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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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1 OF 1

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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17 NOVEMBER 1971
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CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention i

INDOCHINA

Hanoi Derides President's Troop Withdrawal Announcement 1
Low-Key Peking Reaction Denigrates President's Announcement 4
Routine Moscow Reaction Deplores President's Statement 6
Indochinese Unity Reaffirmed During Cambodian Visit to DRV 8
Communists Call Capture of Cambodian Town "Strategic Victory" 11
DRV Army Paper Discusses Struggle Against Pacification 12
North Vietnamese Spokesman Routinely Protests U.S. Bombings 13
Hanoi Outlines Procedures for Christmas Mail to POW's 13

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

New PRC Border Negotiator Attends Soviet Embassy Concert 15
Moscow Cautiously Discusses Chinese Internal Developments 16

CHINA

RED FLAG Articles Attack "Swindlers," Call for Unity 18
Shansi Party-Government Chief Loses Post as MD Commander 21

MIDDLE EAST

Moscow Supports Cairo Call for UNGA Debate on Middle East 23
PRC Envoy in UNGA Reaffirms Peking Support for Palestinians 25
Moscow Kills, Resurrects Report on Golda Meir in Washington 27

ARMS CONTROL

Semenov Repledges USSR to Serious Effort at Vienna SALT 29
Chiao Mentions Liquidating Blocs in UNGA Policy Statement 30

GERMANY

Axen in Finland: GDR Media Ignore Details of Finnish Proposal 32

FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Prague Anticipates Progress in Next Round of Bilateral Talks 34

(Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

17 NOVEMBER 1971

CONTENTS (Continued)

POLAND-USSR

Top Leaders Stress Unanimity on Eve of PZPR Congress 37

TOPICS IN BRIEF

Arbatov on President's USSR Visit 39

CCP-Spanish CP Meeting 39

CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 1 -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 8 - 14 NOVEMBER 1971

<u>Moscow (2691 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1604 items)</u>		
October Revolution Anniversary	(30%)	25%	Domestic Issues	(21%)	24%
[Leaders' Speeches]	(8%)	10%]	Indochina	(8%)	21%
Polish-Soviet Talks in Moscow	(--)	6%	[Cambodian National Day	(--)	14%]
China	(2%)	4%	[FUNK-RGNUMC Delegation in Hanoi	(--)	5%
Indochina	(2%)	4%	Albanian Party Anniversary & Congress	(8%)	13%
Brezhnev in France	(9%)	3%	Asia-Africa Table Tennis Matches in PRC	(17%)	13%
Chilean CP-CPSU Talks in Moscow	(--)	2%	PRC Delegation in UN	(20%)	8%
World Youth Day	(--)	2%	PRC-Lebanon Diplomatic Relations	(--)	4%
Indian-Soviet Friendship Month	(--)	2%	Pakistan Foreign Minister in PRC	(1%)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

' 7 NOVEMBER 1971

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

President Nixon's 12 November press conference announcement that 45,000 U.S. troops will be withdrawn in the next two months was promptly deprecated in Hanoi radio and press comment as a move to assuage public opinion while continuing the war. Like the President's 7 April announcement that 100,000 more troops would be withdrawn by December, this one occasioned no high-level DRV official statement; prior to April, all the President's major statements on Vietnamization and troop withdrawal since November 1969 had elicited official statements. DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in a speech at a reception for a Cambodian FUNK delegation on the 16th, did take brief note of the President's press conference, saying routinely that it again showed U.S. intent to maintain U.S. forces in South Vietnam and to continue support for the Thieu administration.

In Peking's initial reaction to President Nixon's press conference, an NCNA report on the 15th echoed Hanoi's interpretation of the troop withdrawal announcement as a move to allay public opposition while persisting in the war in Indochina. If the President were serious about withdrawing troops, according to NCNA, he would accept the PRG's seven-point peace proposal. PRC delegate to the UNGA Chiao Kuan-hua, in his maiden speech on the 15th, also expressed support for the PRG's seven points, adding that a U.S. troop withdrawal to allow the three Indochinese countries to solve their own problems is "the key to the relaxation of tension in the Far East."

