

Doc/Ser

Confidential



TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

9 FEBRUARY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 6)

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

**GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification**

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention	1
INDOCHINA	
DRV Statement, Comment Contrast PRG Proposal With U.S. Plan . . .	1
Truong Chinh December Remarks on U.S. World Policy Released . . .	6
Pathet Lao Statement Supports PRG, DRV Plans for Settlement . . .	7
Sihanouk's "Government" Rejects U.S. "Compromise Formulas" . . .	8
PRC Statement Reaffirms "Unshakable" Policy on Indochina War . . .	9
Kosygin, Moscow Commentators Support PRG, DRV Stands	11
PRG's 10-Point Policy on Defectors Continues to Be Pressed . . .	14
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS	
Chou Raises Taiwan Issue; Comment Assails Nixon Messages	15
USSR-U.S.-PRC	
KOMMUNIST Reassures World Movement on Soviet Detente Policy . . .	19
TASS Links "New Purges" to Mao's Anti-Soviet, Pro-U.S. Line . . .	21
PRAVDA Hits Alsop Portrayal of U.S. as Peking's "Savior"	23
JAPAN	
Peking Condemns Gromyko Visit as a Move Against China	24
PRC-PAKISTAN	
Peking Offers Limited Support During Bhutto's Visit	26
CHINA	
Politburo Member Hsu Shih-yu Reappears After 8-Month Absence . . .	29
East China Provinces Cite Chiang Ching's Cultural Role	29
MIDDLE EAST	
Moscow, Cairo Urge Jarring Talks, Discuss Egyptian "Defense" . . .	31
East Europeans View Cairo Pressures, French CP Scores as-Sadat . .	36

(Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

CONTENTS (Continued)

FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

Low-Volume Soviet Comment Blames West for Delay in Talks 39

SOVIET-FRG TREATY

Moscow Notes Start of Ratification, Decries Strauss "Draft" . . 41

TOPIC IN BRIEF: Salt Communique 43

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- i -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 31 JANUARY - 6 FEBRUARY 1972

<u>Moscow (2806 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1660 items)</u>		
Indochina	(4%)	12%	Indochina	(23%)	28%
[U.S., PRG Proposals	(2%)	6%]	[U.S., PRG	(8%)	21%]
Warsaw Pact PCC Meeting	(23%)	12%	Proposals		
Ulster Situation	(--)	5%	Pakistani President	(--)	20%
China	(4%)	4%	Bhutto in PRC		
Egyptian President	(--)	3%	Domestic Issues	(36%)	20%
as-Sadat in USSR			UN Security Council	(7%)	11%
UN Security Council	(--)	2%	Special Session in		
Special Session in			Africa		
Africa					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

In the wake of the PRG's 2 February statement elaborating on the first two points of its 1 July proposal and rejecting the U.S. eight-point peace plan, Hanoi and Front propaganda has stressed alleged U.S. duplicity in negotiations and Vietnamese resolve to defeat the Nixon Doctrine and the Vietnamization policy. A supporting DRV Government statement came only belatedly on the 5th, the day after a PRC Government statement, although DRV Premier Pham Van Dong had promptly endorsed the PRG statement at a banquet on the 2d and DRV delegate Xuan Thuy had done so at the Paris session on the 3d. The delay in issuance of the DRV Government statement may have merely been a function of Hanoi's effort to return the PRG to the forefront of the negotiations. The statement echoed earlier propaganda in castigating President Nixon for having unilaterally, in his 25 January TV speech, disclosed a "distorted version" of the substance of the U.S.-DRV private meetings.

Not unexpectedly, Hanoi as well as Front media merely repeat without amplification the "reasonable" elaborated demands of the PRG that the United States set a date for total withdrawal from South Vietnam and that Thieu resign immediately. While Hanoi propaganda following President Nixon's speech was largely devoid of personal abuse, a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 7th reverted to more standard invective when it called the President an "utterly reactionary and ferocious hawk" who "only wants to settle the Vietnam problem by an aggressive war."

Peking was prompt in weighing in with authoritative support for the 2 February PRG statement in the form of a government statement and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 4th. In addition to supporting the PRG's position, the Chinese statement extended the demand for unconditional U.S. and allied withdrawal to apply to all of Indochina. Possibly with an eye on President Nixon's visit, the statement reassured Peking's Indochinese allies that its "unshakable established policy" is to support them in their war effort.

Unlike Peking, Moscow did not endorse the PRG statement with an official statement of its own. But Soviet media reported that Kosygin expressed support for the Vietnamese struggle and peace proposals when he received the DRV and PRG representatives in Moscow on the 4th.

DRV STATEMENT, COMMENT CONTRAST PRG PROPOSAL WITH U.S. PLAN

Vietnamese communist propaganda since the President's 25 January speech and the PRG's 2 February statement has insisted that the U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 2 -

eight-point proposal is merely a device to continue Vietnamization while the PRG's "elaboration" of its 1 July proposal is further evidence of good will and a desire to reach a political settlement. Although the DRV Government statement endorsing the PRG elaboration was delayed, surprisingly, until 5 February, the PRG initiative had been welcomed--and repeated--by DRV delegate Xuan Thuy at the Paris session on the 3d. DRV Premier Pham Van Dong had "warmly welcomed the PRG stand in a banquet speech for the Hungarian delegation on the 2d without acknowledging the substance of the proposal. NHAN DAN gave editorial support to the PRG on the 4th; and Pham Van Dong, speaking on that day at a meeting for the Hungarians, spelled out the PRG's elaboration and called it a "rebuttal" to the U.S. eight points. The editorial said that the PRG statement "has put into sharp contrast the U.S. imperialists' stand and that of our people on the Vietnam issue" and that "our people resolutely expose and denounce the deceitful measures of the eight-point plan."

VNA's account of the 3 February Paris session quotes Thuy as saying that the DRV delegation "fully agrees with and backs the PRG's elaborations on the two key problems in the seven-point solution, which fully conforms with the DRV stand." Thuy in his formal speech had gone on to explain that the DRV stand was that outlined in the nine-point proposal "which was handed to the United States privately on 26 June and made public on 31 January." (While the PRG has referred to the DRV's nine-point proposal, it has been reluctant to refer to the private DRV-U.S. talks. Thus, both the PRG statement on the 2d and PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien at Paris on the 3d said only that the "reasonable and logical" negotiating position of the communists is shown by the DRV's nine-point proposal "made on 26 June" as well as by the PRG's seven points.)

Both PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien and Xuan Thuy assailed the eight-point plan for failing to set a terminal date for U.S. withdrawal and for the suggestion that President Thieu resign just a month before new presidential elections would be held. Thuy went into more detail regarding the U.S. plan, seeking to show that it makes U.S. withdrawal "conditional." He ridiculed the notion of withdrawing U.S. troops six months after an agreement, stating that this time period has no more significance than the 12-month period which the President had suggested in his May 1969 proposal. Thuy also claimed that the United States has put troop withdrawal in the framework of an overall settlement, including "such absurd points" as mutual withdrawal

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 3 -

and a cease-fire* that were mentioned in the U.S. October 1970 five-point plan--a plan, he said, which "we rejected."

After assessing the U.S. plan as one serving the continuation of Vietnamization and the perpetration of numerous new "crimes," Thuy did not go on to refer to the assertion in the PRG statement of the 2d, repeated by Tien at the session, that the PRG "does not accept" the U.S. peace plan. Instead he said that "of course such a plan is not acceptable to honest, peace- and freedom-loving people." The NHAN DAN editorial on the 4th said that the President's "'plan for peace' definitely cannot be accepted." And the DRV Government statement on the 5th said: "In complete agreement with the 2 February PRG statement, the DRV firmly declares it does not accept President Nixon's deceptive 'peace plan' and unreservedly supports the seven-point solution of the PRG, whose two key problems have been elaborated."

The DRV statement closely followed the language of the PRG statement in saying that in his eight-point peace plan the President "still refuses to set a specific terminal date for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from South Vietnam and continues to pose conditions for the withdrawal of troops for the purpose of maintaining the U.S. stooge regime in South Vietnam. In suggesting the holding of elections within the framework of the present puppet administration and in the grip of its oppression and coercion, President Nixon has attempted to compel the South Vietnamese to accept the present U.S. puppet regime, to negate the PRG, the genuine and legal representative of the South Vietnamese people."

While other portions of the DRV statement also closely paralleled the PRG statement, the DRV statement did contain additional passages touching on Hanoi's nine points. After referring to the DRV's consistent support for the "struggle" and peaceful proposals of the Pathet Lao and Sihanouk's government, it observed that the DRV position had been made clear in the nine points and specified the call for "U.S." respect for the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, an end to U.S. aggression and intervention in the Indochina countries, and the opportunity

* Point six of the U.S. plan calls for a general cease-fire throughout Indochina, to begin when the agreement is signed, and says that as part of the cease-fire there will be no further infiltration of outside forces into any of the countries of Indochina.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 4 -

for the Indochinese peoples to settle their own affairs. Except in publicizing the text of the nine-point plan, Hanoi had mentioned its substance only in a 2 February NHAN DAN Commentator article.

Hanoi had publicized the U.S. eight-point proposal as well as the DRV's nine points* in the series of documents it released on 31 January, but criticism of the U.S. stand has focused almost exclusively on point one on U.S. and allied troop withdrawal and point three on the political situation in South Vietnam. Initial comment on the President's speech had made passing acknowledgment that the proposal included provisions for POW release and cease-fire and had mentioned the matter of U.S. aid to Indochina. But available propaganda since Xuan Thuy's statement at the Paris session on the 3d has not brought up any of the other points.

PRG ELABORATIONS Hanoi seconds the Front in stating that if the PRG's elaborations are accepted, all other issues will be settled quickly. At the Paris session Tien said the elaborations demonstrated his side's good will and flexibility. In one of Hanoi media's occasional departures from the practice of not reporting the post-session briefings, Hanoi radio's Mandarin and English services on the 7th carried some of the remarks made by PRG press spokesman Ly Van Sau. The radio quoted Sau as explaining on the 3d that since President Nixon had objected to suggestions of a withdrawal date, "we do not set any date this time, but leave it to President Nixon to choose himself a terminal date without posing any conditions. We will discuss this matter with him." Hanoi also quoted Sau on the issue of power in South Vietnam: He noted that in view of President Nixon's "flagrant argument" that he could not overthrow his ally, "we have asked" that President Thieu resign and that his "bellicose policy be ended."

