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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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14 JUNE 1972

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
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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14 JUNE 1972
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FBIS TRENDS
14 June 1972

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 11 JUNE 1972

<u>Moscow (2857 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1328 items)</u>		
Indochina	(3%)	10%	Domestic Issues	(53%)	39%
[PRG 3d Anniversary	(1%)	9%]	Indochina	(12%)	25%
Tito in USSR	(1%)	10%	[PRG 3d Anniversary	(1%)	19%]
Nixon USSR Visit	(25%)	6%	UN Conference on	(--)	6%
Moscow World Communist	(1%)	4%	Environment in		
Conference 3d			Stockholm		
Anniversary			PRC-Greek Diplomatic	(--)	6%
Brussels Conference on	(7%)	3%	Relations		
European Security			Middle East 1967 War	(0.1%)	4%
Iraqi Foreign Minister	(--)	3%	Anniversary		
in USSR			Kim Il-Song's New York	(0.1%)	3%
Nationalization of	(1%)	3%	TIMES Interview		
Iraqi Oil			Chilean Economic	(3%)	3%
Middle East	(1%)	3%	Delegation in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist media have revealed that the top leadership in both the North and the South met recently to assess developments since the launching of the communist offensive on 30 March. The Front on 11 June broadcast a communique on a PRG Council of Ministers meeting, held from 6 to 8 June, reaffirming confidence in the Council's assessment of the situation last January, "which led to the offensive" VNA had reported on the 10th that a "recent" DRV Council of Ministers meeting expressed approval of feats during the past two months in connection with both the offensive in the South and U.S. "escalation" against the North.

Hanoi on 10 June broke its pattern of daily foreign ministry spokesman's protests over the air strikes and issued a higher-level DRV Foreign Ministry statement--the first at this level since 18 May. The statement singled out attacks on 6 and 8 June in the Hanoi and Haiphong area as well as the resumption of B-52 strikes in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh area. It did not, however, mention the strikes near the Chinese border. The statement and other propaganda has reaffirmed North Vietnamese determination to continue the struggle no matter how great the sacrifices. And press comment has been stressing the need to revert to a wartime footing as in the 1965-68 period and to continue supporting the South.

While Hanoi's 10 June protest made no mention of air strikes near the Chinese border, a supporting PRC Foreign Ministry statement on the 12th took sharp exception to U.S. air action near the Sino-Vietnamese border as "threatening the security of China." Having thus made Peking's first linkage of its security interests with Vietnam developments since the Lam Son 719 operation last year, the Chinese statement pledged continuing support no matter "what circumstances may yet arise in this war."

Moscow comment on President Nixon's visit to the USSR has continued to defend Soviet policy against criticism by unnamed parties and to insist that agreements with the United States are not directed against any third powers. At the same time, there have been routine reaffirmations of Soviet support for the Vietnamese.

U.S. STRIKES ON 6, 8 JUNE PROMPT DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTEST

The 10 June DRV Foreign Ministry statement broke the weeks-long pattern of daily protests at the lower level of the foreign ministry spokesman. Presumably the statement was issued at the

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higher level because it singled out action in the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong--on 6 and 8 June, respectively--as well as the resumption of B-52 strikes on the 8th in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh area. The last two previous foreign ministry statements, issued on 11 and 18 May, also condemned strikes at Hanoi and Haiphong; the one before that, on 6 May, scored the bombing of Nam Dinh city.* Although the U.S. strikes have continued at an intensive level since the 8th, Hanoi reverted to its daily routine protests by the foreign ministry spokesman from the 11th through the 14th. As of the 13th, Hanoi claimed a total of 3,653 U.S. planes since the beginning of the air war.

The foreign ministry statement followed Hanoi's usual practice in referring only vaguely to "populated areas" and "economic and cultural establishments" being hit and thus did not acknowledge, for example, that a thermal power plant reportedly was among the targets on the 6th. The statement also failed to acknowledge that the strikes that day were within 20 miles of the Sino-Vietnamese border. However, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary article on the 14th--referring to the strikes on the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong, on the 6th and 8th and at Nam Dinh city on the 11th--said that "U.S. aircraft have also bombed areas close to the Vietnam-China border, threatening the security of the PRC."

The statement differed from earlier ones in that it took the occasion to round up the strikes since early April. It declared that U.S. ships and planes have "bombarded on a daily basis many densely populated areas in the DRV, from the coast to the hinterland, from villages to towns." It charged that the United States had attacked Hanoi and 30 municipalities, cities, and towns in 19 provinces and that many areas had been subjected to repeated attacks, "some to a dozen raids, such as Haiphong, Vinh, Thanh Hoa, and Dong Hoi." It said that "according to still incomplete figures,"

* A 6 April foreign ministry statement condemned strikes at Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh; an 11 April government statement protested the announcement that U.S. strikes were being expanded; the 16 April strikes at Hanoi and Haiphong prompted a DRV joint party-government statement that day; and the President's 8 May announcement of U.S. mining of DRV ports and other interdiction moves brought a DRV Government statement on the 10th. The last previous protest to mention B-52's was the one issued by the foreign ministry spokesman on 24 April.

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U.S. bombs have hit more than 30 schools, "20 medical centers including eight provincial and municipal hospitals, 12 churches and pagodas, 32 portions of dike on the main waterways, and 29 sluices and dams." It also said that many houses have been destroyed and that "thousands of civilians have been killed or wounded." Some of these statistics were repeated in an 11 June NHAN DAN editorial supporting the foreign ministry statement. On the 9th VNA had publicized a "special communique" by the DRV War Crimes Commission on action against Hanoi on the 6th and 8th. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 14th ridiculed a reported statement by Kissinger in Tokyo to the effect that U.S. policy was to bomb only military targets and that if civilian targets were hit, it would have been inadvertent. Also on the 9th, VNA carried a War Crimes Commission communique enumerating "criminal" actions against both the North and the South during the month of May. Hanoi media have also publicized criticisms of alleged U.S. criminal actions in Vietnam voiced at the UN Conference on the Environment in Stockholm by the Chinese delegate and by Swedish Premier Palme, among others.

SUPPORT AND AID The high-level protests since the beginning of April have used various formulations regarding moral support and material assistance from the communist and "peace-loving" nations. The statement of the 10th expressed "gratitude" for condemnations of the U.S. escalation but went on to appeal to "brothers and friends in the world" to struggle "even more vigorously" to stay the hand of the aggressor and "to continue to support and assist the Vietnamese people."

The 11 April government statement had been notable for its appeal for "even stronger support and assistance," and the 10 May government statement on the U.S. mining had expressed "firm confidence" that the socialist countries and peoples of the world would "strengthen support and further assist the just resistance against aggression." The 11 May foreign ministry statement said nothing about material aid, instead calling on the fraternal socialist countries to "act resolutely to stay in time the bloody hand of the U.S. aggressor." The 18 May foreign ministry statement was similar to the government statement of the 10th in expressing confidence not only that there would be action "to stay the hand of the aggressor," but that the fraternal and peace-loving countries would "support and assist more powerfully the Vietnamese struggle."

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The current statement's call "to continue to support and assist" the Vietnamese would seem to indicate satisfaction at the level of aid at present and concern that it be maintained.

DIFFICULTIES IN U.S.,
MCGOVERN "PHENOMENON"

The foreign ministry statement typically expressed determination to continue the struggle. Declaring that the Nixon

Administration believes it can force the Vietnamese "to approve the insolent U.S. conditions and thereby save its Vietnamization policy," the statement said: "Bombs, bullets, and all crafty political and diplomatic schemes and maneuvers by the Nixon Administration can in no way shake the Vietnamese people's iron determination."

The current statement differed from other recent ones in detailing difficulties facing the United States. Thus, it hailed the military successes of the communists in South Vietnam and said that "the movement to oppose" the Americans and Thieu is developing in Saigon and other cities, that "the U.S.-Thieu clique's posture is a passive, defeated one," and that "the Vietnamization policy is collapsing more and more seriously." Regarding the situation in the United States, it pointed to the "growing" protest movement against the escalation of the bombing as well as to economic problems facing the President. And it concluded that contrary to the expectations of the White House, Vietnam remains a foremost problem in the United States during a presidential election year and "a central problem in international political life."

