

24 MAY 1972

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

EARLY REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S USSR VISIT:

Soviet treatment of the visit - page 1

East European comment - page 6

Hanoi's indirect polemics - page 10

Peking's behavior - page 26

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24 MAY 1972

(VOL. XXIII, NO. 21)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

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FBI'S TRENDS
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 15 - 21 MAY 1972

<u>Moscow (2914 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1290 items)</u>		
Soviet Pioneers 50th Anniversary	(--)	9%	Domestic Issues	(28%)	39%
CPSU Central Committee Plenum	(--)	6%	Indochina	(45%)	26%
Indochina	(15%)	6%	[Strikes on DRV & Mining of Ports	(25%)	12%]
[Strikes on DRV & Mining of Ports	(12%)	3%]	[2d Anniversary of Mao Statement on Cambodian Revolution	(--)	4%]
FRG Ratification of Treaties	(2%)	4%	[Sihanouk North China Tour	(7%)	3%]
Grechko in Egypt	(--)	3%	[Ho Chi Minh Birthday	(--)	2%]
Nixon USSR Visit	(--)	2%	Somali President in PRC	(3%)	10%
China	(2%)	2%	Okinawa Reversion	(0.1%)	5%
			PRC-Netherlands Diplomatic Relations	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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U. S. - SOVIET SUMMIT

MOSCOW UNDERSCORES "BUSINESSLIKE, REALISTIC" NATURE OF TALKS

Extensive Soviet coverage of the initial stages of the President's visit has focused attention on the top-level Soviet-U.S. talks while relegating Vietnam to the background. Pervasive stress has been on the "businesslike, realistic" character of the visit and on the "substantive" nature of negotiations on key issues on which Soviet-U.S. cooperation serves the interests of world peace and security. An optimistic prognosis for the summit came from the head of the press center, Leonid Zamyatin, in the course of his joint press conference with White House press secretary Ziegler on 23 May: Soviet media publicized his statement that "the peoples of our country, the people of the United States, and the peoples of the whole world expect positive results from the current Soviet-American meeting."

The President's arrival at Vnukovo airport on the 22d was carried live by Moscow radio and television, and PRAVDA published a frontpage picture and biography of Mr. Nixon. Recounting the cordial but restrained, strictly correct airport ceremony, TASS noted that the President was "welcomed" by President Podgorny and Premier Kosygin but offered no characterization of the atmosphere. Brezhnev's absence from the airport--manifestly because of the current U.S. actions in Vietnam, and in the wake of a CPSU Central Committee plenum which endorsed the Brezhnev leadership's restrained reaction to the U.S. moves--was in accord with a protocol that has not invariably been observed. Thus Brezhnev had personally greeted French President Pompidou on his arrival at the Moscow airport in October 1970. He was also present to greet Egyptian President as-Sadat in October 1971, although protocol was not waived in that instance: the CPSU as well as the Soviet Government had issued the invitation to as-Sadat, as head of the Arab Socialist Union as well as the government.

TASS, in recounting Pompidou's arrival in 1970, noted that flags of the two countries lined the streets from the airport to the Kremlin "hailing the friendship" between the French and Soviet peoples. TASS this time mentioned the flags but said nothing about friendship. It noted that "representatives of the working people of Moscow were present" at the airport, but it said nothing about crowds along the streets.

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Publicity for Brezhnev's meeting with the President little more than two hours after his arrival underscored Moscow's portrayal of the businesslike character of the visit. TASS said the "businesslike and frank" conversation opened "the discussion of problems of fundamental importance for the development of Soviet-American relations as well as vital international problems."

In line with protocol, President Podgorny hosted the dinner in the President's honor in the Kremlin palace on the 22d, attended by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and the other Moscow-based Politburo members.* Podgorny has regularly hosted such functions. He gave the initial dinner and made the initial toast during Pompidou's visit, as during as-Sadat's visit last October.

TASS and PRAVDA carried the texts of the speeches by Podgorny and the President at the official dinner. Podgorny's remarks were in keeping with Moscow's general effort to underscore the overriding importance attached to the Summit--its pivotal importance for world peace as well as for U.S.-Soviet relations. Describing the top-level U.S.-Soviet talks as "a momentous event," the Soviet president said the results "will predetermine in many ways the prospects for relations between the Soviet Union and the United States . . . and will have an effect on the further development of the international situation either toward lasting peace and stronger universal security or toward greater tension." He hewed closely to anticipatory authoritative Soviet comment in reaffirming the USSR's conviction that improved Soviet-U.S. relations are both "possible" and "desirable"--with the stock qualifying assurance to client countries that this would not be at the expense of "any third countries or peoples." In the same vein, in the course of a reiteration of the need for political settlement of international problems, he reasserted the proviso that "due account should be taken of the aspirations and right of peoples to decide their destinies themselves without interference and pressure from outside."

* Kazakhstan's Kunayev and the Ukraine's Shcherbitskiy were absent along with Shelest, according to TASS. For background on Shelest, see the USSR Internal Affairs section of this TRENDS.

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Podgorny recognized "principled differences" between the Soviet Union and the United States but pointed pragmatically to the "objective factors that determine similarity of interests" and dictate that the United States and the USSR act "in such a way as to ward off the danger of global war." Repeating the pervasive line that the USSR approaches the talks from "realistic positions," he pledged that "it will make every effort in accordance with the principles of our policy to achieve positive results." The first substantive outcome was publicized early in the visit, when TASS announced on the day after the President's arrival that a decision had been reached on signing agreements on cooperation in the protection of the environment and in medical science and services. On the 24th TASS reported that President Nixon and Premier Kosygin had signed an agreement on U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space and that Secretary Rogers and Chairman of the Soviet Committee for Science and Technology Kirillin had signed a pact on cooperation in science and technology. TASS noted that Brezhnev and Podgorny were present at both signings.

PREPARATORY COMMENT As part of the political preparation for the summit, the CPSU Central Committee meeting on the 19th in effect gave the Brezhnev leadership a mandate for its policy on Vietnam as well as its negotiations with President Nixon. TASS reported that Brezhnev delivered a report on foreign policy at the plenum and that it was "unanimously approved." Brezhnev's report was not published and the plenum resolution was publicized only in abridged form, but authoritative interpretations of the plenum decision were provided in editorials in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 21st. Both were at pains to portray Brezhnev's foreign policy as a consistent implementation of the line set at the 24th CPSU Congress and to emphasize that it has the united support of the party and "all" the people.

Both editorials gave reassurance, for both domestic and foreign consumption, that Moscow's "principled" policy had not altered-- a theme that has permeated Moscow's authoritative comment on the President's visit since the plans were originally announced. PRAVDA pledged that the Soviet Union would pursue its efforts to observe the principles of coexistence among nations, while at the same time "rebuffing imperialism's aggressive policy." Advocating improved relations with the United States along familiar lines, the IZVESTIYA editorial declared: "It would be wrong to close our eyes to the great divergences existing

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between the two states. But it is also beyond all question that with a sober and realistic approach and good will it is possible to achieve much with regard to mutual interests and, of course, not at the expense of the rights and interests of third countries. It is precisely from such positions that the Soviet public approaches the arrival of U.S. President Nixon in our country." In the next paragraph the editorial stated that the party's foreign policy "enjoys the undivided support of all the people," citing the plenum resolution as evidence that the Central Committee entrusted the Politburo with the task of continuing to implement the 24th congress detente line.

In a broad-ranging review of Soviet foreign policy, the PRAVDA editorial restated the USSR's positions on major world issues and in the process reassured its allies that their interests would not be damaged at the summit. Pledging loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism, the editorial thus reaffirmed that the USSR is "giving aid and is defending the DRV's freedom and independence." But the cautiously framed passage on Vietnam made no mention of the United States, merely registering the Soviet people's demand that "the interventionists" leave Indochina. And with regard to the Middle East conflict, the editorial merely reiterated Soviet support for the Arabs' "just struggle" and for a political settlement of the dispute.*

WORLD SUPPORT As part of the general effort to rationalize the Soviet decision to proceed with the summit, Soviet media have played up worldwide support for U.S.-Soviet detente, particularly from the USSR's allies and from the American public. In a typical commentary, a 21 May Moscow domestic service commentary stressed that "the fraternal socialist countries" had unanimously accepted the Soviet peace program formulated by the 24th CPSU Congress. As evidence of this "unanimity," the broadcast cited Bulgarian party chief Zhivkov for the view that the Bulgarian people "fully support the USSR's principled and realistic proposals aimed at strengthening world peace." It also unearthed general statements supporting Soviet detente policy by East Germany's Honecker and Romania's Ceausescu, without providing the dates or the context of their statements.

* See the Indochina and Middle East sections of this TRENDS for fuller discussion of Moscow's treatment of those issues in comment pegged to the President's visit, underscoring the importance of political settlement.

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The theme of American public support for detente with Moscow was highlighted in an article by Kolesnichenko in PRAVDA on the 20th. Entitled "The Wish of the Majority of Americans," it cited U.S. press reports pointing to the significance of the summit and commented: "This testifies to the profound interest among broad strata of American society in the relaxation of international tension and the improvement and development of Soviet-American relations." References to elements favoring a return to the cold war have emphasized that such dissenters are in the minority. Kolesnichenko observed that "broad circles of the U.S. public hope the mutual interests of our peoples in the solution of urgent problems will prevail over the aspirations of those American politicians who would like to freeze Soviet-American relations in the trenches of the cold war." In a similar vein, TASS commentator Kornilov on the 22d, portraying a groundswell of Western support for detente, noted that a public opinion poll recently taken in the United States showed that "almost 75 percent of the Americans favored the development of Soviet-American relations." The same poll has been cited repeatedly in Soviet comment.

THE CHINA DIMENSION At this sensitive juncture in the triangular relationship, the PRAVDA editorial of the 21st was notable for a reaffirmation of the 24th CPSU Congress line on China, quoting from the congress resolution on Peking's "splitting" efforts within the international communist movement as well as on the USSR's willingness to normalize relations with the PRC.