* The general categories of the DRV's proposals are very similar to those of the U.S. plan. The additional point on the DRV side (No. 4) is the one calling for reparations. Otherwise the order is parallel: withdrawal, prisoner release, South Vietnamese settlement, respect for the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, Indochinese settlement of their own problems, cease-fire, international supervision, and international guarantees.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 5 -

ATTACKS ON U.S. POLICY,
PRESIDENT NIXON

Along with its deprecation of the U.S. peace plan as a device to pursue Vietnamization, Hanoi has continued to ridicule the President for describing it as a generous and fair offer. Such ridicule was interjected at the beginning of a 4 February NHAN DAN Commentator article which cited the Pentagon papers in setting out to document the charge that the Nixon Doctrine is a continuation of consistent "aggressive" U.S. policy in Indochina. The article did not acknowledge any of the recent developments in negotiations, mentioning neither the President's disclosures in his 25 January speech nor the PRG's elaborations of its proposal. Commentator began by saying that "when Nixon argues about U.S. policy toward Vietnam, many people recall the Pentagon secret documents" published last summer. He added that "Nixon resorts to all means to show that he is right, strong, and generous, but daily events expose his acts" The article reached back to 1954 to demonstrate the President's consistent "hawkish" attitude toward the war.

An article also signed Commentator in NHAN DAN on the 7th, as reviewed by VNA, similarly failed to explicitly mention recent developments related to negotiations when it scathingly attacked the President. As reviewed by VNA, it said that the President "cannot, by whatever tortuous and truculent pleas, whitewash his crimes of prolonging and expanding the aggressive war." It added that he "has leaked out his design to maintain indefinitely in South Vietnam several scores of thousands of U.S. troops to carry on its war role, to bargain at the negotiations, and as a pretext for 'protective reaction' for every attack on North Vietnam." Commentator concluded: "Richard Nixon--utterly reactionary and ferocious hawk--only wants to settle the Vietnam problem by an aggressive war."

As he had done on 27 January, Xuan Thuy at the Paris session on the 3d spoke of the President's "threats." Thuy took issue with the President for having "threatened" in his speech on 25 January "that in case the Vietnamese people pursued their just struggle, he would fully meet his responsibility as commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed forces."

Comment on the President's speech, including the 31 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article, had observed that the President's "threats" expose the "deceitfulness" of the U.S. peace proposals.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 6 -

TRUONG CHINH DECEMBER REMARKS ON U.S. WORLD POLICY RELEASED

VNA's press review on 1 February announced that Hanoi's papers that day devoted most of their space to publishing the "important report" by Politburo member Truong Chinh, delivered at the "recent congress of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF). Hanoi radio on the 1st and VNA on the 3d carried accounts of the report, which had been presented at the closing session of the VFF congress on 17 December and was briefly summarized by the radio on 21 December. It is not unusual for Hanoi to belatedly release major pronouncements in this fashion,* but it is possible that the timing of the release in this case was influenced by the imminence of President Nixon's visit to Peking and the current state of Sino-DRV relations. Some of Truong Chinh's remarks were obviously made with the President's trip in mind. Truong Chinh not only repeated the charge prominent in Hanoi's polemical propaganda last summer that the United States is scheming to split the "socialist bloc," but he also made an unusual, explicit reference to the Soviet Union and China in warning against the duplicity of the U.S. policy of negotiations.**

Analyzing U.S. foreign policy since World War II, Truong Chinh held that from 1961 to 1968 the United States had attempted to take advantage of contradictions in the socialist camp--"especially . . . between the Soviet Union and China"--in order to "seek a temporary detente with the Soviet Union." Since 1969, according to Truong Chinh, U.S. policy has been guided by the Nixon Doctrine which holds, among other things, that the United States is "'ready to negotiate' with a number of countries, especially with the Soviet Union and China, with a view to 'detering' and 'containing' these biggest socialist countries" In addition, Truong Chinh charged, the United States "makes the fullest use of contradictions between these

* Truong Chinh's major 1968 Marx anniversary report, for example, was treated in this typical fashion in the media. The report was delivered at a congress some time in August 1968 and was summarized by VNA on 23 August, but the full text was not released until mid-September.

** Hanoi had studiously avoided direct mention of President Nixon's trip to Peking in its vitriolic anti-Chinese polemic during July and August. The only known explicit mention of the President's planned visits to Peking and Moscow in any DRV media appeared in the November issue of a journal of the Central Committee's propaganda department THOI SU PHO THONG (CURRENT EVENTS), in an article which charged the President with "using vague hints to create the illusion that those trips will help the United States to resolve the Vietnam problem." (See the 5 January TRENDS, page 4.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 7 -

two countries and sows discord among the socialist countries in general in a bid to create favorable conditions for the United States, strives for 'detente' among the big powers, and continues to bully the smaller countries."

Truong Chinh's formula for defeating the Nixon Doctrine included the prescription that "the spearhead of the world revolution" be directed at the United States as the "number one enemy," that U.S. forces not be overestimated, and that opponents of the United States "strengthen their unity" and "be ready for united actions and foil by every means old perfidious plots and adventurous plans of U.S. imperialism." Truong Chinh went on, at another point, to propose that there be "three united fronts" to oppose the United States--fronts in Vietnam, in Indochina, and in the world.

PATHET LAO STATEMENT SUPPORTS PRG, DRV PLANS FOR SETTLEMENT

The Pathet Lao scored President Nixon's eight-point plan and supported the PRG and DRV Government statements with an NLHS Central Committee statement on 6 February, having previously limited its reaction to routine-level radio and press agency comment scoring the eight points as "shopworn proposals." NLHS Central Committee statements have been the customary vehicle for Pathet Lao reactions to past initiatives, including the PRG's seven-point proposal of 1 July 1971 and President Nixon's 7 October 1970 five-point plan.

The 6 February statement scored the U.S. proposal as a "plan to negotiate from a position of strength" and drag out the war, hoodwink the public, and "further Nixon's plan for another term in office." As in the earlier routine-level comment, it criticized the points on troop withdrawal and South Vietnam elections and ignored the points on respect for the Geneva agreements, international guarantees, and an international conference. "Only the seven-point political solution of which the two key points were elaborated" in the PRG statement and which was "fully approved" by the DRV Government, it said, is the "correct basis" for a Vietnam solution. The NLHS statement went on to describe the content of the PRG "elaboration." It concluded with the stock warning that "true to the joint declaration of the Indochinese Peoples' Summit Conference," the Lao people will cooperate with the peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia to "completely defeat" U.S. aggression in Indochina.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 8 -

SIHANOUK'S "GOVERNMENT" REJECTS U.S. "COMPROMISE FORMULAS"

Sihanouk's government, the RGNU, continues to denounce President Nixon's eight-point plan in a flurry of official comment, including a 5 February RGNU statement and an 8 February RGNU Foreign Ministry statement. These documents follow the initial reaction to the President's 25 January speech which had come in a 28 January statement by the RGNU Minister of Information and Propaganda, taking issue with the proposals on a cease-fire and elections in South Vietnam. Earlier, a 26 January statement by the "interior part" of the RGNU had not specifically mentioned the President's speech when it ambiguously complained of U.S. "diplomatic" trickery regarding Cambodia.*

The 5 February RGNU statement, reported by NCNA that day and by the radio of Sihanouk's front (FUNK) on the 9th, charged that the United States, trying to find a way out of the military defeats being inflicted on it in Cambodia, is "doggedly inventing such deceitful tricks as 'on-the-spot cease-fire,' 'peace negotiations,' 'partition of Cambodia,' 'referendum,' 'international conference,' 'government of national reconciliation,' and other fraudulent formulas of compromise." It claimed that President Nixon resorted once again to "some of these formulas" in his eight-point proposal. All these attempts are "nothing new" in Cambodia, it said, adding that "in conformity with the directives" of the FUNK Political Bureau which met "recently" under the chairmanship of Sihanouk, the RGNU "categorically rejects" the parts of the eight-point proposal which relate to Cambodia.

The statement reaffirmed the Cambodian people's resolve to struggle without retreat or compromise to drive out the U.S. forces and their "lackeys," overthrow the Phnom Penh "clique," and build a new Cambodia. It said that this "just stand" had been repeated many times, especially in the 26 January statement by the "interior part" of the RGNU and in the 28 January statement by the RGNU Ministry of Information and Propaganda. The language of the current statement echoed that used in the ambiguous 26 January statement, which alleged that President Nixon had "lately" advanced various schemes "such as a cease-fire on the spot, peace talks, partition

* Sihanouk's RGNU also reacted officially to previous peace initiatives. President Nixon's five-point proposal of 7 October 1970 was scored in a number of statements both in the name of the RGNU and Sihanouk personally, and a RGNU "spokesman's" statement supported the PRG's seven-point plan of 1 July 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 9 -

of Cambodia, settlement between the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh traitors and the FUNK, and many other formulas." Sihanouk has long registered opposition to such proposals as an "international conference on Cambodia" and a "partition of Cambodia," as in his reaction to the President's 10 October 1970 proposal for an Indochina conference. But the current statements came at a time when the DRV, in a 1 February foreign ministry spokesman's statement, was dismissing "fabricated reports" that it had engaged in indirect approaches to Phnom Penh concerning "a separate peace in Cambodia."

Other current propaganda by Sihanouk's government and front similarly scores alleged U.S. proposals for a Cambodian settlement. Introducing a statement by Khieu Samphan--the RGNU minister said to be leading the struggle in the "liberated zone"--which denounced the "crimes of the Phnom Penh traitors," a FUNK radio announcer on 7 February explained that the statement elaborates the reasons for the RGNU's "categorical rejection" of "all the formulas of compromise" with the United States and the "Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh clique." The announcer claimed that the President's eight-point plan "includes a part relating to Cambodia and especially shamelessly suggesting a settlement between the Phnom Penh traitors and the FUNK."

A FUNK radio commentary on 4 February asserted that on 29 January the "U.S. military radio" reported that when General Westmoreland met the Phnom Penh leaders on the 28th, he was assured that the "clique's" support for Nixon's eight-point proposal "meant that certain regions in Kampuchea would remain under communist control." Assailing this "plan to partition Cambodia," the commentary expressed the "patriots'" determination not to yield or compromise.

