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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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15 MARCH 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 11)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 6 - 12 MARCH 1972

Moscow (2697 items)

International Women's Day	(1%)	10%
China	(12%)	8%
[Nixon Visit	(7%)	4%]
Indochina	(6%)	8%
Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman in USSR	(9%)	4%
Middle East	(2%)	3%
Libyan Government Delegation in USSR	(--)	3%

Peking (1623 items)

Domestic Issues	(43%)	46%
Indochina	(3%)	23%
[Sihanouk in DRV	(0.3%)	9%]
[Laos	(1%)	5%]
[U.S. Bombing of DRV	(--)	4%]
International Women's Day	(--)	9%
UN Seabed Committee Meetings	(2%)	4%
Chilean Socialist Party Delegation in PRC	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi media have continued the pattern of quoting and criticizing statements made by President Nixon in China without so identifying them. In the wake of the Commentator articles in NHAN DAN on 3 March and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 8th, two more Commentator articles on the President appeared in the party paper on the 10th and 13th. Hanoi has cited continued U.S. air strikes against the DRV as further evidence of the President's "hypocrisy" regarding a peaceful settlement. And a 12 March NHAN DAN editorial following up the DRV Foreign Ministry protest against the strikes also disparages some of the statements made by the President in China. The continuation of the propaganda attacks at this authoritative level suggests that Peking has as yet been unable to placate the DRV.

Peking seconded the 6 March DRV protest with a foreign ministry statement on the 10th, marking Peking's first official criticism of U.S. actions in Indochina since President Nixon's visit. The Chinese statement, which does not go beyond the minimum in backing the DRV, also came in the wake of the rumored briefing of the North Vietnamese by Chou En-lai, who on 11 March made his first officially reported appearance since he returned to Peking on 29 February after seeing the President off in Shanghai. Two days after the PRC Foreign Ministry statement, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article used similarly mild terms to support an 8 March NLHS statement condemning U.S. actions in Laos.

Moscow's continued critical comment on the President's China trip includes passages in a 13 March Yuriy Zhukov PRAVDA article, pegged to the usual WPC-sponsored mid-March "week of solidarity with the Indochinese peoples." Zhukov observed that the Sino-U.S. communique showed that the United States continues to insist on the "notorious" eight-point peace plan which, he noted, the Vietnamese communists have rejected. Soviet Politburo member Grishin at the Italian CP Congress, judging by the 14 March TASS summary of his speech, merely voiced hope for the "speediest ending" of U.S. "aggression" in Indochina and promised the Vietnamese "the assistance and support they need."

DRV, PRG CONTINUE INDIRECT ATTACKS ON PRESIDENT'S CHINA VISIT

Vietnamese communist media show no signs of ceasing their indirect sniping at the President's visit to China. Hanoi's studied

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avoidance of any explicit mention of the President's visit was demonstrated most pointedly in the NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 10th: Commentator explained that Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green was reassuring Asian countries regarding U.S. commitments because "in recent days Nixon has made a number of statements in unusual circumstances" concerning peace, negotiations, and the right of self-determination for the Asian peoples. The article, entitled "Satan's Commitments," echoed earlier propaganda when it ridiculed the pledges in the Sino-U.S. communique to base international relations on such principles as respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, and nonintervention.

Commentator on the 10th repeated personally abusive epithets when asking rhetorically: "How can these few deceitful words of Nixon cover up the bloody crimes--piled as high as a mountain--of the warlike imperialists, among whom Nixon is a war maniac?" An LPA commentary on the 11th said that "Nixon remains obdurate, bellicose, and perfidious in intensifying the war of aggression" And it ridiculed, among others, the President's remarks in China on the removal of walls between nations.

The sensitive issue of unity among the communist countries has not been brought up in the current propaganda. However, the NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 13th, entitled "U.S. Imperialism Is the Most Dangerous Enemy of the Asian People," in the course of a historical review claimed that "U.S. imperialist acts" have been aimed at "encircling and eventually attacking the socialist countries and any other countries refusing to accept the U.S.-type colonial regime." That article concluded by ridiculing the President's professed desire to build a new world order and structure: It claimed that "U.S. acts of aggression and Nixon's recent deceitful allegations" show that this new order is U.S. neocolonialism.

Commentator on the 13th routinely lauded the Vietnamese contribution to the struggle to defeat the Nixon Doctrine. The Commentator article on the 10th, assailing the Vietnamization policy in standard terms, observed that the President's 9 February foreign policy report had again said the United States would continue to maintain its forces in Asia. The "U.S. lackeys," Commentator remarked, are worried not about being "forsaken" by the Americans but about the "vigorous" development of the revolutionary movement.

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HANOI, FRONT ASSAIL FURTHER U.S. INTENSIFICATION OF AIR WAR

The spate of protests over the U.S. air strikes against the DRV continued with statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 9 and 10 March. A NHAN DAN editorial on the 12th recalled that the early-March strikes had been protested in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 6th* as well as in a PRG Foreign Ministry statement on the 10th. The series of protests, which began with two spokesman's statements on the 4th, condemned strikes in the Vinh Linh area and in Ha Tinh and Nghe An as well as Quang Binh provinces. Hanoi had earlier claimed that five planes had been downed from 1 through 6 March, and a broadcast on the 9th belatedly reported that another unmanned plane had been downed on the 6th, bringing Hanoi's total to 3,446.

A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 12th as well as the NHAN DAN editorial castigated the United States for "threatening" to intensify the use of air power. The army paper cited UPI as saying that the strikes which began against the North on 1 March were carried out for a longer period than any since November 1968. Both papers cited AP as reporting on the 10th that the Administration had said it would utilize the air force to attack any time, anywhere if this were judged necessary. Both press articles and a domestic service radio commentary on the 11th repeated the frequently voiced reminder that it had been demonstrated during the Johnson Administration that the Vietnamese cannot be deterred from their struggle by air strikes.

To further document the charge of U.S. hypocrisy, the comment on the air strikes cited the President's statements in China, without identifying them as such. Thus, NHAN DAN's editorial said that the "aggressive" U.S. actions cast doubt on the President's expressions of support for self-determination. And a Hanoi radio commentary on the 9th pointed to the coincidence of the bombings throughout Indochina and his remarks on concern for future generations, on ending the war quickly through negotiations, and on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries.

* Moscow duly reported the DRV Foreign Ministry statement but, unlike Peking, issued no official statement of its own. This pattern accords with Moscow's reaction to the mid-February strikes, although the year-end sustained U.S. bombing had prompted a 30 December Soviet Government statement.

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POW ISSUE Both the NHAN DAN editorial and the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, in their attacks on the President, saw evidence of further "hypocrisy" in the 10 March announcement designating the week 25 March to 1 April as "national week of concern for prisoners of war or those missing in action." Declaring that this act was aimed at diverting U.S. concern "for the White House leaders' new crimes," the army paper said it is because of the President's "bellicose and stubborn aggressive policy" that POW's have not returned home and that American military men have continued to be captured. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN claimed that U.S. newspapers have realized that the President has merely used the POW problem as a pretext for intensifying the war, and it cited the New York TIMES as saying that he has used the prisoners to justify the bombings and the decision to maintain U.S. forces in South Vietnam.

The NHAN DAN editorial repeated in this context the standard line that "if Nixon really wants to bring the captured U.S. military men home," he must end the war.

FRONT SUPPORT The PRG Foreign Ministry statement on the 10th, in addition to noting the sustained strikes against the North beginning on 1 March, charged that the United States has also intensified B-52 raids against "many populous areas" in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces and in the western highlands of South Vietnam. In the pattern of the 6 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement, the PRG said that the strikes against the North "brazenly violate" the U.S. commitment to end the bombing of the DRV. Also following Hanoi's lead, the PRG statement said the strikes "constitute an insolent challenge to the people of the world and the United States" who are demanding an end to the war. This line is echoed in a 7 March LPA commentary and in a Liberation Radio commentary on the 9th.

REFERENCES TO PRG PROPOSAL GLOSS OVER 2 FEBRUARY ELABORATION

Vietnamese communist propaganda has continued to cite the PRG proposal of 1 July and the 2 February elaboration as the proper basis for a political settlement, but in the past month the detailed demands of that elaboration have not been spelled out

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in full except in the DRV-Sihanouk communique of 5 March.* The omission may be traceable merely to the concentration on attacks on the President and his policy and to the fact that there has not been a full session of the Paris talks since 10 February. But there have been occasions when it would have seemed appropriate to repeat the specific demands in both points elaborated on 2 February.