Soviet central media had avoided references to Peking's splitting line in comment preparatory to the Moscow summit. The PRAVDA editorial on the 17th, for example, made no mention of China in its general foreign policy review. And Brezhnev's comments on the President's China trip in his 20 March speech did not recall the party congress resolution's attack on Peking's ideological line or Chinese "splitting" tactics. Thus PRAVDA's reminder of Peking's "splitting line" suggests that the China question may have figured prominently in Moscow's decision not to abort the summit over Vietnam developments. A 22 May Radio Moscow broadcast in Mandarin by Mulatov, pegged to the party plenum, stated that the gathering "attached great importance to Soviet policy toward the Asian continent and discussed the USSR's policy toward China." The broadcast added that while Moscow pursues a policy of normalization of relations with Peking, the Soviet Union also "actively opposes the Chinese leaders' splittist policy, which undermines the socialist cause."

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Soviet broadcasts in Mandarin have kept Chinese audiences abreast of the progress of the summit. A broadcast in Mandarin on the 22d reported the President's meeting with Brezhnev and quoted Podgorny's remark at the Kremlin dinner that "we stand for a radical turn toward relaxation of existing tensions on all continents of the world." On the 23d Moscow reported in Mandarin that President Nixon and the Soviet leaders had discussed questions involving the development of Soviet-U.S. relations "in a cordial atmosphere and according to reality," and the tangible results were publicized in prompt reports of the signing of bilateral agreements.

Moscow used its purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress to draw an invidious comparison between the USSR's attitude toward coexistence and the PRC's. A broadcast on the 20th, reporting on the CPSU Central Committee plenum, contrasted Moscow's "steadfast" line on coexistence with the Peking's leadership's "expediency." Charging the Chinese with merely paying "lip service to peaceful coexistence," the broadcast cited Peking's "frenzied attacks on the Soviet Union's peace-loving measures" and its alleged opposition to a political settlement of the Middle East crisis as evidence of Chinese hypocrisy.

EAST EUROPEAN MEDIA GREET SUMMIT WITH RESTRAINED OPTIMISM

Following a month-long hiatus, East European media resumed commentary on the President's visit in mid-May--after Moscow had signaled that the summit would proceed as planned. There has been a moderate volume of restrained but optimistic comment on the President's arrival and the early stages of the talks. Authoritative comment from Prague and Budapest has explicitly called the summit a significant and desirable event despite U.S. actions in Vietnam. Tirana has predictably denounced the meeting of the leaders of "the imperialist-revisionist holy alliance."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA Prague has provided the heaviest volume of comment, treating the President's visit as a fruition of Soviet peace initiatives. Husak, in an 18 May speech to a Czechoslovak Journalists Union congress which TASS picked up on the 19th, described the summit as "part of the great peace initiative of the Soviet Union aimed at easing world tensions" and voiced "full support" for Soviet peace efforts. TASS also reported his remark to the effect that "political talks are always better than confrontation and clashes," if

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conducted on the basis of "principle." Husak stated unequivocally what Moscow has avoided saying in its own comment--that "despite the escalation which the U.S. Government has effected in Vietnam, we regard it as correct that there should be negotiations." TASS omitted this passage, which appeared in the Prague domestic service version.

On the date of the President's arrival in Moscow, the Bratislava PRAVDA stressed that "Soviet policy provides Nixon with an opportunity to take advantage of this meeting for further progress in the field of detente, pursued by the Soviet Union for more than 50 years." The party daily RUDE PRAVO on the 24th interjected a tougher note when it remarked, in connection with the President's call for peace in his Kremlin dinner speech on the 22d, that "if such a wish is being pronounced at a time when Indochina is in the fire of American bombs, then it should be precisely the United States which should confirm its verbal statement by actual deeds"--withdrawal from Indochina.

POLAND, HUNGARY In a smaller volume of comment than that of Czechoslovakia, Polish and Hungarian media offered optimistic appraisals of the prospects for success at the summit. PAP on the 21st reported ZYCIE WARSZAWY's Moscow correspondent as noting that "Moscow political and journalist circles speak of the prospect of the Soviet-American relations in a businesslike tone tinged with a sober optimism" and that the President "can be certain about the success of the talks if he comes with good will and with constructive proposals." The paper viewed the 19 May CPSU plenum as "one more evidence of the seriousness" with which the Soviet party and government leadership is approaching the talks. TRYBUNA LUDU's Washington correspondent on the 20th said U.S. observers and political circles were predicting that the talks would deal not only with disarmament but with the "difficult and tangled" Vietnam and Middle East situations and would "create a chance of understanding" and strengthened detente.

A tone of hopeful optimism has marked Budapest comment on the summit. A Budapest radio commentator observed on the 17th, for example, that "the very fact that in the current international situation this summit meeting can take place is a significant result of the diplomatic efforts aimed at the easing of international tension." He added that the socialist countries adhere to principles of peaceful coexistence and "do not yield to the pressure of various circles whose interests are to maintain tension throughout the world." The commentator

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applauded the 17 May PRAVDA editorial's stress on peaceful coexistence and its assertion that improved Soviet-U.S. relations cannot be achieved at the expense of other countries.

On the 16th, the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG's leading foreign affairs commentator, Varnai, noted that the President had "risked" his Moscow visit by his recent Vietnam measures and that the Soviet leaders had acted with "tremendous responsibility and circumspection" in refraining from a "confrontation" and allowing the visit to go on as scheduled. Varnai took a swipe at the Chinese in remarking that the present Vietnam situation "would not have arisen if the Chinese Government had been prepared to jointly help the Indochinese patriots, if it had not based its policy on pitting the Soviet Union and the United States against each other."

BULGARIA, EAST GERMANY Sofia and East Berlin have been notably restrained in meager comment thus far. The Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT on the 20th, in an article entitled "Reality and Responsibility," said the visit resulted from a "realistic evaluation of certain international facts" and "certain trends towards changes" in U.S. foreign policy which are, however, not "decisive changes." In this connection, as reported by BTA, the article criticized "the understanding reached of late between the United States and China on the basis of anti-Sovietism" and the "escalation" of the Indochina war.

The GDR domestic radio's Moscow correspondent Seybold on the 23d, after recounting the events of the President's first day in the Soviet capital, commented that "the Soviet people appreciate the good and mutually successful tradition of past Soviet-U.S. relations," and "it is also known that the U.S. people remember this fact despite the cold war" waged against the USSR by "imperialism." The visit, the correspondent added, results from "the growing realization in the West that it is of great advantage" to have peaceful relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

ROMANIA Bucharest made its first original comment on the President's visit in an article in the party daily SCINTEIA by the authoritative foreign affairs commentator Caplescu on 23 May. Similarly, its first comment on the President's Peking trip had been made in a SCINTEIA article by prominent foreign affairs commentator Iliescu on 23 February, two days after the President's arrival in the PRC capital. Caplescu's article expressed "satisfaction" that the meeting of the heads of "two states with such dimensions and potentials"

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was taking place despite "the deep differences of views and of stands determined by the very nature of the social systems." Caplescu described the President's trip to Moscow as an event in harmony with Romania's own "tireless" promotion of peaceful coexistence, although it was "too early to anticipate the outcome" of his talks with the Soviet leaders. As summarized by AGERPRES, the article made no mention of Vietnam and did not recall the Peking summit.

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INDOCHINA

The Hanoi radio and press have continued studiously to avoid any explicit mention of President Nixon's visit to Moscow, but as at the time of his Peking visit in February Hanoi currently has leveled vitriolic attacks at the President and his policies. Commentator articles in the party organ NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 20 and 21 May, respectively, condemned the President's "divisive schemes" and "deceit and wooing," and the army paper specifically accused him of "sowing disunity and sabotaging the socialist camp." At the same time, Hanoi has reasserted its confidence that additional aid and support will be forthcoming from the socialist countries.

The determination of the Vietnamese to persist in their struggle was voiced by both Truong Chinh and Hoang Quoc Viet at a meeting of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, with Viet declaring that the Vietnamese would persist in their independent line but also would strengthen solidarity with the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries. Hanoi has repeated the assertion that neither the mining of its ports nor the sustained U.S. air strikes can stop its support of the South. Both Hanoi and the Front insist that the way to settle the issue is to resume the Paris talks, and the PRG promptly endorsed the DRV's 17 May statement rejecting a UN role or an international conference.

Moscow has continued to show restraint on Vietnam in the face of the President's visit and, unlike Hanoi, has avoided mentioning such sensitive issues as damages to Soviet ships in DRV ports. Meager comment on Indochina was highlighted by Ratiani's remarks in his PRAVDA review of Soviet foreign policy on 21 May, the eve of the President's arrival. Ratiani prefaced a passage on Vietnam with the statement that "the path of negotiations and political settlement of acute international problems is the sole rational and acceptable course" in international relations.

Adhering to its cautious line of emphasizing Vietnamese communist resolve to carry on the struggle while minimizing Chinese involvement, Peking muted its commemoration of Mao's 20 May 1970 call for an anti-U.S. front in reaction to the Cambodian incursion. The Chinese have lent support to Hanoi's opposition to moves to internationalize the Vietnam question, and a reference to "accomplices" in U.S. "political schemes" may have been directed at the Soviets.

HANOI ATTACKS PRESIDENT, MAINTAINS SILENCE ON MOSCOW VISIT

The Hanoi radio and press have totally ignored the President's trip to Moscow. The only known mentions in Hanoi media have been in a VNA

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Vietnamese-language Morse transmission which consists largely of foreign press pickups and is assumed to be an information service for select cadres.* This Morse transmission also was the sole Hanoi medium to carry reports of the President's Peking visit last February. An item transmitted on 22 May cited a BBC news report to the effect that neither the Soviet nor the U.S. side has mentioned Vietnam as an agenda item for the Moscow meetings but that it is likely to be discussed though not referred to in the communique. Most of the items have been drawn from Western sources, but on the 23d TASS was cited in reporting that two Soviet-U.S. agreements had been signed that day.

