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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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29 MARCH 1972

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
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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

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**Confidential**

29 MARCH 1972  
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 13)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 20 - 26 MARCH 1972

<u>Moscow (2615 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1502 items)</u>		
AUCCTU 15th Congress*	(3%)	47%	Indochina	(22%)	35%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	26%]	[FUNK Anniversary	(--)	23%]
[Middle East	(--)	2%]	[Sihanouk Return	(5%)	4%]
Statement			to Peking		
[Indochina	(--)	1%]	[Vietnam	(3%)	4%]
Statement			Domestic Issues	(41%)	32%
[Northern Ireland	(--)	1%]	Husayn Proposal on	(7%)	8%
Statement			Jordan Federation		
Indochina	(14%)	7%	Egyptian Government	(--)	3%
[Solidarity Week	(10%)	3%]	Delegation in PRC		
China	(6%)	4%	UN Seabed Discussion	(1%)	3%
Middle East	(2%)	5%			
Northern Ireland	(1%)	2%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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\* Publicity for the three AUCCTU statements is also included in the figures for Indochina, Middle East and Northern Ireland. The figure for Brezhnev represents both rebroadcasts of the speech and supporting comment.

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## INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist media reacted cautiously to the U.S. decision, announced by Ambassador Porter on 23 March, not to hold the weekly sessions of the Paris talks unless there are indications that serious negotiations will take place. The first Hanoi press comment came on the 27th, three days after President Nixon's press conference statement that he had personally directed Porter's move. High-level official reaction came belatedly on the 28th in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement, which echoed earlier comment in scoring the President's decision as an act calculated to wreck the negotiations. Most notably, the statement condemned the unilateral disclosure of the DRV-U.S. private talks and declared that "thus, it is the United States that has sabotaged all avenues of negotiations" with the DRV. A PRG Foreign Ministry statement on the 29th came out in "full agreement" with the DRV statement.

Hanoi media announced on the 27th that the second session of the DRV's Fourth National Assembly had been held from 20 to 25 March. Publicity for the session--attended by party First Secretary Le Duan as well as by top-level government officials--included the revelation that the party Central Committee had held its 20th plenum "early this year." Premier Pham Van Dong, delivering the government report on the 20th, sharply assailed the "Nixon Administration" for obstructing negotiations but did not explicitly criticize the President.

Peking's propaganda on Indochina has been dominated by heavy play for the anniversary of Sihanouk's front. Peking's attention to Vietnam has been confined largely to reports of DRV comment, including a substantial summary of Pham Van Dong's National Assembly speech and accounts of Hanoi comment on U.S. "sabotage" of the Paris talks. Consistent with PRC media's cautious treatment of the United States, these reports omit Hanoi's strongest denunciations of President Nixon.

The recent visit of a Soviet military delegation led by the air defense forces commander was given extensive publicity by Hanoi, while Moscow all but ignored it. Hanoi took the occasion to praise Soviet military aid and said the delegation's visit will encourage the war effort in both parts of Vietnam.

## DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY CALLS U.S. DECISION ON PARIS "SABOTAGE"

The U.S. decision to suspend automatic holding of the weekly Paris sessions was at first acknowledged by Hanoi only in the VNA account

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of the 23 March session. VNA said that "the U.S. delegate today took an extremely serious act of sabotage by proposing to postpone indefinitely the Paris conference on Vietnam, and insolently declared that the United States would agree to resume the conference only when the DRV and FRG sides have put forward 'serious' proposals." VNA thus ignored Ambassador Porter's statement that the decision not to participate in a session on the 30th was related to the President's decree on the week of national concern for U.S. prisoners of war.\* It similarly ignored his statement that the allied side intends to suggest meetings to discuss particular points or subjects whenever such discussions seem likely to be useful.

The Vietnamese communist delegates had delivered their prepared statements before Ambassador Porter spoke. VNA noted that in additional remarks both PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi and DRV delegate Xuan Thuy "energetically and seriously condemned the Nixon Administration for seeking every way and means to undermine the conference." Thuy was quoted as claiming that "the attitude shown by the U.S. delegate today proves that the Nixon Administration speaks of 'peace' and 'negotiations' while in fact it is blocking negotiations and intensifying" the war. He emphasized that the Nixon Administration "must bear full responsibility for all consequences of its acts of sabotage." (PRG delegation head Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, who arrived in Paris on the 24th after a seven-month absence from the talks, also scored the U.S. proposal as proof of U.S. "sabotage" of the talks.)

Hanoi media were similarly slow to respond to the President's 24 March press conference in which he said that what the United States was trying to do at Paris was break the filibuster and that this was being done at his direction. The communist press spokesmen in Paris on the 25th routinely condemned the President's "sabotage" of the talks, but their remarks were not reported by the media until the 26th. The first substantial comment came on the 27th in a NHAN DAN Commentator article and in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary.

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\* A NHAN DAN commentary on the 28th called the week of national concern a "trick," along with the President's instruction for the U.S. delegation to cease attending the regular sessions. NHAN DAN claimed that the President was positing the Vietnamese people's stand on the POW problem as one of many conditions for a return to the negotiations.

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Commentator reported the President as saying he had directed Ambassador Porter to stop attending the sessions "because the Vietnamese side did not agree to negotiate seriously and took advantage of negotiations to conduct propaganda activities." The article countered with a review of the President's actions beginning with his pre-election promise to end the war in six months, castigating his failure to appoint a chief negotiator between November 1969 and August 1970, and charging that all three negotiators--Lodge, Bruce and Porter--had gone to Paris with "empty briefcases." Commentator routinely repeated the claim that the "essentials" of the U.S. eight-point prop are the same as those of the Vietnamization plan.

A Liberation Radio commentary broadcast on the 28th, on U.S. "sabotage" of the negotiations, was particularly abusive toward Ambassador Porter. It said, among other things, that in appointing Porter the President had chosen a delegation chief who "manifested the nature of a pirate." Porter had achieved a record for cancellation of sessions, the broadcast said, by canceling six meetings in five months. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 27th took the Administration to task for arrogating to itself the right to determine when negotiations are serious or useful. The U.S. decision regarding the Paris sessions, the paper declared, makes it the more obvious that "Nixon has no intention of negotiating."

FOREIGN MINISTRY      The DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the  
STATEMENT              28th echoed the press comment in highlighting  
                                 the President's assertion that Ambassador  
Porter's actions had been at his direction. Unlike the press  
comment, however, the statement seemed directly responsive to the  
President's avowal that the United States "is ready to negotiate  
in public channels or in private channels." As broadcast by  
Hanoi radio in Vietnamese, it said:

The public still recalls the despicable U.S.  
action of unilaterally making public the  
private meetings between the United States  
and the DRV. Thus, it is the United States  
that has sabotaged all avenues of negotiations  
between the United States and the DRV.\*

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\* The VNA English version rendered this sentence: "So doing, the U.S. has blocked all negotiations between it and the DRV."

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While the statement seemed to suggest that Hanoi would not welcome further private discussions, it concluded with a plea for continuation of the Paris talks. It called on the governments and peoples of "the fraternal socialist countries, the peace- and justice-loving countries, the American and world people . . . to condemn the sabotage of the Paris talks, to make the Administration put an end to its Vietnamization policy, continue attending the Paris sessions regularly, engage in serious negotiations, and positively respond to the PRG's seven-point proposal."

#### MOSCOW COMMENTATORS ASSAIL U.S. "SUSPENSION" OF PARIS TALKS

TASS promptly reported Ambassador Porter's decision regarding the Paris talks on the 23d and has carried Vietnamese communist and other foreign comment routinely alleging that this shows that the United States wants to avoid a negotiated settlement. Brief Moscow radio news reports of President Nixon's 24 March press conference singled out his comments on the suspension of the talks, but the TASS report--on 25 March, published in PRAVDA the next day--played down these remarks. Although the President's comments on Paris were part of the first exchange at the press conference, TASS reported them only after highlighting his references to his forthcoming Moscow trip and noting his remarks on other subjects, including the statement that it would not be useful to indicate what was or was not discussed during his visit to Peking. TASS then mentioned briefly that the President said the Paris talks were suspended on his instructions because "the way the talks were going, there was no hope whatsoever."