SUPPORT FOR RCNU support for the 2 February PRG statement
PRG STATEMENT thus far has been minimal. It was hailed in
the 8 February RGNU Foreign Ministry statement,
which also condemned the U.S. eight points but discussed the
content of neither. Failing to acknowledge that the PRG statement
"elaborated" on the seven points, the RGNU foreign ministry
statement merely demanded that the United States "seriously
respond" to the PRG seven-point proposal. LPA on the 6th
briefly reported that Sihanouk, receiving the PRG Ambassador
on 3 February, expressed support for the PRG statement, again
without mentioning its contents. Sihanouk's meeting with the
ambassador has not been reported by NCNA or by FUNK media.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 10 -

PRC STATEMENT REAFFIRMS "UNSHAKABLE" POLICY ON INDOCHINA WAR

Peking weighed in promptly with authoritative support for the 2 February PRG statement rejecting President Nixon's eight-point proposal and "elaborating" on the PRG's seven-point plan. On the 4th a PRC Government statement and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial expressed support for the PRG's position and reaffirmed unwavering Chinese backing for the war effort in Indochina. This represents the first government-level statement on Indochina since the Lam Son 719 operation last winter. In July, Peking had issued the 4 July 1971 PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial endorsing the PRG's seven-point plan issued on 1 July.

Peking's response may have been shaped with an eye on the President's visit to China this month. The government statement, extending the demands on the United States to apply to the whole of Indochina, declared it to be Peking's "unshakable established policy" and "an unshirkable internationalist duty" to support "the Vietnamese and the other Indochinese peoples" in their war effort. This sort of pledge, with its implicit reassurance to Peking's allies that their interests are not jeopardized by the forthcoming Sino-U.S. negotiations, has marked Peking's effort to allay any disquiet over the effects of the President's visit on Peking's position on Indochina. Thus, in the joint communique on DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's visit to the PRC last November, the Chinese reaffirmed their "unshirkable internationalist duty" to support the war effort to the end. At that time, however, the Chinese had further dramatized their commitment by declaring their readiness to undertake "the greatest national sacrifices"--a pledge not reiterated in the current statements.

In addition to demanding withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces from all of Indochina, the government statement called for the United States to end support for "the Nguyen Van Thieu puppet clique, the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak treacherous clique, and the rightists in Laos." Indicating that the way to a settlement in Indochina does not run through Peking, the statement reiterated Peking's position that the questions of the three Indochinese countries "can only be settled" by their peoples themselves "free from any foreign interference." In the absence of a settlement, the statement pledged "all-out support and assistance" to the peoples of the three countries until complete victory in their war.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 11 -

PEACE SETTLEMENT The government statement and the editorial cite only the PRG's seven-point plan and its 2 February elaboration as the basis for a settlement while criticizing the "deceptive" eight-point proposal advanced by President Nixon on 25 January. Though the statement dismissed Washington's peace proposals as "nothing but deceitful empty talk" so long as the United States does not unconditionally withdraw its troops and end support for Thieu, none of Peking's comment has cited the PRG's assertion that it "does not accept" the President's proposal. (However, Peking has carried the texts of the PRG statement and the DRV's 5 February statement containing this assertion.) Peking's comment has also ignored the PRG's reference to the POW question and to talks with the Saigon administration on formation of a government of national concord.

While duly acknowledging the PRG's elaboration on "two key points" in its peace plan, Peking's supporting comment does not spell out all of the elements contained in the PRG's elaboration. Thus, on the matter of U.S. withdrawal, Peking's comment does not mention the withdrawal of advisors, weapons, and war materials, as demanded in the PRG statement. And on the political question, Peking has not echoed the PRG's demand for Thieu's immediate resignation though it calls for the United States to "stop supporting the Vietnamese traitor Nguyen Van Thieu."

KOSYGIN, MOSCOW COMMENTATORS SUPPORT PRG, DRV STANDS

Moscow has failed to support the PRG's 2 February statement with an official statement of its own, or to denounce President Nixon's eight-point plan authoritatively. While Moscow has not issued official statements on Vietnamese communicc peace initiatives in the past, it did endorse the PRG's 1 July proposal in a PRAVDA editorial on 5 July--the day after Peking's editorial support in PEOPLE'S DAILY.*

* A PRAVDA Observer article greeted the NFLSV's 10 points in May 1969, and the 8-point "elaboration" of 17 September 1970 drew low-level comment although Podgorny briefly praised it in a 23 September luncheon speech for the visiting Indian president. President Nixon's 7 October 1970 five-point plan drew only low-level Moscow comment.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 12 -

Kosygin received the DRV and PRG ambassadors on 4 February who informed him of the PRG statement and the DRV "stand" on the U.S. eight-point plan, according to a TASS report that day which was also published in PRAVDA on the 5th. According to TASS, Kosygin expressed Soviet support for "the just struggle of the Vietnamese people and the proposals of the DRV and PRG aimed at a political settlement of the problems of Indochina." But TASS did not report, as did VNA, that he promised that the USSR will "increase its political support as well as military assistance to the Vietnamese people." VNA also quoted him as saying that "although they have sustained heavy setbacks in Indochina, the U.S. imperialists are still stubborn and refuse to give up their aggressive designs in this region." TASS omitted this remark but reported that the Vietnamese envoys "resolutely rejected" the U.S. proposals as "nothing but an attempt to impose a solution of the Vietnam problem on an American pattern."

As usual, Moscow duly reported the PRG and DRV statements. An initial factual report of the PRG statement inexplicably was not disseminated by TASS but a TASS-attributed summary which included the text of the "elaboration" was printed in PRAVDA on the 3d and IZVESTIYA on the 4th. The DRV Government statement of the 5th was promptly reported in a TASS item the following day which included both the criticism of the President for having revealed the secret meetings and the DRV's declaration that "it does not accept" the U.S. peace plan and supports the PRG's seven-point proposal. There were also the usual brief TASS reports of the statements at the 3 February Paris session and the post-session press briefings, which note that the delegates presented the PRG's "elaborations" on the seven points.

Routine comment on the PRG's "elaboration" of its stand included a 4 February Shakhov commentary broadcast in foreign languages which reviewed the contents of the two points put forward by the delegation at Paris and commented that their acceptance would "facilitate the solution of other problems that stand in the way of ending the war and establishing peace in South Vietnam." Shakhov went on to criticize President Nixon for failing to mention an end to the air war or a date for troop withdrawal in his eight-point plan, and added that it was also evident that the United States intends to preserve the Thieu administration "which is the main obstacle to solving the political problem in South Vietnam." A Kozyakov commentary

CONFIDENTIAL

- 13 -

broadcast in English to North America on the 3d, scoring U.S. efforts to exploit the POW issue, said that the PRG "has just restated its peace proposals" and it is clear that there would be "no problem" of releasing the prisoners if Washington would only drop its "aggressive policy" in the South.

Yuriy Zhukov, in a 5 February PRAVDA article on growing U.S. public dissatisfaction with the Administration's policies of "protracting" the war, ignored the PRG's "elaboration" in the course of a criticism of President Nixon's eight-point plan. Attacking characterizations of the President's program as "generous," Zhukov cited the DRV representative at Paris on 26 January as calling it a "treacherous maneuver aimed at deceiving the American electorate." Zhukov said that Nixon's 25 January speech and Kissinger's "verbose" press conference the next day "failed to satisfy sober-minded American figures," and he cited critical remarks made by several congressmen, including Representative McCloskey's remarks on elections in South Vietnam.

In contrast to DRV media, TASS on the 7th briefly reported that in his interview with CBS the day before, Xuan Thuy reviewed the Vietnamese peace program and said that the demand for an end to U.S. support to the Saigon regime is "a very important element of the settlement." TASS added that Secretary Rogers, also interviewed by CBS, "implied" that the United States intends to continue supporting the South Vietnam regime and that he blamed "the other side" for the failure to reach a peace settlement.

ATTACKS ON Moscow has continued to point to the President's
PEKING announcement of his peace plan on the eve of his
visit to China as an example of Peking's
"collaborationist" policies. Some commentators once again have sought to play on Vietnamese fears of a Sino-U.S. backstage deal on Vietnam. A Moscow domestic service commentary on 3 February cited "observers" as speculating that one reason for the President's announcement of the peace plan was to prepare "some initial positions for possible discussion of the Indochina problem with the Peking leaders during the forthcoming visit by the U.S. President to China." It added that "American ruling circles" apparently still hope to achieve "some kind of deal behind the backs of the struggling people of Indochina." A similar point was made in a Mandarin-language broadcast on 3 February, which went on to cite a NHAN DAN article as warning that "no brutal acts of war or cunning and fanciful schemes" of the United States can dissuade the Vietnamese from their struggle.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 14 -

PRG'S 10-POINT POLICY ON DEFECTORS CONTINUES TO BE PRESSED

Vietnamese communist media continue to give publicity to the appeal to personnel of the Saigon government and army initiated in the 10-point statement of PRG policy released on 25 January* and later reiterated in other authoritative comment, including the 2 February PRG statement elaborating on the 1 July proposal and rejecting the U.S. eight-point proposal. Routine comment, like the 2 February PRG statement, calls on armymen to respond to the 10-point statement and join in forcing a U.S. withdrawal and the overthrow of Thieu. In his 4 February speech at a meeting for the Hungarian delegation, Pham Van Dong claimed that the "movement" in South Vietnam to attain these communist goals has been extended because of the PRG's "new policies."

The practical application of the 10 policies is pointed up in propaganda urging increased proselyting efforts. Thus, for example, an editorial in QUAN GIAI PHONG (LIBERATION ARMY), broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 6th, maintained that the Front has "an extremely favorable opportunity to launch a vigorous and timely proselyting attack into the enemy's ranks." The dissemination of the PRG's policies among those "in the enemy's ranks" was seen by the editorial as a contribution toward the disintegration of the Saigon government and army and thus toward the frustration of Vietnamization. In addition to promoting the PRG's policies in routine comment, Liberation Radio has also begun broadcasting statements attributed to captured ARVN officers who acclaim the policies and appeal for Saigon servicemen to defect.

A commentary in the 7 February QUAN DOI NHAN DAN hailed the communists' proselyting efforts in 1971, claiming that they "contributed significantly to gradually disintegrating" the Saigon army and were a "strong blow" at Vietnamization. Highly evaluating the impact of the new PRG policies, the army paper held that men in Saigon's armed forces who "have clearly understood this major PRG policy" will "certainly not allow the U.S. aggressors to continue to coerce and deceive them" but will, "depending on their circumstances, contribute to the struggle to save the country and their families."