Hanoi's avoidance of any reference to the visit in its regular media has been most blatant in brief items carried by the domestic radio which reported cryptically on the demonstrations against the President upon his arrival in Austria and on Kissinger's "warlike statement" there that the United States intends to continue the bombings of the DRV as well as the mining of its ports. VNA's press review on 23 May said QUAN DOI NHAN DAN had commented that Kissinger's statement in Austria again revealed the "extremely stubborn and bellicose" U.S. attitude, but it too failed to explain Kissinger's presence in Austria. Hanoi radio's domestic service review of the army paper that day, without further elaboration, reported that an article said: "In his trip aimed at pushing the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. President on 21 May had his

* An article in the April issue of the party journal HOC TAP had stopped short of mentioning the visits to Peking and Moscow when it set out to put the President's diplomacy in perspective. It referred to "visits to socialist countries" and said that by relaxing tensions with the Soviet Union and China the Americans "can hardly find an opportunity to solve their difficult problems" in a way favorable to them, "especially as long as they are still unable to solve their core problem, the Vietnam problem." Hanoi domestic media's first and only known explicit mention of the President's planned visits to China and the USSR had come in the November issue of THOI SU PHO THONG (CURRENT EVENTS), a journal of the party central committee's Propaganda and Training Department. The department's main journal TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING), in an article in its January-February 1972 issue, clearly reflected concern over the impact of the President's moves on North Vietnamese cadres and party members but did not mention the trips explicitly. See the TRENDS of 22 March 1972, pages 18-20.

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security affairs adviser Kissinger hold a press conference in Salzburg, Austria" at which he said the United States would continue bombing and blockading North Vietnam.

On 20 and 21 May, with the President's arrival in Moscow imminent, Hanoi radio broadcast Commentator articles from NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN which amounted to lectures to the DRV's big allies on the proper way to deal with the United States. Referring to U.S. "imperialism" as the number one enemy of mankind, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said that "quickly denouncing and resolutely smashing" the U.S. "counterrevolutionary attack" in Vietnam "is the best and most correct way to defend world peace at present as well as in the future." It said that "communists always consider the revolution of each nation as an inseparable part of the world revolution," and it warned against tolerating "imperialist crimes" or showing weakness. The article added that the Vietnamese are determined to defeat U.S. escalation, "thus making worthy contributions to the defense of the socialist camp and to the promotion of the national liberation movement and the defense of world peace."

While avoiding any mention of the President's Moscow trip, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article said pointedly that the President "is sowing disunity and sabotaging the socialist camp" and that together with the mining of DRV harbors he has "resorted to many dark schemes--threats, disunity, and wooing--in an attempt to undermine the revolutionary battleground." The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 20th also referred to the President's "divisive schemes and deceptions" and "wicked political intrigues." Like QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, it warned against any sign of weakness.

Both Hanoi press articles resorted to extremely vitriolic language in attacking the President: QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said he has been called "a frenzied anticommunist fighter," "a famous leader of the cold war," "a double-faced gambler," and "a cruel fascist." NHAN DAN described him as "an extremely bellicose aggressor, an international pirate, a loathsome bloodthirsty man, and a dangerous plotter." NHAN DAN stressed communist and worldwide protests over U.S. mining and other escalation of the war and claimed that in the course of condemning the President, people in the United States and throughout the world are shouting: "Drop Nixon on Haiphong, put him in the electric chair, and bring him to court and try him as a war criminal."

As reported by Hanoi radio's domestic service, Hoang Quoc Viet, at the session of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee, also seemed to allude to the President's trips. After reiterating

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Vietnamese determination to combine an independent line with strengthening of unity with the USSR, China, and other brotherly countries, Viet said: "We vehemently denounce all serious war escalation steps of the Nixon Administration, which is using insidious political and diplomatic tricks to sow division among the world people's front that is supporting the Vietnamese people"

DRV, PRG PRESS FOR RESUMPTION OF PARIS TALKS, ASSAIL UN ROLE

The 17 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which rejected the notion of an international conference or a UN role in Vietnam* was followed up on the 19th by a NHAN DAN Commentator article and a supporting statement from the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman. NHAN DAN echoed the DRV spokesman's statement in claiming that the United States was trying to promote a UN-sponsored Asian peace conference which would be aimed at bringing about an internationally supervised cease-fire "as proposed in the President's 8 May speech." The PRG statement stopped short of mentioning the President's call for a cease-fire, saying only that in his 8 May statement he had "set arrogant conditions which are actually aimed at forcing the Vietnamese to give up their just struggle for independence and freedom." Hanoi as well as the Front has obscured the President's assertion that after an internationally supervised cease-fire and the return of POW's, the United States would cease all military action in Indochina and withdraw all U.S. troops from Vietnam within four months.

The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 19th also echoed the DRV spokesman's statement in assailing UN Secretary General Waldheim's "moves" to bring the Vietnam issue before the United Nations and in scoring the British for calling for a new Geneva conference. The party paper in an article on the 18th, which stressed the need to resume the Paris talks, had failed to mention the spokesman's statement when it referred vaguely to "clamors" for a UN discussion of Vietnam, the holding of an Asian peace conference, a cease-fire, and the "internationalization" of the Vietnam issue.

On 24 May VNA reported that the DRV and PRG delegations in Paris had again pressed for resumption of the Paris sessions, proposing that the 150th session be held on 25 May. Both statements recalled that the delegations had called for a session on the 18th but that "the U.S. delegation had refused."

* See the TRENDS of 17 May 1972, pages 1-4.

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DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY CONTINUES PROTESTS OVER U.S. ACTION

Hanoi has sustained its pattern of official protests, with six statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman and one higher-level foreign ministry statement during the past week. The 18 May foreign ministry statement--the first at that level since 11 May*--protested raids that day on populated areas in Haiphong and Hanoi. Typical of the higher-level protests, it expressed the conviction that the governments and peoples of the socialist countries "will support and assist still more strongly the Vietnamese people's just struggle." (According to U.S. spokesmen, a major petroleum-storage area near Hanoi was destroyed on the 18th.) Protests by the ministry spokesman on the 17th and 20th claimed that strikes had hit dike networks, an allegation last made in an 8 May spokesman's protest.

Two recent editorials reflected Hanoi's expectation that the air strikes are likely to continue at the accelerated pace. The army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 24th, editorially hailing the alleged downing of eight planes the day before, said: "From the provinces of the 4th military region to the cities, towns, and localities deep in the northern mainland, all the people have followed a martial way of life and prepared for a protracted fight; they are determined to defeat the enemy in the North and, together with the kith-and-kin South, to smash the Vietnamization policy of the U.S. aggressors." Declaring that the North cannot be intimidated, it reaffirmed that the Vietnamese people will not waver "even if they have to fight for five or 10 years or more."

An editorial in NHAN DAN on the 22d also seemed to anticipate a prolonged struggle when it lectured militia and self-defense forces on shooting down low-flying planes. It recalled numerous feats of various forces at the time of the air strikes during the Johnson Administration and stressed that rifles and machine guns can shoot down modern jets. It suggested that the defense against low-flying planes may have been less than satisfactory when it said that developing "a very strong antiaircraft fire net . . . constitutes a very important task for all party committee echelons, administrative machinery, and military organs in all localities." The editorial

* At the time of the release of the 11 May statement, there was some confusion in the propaganda over whether it was a spokesman's or a foreign ministry statement. The 12 May NHAN DAN identified it as being issued at the higher foreign ministry level.

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stated that all localities "must activate a great many aircraft-hunting militia and self-defense units, thus dealing low-flying enemy aircraft, wherever they come, fierce counterblows."

The succession of protests during the past week leveled the following specific charges:

+ The 17 May foreign ministry spokesman's statement said that on the 16th U.S. aircraft made "savagely attacks on many heavily populated areas on the periphery of Haiphong and Vinh cities and in Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area," while ships "shelled a coastal village in Ha Tinh Province." "Many" civilians were said to have been killed or wounded, dwellings destroyed and "a portion of the dike along the La River in Duc Tho district, Ha Tinh Province" damaged.

+ The foreign ministry statement on the 18th said air raids that day "on many heavily populated areas" in Haiphong and Hanoi were aimed at "many residential quarters" in order to "massacre the civilian population and destroy economic establishments."

+ The spokesman's statement on the 19th charged that on 17 and 18 May, "along with the mining and blockade of the DRV ports and air attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong," air strikes hit "many populous areas" of Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area. It said that "a large number of civilians" were killed and "many" houses and economic, social, and cultural establishments destroyed and that 12 U.S. planes were downed. The statement added that ships also "wantonly shelled many populated coastal areas" in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, and Thanh Hoa provinces.

+ The spokesman charged on the 20th that "along with the mining and blockading" on the 19th, "many" planes "barbarously" bombed and strafed "many populated areas" in Haiphong, in Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces, and in Vinh Linh. Ships were said to have shelled many coastal villages in Thai Binh and Nam Ha provinces and the islands of Hon Ne and Hon Ngu, in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An provinces, respectively. The statement charged that on the 20th planes "savagely attacked a number of populated areas in the outskirts of Hanoi," hitting villages, hamlets, schools, dikes, factories and farms, "killing or wounding many civilians, including many women and children, and destroying many houses and economic and cultural installations of the Vietnamese people."

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A VNA item on the 20th reported that U.S. planes on the 19th "ferociously attacked culverts and sea dikes in village D, in Tien Hai district, Thai Binh Province, causing many casualties and substantial material losses to the population." The item added that U.S. ships have "hammered" at populous coastal villages for nearly a month now.

+ The spokesman's statement on the 22d uniquely charged that on the 21st the United States continued to send airplanes "to drop mines to blockade Haiphong harbor" as well as to "barbarously strike" at Ninh Binh city and many oppopulous areas on the outskirts of Haiphong and in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces. It claimed that two planes were downed, and VNA credited the downings to anti-aircraft units. The 22 May protest was the only one in the current series to charge that the U.S. "frenzied acts of war" encroached on the right of free navigation and free trade on the part of various countries of the world--perhaps because of its charge of new mining in the Haiphong area.

+ The spokesman's statement on the 23d charged that the United States, "continuing to take illegal and criminal escalation steps against the DRV," on 22 May sent "many" planes to "barbarously bomb and strafe many populous areas in Yen Bai, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces, killing or wounding a number of civilians and destroying many homes and economic, cultural, and social establishments of our people."

+ In his statement on the 24th, the spokesman charged that on the 23d the United States "barbarously bombed and strafed" many urban wards, factories, and schools in Haiphong and Nam Dinh and that planes "indiscriminately rained bombs and shells" on many populous areas in Yen Bai, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Ninh Binh, Nghe An, and Quang Binh provinces and in Vinh Linh area. He claimed that "many" homes and economic and cultural establishments were destroyed. Eight U.S. planes were allegedly downed and "many aggressor pilots captured or annihilated." (A Hanoi radio broadcast on 23 May had claimed the downing of the eight planes but did not mention the fate of the airmen.)