The President's alleged difficulties were also discussed in a 10 June NHAN DAN commentary which reported Senator McGovern's victories in the Democratic Party primaries and cited reports that "in all probability" he would be the candidate in the race against President Nixon. The article ascribed the McGovern "phenomenon" to the President's "cruel, stubborn, and perfidious policy" on Indochina. Noting that McGovern was one of the earliest and most persistent opponents of the Vietnam war, it said the Senator had described "Nixon's war-maniac measures" of mining DRV ports as illogical and unnecessary and had stated that they could not succeed. NHAN DAN said the McGovern "phenomenon" reflects the strength and scope of the antiwar feelings in the United States; it went on to caution that there will be many new developments before the convention but deemed it certain that the war and economic and financial problems will remain the "burning issues." The article echoed earlier propaganda in referring indirectly to

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area. It also said that B-52's bombed a number of hamlets in Quang Binh and Vinh Linh and that many civilians, mostly old people, women, and children, were killed and "many economic and cultural establishments" and people's homes destroyed.

+ The 14 June protest said that on the 13th, "along with mining and blockading North Vietnam's ports," U.S. planes hit "many populated areas in Haiphong and its suburbs" and in Vinh Phu, Hai Hung, Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh. Like all the protests since 10 June, it scored the renewed use of B-52's, stating that B-52's "wantonly bombed a number of hamlets and villages" in Quang Binh. The statement asserted that the United States "rained bombs and shells at random on many villages, townships, urban areas, and factories, killing and wounding many civilians." It claimed that "a great number" of economic and cultural establishments were destroyed, including the Ngoc Uyen church in Nam Sach district, Hai Hung Province, and a school in Phu Ly, Nam Ha Province.

DRV STRESSES NEED FOR WARTIME FOOTING, CONTINUED AID TO SOUTH

North Vietnamese determination to continue the struggle was reasserted officially in a communique issued by the DRV Council of Ministers meeting which VNA on the 10th announced had been held "recently."* The communique, as reported by VNA, called on the army and people, among other things, "to urgently switch all activities to wartime conditions" and "in all eventualities fulfill the sacred duty toward blood-sealed South Vietnam" as well as the "international obligation" toward the peoples of Laos and Cambodia.

Earlier, a series of articles in NHAN DAN on 1, 3, and 5 June, attributed to Hong Ha, graphically detailed the sacrifices and hardships the people may be called upon to make. In his first article, Hong Ha said that the North's "greatest and most valuable task" is to fulfill its duty to the front; he stressed that a wartime labor mobilization policy is necessary, adding that "it is unacceptable for the rear base to continue to feed the lazy and all those who earn their living dishonestly."

* The last known Council of Ministers meeting was held on 17 April. Hanoi media on 11 May referred to it in reporting that Premier Pham Van Dong, implementing a resolution of that meeting, had issued a decision on 5 May promulgating regulations on maintaining security and order and managing commerce in wartime.

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In the second article he said that the North Vietnamese had "accepted the Nixon clique's challenge," that all forces were being mobilized, and that "peace will only return to the North when the South has triumphed." In the third article he said the "enemy can never paralyze our economy to the point of preventing our survival and our ability to supply the South," and he added dramatically:

Our people can walk, can use torchlight, can eat watered gruel and still defeat the U.S. aggressors. We are prepared to do this because what is important is that our hearts continue to beat for the South and because at the very moment we do this, we are approaching final victory.*

Hong Ha went on to observe that "we still do not have conditions for making aircraft, artillery guns, and warships, and we do not need to produce barbed wire and poison chemicals." And he added that "if we satisfactorily insure communications and transportation, agricultural production, and local industrial production, we will meet the fundamental demands of combat and insure the people's livelihood." He labeled communications and transportation the most important tasks at present and said that "arteries operate incessantly to bring aid to the frontline and to serve combat, production, and the people's livelihood. However, assistance to the frontline is of first priority." Stressing the importance of "firmly maintaining and developing communications and transportation," Hong Ha said that "we will link roads and communications lines together. A destination can be reached by many roads. A river can be crossed at different places. Many methods can be used to transport one type of goods." He also noted the importance of "absolutely preventing leaks of secrets" on the transportation and communications front.

* AP in Hong Kong reported that it monitored this article from a Hanoi English-language transmission on 5 June. FBIS did not hear the broadcast, and the series is not known to have been broadcast in Vietnamese.

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Stating that agriculture is one area of production "which needs to be developed first," Hong Ha noted the necessity of "exhaustively using any cultivable piece of land and any idle laborer in food production." He urged that "now more than ever it is necessary to economize on food, to endeavor to abolish the free food market, and to insure that the state concentrates the necessary foodstuffs so that it can successfully organize the fighting." In this context, he also stressed the importance of protecting the dikes.

NHAN DAN has also recently published a number of editorials concerning domestic matters. Editorials on 7 and 10 June stressed the importance of agricultural production, while the editorial on the 8th linked production with the need to practice thriftiness. An editorial on the 13th discussed the importance of correctly implementing the policies regarding sick and wounded soldiers and the families of fallen heroes and troops.

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PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY SAYS BOMBING THREATENS CHINESE SECURITY

Departing from its markedly cautious reaction to U.S. interdiction measures in North Vietnam, Peking has sharply protested U.S. air strikes close to China's border and has hinted at counteraction in support of the DRV. The PRC Foreign Ministry statement on 12 June, seconding the DRV statement of the 10th, charged that by "steadily" expanding its air action to areas close to the Sino-Vietnamese border the United States was "threatening the security of China"--the first direct linkage of Chinese security interests with Vietnam developments since the allied incursion into southern Laos in February-March 1971. The statement called the U.S. actions "grave provocations" against the Chinese, the same charge as appeared in the 9 May foreign ministry protest against the shelling of Chinese cargo vessels anchored off the DRV. Unlike the May protest, the 12 June statement reaffirmed Peking's commitment to support the DRV, adding a cryptic reminder to the United States that the peoples of Indochina "are by no means alone" in their struggle.*

While taking sharp exception to U.S. moves near the Chinese border, a matter of special sensitivity since the very first year of the PRC's existence, the Chinese statement was carefully limited in its warning and stopped well short of meeting Hanoi's needs for reassurance. Indeed, the DRV statement to which the Chinese protest was pegged had made no mention of air strikes near the PRC border, and the divergent reactions of the two allies indicate that their motives and interests remain apart in significant respects. Where the DRV statement took the occasion of U.S. raids on 6 and 8 June to call into question the Nixon Administration's interest in a peace settlement and to raise the issue of the U.S. elections, Peking used the issuance of the DRV statement as a peg for expressing concern over action near its borders while taking care to avoid injecting political issues that would complicate Sino-U.S. relations.** The Chinese statement made no direct reference to the Nixon Administration and made no mention of political questions or a settlement. Moreover, Peking took the unusual step of editing the DRV statement in order to excise references to the Administration's "hypocritical professions" about peace and to the war as a factor in the U.S. presidential

* VNA repeated the Chinese statement in full on the 13th, and TASS that day summarized the statement.

** Peking announced on the 14th that Dr. Kissinger would visit the PRC from 19 to 23 June to further normalize relations and to exchange views on "issues of common interest."

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election. NCNA's account of the statement also omitted its expression of gratitude to the socialist countries and its call for stronger action to stay the U.S. hand.*

In reaffirming Peking's "unshirkable internationalist duty" to support and assist the Vietnamese war effort, the PRC statement revived the formulation--last used at the time of DRV Premier Phan Van Dong's visit in November--saying that China and Vietnam are "neighbors closely related like lips and teeth." In an unusual formulation, the statement promised continuing support no matter "what circumstances may yet arise in this war" and closed with the reminder that the Indochinese peoples "are by no means alone" in their struggle. While the statement was vague in portraying a U.S. threat to Chinese security, the unusual formulation regarding future Chinese action, taken in the context of a protest against action near the border, suggests sensitivity to U.S. pressures along the border that more directly impinge on the Chinese than other interdiction measures. In this respect the protest may be viewed as a warning and a deterrent to dissuade the United States from creating a situation that would seriously complicate Peking's tightrope walk between meeting its allies' needs and sustaining the improved Sino-U.S. relationship.**

**SPEECH AT STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE**

The chief Chinese delegate at the UN conference on the environment being held in Stockholm delivered a blistering attack on U.S. actions in Vietnam in the course of a diatribe against the two superpowers as the main culprits damaging the environment. In a major speech on 10 June, the Chinese declared

* On a previous occasion, Peking cited a 6 May DRV Foreign Ministry statement to delete a charge that the United States had proven to be worse than Hitlerite fascism. Normally Peking does not tamper with official DRV statements on the foreign ministry or government level.

