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Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050004-8

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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26 JAN 1972

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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
26 JANUARY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 4)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 17 - 23 JANUARY 1972

Moscow (2480 Items)

Indochina	(10%)	8%
[U.S. Air Raids	(6%)	2%]
China	(9%)	7%
India-Pakistan	(3%)	4%
European Security	(3%)	3%
Middle East	(2%)	3%
World Zionist	(1%)	2%
Congress		
Gromyko Visit to	(--)	2%
Japan		

Peking (1353 Items)

Domestic Issues	(41%)	39%
Indochina	(18%)	22%
[Military Action	(8%)	9%]
in Laos		
[PRC Foreign Ministry	(--)	3%]
Statement on Reloca-		
tion of South Vietnamese		
UN Security Council Special	(--)	5%
Session in Africa		
PEOPLE'S DAILY Rebuttal of	(--)	3%
USSR's Malik		
Rhodesian Situation	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi reacted to the President's 25 January TV speech with a domestic service radio commentary some five hours after it was delivered. This initial commentary totally ignored the President's disclosures that there had been private negotiations and that Presidential advisor Kissinger had met with North Vietnamese leaders a total of 13 times since August 1969. It dismissed the President's eight-point peace plan as old proposals "put in a new frame to fool the public." Hanoi and Front comment on the 20 January State of the Union message castigated the President for pursuing the war through Vietnamization instead of responding to the PRG proposal.

In a departure from its normal practice of promptly covering all major U.S. developments, TASS has not reported the President's TV speech. The first available Soviet reaction came at 1900 GMT on the 26th in a Moscow domestic service broadcast which, unlike Hanoi, reported his announcement that the U.S. peace plan would be submitted at the Paris talks on the 27th.

Peking's support for the Vietnamese communists is currently highlighted by the announcement of the signing on 22 January in Peking of a protocol on "supplementary" aid to the DRV for 1972. Peking continues its circumspect treatment of the President: the NCNA report of the State of the Union message as well as other propaganda remains devoid of personal attacks. Consistent with its normal reaction time, Peking has yet to mention the President's speech of the 25th.

A PRG Government statement stressing the need to destroy the Vietnamization policy and calling for the South Vietnamese to unite, "millions as one," in an uprising to overthrow the Thieu administration has been given wide publicity beginning on 25 January. The statement directs its appeal to 10 different groups--from youths about to be conscripted to main force army units--and stresses the "humane and lenient" policies of the PRG. Publicized at a press conference in Hanoi on the 25th by Nguyen Phu Soai, the statement was hailed the next day in a NHAN DAN editorial and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary.

DRV DISMISSES PRESIDENT'S EIGHT-POINT PEACE PLAN AS "REHASH"

Hanoi reacted promptly to the President's TV speech in a radio commentary first broadcast at 0500 GMT on 26 January and

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subsequently repeated in other casts. Entitled "Nixon Set Forth A Deceitful Eight-Point Vietnam Plan Designed to Fool the Public," the commentary says a careful analysis of the proposals indicate that Washington's basic stand remains unchanged. It argues that the President is still suggesting a "conditional" withdrawal-- that is, withdrawing while maintaining "neocolonialism through a puppet regime." The commentary similarly ridicules the notion of elections to be held a month after Thieu's resignation when in fact, it says, a caretaker government would be headed by Thieu's "henchmen." In standard fashion, it dismisses the President's proposal for a cease-fire throughout Indochina as aimed at depriving the people of the right to self-defense, and it casts doubt on the sincerity of his concern over the fate of U.S. prisoners. And it repeats the stock line that the PRG's seven-point proposal is the correct way to end the war and restore peace.

This initial reaction is more notable for its omissions than its content. Thus, it fails to acknowledge any of the President's revelations that secret negotiations had been taking place during the past three and a half years, that the communist side presented a nine-point proposal privately, that the eight-point U.S. proposal had been dispatched privately but had gone unanswered, and that Ambassador Porter has been instructed to introduce the proposal at the Paris session on the 27th.

REACTIONS TO PAST DISCLOSURES Hanoi had reacted differently to the President's disclosure of information about private contacts with the Vietnamese communists in his 3 November 1969 speech on the U.S. Vietnamization and withdrawal policy--the speech in which he revealed that there had been correspondence with Ho Chi Minh during that summer and that there had been 11 private meetings between the two sides in Paris. Unlike the current commentary which totally ignores the secret diplomacy aspect, immediate routine Hanoi radio reaction to the 1969 speech said "the President advanced the idea of secret contacts aimed at misleading public opinion," and VNA said that to divert public opinion the President "insinuated" that private meetings were taking place. Xuan Thuy at the Paris session questioned the President's motives in divulging private DRV-U.S. contacts.

A DRV Government statement on the President's 1969 speech begged the question of his remarks on private contacts, saying only that he distorted the truth about the "situation of negotiations with a view to leading people to believe he has good will." But at

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the same time that Hanoi released the Government statement, it broadcast the texts of the President's and Ho's letters.*

MOSCOW COMPLAINS PRESIDENT'S PLAN SET NO WITHDRAWAL DATE

Soviet media reacted to the President's 25 January TV speech belatedly in Moscow radio's domestic service broadcast at 1900 GMT on the 26th--the main evening news show. Like Hanoi, the Moscow broadcast ignored the President's disclosure of U.S.-DRV secret talks. But unlike Hanoi, it acknowledged his announcement that the U.S. representative is to submit the U.S. eight-point plan at the Paris conference on the 27th.

Moscow complained that the plan neither contains an exact date for total U.S. troop withdrawal from South Vietnam nor mentions U.S. readiness to withdraw armed forces from other Indochinese countries and to remove air and naval forces. Noting that the President said the United States would never agree to the overthrow of its "ally," the broadcast said the speech indicates that the United States intends to preserve "a pro-American regime" in Saigon although it maintains that it is prepared to hold new elections there. Moscow concluded by noting that the President said "in essence" that the United States intends to conduct the Paris talks "from a position of strength" and insists on "the unqualified acceptance" of its plan, citing him as stating that if the opponent rejects the proposal Washington will proceed with the Vietnamization policy.

The notable failure of TASS to carry its normal, prompt news report of a major speech by the President suggests indecision on how to react even on a reportorial level, at least until Hanoi's reaction becomes known. It may also be related to the absence from Moscow of Brezhnev and Kosygin, who were in Prague for the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee session. The session issued a statement on Indochina--coincidentally carried by TASS at the same time as the domestic radio broadcast reporting the President's speech--which complained that "Washington continues to bid not on a political but on a military solution of the problems" of Indochina. The statement did not mention the President's speech.

* For a further discussion of this propaganda, see the TRENDS of 13 November 1969, pages 3-5.

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DRV, PRG SAY STATE OF UNION MESSAGE SHOWS PRESIDENT'S OBDURACY

Hanoi and the Front routinely assail President Nixon's remarks on Indochina in his State of the Union message as further evidence of his intention to pursue the war. In addition to routine Hanoi and Front radio and press agency reaction, there are articles in the party daily NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 23d which include personally abusive comments on the President. As briefly summarized by Hanoi radio, the army paper says that while the President wanted to present "a peace facade" in order to maintain the presidency another term, "no adornment can cover up his too rotten, horrible face. Nixon continues unswervingly to show that he is an extremely stubborn and crafty ringleader aggressor." In a similar vein, the NHAN DAN article says that the message to Congress mirrored the President's true image: "After three years in office as President, Nixon's nature remains unchanged. He remains one of the most anticommunist reactionaries; he remains one of the most dangerous enemies of peace, independence, and the freedom of the nation."

The NHAN DAN article as broadcast by Hanoi radio is attributed to Nguyen Huu Chinh, a specialist on the United States who has frequently commented on President Nixon--most recently in a 7 January NHAN DAN article on the President's 2 January TV interview.* Chinh's latest article contains some of the undertones present in that on the 7th and, more sharply, in Hanoi's July-August anti-China polemics in the wake of the announcement of the President's Peking visit. The polemical Hanoi comment last summer had repeatedly claimed that the Nixon Doctrine was aimed at splitting the socialist camp. In referring to the nine foreign policy points as outlined by the President on the 20th, Chinh now claims that they mean, among other things, that the United States will continue "to provoke and sow discord among the socialist camp." And in a possible allusion to the President's summit diplomacy, Chinh says: "Nixon wants to make believe that some diplomatic moves could keep him in the oval office. But now as before in U.S. history, the fate of a president can never be decided on by sheer diplomatic activities."

Chinh also repeats the elaborated demands of the PRG proposal regarding U.S. withdrawal and support of Thieu--an end to all U.S. action in both parts of Vietnam and relinquishment of

* See the TRENDS of 19 January, page 2 and 12 January, pages 3-5.

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all commitments to Thieu--which have been spelled out frequently, both at the Paris talks and by propagandists, since DRV Premier Pham Van Dong presented the elaborated formulation in his 20 November speech in Peking. Chinh prefaced this by saying that the United States must give up its "illusion" of winning a military victory--an illusion he claimed to see evidenced in the Administration's remarks on a U.S. residual force in South Vietnam and on continued use of U.S. air and naval power in Indochina.