DOWNED PLANES, PRISONERS	Hanoi's claims of downed planes since 1 April total 163, 36 of them claimed since 18 May, for a total of 3,609 since 1964. Five planes were allegedly downed on the 18th by the "antiaircraft, air force, and other armed services"--one in Hanoi, one in Thanh Hoa Province, and three in Ha Bac Province. One plane was claimed to have been downed in Thanh Hoa on the 17th. Reports on the 19th said that one plane had been
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downed in Ha Tinh on the 14th, one in Nghe An on the 16th, and two in Haiphong and one in Quang Ninh on the 18th. A subsequent broadcast on the 19th claimed that two planes were downed in Ha Tinh that day and that U.S. "pilots were captured." A VNA report on the 21st specified that two pilots were captured. Hanoi claimed on the 20th that two planes were downed by "air defense and air force units" that day, and on the 21st VNA said two planes were downed that day over Ninh Binh and Nghe An. On the 23d Hanoi radio reported the downing of eight planes that day--one each in Quang Binh, Quang Ninh, Ninh Binh, and Nam Ha and four in Ha Bac--by the anti-aircraft troops and air force in coordination with the army and people. The broadcast on the 23d also reported one plane downed in Nam Ha on the 14th, one in Nghe An on the 19th, one in Quang Binh on the 20th, and one each in Nam Ha and Ninh Binh on the 22d. On the 24th a Hanoi broadcast reported three planes downed that day, one each in Quang Ninh and Hai Hung provinces and in Haiphong. It claimed that U.S. pilots were taken prisoner. The broadcast also cited three earlier downings, two in Quang Binh on the 20th and 23d and one in Vinh Linh on the 23d. U.S. pilots were allegedly captured in the Quang Binh action.

VNA on 17 May carried an atypical item describing the alleged capture of two U.S. airmen on 11 May. The report said that pursuit began on the afternoon of the 11th, described U.S. rescue attempts, and reported that one of the pilots eluded capture until the morning of 13 May. However, no prisoners have been identified since 17 April.

TRUONG CHINH, HOANG QUOC VIET ADDRESS FATHERLAND FRONT SESSION

Expressions of Vietnamese determination to carry on their struggle until final victory no matter how protracted the war were highlighted in reports of a conference of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) Central Committee and in editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN pegged to the 19 May birth anniversary of Ho Chi Minh. Hanoi's first reports, on 22 May, of the VFF meeting described it only as having been held "recently," but a 23 May NHAN DAN editorial specified that it was held on the 20th to mark Ho's 82d birth anniversary.* The

* Following Ho's death in September 1969, Hanoi had marked his birth anniversary in 1970 and 1971 with a meeting jointly sponsored by the VWP Central Committee, the National Assembly Standing Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee. See the 26 May 1971 TRENDS, pages 1-4, and the 20 May 1970 TRENDS, pages 13-15.

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meeting was said to be the second conference of the VFFCC, third term.* In keeping with standard practice, the opening remarks at the conference were made by Politburo member Truong Chinh and a political report was given by Hoang Quoc Viet on behalf of the Front's presidium. In addition, Truong Chinh delivered a regular speech to the session, and there was a report on the military situation by Maj. Gen. Le Hien Mai and an address by Xuan Thuy, head of the DRV delegation to the Paris talks. Xuan Thuy reportedly discussed DRV policies on reaching a political solution and condemned the U.S. stand and "lack of good will." A statement issued by the conference was carried by VNA on the 23d.

A 23 May NHAN DAN editorial on the VFF conference said the gathering reflected the determination of all the people to persevere in resistance until total victory. The editorial also noted that Hoang Quoc Viet's report, the conference statement, and statements from other delegates, including "Comrade Truong Chinh," focused on the "main task" of the revolution--"to concentrate all forces on completely defeating the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, completely eliminating neocolonialism" in the South, "smashing" all war escalation, and protecting the North. Both Viet and the conference statement reaffirmed that "Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese nation is one," and that "it is an inalienable right of the nearly 40 million Vietnamese people to resist foreign aggressors and their henchmen, to unite to resist the U.S. aggression and to save our country."

Spelling out the North's current tasks, Viet cited the need to promptly and adequately supply the frontline, to sharpen vigilance and readiness to fight, to boost production and practice economy, and to strengthen friendship and solidarity with the world's people. He restated Hanoi's demand that the United States respond to the PRG's seven-point solution and asserted that as long as the United States refuses to recognize the basic rights of the Vietnamese, they are determined to step up their resistance. Underlining this resolve, Viet recalled the 10 May DRV Government statement which repeated the pledge that the Vietnamese people will fight for five or 10 years or longer.

* The date of the first conference of the VFF Central Committee is not known, but it may have been convened in December following the election of the Central Committee by the VFF Third Congress.

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LITTLE MOSCOW COMMENT ON EVE OF PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO USSR

The 21 May Ratiani PRAVDA International Review on Soviet foreign policy contains the only current substantial Moscow comment on Vietnam. Consistent with other propaganda on the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and support for negotiated settlements, Ratiani prefaced his remarks on Vietnam by declaring that "the path of negotiations and political settlement of acute international problems is the sole rational and acceptable course" in international relations.* He added: "However, recognition of this fact is still forcing its way into practice with difficulty in a number of cases," and he went directly on to complain that the U.S.-Saigon side had refused to hold the 150th session of the Paris talks last week.

Ratiani said that the Paris talks had not progressed because "Washington" is attempting to preserve its domination in South Vietnam "and the thoroughly rotten Thieu regime." And he quoted the Belgian Minister of State as having said "in the press a few days ago" that "military actions could have ceased long since if the Washington administration had not aspired to stubbornly maintain President Thieu in power and had permitted the formation of a coalition government." Ratiani also argued that the path to ending the war is through talks, since "it is not possible nor will it be possible to frighten the Vietnamese people or isolate them from the assistance of true friends."

While Moscow has continued to support the Vietnamese communists in their insistence that the Paris talks be resumed, it has remained silent regarding attempts to "internationalize" the issue. Typically, Moscow did not mention that following the President's 8 May speech Britain had made overtures to the USSR--and to China--in its role as 1954 Geneva conference cochairman. Moscow ignored the 17 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement assailing efforts by the UN Secretary General as well as Britain and the United States for trying in various ways to internationalize the issue. TASS on 22 May did briefly report the PRG Foreign Ministry

* Soviet elite statements on the importance of negotiations have not normally been couched in such forceful terms in recent years. However, Gromyko, addressing the 24th CPSU Congress on 3 April 1971, did say: "The Soviet Union and its allies propose that all international matters of dispute be solved by peaceful means, by means of negotiation This is the only realistic way to look at this, and is a method which has always been in the arsenal of our party, the CPSU Central Committee, and the Politburo and Soviet Government."

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spokesman's endorsement of the DRV statement, but in such a fashion as to obscure its substance. Thus TASS noted that the PRG "confirmed its serious attitude toward the Paris talks" but ignored the PRG's references to efforts for a peace conference.

Ratiani's circumspection toward the United States and his avoidance of direct reference to the Nixon Administration was apparent in his remark that "the American reactionary press" has recently "kicked up a provocative ballyhoo" regarding the South Vietnamese "liberation" forces having modern arms supplied by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. He went on to say that "these same press organs" regard the "colossal American military arsenal in Indochina as something to be taken for granted." Other propaganda currently has reiterated Soviet determination to continue giving aid. Thus the 21 May PRAVDA editorial on the 19 May CPSU Central Committee plenum, like the 17 May editorial on Soviet foreign policy, reiterated Moscow's loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism regarding aid to the Lao and Cambodian "patriots" as well as the Vietnamese people.

SOVIET SHIPS Moscow's concern to avoid sensitive issues during the President's visit is illustrated by its continued silence regarding U.S. damage to Soviet ships in Haiphong since the President's announcement of the mining there, although the subject has been given continuing publicity by Hanoi. Moscow media had ignored incidents on 9 and 10 May, protested by Hanoi, in which Soviet ships were damaged and Soviet crewmen injured and killed. On 20 May VNA reported that DRV President Ton Duc Thang signed a decision on the 16th to confer a posthumous award on a Soviet crewman killed in the incident of the 10th. On the 21st NHAN DAN commented on the award, praising Soviet assistance. NHAN DAN said U.S. aggression had aroused the indignation of the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries and pointed out that the sailors of the ships in DRV ports are "going ahead with their plans of unloading goods."

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PEKING MUTES COMMEMORATION OF MAO'S 1970 ANTI-U.S. STATEMENT

Peking's comment in the wake of its authoritative reaction to President Nixon's 8 May announcement on the interdiction of DRV supply routes has adhered to the cautious line of stressing the Vietnamese communists' resolve to persist in the struggle while avoiding any portrayal of a challenge to Chinese interests. In significant contrast to last year, Peking muted its commemoration of Mao's major 20 May 1970 statement calling for an anti-U.S. united front in reaction to the incursion into Cambodia. Peking chose to mark the occasion this year, coming on the eve of the President's visit to the USSR, by pressing its line of competition with "the two superpowers."* In what might also be read as a jab at the Soviets as well as at the United States, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on the 21st criticized "the military blackmail and political schemes" of the United States "and its accomplices."**

Li's speech contained no explicit reference to the measures announced by the President, but these were attacked by several lower-level Chinese officials in recent speeches as a "grave escalation" of the war, the charge made in earlier authoritative reaction. Li and the other Chinese speakers emphasized that the Vietnamese cannot be intimidated and routinely promised continuing Chinese support until the war's end. On the same occasion as Li's speech, the visiting Syrian foreign minister went beyond the cautious Chinese formulations by condemning the U.S. "blockade" of the DRV as "a grave threat to world peace."

Chinese officials speaking during Prince Sihanouk's tour of Northeast China have briefly invoked Mao's 20 May statement in reaffirming support to the Indochinese, but the restraint shown by the Chinese contrasted with Sihanouk's more urgent tone. At a banquet in Changchun on the 18th, Sihanouk assailed the President's "archcriminal decisions" to bomb the DRV and impose "a complete blockade" of its coasts, adding that "our brothers of North Vietnam have already made arrangements several months in advance to deal"

* Peking's treatment of the anniversary is discussed further in the China section of this TRENDS.