* The 10-point PRG statement of policies toward elements associated with the Saigon government was discussed in the 2 February TRENDS, pages 20-23.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 15 -

SINO - U. S. RELATIONS

CHOU RAISES TAIWAN ISSUE; COMMENT ASSAILS NIXON MESSAGES

At a time when Peking has been taking care to leave the negotiating door open on Sino-U.S. issues, Chou En-lai took the occasion of a banquet for visiting Pakistani President Bhutto on 1 February to reaffirm Peking's determination to recover Taiwan. But while raising the issue, Chou's remarks on Taiwan avoided any mention of President Nixon's China policy, conveyed no sense of urgency on the issue, and were not echoed in his formal speech at the banquet. Also during this period, Peking has directed a spate of criticism at U.S. policy on a range of issues outside the sensitive area of Sino-U.S. relations, focusing in particular on the President's Vietnam position* and his policy reports to Congress. Comment on these annual messages, including a 30 January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the State of the Union and Budget messages, has been more authoritative and thorough than the sparse NCNA accounts last year, though Peking has discreetly avoided the personal invective that pervaded last year's comment.

In keeping with this carefully tailored comment, Chou was cautiously tactful regarding U.S. leaders during a private conversation on 31 January with a group of visiting Americans. (In line with past Chinese coverage of such sessions, NCNA merely reported those present at the meeting, providing no details on Chou's comments or on the topics of the conversation.) Judging from REUTER accounts of the session, in the course of a two-hour talk Chou reflected Peking's public position on the President's eight-point peace plan for Indochina, stating that he thought "it would not be possible" to end the conflict on this basis, but he added a favorable comparison of U.S. leaders with Soviet officials by observing that the Americans, unlike the Soviets, had not attempted to ridicule Peking at last fall's General Assembly session. Making a bow to Kissinger as a "man with whom one can argue," Chou reportedly refused to be drawn in when one of the visitors described the Presidential advisor as "Nixon's Metternich," rejoining that it would be impossible for such a figure to appear today.

* See the Indochina section of the TRENDS this week and last week.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 16 -

Along with Chou, the Chinese officials meeting the American group-- which included several members of an organization advocating the rapid establishment of relations between Washington and Peking-- included Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and several of the foreign ministry experts on American affairs who were in Peking's delegation to the United Nations last fall. This turnout of officials was consistent with previous occasions when the Chinese practiced "people's diplomacy" with visiting Americans.

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES Following its initial reaction to the President's State of the Union message in an NCNA account of 24 January,* Peking has directed a volley of criticism--highlighted by the 30 January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article--against the foreign policy and domestic programs put forth in the annual messages to Congress. The overall thrust of the criticism is similar to last year's comment in depicting the United States as a declining power beset by internal and foreign problems and in assailing the President for making "empty promises" in his policy statements. Peking may have offered more extensive and authoritative comment this year to demonstrate that its invitation to the President does not imply approval of his policies.

In line with the 24 January NCNA account of the State of the Union message, the Commentator article focused on U.S. foreign policy, attacking the President on a number of issues while avoiding any gratuitous comment on issues directly involving Sino-U.S. relations. The article discussed in some detail the President's pledge to honor existing treaty commitments, commenting that this demonstrated U.S. persistence in infringing on the sovereign rights of various countries, but it refrained from citing the Taiwan question as a case in point. Calling attention to the President's discussion of defense needs, Commentator viewed this as directed chiefly against the Soviet Union, making no attempt to draw implications concerning Chinese interests. Comment on U.S. domestic problems repeated familiar claims that the U.S. trade imbalance, expanding national debt, and deficit budget underlined the decline of the American economy and the weakening of American power abroad.

Supporting this portrayal of U.S. decline, a 3 February NCNA account of the President's 27 January economic report echoed the keynote of the New Year's joint editorial--that the world is undergoing a propitious "upheaval"--in predicting that the present "turbulent world situation" will soon develop into "ever greater upheaval." NCNA elaborated on the editorial's claim that the United States is facing growing competition from other capitalist countries and must intensify "its scramble for world hegemony" with the Soviet Union, thereby sharpening "the basic contradictions" in the world today. The notions of an "upheaval" and sharpening "contradictions" have been key elements in Peking's rationale for the invitation to the President and its flexible moves in the international community.

* See the TRENDS of 26 January 1972, pages 17-18.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 17 -

TAIWAN ISSUE Chou En-lai's pointed reminder on 1 February of Peking's resolve to recover Taiwan may have been intended more for the PRC's allies than for the United States. Chou made his reference to Taiwan in a toast addressed both to the Pakistani guests and to Prince Sihanouk and other Cambodians present. Observing that Cambodia, Pakistan, and China have common aims because their territories have been invaded and split, Chou declared in pro forma terms that the Chinese must strive to "liberate" Taiwan. In raising the Taiwan issue in this setting, Chou may have been indicating that the PRC-U.S. alignment on the Indian-Pakistani conflict and Peking's invitation to the President do not imply a willingness to compromise basic objectives.

Chou's message may also have been intended for the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese, who have linked their unfulfilled revolutionary goals with Peking's claim to Taiwan. This claim, in fact, was most recently voiced by a Chinese spokesman at a reception marking the North Korean army's anniversary on 7 February, when PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Chang Tsai-chun accused the United States of continuing its military "occupation" of Taiwan and underscored Peking's determination to gain control of the island.

The most authoritative recent Chinese comment on the Taiwan issue was contained in an unusually lengthy passage in the New Year's joint editorial reiterating Peking's demand for a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the island and straits. The editorial reaffirmed opposition to any resolution of the issue that would dilute Peking's claim to sovereignty over the island. The editorial specifically denounced formulas advocating a solution on the basis of "one China-one Taiwan," "one China-two governments," the status of Taiwan remains to be determined, or an independent Taiwan.

Peking has occasionally added or omitted formulas in commenting on this issue, attempting to clarify or underline its claim in the light of ongoing international developments affecting the Taiwan question. Thus, in response to publicity for a movement demanding Taiwan independence at a time when the ROC's international status was being eroded, Peking initiated polemical attacks on the notion of Taiwan independence and incorporated it as one of the formulas found objectionable. Similarly, in response to a Japanese shift from full support for the ROC to a position that there is only one China but two regimes in control of different territories, Peking included the formula "one China-two governments" among its polemical targets.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 18 -

Peking's propaganda attention to these formulas and the views they encapsulate has been notably strong in the past year, reflecting concern over a possible tendency within the international community to accept a permanent alienation of Taiwan from PRC sovereignty. Peking's uneasiness on this score was most sharply demonstrated last spring in reaction to a press briefing on U.S. policy toward Taiwan by State Department spokesman Charles Bray.* Taking forceful issue with Bray's statement that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined" and is subject to future international resolution, Peking did no more than acknowledge that Bray also suggested that the Taiwan question should be resolved by agreements arrived at between the two rival Chinese sides.

Peking has since given much polemical attention to the unsettled-status formulation, grouping it in the list of formulas regularly denounced. The notion of an international resolution of the Taiwan problem raised in the Bray briefing has also been denounced in Chinese attacks on the Taiwan independence movement. In addition, Peking has voiced indirect criticism of this position by persistently emphasizing that the Taiwan problem is an internal Chinese affair that "brooks no foreign interference."

In notable contrast to this extensive attack on the notion that Taiwan's status remains unsettled, Peking has remained silent on the suggestion floated in the Bray briefing that the Taiwan issue should be resolved by agreement between Peking and Taipei, failing to take note of subsequent speculation along this line. This silence suggests that Peking may be deliberately leaving open the possibility of an accommodation with the rival regime that would protect the interests of those on Taiwan without compromising Peking's claim to sovereignty. Against the background of indications in the past that Peking would be willing to engage in direct talks with the Chinese Nationalists, and given such major recent developments as the seating of the PRC in the United Nations, it may be significant that Peking has been softening its criticism of the Taipei regime. While maintaining the basic position that Chiang Kai-shek's regime is not a legitimate government and continuing to characterize it as a "clique" and a "gang," authoritative Chinese comment no longer refers to the regime, or to Chiang himself, in such terms as "traitor," "political mummy," or "political corpse"--terms that remained in currency until early 1971.

* Peking's reaction is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 May 1971, pages 11-14.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 19 -

U S S R - U, S. - P R C

KOMMUNIST REASSURES WORLD MOVEMENT ON SOVIET DETENTE POLICY

Against the background of a rising crescendo of Soviet bloc attacks on the development of Sino-U.S. relations as the dates of President Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow draw nearer, a lengthy editorial in the year's first issue of KOMMUNIST offers an elaborate defense of Brezhnev's detente line and is at pains to distinguish it from the Maoist leadership's "intrigues."

The editorial, in the issue of the CPSU theoretical journal signed to the press 4 January, seems addressed both to domestic party cadres and to allied communist states whose interests could be affected by the course of Moscow's "peace program." Thus KOMMUNIST assures its readers that Soviet foreign policy moves are both "completely in keeping with the Soviet people's fundamental interests" and have already led to "an indisputable strengthening of the national liberation movement." It pictures Moscow, in the pursuit of "peaceful cooperation and negotiation" with the West, as eschewing any "unprincipled, unstable foreign policy compromises" at the expense of either Soviet national interests or the interests of the national liberation movement. And the thrust of the point is sharpened by the editorial's specific denigration of Peking's current diplomatic ventures as self-serving politicking, motivated by "hegemonistic" ambitions and "anti-Sovietism."

Elaborating the ideological rationale for Soviet foreign policy initiatives since the 24th CPSU Congress, the editorial invokes Lenin on the need to "exploit differences between opponents"--but "only the profound differences explained by the most deep-seated economic causes," for "if we attempt to exploit petty chance differences we shall end up in the position of a petty politician and cheap-skate diplomat."* KOMMUNIST argues that "contradictions" in the capitalist world, particularly in the economic and political area, are more ripe for exploitation than in the past when capitalism was essentially "monolithic." It goes on to replay a theme that has been prominent in Soviet comment making the

* Accusing Peking of following a non-class foreign policy, Moscow has taken the Chinese to task for extending the invitation to President Nixon as part of an effort to isolate the Soviet Union as the main enemy.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 20 -

case for improved U.S.-Soviet relations, stating that those "imperialist politicians" who resort to threats against socialism are today counterbalanced in some states by proponents of coexistence who proceed from "a more sober assessment of the present balance of forces." The editorial cites Soviet relations with France, Italy, Canada, and the FRG as good examples of the successful development of relations on this basis. It brings up the SALT negotiations in the same context as evidence of the CPSU's efforts to "implement disarmament," and in the same vein it observes that President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May "could open up more favorable prospects in relations with the United States, too."