The 12 March VWP Central Committee's message to the 13th Italian CP Congress essentially repeated the elaboration on U.S. withdrawal--demanding that the United States set a precise date for complete withdrawal of all troops, advisers, military personnel, weapons, and war materials. But it did not detail the demand in the second point that President Thieu "resign immediately" so that steps can be taken toward forming a government of "national concord" and organizing general elections.

DRV Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi, speaking at a 13 March reception honoring the visiting Romanian delegation, outlined the communist negotiating position only in general terms when he declared that the DRV "fully supported" the PRG's seven points and its "elaboration" on the two key problems. He called for an end to the war and to Vietnamization, a complete U.S. withdrawal and an end to U.S. support for the Thieu administration, and respect for the South Vietnamese peoples' right to self-determination. Nghi also scored the U.S. negotiating position as presented in the President's eight-point proposal, which he said is intended to secure U.S. troop withdrawals and the return of POW's while continuing the war through Vietnamization and while "stubbornly" supporting the Thieu regime. Asserting that "peace- and justice-loving people in the world" have spoken out against "this perfidious plan," Nghi stated that the DRV Government "categorically rejects" the eight-point plan.

A statement by the DRV National Assembly's National Reunification Committee publicized on 15 March, scoring air strikes against the North as well as "new attacks" against the South, went back to the old formula when it demanded that the U.S. Government "seriously

* Prior to the communique, the two-point elaboration had been spelled out in full in Pham Van Dong's 10 February message to the Versailles assembly on Indochina and by PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien at the Paris session the same day.

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respond" to the PRG seven-point solution without even mentioning that there had been an "elaboration" on 2 February. It said the "two key points" of the seven-point proposal are that the U.S. Government must (1) stop the air war and all military acts in Vietnam, withdraw quickly and totally the troops, advisers, military men, weapons, and war materials of the U.S. camp from South Vietnam and dismantle U.S. bases there, and (2) respect the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and stop all interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.

PARIS TALKS The U.S. decision not to attend the 9 March session of the Paris talks--due to the communists' walkout from the 24 February session and the "tone and content of recent official announcements from Hanoi"--was scored in statements issued by the PRG and DRV delegations in Paris on the 8th and 9th, respectively. (Earlier, the two communist delegations had scored the similar U.S. refusal to attend the 2 March session in statements issued on the 1st.) Both statements noted that the U.S. refusal to attend the session--made known to the communists on 7 March, in a statement which also proposed that the next session be held on 16 March--took place at the same time as heightened U.S. war activities in Indochina, especially the strikes against the DRV. Both delegations condemned the "acts of war" and U.S. actions aimed at "sabotaging" the Paris talks.

The charge that the United States is "sabotaging" the talks has also appeared in some of the comment. For example, a 9 March Hanoi radio commentary charged that while the President was saying that the primary objective of the United States is to settle the Vietnam issue through negotiations, the Americans "unreasonably called off the scheduled 2 and 9 March sessions" of the Paris talks. And Liberation Radio on the 10th said that on the President's orders, Ambassador Porter "sabotaged the Paris conference on Vietnam." It said that "last week the U.S.-puppet clique unreasonably refused to attend the 146th session scheduled for 2 March," and this week it continues to delay the conference.

PATHET LAO, HANOI DENOUNCE U.S. WIDENING OF WAR IN LAOS

An 8 March NLHS Central Committee statement assailed what it described as the intensification and widening of the "war of aggression" in Laos by the "obdurate, bellicose, and reckless U.S. imperialists." The statement charged that there are now more than 20 battalions of Thai forces in Laos and that "large numbers of

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other Thai troops are massing along the Thai-Lao border areas, ready to break into Laos." It went on to claim that "the United States and its henchmen" are stepping up air attacks "to prepare for ground assaults in Paksong, Bolovens, and other parts of southern Laos." In addition to assailing bombings by B-52's and other aircraft, the statement cited the New York TIMES as reporting that the United States has 14,000 U.S. advisers in Laos including 400 to 500 now in Vientiane, most of them CIA agents and Air Force or Army officers. It complained that "ultra-reactionaries" in Vientiane are "slandering" the NLHS and the DRV in order to "incite the puppet army" and serve the U.S. "scheme" to intensify the war, and it asserted that Souvanna Phouma had asked for more military aid at a meeting with U.S. envoy Marshall Green on 7 March.

The statement called the U.S. activities "brazen sabotage" of the 1962 Geneva agreement which recognized the independence, sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Laos. It repeated demands that the United States unconditionally stop the bombing so that the "Lao parties concerned" may meet to settle their internal affairs on the basis of the NLHS five-point solution and the proposals of April and June 1971, "consistent with the spirit of the 1962 Geneva agreement and the realities in Laos."

DRV SUPPORT Hanoi supported the NLHS statement in the usual manner with a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 14th. Hanoi's statement charged that the "Nixon Administration" has taken the war in Laos to "a new serious degree." Like the NLHS statement, it denounced the U.S. bombings--especially the "doubling" of B-52 raids--and the dispatch of Thai troops as well as the massing of more Thai forces on the border. It explicitly scored Souvanna Phouma and his administration (rather than "ultrareactionaries") for spreading "vile slanders" against the DRV and the NLHS, commenting that neither these slanders nor President Nixon's "fallacious allegations on 'peace' and 'goodwill'" can cover up the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism and its "extremely savage crimes" in Laos. Hanoi's statement did not mention Marshall Green's meeting with Souvanna Phouma, but a 15 March NHAN DAN article praising the victory of the Lao Patriotic Forces at Sam Thong said Green promised at that meeting to increase aid to Vientiane and to intensify U.S. bombings. The DRV statement seconded the NLHS demand that the United States stop the bombings so that the Lao parties concerned can meet and settle their affairs on the basis of the 1962 Geneva agreement and the present situation in Laos.

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PEKING MILDLY CENSURES U.S. "AGGRESSION" IN INDOCHINA

The 10 March PRC Foreign Ministry statement, seconding the DRV statement of the 6th condemning U.S. air strikes, represents Peking's first official criticism of U.S. actions in Indochina since President Nixon's visit. The Chinese statement also comes in the wake of Chou En-lai's rumored briefing of the North Vietnamese leadership on the President's visit. Having last been reported appearing on 29 February when he returned to Peking after seeing the President off in Shanghai, Chou's first reported appearance since was on 11 March when he was present at the Peking airport to receive the remains of a Chinese provincial leader. On the next day he saw the Romanian economic delegation in Peking on its way to Hanoi. Also at this time the DRV ambassador reappeared in Peking after not having been reported there since January. On 13 March he was at the Peking airport to see the Romanians off on their way to Hanoi.

Just as Hanoi's persistent sniping at the President's visit suggests continuing pique despite whatever briefings the Chinese may have given, so Peking's response to the U.S. bombing implies that it is reluctant to go beyond the minimum in backing the DRV. The four-day interval between the DRV and Chinese statements may also reflect difficulties between the two allies. There was a two-day interval between the last previous DRV Foreign Ministry statement on U.S. air strikes and a supporting Chinese statement on 19 February. Before that, a 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement had seconded a DRV statement of 26 December.

On substantive issues, the 10 March Chinese statement is notable for its failure to attack U.S. professions of interest in a peace settlement, though the DRV statement it seconds charged that the bombings exposed the Nixon Administration's "fake allegations about peace." The 19 February PRC statement had mentioned the U.S. eight-point proposal in charging that the bombings uncovered the "disguise of sham peace" and the "aggressive features" of the United States. Also unlike the February statement, the one on 10 March does not denounce Vietnamization. Making no mention of specific peace plans, the statement demands that the United States stop its attacks in Indochina, withdraw U.S. and "vassal" troops before "a set terminal date," and "cease to support the puppet cliques" in Indochina.

The statement includes the routine affirmation that the Chinese Government and people "resolutely support" the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples in "their war against U.S. aggression

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and for national salvation." (The Sino-U.S. communique had softened this formulation to support for the Indochinese peoples' efforts to attain "their goal.") The statement concludes with a routine pledge that the Chinese people "will do their utmost to give all-out support and assistance to the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples," an assertion slightly more emphatic than the pledge of "firm support" in the February statement.

Hanoi's VNA summarized the PRC statement on the 12th in a report which lumped it with statements by Sihanouk's government and the East German acting foreign minister. Hanoi media had waited until 1 March to report the 19 February PRC statement, thereby delaying until after the conclusion of the President's trip to the PRC; VNA summarized it along with several other communist protests, in a departure from Hanoi's normal practice of reporting Peking's statements immediately and by themselves. The current VNA report omits the PRC statement's demands for a U.S. withdrawal and end to support for the "puppet regimes," although VNA had reported a similar passage in its summary of the earlier statement.

