than the satisfaction imputed to it by Moscow: AL-JUMHURIYAH, reviewed by Cairo radio on the 16th, called it obvious that reactivation of the Jarring mission was aimed at forestalling resubmission of the crisis to the fall session of the UN General Assembly. A Cairo Voice of the Arabs commentary broadcast on the 15th, like AL-JUMHURIYAH, scorned attempts to "cast doubt" on Soviet-Egyptian relations. But it said one had to examine the Soviet attitude in light of the efforts to renew the Jarring mission, a "move that began in the wake of the Moscow summit meeting." It claimed that if Israel again refused to reply to Jarring, then Egypt's "right to use all means" to liberate the Arab territories should receive the support of the entire international community, first of all the Soviet Union.

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SALT

USSR ACKNOWLEDGES USE OF SATELLITES TO MONITOR ACCORDS

An article in the Soviet monthly INTERNATIONAL LIFE (No. 7, signed to press 21 June) contains the first public Soviet acknowledgment that the strategic arms accords will be monitored by satellites. Reviewing in considerable detail both the ABM treaty and the interim agreement on offensive arms, the author of the article, V. Viktorov, who has written in the past on disarmament issues, pointed out that the United States and the Soviet Union each "observes the implementation of the commitments adopted by the other side under the [ABM] treaty." He added, drawing on the wording of the treaty, that each side uses for this purpose "the national technical monitoring facilities at its disposal while observing generally recognized norms of international law." This statement prefaced Viktorov's comment on the use of satellites:

It should be noted that the existence of such sophisticated facilities, particularly artificial earth satellites, made it considerably easier to reach agreement, since it removed the question of conducting international on-the-spot inspections, which had been a stumbling block during previous examinations of many other disarmament measures The treaty prohibits interference by the other side with national technical monitoring facilities.

Another post-summit article on the SALT accords, in the 2 June issue of NEW TIMES (No. 23) by N. Arkadyev, also noted that the two parties to the ABM treaty undertook to use "technical control facilities at their disposal" but did not go on to mention satellites. Prior to the Moscow summit, Soviet commentators and spokesmen had only rarely broached the subject of "spy satellites," usually in the context of denouncing Washington for using them to carry out "subversive" intelligence activities. In linking the use of satellites with "generally recognized norms of international law," the Viktorov article may portend a constructive change in the Soviet media's treatment of space reconnaissance.

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U. S. ELECTIONS

MOSCOW REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO SENATOR MCGOVERN'S NOMINATION

In line with traditional practice, Soviet media are devoting limited comment and reportage to the U.S. election campaign, with the Democratic Convention in Miami drawing less than one percent of Radio Moscow's comment to all audiences during the week it was in progress. To date PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA have discussed the outcome only in correspondents' dispatches from Miami, relying heavily on the views of U.S. observers. Moscow's cautious approach so far has been to portray McGovern's selection as a reflection of public dissatisfaction over Vietnam and a desire for "radical changes" in American policies, while at the same time taking note of "inconsistencies" in the Senator's program and dismissing the party platform as a whole as offering no prospect for significant change. Apart from noting that President Nixon will "no doubt" be the Republican standard-bearer in November, Soviet comment has avoided references to the President's campaign for reelection and predictably steered clear of speculation about the outcome. But it has underscored disarray and division in the Democratic Party and in effect forecast a difficult path for McGovern.

Against the background of the classic Soviet portrayal of American elections as offering the voters a choice only between representatives of "big business" interests, Radio Moscow correspondents Zorin and Soltan in a dispatch from Miami on the 14th sought to explain why McGovern was nominated "despite the opposition of the party machine and the dissatisfaction of the Wall Street businessmen." They attributed his victory to "the mood of the American general public, which is desperately longing for radical changes in the country," is "disgusted with the policy of continuing aggression in Vietnam, and is dissatisfied with the rising cost of living and growing unemployment." The dispatch added that "McGovern's campaign, despite its inherent demagogic element, to a certain extent took this mood of the masses into account, and that is why he became his party's presidential candidate."