** Recent authoritative Chinese comment has avoided references to "accomplices" in criticizing U.S. "political schemes" in Vietnam. In the past, Peking has used this formulation to accuse Moscow and others of improperly meddling in the Vietnam question, and at times references to a single "accomplice" or "collaborator" of the United States clearly meant the Soviet Union.

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with these measures. Seeking to associate the Chinese with the fate of the Indochinese, Sihanouk cited Mao's 20 May statement as "the point of departure" for the "joint victories" over the United States of the three Indochinese peoples "and the great Chinese people." Similarly, speaking in Harbin on the 23d, he spoke of China and Cambodia fighting "side by side . . . in our common struggle against U.S. imperialism." NCNA on 20 May carried messages to Chou En-lai from Sihanouk and the premier of his government greeting the anniversary of Mao's statement. The messages effusively praised the PRC's "mighty support and immense aid."

The anniversary was also marked by an NCNA correspondent's report--dated the 20th and quoting a dictum from the statement without actually naming the source--which recounted the military developments during the 1971-72 "dry season offensive" in Indochina, including "the powerful spring offensive" launched in South Vietnam on 30 March. Offering an assessment of the situation on the Indochina battlefields now "linked as one," NCNA claimed that victories "of strategic importance" have brought about "a new change in the balance of forces" and have created "favorable conditions for the attainment of ultimate victory" in the war. While this assessment goes beyond what Peking has been saying about the offensive in South Vietnam, it is qualified by being applied to the whole of Indochina for a period of half a year and by a closing prescription for the Indochinese to persevere in "a protracted people's war." An NCNA report on this occasion last year had similarly referred to victories the previous year of "enormous strategic significance" and called for protracted war. The revival on this year's anniversary of the formula on protracted war, which was discarded in mid-1971 as Sino-U.S. relations improved and Peking took an optimistic view of the Vietnam situation, suggests that Peking is taking the long view and does not regard the current offensive in South Vietnam as a decisive breakthrough.

In what might also be related to the anniversary of Mao's statement, the Canton television on the 19th and 20th devoted extensive time to documentary films on the Vietnam war, including an hour-long film pegged to DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's visit to Peking last November.

INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE

Li Hsien-nien's reference on the 21st to "political schemes" by the United States and its "accomplices" came in the wake of statements by Hanoi attacking moves by the United Nations, the

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British, and the United States to internationalize the Vietnam question. The Chinese UN representative formally registered Peking's opposition to a UN role in a letter on 11 May, and Peking has carried the DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry spokesmen's statements, on the 17th and 19th respectively, and a Hanoi radio commentary on the 16th rejecting a UN role and the convocation of a new international conference. Peking's opposition to internationalizing the Vietnam question is consistent with the attention it has devoted to the Paris negotiating forum and with its aversion to an enhanced Soviet role in the Vietnam situation. Li's remark may have been intended to reinforce Hanoi's position and to warn others--including Moscow at the time of the President's visit--against seeking to get a hand in the bargaining.

Peking has acknowledged the President's proposal for an internationally supervised cease-fire in Vietnam by publishing the text of his 8 May speech and carrying the DRV statements attacking the proposal. However, Peking has offered no comment on a cease-fire, in contrast to its attacks on such a proposal advanced in the President's 25 January address, and it has not reported the 19 May NHAN DAN Commentator article assailing the notion.

DRV PARTY JOURNAL CITES POLITBURO DECREE ON PRESS CRITICISM

An editorial in the April issue of the North Vietnamese party's theoretical journal, HOC TAP revealed that the party Political Bureau had "recently" issued a directive "on the role of the press in publicizing criticism and self-criticism." Attention had been focused on the press the month before when on 4 March Hanoi radio and NHAN DAN publicized a 24 February party Secretariat circular on improving the distribution of the press.* The HOC TAP editorial did not indicate when the Political Bureau adopted its directive, but it may well have been drafted at the same time as the February circular from the Secretariat. A Political Bureau resolution on the press in December 1958 was followed five days later by a Secretariat circular on press distribution.

The HOC TAP editorial underlined the role of the press as a watchdog for the party and administration by quoting from the 8 December 1958 Political Bureau resolution. It cited the resolution's assertion that criticism and self-criticism in the press is a "very important task" and its observation that: "Our party has become the leader of

* The Secretariat circular is discussed in the 8 March TRENDS, page 22.

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the state and the administration, the mistakes of party and administration echelons, economic agencies, and people's organizations will be harmful to the masses' interests if they are not spotted and corrected in time." HOC TAP did not cite the resolution's further statement that "criticism and self-criticism in the press is an extremely good method for promptly discovering and correcting these shortcomings in order to strengthen the relationship between the party and the masses and to correct bureaucratism."*

The HOC TAP editorial maintained that "only by publishing public criticism and self-criticism in the press can we vigorously motivate cadres, party members, and the masses to carry out most satisfactorily all political tasks entrusted to them by the party and state." It added that the publication of criticism and self-criticism "is one of the most effective ways to struggle to persevere and thoroughly understand the party's lines and views in all fields of activity and daily life and to protect and enforce the socialist legal system." The role of the press is usually not raised in this regard, although the party routinely advocates criticism by the "masses."

The current directive, according to HOC TAP, called upon all publications at all levels to "constantly carry out mass criticism and self-criticism on activities of party and administrative organs, organizations, specialized branches, cadres, party members, and the state's personnel in implementing political tasks." All cadres, party members, and citizens were enjoined by the directive to participate in criticism and self-criticism; and it warned that "obstruction of criticism and self-criticism is a violation of party discipline and state law." HOC TAP indicated that efforts have, in fact, been made to obstruct such criticism. It noted that some persons have not only failed to respond to criticism in the press but have also "sought to create difficulties for those criticizing them or for the publications publishing the articles critical of them and, worse still, have committed improper reprisals against those criticizing them." Offering guidance to the press, the HOC TAP editorial warned against "malicious 'criticism' aimed at attacking individuals, sowing disunity, fabricating stories, distorting facts, defaming our regime, maligning others, using 'double talk,' or disclosing state secrets." Listing the primary targets for criticism,

* The text of the 1958 resolution is not known to have been released, but was summarized in NHAN DAN on 24 December 1958.

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the editorial called upon publications to concentrate on criticizing problems of economic management, on stepping up the patriotic emulation movement, and on heightening the sense of responsibility and behavior of cadres and party members.

The editorial noted that the press has been implementing the 1958 resolution and has been publicizing the lines and policies of the party by citing good examples and criticizing deviations. "However," the editorial cautioned, because of the war and "inherent weaknesses of the press, criticism in the press has revealed many shortcomings and has not been able to meet requirements arising from the performance of revolutionary tasks." Citing specific shortcomings, the editorial noted in general terms the failure of the press to focus promptly on the major issues and failure to correctly analyze reasons for outstanding successes and the nature and causes of errors.

BACKGROUND Much more serious problems with the press were decried at the time of the December 1958 Political Bureau resolution. The NHAN DAN account of the 1958 resolution indicated that it attacked "the rightist behavior and lack of a serious stand by a number of our newspapers and magazines during the first period after the restoration of peace." And a 24 December 1958 NHAN DAN editorial reported that the Political Bureau had charged that "a Marxist-Leninist view of the press" was not "understood, by either journalists or readers, while bourgeois and unproletarian views of the press still prevail among some of them and have proved harmful." A two-part article by Luu Quy Ky, now secretary general of the Vietnam Journalists Association, discussed the 1958 resolution in the context of the regime's earlier struggle against "reactionary" publications. The article, published in 26 and 27 December 1958 NHAN DAN, accused the press of "misrepresenting the ideological viewpoint" and "failures in late 1956." It quoted the Political Bureau as declaring that "this must be regarded as a bitter lesson for journalists" and called upon journalists to "criticize themselves severely to heighten their ideological viewpoint, spirit of struggle, and awareness."

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CHINA

LOW-LEVEL COMMENTARY HITS SUPERPOWERS ON EVE OF MOSCOW SUMMIT

On the eve of President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, Peking took the occasion of the anniversary of Mao's 20 May 1970 statement to reiterate its strategy in the triangular relationship by pressing the line of opposition to hegemony by the two superpowers. A low-level commentary in PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 20th by "a group of workers" marked the anniversary of Mao's statement, which called for an anti-U.S. international united front in reaction to the incursion into Cambodia, by portraying an emerging united front against the power politics and expansion of "U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionist social imperialism." Playing on Peking's favorite themes of the common interests of "medium-sized and small countries" and the third world, the commentary condemned the two superpowers as "the arch criminals of today" seeking to dominate the weaker nations.*

The commentary's harsh indictment of the superpowers is less notable than the fact that Peking chose to mute the anniversary of Mao's major statement, the occasion last year for no less than a joint editorial in Peking's three main organs. Taken together with the appearance of a joint editorial on 23 May marking the 30th anniversary of Mao's Yanan Talks, the low-level treatment of the 20 May anniversary lends further support to the view that international considerations rather than internal troubles accounted for the regime's failure to produce the customary editorial on May Day this year. While muting the May Day and 20 May occasions, which would call for pronouncements on world affairs, Peking was able to produce an authoritative statement on the Yanan Talks anniversary, involving internal issues raised in the ideological campaign surrounding the Lin Biao affair and including pointed anti-Lin references.

* Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien also may have had the Soviet-U.S. summit in mind when he attacked the superpowers at a 21 May banquet for the visiting Syrian foreign minister. Li warned that the superpowers are attempting to "decide the destiny of the Arab peoples and divide spheres of influence." He lectured the Arabs that the only reliable way to achieve their goals is to "rely on their own strength and persist in a protracted struggle." Peking has not directly mentioned the President's USSR trip since NCNA on 14 October reported the original announcement.

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The more complex setting of Chinese foreign affairs stemming from improved Sino-U.S. relations and the recent phase of Vietnam developments may have constrained Peking to avoid a major policy statement on May Day and the 20 May anniversary. Joint editorials on both occasions last year had promoted an anti-U.S. international united front, and the one commemorating Mao's statement had called Indochina the main battlefield in the anti-U.S. struggle. That editorial had also criticized the Nixon Administration by name, referred to "fascist rule" and revolutionary struggle in the United States, and alluded to Moscow only in passing as "the other superpower."