COMMENTATOR ARTICLE
ON LAOS

The PRC Foreign Ministry statement was not accompanied by a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article as had been the case at the time of the 19 February Chinese statement. On 12 March, however, a Commentator article supported in the customary way an NLHS Central Committee statement of 8 March denouncing U.S. actions in Laos. The most recent previous Commentator articles on Laos had been on 18 January, supporting an NLHS statement condemning the dispatch of Thai troops to Laos; on 15 January, celebrating the "victory" at Long Tieng; and on 3 January, supporting an NLHS denunciation of B-52 strikes in the Plain of Jars.

The 12 March article, like the foreign ministry statement of two days earlier, does not seem to offer more than minimal backing to Peking's Indochinese allies. It says the Chinese "firmly support" the "just struggle of the Lao people against U.S. imperialist aggression," but it does not elaborate on the alleged plans for offensives in Laos as does the NLHS statement. Instead it stresses the military exploits of the Lao "patriots," saying that the latter are "marching forward on the crest of victory." Commentator demands that the U.S. Government "stop its interference and aggression" in Laos so that the Lao question may be settled by the Lao people themselves without outside interference, but there is no reference to the Lao peace proposals which are reiterated in the NLHS statement.

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While the Commentator article was restrained in its treatment of the United States, NCNA's report of the NLHS statement included such critical passages as its denunciation of the "obdurate, bellicose, and reckless" nature of the "Nixon Administration." On the other hand, in reporting the Pathet Lao's charges of planned offensives in Laos by Thai and "puppet troops," NCNA omitted its most explicit charges of the presence of American military personnel. It also omitted the NLHS statement's reference to a meeting between Marshall Green and Souvanna Phouma. (Peking has not mentioned the Green tour of Asian capitals.)

Although the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator avoided mentioning the Pathet Lao peace plans, the NCNA account of the NLHS statement duly reported its demands that the United States respect Lao independence, sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity "as recognized by the 1962 Geneva agreement." NCNA also reported the call for the United States to stop bombing so that the Lao parties concerned can meet to settle their own affairs on the basis of the NLHS five-point solution and proposals of April and June 1971.

PROPAGANDA LAUDS COMMUNIST ATTACKS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA

LAOS Pathet Lao and Hanoi media acclaim recent successes scored by the communist forces in Laos, praising their "smashing" of operations southwest of Xieng Khouang town and the capture of Vang Pao positions at Sam Thong. A Pathet Lao broadcast on 12 March reviewed the fighting since December, noting that after communist attacks in the Sam Thong-Long Tieng area in December and January, Laotian and Thai reinforcements had been brought into the area. It detailed actions against the allied counterattack launched in early February southwest of Xieng Khouang, claiming that from 12 February to 3 March the "armed forces and people" of Xieng Khouang Province put out of action more than 3,000 troops and "smashed" the allied operations.

Pathet Lao accounts of the 11 March assault on positions at Sam Thong have claimed that the Lao liberation army (LPLA) killed, wounded, or captured more than 600 troops in that action. A news agency report on the 14th noted that Long Tieng was shelled on the day the attack took place, and a report on the 15th said that the LPLA is now tightening its siege of Long Tieng. Hanoi hailed the LPLA's "exploit" at Sam Thong in articles in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 15th. The party paper commented that the

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recent "victories" in Laos have "seriously foiled the U.S.-puppets' scheme to use the Thai and Vang Pao troops as shock forces in their plans to Laoize the war" and are "severe warnings to the Thanom-Praphat clique, the lackeys of the U.S. imperialists."

CAMBODIA The radio and news agency (AKI) of Sihanouk's government continue to publicize fighting around the provincial capital of Kompong Thom and to advise the population of that city to evacuate. Rounding up alleged military successes from the start of the communist offensive in the Kompong Thom area on 21 February until 5 March, AKI on the 12th claimed that the Cambodian liberation forces (CPNLAF) have already put more than 1,500 troops out of action. AKI and the radio alleged that on 5 March the CPNLAF "liberated" two of the government's biggest and most important positions, including the outpost at Panhachi which AKI on the 29th had said was encircled and under continuous attack.*

The news agency reported that the CPNLAF is pursuing the remnants of government forces and attacking remaining positions around Kompong Thom in order to "totally liberate" the city. It described the troops in Kompong Thom as "in a state of panic" and "lacking rice and drinking water." The radio, appealing to "compatriots" to leave the city, similarly declared that "we are pursuing the enemy until his last den in Kompong Thom town is destroyed."

Communist media have also called for the "liberation" of the provincial capital of Siem Reap. Just as AKI on 29 February had released a four-day-old appeal from the CPNLAF command on the Kompong Thom front for the "liberation" of that city, so on 14 March the news agency issued a 5 March appeal from the army's command on the Siem Reap-Angkor front which calls for redoubled efforts to "annihilate" the government's operation Angkor Chey and to liberate Siem Reap. The appeal cited military developments which it claimed demonstrated that the government operation was already "defeated and routed"; it alleged that the CPNLAF is now attacking west, east, and north of Siem Reap and that the government forces on that front have been "driven into a state of disorder."

* Earlier propaganda on the fighting around Kompong Thom is reported in the 8 March TRENDS, page 23.

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CHINA

PEKING REPORTS SINO-U.S. AMBASSADORIAL MEETING IN PARIS

In Peking's first report on Sino-U.S. contacts as envisaged in the joint communique on President Nixon's trip, NCNA on 13 March reported the meeting in Paris that day between the PRC and American ambassadors. Citing the 28 February joint communique's provision that the two sides would stay in contact through various channels, the brief, factual NCNA dispatch noted that the two governments had decided that Paris is to be "a channel" for this purpose.

Peking has not followed up the President's visit with comment of its own or reports of comment from foreign sources, such as the 4 March North Korean editorial praising the visit. Peking has also ignored Marshall Green's tour of Asian capitals as well as statements by U.S. officials discussing American policy in the wake of the visit. In addition to the announcement on the ambassadors' meeting in Paris, however, Peking's interest in further Sino-U.S. exchanges was reflected in a 13 March NCNA report on the previous day's NBC telecast of the Chinese ballet "The Red Detachment of Women." NCNA noted that Huang Hua, the Chinese permanent representative at the United Nations, was invited to see the televised film at the NBC studio and that at least several million people throughout the United States viewed the show. At the same time, Chinese television viewers were seeing reruns of film on the President's visit. At least the Canton TV station, which is monitored by FBIS, began rerunning this reportage for several days on 9 March; previously it had been rerun for several days after the President's departure.

The parade of unofficial American visitors resumed for the first time since the President's visit when a Black Panther delegation arrived in Peking on 8 March at the invitation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries. According to an NCNA report on the 9th, the 20-member group came for "a friendly visit."

Peking has continued its low-level critical reports on U.S. developments while avoiding personal invective directed at American leaders. Thus an 8 March NCNA report, timed for International Women's Day, recounted U.S. women's "struggle for

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equal rights and against aggressive war" as part of "the revolutionary struggle of the rapidly awakening people" in the United States. NCNA linked the American women's movement with opposition to the Indochina war as contributing to "the common struggle against U.S. imperialism," and it applauded the women for becoming more militant in opposing "the reactionary domestic and foreign policies of the U.S. ruling circles." However, NCNA defined the goal of the women's movement as "emancipation" rather than overthrow of the U.S. Government.

Peking's only authoritative comment on U.S. policy since the President's visit has dealt with Indochina (discussed in the Indochina section of this TRENDS).

PRC PRESSURES JAPAN, REACHES AGREEMENT WITH U.K. ON TAIWAN

In the aftermath of the President's visit, Peking has been exerting pressure on Japan and has reached an accord with Britain on the Taiwan issue. Peking at the same time has put on record its position on other territorial questions. Thus it has forcefully reasserted its claim to the disputed Senkaku Islands and more quietly reminded the United Nations that it regards Hong Kong and Macao as belonging to the PRC. During this period Peking has not discussed the status of the Paracel* and Spratley Islands, which in the past have also been the subject of Chinese territorial claims.

TAIWAN Having signed the joint communique in which the United States said it does not challenge the position that Taiwan is a part of China, Peking has largely ignored the U.S. role in the Taiwan question while focusing its comment on the stand of the Sato government. Peking's most authoritative recent criticism was contained in a 3 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article denouncing Sato for having still "not acknowledged that Taiwan had long been returned to China." Chiding Sato for making inconsistent statements during Diet questioning following publication of the Sino-U.S. communique, Commentator accused the prime minister of adhering to his position that the status of Taiwan remains to be determined as well as persisting in other "schemes" objectionable to Peking.