Moscow's limited reaction to the President's troop withdrawal announcement complained that he failed to set a date for complete withdrawal. Soviet media selectively reported his remarks to show that the United States intends to continue seeking a military solution.

Hanoi's concern over inroads by the allied pacification effort in South Vietnam is reflected in a series of unusually candid articles in the North Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. While reiterating Hanoi's stock forecast that the pacification program will fail, the articles also take note of allied claims of success and acknowledge difficulties created by the program.

HANOI DERIDES PRESIDENT'S TROOP WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Hanoi media reacted promptly and predictably to the President's unscheduled 12 November press conference at which he announced

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 2 -

projected U.S. troop withdrawals from South Vietnam during the next two months. The initial comment came on the 13th in a Hanoi radio commentary, followed on the 14th by a statement from the DRV spokesman in Paris and comment in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. On the 15th Hanoi radio broadcast a Commentator article in the party daily NHAN DAN, a standard vehicle for comment on the President's pronouncements. The only available Front comment was an LPA commentary of the 14th, broadcast by Hanoi as well as Liberation Radio.

The Hanoi radio commentary on the 13th set the line when it said that the President had to continue to withdraw a portion of U.S. troops to placate public opinion but that his real policy was evident from his failure to set a date for total withdrawal, his remarks indicating that he would maintain forces in South Vietnam "indefinitely," and his "threat" to step up air action if U.S. troops are endangered. The radio commentary, like the LPA comment, acknowledged that 45,000 troops are to be withdrawn during the next two months. Other Hanoi propaganda failed to mention the figure, although QUAN DOI NHAN DAN did observe that the President "acted as if the rate of U.S. troop withdrawal was greatly increasing."

The Hanoi radio commentary described the three factors which the President said would determine further withdrawals--the level of enemy activity, progress in Vietnamization, and progress in the release of POW's--as a "pretext" for continuing the war.* It argued that the President's conditions cannot be met because the South Vietnamese will continue to fight as long as the United States maintains troops there and supports the "puppet" Thieu regime, because any progress in Vietnamization is an "illusion," and because the way to obtain the release of prisoners is to respond to the 1 July PRG peace proposal and set a deadline for a total withdrawal. The same resolve to continue the struggle is reflected in other propaganda, and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said the fact that the

* The propaganda of course obscured the President's remarks on the level of infiltration from North Vietnam in connection with "enemy" action. And only the NHAN DAN Commentator article cryptically acknowledged that the President spoke of progress toward a cease-fire as well as on the POW issue in outlining the third factor that would determine future withdrawals.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 3 -

President has had to maintain a "large number" of troops in South Vietnam and "step up" air raids gives the lie to Secretary Laird's recent statement that Vietnamization will be successful.

Propagandists of course obscure the fact that the President said U.S. air strikes would have to be intensified if there was stepped-up infiltration of DRV troops into Laos and through Cambodia into South Vietnam. But Foreign Minister Trinh in his 16 November speech at the reception for the FUNK delegation, after claiming that the President's press conference remarks showed U.S. intent to maintain troops in South Vietnam, went on to say: "The U.S. imperialists, far from ending their war of aggression in Cambodia and Laos, are intensifying it with a threat of stepped-up bombing for the massacre of the three Indochinese peoples."

The President's statement that the combat role of U.S. troops in offensive action has already ended was ridiculed in some propaganda. The DRV spokesman bluntly said that the President "lied" in this regard, and NHAN DAN's Commentator called the statement a "hoax." While Commentator was not as vitriolic toward the President as Hanoi propaganda has been on occasion in the past, he injected the personally abusive remark that "Nixon's ugly face was laid bare" when he refused to announce a deadline for total withdrawal, as demanded by public opinion. Both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN cited critical reactions to the President's announcement by senators, including Mansfield and Javits. And NHAN DAN's Commentator said that the President's "stubborn" attitude will give impetus to the U.S. antiwar movement and prompt the Senate to increase its pressure for a deadline for a total troop withdrawal.