The changed context of Peking's international role is thrown into sharp relief against the background of the call in last year's 20 May editorial for an international united front to "isolate and strike at the chief enemy," the United States. Last August, following the announcement of Peking's invitation to President Nixon, the Chinese sought to justify this demarche by elaborating a flexible strategy directed implicitly at isolating the Soviet Union as the chief enemy.* Peking argued at that time that a distinction must be made between adversaries "now committing aggression against China" and those "not doing so now," the context indicating that the Soviets are the former and the United States the latter. An ideological article in RED FLAG No. 5 this month, continuing a subject from the previous issue on Peking's strategy for coping with the two superpowers, pointedly referred to Russian occupation of "vast tracts" of Chinese territory--the subject of the protracted border dispute--but failed to mention American actions in China, not even the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan.

That the change of strategy may have been a subject of debate is suggested by a passage in the 20 May 1971 joint editorial stressing a need for "high vigilance." After claiming that the United States "will inevitably counterattack" and "even embark on a hazardous adventure," the editorial conveyed a warning in notably polemical terms: "It is dangerous if we see only the raging revolutionary flames but not the enemy who is sharpening his knife, and think that in view of the excellent situation we can lay our heads on our pillows and just drop off to sleep."

* See the TRENDS of 18 August 1971, pages 19-22.

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CULTURAL THAW, ATTACKS ON LIN MARK YENAN TALKS ANNIVERSARY

The 30th anniversary of Mao's Yen-an Talks on literature and art has occasioned the first PEOPLE'S DAILY/RED FLAG/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY joint editorial since 1 January. On the more important 25th anniversary in 1967, at the height of the cultural revolution, there were separate editorials in all of the national dailies, a special issue of RED FLAG, and public rallies and speeches. The occasion then was used to stress the need for struggle and criticism on the cultural front and to attack recently purged cultural leaders. This year's editorial has called for "deepening the criticism of and struggle against...political swindlers," but it also reaffirmed the current relaxed policy on the need to "allow people to make mistakes and correct them." The editorial indicated that so long as artists followed guidelines set by the party leadership they would be able to exercise "socialist initiative" in the spirit of "let a hundred flowers bloom." It quoted from the Yen-an Talks to make its point that Lin Piao must be criticized but that artistic controls must be loosened. It repeated Mao's instruction at Yen-an to adopt as "our motto" Lu Hsun's couplet:

Fierce-Browed, I coolly defy a thousand pointing fingers,
Head-bowed like a willing ox I serve the children.

The latter point, service to the people, has been taken further by several of the provincial commentaries on the Yen-an Talks anniversary, which indicated a new concern that revolutionary dramas have popular appeal. The provincial comment suggests that more variety will be allowed, including a shift toward more regional artistic expression deriving from the different regional traditions. During the cultural revolution, central authorities kept a firm hand over art and drama, and there seemed to be no officially sanctioned variation from the few model works acclaimed by the center. A movement away from this position has been evident for some time, especially after many provinces called for the creation of new works to celebrate the Talks.

A Hunan article, broadcast on 19 May, called for "adapting revolutionary model operas to local opera forms." The article indirectly indicated that one reason for changing the once-rigid injunction against tampering with model operas is that popular opinion is not satisfied by a pure diet of revolutionary Peking operas. The article noted that there are many local provincial operas and "they are liked by the local masses," even though they contain "a large quantity of dregs." The article called for adapting model operas to local forms in order to better understand how to convert local operas so that they will be "suitable."

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A 15 May Canton broadcast of a NANFANG DAILY editorial also cited the validity of local art forms. Perhaps reflecting traditional Cantonese pride in their own cultural heritage, the editorial noted that "local plays and folk songs have their own special features" producing "rich and colorful forms and styles" which would be liked by the workers, peasants, and soldiers. The editorial openly criticized cultural revolution excesses by those who "cut off history and negate inheritance." To adopt the viewpoint of "national nihilism" in treating the artistic heritage was said to go against the wishes of the masses as well as against Mao's line. In calling for rapid growth of literary and art forces the editorial even suggested that it would be wise to "have the old lead the new."

A Tsinghai article broadcast on 21 May also came out strongly for variety in art, though recognizing the dangers of relaxing controls. As the policy of a hundred flowers is carried out, the editorial rhetorically asked, "are the poisonous weeds reappearing?" "Is the reactionary trend . . . repudiated during the cultural revolution emerging in a new disguise?" The article concluded, that "this is entirely possible," but that poisonous weeds should never be feared to the extent "that we dare not approve of fragrant flowers." Stating that the "rich, colorful life" of the masses must be represented by a variety of forms, the article firmly criticized the "left" policies of the swindlers who called for "liquidation of literature and art."

MAO FAILS TO GREET VISITING SOMALI PRESIDENT SIAD

For the first time since the cultural revolution, Mao failed to appear to greet a visiting chief of state during the visit of Somali President Siad from 13 to 18 May. Mao's failure to appear did not seem to reflect disagreements with the Somalis, who were seen off from Peking by Chou En-lai and "well-wishers" who "hailed their successful visit." Presumably the Somalis were given a reason for what seemed a slight by Mao; it is difficult to conceive any reason other than ill-health which would suffice.

Mao's last appearance in public was at the Chen I funeral in January, but he received both Pakistani President Bhutto and President Nixon privately in February. Chiang Ching's appearance in Canton on May Day, the first May Day since the cultural revolution which Mao did not attend in Peking, suggested the possibility that Mao was in South China too. Chiang has now returned to Peking, on 23 May attending a banquet given for the widow of Edgar Snow.

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PRC RAISES RELATIONS WITH NETHERLANDS, PRESSURES UN BODIES

Peking has further enhanced its international position vis-a-vis the ROC by concluding an agreement with the Netherlands raising their relations to the ambassadorial level. At the same time Peking has been seeking to consolidate its position in the international community by insisting that only its representatives can represent China in agencies associated with the United Nations. In the PRC-Netherlands communique on 16 May raising relations from the level of charge d'affaires to that of ambassador, the Netherlands followed a standard formula in recognizing the PRC as "the sole legal government of China." On the key question of Taiwan, the two sides settled on a new compromise term in which the Netherlands "respects" Peking's stand that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. This compromise stands somewhere between the noncommittal "take note" formula--introduced at the time of Canada's breakthrough in October 1970--and the one in the Sino-British communique on 13 March quoting London as "acknowledging" Peking's claim to Taiwan.*

Consistent with earlier recognition agreements in which the other side put forth its position on an international issue and the Chinese expressed support, the Netherlands explicitly interpreted the principles of peaceful coexistence as implying noninterference in internal affairs not only between countries of different systems but "equally between countries belonging to an alliance and having identical or similar socio-political systems." Peking stated it "appreciates this stand." Whatever The Hague's motivation, this interpretation directly contradicts both Moscow's orthodox doctrine that peaceful coexistence applies only to countries having different political systems and the "Brezhnev doctrine" according to which countries in the Soviet bloc have limited sovereignty and are subject to Soviet intervention as in the case of Czechoslovakia. Voicing the sentiments of small countries, the Netherlands may have wished to go on record on this matter during this period of negotiations on a European security conference involving relations both between and within the two blocs.

* The Chinese version of the communique used even stronger language on this issue, in effect saying London recognized Peking's claim. There was no such divergence between the Chinese and English texts of the PRC-Netherlands communique.

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There is no problem for the Chinese in accepting the interpretation advanced by the Netherlands. As early as 1970, in the context of improving Sino-Yugoslav relations, Peking declared that the principles of peaceful coexistence should apply whether countries have the same or different political systems. Peking had enunciated a similar doctrine in the 1950's when it played a mediating role in intrabloc conflict resolution.

UN AGENCIES Peking has recently focused attention on the China representation issue in the numerous intergovernmental organizations associated with the United Nations, stressing that these bodies must be purged of all ties with the ROC. The PRC representative to the UN Economic and Social Council summed up the Chinese position in a speech on 15 May that criticized the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization for continued association with the Taipei government and went on to demand immediate expulsion of ROC representatives from all such UN organizations. Peking has also been devoting considerable attention to its recent successes in this regard, as reflected in an NCNA account on the 10th which applauded the expulsion of the ROC and the seating of Peking's representatives by the World Health Organization and took note of eight other intergovernmental organizations that had earlier taken similar action. Peking is even pressing for the removal of the ROC from those bodies in which the PRC does not seek participation. Thus, PRC representative Lin Chi-hsin at the UNCTAD conference in Santiago on 21 May denounced the International Monetary Fund as an unworkable organization that cannot achieve equality between large and small states, but he went on to assert that ROC participation in the IMF is "illegal and invalid."

In a related move, Peking on 5-7 May hosted the founding meeting of the Asian Table Tennis Union, devoting great attention to the event including a speech by Chou En-lai on the 7th and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 9th. As described in Peking's comment, the new, "truly representative" organization will enhance Peking's unity with the rest of Asia, in contrast to the existing Asian Table Tennis Federation, which includes the ROC and other pariah states and which PEOPLE'S DAILY described as "under the control of a handful of persons" and "an obstacle to friendly contacts."

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EGYPT - USSR

CAIRO, MOSCOW PRODUCE DIFFERING COMMUNIQUES ON GRECHKO VISIT

Moscow and Cairo media carried markedly different versions of the communique on Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's 14-17 May visit to Egypt. While the differences do not fall into a clearcut pattern, and many of them alone seem meaningless, their scope and number are remarkable, and the general explanation appears to lie in disarray stemming from strains between Moscow and Cairo on the eve of the U.S.-Soviet summit. The two sides' versions of such joint documents normally contain only minor discrepancies, most of them traceable to translation. The chief difference between the two versions of the communique on Grechko's last previous visit to Egypt, 18-21 February, was in Cairo's use of the phrase "combat ability" where Moscow used "defense capacity." This time, unaccountably, a version of the communique described as "text" by Cairo radio on 18 May, and also carried by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) and AL-AHRAM, differed on several substantive counts from various Soviet reports--the fullest, and ostensibly complete, one in the military paper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the 18th* and two shorter accounts carried by TASS and PRAVDA.