* The last, 497th "serious warning" by Peking over an alleged U.S. intrusion in the Paracels appeared on 24 December.

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The Commentator article reflected Peking's attempt to keep strong pressure on Tokyo to accede to Peking's terms on Taiwan. Commentator excoriated Sato's Diet performance as "an act of flagrant hostility" toward the Chinese that "cannot but arouse their greatest fury." With an eye to pro-Peking sentiment in Japan, Commentator also claimed that Sato aroused indignation among the opposition parties and "far-sighted personages" in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

Peking returned to the attack on 11 March with a disparaging NCNA appraisal of Tokyo's "unified view" on the Taiwan question as embodied in a 6 March government statement saying that Japan would take no position on the status of Taiwan although it finds Peking's claim "fully understandable." According to NCNA, this is essentially the same as saying the status of Taiwan remains to be determined and "once again reveals the Sato government's reactionary stand of insisting on being hostile toward China." Also taking exception to Foreign Minister Fukuda's reference in the Diet on 6 March to the Nationalist government and to the Japan-RCC treaty, NCNA interpreted Fukuda's remarks as demonstrating an effort to pursue the formulas of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan."

While exerting pressure on Japan to acknowledge that Taiwan is a part of the PRC, Peking has managed to break the impasse with Britain on this question, thus permitting the two sides to raise their relations from the charge d'affaires to the ambassadorial level. Using a key term from the 28 February Sino-U.S. joint communique, a 13 March Sino-British communique (in the English version) says the British Government, "acknowledging" Peking's position that Taiwan is a province of the PRC, had decided to remove its official representation on Taiwan. In the Sino-U.S. communique, the United States "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China," a position that the United States "does not challenge." In "acknowledging" Peking's position, the British went beyond the noncommittal "takes note" formula on Taiwan which was introduced when Canada and the PRC established diplomatic relations in October 1970 and which has been used often since then, most recently in the PRC-Argentine agreement signed on 16 February. The Sino-British

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communiqué otherwise follows the pattern of the agreements using the "takes note" formula in saying the British "recognize" the PRC Government as "the sole legal government of China."*

In another aspect of the Taiwan question, Peking has served notice of its claim to all assets held by two banks that transferred operations from the mainland to Taiwan after the communist takeover. A statement by the spokesman of the People's Bank of China head office, carried by NCNA on 13 March, charges that the ROC Government was illegally attempting to undermine Peking's claims to the assets of the former Bank of China and the Bank of Communications by a bank reorganization act of 15 December. The statement declares that any sale or transfer of these bank assets in Taiwan or abroad is "illegal and null and void," adding that the Peking head offices "reserve every right to recover them."

SENKAKUS,
HONG KONG

In addition to the Taiwan question, the dispute over the Senkaku Islands has also served as a peg for Peking's polemical attacks on the Japanese.

In his 3 March address to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed, Chinese delegate An Chih-yuan assailed both Japan and the United States for allegedly colluding to include the Senkakus as part of the Okinawa reversion agreement and to exploit the seabed resources in the area. The Chinese delegate presented Peking's claim as comprising not only the seabed resources around the Senkakus but also resources of "the shallow sea adjacent to other parts of China." He did not, however, tip Peking's hand regarding its precise stand on territorial sea limits and jurisdiction over offshore resources.

* In the Chinese version of the Sino-British communiqué, the same term, "cheng jen" (0015 6126), is used both for Britain's "acknowledgment" of Peking's position that Taiwan is a part of the PRC and for British "recognition" of the PRC Government as the sole government of China. The Chinese thereby avoided the term, "jen shih tao" (6126 6221 0451), that had been used for the U.S. "acknowledgment" in the Sino-American communiqué; thus the Chinese version gives the impression of a less equivocal British accession to Peking's terms. By the same token, Peking avoided disclosing to the Chinese people that the British made use of a key--and equivocal--term appearing in the Sino-U.S. communiqué on a major issue on which the PRC and the United States remain divided.

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At a 10 March meeting of the UN committee, the Chinese delegate delivered a scathing retort to the Japanese representative's statement a week earlier reasserting Japan's claim to the Senkakus. The Chinese rejoinder was couched in sharply hostile terms, portraying "Japanese militarism" as "a dangerous force of aggression in the Asian and Pacific region." The U.S. role again figured in the Chinese statement, though in a distinctly secondary manner; An declared that the Chinese would not permit the U.S. and Japanese governments to make a deal on the disputed islands and "sow discord" between the Chinese and Japanese peoples.

Peking widely publicized An's speeches of 3 and 10 March. Also on the 10th, but not reported in PRC media, Chinese permanent delegate Huang Hua made public a letter he sent to the chairman of the UN Committee on Decolonization arguing that Hong Kong and Macao are not colonies and thus do not fall within the committee's jurisdiction. When Peking judges that "conditions are right," Huang asserted, the status of these areas will be settled by the PRC without outside interference. The lack of urgency in Huang's language and Peking's failure to publicize the letter suggest that it was intended only as a quiet move to object to what Huang termed the "erroneous categorization of Hong Kong and Macao as colonial territories in UN documents" rather than to raise a political issue that could disturb a tranquil and profitable status quo.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

SOVIET ARTICLES STRESS NEED FOR "COMMON" IDEOLOGICAL POSITION

Moscow's concern to shore up the Soviet wing of the international communist movement, against the backdrop of the complications posed by Peking's new flexibility, has been registered at authoritative levels in recent Soviet press articles focused in notably pointed fashion on a need for better coordination to achieve common ideological positions:

+ PRAVDA on 10 March carried an article by an authoritative proxy spokesman, SED Politburo member and Secretary Hermann Axen, which underscored the primacy of international over national interests and the urgent need to work out "common" ideological positions among the socialist countries in view of the "new" situation in the world communist movement.

+ In the international affairs weekly MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN (issue No. 3, signed to the press 22 February) Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A. Sobolev, head of the section responsible for History of the International Communist Movement in the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, pointed to a need for the communist parties to consolidate their ranks ideologically, politically, and "organizationally." Sobolev's broad subject was "The CPSU's Struggle for the Unity of the International Communist Movement and Against Opportunism and Revisionism."*

* In the weekly NEW TIMES (No. 8, signed to the press 18 February), Sobolev discoursed on the need to combat "opportunism of all kinds" in international communist ranks and approvingly recalled past purges of "revisionists" such as Garaudy from the French Communist Party, Fischer and Marek from the Austrian party, the "Manifesto group" from the Italian party, and the Petkov group from the Venezuelan CP. All were guilty, he said, of "renegadism, anti-communism, and anti-Sovietism." See FBIS Special Report No. 305 of 7 March 1972, "Spanish Communists Reestablish Ties with Peking: Background and Ramifications," pages 16-17.

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+ Sensitivity to the reaction on the part of nonruling parties in particular to the spectre of a new Comintern or Cominform type of organization was reflected in a strong defense of the Comintern in issue No. 1 for 1972 of the journal VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, in the form of a rebuttal to criticism of the Comintern by former Netherlands Communist Party Chairman de Groot. The thrust of the article was to debunk charges by de Groot--also leveled publicly by Romania's Ceausescu--that the Comintern served Moscow first and foremost at the expense of the interests of the majority of the allied parties. Normal Soviet treatment of the Comintern has acknowledged shortcomings along with merits; this article contained no criticism of the organization.

The appearance of Sobolev's and Axen's articles coincided with a flurry of travels by key East European party leaders: Hungary's Kadar visited Moscow and Bucharest in mid- and late February, respectively, and Bulgaria's Zhivkov visited Warsaw in late February and arrived in Prague for an "official, friendly" visit on 13 March. Axen left on the 12th for Milan at the head of the SED delegation to the 13th congress of the Italian Communist Party.

AXEN ON COMMUNIST UNITY Entitled "Proletarian Internationalism and National Interests," Axen's PRAVDA article invoked the judgments of the June 1969 Moscow international party conference and the 24th CPSU Congress of March-April 1971 to posit a "new situation" in the world communist movement that requires appropriate counteraction by the socialist countries. The fact that "new forms of the joint struggle by broad anti-imperialist forces are being elaborated," he declared, means that "the collective formulation of strategy and tactics and joint actions by the communist and workers parties of the socialist community in the international arena have become an objective necessity."