A report of the press conference in Moscow broadcasts for domestic and foreign audiences, also on the 25th, said the President "tried to justify this unpopular step" by maintaining that the talks as they now stand have no hope of success and represented him as saying the United States will return to the talks only if the DRV and PRG "accede to U.S. conditions." One such "condition," the report claimed, is that charges of U.S. "crimes" in Vietnam be dropped.

A PRAVDA article by Korinov, summarized by TASS on 29 March, called the suspension of the talks a "maneuver" underscoring the "crisis" of American policy in Asia. Korionov added that the week of concern for the POW's being observed in the United States is an "unseemly farce," and he repeated the Vietnamese stand that

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"a deadline for the full withdrawal of American troops would also become a deadline for the release of American POW's." In a 28 March TASS commentary by Kharkov, the President's statement that the United States will suspend the talks until the other side is ready for a serious discussion was described as an "ultimatum"--an effort to dictate terms to the Vietnamese, "as many U.S. newspapers noted."

A TASS dispatch from Hanoi on the 26th said that U.S. refusal to participate in the Paris talks and the continued bombing of the DRV are regarded in "official DRV circles" as evidence of U.S. intent to continue the war and "capture the initiative in the military and diplomatic fields." The U.S. "sabotage" at Paris, TASS added, is "connected with new aggressive plans of the American military." The Hanoi-dated dispatch said "it is noted here" that the United States wants to impose a discussion of such "secondary questions" as that of the POW's while refusing to conduct "serious talks" and to answer the "two main points" of the PRG's seven-point program--a final withdrawal of U.S. troops and a renunciation of support for the Thieu regime. TASS on 25 and 27 March cited the New York TIMES and the Washington POST as concluding that the suspension of the talks shows that the United States does not want a negotiated settlement.

#### DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: LEADERS CONDEMN ADMINISTRATION POLICY

Hanoi media first announced on 27 March that the second session of the DRV's Fourth National Assembly had been held from 20 to 25 March. The first session of the Fourth National Assembly, elected in April 1971, was held 7-10 June 1971.\* In line with standard practice, Truong Chinh, chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, delivered opening remarks and Premier Pham Van Dong delivered the government's political report, which Hanoi radio broadcast on the 27th. DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh presented the reports on military and diplomatic affairs, respectively, and an economic report was read by Vice Premier and Chairman of the State Planning Commission Nguyen Con. Excerpts of Con's three-part report were broadcast on the 28th, and VNA briefly summarized Giap's and Trinh's reports on the 29th. President Ton Duc Thang gave the closing remarks to the assembly on 25 March. In addition to the above mentioned members of the Politburo, Le Duan and Hoang Van Hoan were included in the session's presidium.

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\* See the 16 June 1971 TRENDS, pages 1-8.

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DONG, TRINH ON      Pham Van Dong's political report included a  
U.S. POLICIES      detailed criticism of Nixon Administration  
                         policies. And Foreign Minister Trinh,  
judging from the VNA report of his remarks, also assailed U.S.  
"sabotage" of the negotiations. Although Dong reportedly  
addressed the Assembly session on 20 March, passages in the  
purported text of his speech as broadcast on the 27th read  
like a response to the U.S. action at the Paris session on the  
23d: Thus he is reported to have scored the United States  
not only for unilaterally making public the private U.S.-DRV  
talks, but for "brazenly postponing the open talks for an  
indefinite time, therefore blocking the negotiations."

The substance of Dong's remarks on a political settlement  
pointed up the recent failure of the media to spell out the  
substance of the two points of the PRG proposal elaborated on  
2 February. Dong obscured the nature of the "elaboration"  
when he said:

In the diplomatic field, we have asserted our  
people's positive attitude toward the Paris  
talks on the basis of the seven-point solution  
set forth by the PRG and the nine points of the  
DRV,\* with the recent clarification of the two  
key points known to everyone.

After reiterating Vietnamese "rejection" of the U.S. eight-point  
proposal, without acknowledging its substance, Dong did not go  
on to repeat the PRG's elaborated two points but went back to  
language he had used in his 20 November speech in Peking.\*\*

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\* While Hanoi media publicized the nine-point proposal at the  
end of January, after the President's revelation in his 25 January  
speech, it has since been mentioned only infrequently. It was  
cited in a 2 February NEAN DAN Commentator article and in the  
5 February DRV Government statement supporting the 2 February PRG  
elaboration. Xuan Thuy at the 3 February Paris session said that  
the DRV's stand, which accorded with the PRG's, was outlined in  
the nine points, but the VNA account of the session did not  
report this.

\*\* See the TRENDS of 24 November, pages 5-5.

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He said that the U.S. Government must stop the war, end all acts of war against both parts of Vietnam in all forms and regardless of whence they originate, withdraw totally and unconditionally, dismantle all U.S. military bases, end Vietnamization, and end all support and commitments to the Thieu regime. Dong described these as constituting "the main demand" in the seven-point proposal--"an overall solution, an integral, indivisible whole."

In contrast to Dong's remarks, the 28 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the President's "sabotage" of negotiations repeated some of the substance of the 2 February PRG elaboration. It failed to specify that point one called on the United States to set a definite withdrawal date, saying only that its "essentials" are an end to the war by the United States and complete withdrawal of U.S. troops. But regarding point two, it repeated the specific call for Thieu's "immediate resignation" and "the scrapping of the machine of oppression and repression of the Saigon puppet administration" and establishment of a three-part government of broad national concord to hold elections.

Further inconsistency in spelling out of the elaboration was evidenced in the statements by the communist delegates at the Paris session on the 23d.\* Thus, PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi recalled the demand that the United States set a time limit for withdrawal as well as the call for Thieu's "immediate" resignation, and went on to repeat the procedures for arriving at the formation of a three-component government of "national concord." The VNA account duly reported Thi's remarks, but it glossed over Xuan Thuy's reference to the elaboration. In his text Thuy had spelled out the substance of point one, including the demand that the United States set a date for withdrawal; but he glossed over point two, failing to call for the "immediate" resignation of Thieu or to detail the other demands, saying only that the United States must respect self-determination for the South Vietnamese and stop backing Thieu.

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\* At the 16 March Paris session--the first full session since 10 February--both communist delegates called for a U.S. response to the PRG's seven-point proposal, including the 2 February elaboration, but neither spelled out the substance. This was consistent with the recent general avoidance of the details of the elaboration. See the TRENDS of 22 March 1972, pages 29-30, and 15 March, pages 4-6.

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## DRV LEADERS CLAIM COMMUNIST MILITARY POSITION IMPROVING

Uniformly optimistic appraisals of the military situation in Indochina have marked recent authoritative Hanoi propaganda, including major speeches at the 20-25 March DRV National Assembly session--first publicized on the 27th--and an article by the military commentator "Chien Thang" (The Victor) published in the Hanoi press on the 24th. Thus DRV Defense Minister Giap, according to VNA's brief 29 March account of his assembly speech, maintained that the overall military situation showed "the losing, passive, and downgrading position of the enemy and the victorious, initiative, and upgrading position of the Indochinese peoples." Both Premier Pham Van Dong and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh used similar language in their assembly speeches, pointing to the winning and "upgrading" position of the Vietnamese "people." Chien Thang's article, published while the assembly was in session, was devoted entirely to documenting the validity of the formulation set forth by Giap. It was followed on the 25th by an editorial in NHAN DAN which cited recent military action in Indochina to demonstrate the upward trend of the communist position.

It is possible that the analysis of the military situation put forward by Giap, Chien Thang, and the others originated at the North Vietnamese party Central Committee's 20th plenum which, according to Vice Premier Nguyen Con's report at the assembly session, was held early this year. While the implications for Hanoi's military planning are not spelled out in available versions of the National Assembly speeches, it is noteworthy that the Chien Thang article again calls attention to the importance of large-scale attacks by the regular armed forces--a theme pressed in several authoritative Hanoi commentaries over the past year.

CHIEN THANG ARTICLE      The article by North Vietnamese military commentator Chien Thang, entitled "We Are in an Uptrend Posture, the U.S.-Puppets in a Downward Posture," was summarized by VNA and Hanoi radio on the 24th and said to have been published that day in both the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and the party's NHAN DAN.\*

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\* Chien Thang's articles always appear in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. There are occasional precedents for their appearance in NHAN DAN as well--as in the case of a 2 August 1971 analysis of the dry season fighting, discussed in the 4 August TRENDS, pages 15-17. Chien Thang's last previous discussion of the war was in a series of articles published in the army paper from 11 to 17 December.