Grechko's visit was described by Cairo as "official and friendly" where Moscow called it only "friendly"; yet Moscow said talks were held in an atmosphere of "full mutual understanding, trust, and friendship," while Cairo described the atmosphere less effusively as one of "understanding and mutual friendship." At the same time, Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and War Minister Sadiq was reported by Cairo radio as saying, after his talks with Grechko on the 15th, that "views on the military situation were exchanged" during the meeting in an atmosphere of "friendship, full cordiality, and mutual understanding." Grechko was received by as-Sadat on 14 May and had talks with Sadiq in Cairo on the 15th and in Alexandria on the 16th and 17th.

* The Soviet military paper did not specifically identify its version as a "text" but prefaced it with: A communique published here states:"

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In the most notable of the discrepancies, Moscow went further than Cairo in describing the results of the military talks, but balanced its references to Soviet-Egyptian military cooperation with a reference to Security Council Resolution 242 which was absent from the Egyptian version. Moscow also recalled the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, which Cairo did not mention; but it failed to cite the 29 April communique on as-Sadat's last visit to Moscow, while Cairo pointedly reiterated that document's assertion of what Egypt calls the Arabs' "right" to use "various means" to retrieve the occupied territories. (The Soviet version of the April communique, as rendered by TASS in English, used the phrase "have every reason to use other means." Moscow has since used a variety of similar formulations, including references to Egypt's "right" to resort to "different means" or "other measures.")

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT There were differing overall appraisals of the Middle East situation. Moscow hewed to its established line, with its version of the communique declaring that "both sides reaffirmed their governments' determination" to seek a just settlement on the basis of fulfillment of all clauses of Resolution 242, particularly of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967. Although Cairo had subscribed to a reference to the Security Council resolution in the 29 April communique, the Egyptian version of the current document failed to include this passage. Instead, Cairo said that "the views of both sides were in agreement" in their appraisal of the situation in which Israel's "aggressive policy," backed by "U.S. political, military, and economic support," is still the main cause of exacerbation of the grave situation. A similar assertion had appeared in the 29 April communique.

The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and TASS versions carried a watered-down version of this assertion, truncating and thereby in effect moderating the reference to the U.S. role: These versions thus ascribed the continuing tense situation simply to "the U.S.-supported Israeli aggression" against the Arabs. PRAVDA's version on 18 May, otherwise virtually identical to TASS', deleted the reference altogether, thereby divesting it--on the eve of the U.S.-Soviet summit--of any mention of the United States in any context. In a roundabout fashion, a Demchenko article in the 5 May PRAVDA had also seemed to softpedal past charges against the United States. Like other commentators,

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Demchenko referred routinely to U.S. assistance to Israel, but he also went to some lengths to recall, but not identify, a Soviet Government statement "warning Israel" of the responsibility it incurred by thwarting a political settlement. The statement in question--long unmentioned in Soviet propaganda--was that of 22 March 1968. Demchenko skipped over the subsequent, and most recent, government statement of 28 February 1971 which had held that the U.S. Government "shares responsibility" with Israel for the Middle East situation.

In general comment associated with President Nixon's visit, including PRAVDA's 21 May editorial, Moscow has again insisted on the need for a political settlement in the Middle East. And a Radiani international review in the same issue of PRAVDA, calling the path of negotiation and political settlement of acute international problems the "sole rational and acceptable course," saw "an increasingly obvious need for a political settlement" of the Middle East conflict. A Ryzhikov domestic service commentary on the 10th in effect cautioned the Arabs not to take any rash decisions. The situation in the region, he said, "is too serious for any decisions and actions capable of sharply changing the state of affairs in that region not to be thought out and weighed in all the capitals concerned."

Conveying Egyptian apprehension over the results of the Moscow summit for the Middle East, AL-AHRAM on 19 May reported a seminar held under its auspices at which speakers displayed concern lest Moscow, as well as Washington, continue to be content with the "no war, no peace" situation. Two participants called for a "new dialog" with the Soviets which foreign ministry official Isma'il Fahmi said "must be of a new and special type, free of any threats." And AL-AHRAM on the 24th, according to MENA, revealed a Soviet-Egyptian "agreement" that Cairo be informed of all developments in the summit talks regarding the Middle East issue. Agreement was reached during as-Sadat's April visit to Moscow, the paper said, on "full coordination" between Cairo and Moscow with respect to President Nixon's visit.

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MILITARY TALKS Both the Soviet and Egyptian versions of the communique on Grechko's visit noted the two sides' "satisfaction" with their military cooperation, but only Moscow claimed that it was developing successfully in accordance with the Soviet-Egyptian treaty.* Both reported "an exchange of opinions" on strengthening and further developing military cooperation, but only Cairo explained that this was in order to enhance the Egyptian armed forces' "fighting capabilities" in accordance with the 29 April communique, which asserted the Arabs' right "to use various means" to regain the occupied Arab territories. But Radio Moscow's Arab listeners were assured, in a commentary broadcast on the 18th, of their right to use "other means." And a 21 May KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article reflected Arab pressures on this point, taking note of Arab impatience with the stalemated situation in terms reminiscent of Brezhnev's remark, in his 20 March trade union congress speech, that "sober-minded politicians" could hardly hope the Arabs would put up indefinitely with the occupation of their territories. The Soviet military paper observed that the Arabs' patience was not unlimited and said they had every reason to "make use of other methods" to regain their lands.

Moscow's version of the communique added that the two sides "coordinated practical steps aimed at implementing the agreement on further increasing Egypt's military potential reached during President as-Sadat's last visit" to the USSR.**

* A CPSU delegation now on a two-week visit to Egypt, returning a two-week visit to the USSR in March by an Arab Socialist Union (ASU) delegation, will attend an ASU celebration on the 27th marking the first anniversary of the treaty, according to MENA. TASS on the 23d reported a meeting at Friendship House in Moscow in honor of the occasion.

** The corresponding passage in the 29 April communique was couched in vague language, declaring that the two sides "found it necessary to study again" measures directed at protecting the Arab peoples' lawful rights and interests, particularly "by way of further increasing Egypt's military potential." It added that the sides "reached agreement on a further strengthening of military cooperation between them. The implementation of appropriate measures in this direction was arranged."

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MILITARY INSPECTIONS Other variations occurred in the respective reports of military inspections during the visit. The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA account of the communique noted that Grechko, accompanied by as-Sadat, visited an Egyptian air force unit and that in connection with "the presence in Alexandria of a detachment of Soviet warships on a friendly visit," Grechko and Sadiq "toured these ships." Cairo's rendering of the communique mentioned only the visit to the Egyptian air force base, although Egyptian news reports did note the inspection of the warships.

Reporting the air base visit, TASS on the 16th said Grechko and as-Sadat "viewed military equipment" and expressed satisfaction with the Egyptian pilots' successes in mastering "up-to-date equipment." President as-Sadat, TASS said, expressed confidence that the Egyptian air force would fulfill its duty "in case of need" and "defend the Egyptian people's legitimate rights" against imperialist aggressors. MENA, however, said as-Sadat and Grechko expressed great admiration both for the pilots' ability to absorb the "complex modern equipment" and "for the great combat skill they displayed."

Moscow apparently made no mention of honors awarded to Grechko and members of his delegation by the Egyptians: MENA said that as-Sadat on the 15th awarded Egypt's highest military medals to Grechko and Marshal Kutakhov, commander in chief of the USSR Air Force, and that after the final round of talks in Alexandria Sadiq presented medals on behalf of as-Sadat to Grechko and Kutakhov as well as to Admiral Gorshkov, commander in chief of the Soviet Navy.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SHELEST'S DEMOTION UNDERSCORES BREZHNEV'S POWER

The 21 May TASS announcement that Ukrainian party First Secretary Shelest has been appointed Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers provided a dramatic display of Brezhnev's power on the eve of the summit. Like the removal of Voronov as RSFSR Premier last July, the demotion of Shelest represents a major blow to Brezhnev's opponents, though not a fatal one since the latter remain on the CPSU Politburo. Although the nature of Shelest's challenge to Brezhnev is unclear from the public record, the timing of the move against him--on the heels of a CPSU plenum that endorsed Brezhnev's "peace" program--will no doubt be read in party circles as a sign that the issues in dispute related to foreign rather than domestic affairs.

As Ukrainian party boss since 1963, Shelest gained prominence as an uncompromising hardliner, particularly on foreign affairs--a reputation that owes much to his bellicose stand during the 1968 Czech crisis. More recently, however, Shelest's pronouncements on foreign affairs have been in line with the prevailing consensus. For example, while continuing to refer to "imperialists" in bellicose terms, Shelest as recently as last October in East Berlin supported Brezhnev's moves toward detente with West Germany, explicitly endorsing the Soviet-FRG treaty, the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, and the Brandt-Brezhnev talks.

On the domestic side, Shelest has on more than one occasion shown coolness toward Brezhnev personally, as well as reservations toward the latter's consumer welfare program. More importantly, he has vied intensively with Brezhnev's Ukrainian proteges over control of the Ukrainian apparatus. Though apparently not faced with any imminent threat to his position, Shelest seemed to have lost ground in this fight after mid-1970, as his rivals gained control over key Ukrainian posts. The influence of Brezhnev's proteges, led by Premier Shcherbitskiy, reached a high point in 1971 when Shcherbitskiy attained a status of virtual equality with Shelest by virtue of his promotion to full membership in the Politburo at the 24th congress.

In recent years Shelest appears to have been particularly vulnerable to criticism of his handling of nationalities and cultural problems. This vulnerability was evidenced by the transfer of a KGB official from Moscow to head the Ukrainian KGB in mid 1970 and by the subsequent crackdown on nationalist dissidents, which culminated in a wave of arrests early this year. Criticism of Shelest was also implicit in the

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repeated attacks on his proteges and cohorts in the Ukrainian cultural apparatus for laxity in enforcing ideological discipline among writers. As a result of these attacks, Shelest launched a cultural crackdown last year which led to the ouster of the liberal leadership of the Ukrainian writers union.