In 1968 Soviet commentators had emphasized the affinities of the two candidates on the Vietnam issue and concluded that the voters had no real choice in the election. Now, while playing up McGovern's Vietnam position as a major factor in his

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nomination, Moscow has avoided comparing it with President Nixon's, rather setting out to disparage pre-election promises in general. A panelist in the 16 July domestic service roundtable, in the course of a wide-ranging discussion of U.S. foreign policies, recalled that the President, too, had promised to end the Vietnam war before he was elected. Typifying commentaries devoted strictly to the election campaign, which have avoided specific mention of the President's position, a dispatch by PRAVDA's Strelnikov on the 14th interpreted McGovern's nomination as a reflection of public dissatisfaction over "the Pentagon's aggression" in Southeast Asia and singled out for quotation the Senator's pledge of a U.S. withdrawal in his acceptance speech.

A 15 July Miami dispatch in SOVIET RUSSIA took McGovern to task in observing that although he owed his nomination in part to the support of "liberal" forces, he is "already yielding to pressure from the right." Declaring that the Senator has "modified" his position on Vietnam, the dispatch said that where in the past he had called for a total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia, he is "now saying that a certain number of troops will remain on the border of Vietnam until all prisoners are released."

Citing unnamed commentators in Miami for the view that there are "inconsistencies and discrepancies" in McGovern's program as well as in the party platform, Strelnikov asserted that while the Senator advocates a reordering of priorities, he has not "clarified" his proposals on arms spending and advocates the continuation of military aid to Israel, "which fires the expansionist designs of the Tel Aviv extremists." Moreover, the dispatch added, the party's foreign policy program, which "does not go beyond certain partial bourgeois reforms," is also "inconsistent."

While noting that observers in Miami were trying to "guess the outcome" in November, PRAVDA's correspondent did not cite any specific speculation but suggested, by his emphasis on Democratic Party discord, that McGovern faces a difficult campaign: "The convention has not smoothed over the contradictions which rend the party . . . and as before, the powerful industrial-financial circles, the bloc of George Wallace of Alabama, the trade union bureaucrats, and the old guard of the party refuse to support the liberal wing headed by McGovern." In the same vein, an IZVESTIYA dispatch from Miami on the 15th stated that the McGovern candidacy "will most likely provoke a polarization of political forces in America." In this connection it noted the Republican bid to disenchant Democrats to join Republican ranks.

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USSR - CHINA - U. S.

MOSCOW SEIZES ON BOGGS-FORD ACCOUNTS OF CHINESE VIEWS

Accounts by Congressmen Boggs and Ford of their talks with Chinese leaders have triggered authoritative reaction from Moscow and Peking that underscores the sensitive triangular issues surrounding this year's summitry. Following earlier low-level Soviet reports on the Congressmen's statements after their return from China, a 16 July PRAVDA article over the authoritative signature "I. Aleksandrov" complained that the views attributed to Chou En-lai and other Chinese leaders abetted "extreme rightwing forces" in the current U.S. debate over arms control and Indochina. The views cited by Aleksandrov were that the Chinese are concerned over further Soviet arms development while the United States disarms, and over an American withdrawal from Southeast Asia that would create a vacuum in that region.

A day after the Aleksandrov article appeared, Chou took the occasion of a banquet for a Yemeni delegation to put on record Peking's view on the arms control agreements reached at the Moscow summit. Though he did not mention the Boggs-Ford accounts of their talks with him or the Soviet reaction, Chou's remarks broke Peking's long abstinence from comment on the summit agreements and seemed designed to clarify Peking's position amid speculation aroused by the Congressmen's reports. Previously Peking had done no more than carry a factual account of the Soviet-U.S. summit and seemed content to remain noncommittal on the summit results per se.

Whatever Chou's purpose in raising the issue, Moscow promptly took note of his speech as in effect confirming the U.S. Congressmen's accounts. On the 18th TASS commentator Kornilov cited Chou's remarks on the arms limitation accord as an example of Chinese pronouncements that "practically confirm" the Boggs and Ford reports. Kornilov also claimed that the views attributed to Chou by the Congressmen lifted "the veil over the real contents" of the Sino-U.S. summit negotiations. Both Kornilov and a Washington-dated TASS dispatch on the 18th cited a report that Ford had reaffirmed that the accounts given earlier by the Congressmen precisely mirrored what they had been told by Chinese leaders.