The earlier, routine-level comment on the President's message, like the Chinh article, had assailed the President's Vietnamization policy. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 22d said the President "boasted" that during his term 87 percent of U.S. forces had been withdrawn but that he cannot conceal the fact that he has spread and intensified the war throughout Indochina and has accelerated air strikes against the DRV. A LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY commentary on the same day observed that more troops would be withdrawn, however, "on condition that the U.S. agents in Saigon are capable of defending themselves."

PARIS TALKS: GVN LEGITIMACY QUESTIONED, VIETNAMIZATION SCORED

At the Paris session on 20 January PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien focused on the perennial claim that the Saigon government is merely a U.S. puppet and in no sense can speak for the South Vietnamese people. In seeming response to Ambassador Porter's questions on the 13th regarding the PRG, Tien insisted that the NFLSV and PRG, not the Saigon regime, are the "genuine representatives" of the South Vietnamese. The VNA account glosses over Tien's detailed remarks, including the claims that the "people's revolutionary power has been established in South Vietnam from top to village levels" and that the growing international prestige of the NFLSV and PRG is reflected in their having been recognized by 30 countries. Xuan Thuy in his prepared statement routinely assailed the Vietnamization policy and echoed comment on the President's 13 January troop withdrawal announcement in arguing that the war is still an American one in view of continued U.S. air and naval as well as monetary support.

PRG PROPOSAL, In routinely pressing the PRG proposal, Tien
NY TIMES QUERIES said that to end the war and bring home U.S.
servicemen, including POW's, the Nixon
Administration should "negotiate seriously with the genuine
representatives of the South Vietnamese people at the conference."

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And he said again that in addition to a speedy troop withdrawal, the Nixon Administration "must renounce the Thieu ruling group so that the South Vietnamese may decide themselves on their own affairs and future."

The line that the PRG proposal is the road toward a Vietnam settlement was also reiterated in the response to the New York TIMES' A.M. Rosenthal from Ngo Dien, head of the press department of the DRV Foreign Ministry. VNA's English-language transmission on 25 January carried the text of Dien's response, in which he said the answers to Rosenthal's questions could be found in the proposal.* VNA did not transmit the text of Rosenthal's questions, instead stating: "After President Nixon's 2 January TV interview at which he made ambiguous remarks on questions of U.S. troop withdrawal and of the South Vietnamese people's right of self-determination," Rosenthal sent a number of questions to Pham Van Dong "asking him to clarify several points relating to the aforesaid problems."

ALLIED SPEECHES, The VNA account of the 20 January session,
POW ISSUE like the account of the one on the 13th, says
 that "the U.S. delegate again played the trick
of allowing the Saigon delegate to speak for the U.S. side" and
that it "resorted to the POW issue to elude the responsibility
of an aggressor in the settlement of the basic problems raised
in the PRG's seven-point plan."

Hanoi says nothing about Ambassador Porter's absence from the session and the fact that his deputy, Heyward Isham, pressed the communists for information on U.S. prisoners who are known to have been downed alive inside North Vietnam but whose names do not appear on Hanoi's prisoner list. (A brief TASS item on the session, however, said: "The United States continues sabotaging the Paris conference. The U.S. delegation head, Porter, walked out of the conference and left for the United States on 'private business.'")

A TASS item on the 21st reports that DRV Paris spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le in remarks to reporters criticized the U.S. and Saigon representatives' remarks at the post-session briefing on the 20th

* VNA's service channel from Hanoi to Paris carried the text of both Rosenthal's questions and Dien's response on 15 January. See the TRENDS of 19 January, page 4.

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in which they "stressed the prisoner issue but said nothing about the PRG's peace plan." TASS quotes Le as saying "we not only inform the American government of all the captured American pilots but, proceeding from the principles of humaneness, permit them to maintain ties with their families, to maintain correspondence and to have visitors." Le made no such remarks in his regular post-session briefing. No other reference to these remarks has been monitored, and the circumstances under which Le met the reporters are not known.

In another development concerning U.S. prisoners in North Vietnam, VNA on 22 January publicized a communique issued that day by the Hanoi post office under the DRV General Department of Post and Telecommunications. In addition to reporting the acceptance of 300 parcels for prisoners named in Hanoi's December 1970 list, the communique notes that Hanoi has rejected another 407 parcels, "sent to addressees who are not on the above-mentioned list of U.S. pilots captured in North Vietnam," and returned the parcels to the senders.

MOSCOW ECHOES DRV IN CRITICIZING PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, POLICY

Moscow radio and press comment on the State of the Union message echoes Hanoi and the Front in assailing the President for his Vietnamization policy and alleged prolongation of the war. A KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article on the 23d observes that while the President proclaims his wish for a political settlement he continues to bomb the DRV--thus "undermining both his personal prestige and the tattered prestige of the country he represents."

ELABORATION OF PRG PROPOSAL A Moscow radio domestic service commentary on the 24th contrasts the President's expression of hope that the conflict could be ended by talks with U.S. "obstruction" of the Paris talks and alleged failure to seriously discuss the PRG's seven-point proposal. A PRAVDA article by Mayevskiy on the 19th--the day before the President delivered his message--atypically spelled out the elaboration of the PRG proposal, which includes the explicit demand that the United States must stop all military action in both North and South Vietnam and end all support of the Thieu regime.

Mayevskiy may have described the proposal in detail because of the special circumstances: He was in Paris to attend a

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preliminary session for the World Assembly for Peace to be held in Versailles from 11 to 13 February, and in the article he recounted a discussion he had with the DRV and PRG delegates to the Paris talks, Xuan Thuy and Nguyen Van Thieu. Mayevskiy presumably was also concerned to score points against Peking in supporting the Vietnamese. He seemed to obliquely allude to President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking when he accused the President of seeking a solution to the Vietnam problem not in Paris, but "elsewhere." The article was summarized in Moscow broadcasts in a number of foreign languages, including Vietnamese.

PRC SUPPORT OF DRV HIGHLIGHTED BY "SUPPLEMENTARY" AID ACCORD

Peking's effort to reassure the Vietnamese communists of continuing support has been highlighted by a new military and economic aid agreement. NCNA announced on 22 January that a protocol signed in Peking that day calls for a "supplementary gratuitous supply of military equipment and economic materials by China to Vietnam for 1972." Coming a month before President Nixon's visit to the PRC, the signing of the protocol follows in the wake of a "supplementary" aid agreement between Moscow and Hanoi signed on 29 December.

Apart from the usual annual aid accords between the PRC and the DRV, the most recent of which was signed by Li Hsien-nien when he visited Hanoi in September 1971, Peking has signed three previous supplementary aid agreements with Hanoi. The last previous one was signed on 4 July 1971, coinciding with the publication of strong Chinese editorial support for the PRG's seven-point peace proposal. The first two supplementary agreements were signed on 25 May 1970 and 15 February 1971 at the time of the incursions into Cambodia and Laos, respectively.

The current protocol was signed by Chang Tsai-chien, a PLA deputy chief of staff, and by the DRV ambassador. The previous agreements had been signed by visiting DRV officials, but the lower level of representation is consistent with the signing of last month's Soviet-DRV agreement by the DRV charge d'affaires in Moscow. The Peking ceremony was attended by Yeh Chien-ying, vice chairman of the party's Military Commission, who took the place occupied last July by the purged PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng. VNA's report of the signing ceremony, but not NCNA's, cites Yeh as hailing the "brilliant victories" achieved at the beginning of the dry season by the Vietnamese, Laotian,

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and Cambodian peoples and as expressing Chinese determination to support the Vietnamese people until "final victory."

Other Peking support for the Vietnamese has taken the form of a 21 January PRC Foreign Ministry statement--in support of the PRG Foreign Ministry statement of the 17th--condemning "U.S. imperialism and the Nguyen Van Thieu clique" for the relocation of inhabitants of northern provinces of South Vietnam to "concentration camps" farther south. The PRC statement, charging that the "ruthless" U.S. policy of pacification reveals the "savage and cruel nature of the U.S. aggressors," demands that the "U.S. Government" stop its persecution of the South Vietnamese people, end Vietnamization, withdraw from South Vietnam, and stop supporting the "puppet" regimes in Indochina. But it does not censure the "Nixon Administration" by name as does the PRG statement it supports, thus continuing Peking's circumspect propaganda treatment of the President.*

STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE A 25 January NCNA account of President Nixon's State of the Union message similarly avoids the strong personal attacks which punctuate Vietnamese communist comment on the message. Noting that the message tries "to make people believe" that the United States will end its involvement in the Vietnam war, NCNA criticizes the President without epithets for refusing to accept the PRG's seven points, set a deadline for troop withdrawal, and stop supporting the Thieu regime. NCNA also denounces "U.S. imperialism" for bombing the DRV and for bringing Thai "mercenaries" into Laos and Cambodia.

Typically, the President is criticized by name in Peking's pickups of foreign comment, including NCNA's reports of the Vietnamese communist reaction to the State of the Union message and of the PRG and DRV Foreign Ministry statements condemning the relocation in South Vietnam.