NEGOTIATIONS NHAN DAN's Commentator ridiculed the President's remark on continuing negotiations at Paris--"a very old maneuver to deceive public opinion." This cannot deceive the "progressives" in the United States and throughout the world, Commentator said, adding that the President "must be held fully responsible" for the stalemate at Paris. The Hanoi radio commentary on the 13th reported that the President said he does not see any "prospect or breakthrough" in the Paris negotiations. But it distorted his remarks when it said: "But he went on to say that he would carry out diplomatic activities through other channels."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 4 -

The commentary called this "a dirty trick designed to sidetrack public opinion and evade replying to the PRG's seven-point proposal." (The President's remarks were in fact made in the context of the POW issue. After saying "we have not given up on the negotiating front," he added: "I would not like to leave the impression that we see the possibility of some striking breakthrough in negotiations in the near future. But we are pursuing negotiations in Paris and through whatever other channels we think are appropriate.")

ELABORATION OF PRG PROPOSAL In castigating the President for refusing to respond to the PRG's seven-point proposal, some of the propaganda has echoed DRV Foreign Minister Trinh's recent elaboration of the demands in point one on U.S. withdrawal. Thus, the Hanoi radio commentary on the 13th specified that putting an end to aggression and withdrawing troops included the cessation of "all activities of U.S. air and naval forces in South Vietnam." The DRV Paris spokesman's statement echoed this along with the other additional demand that the United States must stop military aid to the Saigon "puppet administration." Trinh had spelled out these two additional demands in a 24 October speech at a banquet for the visiting DPRK delegation, and they were incorporated in the 29 October joint DPRK-DRV communique on the visit.*

LOW-KEYED PEKING REACTION DENIGRATES PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT

Peking's reaction to President Nixon's 12 November press conference has been in a low key and sparing of abuse while glossing over key issues. In the only direct comment thus far, an NCNA report carried in Chinese on the 15th and in English the next day** interpreted the President's announcement on further troop

* These elaborations are discussed in the TRENDS of 3 November 1971, pages 11-13. At the 4 November Paris session PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien also inserted the demand for an end to activities of air and naval forces in reviewing the PRG proposal, but this was not reflected in the VNA account of the session.

** The President's 7 April TV speech announcing troop withdrawals was similarly reported first by NCNA in Chinese on the 10th and in English on the following day. There was no Peking comment on a more authoritative level.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 5 -

withdrawals as a move to allay public opposition while seeking to "persist in and prolong the war of aggression in Indochina."

While acknowledging that 45,000 more troops would be withdrawn in December and January, NCNA noted the President's statement that the United States would maintain a residual force in South Vietnam and would continue to use air power until the Saigon regime has developed the capability to handle the situation. The report also noted the President's remark that the United States might have to step up air strikes, but NCNA did not, of course, report that he indicated this would be in response to increased infiltration from North Vietnam. Similarly, NCNA failed to note the President's conditions affecting further troop withdrawals--the level of enemy activity and infiltration rates, progress in the Vietnamization program, and progress in obtaining the release of prisoners and a cease-fire in all of Southeast Asia.

The NCNA report shied away from the question of negotiations and predictably ignored the President's remarks on his forthcoming visits to Peking and Moscow. In a bow to the PRG's seven-point proposal, which Peking editorially endorsed three days after the plan was introduced on 1 July, NCNA said "it would be a matter not of 45,000 men but of accepting the seven-point proposal" if the President "seriously wants to withdraw troops." But NCNA ignored the President's remarks linking troop withdrawals and negotiations as well as his suggestion that a negotiated settlement would mean withdrawal of American forces stationed "in other places in Southeast Asia or in the Asia theater that are directly related to the support of our forces in Vietnam."