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ALEKSANDROV ARTICLE The appearance of a PRAVDA article with an I. Aleksandrov byline, coming during a period of several months of Soviet restraint on the China question, attests to Moscow's sensitivity toward any tendency in the United States to use China for leverage in the triangular relationship. As Aleksandrov put it, the U.S. Congressmen's reports indicate that "Chou En-lai himself advises America to continue the arms race and stay in Asia." According to the article, such views lend support to a "coalition of extreme rightwing forces" in the "bitter struggle" now taking place in the United States over such key issues as Indochina and arms control. The article called it "noteworthy" that Peking has not found it necessary to deny the Congressmen's accounts. Implicitly playing up to Hanoi and other anti-U.S. forces, the article said these accounts provide a godsend for the Pentagon and noted that "not all Asians think in the same way" about U.S. interference in other people's affairs and about "the barbarous plans and doings of Pentagon generals." The article was broadcast by Moscow in Vietnamese, Korean, and Mandarin, among other foreign languages.

The use of an I. Aleksandrov article, though in this case as a brief commentary rather than as a policy statement, reflects Moscow's concern over a Sino-U.S. accommodation detrimental to Soviet interests in Asia. The Kornilov TASS commentary made this point more explicitly in referring to the Sino-U.S. summit as background for understanding the views now attributed to the Chinese. Moscow's reaction to these views also comes against the backdrop of its ongoing campaign in behalf of an Asian collective security system to replace the existing military alliance structures. A Soviet broadcast in Mandarin to Southeast Asia on 15 July discussed the Boggs-Ford accounts as showing "Peking's approval of the U.S. armed forces remaining in the Pacific regions." According to the broadcast, "those people who were previously doubtful about Peking's attitude toward U.S. military bases in the Pacific region should be quite clear now . . . , for Ford's statement makes it clear that Peking's approval of the stationing of U.S. armed forces in the Pacific region reflects the long-term strategy which the Chinese leaders have mapped out in collusion with imperialism."

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CHOU EN-LAI SAYS SALT ACCORDS MARK NEW STAGE IN ARMS RACE

In Peking's first comment on the Moscow summit results, Chou En-lai declared in his speech on 17 July that the agreements on strategic arms limitation were "by no means" a step toward curbing the arms race but marked "the beginning of a new stage" of the arms race between the two superpowers. Without mentioning the United States or the Soviet Union by name, Chou observed that "the ink on the agreements was hardly dry before one announced an increase of billions of dollars for military expenditure and the other hastened to test new-type weapons, clamoring for seizing nuclear superiority." He then repeated Peking's standard line on disarmament by asserting that disarmament, let alone international peace and security, is "out of the question" in circumstances in which the superpowers intensify their arms expansion and war preparations, station forces in other countries, and practice "nuclear blackmail" against others.

Much as he had used a banquet on 9 July for a South Yemen delegation to call for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, explaining that the situation in the Far East remains "far from truly relaxed" because of the Vietnam war, Chou made the same observation on the 17th about the international situation as a whole in saying the superpowers have not ceased their "expansion and aggression" against other countries. Drawing on another favorite theme, Chou hailed an increasing awareness among "small and medium-size countries" that they must heighten their vigilance, unite more closely, and persevere in struggle against the superpowers.

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CHINA - EUROPE

PEKING STRENGTHENS TIES WITH WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

In the context of growing cooperation among West European states in an expanding Common Market as well as the developing East-West detente on the continent, Peking has made a succession of moves to improve its leverage by strengthening ties with the three main West European powers. The Chinese have accorded a friendly reception to delegations from Britain, France, and West Germany while continuing favorable coverage of developments that reflect greater unity in West Europe as a counterweight to the superpowers. At the same time Peking has muted its former hostility toward detente trends in Europe that would serve to free the Soviets for applying greater pressure on China. Peking has yet to comment on recent East-West agreements on Europe, remaining content thus far with a factual NCNA account on 5 June of the signing of the quadrilateral accord on Berlin and the exchange of instruments of ratification of the FRG's treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland.

The first in the succession of West European visitors to Peking was that of British Undersecretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Anthony Royle last month. The highest-ranking British official to visit the PRC, Royle had a "friendly" talk with Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei on 4 June. He also had talks with Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Assistant Foreign Minister Chang Wen-chin, who attended a banquet at which British and Chinese officials toasted the "growth of relations" between the two countries. The two countries had agreed in March to raise their relations to the ambassadorial level.