Citing the judgment of the 24th CPSU Congress that the socialist community "is at a new stage of development," Axen said the congresses of the other East European parties last year had "demonstrated the unanimity of these parties on the main questions of ideology, policy, and theory," inspired and influenced by the CPSU. These parties, he added, "are rallying increasingly around the CPSU" and, under the specific conditions of their countries' development, are applying "common theoretical conclusions and experience "

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Emphasizing that the formulation of "joint foreign policy" under the Warsaw Pact and socialist economic integration under CEMA represent "a completely new type of international relations," Axen left open the question whether the next logical step would be the formation of new, additional machinery for coordination but suggested that intensified bilateral and multilateral meetings and international party conferences would be in order.* Citing Brezhnev's reference at the 24th congress to "common-law-governed patterns which are inherent in the development of all the socialist countries," over and above "the diversity of specific national conditions," he concluded that bilateral and multilateral meetings, "the collective theoretical generalization of experience, and above all the formulation at international conferences of a common line and a common program of action are acquiring increasingly great importance." A remark in the same vein had been made by Hungarian First Secretary Kadar at a Hungarian-Romanian friendship rally in Bucharest on 25 February, when he delivered a pointed lecture to the Romanians on the importance of unity. Recalling that the 1969 international party conference had served to consolidate unity within the communist movement, Kadar added: "One can say that an overwhelming majority of the communist and workers parties is ready for action for the sake of unity."

Underscoring the primacy of international interests under proletarian internationalism, Axen leveled a veiled attack at the Romanians' concept of sovereignty and an open attack on Peking's "deviation." Recalling that the 1969 Moscow conference had rejected "national narrow-mindedness" and "hegemonism," he declared that "the class interests of the proletariat are predominant in the dialectical unity of the national and international, and superiority here belongs to the general-law-governed patterns and international obligations."

Pointedly noting that the SED had never "isolated" itself from the international communist movement's experience, Axen stressed that socialist internationalism gives "independence and sovereignty a new and higher class content"--the stock

*A KOMMUNIST article reported by Western news media as calling for "organizational unity" in the communist movement to cope with deviations, giving rise to speculation about Soviet plans for a new Cominform-type coordinating center, is not available at this writing.

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Soviet line also enunciated by Czechoslovakia's Husak at the 1969 Moscow conference in his plea to the other parties to refrain from any open discussion of a violation of the USSR's sovereignty in August 1968. In a forthright linkage of "sovereignty" to fealty to the Soviet Union, Axen declared that "the independence, sovereignty, and equality of the socialist states is . . . insured primarily by their high responsibility for the common work of the socialist community, the strengthening of the power of these states, and their firm cohesion around their nucleus--the USSR." In a swipe at Romania in particular, he warned that "the view that the international duty of a socialist state's communist party is fulfilled to a sufficient degree by strengthening only its own country is, to put it mildly, one-sided."

Axen stated explicitly that "China's development shows that the main danger for a socialist country lies in deviation from Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." The documents of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow conferences had identified revisionism as "the main danger," and Soviet comment in recent years has sporadically called nationalism the main danger, with Peking in mind; the main document of the 1969 conference did not identify any "main danger" in its recitation of ideological deviations. Axen's article went on to declare that "the ideology and policy of Maoism seriously harm the cause of socialism."

In the Politburo report which he read to the 16 September 1971 SED plenum, Axen had been the first to register Soviet bloc concern, at the party leadership level, over Peking's contacts with the United States and over Chinese efforts to penetrate the Balkans.

THE COMINTERN Soviet propaganda has been selective and ambivalent in its treatment of the Comintern, dissolved by Stalin during World War II; it has avoided discussing the Cominform--successor to the Comintern--which expelled Yugoslavia in 1948 and was disbanded by Khrushchev in 1956. An international meeting was held in Prague in October 1965 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Seventh Comintern Congress of 1935--an occasion used by CPSU Secretary Ponomarev to highlight that congress' denunciation of "leftist" deviation, against the backdrop of worsening Moscow relations with Peking.

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Another international meeting was held in Moscow in March 1969 to mark the 50th anniversary of the Comintern. Used as a forum for a display of ideological unity prior to the June international party conference, that meeting featured speeches by Suslov and Ponomarev, who offered an apologia for the defunct organization in stressing its ideological legacy of "proletarian internationalism." At the same time, the Soviet speakers also dwelt on the "mistakes" of the Comintern, presumably to reassure the foreign CP's that there was no plan to establish another such organization at the impending international party conference.

The article on the Comintern in this year's first issue of VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS--by Dmitriyev and Shirinya, entitled "Against Historical Truth"--took issue, among other things, with charges by former Netherlands Communist Party Chairman de Groot to the effect "that allegedly the Comintern's only line was coordinated with the state interests of the Soviet Union and hence contradicted" the interests of a majority of world communist parties. A similar charge was leveled against the Comintern by Romania's Ceausescu in a 7 May 1966 speech in which he denounced the organization for "arbitrarily putting fascist Germany on the side of the USSR" via the 1939 Soviet-German pact and for failing to support Romania's resistance to the cession of northern Transylvania to Hungary in August 1940.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW PRAISES ARAB-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP, URGES ARAB UNITY

Moscow propagandists recently have given marked attention to the long-standing theme of Soviet-Arab friendship and cooperation and the need to consolidate "anti-imperialist" Arab unity in the face of alleged divisive attempts by Israel, imperialism, and local reaction. Particularly notable in this context is the stress that has been placed on the need to rally "progressive" forces in the Arab countries. The renewed focus on these themes, not pressed by Moscow since late summer and early fall last year, comes at a time when the Soviet Union has been having a running series of high-level talks with Arab leaders--first Egyptian as-Sadat, and then officials of Iraq, Syria, and Libya.

A PRAVDA Observer article of 12 February seems to have initiated the new stress on these themes. While ostensibly concerned with the problem of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the article also reacted to Western "conjecture and slander" on Soviet-Egyptian relations in connection with as-Sadat's 2-4 February visit and underscored the two countries' "traditional friendship." Subsequent propaganda has also seemed to display sensitivity to U.S. official statements about the Soviet role in the region, Western press speculation about friction in Moscow's relations with Cairo, and questions about Soviet policies from the Arabs themselves.

The attention to "progressive" Arab forces comes against the background of the establishment in Syria and projected formation in Iraq of national fronts including the local communists, a development which Moscow naturally would welcome. Moscow concurrently has been emphasizing the need to strengthen the domestic forces in the Arab countries, in line with Cairo's current policy of building the domestic front.

For example, Demchenko, in PRAVDA on 11 March, declared that political developments in the Arab world "give added urgency to the need for unity of action of the progressive democratic forces in each country and throughout the Arab world." He mentioned new measures in Egypt to strengthen the domestic front, the establishment of Syria's National Progressive Front, and a "serious political evolution" in Iraq "also developing toward the consolidation of the democratic forces." And NOVOSTI

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commentator Katin, in a Moscow domestic service talk on 12 March, saw "notable importance" in points in the 17 and 26 February communiques with Iraq and Syria stressing the "urgency of the cohesion of Arab countries on a democratic, anti-imperialist foundation" and the importance of strengthening friendship and cooperation with the socialist countries. NEW TIMES (No. 9, February) had called it no secret that "lack of complete unity" weakens the Arab countries in the face of intrigues by Israel, imperialism, and reaction, and declared it was "imperative" for them to "agree on unity of action"* as well as to expand their cooperation with the socialist countries.

HIGH-LEVEL COMMENT The recent Arab-Soviet meetings generated few remarks by Soviet leaders other than brief, and widely reported, comments by Brezhnev to the Iraqis and speeches by Mazurov in Syria. The communiques all touched, in varying degrees, on Soviet-Arab friendship, with only the Iraqis going on record with their Soviet hosts in condemning anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, as the Soviet-Egyptian communique had done last October. In Brezhnev's 15 February meeting with the Iraqis, the sides reportedly stressed the need to include all Arab "progressive and democratic forces" in the struggle against Israel and to strengthen Arab unity of action. Similarly, Mazurov in speeches in Syria on 22 and 25 February welcomed any steps leading to unity of action by the Arab states as well as the unity of "all progressive forces," praised Arab-Soviet friendship, and denounced imperialist anti-Soviet propaganda.

The 12 February PRAVDA Observer article seemed to have set the stage for the recent comment. Observer warned of alleged Israeli attempts to "undermine the progressive regimes in the Arab countries from within and to alter their political orientation."** And he also charged that Tel Aviv and "reactionary propaganda in the West" are not abandoning attempts to sow mistrust of the Soviet Union, its policy, and "even" its assistance to the Arab countries, apparently hoping to find support "in the Arab countries"

* In Cairo's AL-AHRAM on 4 February, chief editor Haykal, writing about as-Sadat's Moscow talks, said that at times the USSR "seemed lost in the ocean of Arab disputes." As he had earlier reported in January 1970, Haykal recalled that Kosygin once told an Iraqi official: "I don't know what you want, Arab friends. Agree on the minimum. Agree on the maximum. But for heaven's sake, agree on something."