** The March 1971 visit to Hanoi of a high-powered PRC delegation headed by Chou En-lai was designed both to deter the United States from expanding the operation then going on in southern Laos and to reassure the DRV of Chinese support. On the matter of reassurance the Chinese went far beyond what they have been willing to do in the recent phase of Vietnam developments. Apart from the impact of the well-publicized visit itself, Chou pledged that the Chinese would not flinch "even from the greatest national sacrifices" should the United States proceed to expand the war, and he invoked a Mao instruction declaring that failure to aid the Vietnamese would be "betrayal of the revolution."

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that the conference should not remain indifferent to such "atrocities" as the U.S. bombings and shellings, the use of chemical and poisonous gas, and the bombing of dikes "in an attempt to create a man-made flood catastrophe." The Chinese delegate called on the United States to withdraw its troops and to end the Vietnamization program and support for the Thieu regime. The Chinese had also used the UN Conference on Trade and Development in April to criticize U.S. policy in Vietnam and to denounce the superpowers, and it is likely that it was the opportunity to play to the third-world gallery again--rather than Vietnam developments as such--that led the Chinese to unleash their polemical volley at the Stockholm meeting.

MOSCOW REPORTS AIR STRIKES, ASSAILS CRITICS OF DETENTE POLICY

Moscow has been briefly reporting the continuing DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protests of U.S. bombings in the course of routine-level reportage of military action in both North and South Vietnam. The higher-level 10 June DRV Foreign Ministry statement was briefly summarized by TASS as a separate item that day, but there has been no supporting comment. TASS noted that the statement scored U.S. bombing near Hanoi and Haiphong but inexplicably did not mention the charge that B-52's bombed in Quang Binh Province. A shorter version of the report of the DRV statement was published in PRAVDA on the 11th. Moscow last officially protested U.S. air strikes in a 16 April TASS statement condemning the strikes at Haiphong and Hanoi that day.

On the 13th TASS reported that French Foreign Minister Schumann received the DRV delegate general in France who handed him a copy of the foreign ministry statement. The DRV representative reportedly pointed to the "gravity of the situation" and expressed satisfaction with the French Government's support for a negotiated settlement at the Paris conference. Presumably Hanoi representatives regularly deliver such statements to foreign governments, but available propaganda has not reported any such delivery of the 10 June statement to Soviet officials. VNA did report last month that during Xuan Thuy's meeting with Kosygin--when he stopped over in Moscow en route from Paris to Hanoi--the DRV ambassador had handed Kosygin a copy of Hanoi's 10 May government statement denouncing the U.S. mining of DRV ports. The TASS report of the meeting had said nothing about the delivery of the DRV statement.

Also on 13 June TASS briefly reported the PRC Foreign Ministry statement supporting the DRV, noting that it warned that the

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expansion of the bombing raids in North Vietnam "up to the areas situated in direct proximity to the Chinese-Vietnamese border" imperils the security of China and constitutes a "serious provocation." In the past Moscow has occasionally acknowledged official Chinese statements on Vietnam and other subjects, including the PRC Government statement on the U.S. mining of DRV ports--issued on 11 May, the same day as the USSR Government statement--and the 10 April PRC Foreign Ministry statement denouncing U.S. air strikes on the DRV.

DETENTE POLICY Moscow comment on President Nixon's visit has continued to defend the Soviet policy of coexistence and detente against criticism by unnamed parties and to insist that Soviet-U.S. agreements are not directed against any third powers. Thus, a 9 June PRAVDA article by Academician N. Inozemtsev, while noting that "the overwhelming majority of communist and workers parties" highly assessed the Soviet-U.S. talks, added that

attempts are being made--although, it is true, they are few in number--to replace common sense by unscrupulous speculation about some "conspiracy between the two superpowers" and to the effect that the Soviet-American agreements are allegedly detrimental to some third countries.

To document the claim that agreements with the United States were not reached at the expense of third countries, Inozemtsev recalled, among other things, that in the joint communique the Soviet side had stressed its solidarity with the Indochinese people's struggle and support for the DRV and PRG proposals for a political settlement.

In defense of a policy of "principle-mindedness" combined with "maximal flexibility," Inozemtsev invoked Lenin's dictum on the duty of a "really revolutionary party":

The task of a really revolutionary party is not to proclaim the impossibility of rejecting any compromise but to know how to insure loyalty to its principles, its class, and its revolutionary task through all compromises insofar as they are inevitable
(PRAVDA's emphasis)

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Earlier, a Mikhaylov International Review in the 4 June PRAVDA had more bluntly taken exception to critics of Soviet policy, bringing to mind the 26 May NEW TIMES article by Zagladin, who had seemed to be lecturing the DRV on the international duty of socialist states.* Mikhaylov declared that the enemies of international detente are not only some conservative Westerners but also "an extreme 'left' wing of opponents to the Moscow agreements." The latter, he said, while declaring themselves adherents to the ideas of proletarian internationalism, in fact try to press the theory that "any agreement is inadmissible while military conflicts exist and imperialist aggression continues." Mikhaylov pointed to the impossibility of attaining any "military solution" in either Indochina or the Middle East and asserted that recent international events confirm that only renunciation of force and "recognition of realities" are a precondition for agreements, citing the example of Germany.

At the same time, Mikhaylov spoke of the "immutable" nature of Soviet-Vietnamese solidarity, a theme echoed in other propaganda including the 8 June PRAVDA editorial article on the anniversary of the June 1969 Moscow conference of communist and workers parties. The editorial stressed that Soviet policy serves the cause of international security and supports the liberation struggle, and it declared that the Indochinese "always feel the hand of the Soviet Union their friend." The 10 June Soviet-Yugoslav communique on Tito's Moscow visit said that both sides affirm their unflinching support for the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian peoples, who are waging a "just struggle against U.S. aggression." The communique also called in standard fashion for a cessation of U.S. bombing, a withdrawal of U.S. troops, and respect for the right of the Indochinese peoples to decide their own destiny without outside interference.**

Routine reaffirmations of Soviet support and assistance to the Indochinese include some Mandarin-language commentaries pegged to the 6 June anniversary of the establishment of the PRG in

* The Zagladin article is discussed in the TRENDS of 1 June, pages 19-20.

** While common Soviet-Yugoslav positions on Indochina were stated in the communique, another passage noted that there had been a "mutually useful" exchange of opinions and consultations on "international problems" which would promote "the better understanding of each others' views and positions and successful Yugoslav-Soviet cooperation in the international arena."

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South Vietnam as well as the anniversary of the Moscow conference. They observed that during the Moscow talks with President Nixon, the Soviet side invariably emphasized this support and assistance. The commentaries also again took the Chinese to task for failing to join in "united action" and attacked PRC "slander" charging that the Soviet Union is "colluding" with the United States.

PODGORNYI Moscow and Hanoi media have not thus far mentioned
EN ROUTE TO DRV that Podgorny is en route to Hanoi. The Delhi
radio on 14 June briefly reported his stopover
in Calcutta that day. Later the same day, a Delhi broadcast cited
a Soviet Embassy spokesman as saying that Podgorny's departure
for Hanoi, scheduled after an hour's halt, had been postponed
until the next morning because of bad weather. Podgorny's mission
is presumably to report to the North Vietnamese on President Nixon's
visit.*

PRG COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING LAUDS OFFENSIVE, "UPRISINGS"

Liberation Radio reported on 11 June that the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, meeting from 6 to 8 June, had reviewed the current situation and set forth important tasks aimed at developing the leadership of the revolutionary administrations at all levels and at accelerating the offensive. The three-day meeting, chaired by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, was said to have been held on the occasion of the 6 June anniversary of the PRG. (The usual PRG/NFLSV ceremonial meeting to mark the anniversary was not held this year.)