In accord with the warm state of Sino-French relations, the French delegation was on the level of Foreign Minister Schumann, who arrived on 6 July. Schumann held extensive discussions with Chou En-lai and Chi Peng-fei, and he was accorded the rare honor as a foreign minister to be received by Mao. Unlike the other meetings, which Peking uniformly described as "friendly," Schumann's conversation with Mao was characterized by NCNA as "friendly and frank," indicating significant points of divergence of views. At a farewell banquet on 10 July Chi called the visit "fruitful and satisfactory" and said it was a "major event" in Sino-French relations, though he also acknowledged divergent views on "some international issues." Typically, the thrust of Peking's comment during the visit was directed against "hegemony and power politics," though the Chinese deferred to French sensitivities by omitting their customary references to the two superpowers.

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Chiao Kuan-hua, speaking at the French embassy celebration of France's national day on 14 July, said that during Schumann's visit the two sides had strengthened mutual understanding and made concrete arrangements for the development of economic, cultural, scientific, and technological exchange. In the same speech Chiao enunciated a line having relevance to negotiations on European security when he declared, in a passage expressing opposition to hegemony by the superpowers, that relations between countries "with different or identical social systems should all be based" on the principles of peaceful coexistence. He expressed satisfaction that France and China have "common grounds on these major questions of principle." In the PRC-Netherlands communique of 16 May raising their relations to the ambassadorial level, the Dutch had explicitly interpreted the principles of peaceful coexistence as implying noninterference in internal affairs not only between countries of different systems but "equally between countries belonging to an alliance and having identical or similar socio-political systems." In the communique Peking said it "appreciates this stand."

Marking the first visit by a West German official to Peking, the chairman of the Bundestag's foreign affairs committee, Gerhard Schroeder, a former minister, arrived on 15 July at the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs--a device used for visitors from countries not having relations with the PRC. A welcoming banquet was attended by NPC Vice Chairman Kuo Mo-jo and Chiao Kuan-hua, who earlier had a "friendly" talk with Schroeder. Schroeder has said he expects to discuss European and international questions as well as bilateral matters, possibly opening the way for establishment of formal relations.

Peking in the meantime has indicated to East Germany that it wishes to have reasonably good relations with that country. NCNA reported that the newly appointed PRC ambassador to the GDR had a "friendly" talk with State Council Chairman Ulbricht when he presented his credentials on 3 July. Atypically, NCNA noted that "all members" of the Chinese embassy's diplomatic staff accompanied the new ambassador at the meeting.

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K O R E A

DPRK TREATY ANNIVERSARIES RECEIVE LOW-KEY OBSERVANCE

The 11th anniversaries of the signing of the treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the DPRK and the USSR (6 July) and the PRC (11 July) were observed at a level comparable to that of 1970, the last previous nondecennial observance. This year, however, the observance was notably subdued in tone, reflecting the more relaxed atmosphere produced by the past year's developments in Sino-U.S. relations and the thaw in North-South Korean relations.* Attacks on the United States in this year's observance were considerably muffled and there was no reference to the South Korean people's "struggle" against an oppressive regime.

Soviet comment on the anniversary routinely supported Pyongyang's call for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South and for "peaceful unification," but there was no mention of UNCURK. In observing the anniversary Moscow made no mention of the 4 July North-South Korea joint statement on reunification, a subject on which the Soviets have yet to comment. Pyongyang media, however, reported Soviet speakers as welcoming the statement. The Chinese, who have authoritatively welcomed the agreement, included affirmations of support for it in comment marking the treaty anniversary. Peking reiterated its line that the agreement stripped the United States of all pretexts for intervention in Korean affairs and demanded that the United States withdraw its troops, though there was no mention of UNCURK. The DPRK ambassador in Peking, however, used the occasion to demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops "that fly the flag of the 'United Nations forces'" and the dissolution of UNCURK.

* Kim Il-song, in some interviews with foreign correspondents since last fall that were not carried in Pyongyang media, has suggested that the DPRK might be willing to abrogate its treaties with the USSR and the PRC to facilitate reunification. Not surprisingly, this point did not surface in comment marking the anniversaries.