** The Observer article is discussed in the 16 February TRENDS, pages 33-35.

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most reactionary circles." The Observer article declared that the Arab countries cannot watch the "intrigues of hostile forces" with indifference, and cited Egypt as implementing measures to strengthen the domestic front and providing for mobilization for the struggle against Israel.

An article by R. Petrov* in the 24 February IZVESTIYA took a similar tack in accusing forces hostile to the Arabs of spreading anticommunist and anti-Soviet views to "undermine Arab-Soviet friendship and split the domestic fronts." He singled out Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen as models of Arab countries successfully combining their struggle against Israel and imperialism with socio-economic reforms. Petrov urged the consolidation of all progressive and anti-imperialist forces and pointed approvingly to "a process of establishment and consolidation under way in the vanguard political parties and organizations in power" in these countries. He added that cooperation is gradually being established between these parties and organizations "and communist parties, where they exist." In his IZVESTIYA article--as in an article authored by him in NEW TIMES (No. 8, February) praising Arab-Soviet friendship--Petrov called it of vast political significance that, thanks to Soviet arms deliveries and "the assistance of Soviet military experts," many Arab countries now are in a position to create their own modern armed forces.

PROPAGANDA The last flurry of attention to the Arab unity
BACKGROUND theme occurred late last summer and early fall,
 at the time of another round of Arab-Soviet talks
and as Egypt, Syria, and Libya held the 1 September referendum
on the establishment of the Confederation of Arab Republics (CAR).
While Moscow has long been on record as a supporter of Arab unity

* Petrov seems to be emerging as a Soviet expert on Arab unity: His critical and detailed assessment of the "extremely complex" problems facing Arab unity, in a NEW TIMES article last August, was broadcast in installments to Arab audiences on the eve of the CAR referendum in Egypt, Syria, and Libya. In that article, he warned that any attempt to exclude the communists and their parties from the common struggle could only weaken the united front. See the 9 September 1971 TRENDS, pages 29-31.

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on an "anti-imperialist" basis,* it has given only lukewarm support to actual Arab federation experiments. Thus the communique on as-Sadat's Moscow talks last October noted that he "informed" the Soviet side about the establishment of CAR. (In the current series of talks with CAR members, the subject of the confederation was not mentioned in the Egyptian and Libyan communiqués, but the third member, Syria, did "inform" the Soviets of the CAR's importance.)

The importance of rallying the Arab "patriotic progressive forces" had been stressed by Brezhnev last May in the wake of the Egyptian purge of 'Ali Sabri and his associates, and was picked up by Kosygin and Podgorny in the fall in speeches made during Arab-Soviet meetings. Podgorny, for instance, at a luncheon for the visiting Egyptian president, had assailed an alleged imperialist "anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaign" aimed at disuniting the "revolutionary Arab patriotic fighters" and disrupting Arab-Soviet friendship.

USSR ENDORSES ARAB FRONTS, AFFIRMS TREATY PLANS WITH IRAQ

Soviet propaganda has welcomed the 7 March establishment in Syria of the National Progressive Front, which includes the Syrian Communist Party, and has encouraged the Iraqis to get on with their own front organization, outlined in Baghdad's National Charter last November, which would include the Iraqi CP and the Kurdish Democratic Party.**

Presumably the Soviets would like to see the Iraqi organization established before finalizing the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, mentioned in the 17 February communique on Saddam Husayn's visit. Moscow's apparent neglect in referring to the treaty in immediate post-communique comment would seem to suggest some Soviet hesitation,

* Khrushchev publicly debated the unity question with Nasir during his May 1964 visit to Cairo, arguing the Soviet concept of unity on a class, as opposed to national, basis, and declaring that the USSR was not helping the Arabs "in general" but the people of Egypt who were fighting imperialism.

** Cairo does not subscribe to Moscow's view that political evolution is taking place in Iraq: AL-JUMHURIYAH on 28 February accused the Iraqi regime of failing to achieve tangible political progress or solve important issues such as the Kurdish question, and charged that its attempts at cooperation with other parties, such as the communist and the Kurdish, have failed.

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perhaps until the ground had been prepared with such probable critics as Iran. Comment on the visit in NEW TIMES (No. 9, February) and in Moscow's "Republic of Iraq Corner" broadcast in Arabic on the 25th failed to mention the treaty in assessing the Iraqi talks. The Iraqi Corner broadcast merely stressed that "in the talks" it was underlined that unity of "all progressive and democratic forces" in every Arab country and unity of action between Arab countries are necessary in the confrontation with Israel and imperialism.

The treaty was finally brought up again by NOVOSTI observer Katin in his 12 March commentary on Moscow's domestic service. He forecast that Iraq and the USSR would "take additional measures in the near future" to put their relations on a higher plane, and that "these measures will be put together in the form of a treaty."

Italian CP leader Giancarlo Pajetta, interviewed in the Italian party organ L'UNITA on 27 February after he had recently led a PCI delegation to Iraq, pleaded diplomatic discretion when asked if there were to be an Iraqi-Soviet pact similar to those with Egypt and India. The Italians were told, he said, that the Moscow meeting was considered "fundamental" for Iraq's economic and political prospects. Pajetta observed that the PCI delegation encountered "caution and prudence with regard to relations with other Arab countries," adding that "we have heard (and we were in a way unable not to share) a certain concern about manifestations of conservatism and a possible backsliding to the right in the Arab countries which call themselves progressive and are aligned in the anti-imperialist camp." It must be remembered, Pajetta said, that relations between Iraq and Syria are "also" tense partly because there exist two Ba'th parties. While Pajetta seemed to be referring to Iraq's relations with Syria, he may also have had Egypt in mind.

Moscow has intimated disapproval of certain segments of Egyptian society while at the same time affirming that the Egyptian authorities are correctly seeking to strengthen the internal front as well as solidarity with all progressive forces. Thus Mayevskiy approved this course in the 5 March commentators' roundtable on Moscow's domestic service, noting that Egypt is struggling against "subversive imperialist propaganda." Moscow has gone to pains to rebut Western press speculation about strained Egyptian-Soviet relations, a 9 March PRAVDA article by Jablin--also broadcast in Arabic--assailing a "misinforming story" by NEWSWEEK's de Borchgrave.

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Sablin claimed that according to de Borchgrave, the one topic of private Egyptian conversations is "chilliness in Soviet-Egyptian relations," and that "Soviet foreign policy allegedly gives rise to mistrust and exasperation among certain anonymous Arabs." PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov took comfort, in an article on 10 March, from some new Egyptian films "exposing the apathy and indifference of certain propertied classes" of Egyptian society which try to distract public attention from the Israeli occupation and which "cultivate sentiments of helplessness, defeatism, and despair."

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U. S. BASES

SOVIET ADMIRAL, OTHER PROPAGANDISTS CONTINUE CRITICAL COMMENT

In the wake of the 15 February Soviet Government statement, USSR media have continued to attack the U.S. home-port arrangements for the Sixth Fleet in Piraeus, Greece, and have utilized this project as a peg to criticize U.S. bases worldwide. Most notably, an article in the 8 March IZVESTIYA by Admiral V. Alekseyev did so in assailing U.S. efforts to "encircle" the USSR and the other socialist countries with a "continuous chain of military bases." An earlier article, by Major General R. Simonyan in NEW TIMES (No. 9, February 1972), had pressed much the same line, observing that the Piraeus project has "highlighted anew the problem of American bases as a whole."* Neither article has been broadcast by Radio Moscow, but TASS on the 8th summarized the Alekseyev piece.

The articles are noteworthy for their authoritative ring and for their timing--within a month of the scheduled 28 March resumption of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Helsinki. While neither of the authors mentioned SALT, their comprehensive treatment of the base issue at this time could presage a renewed Soviet effort to include the question of U.S. overseas bases as an agenda item at Helsinki. The first broaching of the base issue in the context of SALT came in a PRAVDA article by V. Shestov on 3 February 1971, and it was raised again in a mid-July RED STAR article by Colonel V. Kharich and Engineer-Captain 2d Rank G. Koloskov.** Since the appearance of the July article, Moscow's continuing low-volume propaganda on SALT has not discussed the bases issue.

* RED STAR on 2 February 1972 carried an article by Simonyan assailing U.S. efforts to "encircle" the states of the socialist community by a "system of hostile military-political blocs and groupings" and identified the author as professor and doctor of military sciences. The Admiral V. Alekseyev writing in IZVESTIYA may be Admiral Vladimir Nikolayevich Alekseyev, First Deputy Chief of Staff of Soviet Naval Forces.