* The last previous PRC Foreign Ministry statement on Vietnam, on 29 December condemning the bombing of the DRV, was similarly devoid of personal abuse of the President.

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DRV SPOKESMAN PROTESTS DMZ, DRV RAIDS; PLANE DOWNINGS HAILED

In its most recent spokesman's protest, the DRV Foreign Ministry on 24 January charged the United States with continuing to send U.S. planes, including B-52's, from 19 to 22 January "to conduct air strikes against a number of areas within the DMZ on DRV territory."* It also claimed that on the 23d U.S. fighter planes "raided a populated area in Dong Hoi, Quang Binh Province." The spokesman in routine fashion "sternly condemned the war acts" and demanded an "immediate and definite" end to all U.S. acts of encroachment on DRV sovereignty and security.

19 JANUARY INCIDENT Vietnamese communist comment followed up the 19 January DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest which, in atypically harsh language for a statement at that level, scored strikes in Nghe An Province and claimed two downed U.S. planes.** (U.S. acknowledgments of an incident over the DRV on the 19th said that a North Vietnamese MIG-21 was downed--perhaps one reason for the vehemence of the protest.) Hanoi radio promptly hailed the downing of the two planes in a broadcast on the 19th and two commentaries on the 20th. A Liberation Radio commentary on the 20th--the only comment from the South--also praised the northern armed forces for their achievement.

The first of the two Hanoi radio commentaries on the 20th, recalling the raids of last December, called the new strikes "extremely serious acts of war that brutally and systematically encroach on the DRV's sovereignty and security." Both commentaries scored Secretary Laird's remark on the 13th that the air force would continue to be used in Indochina, and both denounced the entrance of the aircraft carrier Enterprise into the Gulf of Tonkin. The second commentary added that "with the U.S. air force, an old trump card, whether U.S. pirates launch long-term, short-term, limited or unlimited raids; no matter how numerous they may be, no matter what the weather conditions may be and wherever they may come from, they will certainly be punished by the fire network of our vigilant and experienced armed forces and people."

* The U.S. Command on the 23d reported action inside the DMZ on the 22d, when it said that two DRV antiaircraft guns were destroyed and another damaged.

** See the 19 January TRENDS, page 8.

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All of the comment underscores DRV vigilance and urges even more vigilance in smashing U.S. designs against the DRV. Since the December U.S. strikes in North Vietnam, Hanoi propaganda has sustained its attention to heightening vigilance against U.S. "adventures." Comment discusses various aspects of this, such as anti-aircraft and air force training, cleaning out old shelters and trenches and building new ones, improving militia and self-defense organization and watching for enemy commandos.

COMMUNIST MEDIA HAIL MILITARY GAINS IN NORTH, SOUTH LAOS

Communist media follow up the claim of the capture of Long Tieng in Northern Laos on 12 January with praise for further military gains both in that area and also in southern Laos; specifically the capture of "the entire Bolovens Plateau." A 23 January NLHS Central Committee "grand rally" held to acclaim the recent San Thong-Long Tieng victory was attended by Souphanouvong and addressed by an NLHS Central Committee member who, according to a Pathet Lao radio report on the 25th, asserted that the "brilliant victory" encourages the armed forces and people throughout the country to win greater victories in the future.

LAO CLAIMS TO BOLOVENS PLATEAU

The "recapture of the entire Bolovens Plateau" was hailed in a 21 January communique by the command of the Southern Laos Military Region and praised in a Pathet Lao news agency editorial on the 24th. According to the communique, the recovery of the Bolovens Plateau took place in the course of a month of fighting between 6 December and 11 January, foiling a scheme by the U.S. imperialists and their "quislings" to "nibble" at the liberated zone in southern Laos. It concluded that the "great victory" along with others in the Plain of Jars-Huong Soui and Sam Thong-Long Tieng areas dealt a heavy blow to the Nixon Doctrine in Laos.

The Pathet Lao news agency editorial on the 24th raised the issue of the security of neighboring countries when it charged that the United States and its Vientiane and Thai "lackeys" had tried to turn the Bolovens Plateau and Saravane Province into a "staging area for attacks on central Vietnam and northern Cambodia, thus preventing the three peoples of Indochina from joining hands with one another." It called the Bolovens victory another blow to the

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"Laotization" policy carried out under the Nixon Doctrine. This victory, the editorial added, is a success of the close cooperation of the patriotic armed forces of northern and southern Laos and proves their fast growth, good organization, and efficient tactics.

An editorial in NHAN DAN on the 23d also praised the combat coordination between northern and southern Laos, and called the Bolovens victory an "appropriate punitive blow" at the "U.S. aggressors and their lackeys" who "illegally" nibbled at the southern liberated areas, as well as a strong blow to the Laotization plan and Nixon Doctrine in Laos. NHAN DAN declared that the fact that many Thai battalions were "annihilated" or "seriously mauled" is a "stern warning" to the Thanom Praphat "clique."

Peking reported the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese propaganda but has not commented on the Bolovens victory on its own authority. The PRC had marked the alleged capture of Long Tieng with a congratulatory message from Chou En-lai to Souphanouvong and a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article.

While TASS reported the Lao communique, it did not explicitly acknowledge the claim to the Bolovens Plateau, merely noting that a "counteroffensive" was launched by the patriots all over the plateau. PRAVDA on the 23d carried a dispatch on fighting in northern Laos which--making no mention of action in the south--observed that Long Tieng had "ceased to be an operational base for the U.S. aggressors," having been "evacuated" under attacks from the patriots.

GRENADE ATTACK ON DRV EMBASSY A 24 January DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement protested an incident the day before in which the "Vientiane authorities allowed reactionaries" to make a grenade attack on the DRV embassy. It called this action, along with Souvanna Phouma's "slanders" of the DRV,* a "serious provocative act" by the "U.S. imperialists

* The statement did not elaborate on Souvanna Phouma's "slanders" but on 18 January a Pathet Lao radio commentary had charged that Souvanna Phouma "distorted the true situation in Laos" and "slandered" the DRV and the NLHS in his 25 December message to the Geneva cochairmen following the defeats of the Vang Pao forces in the Plain of Jars-Muong Soui region.

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and their lackeys" aimed at undermining friendship between the Vietnamese and Lao people. A NHAN DAN commentary on the 25th took the incident as the point of departure for a sweeping charge of collusion between the "ultra-reactionaries" in Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh and Bangkok in their service to the United States, connecting it with a visit to Saigon by Lao generals to solicit Thieu's "intervention," the dispatch of more Thai troops to Laos, and the signing of a Thai-Cambodian border security agreement. A Hanoi domestic service commentary on the 24th said that the grenade attack was aimed at diverting public attention from the "heavy defeats" sustained by Vientiane and Thai troops in northern and southern Laos.

A similar grenade attack against the DRV embassy had been protested in a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement in December 1968, and another such episode in January 1968 had prompted a protest to the Lao Foreign Ministry from the DRV charge d'affaires and a supporting NHAN DAN article. Other "provocative actions" against the DRV embassy and its personnel have been protested by Hanoi from time to time over the years.

THAI ACTIONS IN INDOCHINA ASSAILED IN COMMUNIST STATEMENTS

THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER AGREEMENT The Thai role in Indochina comes under fire in official statements denouncing the 19 January signing of the Thai-Cambodian "border security treaty." Sihanouk's government reacts in a 21 January statement by the RGNU Information and Propaganda Ministry, and a DRV Foreign Ministry statement the same day assails the border treaty in the course of scoring Thai involvement in all of Indochina. An earlier RGNU Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, which scored an alleged plan to bring Thai "mercenaries" into Cambodia, is supported in the DRV statement (as it had been editorially by NHAN DAN on the 19th), as well as in a PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, also on the 21st, which does not deal with the border treaty.

The RGNU and DRV statements of 21 January call the border agreement a prelude to the dispatch of Thai mercenaries to Cambodia, and they assert that this once again reveals the failure of the U.S. "Vietnamization" and "Khmerization" policies.

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They scold the Thais for serving U.S. imperialism and routinely warn that the Nixon Administration and its "lackeys" must bear full responsibility for the consequences of their new "crimes" in Cambodia. The NCMU statement goes on to warn that the U.S. imperialists and their "running dogs" are playing with fire and "will be burned by the same fire and the flame of war will be extended to Thai territory." The statements express the determination of the Indochinese peoples to unite to defeat the "U.S. imperialists and their henchmen."

Peking reports the NCMU and DRV statements, but on its own authority treats the border agreement only in a routine-level NCMU commentary on the 21st. Peking earlier supported the 14 January NCMU statement with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article.

TASS reports the DRV statement, but Moscow has offered no comment of its own on the Thai-Cambodian agreement.

**THAI TROOPS
IN LAOS** The dispatch of Thai troops to Laos continues to receive high-level propaganda attention following the 17 January NLHS Central Committee statement which charged that many Thai battalions were sent to Long Tieng and that the Black Leopard Division, which has been fighting in South Vietnam, is to be sent to Laos.* The NLHS statement is echoed, as usual, by the Patriotic Neutralist Forces Alliance Committee in a 19 January statement. A PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 22d also supports the NLHS, calling the alleged plan to send more Thai troops to Laos a "new and serious military adventure" by the United States and its "lackeys." Thus far there has been no DRV statement, although the NLHS statement has received editorial support from NHAN DAN, along with support from Peking in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article.