At pains to demonstrate that there is "no disparity between the CPSU's words and deeds," between its peace offensive and its support for its socialist allies and the national liberation movement, the editorial pledges Soviet loyalty to proletarian internationalism and specifically reiterates Soviet resolve to support the DRV and to back the Arab states against Israel. To buttress the case for Soviet detente policy as serving the best interests of the world communist movement, in essence the dictum that what is good for the Soviet Union is good for the world movement, it contends that since Soviet foreign policy is Marxist-Leninist it organically combines the best interests of the Soviet people with those of the national liberation movement. With such allies as the DRV and GDR evidently in mind, and perhaps hardlining elements in the Soviet Union as well, it argues that

consolidating peace and the people's security represents a gain for everybody and cannot be considered a loss for anybody but the inveterate enemies of mankind. For world socialism, it constitutes the direct implementation of its very important foreign policy objectives and a direct guarantee of its peaceful development. Therefore, successes for the cause of peace are primarily successes for the world socialist community, a decisive factor in world politics. And in this sense the implementation of the foreign policy program advanced by the CPSU signifies the further consolidation of socialism's positions in the struggle against world imperialism and a further shift in the balance of world class forces in favor of socialism.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 21 -

KOMMUNIST declares that Soviet foreign policy "has the complete support of the communists and of all the Soviet people" and is in "keeping with their fundamental interests, aspirations, and hopes." Communists, it says, "are realists" and understand that many "urgent questions still remain unresolved in U.S.-Soviet relations"--hence the need to pursue the policy of coexistence and to try to "resolve problems through negotiations." It is here that KOMMUNIST adds the caveat, for the benefit of the doubters, that

our country does not seek unprincipled, unstable foreign policy compromises with the capitalist countries. Loyal to the Leninist approach, the USSR deals a firm rebuff to imperialist encroachments and resolutely supports the liberation movement and revolutionary forces.

The implied invidious comparison is made explicit in ensuing passages contrasting Moscow's principled support for the national liberation struggle worldwide with "the flagrant disparity between Peking's practical politics" and its pretensions to leadership of world communism. The editorial does not specifically mention President Nixon's impending trip to Peking, but it points to Chinese "intrigues" with the West and to alleged U.S.-PRC collusion in the India-Pakistan conflict as evidence that "the Maoists are ready to sacrifice the national liberation movement" for their own "hegemonist aims."

The editorial winds up with the stock call for heightened vigilance against "anticommunist ideological subversion." It calls on foreign policy, ideological, and propaganda organs "to raise their standard of effectiveness" in combatting Western "bridgebuilding" efforts and in countering "the ideas of military blackmail [a Chinese charge against the Soviets], 'convergence,' the 'two superpowers' [Peking's label for the United States and the USSR], nationalism, and anti-Sovietism."

TASS LINKS "NEW PURGES" TO MAO'S ANTI-SOVIET, PRO-U.S. LINE

On the eve of President Nixon's visit to the PRC, Moscow has intensified its efforts to discredit the Chinese leadership and to portray an ongoing internal crisis in the country linked to dissension over Maoist policies toward the Soviet Union and the United States. And it has unearthed an early quotation from Mao to indirectly warn Peking against forming an alliance

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 22 -

with the United States that would inevitably be directed against the Soviet Union and amount to an end of the Chinese revolution.

A TASS commentary on internal developments in the PRC--published in the central press on 8 February and subsequently broadcast in abridged form in Mandarin to China--said that "a wave of mass purges" has spread from Peking to other parts of the country. Citing Western press reports and "informed Peking sources," it alleged that Mao's group, having won the latest round of internal strife, is now trying to rebuild the greatly depleted Chinese leadership with its own supporters and has entrusted to a special team the task of preparing "black lists" of Lin Piao followers. Quoting "well-informed sources close to the Peking leadership," TASS said many people, fearful of being purged, are trying to leave the country illegally. Stating that "high-ranking" Chinese officers who had attempted to flee the country last September and October had been arrested, tried by a tribunal, and in most cases sentenced to death, TASS claimed that such "executions" have already been carried out in several Chinese cities. It made no reference to the reported crash of a Chinese plane in Mongolia last September.

Implying that Mao's "anti-Soviet" line and rapprochement with the United States are major factors in the Chinese internal struggle, TASS commented that the "wholesale purges and arrests are accompanied by the stepping up of anti-Sovietism in the PRC." At the same time, it said, Peking is curbing its anti-American propaganda "in all places where the U.S. President is going to visit in February."

In effect warning Peking against a Sino-American deal that would rebound against Soviet interests and underscoring the charge that Mao has abandoned anti-imperialism, TASS quotes the Chairman as saying at an unspecified date in the past: "Imperialists are going to fight against the Soviet Union, against the communists. If you form an alliance with the imperialists, they will urge you to go fighting to the north and nothing will remain of your revolution. The situation is now clear: it is either the policy of union with Russia, union with the socialist state, or the policy of union with imperialists, union with imperialism."

Radio Moscow's Chinese audiences have also heard continuing comment calculated to fan party-military tensions in the PRC, including an 8 February broadcast targeted at the PLA which pictured "the new purge in the PLA" as a tragedy both for the

CONFIDENTIAL

- 23 -

Chinese military and for the Chinese people as a whole. Stating that the army is being stripped of its "outstanding cadres who stood in the forefront of China's struggles," the broadcast said it is only natural that these "resolute anti-imperialist fighters, many of whom took up arms to fight the foreign invaders, are now in disgrace when the Chinese leaders are taking pains to appease and conciliate the leaders of U.S. imperialism."

PRAVDA HITS ALSOP PORTRAYAL OF U.S. AS PEKING'S "SAVIOR"

Moscow's sensitivity to the triangular aspects of President Nixon's forthcoming trips is reflected in a vituperative attack on columnist Joseph Alsop in PRAVDA on 6 February. The article takes particular umbrage at Alsop's portrayal of the United States as a restraining factor in Soviet pressures against the PRC. After taking note of his claim that the President and Kissinger "share an identity of views on the need for so-called balance of forces in the world," the article goes on to reject the Alsop "lie" that in 1969 "the Russians inquired whether the White House would turn its back if they undertook the nuclear castration of China." Further noting Alsop's contention that "the true purpose of Nixon's visit to Peking will consist, if possible, in restraining the Russians from an attack," the PRAVDA article vehemently denies that any such attack was ever prepared, but it does not address itself to Alsop's speculation on U.S. motives.

The suspicious note on which the article concludes--"into whose hands does this play, and what are the intentions and maneuvers being fostered by those who are behind him?"--suggests that Moscow's sharp retort to Alsop reflects concern over pressures on the President to develop the opening to the Chinese at the expense of Soviet interests. In the past the Soviets have displayed particular sensitivity over any stigma that might rub off from speculation that they were considering a preventive strike against China, and the PRAVDA article makes a point of invoking the 24th CPSU Congress' line on Moscow's peaceful intentions and its long-term perspective. The message, evidently, is that Moscow is keeping a wary eye on the President's summitry but that it is not threatening a major venture against the Chinese.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 24 -

JAPAN

PEKING CONDEMNS GROMYKO VISIT AS A MOVE AGAINST CHINA

Commenting on Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's 23-28 January visit to Japan, NCNA on 4 February condemned the visit as "an important step taken by Soviet revisionist social imperialism to step up its collusion with the Japanese reactionaries to oppose the people of China and other Asian countries and to contend with U.S. imperialism for spheres of influence in Asia." Reflecting Peking's anxiety over recent Soviet moves toward Japan, NCNA asserted that "Gromyko tried his utmost to woo and curry favor with the Japanese reactionaries" as a means "to oppose socialist China in collusion with Japanese militarism." The NCNA article portrayed the agreement to continue efforts to develop economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan as part of a Soviet attempt to "further attract Japan economically and restrain Japanese-U.S. relations by seizing the opportunity when the contradictions between Japan and the United States in economics and trade have sharpened."

While Moscow apparently hopes to defuse the "northern territories" issue--the disputed status of four islands north of Hokkaido seized by the USSR at the end of World War II--by seeking closer economic cooperation with Japan, Peking appears eager to ignite the territorial issue. Pointing to the fact that the joint communique contained no reference to the "northern territories"--an omission interpreted by the Japanese press as indicating Soviet willingness to negotiate the territorial issue during forthcoming peace treaty talks--NCNA asserted that the Soviet Union is merely attempting "to woo the Japanese reactionaries into cooperation" by adopting a seemingly more relaxed position on the territorial question "as enticement so as to step up their all-round counter-revolutionary collusion."

Public attention was again directed to the territorial question in a 5 February NCNA article denouncing Prime Minister Sato's 29 January Diet speech. Sato was charged with attempting to "cover up the fact that the long demand of the Japanese people for the return of the northern territories from the Soviet Union has not been solved up to now" by "boasting" in his speech that the "Japan-Soviet talks have deepened 'mutual understanding'" and that "Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko has shown positive interest in Japan-Soviet relations."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 25 -

Although the question of the northern territories has been a public issue in past Sino-Soviet exchanges,* Moscow media have not yet responded to the NCNA articles. Moscow propagandists have, however, continued to highlight the possibilities for closer economic cooperation with Japan. Radio Moscow broadcast an Afonin commentary to its Japanese audience on 29 January which portrayed Gromyko's visit as part of "periodic consultations with the Japanese foreign minister on the problems between the two countries and important current international issues of mutual interest." Asserting that recent Soviet-Japanese interchanges "in trade, economic, scientific, cultural, and other fields have been expanded to a great extent," Afonin argued that "there is no doubt that long-term economic cooperation between the two countries will provide an ever-growing foundation for development of their mutual relations."

This theme was also developed in an IZVESTIYA commentary by V. Fyodorov summarized by TASS on 31 January. Claiming that Gromyko's visit to Japan "will promote further Soviet-Japanese relations" and "deepen understanding between the two countries," Fyodorov asserted that "in today's conditions" there are "ample opportunities for the further expansion of mutually advantageous cooperation between the two countries." "Complete normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations on an appropriate treaty basis would meet the long-term interest of the two peoples," he said. Portraying the political line pursued by the Soviet Union in regard to Japan as aimed at "easing tension and strengthening international security," Fyodorov expressed the hope that the "same serious approach to questions of further developing Japan-Soviet relations will be shown by the Japanese side."