** The two articles complained that the United States was seeking one-sided advantages in keeping the base issue off the agenda at SALT. For a discussion, see the TRENDS of 10 February 1971, pages 22-23, and of 21 July 1971, pages 33-34.

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The Alekseyev article declared that: the "Pentagon's bases strategy" dated back to the early postwar years when Washington "decided to encircle the Soviet Union and the socialist countries friendly toward it with a continuous chain of military bases along the perimeter of the socialist camp's borders." According to Alekseyev, U.S. naval forces and "the aggressive military bloc of NATO . . . were to complete the full encirclement of our country from the sea, uniting all their armed forces in the continuous ring of the nuclear blockade, deploying them in good time, and preparing them for attack." He concluded with the observation that, with its reliance on foreign bases, the Pentagon bargains on using with the greatest success "even those means of attack which possess a small range of action but which can threaten from the bases vitally important regions of the socialist community."

The Simonyan article said that the bases--"most of which are concentrated in Western Europe"--represent a "major instrument of Washington's global strategy" and are "intended first and foremost for aggression against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries." Citing Hanson Baldwin, Simonyan stated that the United States needs its foreign bases "as a springboard for attack on the Russian interior."

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FRG TREATIES WITH USSR, POLAND

"REVERSE LINKAGE" OF PACTS WITH BERLIN ACCORD MADE EXPLICIT

Against the background of the continuing West German parliamentary debate over ratification of the FRG treaties with the USSR and Poland, Moscow media have weighed in with the first authoritative public Soviet expression of the "reverse linkage" concept--the demand for ratification of the two treaties before the USSR will sign the final protocol implementing the four-power agreement on Berlin, reversing Bonn's prior call for a Berlin settlement as a precondition for ratification of the treaties. Moscow media never publicized reports, appearing in the Western press last fall, that Gromyko had advised FRG Foreign Minister Scheel of this Soviet position during a conversation at the United Nations.

IZVESTIYA's senior political observer Matveyev voiced the first unequivocal statement of the linkage position in Moscow media in the course of the weekly domestic radio roundtable program on 12 March. The implementation of the "West Berlin" agreement, Matveyev said, "depends directly on the fate of the treaties signed by West Germany with the Soviet Union and Poland." An article in the evening edition of IZVESTIYA the next day by Mikhaylov, reported by TASS, followed up with a more elaborate but equally clear presentation of the same point. In general, Mikhaylov said, ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties is inseparable from other agreements recently concluded in Europe; "it is natural" that continued improvement in the European political situation and the FRG's "involvement" in this process "are directly linked to the ratification" of the two treaties, "after which the West Berlin settlement comes into force"; and "without these treaties, the four-power agreement on West Berlin will not come into force and talks with the GDR cannot be continued successfully."

The notion of reverse linkage had surfaced in Warsaw and East Berlin media before Moscow spelled it out. During the 23-25 February reading of the ratification bills in the Bundestag, the Polish party daily TRYBUNA LUDU declared on the 24th that implementation of the Big Four accord on Berlin "will not take place until the FRG parliament ratifies" the treaties. East German party leader Honecker addressed himself directly to the subject on 10 March in a speech at the Leipzig Fair: Lecturing the Bundestag deputies on the importance of the treaties for European detente, he stated that "only the

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ratification of the treaties . . . will make it possible to implement the agreements between the GDR and the FRG and between the GDR and West Berlin."

Underscoring the GDR stance of readiness to meet West Germany halfway, Honecker pointed to the "constructive step" represented by the GDR's unilateral "goodwill" decision announced on 22 February--the day before the reading of the ratification bills began in the Bundestag--to temporarily implement the inter-German accords in order to allow West Berliners and West Germans to visit the GDR over the Easter (29 March - 5 April) and Pentacost (17-24 May) holidays.

"NABLYUDATEL" ARTICLES Two articles over the authoritative signature of "Observer" (nablyudatel) in PRAVDA argued the case for ratification of the two treaties just before and just after the reading of the bills in the Bundestag--on 20 February and 4 March. The latter brought up the reverse linkage concept indirectly.

"Nablyudatel" is one of two terms used for "Observer" in the past, but the other, more common term "obozrevatel" has been used consistently for the past eight years. The last "nablyudatel" article on record appeared in PRAVDA on 2 January 1964, discussing Cambodia. The identities of the authors writing under the "obozrevatel" and "nablyudatel" labels is unknown, although some "obozrevatel" articles in the fifties contained stylistic idiosyncrasies not unlike those identified with PRAVDA's senior commentator Yuriy Zhukov. The Observer articles of both varieties served traditionally as vehicles for authoritative comment below the editorial-article level but above the level of routine signed articles, although the relatively infrequent "nablyudatel" articles in the fifties seemed to have a somewhat less authoritative cast than those signed "obozrevatel."

The "nablyudatel" articles of 20 February and 4 March are the first Observer articles of any kind on Germany in more than six years: The last one, signed "obozrevatel," appeared in PRAVDA on 30 December 1965 and discussed the dangers posed by possible FRG access to nuclear weapons through NATO. The two articles under the revived "nablyudatel" signature both carry an authoritative ring. The first one, on 20 February, was devoted to a rebuttal of arguments advanced by "opponents"

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of the Moscow-Bonn treaty to the effect that "there are some differences between the Russian and German texts of the treaty." Both the West German and Soviet governments had confirmed the authenticity of the text in both languages, Observer said, and there is no reason to contend that there are differences.

The 4 March article presented a review of the Bundestag debates. It alluded to reverse linkage in observing that the path to the "West Berlin" agreement was opened by the signing of the two treaties, but it went no further. At a later point it skirted the issue again in commenting that the treaties constitute the only possible basis, under present conditions, for establishing peaceful cooperation between the FRG and the socialist countries.

The 4 March article constituted Moscow media's most authoritative suggestion to the Soviet people that ratification of the Moscow-Bonn treaty cannot be taken for granted, although there have been routine-level references to opposition elements in the Bundestag. The article denounced the Bonn opposition parties for "coarse attacks" on the Soviet Union, "blatantly aimed at kindling nationalist and anticommunist passions." Observer asserted that the "hackneyed pseudoarguments" of the West German opponents of the treaties were "unconvincing." Maintaining that the CDU/CSU has "no realistic alternative" to the Brandt-Scheel government's policy toward the socialist countries, he went on to ridicule the CDU/CSU contention that the USSR would launch a process of cooperation with the FRG even without the Moscow treaty. While admonishing the FRG that if it were to "return to the past" it would bring upon itself "the most serious and, possibly, irreparable damage" in the present period of progress toward European cooperation, Observer did not spell out the consequences for Moscow-Bonn relations if ratification fails. He stated only that the "next few months will show whether the leaders of the CDU/CSU . . . realize the extent of the responsibility invested in them" in connection with the ratification of the treaties.

POLYANOV TO GERMAN RADIO AUDIENCES IZVESTIYA's first deputy chief editor and German expert Nikolay Polyanov was less circumspect in a Moscow radio interview beamed to German listeners repeatedly at the beginning of March. Quoting a West German newspaper as saying the USSR "cannot maintain the same good relations

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with a country such as the FRG" if the Moscow treaty is not ratified. Polyakov added that he must "stress that the entire situation in Europe would be affected." The treaty "affects not only the relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG but the general political atmosphere on our continent," he said, warning that if it is not ratified, "danger will be created. The FRG press today deals with this danger, stating that Europe might again return to a cold war period, with all its negative consequences for Europeans in East and West."

To the accompaniment of this kind of propaganda, TASS reported on 4 March that the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium had "examined" the USSR Council of Ministers' "presentation for the ratification" of the treaty and passed it on to the foreign affairs committees of the two houses of the Supreme Soviet for consideration.

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CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS

FURTHER TEMPERING OF HIGHER EDUCATIONAL REFORMS REVEALED

Unusually detailed provincial radio reports on the status of educational reform indicate that, although cultural revolution instructions on the reorganization of higher education are still to serve as general guidelines for all educational work, considerable leeway is currently being allowed in an apparent attempt to complete the rebuilding of the higher educational apparatus. A 7 March Changchun radio report on enrollment procedures for admission to colleges and universities within Kirin, for example, spoke of an "examination on the cultural level and physical condition of the students" to be conducted by county-level party committees and revolutionary committees. Previously issued guidelines had stated that students seeking a higher education should have at least a junior middle school education, but had not indicated that an examination would test their knowledge. The old examination system--formally abolished at the start of the cultural revolution--was condemned as unfair to children of poor and lower-middle peasants.