* See the 19 January TRENDS, page 14.

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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PEKING REACTS TO NIXON-SATO TALKS, STATE OF UNION MESSAGE

In its belated comment on the Nixon-Sato talks and its reaction to the President's State of the Union message, Peking has taken care not to spoil the atmosphere for next month's summit meeting while portraying the United States as beset with troubles at home and abroad which mark its decline as a world power. After waiting more than two weeks before offering an assessment of the 6-7 January San Clemente talks on its own authority, Peking issued an NCNA commentary on the 23d which deflected criticism of Washington's China policy from the President onto Secretary Rogers and depicted growing conflicts of interest between Japan and the United States. Reflecting Peking's circumspect treatment of the President's position on China, NCNA excised a reference to China in quoting the San Clemente joint statement as saying the two sides "covered the general international situation with particular emphasis on Asia." The statement itself had added "including China."

In Peking's initial reaction to the State of the Union message, an NCNA account on the 24th criticized the President's position on a range of issues but ignored his references to his forthcoming visits to Peking and Moscow. Soviet-U.S. relations did figure, however, in NCNA's account of the message's discussion of such issues as defense policy and the Middle East. But while mentioning global rivalry between the two superpowers, NCNA did not refer to Chinese security interests.

NIXON-SATO TALKS Having restricted itself to replays of foreign comment on the San Clemente meeting, Peking's first direct comment on the talks was disseminated by NCNA's domestic and international services on the 23d and broadcast in Japanese and other languages. While saying that the United States and Japan are trying to "intensify their collusion," Peking made a point of probing areas of Japanese-U.S. friction and forecast deepening conflict between the two countries. Peking observed that the talks took place at a time when U.S.-Japanese relations were "tense" after Japan "suffered from a series of blows" from Washington's new economic policies and the failure to maintain Taipei in the UN, but it did not refer to developments in PRC-U.S. relations as part of this background.

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The reason for the delay in the Chinese reaction to the San Clemente talks is not clear, though its timing to coincide with the arrival in Tokyo of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko suggests that it may be related in part to Moscow's moves to improve relations with Japan. The Soviet factor also seems reflected in recent remarks by Chou En-lai and another Chinese official--as reported in the Japanese press but not in PRC media--suggesting common interests between the Chinese and the Japanese on matters affecting Moscow as well as Washington.*

Regarding the most crucial issue affecting Sino-U.S. relations discussed in San Clemente, Peking's commentary on the talks took sharp exception to statements on the Taiwan issue made by Sato and Secretary Rogers. Quoting Sato as saying that U.S. troops stationed in Japan would be available for use in Taiwan and South Korea, Peking interpreted this as showing that "reviving Japanese militarism tries to realize its ambitious designs of aggression against China and Korea with the protection of U.S. troops." Peking took Secretary Rogers to task for his assurances of continuing U.S. diplomatic and defense ties with the ROC. But in directing its fire at the "Sato-Rogers duet" and claiming that the "handful of persons of the U.S. and Japanese ruling circles obdurately hostile to the Chinese people" are "incapable of harming the Chinese people in the least," Peking carefully left the negotiating door open for the President's visit. Peking has not, in fact, directly criticized the President's position on China, having failed to respond to his 2 January remarks affirming continued U.S. relations with Taipei.

Peking's comment on the San Clemente meeting criticized the President directly only in connection with the Okinawa reversion "fraud"--which Peking again attacked as designed to reinforce the Japanese-U.S. security alliance. Quoting the President's statement about arrangements to be made regarding facilities on Okinawa, Peking claimed that the United States will reinforce these facilities "to meet the needs of its new aggressive schemes." The target of these alleged schemes was not specified.

* See the Japan section of the TRENDS.

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Seeking to document the portrayal of growing differences between Japan and the United States, Peking focused on economic disputes and observed that the Japanese resisted making further concessions at the talks. The commentary concluded with an assessment of the talks as showing that the conflicts of interest between the two allies are developing and are insoluble.

STATE OF UNION MESSAGE Peking's reaction to the President's State of the Union message dwelt on U.S. foreign and domestic difficulties in standard terms to portray the United States as a declining power beset with crises. While taking the President to task on a number of issues and mocking his message as "full of empty promises," Peking refrained from gratuitous attacks on issues involving Sino-U.S. relations. NCNA's account took note of the President's assertion that the United States will honor its treaty commitments, but there was no attempt to draw implications concerning Chinese interests.

Treating in some detail the President's discussion of defense needs--including his reference to "others . . . going forward with major increases in their own arms programs"--Peking interpreted the message as indicating Washington's determination to pursue its "worldwide contention with social imperialism." The Soviet-U.S. relationship also figured in Peking's reaction to the President's views on the Middle East. NCNA said the President expressed his intention "to continue to make deals with Soviet revisionist social imperialism" on the Middle East question. On the other hand, NCNA cited Washington's intention to provide military aid to Israel as a move to step up U.S. "contention with Soviet revisionism."

The NCNA account also discussed Indochina* and Latin America. Peking seized on the President's statement regarding U.S. responses to foreign expropriation of American property to play the theme of defense of "state sovereignty" by "the Latin American countries in particular."

Peking's account of the message ended with a portrayal of U.S. domestic problems and of unfulfilled promises by the government. The account concluded on a wry note by citing USIS for the observation that many parts of the message were substantially the same appeals that the President made to Congress last year or the year before.

* See the Indochina section of the TRENDS.

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Peking has followed up its own comment on the State of the Union message with reports on reaction by its communist allies attacking the President in markedly more harsh terms. Notable among Peking's pickups of foreign reaction was an account of an Albanian commentary which quoted from party chief Hoxha's bitter anti-U.S. diatribe at the Albanian party congress last November. In his congress address Hoxha had implicitly taken issue with Peking's moves toward relaxing tension with the United States. By citing some of Hoxha's hardline attacks on the United States, Peking has evidently made a gesture of reassurance to an apprehensive ally.

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CHINA

PEKING PROPAGANDA MAKES A GESTURE TO NATIVE TAIWANESE

A 19 January Radio Peking broadcast to Taiwan hailing Peking's policy of autonomy for minorities may indicate that Peking is preparing to make a gesture along these lines to the Taiwanese. The broadcast noted that since 1949 a policy of "regional autonomy for nationalities" has been carried out by the PRC and that "the rights of equality and autonomy are fully protected among the people of minority nationalities." The broadcast even made an unusual reference to the authority of the 1954 constitution--apparently still in force since the draft constitution drawn up two years ago was never ratified--by noting that it provided for equality of nationalities and prohibited discrimination against minorities.

The radio commentary clearly indicates that Taiwan would be considered a minority area. It stated that "with the exception of Taiwan province, . . . democratic reform movements have been launched in every national minority locality in China." Claiming that all types of enslavement have now been eliminated from the liberated areas, the broadcast went on to enumerate advances in wealth, culture, and health made by minority groups under CCP leadership.

BACKGROUND Propagandists have recently been paying increased attention to minority problems, and it is possible that the groundwork is being prepared for a new official proclamation in behalf of minority autonomy and aimed at Taiwan. The center's attitude toward minority groups has, of course, varied considerably through the years. During the cultural revolution, as during the previous "leap forward" period, official policy seemed to leave little leeway for individuality on the part of minority nationalities. A major charge against such deposed leaders as Ulanfu of Inner Mongolia was that they had encouraged minority separatism--an echo of similar accusations aimed at purged leaders during the "leap forward" period. Last year, however, there was an obvious relaxation of efforts toward forced assimilation of minority groups. Exchanging the stick for the carrot, PRC media indicated that teaching of minority languages would continue and that cadres of minority nationalities would be actively recruited.

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On the latter point, an NCNA article released on 19 January sought to explain why many minority cadres had been purged in the past. Current recruiting of minority cadres, it was said, aims at those of proletarian background, but prior to the cultural revolution many of those recruited were the "former slave owners" and other exploiters among the particular nationality group. In such cases party policies that allowed autonomy had simply permitted the wealthy members of the group to regain power.

LANGUAGE The publication of books in minority languages continued throughout the cultural revolution under the protective cover of "spreading Mao's thought." But now, as indeed also in the case of Chinese, works other than those by Mao are to be printed, and a measure of concern is being indicated in regard to preserving the minority languages. An Inner Mongolian conference on publishing work held last December, according to a radio account broadcast 27 December, criticized cultural revolution ultraleftism and indicated that the publications in Mongolian would no longer be limited to Mao's works. In discussing the more varied literary diet now permitted, the conference took special note of the need to "alleviate the shortage of Mongolian-language publications as soon as possible." More manpower is to be devoted to the effort, and the quality of translations into Mongolian is to be improved as "demanded by the revolutionary cadres and masses of Mongol nationality."