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TREATY WITH USSR The Korean-Soviet treaty anniversary was marked with the usual receptions held in the two capitals by the respective ambassadors, a Moscow meeting sponsored by the USSR friendship society, and a NODONG SINMUN editorial article. Soviet Deputy Premier Novikov, as usual, attended the DPRK ambassador's reception. DPRK Supreme People's Assembly Vice President So Chol attended the Soviet ambassador's reception, a somewhat lower-ranking official than in the past; normally the reception had been attended by Pak Song-chol, a vice premier at the time.

Moscow described the treaty in the customary terms as providing a basis for the friendship and cooperation of the two peoples, as safeguarding the "socialist gains" of the two countries, and as an instrument of peace in the Far East. Typically, Moscow avoided the theme of U.S. "war preparations" and "provocations" in Korea, although Pyongyang was characteristically more polemical. So Chol said that the treaty is a manifestation of the determination of the two people to "firmly defend the security of the two countries and the gains of the revolution from the encroachment of the imperialists, headed by the U.S. imperialists, and to defend world peace." A similar remark by the DPRK ambassador was reported by Radio Moscow in a Korean-language broadcast. The NODONG SINMUN editorial article, which said that the treaty "dealt a heavy blow to the imperialist reactionaries headed by the U.S. imperialists," assailed "the crimes of U.S. imperialism" in Korea, Indochina, and the Middle East.

Comment on both sides was considerably more restrained than last year's. Although Moscow had generally avoided associating itself with Pyongyang's bellicosity and had not specifically denounced the United States, it had characterized the treaty as "a serious warning to those who have not abandoned attempts to operate from a position of strength" and as "a resolute warning to those who like playing with fire." North Korean speakers had described the treaty as an instrument for curbing the "criminal maneuvers" of the United States at a time when its "aggressive and war provocative maneuvers are being intensified," and they had called upon the two countries to "further consolidate" their alliance and "faithfully discharge the obligations they assumed under the treaty" in the face of intensified U.S. and Japanese aggressiveness.

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TREATY WITH PRC The anniversary of the treaty with the PRC was observed much like the one in 1970, with banquets hosted by the respective ambassadors, greetings exchanged by friendship associations, and a NODONG SINMUN editorial article. Pak Song-chol attended the PRC ambassador's banquet in Pyongyang, at which the KPA Chief of Staff spoke. The DPRK ambassador's banquet this year was attended by Politburo members Yeh Chien-ying and Yao Wen-yuan and was addressed by Li Te-sheng, the political chief of the PLA.

The restraint marking Peking's comment was particularly evident in the omission of attacks on the United States by name as a threat to the two communist allies. Li Te-sheng said blandly that the treaty embodies "the great friendship" forged by the Chinese and Korean people in protracted struggles against "the common enemies," and that it "demonstrates their firm determination to fight in unity for the common cause." The Chinese friendship association message similarly referred to "common enemies," in contrast to the Korean message's specific mention of "Japanese and U.S. imperialism" as those enemies. DPRK speakers asserted that the treaty contributes to "defending the security of the two countries and their socialist gains from the encroachment of the imperialists, headed by the U.S. imperialists, and preserving peace in Asia and the rest of the world." The NODONG SINMUN editorial article was still stronger, saying that the treaty "frustrates the maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges for the provocation of a new war."

This year's comment from both sides was considerably blander than in 1971, when the Chinese joined with the North Koreans in saying their treaty was directed against "U.S. imperialist aggression" and explicitly cited the treaty provision committing them to provide military assistance in case of attack. The Chinese last year accused the United States of carrying out provocations against the DPRK and of occupying Taiwan, and the North Koreans aired charges that the United States sent "armed agents, armed spy ships, and high-altitude reconnaissance planes" into the DPRK and conducted armed attacks along the demilitarized zone. Last year Peking briefly recalled that the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) helped the Koreans during the Korean War, and Pyongyang thanked the Chinese for doing so. There was no mention of the CPV this year except in a low-level PEOPLE'S DAILY article by a "workers' commentator group."