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The text of the article is not available, but VNA outlined Chien Thang's point-by-point analysis of the war's trend, contrasting the allies' "losing," "passive," "downward" posture with the communists' "victorious," "initiative," "uptrend" stance. Chronicling the alleged favorable shift on the battlefield, the article contends in standard fashion that the "turning point" came after the 1968 Tet offensive and that the "defeat" last year of Lam Son 719--the "climax" of allied Vietnamization efforts--thwarted U.S. intentions to use the ARVN as the "shock force" in Indochina.

Chien Thang leads off with an evaluation of both sides' regular forces, claiming that the strength of these forces constitutes "the most concentrated and highest expression of the military strength of each belligerent party." Just as he had cited the unique role of main force units in his 2 August article and underlined their importance in his December article, Chien Thang asserts now: "Only with 'big punches' of the regular forces can a party launch major annihilating battles and bring about a clear change in the balance of forces on the battlefield." He holds confidently that "the strongest regular armies of the puppets," supported by U.S. troops, "lost heavily" in "tests of strength" in 1971 with the communists' regular forces. And he maintains that "the backbone of 'Vietnamization'" has been broken "in its most important vertebrae," with the ARVN "unable to stand on its own." By contrast, he says, "the PLAF regulars have made tremendous progress in big-unit operations and in large-scale coordinated actions."

Documenting the claim that the allies are in a passive posture, Chien Thang points out that "since late last year, the Saigon troops have not been able to launch any big operations." In a seeming allusion to ARVN deployments to meet a predicted communist offensive, he asserts that the Saigon troops have in fact been "in constant fear of being attacked" and that the ARVN's "mobile force are scattered in many fronts to assume different tasks." (Communist media in recent months have occasionally referred to allied forecasts of a major enemy offensive. For example, a 19 March Liberation Radio commentary pointed to "worries and panic" among the allies in expectation of an offensive as attesting to the "deceitful" character of U.S. "clamor" about the success of Vietnamization.) Claiming the initiative for the communists, Chien Thang says that the Indochinese armed forces and people have "mounted repeated assaults," forcing the allies to scatter their forces,

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and that the "PLAF regular forces" in South Vietnam "hold firm their initiative in choosing where and when to strike."

Appraising the general trend of the war, Chien Thang asserts that "the Vietnamese people are facing more favorable opportunities than in any previous period." In this context, he points to the significance of the withdrawal of U.S. troops, arguing that the United States "now has only defeated mercenary armies at its disposal" and that the single remaining U.S. "trump card"--its air force and navy--"has long fallen into disrepute."

BACKGROUND        Several Hanoi military commentaries after Lam Son 719 stressed the important role of main force units--a subject that had been virtually ignored in propaganda during the decline in military activity after the 1968 Tet offensive. This line of comment was pursued in other propaganda around the time of Chien Thang's 2 August article, and it was stressed in an October article by the military commentator "Cuu Long" carried in both Hanoi and Front media.\*

Last December Hanoi began to release a major analysis of the relationship of the regular army to the "armed masses" in the form of a four-part article by Defense Minister Giap, entitled "Arm the Revolutionary Masses and Build the People's Army." The first two parts of the article, the only ones available so far, use a lengthy examination of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Vietnam's historic experience to define, and defend, the importance of the regular army's role. This point may also be the keynote of the final two sections, which are said to deal with the past 40 years of the party's experience in arming the masses and building the army and with the task of "strongly and largely arming the masses and building a regular, modern people's armed forces."\*\*

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\* The Cuu Long article is discussed in the 20 October TRENDS, pages 7-9.

\*\* The first section of Giap's article appeared in the December issue of the army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine and the January issue of the party journal HOC TAP. The second part was published in the January issue of the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine and in the February issue of the party organ.

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At a much lower level, the relationship between the use of large and small forces was one of the subjects broached in a round-table discussion "organized" by Hanoi radio and the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, broadcast in several installments from 19 through 30 December and again from 14 through 23 March.\* The panelists stressed the interdependent nature of guerrilla warfare and "concentrated" fighting. While they held that concentrated fighting is "steadily growing on a larger scale," they pointed out that small units can in some circumstances be as effective as large ones.

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\* In December Hanoi radio said it was broadcasting the round-table to mark Vietnamese communist anniversaries that month. The rebroadcast in March was keyed to the 19 March anti-U.S. resistance day anniversary. Hanoi has broadcast similar round-table discussions of military issues on at least two other occasions--from 26 August to 5 September and from 26 July to 3 August 1971. See the 4 August TRENDS, pages 15-17.

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## HANOI HIGHLIGHTS, MOSCOW PLAYS DOWN SOVIET MILITARY VISIT

In an evident effort to underscore Soviet support for the DRV's military capabilities, Hanoi devoted considerable publicity to the visit of a Soviet military delegation strongly weighted with air defense officers. In contrast to Hanoi's extensive publicity, however, Moscow has all but ignored the delegation's visit, thus bypassing a chance to play up Soviet backing for the North Vietnamese military effort against the United States.

On 26 March VNA reported a DRV Defense Ministry communique announcing that a Soviet military delegation headed by Marshal P.F. Batitskiy, CPSU Central Committee member, deputy defense minister, and commander in chief of the Soviet air defense forces, had arrived for a "friendship visit," but it did not specify the date of arrival. On the 28th VNA reported that the delegation had concluded its visit and had been seen off by DRV military leaders, again without specifying the date. According to VNA, the delegation included a political officer in the armed forces, the commander of the air defense missile forces, and the head of the air defense radar forces.

Though no similar Soviet military delegations had previously been reported to have visited the DRV, military leaders of a rank comparable to Batitskiy's have been included in delegations led by top Soviet leaders. When Kosygin visited the DRV in February 1965, Marshal K.A. Vershinin, a deputy defense minister and air force commander, was in the delegation. The Soviet delegation led by Shelepin in January 1966 included Col. Gen. V.F. Tolubko, at that time the first deputy commander of the Soviet missile forces. When Podgorny visited the DRV last October, Senior Gen. Sokolov, first deputy defense minister, was a member of the delegation.

Hanoi's extensive publicity for the Batitskiy delegation's visit included a NHAN DAN editorial on 27 March and VNA reports that day of talks with DRV Defense Minister Giap and other military leaders, a reception hosted by Giap, and a DRV Defense Ministry banquet. On the 28th VNA reported a meeting with Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, a Hanoi "grand meeting," and a "grand reception" hosted by the Soviet delegation. On the 29th VNA reported that the delegation had called on the special representation of the PRG. VNA did not report the dates any of these activities took place. The VNA press review of the 28th said that the Soviet delegation got "considerable frontpage space" with reports and

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photos of its activities. On the 29th the press review said that "much space" was devoted to this "major event." This treatment contrasts with the modest publicity given to the 25 February to 4 March visits to the DRV of USSR Minister of Culture Furtseva and Minister of the Maritime Fleet Guzhenko.

In Moscow's sole reportage on the military delegation's visit, a brief TASS dispatch on the 27th cited the DRV Defense Ministry's announcement of the delegation's arrival. Unlike the DRV announcement, TASS named only Batitskiy as a member of the delegation. The delegation was mentioned in passing on the 29th when the Moscow domestic service broadcast a dispatch from its Hanoi correspondent pegged to the DRV National Assembly session. Reporting praise for North Vietnamese military exploits expressed at the session, the dispatch observed that the DRV is equipped with Soviet weapons, specifically antiaircraft missiles. Citing DRV expressions of gratitude for Soviet aid, the dispatch briefly mentioned the NHAN DAN editorial on the Soviet military delegation's visit.

VNA's 27 March report of the talks with Giap and other military leaders said that they took place in an atmosphere of "friendship and fraternal militant solidarity," but the report the next day of the meeting with Le Duan and Pham Van Dong did not characterize its atmosphere. At Giap's reception, reported on the 27th, Batitskiy was quoted by VNA as saying that the Soviet people and armed forces "stand squarely on the side of" the Vietnamese and other Indochinese people in their fight against the "U.S. imperialist aggressors." In language similar to that used by Brezhnev in his major foreign policy address on 20 March, Batitskiy added that the Soviets "consider it their international duty to sympathize with, support, and assist that fight. The Soviet Union will certainly fulfill her international duty." Giap, in turn, thanked the USSR for its "great, precious, and effective assistance." At the defense ministry banquet Giap added in standard fashion that Soviet assistance is given "in the spirit of proletarian internationalism."