The communique on the meeting reiterated the standard communist claims that recent "victories" have dealt "heavy blows" to Vietnamization, changed the balance of forces, and shaken the allied defenses; it added that the successes have also "effected a qualitative change in the political situation in favor of our people." Despite this conventional optimism, the possibility that questions have been raised as to the wisdom of the offensive was suggested when the communique defensively led off with an

* CPSU Secretary Katushev's 26-29 April visit to Hanoi was not publicized in Moscow and Hanoi media until the day of his departure for home, when TASS and VNA issued identical announcements. Katushev's trip came in the wake of Kissinger's visit to Moscow to prepare for the President's arrival. See the TRENDS of 3 May, page 17.

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endorsement of the Council's analysis of conditions in South Vietnam prior to the offensive. It stated: "The participants at the meeting unanimously asserted that the assessment of the situation by the last session which led to the high tide of offensive and uprisings on all battlefronts aimed at smashing the U.S. 'Vietnamization of the war' policy was very accurate." The previous Council of Ministers meeting had been held "early in January," according to a 28 January Liberation Radio announcement. The communique on that meeting, dated 22 January, claimed that there was a favorable shift in the balance of forces and called upon the South Vietnamese to develop their struggle to win "the greatest victories" in order to "doom" Vietnamization and "advance toward complete victory."*

In spelling out future tasks, the current communique, like the one last January, called for the development and strengthening of the "revolutionary administration" at all levels. This is necessary, according to the communique, so as to step up the offensive and "uprisings" and to record greater victories while building the "liberated zone," developing the political and armed forces, changing the balance of forces, upholding the initiative, "completely defeating" Vietnamization, and advancing toward "total victory." Citing concrete tasks in the local areas, the communique noted the need to safeguard order and security in liberated areas, to build combat villages to resist counter-attacks, to improve the people's livelihood, to boost production, and to contribute more material and human resources to the war.

The communique indicated that the PRG Council also "paid special attention" to implementing and developing "announced policies aimed at broadening the united national front against U.S. aggression and for national salvation." While the communique on the January Council meeting had not stressed this point, that meeting did adopt the PRG's 10-point policy toward members of the ARVN and their families, released on 25 January, which aimed at bringing about affiliation with the PRG of the widest possible range of individuals in South Vietnam. The current communique reaffirmed the PRG's adherence to the 10-point policy and to the proposal in the PRG's seven points for the formation of a provisional coalition government to organize free general elections.

* The January Council of Ministers meeting is discussed in the 2 February TRENDS, pages 20-23.

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FRONT MEDIA CRITICIZE COMMUNIST FAILURE TO PRESS OFFENSIVE

With communist military forces apparently stymied on many fronts in South Vietnam, recent Vietnamese communist propaganda has reflected dissatisfaction with the efforts of some elements in the offensive. For example, a 13 June Liberation Radio commentary routinely praising the role of the PLAF infantry in the offensive also suggested deficiencies in some infantry units: It warned that units which become dependent on fire support will "slacken their spirit of resolutely and intensively attacking the enemy," will "miss opportunities to annihilate the enemy," and will "fail to take full advantage of fire support." These errors, the radio said, will restrict victories and "adversely affect the protection, preservation, and improvement of our forces."

Unusually frank criticism of the actions of some cadres and party members in the conduct of the offensive was set forth in an article broadcast by Liberation Radio on 3 June and said to have been published in issue No. 2 of TAP CHI TIEN PHONG (VANGUARD MAGAZINE)--a journal of the People's Revolutionary Party, the communist party in South Vietnam.* The TIEN PHONG article pressed the view that now is the time to strike a "decisive" blow at the allies, and it harshly criticized those cadres and party members who lacked confidence. The article lectured sternly that "being hesitant, undecided, fearing enemy counterattacks, not daring to act boldly, and adopting a wait-and-see attitude under the pretext of making steady progress are gross errors in the present situation." These attitudes, the article declared, "restrict the great capabilities of the masses" and the "capabilities of the movement that must be developed by leaps and bounds in line with the great developments of the situation."

* The PRP was established in January 1962 and was given fairly frequent publicity in Vietnamese communist media in the 1964-65 period. Since 1966, however, references to the party have been extremely rare. The treatment of the PRP in communist media is reviewed in FBIS Special Report RS. 97 of 24 July 1969, "The PRG and the PRP in South Vietnam," pages 19-24, and in the FBIS SURVEY of 15 September 1969, pages 1-4. The publication TIEN PHONG has been mentioned occasionally in the media; articles from it were last known to have been broadcast in January and February 1970. These articles are discussed in the 12 February 1970 FBIS SURVEY, pages 10-14.

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The failure of cadres and party members in some areas to take offensive action was reflected in TIEN PHONG's admonition that the allies "will only be defeated when they have to cope with the combined strength of our entire armed forces and people's concerted, widespread, violent attacks in all three strategic areas." Noting that such concerted action will support the offensive, reduce difficulties, and "save our cadres and combatants' blood and bones," the journal sounded an emotional warning:

Failure to resolutely and daringly attack the enemy in order to coordinate action with the general movement and failure to spread out the enemy for annihilation at a time when the situation is very favorable for us is tantamount to relinquishing one's responsibility in fighting with one's comrades-in-arms against the enemy. Hesitation in taking action and failure to take advantage of the main-force units' victories to further develop the offensive position and to exert more pressure on the enemy in one's locality is tantamount to disregarding the blood and bones and efforts of our combatants who have made sacrifices and fought to create conditions to stage uprisings and overcome difficult situations in the localities.

Such attitudes, the article added, "are wrong and must be regarded as grave offenses against the revolution and the people."

In contrast to other Vietnamese communist propaganda which has praised the PLAF's destruction of allied forces and ignored its failure to take such objectives as An Loc and Kontum, the TIEN PHONG article demanded that "military spearheads at the provincial and district levels must be more resolute and daring," adding that "it is not enough to only annihilate the enemy's manpower. What we must now do is liberate many villages and areas."

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SALT AND DISARMAMENT

MOSCOW TREATS SALT ACCORDS WITH HIGH PRAISE, LITTLE DETAIL

Soviet comment following up the President's visit--by such senior commentators as PRAVDA's Mayevskiy and IZVESTIYA's Matveyev and in the V. Mikhaylov and Inozemtsev articles in PRAVDA (discussed in the Indochina section of this TRENDS)--continues to treat the strategic arm accords in highly favorable though very general terms, in keeping with the themes keynoted in the PRAVDA editorials of 29 and 31 May.

An atypical commentary, by N. Arkadyev in the 2 June NEW TIMES (No. 23), was notable for the detail with which it discussed the ABM treaty and the interim agreement. In a rare mention in Soviet media of measures for monitoring the accords, Arkadyev pointed out that "to insure confidence" the treaty will be observed, "both sides will use the technical control facilities at their disposal in a manner corresponding to the universally recognized principles of international law." He said that both the USSR and the United States "have such national facilities" and have agreed "not to hinder national technical control facilities or to employ deliberate means of concealment," but he predictably stopped short of acknowledging that such "facilities" would include spy satellites.

Although Moscow promptly publicized Secretary Laird's 27 May order to halt construction of the ABM system in Montana and suspend work on other ABM bases, it was not until 6 June that TASS reported that the USSR Council of Ministers had ordered appropriate USSR ministries to "observe the obligations under the treaty and the interim agreement from the day of their signing."

Moscow media have sustained their silence on the protocol to the interim agreement outlining the number of ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles allowed on the two sides. Reporting the submission of the treaty and the interim agreement to Congress by the President on the 13th, TASS made no mention of the accompanying documents, including the texts of the "Agreed Interpretations" and "Unilateral Statements." Moscow has also been circumspect in reporting the comments by Administration officials on possible savings in defense expenditures flowing from the arms accords. TASS, for example, totally ignored Secretary Laird's testimony to the Congressional appropriations committees on the 5th and 6th, while selectively citing Admiral Moorer's testimony. However, the Defense Department's request for funds for the Trident submarine program and the B-1 strategic bomber have been discussed in routine-level Soviet commentaries.