While seemingly taking care not to encroach on Hanoi's prerogatives, the NCNA reaction to the President's press conference also reflected Peking's concern not to mar the atmosphere for his impending visit. NCNA derided the President's opening statement as having "sanctimoniously" promised an announcement of substantially increased troop withdrawal. It also charged that "'peace' in his mouth is merely a synonym for continued aggression" and that "U.S. imperialism" seeks to hang on in South Vietnam in order to turn it into a military base for "aggression against Indochina and the whole of Asia." Nonetheless, NCNA's reaction was relatively mild. By contrast, NCNA's report on his 7 April address called it "a downright fraud" and contemptuously concluded: "To hell with Nixon's

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 6 -

'troop withdrawal' hoax!" NCNA at that time referred to the President as the representative of "the arch criminals" composing "the U.S. monopoly ruling circles"; it also claimed in April that the President was "more frantic and adventurist" than his predecessors and that his address foreshadowed "a more rabid adventure" than the Cambodian and Laotian campaigns.

As in the reaction to the 7 April address, Peking has again taken note of "strong" opposition from public opinion to the President's announcement. NCNA cited the Western press as reporting that "some" senators expressed disappointment over the announcement and that the announcement may be a ruse for the coming elections.

Also as it did in April, NCNA has reported Vietnamese comment on the President's announcement, summarizing NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN articles on the 16th. Characteristically, Peking has left it to Hanoi to press points currently being blunted in Peking's own comment. Thus NCNA quoted a NHAN DAN Commentator article as saying the President's press conference once again demonstrated his "colonialist, aggressive stand and his bellicose, obdurate attitude." NHAN DAN was also cited for the view that the President's reference to a negotiated settlement is a "customary trick" and that his refusal to respond to the PRG's seven-point plan shows his unchanged intention to seek a military victory.

ROUTINE MOSCOW REACTION DEPLORES PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT

The first Soviet reaction to the President's press conference came early on 13 November in the usual prompt TASS report, which acknowledged that he said 45,000 more troops would be withdrawn in December and January but complained that he made further withdrawals conditional on progress in Vietnamization and in the training of the Saigon army.* TASS failed to

* The 14 November domestic service commentator's roundtable discussion contains, for the first time, internal evidence that this Sunday feature is recorded earlier in the week. In the program as aired at 0900 GMT on the 14th, a participant noted that the President was to make an announcement on Vietnam on the 15th, with no reference to the press conference given two days before. A repeat broadcast of the roundtable, at 1500 GMT, converted this passage into a complaint that the President said "nothing new" at the press conference, his "first preelection statement."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 7 -

acknowledge the other conditions--the level of enemy activity, progress in obtaining the release of prisoners, and progress toward a cease-fire in all of Southeast Asia. TASS complained that the President said he considers it necessary to maintain "residual" forces indefinitely in order to "keep the present Saigon regime in power," but it did not mention his comments on prisoners or a negotiated settlement in this context. Instead, TASS routinely scored the President for allegedly making no proposals for a political settlement and for again ignoring the PRG's seven-point proposal.

The TASS report also noted that the President stressed that the United States would "not only continue the air raids but also intensify them," without, of course, acknowledging that he said the bombings would have to be stepped up if infiltration from North Vietnam into the South were increased. A foreign-language commentary by Shakov, broadcast on the 13th and 14th, similarly noted without elaboration that the President said the raids would be intensified "if necessary."

The Shakov commentary said that preparations to extend U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia account for the "negative attitude" of the U.S. delegation at the Paris talks. Without referring explicitly to the President's remarks in this regard, the commentator said "Washington politicians" have chosen this time to declare "repeatedly" that the United States "sees no prospect in the immediate future of any substantial progress at the Paris talks."

A foreign-language commentary by Soltan on the 15th referred to the recent antiwar demonstrations in the United States and said the White House decided to make a "pacifying statement" in order to create the impression that the Administration is "allegedly sincerely trying to reach a negotiated settlement in Vietnam." Routinely criticizing the United States for ignoring the PRG's seven points and for trying to retain a "military stronghold" in Indochina, Soltan complained that the President set no date for complete troop withdrawal. And a domestic service commentary on the 15th charged that the President intends to retain residual forces "indefinitely" to support the Saigon regime.