Departing from earlier indications that the poor and lower-middle peasants would play a central role in the selection of students for admission to higher educational institutions, the Changchun broadcast indicated that, after the prospective students have taken the examination, county-level party and revolutionary committee members are to make preliminary selections and send a report up to the regional officials, who will conduct an additional "screening" and submit recommendations "to the province for evaluation and approval." It was specifically declared that all school admission work throughout the province is "under the centralized leadership of the provincial party and revolutionary committees."

Judging by a 21 February Hofei broadcast, university students with outstanding academic records will receive special consideration when the time comes for their first job assignment. (Mao's July 1968 instruction on higher educational reform had declared that students "should return to production after a few year's study.") The Hofei broadcast stated that "immediately following graduation" most of the "5,000 students" admitted for the

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current spring term "will generally go back to their original units to work there"; work assignments for some "exceptional cases," however, "will be . . . made by the state."

The almost total "rehabilitation" of the precultural revolution teaching staff in Kwangsi was revealed in a Nanning broadcast on 10 March. In accordance with "the party's policy on intellectuals," several Kwangsi institutes of higher education have "patiently" helped the original teaching staff "to overcome their ideological shortcomings while "boldly making good use of them." Providing a unusual percentage figure on "rehabilitated" teachers, the broadcast stated that "over 90 percent of the former teachers have been appointed to posts in the institutes" within Kwangsi.

Presumably, the decision to restore most of the original teachers within Kwangsi was motivated by the unsatisfactory performance of the worker-peasant teachers who, according to Mao's August 1968 instruction, were to enter and "manage" all schools and colleges. A recently received 14 January KWANGMING DAILY article, written by a commune-level part-time peasant teacher, was unusually frank in revealing that soon after the poor and lower-middle peasants took their position on the teaching rostrum and gave "a few lectures, we ran out of teaching materials." This problem was compounded by the fact that some of the part-time teachers, "noted only for their great enthusiasm, did little to improve their poor speech" and thus their "lectures became quite pointless and were of little educational value." To remedy this problem, the local commune party branch "convened meetings for us part-time teachers to exchange experiences and for the full-time teachers to help us prepare our lectures."

Standards were also raised by reducing the total contact time between part-time teachers and the students. Teaching schedules at the commune were rearranged so that "part-time teachers might deliver lectures without adversely affecting the academic progress of the students when they were taught by full-time teachers." Full-time teachers had complained, it was reported, that part-time teachers--with "no textbook to follow"--were meeting "so often with the students" that "we full-time teachers, who must follow our textbooks, will have to sacrifice our lecturing hours" in order "to get through our textbooks according to schedule."

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The continued moderation of cultural revolutionary higher educational reforms--a trend noted since the July 1970 RED FLAG educational guidelines--appears aimed at removing those obstacles which apparently still prevent the resumption of higher education at all locations. Although many universities and colleges located in major eastern cities accepted new students for technical training in the fall of 1970, and several of the more remote institutions opened the following year, some higher educational institutions have only recently reopened. Sian radio on 7 March, for example, reported that "all colleges and schools in Shensi are now engaged in enrollment" and that "this is the first time since the cultural revolution that colleges and schools in the province have generally engaged in enrollment."

REVISED PEKING OPEPAS REFLECT CURRENT PROPAGANDA THEMES

Nearly all the operas and ballets widely performed and publicized during the cultural revolution were set in periods of armed struggle. But the two most recent opera revivals, "On the Docks" and "Ode to Dragon River," are set in the decade of the 1960's and more closely reflect current themes and problems. Both operas were revised in Shanghai, with final librettos approved in January after "experimental" performances in Peking on National Day last October. Both feature heroines, reflecting recent efforts to raise women's status.

Revisions made in "On the Docks" (the new text was published in RED FLAG No. 2, 1972) clearly reflected the Lin Piao affair and apparent efforts being made to accuse Lin of collusion with foreign countries. References to Lin in the 1969 version have been dropped, and the villain is now remade in the image of Lin, a saboteur who unsuccessfully tries to flee to a foreign country when discovered. In the earlier script, the villain was ideologically impure, but his sabotage was not deliberate. The current version not only portrays him as a total villain and active saboteur, but indicates that he was guilty of crimes as far back as the Korean war--in effect a warning that class enemies are always lurking and that eternal vigilance is necessary.

The text of "Ode to Dragon River" is not yet available, but details revealed by media accounts indicate that its release was timed to add emphasis to the annual propaganda coverage

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for women's day and for the start of the spring farming season. A joint WEN HUI PAO-LIBERATION DAILY editorial on 11 March noted that the opera "displays the glorious images of female party cadres." During the period surrounding the 8 March women's day festival this year extensive propaganda has stressed the ability of women to hold responsible posts and to work as effectively as men. The plot of the opera concerns line struggle in the rural areas, stressing the need for cooperation and coordination and warning against the plots of hidden capitalist-roaders. Similar themes have been aired in the numerous commentaries tied to current agricultural efforts, including the annual PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on spring farming which appeared on 9 March.

While a 4 February joint WEN HUI PAO-LIBERATION DAILY editorial greeting the new version of "On the Docks" noted that the revision was accomplished "under the specific guidance of Chiang Ching," the joint editorial by the same papers on 11 March hailing "Ode to Dragon River" makes no reference to Chiang. Perhaps she took little part in preparing the libretto; in regard to "On the Docks," she had been publicly identified with the earlier, discredited version, and it may have been thought advisable to associate her with the revisions. Chiang's cultural role seems to have greatly diminished, and after the Lin affair began to surface she was not mentioned in the media in any cultural context until mid-winter, when there were scattered references to her from provinces in East China, especially Chekiang. Central media again noted her cultural role in an article discussing "On the Docks" which appeared in RED FLAG no. 2. A 2 March Peking broadcast on films made from model operas also noted her cultural leadership position.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

UKRAINIAN DISSIDENT PENS LETTER OF ABJECT CONFESSION

Zinoviya T. Franko, a leading Ukrainian dissident and a granddaughter of Ivan Franko, one of the Ukraine's most illustrious writers, has been forced to write a public letter of confession following her alleged transmittal of "slandorous and anti-Soviet" material to visiting tourist Jaroslav Dobosh, whose arrest was announced by the KGB on 15 January. In a letter to RADYANSKA UKRAINA published on 2 March, she makes the most abject confession to appear in the Ukrainian press in recent years.

According to her letter, Dobosh, apparently a Ukrainian-born Belgian citizen, was caught "red-handed" receiving information from her. Claiming that Dobosh's arrest and exposure as an enemy agent had "opened my eyes," she confesses to engaging in "anti-Soviet activity" and being on "the path which could lead to treason," renounces her "incorrect and distorted" interpretations of "shortcomings and difficulties" in Soviet life, condemns her past actions, and denounces foreign reports of persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals as "invented." The letter stresses repeatedly her special regret that hostile foreigners were able to use her famous name for anti-Soviet propaganda.

Her public recantation represents a radical reversal of position, since she has stubbornly resisted the authorities during the past decade and has been one of the central figures in the movement to defend Ukrainian culture. She was closely involved in the two most notorious recent conflicts between the KGB and the dissidents. At the November 1970 Moroz trial she harassed Ukrainian SSR Prosecutor F. K. Glukh in the hallway, protesting the closed trial and the harsh verdict and threatening to appeal to the United Nations (ironically, the trial was held in Ivano-Frankovsk, the city named after her grandfather), and she was also one of the main organizers of the funeral of the murdered Alla Horska. Her confession apparently sets the stage for the case that is being prepared against her friends Vyacheslav Chornovil, Yevhen Sverstyuk, and others in connection with Dobosh's arrest.

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EXPULSION OF DZYUBA Ivan M. Dzyuba, the best known of the Ukrainian nationalist dissidents, was finally expelled from the writers union on 2 March. Dzyuba was among those arrested on 12-13 January, but he apparently was one of the five Kiev dissidents released later in January. The 11 February announcement of criminal proceedings against Ivan Svitlichnyy, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Yevhen Sverstyuk, "and others" in connection with the arrest of Jaroslav Dobosh failed to mention Dzyuba, the most prominent of those arrested-- suggesting that the evidence at hand was too weak to bring Dzyuba to trial.

LITERATURNA UKRAINA on 3 March announced that a 2 March meeting of the Ukrainian Writers Union presidium had discussed "the case of I. M. Dzyuba, who spoke at the meeting." The presidium unanimously expelled him from the union "for gross violations" of its statute and "for preparation and distribution of materials which have an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist character, express nationalistic views, slander the Soviet system and the party's nationality policy, and are used by our class enemies"

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