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USSR - YUGOSLAVIA

MOSCOW PORTRAYS TITO VISIT AS EVIDENCE OF "SOCIALIST UNITY"

Yugoslav President Tito's 5-10 June visit to the Soviet Union, his first since the intervention in Czechoslovakia,* carried forward the mutual effort to further improve relations and to relegate irreconcilable differences to the background in the interests of economic cooperation and other pragmatic considerations. Although both sides generally hewed to long-standing positions and no new agreements were announced, the Yugoslavs seem to have scored some ideological points: The final communique contains no reference to "socialist internationalism" or to a joint ideological struggle against imperialism as a basis for bilateral relations, dropping elements present in the joint statement issued at the close of Brezhnev's September 1971 visit to Yugoslavia. In another notable difference, a reference in the communique to renunciation of the use of force as an agreed principle of international relations introduces an element that was not present in the 1971 Belgrade statement.

From Yugoslavia's vantage point, Tito in effect underscored the pragmatic factor in the rapprochement in remarks on the 10th, an airport ceremony on his return to Belgrade, when he hailed the "considerable" progress "especially in economic cooperation" that resulted from the talks. The thrust of Moscow's ample publicity for the visit was reflected in followup comment in PRAVDA which played up the Yugoslav President's trip as another success for the Brezhnev leadership's diplomacy and as testimony to the growth of "socialist unity"--by implication crediting the leadership with having worked out a modus vivendi with the maverick Yugoslavs and having edged them toward the Soviet bloc.

* Tito last visited Moscow four months before the Warsaw Five moved into Czechoslovakia, during a period of blatant Soviet bloc pressures on the Czechoslovaks. During a brief "friendly visit" en route home from Iran, Tito's talks with the Soviet leadership on 28-29 April 1968 produced no communique; TANJUG noted cryptically that "viewpoints" on party relations were exchanged.

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On the eve of Tito's visit, an article in IZVESTIYA by the paper's foreign policy observer A. Bovin, citing recent increased Soviet-Yugoslav contacts, had seemed to betray Moscow's maximum hopes for the visit--or at least to anticipate the kind of propaganda mileage Moscow would seek to draw from it--in observing that "there are great reserves here for moving ahead" on ideological problems, despite some "difficulties" in approach in socialist theory and practice. Noting that on "a majority" of international questions Soviet and Yugoslav positions concur or are extremely close, Bovin discerned "a good basis for coordinating the foreign-political efforts of both states in the struggle for common goals."

JOINT COMMUNIQUE An indication that the deep-seated differences effectively blocked any hopes Moscow may have entertained on the score of "coordination" was conveyed in Radio Belgrade's report, on 8 June, that "certain difficulties on some questions" were complicating the drafting of the final communique. The document that emerged, like the 1971 Belgrade joint statement,* is a patchwork exercise in semantics that allows for varying interpretations. As carried by TASS and TANJUG on the 10th, it says that "the two sides considered the exchange of opinions and consultations" on bilateral and international problems to have been "mutually useful" and conducive to better understanding of each other's views and positions as well as to successful "cooperation" in the international arena. Formulas were found that enabled the two sides to state shared positions, and mask differences in approach, on such questions as Indochina,** the Middle East, a

* The 1971 visit produced both a communique, essentially confined to reporting who was present and defining the topics of the talks, and a joint statement outlining agreed principles of conduct. The current communique, encompassing both the protocol and substantive elements, is thus comparable to the 1971 joint statement on points of substance. It is an anomaly of the successive visits that a communique is the sole document resulting from Tito's "official, friendly" visit to Moscow, where what amounted to an official landmark joint statement emerged from Brezhnev's "unofficial" visit to Belgrade.

** See the Indochina section of this TRENDS.

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a world conference on disarmament, and the movement toward detente in Europe. On the policy of nonalignment, the USSR, as in 1971, expressed unilaterally its support for "the anti-imperialist trend in the policy of the nonaligned countries."

On the question of economic cooperation, the two sides registered confidence that previously drafted measures "for long-term economic cooperation would foster a considerable expansion of economic ties" but did not project specific economic accords.

Complying with what would seem to have been the minimal Yugoslav demands on the matter of the basis for mutual relations, the document says the two sides "noted" the "viability" of the principles of the 1955 Belgrade declaration on Soviet-Yugoslav state relations and the 1956 Moscow declaration that carried forward the post-Stalin rapprochement by defining the basis for relations between the parties. The two sides, it says, "stressed the great importance of the 1971 joint Soviet-Yugoslav statement"--the document which in effect diluted the principles expressed in the earlier ones. In the vein of the 1971 Belgrade statement, the communique takes a tortuous line on party relations: "The CPSU and the LCY, guided by the teaching of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and creatively applying it in accordance with the distinctive features of their countries, will continue to act in the spirit of internationalist traditions, friendship and mutual respect, and equality for the beneficial and comprehensive exchange of opinions and experience, for improving mutual understanding and for the further expanding of cooperation."

The communique divests the definition of state relations of a touchy, contentious element in making no mention of "socialist internationalism," where the 1971 joint statement had stipulated that state-level cooperation was based on, among other things, "loyalty to the principles of socialist internationalism" and "the struggle against imperialism." The 1971 statement had also discoursed on imperialism's aspirations to "dominate the peoples." The current communique does not cite the "struggle against imperialism" as a basis for bilateral relations, and it comes closest to the 1971 treatment of imperialism in an innocuous assertion of mutual desires to cooperate with peoples who are "fighting against imperialism and neocolonialism."

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The new reference in the communique to renunciation of the use of force appears in the following passage: "The two sides paid special attention to the need for continuing an active struggle for consistent realization in international relations of the principle of peaceful coexistence of states, independent of social systems; for renouncing the use of force or threat of force; and for a peaceful and constructive solution of questions under dispute." The reference to nonuse of force, juxtaposed to peaceful coexistence, could be construed from the Soviet vantage point as applying only to relations between communist and noncommunist countries. But in the context of Yugoslavia's complaints about the interventionist "Brezhnev doctrine" on relations between communist countries, its appearance in a joint Soviet-Yugoslav document on principles of "international relations" could be taken as something of a victory for the Yugoslavs. Moscow's sensitivity about publicizing the nonuse-of-force principle in the context of relations with communist states had been reflected in Soviet media's treatment of Brezhnev's 20 March trade union congress speech, broadcast live over Moscow radio, in which the Soviet leader disclosed that the USSR had presented proposals to the Chinese including one on "renunciation of force." That proposal was omitted in the textual versions subsequently carried by TASS and in the Soviet press--tampering which suggested that Moscow may have had second thoughts about diluting its interventionist doctrine by publicly undertaking not to use force against a wayward communist state.

The statement of shared positions on principles governing approaches to international relations came immediately following a lengthy discourse--the longest on any single subject apart from bilateral relations--on the "positive" developments in Europe. Included in this discourse is a passage observing that the tendency toward "normalization of the situation in Europe" has found expression in a deepening of mutual understanding among European states, with full respect for principles of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference "and on the basis of renouncing the threat of force or use of force in any form whatsoever." This and other passages on European developments

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lead up to a statement of agreement that all necessary conditions are present for the "urgent" preparation of an all-European conference on security and cooperation.*

PRAVDA'S APPRAISAL Under the rubric "Positive Advances," Vishnevskiy in PRAVDA's international review on the 11th portrayed Tito's visit as a fruition of the Brezhnev leadership's foreign policy course staked out at the 24th CPSU Congress and as "convincing evidence" of "close cooperation" and "the further growth of the socialist countries' unity." A more comprehensive assessment of the visit in an editorial in PRAVDA the next day similarly depicted the talks as part of the CPSU's "consistent and purposeful" efforts "to strengthen the forces of socialism." The editorial added: "President Tito's visit has become an event of great importance for the further developing and strengthening of cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia and between the CPSU and the League." In this context, PRAVDA noted that the two sides agreed "to an extension of contacts between the leaders of the two parties, states, and governments."

In the wake of President Nixon's visit, PRAVDA seemed to suggest that the talks with Tito were the other side of the coin of Moscow's policy combining detente with the West with fealty to socialist internationalism and the strengthening of communist ranks. The editorial quoted Brezhnev for the view that "life itself shows that the policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries which is directed at a relaxation of international tension and the safeguarding of the people's security is correct and is enjoying even greater support."