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SOVIET BLOC AND PRC

SOVIET BLOC SHARPENS ANTI-CHINA LINE ON EVE OF NIXON TRIP

With President Nixon's Peking trip in the offing, Soviet bloc media have intensified their anti-China polemics and called for a rallying of communist ranks against what is pictured as a Maoist sellout of the national liberation movement through collusion with the United States.

Articles in SOVIET RUSSIA on 19 January and in Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU on the 20th addressed themselves directly to Peking's view of the Soviet Union as "the main enemy." It was left to the Polish paper to warn, with the Romanians apparently the prime target, that there can be no neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict and no normalization of relations with Peking as long as it continues to follow an anti-Soviet course. The East German party's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 22d, noting the approach of the President's trip, charged that Peking and Washington are plotting openly to sell out the DRV and concluded that a "confrontation with Maoism is inevitable." The stepped-up calls for a united anti-China front came on the eve of the Warsaw Pact summit consultations which opened on 25 January in Prague, with the Romanians in attendance.

SOVIET RUSSIA In keeping with the general effort to discredit Peking by portraying it as a danger to world peace, the 19 January SOVIET RUSSIA article resurrected the charge that the Maoists are banking on war to achieve their objectives. Airing allegations that were prominent in the Soviet press immediately following the announcement of the Nixon visit, the article said that the Maoists are militarizing the country in preparation for war. It added that since the cultural revolution "all life in China has been placed under the army's control." This line contrasts with Moscow's current broadcasts to China, which since the purge of Lin Piao have been maintaining that the army is being pushed into the background.

The SOVIET RUSSIA article made it clear that Peking's military preparations are directed ultimately against the Soviet Union, considered by Maoism as "its number one enemy." In keeping with past Soviet comment, the article stopped short of portraying any immediate Chinese threat, assuring the Soviet people that the Soviet Union and its allies are waging a successful struggle to

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relax world tensions and are "thus frustrating Peking's reckoning on drawing mankind into a world war." SOVIET RUSSIA did not directly mention the President's trip to Peking but charged the Chinese leadership with giving "invaluable service to imperialism and colluding with it."

PRAVDA on the 19th made use of an article in the Mongolian party organ UNEN to air the allegation that by consorting with the United States Peking is thwarting solution of the Vietnam war and other international problems. Linking the President's impending visit to Peking with the recent bombing of the DRV, PRAVDA quoted the paper as saying the Mao group has betrayed Marxism-Leninism and has "thus become the accomplice of imperialism--mankind's worst enemy."

TRYBUNA LUDU The 20 January article in TRYBUNA LUDU by Daniel Lulinski, the paper's leading China commentator, charged that Peking, viewing the USSR as "the main enemy," has embarked on a new course of anti-Sovietism. In this context, Lulinski cited Peking's allegedly "obstructive" tactics in the United Nations as well as its opposition to Soviet foreign policy positions on the Middle East, European detente, and disarmament. Echoing earlier Moscow charges, but stopping short of East German allegations of open plotting against the DRV, Lulinski said Peking's invitation to the President has encouraged him to ignore DRV peace proposals and has resulted in a hardened U.S. stand on the war.

TRYBUNA LUDU's call for a rallying of the ranks in the interests of proletarian internationalism seemed to take special aim at Bucharest, which continues to follow its independent line on contentious issues between Moscow and Peking.* Taking note of Chinese "maneuvers" in the Balkans and attempts to pit unnamed socialist countries against the Soviet Union and other allies of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, the article lectured that a communist party's attitude toward the Soviet Union is the touchstone of socialist credentials, and it added pointedly: "On

* The Romanian press did not report the recognition of Bangladesh by the GDR, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Poland. And during the India-Pakistan conflict, the Romanian representative at the United Nations voted for the 7 December Argentine resolution which called for the removal of Indian troops.

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this fundamental question there can be no equivocation, taking some 'neutral' stand or, all the more, assenting to the disruptive concepts of the Chinese leadership."

Setting forth the proper stance for a loyal Soviet ally, the paper repeated the stock formulation that Poland favors normalization of state relations with the PRC, but it also added the sharpened formulation that such a normalization "can never take place and will never take place on the platform of the Chinese leadership's anti-Soviet and disruptive course."

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND In keeping with the GDR's role as a leading proxy spokesman for Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's 22 January article, entitled "Peking Leaders Openly Plot With the United States," charged that Peking has now gone over from indirect cooperation to "coordinated collusion with the chief force of reaction in the world--the U.S. monopoly dictatorship." The closer the date approaches for the President's trip to Peking, the paper said, "the more intensive becomes the plot with Washington." Citing the PRC's stand on the India-Pakistan conflict as evidence of Peking's preparedness "to stab the national liberation movement in the back," the article also specified that Peking is plotting with Washington to "betray" the Indochinese peoples by making "a shady deal" behind their backs. TASS promptly picked up this charge on the 22d.

Echoing an earlier statement by party chief Honecker, the East German article condemned Maoism as the fundamental enemy of the international communist movement and declared that "this is why the confrontation with Maoism is inevitable and urgently necessary to consolidate the unity of the revolutionary forces."

MOSCOW BROADCASTS TO CHINA SEEK TO FAN OPPOSITION TO TRIP

While the Moscow central media have maintained their relative restraint in comment on the President's Peking trip, Soviet broadcasts to China have intensified the use of propaganda lines designed to foment domestic opposition to the trip. Portraying the Chinese leadership as servile accomplices of the "U.S. imperialists," these programs repeatedly play the theme that the President's visit is not in the best interests of the Chinese people or of the international communist movement. A typical broadcast in Mandarin on 17 January said that the Chinese had made "concessions to the U.S. ruling clique at the expense of the Chinese people and of other countries." The commentary added

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that before visiting Peking, President Nixon had "resolutely turned down the Chinese people's legal demand for the liberation of Taiwan, made it clear that U.S. troops would remain there, and said that the United States has no intention of recognizing the PRC." Evidently, the commentator added, "Washington is still not satisfied with the concessions made by the Chinese leaders, and their services are not highly valued."

Other Soviet broadcasts in Mandarin have suggested that Peking's invitation to the President has caused the PRC to lose face in the international arena and has aroused "perplexity" at home. Expanding on this theme, a Moscow radio commentator declared on the 20th that because of its "close cooperation" with the United States Peking's foreign policy "is being trusted less and less by the majority of the countries," and he added that the Maoist leadership's present cooperation with imperialism "can never be accepted by the Chinese people."

Similarly, a broadcast to China over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on the 23d, describing Peking's preparations for the President's visit, said that the Maoist leaders have "basically disregarded, or have even wrecked, the Chinese people's national pride by trying to please the visitor from the other side of the ocean." Another broadcast along the same lines depicted the Chinese leaders' attitude toward the visit as evidenced by their "very attentive and grovelling" preparations for it and noted that the authorities had warned the Red Guards they would be jailed if they tried to make trouble while the President was in Peking. The radio also took the occasion to recall that "the Peking leaders' friends from the other side of the ocean in the past exploited the Chinese working people's property and still support Chiang Kai-shek."

Concurrently, the Soviet propaganda broadcasts to China have continued the effort to fan party-military tensions. A Radio Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on the 20th, pointing out that at one time the Chinese military had great influence in China, said that Mao has now destroyed the supreme leadership of the military by purging Lin Piao and his associates. Judging by the continuing purges, the commentator added, "Mao will create conditions for another subversion of the upper echelon of the leadership." A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast traced the present "purge" of party and government organs to "a great schism among Chinese leaders, mainly over the issue of Sino-Soviet relations." Those who favor a renewal of friendship with the Soviet Union, it said, are being purged in the hope of halting the spread of pro-Soviet sentiment.

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GROMYKO IN JAPAN

PROPAGANDA STRESSES POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Soviet commentators have seized on the occasion of the current visit of Foreign Minister Gromyko to Japan to launch a propaganda offensive aimed at stimulating Japanese interest in closer economic cooperation. Comment pegged to Gromyko's visit has not, however, indicated any softening of Moscow's position in regard to the status of the "northern territories"--the four islands north of Hokkaido occupied by the USSR at the end of World War II. Japanese commentators reiterate the theme that stabilization of relations with the Soviet Union hinges on the ultimate return of the disputed islands.

Gromyko, who arrived in Tokyo on the 23d for five days of talks with Foreign Minister Fukuda and a meeting with Sato, last visited Japan in July 1966 when it was decided to hold annual ministerial-level talks alternating between Tokyo and Moscow. Differences over the territorial issue, however, quickly cooled relations, and the agreement was suspended after Foreign Minister Miki visited Moscow in 1967.

Radio Moscow's reluctance to mention the territorial question in broadcasts to its Japanese audience was specifically illustrated in its handling of a radio talk by Dmitriy Petrov, deputy chairman of the Soviet-Japanese Friendship Association, broadcast to various audiences on 21-22 January. Petrov portrayed Gromyko's visit as "an important step toward the development of relations between the two countries" and argued that recent contacts in the trade, economic, and cultural fields have brought about a new atmosphere in relations between the two countries. Petrov acknowledged that there are still some "difficulties" standing in the way of improved relations, among them the "absurd claims" of "certain Japanese circles" to a part of Soviet territory. But the Japanese-language version of the commentary as broadcast by Radio Moscow referred only vaguely to the "difficulties," omitting the specific reference to the territorial issue.