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C E M A

MOSCOW COUNCIL SESSION ADMITS CUBA TO FULL MEMBERSHIP

The 10-12 July Moscow session of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) "unanimously" accepted Cuba as a full member of the Soviet bloc organization--a move presumably sought by Moscow and its partners in the hope of achieving greater leverage in the management of the Cuban economy and introducing greater discipline into Cuban economic planning through the machinery of CEMA integration. Cuban CP Secretariat member and Minister Without Portfolio Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, attending along with the member countries' prime ministers, acknowledged Cuba's part of the bargain when he declared over Moscow television on 11 July that Cuba would "share to the full extent the responsibility demanded by" CEMA integration. The new move to enhance the Soviet role in Cuban economic planning carries forward the apparent intention behind the formation of the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation in December 1970.

Final details of the admission of Cuba, which has held "observer" status at CEMA gatherings since September 1962, were evidently worked out during Castro's 26 June-5 July stay in the USSR following his visits to the six East European CEMA member states. Castro did not mention CEMA in public speeches during his recent tour of the Soviet bloc. But Havana media on the 17th quoted Rodriguez in his CEMA session speech as citing a statement made by Castro in East Europe to the effect that "national egoism is incompatible with socialism inside and outside of the country," to which Rodriguez added his own comment that Cuban economic development could not be achieved "without Cuba joining the process of socialist integration." And Hungary's Premier Fock, in an interview with the Hungarian news agency MTI before leaving Moscow on the 12th, observed that Cuba's application for CEMA membership was "probably contributed to" by Castro's East European tour.*

* PRENSA LATINA reported on the 18th that Castro's "extensive and detailed report" on his 10-nation tour was "unanimously approved" by party, government, mass organization, and media leaders at a 15-17 July meeting. There has been no Cuban comment indicating the substance of the report; Castro may take the occasion of a scheduled mass rally in Havana on 26 July, the 19th anniversary of the Moncada barracks attack, to inform the nation on his trip.

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Beyond the immediate economic consideration of protecting the Soviet bloc investment, Cuba's admission serves to foster the image of an expanding CEMA, open to any country wishing to participate, at a time of expansion of the West European Common Market and of more assertive Chinese efforts to make inroads into the Soviet domain. The admission of the only other non-European CEMA member, the Mongolian People's Republic in 1962, had taken place in a similar context of Sino-Soviet rivalry. Fock, in the MTI interview, commented that Cuba's admission now was based on "the relevant provision of our integration document according to which any non-CEMA-member country may participate fully or partially in the implementation of the comprehensive program." He expressed the conviction that "in the coming years several countries" would either apply for membership or for the opportunity to participate "in certain provisions" of the integration program.

More specifically, Cuba's admission serves the propaganda purpose of projecting the ultimate expansion of CEMA into Latin America. Typical of Moscow's brief statements welcoming Cuba's admission was PRAVDA's editorial comment on the 15th that "states of three continents are now members of CEMA." A panelist in the Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable the next day remarked in a similar vein that CEMA "from now on will unite the fraternal socialist countries of three continents." A domestic service broadcast of a recording of Rodriguez' Moscow TV speech of 11 July, with overlaid translation in Russian, represented the Cuban delegate as noting that Cuba was "the first country of Latin America" to take part in CEMA integration. And a report of the speech broadcast by Radio Moscow to Brazil attributed to Rodriguez the more expansive statement that "we shall incorporate our America--Latin America--in the activities of" CEMA integration. A report of his speech to the CEMA session, broadcast by Radio Havana to the Americas and published in the party organ GRANMA on the 17th, quoted Rodriguez as stating that with Cuba's admission to CEMA "Latin America would enter the world socialist economy."

According to the communique on the CEMA session carried in Soviet media on 12 July, the other main business was discussion of the implementation of the long-range economic integration program adopted at the last session in Bucharest in July 1971, with emphasis on cooperation in planning, the scientific-technical sphere, and the electric power, chemical, and engineering industries. The session was marked by the attendance of Yugoslav Premier Bijedic--the highest-ranking Belgrade delegate to date

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at a CEMA gathering, raising Yugoslav representation at the session to the same level as that of the member countries. The Yugoslavs, holding "observer" status and "participating" in the work of a number of CEMA commissions under a September 1964 agreement, have insisted in radio and press comment that Bijedic's attendance portends no change in Yugoslavia's nonalignment.