* Sensitivity over the implications of the Brezhnev doctrine in connection with the proposed European conference was strongly expressed by the Netherlands in the 16 May joint communique raising PRC-Netherlands relations to the ambassadorial level. In the communique the Dutch explicitly interpreted the principles of peaceful coexistence as implying noninterference in internal affairs not only between countries of different systems but "equally between countries belonging to an alliance and having identical or similar sociopolitical systems." This position, which Peking said it "appreciates," avoids the ambiguity blurring the formulation in the Soviet-Yugoslav communique. It had been in the context of improving Sino-Yugoslav relations that Peking two years ago adopted the position--unorthodox according to Soviet doctrine--that the principles of peaceful coexistence should apply whether countries have the same or different political systems.

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TITO'S ASSESSMENT In a statement broadcast by Belgrade Radio on his arrival at Belgrade airport on the 10th, Tito spoke of his cordial reception in the Soviet Union and said that his talks with the Soviet leaders had been held in an atmosphere of "friendship, frankness, and mutual understanding." He expressed satisfaction at the outcome of the talks, stressing that they had taken place on "the well-known principles of equality and mutual respect." The communique had similarly characterized the talks as "cordial, frank, and friendly" and specified "a spirit of mutual respect and equality." On the score of the economic cooperation that was evidently at the forefront of Yugoslav concern, Tito observed that "results in economic cooperation are particularly visible" from the talks and added that "many unexploited opportunities" exist in that area.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

BLOC RELATIONS CHIEF RUSAKOV BECOMES ASSISTANT TO BREZHNEV

PRAVDA on 7 June identified K. V. Rusakov as "assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee." His previous title as head of the Central Committee's bloc relations section was not mentioned by PRAVDA, but the reference to him was in connection with his participation in the talks with Tito, indicating that he remains in the East European party relations field. Another Brezhnev assistant for foreign affairs, A. M. Aleksandrov, apparently retains his post: He participated in Brezhnev's talks with President Nixon on 23 and 24 May and was identified as Brezhnev's assistant on both occasions.

Rusakov was last identified as a Central Committee section head on 18 March. He may have assumed his new post by 29 May, since he was shown standing with another Brezhnev assistant, G. E. Tsukanov, in PRAVDA's 30 May photo of the signing of the U.S.-USSR "Basic Principles" document. As deputy minister and minister of fisheries in the 1940's and 1950's and member of the USSR Council of Ministers consumer goods bureau in 1953-55, Rusakov had long worked under then deputy premier and light industry supervisor Kosygin. In the late 1950's he went into diplomatic work and then into the Central Committee apparatus, succeeding Andropov as head of the bloc relations section in March 1968.

LEADERSHIP CHANGES IN UKRAINE REFLECT DISCORD, RIVALRIES

The 8-9 June Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session transferred Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Lyashko to the post of premier, replacing Shcherbitskiy who was promoted to first secretary on 26 May. While the leaders of the Dnepropetrovsk and Donetsk factions have thus occupied the first and second ranking positions in the Ukraine, respectively, the No. 3 post vacated by Lyashko remains open, suggesting that there may be disagreement over the distribution of the spoils in the wake of Shelest's removal.

In his speech at the session Shcherbitskiy said that in regard to the election of a successor to Lyashko he will "introduce the appropriate motion at the next session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet" and that in the interim First Deputy Chairman S. Ye. Stetsenko "will act as chairman" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 10 June).

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The postponement in the selection of Lyashko's successor and delay in naming him premier--the post was vacant for over two weeks--appear to reflect the unexpectedness of Shelest's 19 May transfer to Moscow and the difficulty in resolving the competing demands of rival Ukrainian factions. Despite Shcherbitskiy's praise of Lyashko as "an experienced, principled, energetic leader" in his speech nominating him for premier, relations between the two men may be strained. Shcherbitskiy's Dnepropetrovsk faction at present has two votes (Shcherbitskiy's and Dnepropetrovsk First Secretary Vatchenko's) in the eight-man Ukrainian Politburo, while Lyashko's Donetsk faction has three (Lyashko's, Central Committee Secretary Titarenko's, and Donetsk First Secretary Degtyarev's); their respective proteges, Vatchenko and Titarenko, are prime candidates for advancement. Another sign of contention may be the practice, begun at the Supreme Soviet session, of listing Politburo members alphabetically rather than by rank, as had been the case in the past.

The Supreme Soviet session's other main action was the naming of Kharkov First Secretary Vashchenko to the post of first deputy premier for industry, replacing another Kharkovite Sobol who was retired in April. Ironically, the session adopted a decree censuring the Kharkov executive committee for local shortcomings in industry, especially insufficient production of consumer goods. The Ukrainian Politburo's 1971 exposure and condemnation of Kharkov's neglect of consumer goods may have been one of the reasons for Sobol's early retirement. Vashchenko's fortunes may have been aided by the fact that at the Ukrainian party congress in 1971 he joined Vatchenko in obliquely criticizing Shelest for laxity in enforcing ideological discipline.

ARRESTED TOURIST IMPLICATES FIVE UKRAINIAN DISSIDENTS

At a 2 June press conference in Kiev Belgian citizen Jaroslav Dobosh, arrested by the KGB for anti-Soviet activity in January, confessed to crimes and implicated five Ukrainian citizens as his accomplices. After apparently providing all the evidence desired by the KGB, Dobosh was released and expelled from the USSR. The conference was extensively reported in Ukrainian media.

Dobosh confessed that he had been sent to the Ukraine on 29 December by a Ukrainian emigre organization to contact five dissident Ukrainians in Kiev and Lvov and receive information and documents from them in exchange for cash. After completing his mission, he left Lvov on 4 January but was arrested at the Czechoslovak

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border allegedly with underground documents in his possession, including a manuscript by Svyatoslav Karavanskiy. On 12-13 January the KGB carried out a series of arrests of Ukrainian dissidents and on 15 January publicly announced Dobosh's arrest. On 21 January LITERATURNA UKRAINA carried a denunciation of Karavanskiy as a Nazi collaborator and convicted spy and foreign agent.

Dobosh's 2 June statement listed only five dissidents as collaborators--Ivan Svitlichnyy, Zinoviya Franko, Anna Kotsurova, Leonid Seleznenko and Stefaniya Hulyk--but failed to mention Yevhen Sverstyuk and Vyacheslav Chornovil, whom the KGB had earlier publicly accused of collaborating with him. In all, at least 20 were arrested in January directly or indirectly in connection with the Dobosh affair. Emigre and Western press sources have listed the names of 12 in Kiev (Svitlichnyy, Sverstyuk, Franko, Chornovil, Seleznenko, Vasyl Stus, Oleksandr Sergiyenko, Mykola Shumuk, Zinoviy Antonyuk, Grigoriy Kochur, M. Plachtunyk, and V. Minyailo), six in Lvov (Hulyk, Mykhailo Osadchiy, Ivan Hel, Grigoriy Chubay, Stefaniya Shabatura, and Irina Stasiv), and two in Ivano-Frankovsk (Ivan Dzyuba and Rev. Vasyl Romanyuk). The same sources indicated that Dzyuba, Chubay and five of those arrested in Kiev were later released. On 11 February the KGB announced that Svitlichnyy, Chornovil, Sverstyuk, and unnamed others had been brought to "criminal responsibility" in connection with Dobosh's arrest. On 2 March RADYANSKA UKRAINA published a letter from Franko confessing to have passed information to Dobosh; she repeated her confession in a 25 April Ukrainian broadcast to Europe in an effort to refute allegations that she had not authored the letter herself. On 3 March LITERATURNA UKRAINA reported the expulsion of Dzyuba from the Ukrainian writers union. Among those implicated by Dobosh, Anna Kotsurova alone had not previously been reported as under arrest.

AGRICULTURE MINISTRY UNDER PRESSURE TO REFORM

Recent changes in the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, traditionally a bulwark of bureaucratic conservatism, suggest a weakening of resistance to agricultural innovation. Two new deputy ministers of agriculture have been identified since mid-May, and both new appointees are on record directly or indirectly in favor of agricultural reforms, including the controversial link system of farm labor organization. At the same time, the central agricultural bureaucracy has been undergoing a series of organizational changes designed to facilitate specialization and improve administration.