On trade and economic issues, Moscow commentators spoke both of the positive benefits bound to flow from increased Soviet-Japanese trade and, on the negative side, of the steady deterioration in U.S.-Japanese economic relations. A broadcast in Japanese on the 19th, pointing to "the 10 percent surcharge

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In August of last year" and the sudden announcement of "Nixon's plan to visit China without consulting Japan, its most intimate ally in the Far East," claimed that "the San Clemente talks between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato only confirmed that contradictions between the two countries are deepening." The thesis that "Japan's trade with the Soviet Union is more dependable than that with any other country in the world" was argued in a 22 January Petrov commentary broadcast in Japanese. Asserting that Japanese trade with China has experienced declines in the past because of the "cultural revolution and the subsequent economic mess" and that "Japan's trade with the United States has also experienced serious fluctuations," Petrov argued that trade with the Soviet Union "will never experience such things."

TASS on the 21st noted that Gromyko is to visit Japan at a time when "favorable opportunities are available for continued successful development of Japanese-Soviet cooperation in various fields." Future development of economic relations between the USSR and Japan will, however, "largely depend on a constructive approach to this problem by the Japanese side," it was argued. On the 19th a PRAVDA article by A. Biryukov developed the thesis that "there are many fields in which the USSR and Japan could fruitfully cooperate in the international arena."

CHOU EN-LAI SUPPORTS JAPANESE STAND ON TERRITORIAL ISSUE

In an apparent effort to make Gromyko's visit less than comfortable, Chou En-lai expressed Chinese support for the Japanese claim to the "northern territories" on 21 January, just two days before Gromyko arrived in Tokyo. Chou also conceded, in contrast with Peking's usual harsh condemnation of the Okinawa reversion agreement, that although "the Okinawa reversion agreement is a fraud . . . it has started the first step." Chou's comments, delivered at a meeting with three Japanese delegations visiting Peking, were reported by Japanese correspondents. NCNA, which often does not publicize Chou's remarks to foreign groups visiting Peking, reported only that Chou had met with the Japanese delegations.

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Chou also offered to sign a bilateral treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons with Japan "if the Japanese Government abrogates the Japan-Taiwan treaty, terminates the state of war with China, and normalizes diplomatic relations with China." With such a treaty, Chou continued, "Japan and China can make various demands on the United States and Soviet Union." Chou's reference to a bilateral treaty with Japan banning nuclear weapons--the first time such a possibility has been raised--appears timed to stimulate pro-Peking sentiments within Japan during the Gromyko visit and to counter recent Japanese anxiety (which was played on by Soviet propagandists) over possible fallout from the PRC's nuclear test on 7 January.

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SOUTH ASIA

SOVIET UNION ANNOUNCES RECOGNITION OF BANGLADESH

Moscow announced its recognition of Bangladesh on 25 January, shortly after Pakistani President Bhutto left his country for a tour of Muslim states. Czechoslovakia and Hungary announced their recognition of Bangladesh soon after Moscow's announcement. Speaking in Rabat after the Soviet announcement, Bhutto said that Pakistan would not break off relations with the Soviet Union but would recall the Pakistani ambassador to Moscow for consultations. Karachi has reported that Bhutto will return home on the 28th and then go to China on the 31st. There has been no Peking announcement of Bhutto's projected visit.

Soviet propaganda treatment of Bhutto has grown more favorable in the past month. On 21 December, reporting his address to the nation and his press conference after acceding to power, TASS had quoted his avowal that the Pakistanis would "struggle for East Pakistan" and "take revenge." Soviet accounts of the leadership change at that time had also noted that Bhutto was "one of the country's richest landowners." Subsequently, however, Soviet media began treating him more favorably. On 1 January TASS cited Bhutto's assertion in Lahore--after his meeting with the Soviet ambassador--that "the Soviet Union is our neighbor and friend and Pakistan wants to have close relations with it." Articles by G. Kudin in the first two issues of the weekly NEW TIMES this year pointed out that Bhutto had won "an impressive victory in the December 1970 elections"--the elections which Moscow cites as the source of Mujibur Rahman's mandate in Bangladesh. The articles also noted that Bhutto is the first civilian president Pakistan has had in 13 years and that he had taken steps "which are seen as attempts to strengthen the social basis of his government."

A week prior to its recognition announcement, Moscow reported that President Podgorny had sent a telegram congratulating Bhutto on his accession and that the latter had responded. Karachi had reported the Podgorny telegram on 25 December.

BANGLADESH CP Soviet bloc media have been providing propaganda support for the Bangladesh CP, in effect appealing for an active role for the communists in the new regime and seeking to discredit radical elements that might have a disruptive effect. A commentary on the Moscow

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domestic service on 19 January noted that the political situation in Bangladesh was returning to normal and that "the activities of the Communist Party, which had to work underground for 24 years, have been permitted." The East Berlin radio, also on the 19th, broadcast an interview with Abdus Salam, general secretary of the Bangladesh CP, in which he noted that during the liberation struggle "we sought to unify all patriotic forces." Now, he continued, a reconstruction period has begun. "We are in the course of building party organizations in all parts of the country. We have thousands of cadres who have taken part in the liberation struggle and who now wish to join the party We are trying to organize systematic Marxist-Leninist education in the party. The central party organ, which is now published once again, will play an important part in this."

Radio Moscow in Bengali on the 20th broadcast an extensive commentary on the Bangladesh communists, whose contribution to the success of the national liberation movement "is not at all insignificant." Recalling that the party had called for a national united front in May 1971, a front which "could also effectively help the Awami League's program," the commentary claimed that these communist efforts to forge unity led to creation of the Consultative Committee attached to the Bangladesh Government. Stressing communist willingness to play an active role in reconstruction and to help the governing Awami League, the commentary called for unity of various parties and patriotic forces.

The commentary in Bengali raised the question of rivalry among communist factions, a characteristic feature of the South Asian communist movement that could bedevil the Bangladesh regime's efforts to achieve stability. Making a pitch for unity, the commentary said:

The members of the Communist Party have, like other persons in Bangladesh, definite proof that behind the cover of extreme revolutionary slogans, the Chinese leadership, which is trying to create a split in the international communist movement, fully supported the reactionary military dictatorship of Yahya Khan to crush the national liberation movement. At the beginning of 1972, the former pro-Peking groups in the Bangladesh Communist Party set up a central communist joint committee for reorganization work and to draw up a new program. This committee calls the Bangladesh liberation movement a proletarian revolution. This stand can be

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considered as fully in line with its earlier policy It can be mentioned here that many former pro-Peking groups in the Bangladesh Communist Party learned the technique of guerrilla warfare and also took an active part in the national liberation movement. The Bangladesh communists are trying to preserve the unity which developed among the progressive forces during the liberation movement. The people are supporting their efforts because this unity can help in the reconstruction of the nation.

TASS on the 24th disseminated a commentary by PRAVDA correspondent I. Schedrov which also preached the virtue of unity: "The now legalized Communist Party of Bangladesh has actively joined in the country's socio-political life. Together with the mass progressive Awami League Party, the National People's Party, and other progressive organizations, the Communist Party is incorporated into the wide front of democratic forces The Communist Party of Bangladesh also takes part in the work of the Consultative Committee of five parties set up under the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh." PRAVDA also interviewed CP leader Moni Singh, quoting his support for the policies of the government, his references to the 1969 international communist conference and to the 24th CPSU Congress, and his condemnation of the "disgraceful role played by the Maoist leadership of China."

PEKING REPORTS EVACUATION OF CONSULAR STAFF FROM DACCA

Peking has continued its virtual silence on recent developments centering on Bangladesh, though it has reminded the world that it still regards East Bengal as part of Pakistan. NCNA reported on the 25th that the Chinese consular staff evacuated from "Dacca of Pakistan" had arrived in Peking that day. NCNA noted that the decision to close the consulate was made "right after the Indian aggressor troops occupied Dacca" on 16 December and that the consulate "discontinued its external functions" on 17 December. There has been no Chinese reference to Bengali personnel stationed at the Pakistani embassy in Peking.

NCNA's report on the evacuation of the Chinese staff from Dacca noted that they returned via Rangoon. Five days before their arrival in Peking, the Maoist Burmese communists' Voice of the People of Burma broadcast a scathing attack on the Ne Win regime's

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recognition of Bangladesh as contributing to Soviet efforts to encircle China. Developing this theme, the clandestine radio-- whose existence has never been acknowledged in PRC media-- explained that

Soviet social imperialism has been implementing plans to encircle and destroy the PRC. The Soviet social imperialists stationed many troops along the northern military front of China. . . . The social imperialists attempted [through the treaty with India] to take over control of certain border areas in the western part of China. . . . By recognizing Bangladesh, the Ne Win military government has become the running dog of the Soviet social imperialists and Indian reactionaries.