TIRANA COMMENT A Tirana radio commentary on the CEMA session on 17 July pointedly omitted any mention of either Cuba or Yugoslavia. Entitled "CEMA, an Instrument in the Hands of the Soviet Revisionists to Exploit the Satellite Countries," the commentary typically described the meeting as a further step in an alleged Soviet campaign to tie the economies of "Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the other revisionist countries" to that of the USSR. It notably refrained from directly pinning the revisionist label on Hungary and took the occasion to draw propaganda capital from the recent tensions in Moscow-Budapest economic relations. Thus it charged that "how immoderate the Soviet revisionists are in plundering these countries is also revealed by the position of Hungarian bauxite production," adding that "in bauxite production Hungary occupies second place in the world" but "has no aluminum industry of its own." Hungary, the broadcast said, must send the bauxite "about 3,000 kilometers" to a processing plant near Stalingrad, and the USSR sells the processed aluminum to Hungary at a "capitalist profit."

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

DUTCH CP REASSERTS AUTONOMY, INDIRECTLY REBUKES CPSU

The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) has strongly reiterated the party's claim to "complete autonomy" in the international movement and pointedly rebuked the CPSU for interfering in CPN internal affairs and attempting to alienate the Dutch party's rank and file from its duly elected leadership. The documents of the 26-28 May congress in Amsterdam, recently available in translation, sustain what has become a public polemic between the CPSU and the small independent-minded Dutch party. Specifically, the documents may be read as the CPN's response to a PRAVDA Observer article of 12 May which charged the Dutch party with rebuffing CPSU efforts to reestablish interparty relations; the authoritative PRAVDA blast at the relatively insignificant Dutch CP betrayed Moscow's acute sensitivity to public criticism from other parties and reflected, at the same time, the capacity of a small but vocal party to act as an irritant toward Moscow at the present juncture in international communist relations.*

The "unanimously" adopted resolution of the CPN congress, published in the party organ DE WAARHELD on 29 May, spelled out the party's view of its role in interparty relations. It proclaimed that the CPN is for "cooperation in concrete actions with all communist parties without distinction," but it immediately added that "relationships with other parties must be maintained and regulated only from executive committee to executive committee"---a statement reflecting fear that the CPSU was attempting to isolate the Dutch CP leadership from the party rank and file. The resolution continued:

Relationships between parties in the international communist movement should be based on unequivocal recognition of complete autonomy, not just lip service but also in practice, so that there may be no talk of interference in any form or support of groups of persons who attack the elected, authorized CPN leadership and who oppose the policy decided upon by the congress.

* See the TRENDS of 17 May 1972, pages 36-39, for a discussion of the PRAVDA article and background on CPSU-CPN dissensions.

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The PRAVDA Observer article, appearing shortly before the congress, had made a pointed appeal to the Dutch rank and file: "The assertion that the CPSU is unwilling to have contacts with the CPN is completely untrue and is capable only of misleading broad strata of CPN members; however, such a position hardly meets the interests of the Dutch communists." Stressing that the policy of the Dutch CP as approved by the congress must be enforced by the CPN Executive Committee "under all circumstances," the congress resolution cautioned that the "the entire party is obliged to use the greatest vigilance to protect the unity and policy of the party against hostile interference."

Alluding to the split in the international movement generated by the Sino-Soviet conflict, the resolution asserted that the CPN is for a "principled international discussion on the basis of equality on the problems of Marxism-Leninism in these times," adding that "no exclusive attitude in regard to other parties may be taken in these discussions." The issue of relations between the Dutch CP and the Chinese Communist Party was raised directly in the resolution's statement that "the CPN in past years has steadfastly refused to participate in the 'anti-Mao campaign' because of its established rule not to comment on domestic conditions in socialist countries on which it has no factual information." CPN Chairman Hoekstra, in his main report to the congress on 26 May, also said that all communists must unite against "any intrigues Nixon may try in order to exploit differences between the Soviet and Chinese communist parties and to sow confusion; therefore, we must come around to a new basis of international cooperation and unity of action." Hoekstra then remarked that the resolution shows how this "new" unity can be achieved.

CPSU MESSAGE PRAVDA published a two-paragraph CPSU message to the congress on 26 May which conveyed a picture of disunity in CPN ranks by pointedly wishing the CPN "unity of its ranks on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, development of ties with friendly communist parties" Neither DE WAARHEID's reportage nor available versions of the congress speeches, however, acknowledged any foreign party congratulatory messages. The congress resolution explained the absence of foreign party delegations as well as the failure to acknowledge the CPSU message: "It is apparent that participation of guest delegations at congresses and written greetings are not practical for the exchange of opinions under present conditions. Therefore, for the time being, our party is giving up this practice."