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On 19 May RURAL LIFE identified L. I. Khitrin, former Belorussian deputy premier in charge of agriculture, as the new first deputy minister of agriculture.* This change in the agricultural ministry was followed by the identification of former Central Committee agriculture section deputy head I. N. Kuznetsov as a new deputy minister of agriculture (SOVIET KIRGIZIA, 1 June). Both new appointees have been receptive to agricultural innovation. Their appointments notably coincided with a flurry of articles in the central press favoring the introduction of unregulated mechanized links, including IZVESTIYA's 19 April challenge to the agriculture ministry to take a definite stand on the issue.**

Khitrin presumably favors the mechanized links, since this and other agricultural innovations were officially approved and widely applied in Belorussia during his tenure there as deputy premier. Kuznetsov's record is more outspoken in support of innovation. In a 19 January 1972 PRAVDA article he complained that introduction of agricultural innovation was proceeding "extremely slowly" and declared it a "most important duty of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and its local organs to actively introduce into production achievements of science" and to "act as the main organizers of technical progress." In an April PARTY LIFE article Kuznetsov praised mechanized brigades and links using the unregulated wage system modelled after V. Ya. Pervitskiy's link. Noting that thousands of brigades and links in the Kuban and Ukraine had followed Pervitskiy's example, he declared that "this progressive form has a great future."

Kuznetsov had risen from deputy director of the Omsk Agriculture Institute, which was high in Khrushchev's favor, to head a subdivision of the Central Committee agriculture section in the early 1960's. He was promoted to deputy head of the section in spring 1971 and became one of its most active spokesmen, although the April 1972 article was his first mention of links.

Further support for agricultural innovation appeared in a 5 June PRAVDA editorial which praised the creation of agricultural associations, agroindustrial complexes, trusts, sovkhoz ministries, and other changes in agricultural administration in

* For background see the TRENDS of 1 June, pages 39-42.

** For background, see TRENDS of 3 May, page 43.

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recent years. Some organizational changes were begun in early 1972 in order to improve administration of the new specialized farms and livestock complexes created as a result of the spring 1971 Politburo decisions. In February an RSFSR Ministry for Sovkhozes was created to take over management of the new sovkhov trusts, and first deputy agriculture minister I. P. Volovchenko was appointed minister (PRAVDA, 21 March). The Azerbaydzhanl paper VYSHKA on 3 March announced the formation of a USSR Main Administration for Production of Livestock Products on an Industrial Basis (Glavzhivprom) to administer new livestock complexes; the new administration was patterned after the All-Union Administration for the Poultry Industry (Ptitseprom), created in 1964 and singled out for special praise in PRAVDA's 5 June editorial. VYSHKA also reported on 3 March the establishment of a new main administration in the Agricultural Equipment Association for the purpose of aiding construction of the new livestock complexes. And Deputy Agriculture Minister A. V. Kardapoltsev was appointed deputy chairman of the Agricultural Equipment Association, a post in which he was first identified in the 31 March TRUD.

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PRC AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

PEKING CULTIVATES BETTER RELATIONS, DOWNPLAYS INSURGENCIES

In keeping with its expanding effort to develop political and economic relations with Southeast Asian governments while downplaying its involvement with insurgent movements, Peking's muted observance of the anniversary of Mao's 20 May 1970 statement on world revolution was not accompanied this year--as it had been during the major celebration of the occasion last year--by a review of Maoist armed struggles in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. With the change in foreign policy priorities and the fading of the Maoist evangelism that put a premium on armed insurgency in the late 1960's, Peking has significantly reduced its propaganda support for insurrectionary movements while publicizing growing official and unofficial contacts with the target countries. The declining propaganda support for the insurgents consists mainly of broadcasts by PRC-based clandestine transmitters and selective replaying of these broadcasts in Peking media.*

Peking has made the largest strides toward normalizing bilateral relations with Burma, whose prime minister visited the PRC last year and whose aid relations with Peking have recently been advertised in PRC media (see discussion below). There have also been signs of cordiality in Chinese contacts with delegations from Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, though these have been restricted to the unofficial level. Most recently, NCNA on 30 May reported that Chinese medical figures had feted a group of Malaysian physicians, and on 9 May PRC Agriculture Minister Sha Fang held a "friendly conversation" with a group of Philippine politicians. At the same time, Peking's propaganda support for communist-led insurgencies in these countries has been sanitized to remove direct criticism of the governments involved and to avoid other sensitive issues. Thus, NCNA on 4 May marked the 42d anniversary of the founding of the Malayan CP by reporting a 29 April editorial on the occasion broadcast by the "Voice of the Malayan Revolution," but unlike last year the NCNA account deleted attacks on the Razak and Lee

* There are three clandestine stations: The Thai CP's "Voice of the People of Thailand," the "Voice of the People of Burma" broadcasting in the name of the Burmese communists, and the "Voice of the Malayan Revolution" beamed to Malaysia and Singapore.

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"cliques." Also omitted was last year's charge that "Malay chauvinism" was causing persecution of Chinese and other minorities, a sensitive subject which Peking has chosen to treat gingerly. The downgrading of the cult of Maoism was subtly reflected in NCNA's formulation referring to "Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought"--a form of punctuation reverting to past usage before the cultural revolution elevated Mao Thought to a level equivalent to Marxism-Leninism.*

As in the case of Malaysia and Singapore, Peking's pickups of infrequent statements of the Maoist Philippines CP have contained no direct attacks on the Marcos government. In the case of Indonesia, however, Peking has aired direct condemnation of the Suharto regime in the name of the Indonesian communists (PKI) while reducing its publicity for the Peking-based PKI delegation. NCNA made no mention of delegation head Adjitorop as present at the 6 June PRG anniversary reception in Peking, an event which he attended last year, but NCNA's 23 May account of a PKI statement on the party's 52d anniversary included denunciations of the "bloody suppressions" and "political swindles" of the "Suharto fascist military clique."

PEKING PLAYS UP IMPROVED OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH BURMA

Peking's warm reception for the "friendly" visit of a Burmese Government economic delegation from 15 May to 7 June underscored its continuing efforts, in the months following Burmese Prime Minister Ne Win's 6-12 August 1971 visit to the PRC,** to improve official relations with Burma. The hospitality accorded the economic delegation was markedly more cordial than that granted Ne Win nine months ago or a Burmese trade delegation in November. While Peking remains identified with the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) by the continuing operation of the clandestine "Voice of the People of Burma" (VOPB), a radio propagating a Maoist line of armed struggle against the Rangoon regime, support for the BCP in PRC media has become virtually nonexistent.

* At the peak of the Mao cult during the cultural revolution, Peking began using the formulation "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought," a change of punctuation serving to put Mao on the same level as the two masters of communist ideology. That formulation is still standard usage by Peking in the Chinese domestic context.

** Peking's treatment of the August 1971 visit of Ne Win is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 August 1971, pages 23-26.

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Chinese media carried no commentaries on Sino-Burmese relations during the Burmese economic delegation's visit, but ample reportage covered the activities of the delegation. The tone was set when the visitors, led by Minister for Planning and Finance U Lwin, were welcomed at the Peking airport on 17 May by a Chinese delegation headed by Fang I, the minister in charge of Chinese foreign aid. NCNA reported that the national flags of Burma and China fluttered at the airport and that welcoming crowds shouted slogans hailing Sino-Burmese friendship. Only the national flags had greeted Ne Win in August; there were no welcoming crowds shouting slogans. And neither flags nor crowds greeted the November visit of a Burmese trade delegation.

Speaking as the host at an 18 May banquet "permeated with an atmosphere of friendship between the people of China and Burma," Fang I suggested that the Chinese considered Ne Win's visit last August as a turning point in Sino-Burmese relations. He remarked that since Ne Win's visit "the relations between our two countries have experienced a new development." Noting that bilateral economic and technical cooperation "began over 10 years ago," Fang said the current economic delegation's visit "will certainly promote the friendship between the two peoples and the economic and technical cooperation between the two countries." In contrast, during the Ne Win visit neither side referred to economic aid relations, and Fang I, although present on protocol occasions, did not take part in the talks between the Ne Win delegation and Chou En-lai and Li Hsien-nien. Expressions of Sino-Burmese friendship and praise for growing economic cooperation pervaded Peking's coverage of the Burmese delegation's three-week stay in China. At a farewell banquet hosted by U Lwin on the 26th both he and Fang I, according to the NCNA report, expressed the hope that "the friendship between the people of China and Burma and the relations of economic and technical cooperation between the two countries would grow continuously."