In its 28 March reports of activities, VNA attributed somewhat less effusive language to the speakers. The political commissar of the DRV air defense and air force, speaking at the Hanoi meeting, was quoted as thanking the USSR for its "support," and Batitskiy reaffirmed Soviet "support." Giap was quoted briefly, expressing the Vietnamese people's "sincere feelings" toward the Soviet Union. At the reception he hosted, Batitskiy expressed his

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firm belief in "the constant consolidation and development of the fraternal friendship and solidarity" of the Soviet and Vietnamese peoples and armed forces. Giap emphasized that the Soviet delegation's visit proved that the USSR and other communist countries "were always standing with" the Vietnamese people and helping them to defeat U.S. aggression.

The NHAN DAN editorial of the 27th expressed satisfaction over the results of the visit and praised Soviet military assistance. According to the editorial, the visit "will certainly further tighten the militant unity" between the DRV and the USSR, and it will "contribute toward motivating and encouraging" the people and armed forces "in both parts of our country to resolutely persevere in and increase our anti-U.S. national salvation resistance" in behalf of Vietnamese independence, "the socialist camp's security," and the world revolutionary cause.\* Citing the "many" accords signed in the past on Soviet aid, the editorial said this "valuable support and aid" based on proletarian internationalism has "greatly contributed to our people's great victories."

The editorial concluded by stressing the importance of Soviet-DRV friendship and unity in language that could be read as expressing some concern. Thus, it said the Vietnamese "are incessantly endeavoring to strengthen this friendship" and "sincerely hope that the militant unity . . . will be increasingly strengthened and developed." References to solidarity are more often in a sloganized form ("May the friendship and militant solidarity develop . . ."), but Le Duan last October, at the time of Podgorny's visit, declared that the party and government "will do their best to foster the great friendship and militant solidarity" with the Soviets.

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\* It is standard Hanoi practice to refer to the Indochina war as contributing to the security of the socialist camp. For example, Le Duan did so in a 4 October speech during Podgorny's visit.

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## PROPAGANDA FANFARE MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF SIHANOUK'S FRONT

Peking and Hanoi have marked the 23 March second anniversary of the formation of Sihanouk's front (FUNK) and liberation army (CNPLAF) with a propaganda fanfare and show of support exceeding that of last year. Moscow has also given the occasion somewhat more attention than last year, although it has limited itself to routine-level comment in keeping with its more distant relations with Sihanouk's Peking-based movement.

PEKING Initial Peking propaganda had included a banquet on the 19th--marking the anniversary of Sihanouk's arrival in Peking as well as of the FUNK and CNPLAF--attended by the entire array of fully active Chinese Politburo members and a Chinese leaders' message.\* This was followed by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial; a speech by the Prime Minister of Sihanouk's government, Penn Nouth, at a 22 March Peking "report meeting" sponsored by Chinese public organizations; and a banquet on the 23d hosted by Sihanouk--an event not included in last year's celebrations--at which the prince and Chou En-lai echoed points they made in speeches at the 19 March banquet. On the 19th Chou had set the tone of this year's celebrations by calling Sihanouk the Chinese people's "closest friend."

VIETNAMESE Like Peking, the Vietnamese communists accorded the  
COMMUNISTS FUNK and CNPLAF anniversaries more publicity than last year. This included observance of a "week of solidarity" with the Cambodian people, messages from DRV and PRG leaders and defense ministers, and editorials. The Cambodian ambassador held a banquet attended by Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap and addressed by Nguyen Duy Trinh; Giap and others addressed a Hanoi "grand meeting." A "grand meeting" was also held in the South Vietnam "liberated zone." Last year the anniversary had been publicized only by leaders' messages, editorials, and a Hanoi press conference by the Cambodian ambassador.

As in 1971, the DRV and PRG leaders' messages praised the victories of the Cambodian "patriots" and lauded the fighting solidarity of the Indochinese peoples. The DRV message, sent this year by President Ton Duc Thang and Premier Pham Van Dong (last year's

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\* The initial propaganda is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 March, pages 23-25.

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message having been sent only from Thang), inexplicably failed to recall the declaration of the Indochinese summit conference or to praise Sihanouk's five-point program as the message did last year, but these points appeared in other Hanoi propaganda. The PRG message, again sent by Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat, recalled the Indochinese summit conference but failed to mention Sihanouk's five-point program. Messages from the DRV and PRG defense ministers to Khieu Samphan, the defense minister in Sihanouk's government, were new this year.\*

**MOSCOW** Moscow gave the anniversary somewhat more publicity than last year, although still limiting itself to routine-level attention. While last year there had been no press comment and only a few foreign-language radio commentaries, this year articles appeared in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR on the 23rd, and TASS that day briefly reported a Moscow "public meeting" attended by "diplomatic staff of the embassies of a number of Asian countries." Unidentified speakers were quoted as having said that the formation of the FUNK was a "turning point" in the Cambodian people's struggle and a manifestation of their resolve to give a rebuff to "U.S. imperialism's criminal aggression." A resolution adopted at the meeting expressed the "Soviet people's" condemnation of U.S. aggression in Indochina and their "full support" for the struggle of the peoples of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos.

Consistent with normal practice, Moscow's comment on the anniversary failed to mention either Sihanouk or his government (RGNU). However, the RGNU was mentioned in a 15 March PRAVDA report of an interview with Ieng Sary--not connected with the anniversary--which originally appeared in the VIETNAM COURIER, a Hanoi weekly published in English and French. PRAVDA duly reported his title of "special representative of the FUNK and RGNU," and it quoted him as saying that "the leaders of the FUNK and RGNU" are veterans of the liberation struggle, exercise "collective leadership," and "stick to the political line of the FUNK." Moscow has mentioned the RGNU since its founding in May 1970 only on rare occasions, usually in connection with Moscow stopovers of traveling RGNU officials.

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\* These messages were devoted to the CNPLAF anniversary. This anniversary was included in the celebrations in Peking for the first time this year, but the Chinese have not sent defense minister's messages since the downfall of Lin Piao.

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Also consistent with Moscow's usual practice, most of the anniversary comment failed to attack Lon Nol by name. The IZVESTIYA article was exceptional for its attack on Lon Nol for his various steps to establish "an overt military dictatorship," particularly his 10 March proclamation of himself as President. Moscow had previously attacked this proclamation, for example in a 17 March PRAVDA article, but it has rarely attacked Lon Nol personally in the past, normally reserving its criticism for the "Phnom Penh regime."

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## CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

## PEKING MAINTAINS SILENCE; MOSCOW PUBLICIZES RADIATION THREAT

PRC media have remained silent on the 14th Chinese nuclear test, reported by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to have been detonated in the atmosphere on 18 March. Two earlier monitored Chinese tests had gone unannounced by Peking--those of 24 December 1967 and 14 October 1970. Peking's longest delay in announcing its tests followed the eighth and ninth tests of 23 and 29 September 1969, both of which NCNA publicized for the first time on 4 October. Most announcements have been made by Peking on the day of the experiment or within a day or two. Thus the 7 January 1972 detonation, the last previous one and the 11th to be announced, was acknowledged by NCNA on 9 January; and the test conducted on 18 November 1971 was reported in PRC media on the 19th.

Moscow and its hardlining East European allies have promptly publicized the latest Chinese test, as has Ulan Bator. In the absence of a Chinese acknowledgment of the test, Bucharest, Tirana, Hanoi, and Pyongyang have all followed protocol and stayed silent.

SOVIET COVERAGE      In the pattern of Soviet media's treatment of the November 1971 and January 1972 Chinese tests, TASS and Radio Moscow promptly reported the 18 March experiment on the 19th, citing the Atomic Energy Commission.\* Also in the pattern introduced in November, Moscow media have given wide play to expressions of concern over attendant radiation hazards. Thus Moscow has reported the customary Japanese protests and has noted the increased radiation levels in Japan and areas to the east, including the United States. A Moscow commentary beamed to Southeast Asia in Mandarin on the 23d pointed to "the destructive effects of the lethal radioactive

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\* Moscow cited the AEC in reporting the November and January Chinese tests in advance of Peking's own announcements. Its previous consistent practice had been to await the NCNA announcements. Thus Moscow media did not at the time report the December 1967 and October 1970 tests which Peking did not publicize; but Moscow has retroactively included them in adding up the total number of Chinese tests to date, accurately giving the total as 14 since October 1964.