CONSERVATIVE TAKES OVER SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE

PRAVDA on 16 May identified Sverdlovsk philosophy professor M.N. Rutkevich as new director of the Institute for Concrete Social Research, replacing the liberal A.M. Rumyantsev who headed the controversial institute from its foundation in mid-1968 until last year. The institute was established as a center for empirical sociological studies, but its unorthodox works have been under constant attack by doctrinaire party ideologists in rival institutions. The appointment of Rutkevich appears to signify a downgrading of the institute, since he lacks Rumyantsev's prestigious credentials as a member of the CPSU Central Committee and an academic leader. The appointment coincides with other indications of a general tightening of ideological controls in the social sciences.

Rumyantsev's removal was revealed in the 1971 yearbook of the LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA (signed to press on 6 October 1971), which listed him as director of the institute in 1968-71 and a member of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences from August 1971 on. Although Rumyantsev was re-elected to the Central Committee at the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971, his removal from the institute was foreshadowed by his failure to gain re-election as Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences at the May 1971 general meeting of the academy (he was retained on its 41-man presidium). Although the yearbook failed to identify Rumyantsev's replacement, it carried a brief biography of Rutkevich, which identified him as a professor at Ural University and the Ural scientific center. The inclusion of this biography in a publication normally reserved for prominent officials was the first sign that Rutkevich was being groomed for higher office.

The elevation of a conservative and relatively obscure philosopher over the heads of the liberal deputy directors of the institute, F.M. Burlatskiy and G.V. Osipov, clearly represents a setback for the forces of enlightenment in the social sciences. Rutkevich's orthodox leanings were revealed shortly after the formation of the institute, when he sided with other conservatives in warning

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against attempts to create a sociology independent of Marxist philosophy (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 3 August 1968). At the age of 55, Rutkevich has been a professor at Ural University in Sverdlovsk since 1953 and head of its dialectical materialism department and dean of its philosophy faculty since 1966. In the latter capacity, he instituted a course in sociology, began training sociologists, and sponsored the publication of a sociological journal (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 19 December 1969). He may owe his recent advancement to acquaintance with CPSU Politburo member Kirilenko, who headed the Sverdlovsk party organization from 1955 to 1962.

**CONTROVERSIAL
RESEARCH CENTER**

The Institute for Concrete Social Research was organized in mid-1968 following the publication of the August 1967 Central Committee decree on improving work in the social sciences. The appointment of Rumyantsev as director clearly enhanced the prestige of the new institution. A former chief editor of PRAVDA and KOMMUNIST and a member of the Central Committee, Rumyantsev had gained renown as a liberal spokesman. In an 8 June 1968 IZVESTIYA article Rumyantsev, Burlatskiy, and Osipov indicated that the pioneer institute would aspire to leadership in sociology, coordinating all Soviet research in this field and employing empirical and mathematical-statistical methods not previously used in the USSR.

From the outset the new institute encountered hostility from the rival institutions in the social sciences. For instance, P.N. Fedoseyev, soon after becoming director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in 1967, warned in an October 1967 PARTY LIFE article against efforts to "separate sociology from historical materialism" or even set the first above the second. "Thus," he wrote, "certain scientists think that sociology rests on quantitative methods, while general theory deals with analysis of qualitative changes." Rutkevich, in the above-noted article, echoed Fedoseyev's warnings, observing that the recent "attempts to create some kind of 'new' Marxist sociology outside historical materialism, without it, above it, etc." are based on "misunderstanding of the basic fact that theoretical sociology was created by Marx and Engels and that it is called historical materialism and is a special philosophical science."

The conservative attacks on the institute were accompanied by organizational and personnel changes in the social sciences. In November 1970 a Central Committee decree reorganized the Academy of Social Sciences; a new director, M.T. Iovchuk, was installed and several new departments (party construction, theory of state

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and law, and theory of methods of ideological work) were created. The academy's deputy director, G. Ye. Glezerman, warned in a March 1971 **KOMMUNIST** article against setting concrete social research against historical materialism and declared that social research could be effective only within the framework of historical materialism. At the May 1971 session of the USSR Academy of Sciences Fedoseyev replaced Rumyantsev as vice president of the academy.

At the 21-23 December 1971 Moscow conference of heads of university social science departments, Fedoseyev said it is "well known" that methodological "errors" had been committed in sociological research--namely, "copying of schemes and models originated in bourgeois sociology, underrating of the general theoretical role of historical materialism, narrowness of statistical-empirical base" (**KOMMUNIST**, No. 1, 1972). But he cautioned against the adoption of a "nihilistic attitude toward concrete sociological research" and called for "serious, deep concrete sociological research based on Marxist-Leninist theory."

On 24 December 1971 a USSR Philosophy Society was formed, with the aging neo-Stalinist philosopher F.V. Konstantinov as president and Rutkevich as one of seven vice presidents. The new society's goals, defined by Fedoseyev in his opening speech at the formative congress, called for intensification of the influence of Marxism-Leninism in the humanities (**QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY**, No. 1, 1972).

Other changes affecting the Institute for Concrete Social Research were later announced. The April 1972 **HERALD OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES** (signed to press 4 April) revealed that the scientific council for problems of concrete social research which supervised the institute had been merged with the scientific council for economic problems of scientific-technical progress and renamed the scientific council for socio-economic and ideological problems of the scientific-technical revolution, with Kosygin's son-in-law D.M. Gvishiani as chairman. Moreover, the scientific council for information in the field of social sciences was abolished at this time and its functions were transferred to the Institute for Scientific Information on Social Sciences, created in 1968.

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OKINAWA REVERSION

TERMS OF AGREEMENT SHARPLY DENOUNCED IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

The reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administrative control on 15 May has drawn hostile comment from Peking, Moscow, and the Japan CP. In condemning the terms of the reversion agreement, Peking has used the occasion to reiterate its claim to sovereignty over the Senkakus. Moscow denounced the Okinawan agreement for failing to provide for a complete U.S. military withdrawal from the island and warned of deepening Japanese involvement "in the struggle in the Far East and Southeast Asia under U.S. leadership for U.S. interests." The Japan CP faulted the agreement for "violating the national demand of unconditional and full return of Okinawa" and called for "abolishment of the treasonous and aggressive clauses of the agreement."

PEKING While minimizing the U.S. role, Peking has seized upon the reversion of Okinawa to Japan to breathe new life into its longstanding polemical campaign against the Sato Government. The main thrust of an 18 May PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, for example, was that since several U.S. military bases still remain on the island the Japanese Government could not rightfully claim that it had achieved "reversion of Okinawa to the fatherland." Avoiding any reference to the Nixon Doctrine, which once figured prominently in Chinese comment on U.S.-Japanese relations, Commentator claimed that "Okinawa continues to be an important bridgehead of U.S. imperialism for its aggression in Asia" and that the "propaganda of the reactionary Sato Government that Okinawa would become an 'island of peace' can fool nobody."

Commentator took sharp issue with the reversion agreement for including the Senkakus in the area of reversion. Terming this part of the agreement "a serious encroachment on China's territory and sovereignty," the article warned that "the plot of anyone to occupy and annex China's territory will never succeed." Reflecting Peking's sensitivity on this issue, the article specifically castigated the Sato Government for "declaring that ships of its maritime security force will be sent to 'patrol' these islands." Like last December's PRC Foreign Ministry statement which authoritatively asserted Peking's claim to sovereignty over the Senkakus, however, the article did not outline any Chinese course of action and linked recovery of the disputed islands to the eventual incorporation of Taiwan.

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Peking's current interest in assuming a more flexible posture toward Japan--a tactical move aimed at influencing the China policy of Sato's eventual successor--was reflected in the article's failure to follow the usual line of connecting Okinawa's reversion to a portrayal of Japan as an expanding military threat. Last June's agreement formalizing plans for the reversion of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands to Japanese administrative control had triggered, for example, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which speculated that the signing of the reversion agreement "by the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries" has brought "their military collusion to the new stage of building up a joint operational system in preparation for an aggressive war."

MOSCOW Soviet commentaries have sought to focus attention on alleged shortcomings in the terms of the reversion agreement in an apparent effort to provide more fuel for the ongoing campaign, originally launched during Foreign Minister Gromyko's January visit to Japan, aimed at stimulating Japanese interest in closer economic cooperation with the USSR. An Afonin commentary broadcast in Japanese by Radio Moscow on 15 May, for example, asserted that as a result of the return of Okinawa to Japan "the number of foreign bases in Japan has drastically increased" and "the scale of military operations to be carried out from them has been enlarged." Afonin portrayed the terms of reversion as "an important factor in materializing Nixon's 'Guam Doctrine'" which "is aimed at making Washington's allies in Asia participate more positively in the imperialists' aggressive strategy in this area." Touching on an extremely sensitive Japanese domestic issue, Afonin claimed that Japan has no means of confirming the removal of nuclear weapons on Okinawa and forcefully argued that "recent developments in U.S.-Japanese relations show that the United States does not consider it necessary to inform Japan, its ally, in advance of any decision which is very important to its foreign policy." "If the same method is adopted in connection with U.S. nuclear weapons on Okinawa," Afonin continued, "there is a danger that Japan will be turned into a U.S. nuclear base."

Afonin sounded similar themes on 13 May when he told his Japanese audience that "what Japan is to obtain on 15 May is not just Okinawa Prefecture" but that "about 100 new military bases will accompany it." This fact, according to the commentator, "will involve Japan more and more in cooperation and complicity in the barbarous U.S. aggression." Rubbing in the point that "the

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Japanese people learned more than once last year that the United States does not bother to consult with Japan even on important economic, political, and other problems which directly concern Japan's interests," Afonin asserted "that there are aspects in the Okinawa problem which are hidden from public opinion both at home and abroad" and predicted that the "prior consultation arrangements under the Japan-U.S. security treaty" will not effectively control the activities of U.S. forces within Japan.

JAPAN CP Reiterating familiar propaganda themes on Okinawan reversion, the JCP issued a formal statement on 15 May which pointed to recent U.S. moves in Vietnam as evidence of the "treasonous and aggressive nature" of the reversion agreement. Denouncing Washington for "intensifying the bombing of North Vietnam and challenging the world's peace and nations' sovereignty by blockading the DRV," the statement portrayed the terms of the agreement as "going along with the Nixon Doctrine" and as "forcing Japan to accept the continuous presence of huge U.S. military bases on Okinawa and closer collaboration with the U.S. war program in the Far East."

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