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GERMANY

GDR EVINCES CONCERN OVER RAMIFICATIONS OF MOVES TOWARD DETENTE

Concern for the viability of the GDR's "socialist" system if detente in the triangular Bonn-East Berlin-Moscow relationship continues unchecked is registered in a continuing stress in East Berlin propaganda, especially marked since the turn of the year, on the need to maintain firm vigilance against "imperialist" influences. GDR party leader Honecker keynoted this propaganda in two major speeches during the past month, as well as in his article written for PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM and published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 16 January. Summarized by ADN, Honecker's article essentially recapitulated and embroidered in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory some of the points he had made bluntly in his 6 January speech at a meeting of the army garrison on Ruegen Island, from which much of the routine-level press and radio comment now takes its cue.

As in his tour d'horizon of current East-West German relations before the SED Central Committee plenum on 19 December,* but in more polemical terms, Honecker on 6 January played on the basic theme that the moves toward European detente had not made "imperialism" any less imperialist or less dangerous. And in the theoretical article he expounded the companion theme that it had not made "social democratism" less alien to the interests of socialism. In the speech he derided the "fairy tale" that the "imperialist wolf" had turned overnight into "a meek sheep," and he exhibited a major GDR concern in insisting in effect that the treaties and agreements concluded in the recent period had in no way blurred the lines between the two Germanys: They had rather won "higher international prestige" for the GDR and drawn "an even clearer dividing line between our republic and the FRG."

In again repudiating Brandt's thesis of two German states within one German nation, Honecker declared adamantly in the 6 January speech:

This is the way things are: There is the socialist GDR and the imperialist FRG . . . There is no unity and there can be no unity between the socialist GDR and the imperialist FRG. This is as certain and clear as night

* See the TRENDS of 29 December 1971, pages 29-31.

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follows day. Continuous talk about "unity of the nation" will not change this. It is more an attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of the GDR, and this is a right which we shall grant no one in the FRG. Things are quite clear. Our republic and the FRG treat each other the way each of them treats another third state. The FRG is thereby a foreign country and, what is more important, it is an imperialist foreign country.

Honecker's speech had been made against the background of a flurry of FRG official statements and year-end commentaries in West German media taking stock of Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, particularly the state of West-East German relations and the possibility that Bonn may reach a contractual modus vivendi with East Berlin in 1972 on bilateral state relations. The Federal Government having released an announcement on 3 January (unacknowledged in GDR media at that time) that State Secretaries Bahr and Kohl would resume the negotiations on a general FRG-GDR traffic treaty on the 20th, Honecker seemed to be using the Rügen Island speech to put the party leadership again on record with a pledge that there will be no compromise of GDR sovereignty in the coming talks with Bonn.

Four days later, a GDR Government statement warned Bonn that it must bear "full responsibility" for the 9 January Kiel Canal incident, in which West German border police boarded a GDR ship in the canal to free the family of an East German engineer who had fled to seek asylum. The GDR Government protest on the 10th warned the FRG Government that it would have to bear the "consequences," and East German propaganda was shrill and vocal on the incident. Nevertheless, the Bahr-Kohl round on a traffic treaty between the two Germanys took place as scheduled on 20-21 January.

Moscow's reportage on Honecker's 6 January speech was notable for the complete omission of all the bitter, sarcastic, vituperative statements directed against the Federal Republic and Brandt personally. It is not unusual for Moscow's reportage to soften the thrust of East German rhetoric. But the sanitizing this time was notably thorough, at a time when Moscow would have a special interest in not impeding the course of the long parliamentary process launched by the Brandt-Scheel coalition to finally ratify the Moscow and Warsaw treaties on relations with the FRG.

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Moscow's current interests were made plain in a 20 January IZVESTIYA article by Grigoryants which contained an unusually clear but still typically indirect statement on the notion of reverse linkage--the stipulation that Bonn must ratify the Moscow and Warsaw treaties before the Soviet Union signs the final quadripartite protocol on the Big Four Berlin accord, turning around Bonn's prior insistence on a Berlin settlement before the treaties could be ratified. Calling the two treaties "an important link in the positive process of changes" on the European political scene, along with the Big Four agreement on Berlin and the subsidiary intra-German agreements, Grigoryants declared: "One can say without exaggeration that the fate of the treaties entails not only the fate of future relations between the FRG and the socialist states, but also to a certain degree the fate of positive shifts in Europe."

UNDERCURRENTS OF STRAIN Undertones of disharmony flowing from the differing major concerns of the Soviets and East Germans have been discernible in GDR public statements. Honecker's polemical admonitions on 6 January against anyone "misunderstanding the true character" of the GDR's policy and misinterpreting the import of recent events could be read as directed not only at Bonn. His diatribe against the "blabbering" about the FRG not being "a foreign country" could well have been aimed also at elements within the GDR and designed at the same time as a plea to Moscow not to push East Germany too fast. In one notably polemical passage, he declared:

Let me make it quite clear: As far as Brandt and the SPD in the Federal Republic of Germany are concerned, we labor under no misconception, and no one should do so. Illusions should not be allowed to arise in the first place. In view of the role played by the SPD in the FRG as a party upholding the state of monopoly capitalism, no one can pull the wool over our eyes concerning its function.

He went on to tell his military audience that "we have every reason, therefore, not to flag in our political and military vigilance for a single moment," and he added truculently: "Our estimate of the enemy is absolutely correct."

GDR comment in a similar vein was occasioned by the Kiel Canal incident. Most notably, veteran East German television commentator Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler on the 11th, in denouncing the

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"act of piracy" as part of "an escalation of aggressive acts against the GDR," cautioned about "increased agitation against our state border, the slandering of our security, and attempts to weaken and divide us." Arguing the correctness of the regime's attitude toward the FRG, von Schnitzler warned that "provocations such as Kiel are directed not only against the GDR but against European security as a whole."

A less than sanguine Soviet view of East German behavior had seemed mirrored earlier in the exchange of messages on Brezhnev's 63th birthday. Honecker's long congratulatory telegram on 19 December described SED-CPSU relations as marked by "full agreement on theoretical and political questions" and included references to "the unity of our views and actions" and "our firm unity." Brezhnev's curt, formal message of thanks, appearing in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 2 January, made no reference to unity or unanimity. Brezhnev thus passed up an opportunity to express satisfaction at Soviet-GDR cooperation at a time when the inner-German accords had finally been concluded.

The message of thanks from the three top Soviet leaders to their GDR counterparts for the latter's congratulations on the October Revolution anniversary seemed to deliver a similar rebuff. Where the GDR leaders' telegram of 6 November stated that cooperation "is being consolidated and intensified in the political, ideological, economic, scientific-technical, and military fields," the Soviet response--signed in Moscow on 24 December and published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 27th--said only that the Soviets and East Germans would continue "to unceasingly strengthen and deepen the close cooperation" between them. By contrast, the three Soviet leaders replied to the Bulgarian message on the October anniversary with a reference to Soviet-Bulgarian "unanimity" on "all topical international problems," and the tone of the Soviet message even to the Romanians was warmer than that of the one to the East Germans.

In addressing New Year greetings to the Soviet leaders, the East German leaders--in a message released by ADN on 30 December--reciprocated by including no reference to unity or unanimity of Soviet and East German views.

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TOPIC IN BRIEF

THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Against the background of continuing low-level propaganda attacks on U.S. defense policies and the influence of the "military-industrial complex," Soviet press and radio treatment of President Nixon's 20 January State of the Union address has given predictably wide play to his remarks on an increased defense budget and plans for new weapons systems, including missile-carrying submarines. Moscow has also questioned the Administration's sincerity in announcing such plans while SALT is underway.

A participant in the commentators' roundtable show broadcast in the domestic service on the 23d, for example, called the President's remarks evidence of the "decisive" influence of the "military lobby." The same commentator, citing the New York TIMES for the observation that SALT is taking place "against a background of increased pressure by circles seeking to increase the underwater arsenals," concluded that "many Americans . . . are baffled" by the President's "cautious optimism" on SALT while moving toward a new round in the arming of the United States.

In the same vein, a foreign-language radio commentary by Shakhov on the 21st asserted that "we fail to understand how a policy of strategic weapons buildup and negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race can be reconciled." Another foreign-language broadcast on the same day, summing up American public reaction to the President's "electioneering" speech, cited AP for the statement that the United States is "stepping up the strategic arms drive, jeopardizing the current talks to limit such arms."

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

DISSIDENT ACTIVITY IN THE UKRAINE LEADS TO NEW ARRESTS

A new wave of arrests of dissidents occurred in mid-January in both Moscow and the Ukraine. The Ukrainian raids appear traceable to a recent heightening of tension between the authorities and Ukrainian nationalists. Ukrainian unrest, apparently centering in Kiev and Lvov, has been documented directly by underground material published abroad by the emigre journals SUCHASNIST' and POSEV and indirectly by Soviet press reports of official attacks on nationalist manifestations, especially in Lvov.

The arrests (12 in Kiev, 7 in Lvov) reportedly occurred on 12-13 January and included well-known nationalist dissidents Ivan Dzyuba, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Ivan Svitlichnyy, and Yevhen Sverstyuk; in addition, the apartment of the prominent Kiev writer Viktor Nekrasov was searched. In a possibly related move two days later, the Ukrainian papers carried the unusual announcement that the Ukrainian KGB had arrested a man named Jaroslav Dobosh from Belgium for carrying on "subversive anti-Soviet activity."