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fallout on living things" and cited "authoritative experts" for the observation that Peking's nuclear tests "have caused irreparable damage to all living plants and especially to the health of people." In a similar vein, a commentary in English to South Asia the next day warned of the dangers of an accumulation of strontium 90 and the consequent threat to the health "of the present as well as of future generations." A letter published in IZVESTIYA on 24 March, signed by a Soviet scientist, took note of the radiation hazards and observed that nuclear tests carried out by the PRC "in the region geographically close to the territory of the Soviet Union and the fraternal Mongolian People's Republic put the Soviet people particularly on their guard."

Moscow has utilized the latest test, again as in November and January, to assail the Chinese attitude toward disarmament measures and to denigrate Chinese motives in developing nuclear weapons. On the latter score, the 23 March commentary in Mandarin cited a Dakar newspaper for the view that the PRC's nuclear weapons "are directed against the neutral countries. They are being used to turn Africa and the whole neutral camp, if possible, into China's vassal states." On 22 March, a Moscow radio commentary for Japanese listeners charged that the Chinese leadership is strengthening the PRC's nuclear power "against the interests of the Asian peoples, including the Chinese people, and is also rejecting all proposals to halt the nuclear arms race." The commentary quoted the Japanese paper YOMIURI to the effect that Peking is striving "to develop a powerful warhead for a medium-range missile."

A NOVOSTI commentary, published in Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO on the 23d and in the Bratislava PRAVDA the following day, chided the PRC for its failure to sign the 1963 partial test-ban accord and observed that with the latest nuclear test the Chinese leaders "want to scare their Asian neighbors and mentally prepare them to accept the idea of Maoist domination."

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## STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

## BREZHNEV REMARKS SERVE AS FOCUS FOR SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON SALT

Soviet media treated the opening of the seventh round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Helsinki on 28 March in much the same fashion as they treated the opening of the sixth round in Vienna in November, with straightforward reports of the ceremonial functions and a careful avoidance of any mention of substantive issues likely to be discussed. Brezhnev's general remarks on SALT in his 20 March trade union congress speech have predictably served as the focus for subsequent comment. Vladimir Semenov, the chief Soviet delegate to the talks, in arrival remarks in Helsinki quoted Brezhnev on "the great importance" the USSR attaches to the talks and on Moscow's desire for "a mutually acceptable agreement." TASS noted that Semenov went on to say "we have firm instructions from the Soviet Government to work in a constructive and businesslike manner."

Reporting President Nixon's 24 March press conference, TASS said the President noted that Brezhnev's "quite constructive remarks" indicate that there is "'a good chance' for reaching agreement" on strategic arms limitation during the Moscow summit in May. The account did not mention the President's caveat that an accord on SALT may not be reached before the Moscow summit because of differences on such "fundamental issues" as submarine-based missiles.

In the only available Soviet commentary on the opening of the Helsinki round, a radio talk by Kozyakov for North American listeners on 27 March cited Brezhnev's remarks as a summation of the Soviet attitude toward SALT and called this attitude "a logical followup of this country's persevering efforts to reach agreement on disarmament." Following Brezhnev's lead, the commentator went on routinely to criticize rising U.S. arms expenditures--a theme that threads through other Soviet propaganda not directly mentioning SALT.

Kozyakov's commentary echoed Brezhnev's praise for the SALT agreements last September "to reduce the danger of a nuclear war breaking out" and repeated the Soviet leader's observation that the USSR would like other nuclear powers to join in such arrangements in some form. A 28 March TASS commentary by Kornilov, reviewing the USSR's "peace program" advanced last year, also repeated this call. Neither commentator elaborated.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW CONTINUES TO AVOID COMMENT ON HUSAYN PLAN FOR JORDAN

Moscow still refrains from expressing an opinion on King Husayn's plan for a federated kingdom of Jordan and has followed up its initial minimal coverage of negative Arab reaction in only one Arabic-language broadcast on the 25th, reporting an undated NEW TIMES article which rounded up critical comment. Another commentary in Arabic, on the 28th, began by noting that Husayn had arrived in Washington for talks with President Nixon and that the king's proposals and U.S. aid to Jordan would reportedly be discussed. After observing that Husayn's trip coincided with Arab denunciation of the United States, the commentary focused on the U.S. policy of "terrible hypocrisy and extreme hostility" toward the Arabs, with no further mention of the king. TASS the same day reported Husayn's arrival in Washington on an "official visit" and said the "official talks" would concern the king's plan, which "was criticized in the Arab countries."

An article by PRAVDA's New York correspondent Kolesnichenko on the 27th in effect took the United States to task for misrepresenting the Husayn plan, claiming that the American press was reporting that it forms the basis for a separate agreement between Israel and Jordan. While the Jordanian representative at the United Nations flatly rejected any possibility of a separate agreement, Kolesnickenko said, U.S. propaganda, "manifestly incited by the State Department," attempts to sell the idea of such an agreement as a breakthrough in the Middle East impasse.

Albania has come out with characteristic censure of the USSR's attitude toward the Husayn plan: Tirana radio on the 27th cited the Jordanian weekly AL-HAWADITH as reporting that the Soviet Union, informed of the plan just prior to its announcement by Husayn on the 15th, had notified Jordan of its "favorable stand." The Jordanians were also told, Tirana said, that the Soviet ambassadors in Cairo and Damascus had informed the respective governments that Moscow approved of the initiative and that "efforts were being made to examine King Husayn's plan with greater attention." Tirana further noted reports that King Husayn's brother had conferred with the Soviet charge d'affaires on the 26th, a meeting announced by Amman radio that day. Tirana hit at Soviet silence regarding Husayn's proposals in a radio commentary on the 28th, charging that

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Moscow's "indifferent attitude" proves that the Soviets accept the plan because it "answers their reactionary concept--a political settlement" of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

**IRAQ UNITY PROJECT** Iraq's hastily proposed unity project with Egypt and Syria, announced on the 15th shortly after King Husayn made public his proposals for Jordan, was acknowledged belatedly by Moscow in the 25 March Arabic-language broadcast of the NEW TIMES article. Noting that the plan had provoked a "violent reaction" in the Arab world, NEW TIMES observed in passing that "according to AFP, Iraq has proposed immediate union with Syria and Egypt to oppose King Husayn's plan." But there apparently has been no Soviet reference to the 21-26 March visit to Damascus of a high-level delegation led by Saddam Husayn, Ba'th Party deputy secretary general and deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council, or to the delegation's 26-28 March talks in Cairo.

In a domestic service commentary on the 27th, NOVOSTI commentator Katin, elaborating on Brezhnev's remarks on the Middle East in his AL'CTU speech on the 20th, routinely hailed growing inter-Arab cooperation and singled out "in particular" the formation of the Confederation of Arab Republics--Egypt, Syria, and Libya--as "unquestionably a positive element" in strengthening inter-Arab cooperation.

#### USSR PRAISES TIES WITH ARABS BUT HINTS AT AREAS OF FRICTION

Despite the sweeping claim in Brezhnev's 20 March trade union congress speech that Soviet relations with the Arabs have never been "so profound and multifaceted" as now, difficulties in these relations--as well as concern over inter-Arab frictions and internal developments in the Arab countries--appear to underlie frequent Soviet protestations of ever-increasing friendship and cooperation. Reacting to Arab criticism, Moscow has issued a defensive explanation of its policy on emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel; it has also been at pains to encourage cooperation between communists and "progressive" followers of Islam.

Soviet concern about "adventurist" views in Egypt favoring military action against Israel as well as about "defeatist theories"--possibly reflecting Egyptian dissatisfaction over Soviet military supplies--was intimated in a 17 March PRAVDA dispatch. The paper's Cairo correspondent, Glukhov, praised the appeal for "self-restraint and for a sober analysis of the

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situation" at the recent Arab Socialist Union Congress and denounced "foreign and domestic reaction" for trying to raise "adventuristic slogans." The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) on the 27th indicated another area in which the Soviets have come in for criticism, so far unanswered in Moscow media: At a seminar organized by AL-AHRAM in February and attended by "Arab, Egyptian, and Soviet thinkers," MENA said, representatives of the Palestinian resistance complained to the Soviets that the Palestine question was not getting the kind of vigorous attention that the USSR devotes to such similar questions as Vietnam.

EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS      Moscow has defended its policy on emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel in a statement by B. T. Shumilin, a deputy minister of internal affairs, to a NOVOSTI correspondent. Except for rare statements by Kosygin during visits to Western countries, when he has responded to questions about Jewish emigration in remarks given little or no publicity in Soviet media, this appears to represent the highest-level Soviet statement on the subject to date. While other factors must have entered in, the statement undoubtedly is responsive in large measure to increasing Arab complaints\*: It was initially broadcast twice to Arab audiences and once in French to Africa on 24 March, then rebroadcast in Arabic four times on the 25th. Not until the 27th was the statement issued by TASS. It was again rebroadcast--twice--in Arabic that day as well as in some European languages.

Shumilin's statement rebutted "slanderous inventions" by imperialist, Zionist, and Maoist "propaganda agencies" in connection with emigration to Israel. In the initial Arabic version on the 24th, Shumilin pointedly complained that "even certain Arab statesmen" are taking the liberty of "using such false sources concerning the position of Jews in the Soviet Union." As issued by TASS, however, this passage was amended to say that "some politicians in Western countries" permit themselves to make use of false sources of information. The TASS formulation was used in the subsequent Arabic broadcasts.

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\* For example, Haykal, chief editor of Cairo's AL-AHRAM, remarked in a 4 February article that "perhaps we should show more understanding for the USSR's allowing Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel." And a Voice of Fatah broadcast from Cairo on 21 February reported that Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir 'Arafat had advised the Soviet ambassador in Damascus, in a meeting with him that day, of "the dangers threatening the Arab nation in general and Palestine in particular because of the mass immigration of Soviet Jews" to Israel.

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Shumilin asserted that the aim of the "slandorous campaign" was to try to undermine Arab-Soviet friendship. For the Arabs, he injected a reminder that while in the postwar period approximately 21,000 people had left the Soviet Union for Israel, in the same period about 800,000 Jews emigrated to Israel "from the Arab countries alone." He also made the point that the USSR does restrict some categories of citizens from leaving the country, primarily those "who have had a definite measure of military training or are by dint of their occupation associated with work bearing on state interests." In statements made during his visit to Canada last October, Kosygin had said that the USSR applies some restrictions, mentioning "those who have only just received their education" and adding "nor can we supply Israel with soldiers." IZVESTIYA, reporting his Ottawa press conference remarks, merely noted that Kosygin said with respect to emigration that "all these questions are examined within the established framework of law" and added that "he cited specific examples on this point."

The Shumilin statement also made the point, pressed in recent propaganda, that an increasing number of Soviet Jewish emigres to Israel now wish to leave. The statement was followed up on the 29th by TASS commentator Boris Petrov's assertion that more and more applications for permission to return to the USSR are being received from Jews who "took the bait of false Zionist propaganda" and left for Israel.

The emigration issue was picked up by Peking in a 28 March NCNA report on the Kuwaiti paper AL-RA'I AL-'AMM's criticism of U.S. and Soviet policies toward the Arabs. NCNA publicized the paper's charge that the USSR is trying to complicate the situation in order to strengthen its hold on the region. It quoted the paper as adding: "It is for this reason that the Soviet Union provides 'aid' to this region and permits Jews to migrate to Israel."

ATTITUDE                    Moscow came to the defense of "progressive  
TOWARD ISLAM                religious groups" in an Arabic-language  
                                  commentary on the 27th approving the alliance  
of progressive revolutionary parties and "believers" in a common  
struggle for just objectives. Billed as the first in a series  
entitled "Against Imperialist Attempts To Exploit Religion for  
Reactionary Purposes," the commentary may have been intended as  
an answer to outbursts against atheistic communism by such

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devout Moslems as Libya's al-Qadhdhafi\* and as a warning against "such reactionary organizations as the Moslem Brotherhood, now banned in Egypt." The author, candidate of historical sciences Dimitriy Ponomarev, affirmed that Moslems in many Afro-Asian countries where Islam is the official religion actively participate in the struggle against colonialism, and he credited "progressive religious groups" with helping bring about profound social changes. Pointing out that the mufti of Egypt supported Nasir's 1961 decrees "in connection with capitalism," Ponomarev declared that men of religion currently exercise great influence in mobilizing Egyptians for the struggle against "Israeli aggression."

Recalling that the 1969 Moscow international communist conference had discussed the question of unity of action between communists and believers, Ponomarev pointed out that the conference's main document said cooperation was developing in certain countries between communists and the broad democratic masses of Catholics and members of other faiths. He accused "imperialism" of trying to distort and falsify many of "Islam's progressive principles" and create mistrust and hostility among Moslems, as well as of "fabricating lies" to hinder the unity of action of communists and "all progressive forces, including the millions of Moslems."

In the second talk in the series, broadcast on the 28th, Ponomarev further accused "imperialism and Zionism" of "fabrications" to the effect that ruling communist parties in socialist countries and communists in other countries are hostile toward Islam and "persecute faithful Moslems." Asserting that the USSR observes "freedom of conscience and of religion," he insisted that in Soviet society there are only "philosophical arguments" between believers and nonbelievers and that the basic distinction which communists draw is between exploiters and exploited.

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\* Yugoslav and South Vietnamese PRG representatives are the only communist delegates thus far reported to be attending the inaugural congress of Libya's Arab Socialist Union, which opened on the 28th. In reporting the opening session, TASS said only that the gathering was addressed by al-Qadhdhafi; the Libyan leader typically said Libya's "international relations" with the Soviet Government had nothing to do with communist ideology and doctrine.

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MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT      An article by Yo. Dmitriyev in MEZHHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN (No. 3, signed to press 22 February) points up Moscow's difficulty in selling the idea of a political settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict to "right and ultraleft circles" in the Arab countries. Ostensibly a critique of the United States' policy of "quiet diplomacy" in the Middle East, the article expressed regret that Egypt's "peace-loving and genuinely constructive" foreign policy and quests for a Middle East settlement are "virtually regarded as capitulation by individual people, and even officials, in some Arab countries." Dmitriyev claimed that the Egyptian path of seeking a settlement based on Resolution 242 is attracting new Arab advocates who support the interests of the whole Arab nation, rather than attaching importance to "wrongly understood and erroneously interpreted prestige factors." But the stalemated situation, according to Dmitriyev, affords reactionary forces an opportunity to strengthen their positions as well as their links with Western powers, as well as being conducive to a strengthening of "ultraleft forces" which promulgate the "'people's war' slogan, disseminated by the Peking leadership." Dmitriyev displayed concern that this abandonment of a political solution by "certain circles" in Arab countries resulted in "slander" of the USSR's Middle East policy.

The author also suggested some disquiet at the notion that these "right and ultraleft circles" are attempting to move into positions of political power. "American-Zionist propaganda," he charged, is trying to influence "the circles in Arab countries which have not yet renounced the intention to return to power" with the aid of imperialist forces. According to Dmitriyev, these unidentified circles regard Arab "progressive" development and strengthened ties with the socialist countries as a sign of their "inevitable future disappearance" from the political scene.

The article indicated sensitivity to Arab questioning of Soviet motives in the Middle East in declaring that "Arab patriots" understand the malice of "propaganda about the 'Soviet threat.'" Dmitriyev went on to cite Egyptian President as-Sadat as saying in a New York TIMES interview that the talk about the Soviet presence is "the same old chestnut" that Israel constantly repeats to the whole world.

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## USSR - YUGOSLAVIA

## MOSCOW PURSUES MILITARY, ECONOMIC TIES WITH BELGRADE

Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's arrival in Belgrade on 27 March at the head of a high-powered military delegation, coupled with the opening in Moscow on the same day of a new round of Soviet-Yugoslav talks on comprehensive economic cooperation, underscores the rapprochement between the two countries that has been evolving since Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade in September 1971. According to TANJUG, the Yugoslav press gave prominent coverage to the Grechko delegation's arrival on "an official visit" returning Yugoslav Defense Minister Ljubicic's May 1970 visit to Moscow. In successive reports of the delegation's departure from Moscow and arrival in Belgrade, TASS called the trip "an official friendly visit," pointing up the cordiality of bilateral relations at a time when Moscow is concerned to counter Chinese inroads in the Balkans and to strengthen its own influence in Belgrade in preparation for the post-Tito period.