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PRAVDA carried its only other mention of the congress on 30 May when it reported tersely that the gathering had finished its work, having heard the CPN leadership's report, discussed party finances, and elected a new executive committee. There was no detail on the substance of the report or the discussions and no mention of the resolution.

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GERMANY

IZVESTIYA BACKS FINNISH PROPOSAL FOR RELATIONS WITH FRG, GDR

The Moscow press has for the first time publicly endorsed the Finnish Government's long-standing proposal to start discussions with both German states aimed at the establishment of diplomatic relations. A 16 July IZVESTIYA article by Yuriy Goloshubov took note of Helsinki's latest public renewal of its proposal, on 10 July, commenting that it "merits a positive appraisal" and "ought to be considered against the background of the overall process of detente taking place in Europe." Arguing that recognition of the GDR would be "an important contribution" to the continuing process of lessening tensions in Europe, the article maintained that this was why the Finnish proposal had evoked a "great response" and had acquired "such urgency." Nothing that "unfortunately" there are "voices" in the FRG and in the West which "are trying to convince the public of the 'prematureness' of implementing the Finnish proposal," the article concluded that "broad sections of the West Europe public are convinced" that the Finnish initiative "fully accords with the spirit and demand of the times."

At the time of the original Finnish Government proposal of 10 September 1971, both the East German and Soviet media had reacted with extreme caution.* At that time both Moscow and East Berlin carefully avoided any reference to the Finnish call for negotiations on the settlement of damages caused by German troops in Finland in 1944-45, and both ignored Helsinki's stipulation that its treaties with the two German states must come into force simultaneously--the first proviso being abhorrent to East Germany because of its long-standing refusal to accept any responsibility for damages inflicted by the Germans in World War II, and the second giving Bonn power to delay Finnish recognition of the GDR until its own conditions are met. Other elements of the 1971 draft treaties submitted to Bonn and East Berlin, as part of the Finnish "package deal" to be negotiated along with the establishment of diplomatic relations, included recognition of Finland's "policy of neutrality" by both German states and renunciation of force or threat of force in relations with Finland.

* See the TRENDS of 29 September 1972, pages 31-32, and of 17 November 1972, pages 32-33.

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In reporting on a visit to Finland by SED Politburo member Axen in November, East Berlin media continued to avoid mention of the German reparations issue. However, Axen was reported by Helsinki media to have said that it was difficult to appraise the grounds for Finland's claim to compensation for war damages and that the important thing was to move ahead with negotiations on normalizing relations. During this visit East Berlin media acknowledged for the first time that the 1971 Finnish proposal to establish diplomatic relations with the GDR was contingent on simultaneous establishment of FRG diplomatic relations with Finland.

Moscow and East Berlin have apparently reacted more favorably to Helsinki's 10 July proposal because it now seems to separate the "other issues" from the establishment of diplomatic relations, though still calling for negotiations on the other questions simultaneously with negotiations on diplomatic relations.

GDR REACTION The 10 July proposal was advanced at the beginning of the annual Baltic Week festivities in Rostock--a forum that gave East German spokesmen ample opportunity to welcome the Finnish Government's initiative. On the official level, the GDR Council of Ministers on the 12th, according to ADN, instructed Foreign Minister Winzer "to take the necessary measures for conducting the negotiations proposed by the Finnish Government for the complete normalization of relations between the GDR and Finland." Promptly on the 13th, ADN reported that the acting head of the GDR trade mission in Helsinki, Nestler, had presented the GDR's reply, which affirmed the GDR's "repeatedly expressed conviction that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states corresponds to the interests" of the two states and of Europe in general. The reply said the GDR "sincerely" welcomed the Finnish proposal and declared "its readiness to conduct negotiations with representatives of the Finnish Government on the establishment of diplomatic relations."

East Berlin has not acknowledged the fact that the renewed Finnish initiative called for the simultaneous opening of talks on the "other" matters outlined in the original 1971 proposal. TASS, on the other hand, did note in its 10 July report that the Finnish Government said "agreement should be reached on the commencement of a discussion of other questions connected with the full settlement of relations" with the two German states.

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