* In a July 1964 interview with a visiting Japanese Socialist Party delegation, Mao attacked Soviet World War II territorial gains in Europe and Asia and specifically declared that "as regards the Kurile Islands, this question is clear as far as we are concerned: They must be returned to Japan." PRAVDA, on 2 September 1964, printed the text of the interview along with an editorial which lashed out at Mao for trying to "fan nationalistic passions" by "fabricating . . . territorial issues" between communist countries. Turning to Mao's comment on the "northern territories," the editorial firmly declared that "the statement that the USSR should give up the Kuriles to Japan plays into the hands not only of Japanese but of American militarists."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 26 -

P R C - P A K I S T A N

PEKING OFFERS LIMITED SUPPORT DURING BHUTTO'S VISIT

Peking afforded Pakistani President Bhutto political support and offered some measure of economic relief during his visit to the PRC from 31 January to 2 February, but there was an evident effort on both sides to let the dust settle in South Asia while bolstering Bhutto's position during the postwar period. Bhutto was accorded full honors, being hosted by Chou En-lai and received by Mao. The visiting delegation, which included the commanders of the Pakistani armed services, held talks with Chou; his leading associates, Yeh Chien-ying, a member of the party's Military Commission, and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien; and defense and foreign affairs officials. According to the communique, the two sides were "fully satisfied" with the results of the talks, which concerned the Indian-Pakistani conflict "and its aftermath," "major" international issues, and bilateral relations.

Despite the strong military representation in the visiting delegation, the only reference to Chinese assistance was a decision recorded in the communique to help the development of Pakistan's economy by converting four outstanding loans into grants and deferring payment on a loan provided in 1970. At a banquet given by Chou on 1 February, Bhutto assured his hosts that Pakistan has no intention of being a liability and burden on the PRC and that the delegation was returning home "completely satisfied" with its visit.

For its part, Peking seemed concerned not to have Pakistan become a political liability in the aftermath of the Indian-Pakistani conflict. While offering generalized expressions of support for Pakistan's defense of "state sovereignty and territorial integrity," the Chinese remained noncommittal about the future relations between what had been the two wings of an ally. The communique registered Bhutto's view that the relations between "the two parts of Pakistan" should be established through negotiations between the elected leaders and that other states should not in the meantime take "any precipitate action" that would undermine this objective. According to the communique, Chou went no further than to express "his understanding of and respect for the above stand" of Pakistan.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 27 -

Peking's approach to this question was foreshadowed by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 31 January, the date of Bhutto's arrival. The editorial assailed the Indians and Soviets for having imposed Bangladesh on Pakistan and for having done so in the name of support for national self-determination. The editorial did not, however, attack the Bangladesh authorities or discuss the future relations between East Bengal and Pakistan, and it quoted an unnamed Pakistani leader as having admitted that Pakistan had made "terrible blunders indeed" in handling the question of East Pakistan. Bhutto's remark at the 1 February banquet that the people of Pakistan want to "look inwards" and "try to rectify our mistakes" must have been received approvingly by the Chinese.

APPEAL TO INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY

While seeking to cut its losses following the defeat of an ally, Peking has sought to capitalize on the opprobrium accrued by India and the Soviet Union for their power play in dismembering Pakistan. The joint communique, condemning India's "naked aggression" as a defiance of international law, the UN Charter, and the Bandung principles, called upon "the international community to take serious note of the grave consequences that must ensue for the world order" if a country imposes its will on a neighbor by military force. The communique also "noted with gratification that the members of the third world in general and the Islamic countries in particular"--many of which have their own separatist problems--have supported Pakistan in defense of its territorial integrity.

Though the Chinese muted their anti-Soviet polemics in deference to Bhutto's interests and concentrated their fire on the Indians during his visit, the 31 January editorial blistered the Soviets for supporting the dismemberment of Pakistan in the name of national liberation. Making a pitch to the Muslim world, the editorial argued that the Soviets have sabotaged the Palestinian people's armed struggle by appealing for a political solution in the Middle East and making deals with "the other superpower." Probing another sore spot, the editorial ridiculed Soviet claims that the situation in Bangladesh has returned to normal as reminiscent of similar claims following the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The editorial sounded a recurrent theme in repeating Peking's judgment of last December that the fall of Dacca was not a milestone toward Indian victory but the starting point of "endless strife" in South Asia. Returning to this theme at his 1 February banquet, Chou explained that India's power move has intensified its conflicts with its neighbors and "aggravated

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 28 -

the scramble between the two superpowers" in the region. As in earlier Chinese comment on the Indian-Pakistani war, Chou thus implicitly acknowledged that Soviet and U.S. interests have been in conflict in South Asia, in contrast to the judgment that the two superpowers have engaged in collusion in the Middle East. However, the Chinese have dropped earlier charges that Moscow's moves in South Asia were aimed at the PRC.

NATIONALITY QUESTIONS Peking used the occasion of Bhutto's visit to proclaim its line that "a country's internal affairs, including its nationality problems, should be handled only by its own people and no foreign country has the right to interfere," and that disputes between states should be settled by the two sides concerned "through peaceful consultations and there should be no resort to force." As for the particular question of Kashmir, the Chinese joined their visitors in the joint communique in calling for withdrawal to positions "which respect the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir," and Chou on the 1st declared Chinese support for "the people of Kashmir in their just struggle for the right to national self-determination."

As in the case of the 16 December PRC Government statement on the Indian-Pakistani conflict, the 31 January PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial pointedly offered a reminder that it is in India that "sharp national contradictions and oppression really exist," citing the "just struggles against national oppression" being waged by the Nagas, Mizos, Sikhs, and other nationalities. (On 1 February the NCNA domestic service disseminated "international reference material" to document this line). But after thus again raising a threat of fishing in troubled waters, the editorial immediately disclaimed any interventionist intent: "Even so, we do not consider that other countries can make armed intervention there."

The editorial discussed the issue of Indian nationalities after denouncing the Indians for having "recently unleashed" the Dalai Lama to raise the question of Tibetan independence. This sensitive question had been the subject of a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 27 January objecting to a recent speech by the Dalai Lama in Calcutta. Expressing "the greatest fury" over the "criminal acts of the Indian Government" in allegedly interfering in China's internal affairs, the editorial charged that India had instigated him to raise the Tibetan question now in order to divert attention from the attack on Pakistan. The editorial concluded with a warning to India not to meddle in the Tibetan situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 29 -

CHINA

POLITBURO MEMBER HSU SHIH-YU REAPPEARS AFTER 8-MONTH ABSENCE

Making his first appearance since June, Politburo member Hsu Shih-yu showed up in Nanking on 1 February for a "support the army" rally. A Kiangsu radio broadcast on 4 February reported the rally and identified Hsu with all of his previous titles, including his posts as commander of the Nanking Military Region, Kiangsu party first secretary, and Kiangsu revolutionary committee chairman. Western correspondents had reported rumors from travelers returning from China that Hsu was to be named to a top post in Peking; his lengthy absence, however, had suggested he might be in political difficulties.

Hsu previously survived a long period of absence to come back with power apparently unimpaired. In 1967 and until March of 1968, Hsu's only appearance was for National Day on 1 October, although he apparently continued to hold his pre-cultural revolution post as head of the Nanking Military Region. He was appointed chairman of the Kiangsu revolutionary committee in March 1968 and named to the Politburo in April 1969 at the Ninth Party Congress.

Hsu's reappearance indicates that he is not now suspected of any deep complicity in the Lin Piao affair. His apparent failure to be named to the rumored central post may indicate, however, that he has not yet completely regained his previous power position; his absence may have been caused not by duties at the center but by the center's requirement that he undergo a period of personal "rectification."

It now appears that all military region commanders in China have survived the Lin Piao purge, with the possible exception of the continually troubled Peking Military Region, whose present chief remains unknown. All the others have made public appearances since last September.

EAST CHINA PROVINCES CITE CHIANG CHING'S CULTURAL ROLE

Provincial media in Shanghai and Chekiang have provided the first mentions since October of Chiang Ching's role as a leader on the cultural front. A Chekiang provincial broadcast on 1 February included the once-standard phrase "model theatrical works carefully cultivated by Comrade Chiang Ching,"

CONFIDENTIAL

- 30 -

and on 4 February Shanghai radio broadcast a joint WEN HUI PAO-LIBERATION DAILY editorial hailing Chiang's "guidance" in creating a new script for the revolutionary Peking opera "On the Docks."

Unlike most of the revolutionary operas and dramas, "On the Docks" is concerned with the struggles of urban workers rather than with PLA or peasant militia battles. The plot of the play revolves around efforts by Shanghai dockers in 1963 to load speedily and safely a shipment of wheat intended for the aid of "brothers" in an unidentified foreign land. Shanghai's editorial notes that the play embodies "Mao's revolutionary line on foreign policy," and that it demonstrates that "people who have won revolutionary victory should help those people who are now struggling for liberation."

"On the Docks" was introduced during the cultural revolution, but it was not in a class with such overwhelming favorites as "The Red Lantern" and "Shachiapang." It was among the operas given "experimental performances" on National Day last year, according to NCNA at the time. One reason for its new script is evident in the first scene of the previous version, which included praise for Lin Piao. The original also contained several references to cruel American dockside bosses of pre-revolution days--possibly another reason for revision.

Chiang's position as China's cultural tsar seemed to suffer some diminution in August when a cultural group was established under the State Council. Her name continued to be noted in cultural contexts until after Lin's name completely dropped out of the media, however. Chiang's cultural role had been closely tied to Lin, and the media had routinely referred to Lin's letter entrusting Chiang with cultural reform in the PLA.

The current references to Chiang's cultural role are both from East China, the area that most strongly supported Chiang's efforts in the early stages of the cultural revolution. Shanghai chiefs Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan are the only members of the early Cultural Revolution Group to escape unscathed from the revolution, and Chang's post as Nanking Military Region political commissar gives him authority in neighboring provinces such as Chekiang. Unless central media soon pick up mentions of Chiang's reformation of culture, it may be assumed that the East China references reflect political peculiarities rather than a major actual re-emergence by Mme. Mao on the cultural scene.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 31 -

MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW, CAIRO URGE JARRING TALKS, DISCUSS EGYPTIAN "DEFENSE"

Moscow's modest coverage of Egyptian President as-Sadat's 2-4 February talks in the Soviet capital, combined with certain inclusions and omissions in the communique, which was abbreviated for talks at that level, suggest continuing differences between the sides. The communique routinely asserts that the talks were held in an atmosphere of "trust, full mutual understanding, and friendship," but the visit did not receive the publicity accorded as-Sadat's "official visit" last October.* Radio comment during the visit was confined chiefly to material broadcast in the Arab-language service--daily commentaries along with reportage on the arrival and departure ceremonies and roundups of Arab press comment. Subsequent to the visit there was a domestic service commentary on the 5th and a widely broadcast foreign-language commentary by Borisov as well as TASS reviews of foreign press reaction. The talks and the communique are also cited in propaganda dealing with various developments related to the Middle East, such as Israeli Defense Minister Dayan's current U.S. visit, U.S. Phantom and Skyhawk deliveries to Israel, and Israeli acceptance of interim talks on opening the Suez Canal.