In addition to Grechko, the Soviet military delegation includes Col. Gen. M. M. Kozlov, Air Force Col. Gen. A. P. Silantsev, and Admiral V. S. Sysoyev. TANJUG reported that during their stay in Yugoslavia the group would visit "certain towns, Yugoslav people's army units, and institutions." The presence of Admiral Sysoyev in the group suggests that the deployment of U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean may be among the subjects under discussion. Yugoslav media are on record with recurrent complaints about the "increased deployment" by "the major powers" in an area adjacent to Yugoslavia.

Evincing sensitivity to the notion that Moscow may use the occasion to seek a new home port for its expanded Mediterranean fleet in nonaligned Yugoslavia, Radio Zagreb's chief political commentator Milika Sundic, in a broadcast on the day Grechko arrived, vigorously rejected speculation that the Soviet defense minister will "allegedly ask for the establishment of Soviet military bases on the Adriatic coast." Noting that "such stories" have been spread in the past and have not materialized, Sundic added: "They will not come true this time either. There has been no change in the foreign policy of our country, and it is therefore impossible to talk about the acceptance of such a demand." Further assuring his listeners that Yugoslavia is not moving into the Soviet orbit

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or abandoning its nonaligned balancing act, Sunde stated again that any speculation that Yugoslavia is "reappraising" its foreign policy is groundless. He insisted that the Yugoslavs "do not hesitate to cooperate with all countries in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence, regardless of differences in social systems."

Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation, on the other hand, appears to be on the upswing, unencumbered by the kinds of constraints that operate on military cooperation. On the 27th Radio Moscow reported the opening in the Soviet capital of a meeting of the intergovernmental Soviet-Yugoslav committee for economic cooperation, with delegations led by Soviet Deputy Premier Novikov and Yugoslav Federal Executive Council member Mirjana Krstinic. Radio Belgrade said on the same day that the new round of talks will "concretize the fruitful and interesting" economic talks held in Belgrade in early December 1971 with Soviet Deputy Premier and planning chief Baybakov. That visit resulted in the signing of a supplementary trade protocol for 1972-1975 which, according to TANJUG at the time, called for "an increase of 580 million dollars--more than 50 percent compared with the previous period." TANJUG said on 10 December that both sides characterized those talks as "a major step in the further expansion and promotion of trade, industrial cooperation, scientific-technical cooperation, and other forms of economic relations."

Commenting on the current Moscow session, Radio Belgrade stated on 26 March that the two sides will now consider "tasks not only up to 1975" but through the current decade. The broadcast said "it is envisaged that the planning organs of both countries will reach an agreement to establish permanent contacts which, in addition to existing channels, will insure the continuity and long-term planning of the economic relations of interest to both countries." It is also expected, the radio added, that the two sides will consider the formation of a special commission for the machine-building industry and will discuss scientific-technical cooperation.

In the area of industrial cooperation, the 26 March broadcast said, the two countries will explore possibilities for the participation of Yugoslav light industry--particularly the leather and textile industries--in the reconstruction of Soviet enterprises. Under this plan, the Yugoslav industry involved would send workers and some technical equipment to construct projects in the Soviet Union. On their part,

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according to the radio, "Soviet builders are interested in the construction of some projects in Yugoslavia, such as the metropolitan underground railway system on which they are experts."

There has been no detail of this kind in Moscow media, and the Belgrade broadcast made no mention of the possibility of additional Soviet investment credits for Yugoslavia--a likely agenda topic in view of Belgrade's straitened economic situation during a period of mutual interest in closer relations.

#### TIRANA WARNS BELGRADE OF MOTIVES BEHIND SOVIET OVERTURES

Albanian apprehensiveness over the developing Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement was registered in a 29 March editorial in the party daily ZERI I POPULLIT which attacked Grechko's Belgrade visit as part of an "expansionist" Soviet strategy that could damage Belgrade's interests, and by implication also Tirana's. Tacitly addressing itself to the concurrent Soviet-Yugoslav economic talks in Moscow, the editorial at the same time warned the Yugoslavs against harboring any notion that they could exploit Soviet policy aims for their own economic advantage without paying a price.

Entitled "Hands Off the Balkans," the editorial, as reported by ATA, traced present Soviet interests in Yugoslavia chiefly to that country's strategic position in the Mediterranean in a period of rising Soviet stakes in the Middle East. Noting that Grechko's arrival in Belgrade immediately followed his participation in Soviet naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean and visits to several Middle East countries, the paper concluded that "Moscow views the Balkans with envy as a road of passage or a bridge to this area and as a desirable base for its expansionist plans in Europe and on other continents."

ZERI I POPULLIT saw in frequent "friendly" calls of Soviet as well as U.S. warships at Yugoslav ports "a seed of danger not only to the peoples of Yugoslavia but to the countries of the Adriatic area." Concern that such Soviet naval visits might evolve into more frequent and more formalized calls at Yugoslav ports, menacing Albania as well as Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period, seemed to underlie the paper's elaborate lecture to Belgrade on the magnitude of the alleged Soviet threat and the dangers of becoming entangled with a country bent on "subverting" Yugoslavia for larger strategic purposes.

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The paper drew implicitly on Albania's view of its own experience with the Soviets in cautioning that "when Moscow pledges friendship, it prepares to stab you in the back" and "when it offers you aid, it thinks of how to strangle you." While the Soviets may offer "arms at a cheap price," the lecture continued, the recipient becomes "a prisoner dependent on the Soviet Union for spare parts, . . . and it has been proven that such dependence means economic and political dependence." In the same vein, the editorial warned of the danger a country would court by allowing the Soviets a physical presence on its territory: "Whenever the Soviet revisionists have been able to get a foothold, either by intrigues or by exploiting a troubled situation"--a clear allusion to alleged Soviet efforts to capitalize on Yugoslavia's current domestic troubles--"they do not easily depart." ZERI I POPULLIT concluded that it would be "a grave error" for any country to believe it can "exploit its relations with the revisionists for its economic interests of the moment" without damaging its own sovereignty and placing a heavy "mortgage" on its future.

In the period following the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Albanian propaganda had sought to capitalize on heightened Yugoslav suspicions of Soviet intentions, courting the Yugoslavs with a portrayal of an Albanian-Yugoslav common bond in the face of a shared danger. Now in effect reviving the notion of Albanian-Yugoslav affinity with a different thrust, ZERI I POPULLIT's lecture to Belgrade underscores concern lest Yugoslavia's receptivity to Soviet overtures reverse the gradual trend toward improvement in Belgrade-Tirana relations and result in the further isolation of Albania in the post-Tito period.

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### SHELEST GIVES DEMONSTRATION OF HIS POWER IN UKRAINE

In a recent flurry of activity seemingly designed to demonstrate that he is still boss in the Ukraine, Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest has ousted the leader of one oblast and made well-publicized tours to several areas, haranguing local leaders on the proper running of their affairs. Especially noteworthy is the fact that Shelest appears to have taken personal charge of ousting an oblast leader, in view of his apparent inability to control top personnel decisions in 1970-71 when several proteges of his rivals were placed in key positions. His moves appear to be aimed indirectly at members of rival factions.

**KHMELNITSKIY PURGE** Shelest's personal role was highlighted in the Ukrainian press reporting of the 14 March Khmel'nitskiy obkom plenum. Instead of the usual brief, unelaborated report of an obkom leadership change carried on page two or the bottom of page one, a lengthy account was carried by all Ukrainian Central Committee papers at the top of page one under the heading "Improve Leadership of Primary Party Organizations." Rather than simply noting at the end that Shelest, or another republic leader, had participated in the plenum--as is customary--the account featured Shelest's role and included a summary of his speech, with indications that he had criticized the oblast leadership, especially regarding cadre work. The plenum was attended by no other Ukrainian leaders--even leaders of the Ukrainian Central Committee's cadre section, proteges of Shelest's rivals in Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe, were absent--and thus no collective aura surrounded Shelest's moves.

T.G. Lisovoy, the new Khmel'nitskiy first secretary installed by Shelest, appears to be one of his old proteges. Lisovoy rose through the Kiev oblast organization, where Shelest was first secretary 1957-62. Appointed first secretary of one of Kiev oblast's leading rayons in the mid 1960's, Lisovoy was singled out for special favoritism in 1966 when he was made a full member of the Ukrainian Central Committee (apparently the only Kiev raykom secretary so favored). In March 1970 he was transferred to Khmel'nitskiy to replace retiring executive committee chairman I.F. Levchenko.