BILATERAL RELATIONS Since Ne Win's August 1971 visit Peking has publicized a number of bilateral contacts while virtually ignoring the BCP. Thus, Peking reported that the Chinese ambassador to Burma gave a PRC National Day reception "in a friendly atmosphere" on 1 October 1971; on 8 October NCNA reported the renegotiation of the terms of a 1961 agreement on economic and technical cooperation; on 8 November it reported the receipt of a congratulatory message on the PRC's seating in the United Nations; and in November it covered the visit to the Canton trade fair and to Peking of a Burmese Government trade delegation and the signing on 19 November

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of a trade agreement and a commodity loan agreement between Burma and the PRC. In contrast to coverage of the recent visit, Peking's reportage on the November trade delegation's stay in China consisted of a few brief items on the delegation's principal activities without atmospherics or reports of banquets or speeches.

Peking's observance of the 24th anniversary of Burmese independence on 3 January this year reflected the improved atmosphere surrounding bilateral relations. A Chou En-lai message of congratulations to Ne Win expressed the hope that "friendly relations and cooperation between China and Burma" would "develop continuously," and Li Hsien-nien headed a Chinese delegation attending an independence day reception given in Peking by the Burmese ambassador. According to NCNA, toasts offered at the reception acknowledged "the new development of the relations between Burma and China brought about by the concerted efforts of the two governments and two peoples in recent years,* and wished the friendship between the two peoples and the relations between the two countries constant development." Last year Peking media did not report a high-level Chinese congratulatory message to the Burmese; a lower-level delegation--headed by Kuo Mo-jo--attended the 3 January 1971 Burmese ambassador's reception in Peking; and the toasts then expressed a more subdued hope that bilateral friendship "would be further developed."

Also in January this year, Peking reported Chou En-lai's receipt of a message from Ne Win "expressing sincere condolences" on the death of former Foreign Minister Chen I.

PRC SUPPORT While playing up improved bilateral relations, Peking
FOR BCP media have virtually ceased their support of the
 BCP in the past two years and particularly since
Ne Win's August 1971 visit. For example, after giving extensive
commentary observance in 1970 to the 28 March anniversary of the
launching of the Burmese communist insurgency, Peking media
were silent on that occasion in both 1971 and 1972. The last
Peking-originated commentary on the BCP's exploits was in
September 1970. Peking did not acknowledge a 30 October 1971
BCP Central Committee congratulatory message to the CCP Central
Committee on the PRC's seating in the United Nations--although
it disseminated a message from the Burmese foreign minister.
In fact, Chinese media have publicized only four BCP messages
in the past two years: on the 3 March 1971 PRC satellite
launching, on the 50th anniversary of the CCP, and on 19 January

* Chou En-lai at his 6 August banquet for Ne Win had credited the Chinese Government--but not the Burmese--with "consistently pursuing a friendly and good-neighbor policy." Chou was restrained in his assessment of Sino-Burmese relations at that point and limited in his praise for Burmese policies.

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and 8 April of this year expressing condolences on the deaths of Chen I and Hsieh Fu-chih. The January message contained no reference to the situation in Burma and the April one did so only in noting that Hsieh's death represented a great loss to China and "also to the oppressed peoples of Burma and other countries in the world."

In what may also reflect a similar downgrading of Chinese support for the BCP, Peking has not since 1 October 1971--at PRC National Day observances--acknowledged the presence in Peking of Thakin Ba Thein Tin, identified as leader of the resident BCP delegation in Peking and vice chairman of the BCP Central Committee. Ba Thein Tin was not reported to have been present this year at the May Day celebrations in Peking or at the 6 June PRG ambassador's reception in Peking--events which he was reported by Chinese media to have attended in 1971.

VOPB BROADCASTS The voice of the People of Burma--which, unlike other PRC-based clandestine radios, has never been acknowledged by Peking--has throughout this period sustained unremitting hostility toward the Ne Win government and propaganda support for the PRC on various foreign policy issues. In response to the 20 April Burmese Government announcement of a top-echelon reorganization, which among other things upgraded Vice Premier San Yu by appointing him concurrently defense minister, the VOPB expanded its criticism of the "Ne Win military clique" to encompass the "reactionary Ne Win-San Yu military clique." As its standard fare, the VOPB carries frequent combat reports of victories of the insurgent army led by the BCP, commentaries denouncing government policies, and lessons in Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung Thought. Contending that governmental reorganizations will not transform the Ne Win regime, a VOPB commentary on 23 April argued that the only alternative "is to seize power and win the war, carry on the people's democratic armed revolution, and fight until the Ne Win military government is overthrown. There is no other way."

The VOPB's line on international issues offers support for Chinese policy. Thus, a 20 January VOPB commentary called the Burmese Government's recognition of "East Pakistan as a separate country under the name of Bangladesh" an "extremely reactionary act" indicating that the Ne Win government "openly supports the Soviet social imperialists' plans for imperialism, economic monopoly, and encirclement and blockade of the People's Republic of China." In a similar vein a 14 May commentary called for resolute opposition to "the Soviet social imperialist military demon" and its "collusion" with the United States in an effort "to divide the world."

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CHINA

HUNAN AGRICULTURAL REPORT DETAILS POLICIES, PROBLEMS

A report issued by a Hunan provincial symposium on learning from Tachai, broadcast on 8 June by the Changsha radio, provided a detailed account of the progress being made in dismantling agricultural policies advocated during the cultural revolution. The report noted the principal areas of change, in policies affecting crop diversification and peasant remuneration, and admitted that in some areas "the struggle between the two roads is still very sharp."

The report painted a picture of overall progress for the province, with grain yields up 10 percent and peasant income up 12 percent, thanks to "a certain extent" of change away from a one-crop economy. But "everywhere there are some backward units" where the implementation of current policies is lagging, and the report stated that yields are still generally low, diversification efforts are being implemented too slowly, and "little contribution is made to the state."

To overcome resistance to the return to more moderate policies, the symposium report offered the theoretical justification that the current stage of people's communes as "collective economic organizations" must persist "for a very long historical period." Thus cadres and peasants alike should not fear another sharp turn toward hasty communization, and assurances were given that private plots and remuneration according to labor will continue. Without even a bow to the usual requirement that workpoints not be put back in command, the report stated that remuneration may take "various forms" so long as distribution is according to labor, is convenient and supported by the masses, and obeys the vague injunction to "persist in the socialist road." Without explanation, the report declared that the methods now in effect in the various localities "are practical and should be even further implemented."

Implicitly placing the blame for past errors on Lin Piao, the report blamed "swindlers" for hurting production by "negating objective laws." While noting rightist errors such as "production first," the report took aim primarily at those who "preached that 'politics can squeeze out everything else'" and who neglected

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science in favor of politics. The symposium called for bringing back former cadres into their old positions, taking special note that former agricultural technicians "should as far as possible return to their brigades and production teams."

The themes sounded in the Hunan report have also been advanced, though in less detail, in Peking media. A 2 June Peking broadcast emphasized the primacy of the production team in ownership, part of the general policy of remuneration for achievement. Production brigade-run enterprises were praised for reducing manpower borrowing from the teams to a minimum. Also, any manpower borrowed was compensated "according to the production teams' system of recording workpoints" and the individuals received credit. As a result the "brigades, teams, and the commune members were all happy." Plans of larger units were also said to depend on the approval of teams. A county party committee was praised for its attention to "the production teams' opinions and requirements," after it abandoned plans for a large water project which would have taken team manpower and affected production. Marking a sharp departure from past practice, Peking applauded the decision that "the plan for further big projects be shelved."

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TOPIC IN BRIEF

ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN AIR INCIDENT

Moscow media carried a prompt, terse acknowledgment--citing only Cairo's version--of the 13 June clash between Israeli and Egyptian aircraft over the sea north of Sinai. The brief Soviet report, carried by TASS and broadcast by Radio Moscow in Arabic on the 13th and domestically on the 14th, stated that "16 Israeli aircraft violated Egyptian airspace this afternoon in the Ras al-Barr area north of the Suez Canal." It added: "The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY reported that two Israeli Mirage aircraft were shot down during the air battles and that two Egyptian aircraft were damaged." In the pattern of Moscow's treatment of the clashes involving Israeli and Egyptian aircraft on 11 and 17-18 September last year, the report predictably ignored Israel's claims that two MIG-21's were shot down, its denial of Cairo's claim that two Israeli aircraft were shot down, and its insistence that all the Israeli planes returned safely to base.

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