One relatively minor, but suggestive, indication of differences occurred in the characterization of the visit, which Moscow persistently described as "friendly unofficial" while Cairo as insistently called it "friendly official." In what was apparently a compromise, the communique--and subsequent Moscow propaganda--termed it a "friendly visit," and the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) shifted gears by issuing a correction deleting the word "official" from its report of as-Sadat's departure from Moscow "ending an official visit." (Cairo and Belgrade on the 3d both announced as-Sadat's forthcoming "friendly unofficial" Yugoslav visit, but Cairo's version of the Egyptian-Yugoslav communique, otherwise identical to that of TANJUG's, said as-Sadat paid a

* The 11-13 October visit accounted for 8.5 percent of total broadcast comment in the week ending 17 October, of which slightly over half represented publicity for Podgorny's banquet speech and the communique. The figure for the current visit was only 3 percent for the week ending the 6th, over half of which was the communique.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 32 -

"friendly" visit to Yugoslavia on 4-5 February. TASS briefly noted as-Sadat's short visits to Yugoslavia, Syria, and Libya following his Moscow talks.)

AGENDA While MENA reported a two-hour meeting between
OF TALKS Brezhnev and as-Sadat on the morning of the 4th,
 Moscow media unaccountably failed to acknowledge
these talks. TASS did, however, report a meeting between the
two foreign ministers that morning for a "warm, friendly talk"
on questions of mutual interest with special attention to the
Middle East situation. And Moscow's domestic service reported
that a luncheon was held in a "warm and friendly atmosphere"
that day, with Kosygin and as-Sadat exchanging speeches.
Neither side has revealed the substance of the speeches.

A luncheon in as-Sadat's honor on the 3d was canceled, according
to MENA, in favor of continuing talks at a working luncheon.
Cairo radio's press review on the 4th said the 3 February
"business session" began at 10:00 and continued until 10:00
that night. Reporting on the 3 February talks, TASS said
tersely that bilateral relations were discussed and particular
attention was paid to the "dangerous situation" in the Middle
East as a result of "Israeli aggression."

That the question of emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel might
also have been brought up was suggested by Cairo's AL-AHRAM:
According to the 3 February Cairo radio press review, the paper
in discussing as-Sadat's visit referred to the "Zionist campaign"
to attract "Jewish citizens" to Israel and added that "this makes
it incumbent on the Arab and Soviet leaders" to study the
"ideological aspects of the Zionist challenge."

"JUST" SETTLEMENT, In apparent deference to the Egyptian view
JARRING MISSION that possibilities for a peaceful settlement
 have been exhausted, the communique reaffirms
the sides' determination to struggle for a "just settlement" but
makes no explicit reference to a political solution, long a
standard element of Soviet propaganda. The USSR's past expressions
of satisfaction with Egypt's "constructive position with regard
to a peaceful settlement" now become "high appreciation of
Egypt's firm position" in the face of "imperialist and Zionist
provocations." Followup comment takes much the same line on
Egypt's "firm position" and advocates a "just and lasting"
settlement. But Moscow has not abandoned its "political
settlement" concept: A dispatch from PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent
Glukhov, reported by TASS on the 8th, said, for example, that the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 33 -

results of the Moscow talks clearly expressed a striving to continue the "exploration of ways toward a political settlement" of the crisis. Earlier, the 5 February Moscow domestic service commentary observed that during the Moscow talks the USSR and Egypt decided "to explore all possibilities in the interests of peace."

The communique adds that the UNGA debate last fall demonstrated the support of peace-loving states for Egypt's efforts to "liberate" the occupied Arab territories and secure an "equitable settlement." Use of the word liberate does not necessarily imply Moscow's support for Arab military action, since Soviet propagandists and spokesmen--including Kosygin, in a June 1970 speech--have occasionally said that "Israel must liberate" the occupied territories.

While previous Soviet-Egyptian communiqués have expressed support for Ambassador Jarring's mission, the sides currently advocate "immediate" resumption of Jarring's "consultations with the sides concerned" to establish a just peace providing for complete withdrawal from all occupied territories and for securing the rights and interests "of all the countries and peoples of this region," including the Arab people of Palestine. The same formulation on the requirements of a settlement appeared in the October communique. The reference to rights and interests of "all countries and peoples"--implying Israel's right to exist--appears to be a Soviet addition to Egypt's two-point stand on total Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian rights, restated by as-Sadat as Egyptian and Soviet policy in a TASS interview in Brioni, Yugoslavia, reported on the 5th. MENA's Belgrade correspondent reported the same day that as-Sadat, in a Yugoslav television interview, said he saw no possibilities for a peaceful settlement but "we must give Ambassador Jarring the opportunity" to perform his mission.

CANAL TALKS Given Moscow's propaganda denigration of U.S. efforts to assist in achieving an interim settlement involving the Suez Canal, as well as as-Sadat's reiterations of his mid-November statement that he had stopped all contacts with the United States, it is not surprising that the communique does not mention an interim agreement. It is unlikely that Moscow would dignify the U.S. initiative by including a reference to it, positive or negative, in a formal communique. For instance, the communique on then Foreign Minister Riyad's visit to Moscow last July did not allude to a U.S. role in an interim settlement in stating that the problem of opening the canal for

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 34 -

international shipping could not be solved in isolation from other problems of a settlement but should be in the context of an agreement on Israeli withdrawal to pre-5 June 1967 lines.

Moscow brushes off the notion of "proximity talks" between Egypt and Israel for a canal agreement, officially accepted by Israel on 2 February, but does not flatly reject the idea. The Borisov foreign-language commentary on the 5th pointed out that Israel's "consent to U.S. mediation" on a preliminary canal agreement and Washington's enthusiastic acceptance of this consent were arranged during as-Sadat's Moscow visit to "deceive world public opinion." A panelist on the 6 February Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable similarly noted the coincidence of the timing, while an Arabic-language commentary on the 7th repeated the Soviet objection that by talking about such mediation, Washington is trying to bury Jarring's mission. Egypt, it said, "naturally officially rejected the so-called U.S. mediation" imposed without UN consultation and without regard to UN resolutions. And it noted that while Israel agreed to contacts on the canal question, "there were reservations and conditions."

ARMS ISSUE The Soviet-Egyptian communique returns to the customary phraseology with regard to measures to further strengthen Egypt's "defense capacity." Last October's communique had atypically mentioned measures to strengthen Cairo's "military might," but propaganda since has largely employed the "defense potential" formula. The current document adds that the sides "outlined a number of concrete steps in this direction," but naturally is not forthcoming on the nature of the steps or when they might be implemented. At a later point the communique also says that the Moscow talks will contribute, among other things, to "increasing Egypt's capacity to repel the Israeli aggression."

While reiterating the communique's language on strengthening Egypt's defense potential and improving its ability to rebuff aggression, subsequent comment also picks up the 6 February New York TIMES report that Washington has agreed to sell Israel 42 Phantoms and 90 Skyhawks over the next two to three years. The communique ritually notes U.S. financial and military support of Israel in denouncing Tel Aviv's "aggressive, expansionist policy," along the lines of previous communiqués. A Moscow domestic service commentary on the 7th, citing the TIMES report, wondered what Secretary Rogers was talking about when he said in a television interview that the United States was trying to carry out a policy of arms restrictions in the Middle East. And a Shakhov foreign-language commentary the same day charged the United States with

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 35 -

trying to launch "a new round of the arms race" and said that under such circumstances Arab efforts to insure their own security "become pressing."

BILATERAL RELATIONS The communique and surrounding propaganda predictably praise the relations of "traditional friendship and fruitful cooperation" between the two countries and hail last year's friendship and cooperation treaty. And the Egyptian side professes the usual gratitude for Moscow's "active and consistent aid and constant support" in the struggle against Israel. (In his TASS interview in Brioni as-Sadat made a point of expressing thanks "not only for the political and military support," but also for the "all-round aid" to the economy, particularly, he said, to the development of heavy industry.)

There is no reference this time to "socialist reconstruction" in Egypt nor to Cairo's determination to follow Nasir's course--still featured in the communique last October. At the same time, there is no repetition of the October caution against anticommunism and anti-Sovietism*; Soviet propaganda continues, however, to warn of alleged efforts by imperialism, Zionism, and reaction to cast doubts on Soviet-Egyptian friendship, and the visit is held up as refutation of such "rumors and fabrications."

Although it might not necessarily be expected, the communique fails even to pay lip service to party relations, which got at least passing mention in communiqués in October and May. Nothing more has been heard of an Arab Socialist Union (ASU) Central Committee delegation which, according to MENA on 23 January, was to have visited the Soviet Union for talks with the CPSU after the Moslem holidays in late January. The invitation had been extended by Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov to ASU Central Committee First Secretary Sayyid Mar'i. A MENA report on 7 February said Mar'i proposed to a visiting Soviet delegation the formation of joint groups of ASU and CPSU experts "to study questions and problems" with a view to promoting mutual understanding. Moscow has not been heard to mention the visit of the delegation which, MENA said, was led by Professor Zhukov of the USSR Academy of Sciences and was in Cairo to attend an AL-AHRAM seminar on "the national liberation movement and the socialist countries."

* Cairo's AL-AKHBAR observed on the 2d that an anticommunist policy would prevent "real cooperation" with the Soviet Union, but that Egypt's "official policy" is that while it is not communist, it is not hostile to communism. The paper wondered if it were not possible for allies to differ over "important matters" from time to time, remarking that while some differences will occur, if there are common basic interests it should be easy to iron out "temporary" differences.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 36 -

The communique notes in conclusion that Brezhnev accepted an invitation to visit Egypt at a date to be agreed later; the October communique had recorded acceptance of an invitation to Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin. On the matter of invitations, the communique inexplicably omits the standard opening language on the invitation to the visitor, although TASS in describing the welcoming and departure ceremonies had routinely noted that as-Sadat came at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Soviet Government.