Among those reportedly arrested, Dzyuba--author of the anti-Russian underground book "Internationalism or Russification?" published in the West in 1968--is the most prominent figure. After he finally made a statement in December 1969 attacking Western misuse of his writings and declaring he had "nothing in common with the ideology of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," his expulsion from the writers union was canceled (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 6 January 1970).

When the KGB stepped up its pressure on dissidents later in 1970, however, Dzyuba renewed his defiance. When he, V. M. Chornovil, and B. D. Antonenko-Davidovich were summoned to the 17-18 November 1970 trial of Valentin Moroz in Ivano-Frankovsk, they refused to cooperate unless the trial was opened to the public (POSEV, March 1971). Immediately after the trial the trio sent a letter to the Ukrainian Prosecutor and Justice Minister protesting the "illegal acts" of the court (the letter is printed in the June 1971 SUCHASNIST'). Nonetheless, an article attacking Moroz in the 14 August 1971 RADYANS'KA OSVITA claimed that it was the testimony of the three protesters which had finally forced Moroz to confess to authoring anti-Soviet writings.

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The current crackdown appears to stem from the Moroz trial and its aftermath of protests. The Ukrainian dissidents vigorously resisted the proceedings against Moroz, as well as his unusually harsh sentence of nine years imprisonment plus five years in exile. Further confrontations between the KGB and dissidents stemmed from the murder of outspoken Kiev protester Alla Hors'ka shortly after the Moroz trial. In mid-1970 Hors'ka had been questioned by the Ivano-Frankovsk KGB but had refused to give any testimony against Moroz, whose case was then under preparation, and even dared to mock the KGB investigators (according to the samizdat UKRAINS'KIY VISNIK, No. 4, 1971, as reprinted in the November 1971 SUCHASNIST'). On 28 November 1970 she was found beaten to death on a road near Kiev, and her fellow dissidents suspected the KGB of organizing the murder. Despite official pressure, Hors'ka's friends insisted on speaking at the funeral ceremony. One man, Oleksandr Sergiyenko, subsequently lost his job as a result; another, Ivan Kel', was censured, while Sverstyuk, who delivered the eulogy at the funeral, has now been arrested.

LVOV SERVES AS PRINCIPAL CENTER OF NATIONALIST UNREST

Although the Moroz trial occurred in Ivano-Frankovsk and the Hors'ka affair in Kiev, the greatest tension appears to have been manifested recently in Lvov, a historic center of Ukrainian, especially west Ukrainian, nationalism. Some of the best-known active dissidents reside in Lvov, including Ivan Kandyba, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Mikhaylo Osadchiy, and Igor Kalinets'; all were imprisoned in recent years but renewed their resistance activities after release from prison.

Among these activists, Kandyba exposed the 1961 Lvov trials; his petition was printed in the December 1967 SUCHASNIST'. Journalist Chornovil, sent to cover the 1965 Lvov trials, turned into a protester and wrote a book exposing the trials, a book that reached the West in 1968. Lvov obkom instructor Osadchiy, a subordinate of the pro-Russian former Lvov obkom ideology secretary Valentin Malanchuk, recently began circulating a samizdat account of the 1965-1966 arrest and trial of himself, Chornovil, Svitlichnyy, Dzyuba, and others (excerpts are published in the November and December 1971 SUCHASNIST'). Kalinets' was among those writing protests against the Moroz trial--printed in the June 1971 SUCHASNIST'.

Indicative of the tensions in Lvov is a recent report telling how the Lvov KGB organized the destruction of historical Ukrainian graves in Lvov during the summer of 1971 (SUCHASNIST', November 1971).

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Chornovil and others sent protests to Ukrainian President Lyashko, Premier Shcherbitskiy, Deputy Premier Tron'ko, and Central Committee Secretary Ovcharenko (the latter two are in charge of culture). As a result some of the protesters, such as poet Igor Kalineta's wife, lost their jobs.

The Soviet press itself has provided ample evidence of serious nationality problems in Lvov since last summer, notably involving educators, intellectuals, and youth. In the 29 June 1971 PRAVDA UKRAINY, Deputy Ukrainian Higher and Secondary Specialized Education Minister V. Yu Malanchuk, a former Lvov obkom secretary, wrote that "at a recent Lvov obkom plenum it was noted that some scientific workers in their research works have not taken a precise class position but rather an objectivist approach to the evaluation of some figures of the past and phenomena of public life"; he went on to attack writings presenting past Ukrainian nationalists in a favorable light. A September Lvov obkom plenum discussed improvements in ideological work and the "international education of the workers" (RADYANS'KA UKRAINA, 28 September).

In October, even while presenting an Order of Lenin to Lvov, Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest used the occasion to attack bourgeois nationalists and Zionists and others who "cast a shadow" on our "historic successes" (RADYANS'KA UKRAINA, 29 October). Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Komsomol adopted a decree "On the Work of Komsomol Organizations of Lvov Oblast and Kiev City in Teaching the Youth a Communist Attitude toward Work. . .," a decree discussed at a Lvov Komsomol plenum which released its first secretary (MOLOD' UKRAINY, 2 November).

UKRAINIAN CONFERENCE RAISES ISSUE OF NATIONALISM

Nationality problems were apparently severe enough to prompt republicwide action. On 10-12 November Ukrainian ideological workers were called to Kiev for a conference which discussed "raising class political vigilance and intensifying the struggle against bourgeois nationalism, Zionism, and antisocial phenomena" (RADYANS'KA UKRAINA, 13 November). At the conference Shelest rapped the work of Ukrainian ideological cadres in general, criticized "many party organizations" for poor ideological work, and attacked "revisionism, opportunism, bourgeois nationalism, and Zionism." He charged that Zionists recently had "significantly increased their subversive activities" (RADYANS'KA UKRAINA, 11 November).

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Also speaking at the conference, the Ukrainian secretary for ideology P. D. Ovcharenko assailed "some publications" for "superficial" analyses of events, attacked the ideological shortcomings of literature and films, "devoted much attention to questions of international education," and criticized "some petty organizations" for allowing church influence to spread (RADYANS'KA UKRAINA, 11 November). The ideology secretaries of Lvov, K. I. Pirozhak, and Volyn, N. L. Alekseyeva, spoke on "the struggle against bourgeois ideology and antisocial phenomena." On the opening day of the conference the Ukrainian press announced the retirement of Ukrainian Culture Minister R. V. Babychuk and his replacement by the second secretary of the Lvov obkom, Yu. N. Yelchenko (Ukrainian Komsomol first secretary 1960-1968).

Postconference ideological activity was centered in Lvov. On 19 November 300 teachers from Ukrainian higher educational institutions and tekhnikums were called to a conference in Lvov where attention was concentrated on criticism of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and Zionism and "bourgeois-nationalist falsifications of history" (RABOCHAYA GAZETA, 20 November). On 20 November a Lvov obkom plenum on improving political work among the public was held. The main attention was focused on the "big shortcomings and omissions" in Communist education. Speakers noted that some local party organizations "insufficiently consider the special features of the oblast, its historic past, and the constant subversive activities by foreign anti-Soviet, nationalist centers, and do not show proper skill in the work of patriotic and international education and in overcoming nationalist survivals" (PRAVDA, 1 December). PRAVDA's account (which was sharper than local accounts) called it "impermissible" that "some scientific workers and teachers in higher educational institutions in their books and articles" defend "some ideologues of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" and declared that "these phenomena, which cause direct damage to the ideological-political education of workers and especially youth, were not given timely and principled party evaluation."

The Ukrainian account said that the plenum stressed the need to devote more attention to the "successes of Leninist national policy," to "exposing the ideology of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and international Zionism," and to "strengthening the struggle against survivals of the past in people's consciousness, especially against religious views" (RADYANS'KA UKRAINA, 23 November). Party organizations were ordered to "improve the ideological-political education of the intelligentsia" and teach "creative intelligentsia high responsibility for their work."

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Despite its many failings in the field of ideology and nationalities policy, Lvov continues to develop "cultural" officials who rise to republicwide positions of supervision over cultural policy. Both the new Minister of Culture, Yelchenko, and his predecessor, R. V. Babychuk, were Lvov obkom secretaries at the time of their appointments. In addition, V. Yu. Malanchuk, Ukrainian deputy minister for higher and secondary specialized education since 1967, is from Lvov. As head of the Lvov obkom science-culture section (1961-63) and then Lvov obkom culture secretary (1963-67), he presumably was involved in the 1961, 1963 and 1966 Lvov trials, and he has often spoken out on nationality policy--most recently in his 29 June PRAVDA UKRAINY attack on objective treatment of Ukrainian nationalist figures and his August 1971 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY criticism of Dzyuba's book. Dzyuba's book assails Malanchuk personally as a leading russifier, and Malanchuk's ministry has been the target of protests for its alleged discrimination against Ukrainians in the admission of students to Ukrainian universities.

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