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Khmelnitskiy obkom's cadre work has been less than satisfactory in recent years, and the recent plenum bore the earmarks of a minor purge. In a March 1972 PARTY LIFE (No. 5) article on cadre work, Ukrainian Second Secretary I.K. Lutak criticized the cadre work of Khmelnitskiy obkom and revealed that sometime during the past three years it had been required to report to the Ukrainian Central Committee on its cadre work. Second secretary M.I. Mekheda (as second secretary, in charge of cadre work) was removed in August 1970 and replaced with obkom secretary O.I. Tovstanovskiy, who had been raised from a raykom secretary to obkom secretary only months earlier.

The newspaper account of the 14 March plenum noted that party organizational work had improved but added that shortcomings remain. Shelest spoke on fulfillment of the decisions of the June 1971 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum on improving the leadership of primary party organizations. First secretary N.D. Bubnovskiy did not speak, and the report on the obkom's leadership of primary party organizations was delivered by second secretary Tovstanovskiy. The 62-year old Bubnovskiy, once one of the Ukraine's top leaders as Central Committee agriculture secretary 1954-63, was retired on pension, while Tovstanovskiy was transferred to the office of executive committee chairman. Bypassing the other obkom secretaries, the plenum elected local raykom secretary M.I. Pochinok as obkom second secretary. (Pochinok, though only a raykom secretary, had spoken for Khmelnitskiy oblast at the 24 June 1971 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum on leadership of primary party organizations.)

Shelest's complaints against cadre work in Khmelnitskiy may also be indirectly aimed at his apparent foe, Dnepropetrovsk first secretary A.F. Vatchenko. The leader most directly responsible for the cadre shortcomings in recent years would have been second secretary Mekheda, who supervised this work for the 1960-1970 period--and Mekheda was Vatchenko's top deputy for three years, while Vatchenko was Khmelnitskiy first secretary, from 1959 to 1963. Mekheda has disappeared since his August 1970 removal.

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SHELEST TOURS While in Khmel'nitskiy Shelest visited several kolkhozes and plants, pointing out to the oblast leaders examples of good local leadership to be emulated. Moving on to neighboring Ternopol oblast, Shelest met with the obkom bureau on raising the effectiveness of industrial and agricultural production and correctly selecting leading cadres. Shelest pointed out to them that they had insufficiently used local reserves for raising agricultural production and had paid insufficient attention to raising farming efficiency. His Khmel'nitskiy and Ternopol lectures were reported by Ukrainian papers on 18 March in lengthy articles on page one entitled "Raise the Responsibility of Cadres in Each Sector."

The 14 March Khmel'nitskiy plenum followed by only a few days another apparent demonstration of personal authority by Shelest. Under the title "Constantly Raise the Effectiveness of Agricultural Production," Ukrainian papers on 5 March featured a long report on Shelest's visit to several rayons in southern and eastern parts of Kiev oblast. Shelest delivered harsh lectures to local farm leaders and especially members of the Volodarskiy raykom bureau on the need to correct shortcomings and improve their agricultural production. Shelest was dutifully accompanied on his rounds by Kiev obkom first secretary V.M. Tsybulko, a close protege of Shelest's apparent rival, Ukrainian President A.P. Lyashko. Tsybulko's obkom had been severely censured by Shelest at the February 1971 Kiev oblast party conference for its poor leadership of agriculture.

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## CHINA

## HEILUNGKIANG PARTY PLENUM REFLECTS ARMY-CIVILIAN TENSIONS

A second, enlarged plenum of the Heilungkiang provincial party committee was held from 28 February to 20 March, according to a Harbin radio report of 27 March. A total of 83 full and alternate committee members were among the 945 persons in attendance; 109 members were elected to the committee at the party congress last August. The total attendance of 945 persons is close to the figure of 998 congress delegates who elected Heilungkiang's new party committee last August. In the case of the other enlarged provincial party plenums held since Lin Piao's overthrow, and for which data is available--Anhui, Shansi, and Liaoning--the relative proportions are far different. Liaoning's second plenum was the largest in relation to its congress; but even so delegates to the plenum were only 30 percent as numerous as delegates to the congress.

The Harbin report indicated that denunciation of the Lin Piao affair at the plenum was a formal process structured around discussions of "important documents" criticizing "swindlers"--codeword for Lin and his followers--for "maintaining illicit relations with foreign countries . . . and vainly attempting to change the party's basic line and policies."

In contrast with other recent party plenums, the report on the Heilungkiang gathering localized the struggle against the still unnamed "swindlers" by emphasizing the need to intensify struggle against "their agents in the province." Unlike most other provinces, however, Heilungkiang had previously indicated that local "swindlers," apparently former provincial chief Pan Fu-sheng among them, were guilty of serious leftist deviations. Several broadcast articles in late September and October noted that the provincial struggle "has not come to an end," and claimed that the "opportunist line which is 'left' in form but right in essence has hurt our cause."

The plenum's stress on struggling against Lin's agents in Heilungkiang suggests continued instability among the provincial leadership. Problems within the provincial hierarchy may, in fact, have influenced the decision not to identify those top party leaders taking part in the plenum. The report merely indicated that "the principal responsible comrades of the provincial CCP committee separately reported on the work of

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the provincial CCP committee" since its formation last August. Four of the five Heilungkiang secretaries have appeared publicly during the past two months. First Secretary Wang Chia-tao has not made a public appearance since last August, before the Lin affair, when he attended the first plenum of the new provincial party committee. On 29 and 30 December, Harbin radio explained that Wang had been absent from two separate provincial work conferences because he was "out of town"; in each case it was carefully noted that instructions were issued to the conferences in Wang's name. The report on the just concluded second party plenum, however, makes no mention of Wang.

Wang's current eclipse from public view may reflect continued struggle over the PLA's dominant role in the reconstructed party apparatus--possibly one of the issues involved in the purge of Lin and several other top military leaders last fall. Wang, veteran commander of the Heilungkiang Military District, replaced Pan Fu-sheng, the ousted civilian chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, as province chief when he emerged as first secretary of the new provincial committee eight months ago. Wang has not, however, been publicly named as chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee.

Judging by the Harbin report itself, a realignment of certain military-civilian roles was discussed at the plenum. A greater role for party-controlled civilian security organs--a relatively new theme in PRC propaganda--was sounded by the plenum, which took note of the security organs' role in building up border defenses. Underscoring the apparent disengagement of the PLA from public security functions, a specific call was made to strengthen "social security measures" by "strengthening the building of the rank and file of public security police and constantly striving to improve their political quality and operational ability." Calls to strengthen militia building and "civil air defense work" were also issued at the plenum.

Asserting that "we are still not developing fast enough to meet the demands of the party and the state and to keep pace with the situation in the entire nation," the plenum called on cadres to make a clear distinction "between what helps strengthen party leadership and what weakens or rejects it." Cadres throughout the province were enjoined to "uphold the principle of the party assuming leadership over everything" in order "to strengthen party unity and disciplinary control, and to intensify education in discipline in order to tighten up the party's discipline."

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## TOPIC IN BRIEF

## HAVANA, MOSCOW ON ITT-CIA "PLOT" IN CHILE

Cuban and Soviet media have devoted limited daily reportorial coverage, along with some comment, to developments surrounding the allegations of syndicated columnist Jack Anderson about a "plot" involving the CIA, International Telephone and Telegraph, former Chilean President Eduardo Frei, the Chilean right wing, and the U.S. Embassy in Santiago to block President Allende's inauguration in late 1970. The Soviet and Cuban reports have both pointed up allegations that U.S. Ambassador Korrry had full authorization from the White House to move against Allende. Both have given considerable space to Chilean reaction, with Havana taking particular note of calls for the "immediate seizure" of ITT's Chilean subsidiary.

Both Havana and Moscow have pictured the alleged 1970 machinations as only one episode in a constant, continuing threat to the Allende regime that requires unabated Chilean vigilance. But their portrayals of the nature of the threat have different shadings. Thus Havana has played the incident in terms of the staple Cuban propaganda theme that progressive regimes in the hemisphere face an ever-present threat of sabotage from the right, aided and abetted from Washington. Moscow's propaganda, chiefly in the form of Santiago-dated TASS dispatches and radio comment beamed to Latin America, has put heavy emphasis on the CIA as the principal villain. The first and to date only Soviet central press article on the subject, by V. Borovskiy in PRAVDA on 25 March, is entitled "CIA Plot Against Chile."

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