EAST EUROPEANS VIEW CAIRO PRESSURES, FRENCH CP SCORES AS-SADAT

Warsaw and Budapest, openly discussing the domestic pressures on as-Sadat for military action, believe that Moscow's advice on political action will prevail, but that as-Sadat faces no easy time in selling this approach at home and among his Arab colleagues. The French CP organ L'HUMANITE, showing no such understanding of as-Sadat's difficulties, holds him responsible for policy errors both domestically and abroad.

POLAND A dispatch from ZYCIE WARSZAWY's North African correspondent, reviewed by PAP on the 2d, said that many Egyptians believe their defense system is insufficient if it is not accompanied by offensive arms at least to match Israel's. Egypt is prepared to defend itself, the paper said, but not sufficiently prepared to go to war. Analyzing the Moscow visit, a Kalawinski commentary on Warsaw's domestic service on the 7th felt as-Sadat had been convinced to give up the idea of military action and to continue the search for a political solution. Kalawinski described as-Sadat as sounding "rather nervous" before the visit and focusing only on a military solution, while now "his tone has gained in wisdom and self-control." The commentator noted, however, that Cairo students had been demanding that war be started and he predicted that as-Sadat might have difficulty in convincing "impatient Arabs," including his federation partners Syria and Libya, of the wisdom of Moscow's "peaceful suggestions."

HUNGARY Budapest likewise has taken note of domestic pressures on as-Sadat for military action. A domestic service commentary on the 3d said that Egyptian internal developments would be taken into account in the Moscow talks, adding that these developments reflect stronger and stronger reports of a call for an immediate war of liberation, "particularly in army

CONFIDENTIAL

- 37 -

ranks." It is apparent from last October's Soviet-Egyptian communique, Budapest said, that the Soviet Government is ready to offer every assistance to "eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression" but, as Moscow continues to stress, the solution must be a peaceful settlement on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242. An MTI commentary on the 3d regarded Washington's latest arms commitments to Israel as causing as-Sadat domestic political difficulties because they provided ammunition to "those circles pressing for war without delay." MTI asserted that as-Sadat with difficulty opposed this pressure and insisted on a settlement based on Resolution 242; it was to that end, MTI added, "that he applied the means of military pressure as well."

A commentary broadcast by Budapest in English to Europe on the 3d advanced the idea that a Middle East solution lies in guaranteeing the existence of the state of Israel "to avoid the possibility of any repetition of the aggression and the aggressive seizure of territory." Also noting Soviet orientation toward a political solution, the commentary declared that while Soviet support has made it possible for Egypt to increase its defense capabilities, the "Egyptian defense zone. . . does not represent any threat to Israel."

FRENCH CP While Poland and Hungary profess an understanding of as-Sadat's domestic pressures, a L'HUMANITE article by Jacques Coubard on 25 January, in the wake of the student sit-ins and demonstrations in Egypt, assailed the Egyptian president for a variety of policy mistakes. The Cairo University incidents, it began, revealed the unrest brewing in Egypt ever since an "ambiguous policy" was embarked upon following Nasir's death. Ticking off the errors, L'HUMANITE took as-Sadat to task for trying to win Washington's good will in the matter of a partial settlement on reopening the Suez Canal, and claimed that the "concessions thereby implied" constituted one of the reasons for the break last May between the president and former Arab Socialist Union leaders. Furthermore, L'HUMANITE complained of "the participation of the Egyptian army" in the "bloody operation" to reinstall Sudan's president last summer which it said increased the unrest in Egypt.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 38 -

As for his domestic policy, L'HUMANITE pointed critically to as-Sadat's abrogation of a number of measures directed against big landowners and the Moslem Brotherhood and other measures benefiting members of the Cairo bourgeoisie. As if that weren't enough, L'HUMANITE added, the "political organization of the 'home front'--a weak point even under Nasir--was making no progress." Any solution to this tense situation, the paper concluded, would depend on answers to questions being asked by the majority of the Egyptian people: With whom and how can the struggle for the survival of independence be waged in 1972?

CONFIDENTIAL

- 39 -

FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

LOW-VOLUME SOVIET COMMENT BLAMES WEST FOR DELAY IN TALKS

Moscow continues routinely to hail the declaration on European security and cooperation adopted by the participants in the 25-26 January Prague meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee. Propaganda focuses on the call for a European security conference to the virtual exclusion of the document's passage on force and armaments reductions in Europe. Thus the 28 January statement by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the USSR Council of Ministers in support of the activities of the Soviet delegation at the Prague meeting ignored the force-reduction issue entirely while taking note of the call for a security conference. Editorials in IZVESTIYA on 28 January and in PRAVDA on 28 January and 3 February followed suit in their treatment of the Prague meeting.

The low-level propaganda touching on the force-reduction issue seems clearly aimed at placing the blame for a delay in the talks on the West. A foreign-language commentary on 31 January, for example, charged that the forces opposing detente in Europe "cannot conceive of a European policy that is not defined in terms of blocs." These same elements, according to the commentary, seek to strengthen NATO and "apply a brake to the solution of the problems of reduction of arms and armed forces in Europe." Dealing with the force-reduction issue at greater length, a Moscow radio talk for Italian listeners on 2 February complained that the West has limited itself to "general phrases on the desirability of reductions but has given no concrete reply--if it has replied at all--about opening real negotiations." The West's proposals "to take preliminary soundings do not promote the solution of the question," the commentary said. While chiding the "Western countries," presumably NATO, for failure to respond to proposals for talks on force reductions, the commentary stressed, as did the Prague declaration, that the matter "must not be the prerogative of the political-military alliances."

The commentary's reference to the West's "preliminary soundings" is presumably an allusion to NATO's designation of former Secretary General Brosio as the emissary to meet with Soviet officials in Moscow to explore the force-reduction issue. Moscow propaganda in early October 1971 had acknowledged that Brosio had

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 40 -

been selected for this task, but has since maintained a virtual silence on his so far fruitless mission. In a rare recent mention of the Brosio assignment, a Commentator article in the December 1971 issue of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN (signed to the press on 22 November) noted in passing that Brosio had been selected to conduct "probing consultations" on the question of force and armaments cuts.

Consistent with this reticence, available Moscow propaganda on the 1 February National Press Club speech of the current NATO secretary general, Joseph Luns, has not acknowledged his reference to the Brosio mission, instead focusing on the elements in the address which "reek of the cold war." A PRAVDA article reviewed by TASS on the 5th, for example, said Luns urged that preparations for a European security conference "be dragged out for a long period." And TASS commentator Kornilov on the 2d, noting Luns' remarks on the need for increased military spending by the alliance's members, concluded that the speech sounded "in especially sharp dissonance" in the wake of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee meeting.

CONFIDENTIAL

SOVIET-FRG TREATY

MOSCOW NOTES START OF RATIFICATION, DECRIES STRAUSS "DRAFT"

In a one-sentence announcement, Moscow media on 2 February reported that the USSR Council of Ministers had approved the Soviet-West German treaty, signed on 12 August 1970, and presented it for ratification to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. This Soviet action comes against the background of intensified West German debate in connection with the beginning of the parliamentary ratification process for the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, with CDU Chairman Barzel visiting Washington to present the Bonn Opposition's views on the Soviet treaty and CSU Chairman Strauss offering his own alternative "draft treaty." The USSR Council of Ministers' approval followed by two days the publication of what Moscow radio commentator Zholkver described on the 3d as Strauss' "absurd proposal." In a vitriolic attack on the "revanchist" Strauss, PRAVDA's Mikhaylov on the 4th declared that this "draft treaty," among other things, views the FRG-GDR and GDR-Polish borders as "'demarcation lines,' the settlement of which should be postponed." Moscow media note, but discount, the possibility that the Brandt-Scheel coalition may not succeed in obtaining parliamentary ratification of the two treaties.

Propaganda continues to carefully avoid explicit discussion of the "reverse linkage" issue--the notion that Bonn must now ratify the Moscow treaty before the USSR signs the final quadripartite protocol on the Big Four Berlin agreement, turning around Bonn's prior insistence on a Berlin settlement before the treaty can be ratified. However, Zholkver's widely broadcast commentary on the 3d made one of Moscow's most direct public allusions yet to the reverse linkage issue. Pointing out that the "basic," "all-European" importance of the Moscow treaty is the most unequivocal confirmation of the inviolability of the current European borders--that is, recognition of the postwar status quo in Central and East Europe--Zholkver declared that the treaty is already exerting a "favorable influence" on the course of European affairs even before its ratification, reflected, for example, in the Big Four agreement on "West Berlin." Zholkver cited an explicit cause-and-effect relationship between the USSR-FRG treaty and the agreement on Berlin, implying that without the former the latter cannot be fulfilled: "Everyone now recognizes that this [agreement] became possible as a result of the conclusion of the treaty between the Soviet Union and the FRG."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 42 -

Discussing the internal West German debate on the ratification of the treaties, routine Soviet propaganda has stressed that an ever-increasing majority of the West German population, as reflected in West German public opinion polls, favors ratification. The comment has also cited repeated public reassurances by leaders of the Brandt-Scheel coalition that ratification will be successful, has pointed out that Barzel returned empty-handed from his week-long visit to the United States at the end of January in an attempt to get Washington's support for the Bonn Opposition's stand, and has noted that even the CDU/CSU Opposition is not united in opposing the treaties.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972

- 43 -

TOPIC IN BRIEF

SALT COMMUNIQUE

Consistent with Moscow's current low-keyed treatment of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), no Soviet propaganda fanfare has accompanied the windup of the sixth session of the negotiations in Vienna on 4 February. TASS and Moscow radio on the 4th promptly carried the text of the communique, which appeared in the central press the next day. The communique notes that in accord with the 20 May agreement between the United States and the USSR, the two sides continued discussing questions concerning a treaty on the limitation of ABM systems and "interim agreement on some measures in the field of limitation of strategic offensive weapons." It says that "progress has been made on some questions" and that the delegations "express resoluteness to continue efforts for reaching an agreement." The talks are to resume in Helsinki on 28 March, according to the communique. To date, there has been no followup comment from Moscow. The last two SALT sessions--which ended on 24 September and 20 May 1971--occasioned a low volume of comment hailing the progress at the talks.

CONFIDENTIAL