A PRAVDA article by Vishnevskiy, briefly summarized by TASS on 17 November, said that the announcement on the withdrawal of another contingent of 45,000 troops "by no means signifies

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 8 -

the reduction of combat operations." It asserted that "Pentagon hawks" are calling for intensified bombings of the DRV and that the Administration publicly "admitted" its intention to keep a residual force in Vietnam indefinitely.

Like Peking, Moscow predictably ignored the President's remarks on his forthcoming visits to China and the USSR.

INDOCHINESE UNITY REAFFIRMED DURING CAMBODIAN VISIT TO DRV

A delegation of Sihanouk's front (FUNK) and government (RGNU) paid a "friendship visit" to Hanoi from 10 to 17 November at the invitation of the DRV Government and the Vietnamese Fatherland Front to reaffirm Vietnamese-Cambodian solidarity and presumably to coordinate their anti-U.S. plans. The delegation, led by Ieng Sary, "special envoy of the interior part" of the RGNU, included a number of FUNK Politburo members and RGNU ministers.

The delegation was greeted with considerable fanfare in Hanoi; its impending arrival was announced in a communique issued by the DRV Foreign Ministry on the 10th, and the visit was hailed in editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the same day. The group was seen off in Peking by Li Hsien-nien and was met at the airport in Hanoi by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. The Cambodians had talks with a DRV Government delegation headed by Trinh and also attended by Pham Van Dong, and they were received by Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, and Dong. These meetings were described as having taken place in an atmosphere of "militant solidarity" and "fraternal friendship."

Ieng Sary has been playing a prominent coordinating role, both between the pro-Sihanouk Cambodian forces in the field and those based in Peking and now between the Cambodians and the Vietnamese. He had gone to Peking in August "directly from the front lines" in Cambodia, and his arrival there was used as a demonstration of the unity of the Khmer "patriots" at home and abroad and as an occasion for a show of Asian unity embracing Peking and its allies.* His image as a representative of unity among the Khmers was further served by his role in "seminars" in Peking involving FUNK members and RGNU heads of

* Ieng Sary's arrival in Peking is discussed in the TRENDS of 1 September, pages 8-10.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 9 -

diplomatic missions. RGNU Premier Penn Nouth, in a speech reported by the FUNK radio on 5 November, praised Ieng Sary for having played "the most important role in achieving unity of views and stands, conscience and policy, and in strengthening the unity of Cambodians at home and abroad" by means of the seminars.

UNITY THEMES Ieng Sary's visit to Hanoi was also used to promote themes of unity. The visit was accompanied by copious testimony to Vietnamese-Cambodian solidarity and mutual expressions of gratitude for assistance and support. Speakers on both sides repeatedly reaffirmed their loyalty to the joint statement of the Indochinese People's Summit Conference and the determination of the Indochinese peoples to continue to fight together in unity until victory. According to the joint communique signed on the 16th, the two sides discussed the anti-U.S. struggle and Cambodian-Vietnamese relations, revealing "identical views on all problems discussed." (Similar references to unanimity of views appeared in the joint communiques on Podgorny's early-October visit to Hanoi and the 24-30 October visit of the DPRK's Pak Song-chol; in all three cases, surrounding comment suggested that this characterization was included at the visitors' behest. DRV spokesmen during the course of the visits avoided referring to unanimity of views even as the visitors so characterized the talks.)

At a farewell banquet on the 16th, Ieng Sary expressed satisfaction that an "identity of views" had been reached on all questions discussed. "Our two parties have identical conceptions and stands regarding the conduct of the revolutionary war of national liberation and regarding the offensives launched against the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs," he said, adding that "our delegation has particularly noted the unanimity of view of our two parties on the conception of militant and fraternal friendship and fighting solidarity." But Nguyen Duy Trinh, in his brief speech at the banquet, did not offer any assessment of the discussions during the visit.

NIXON VISIT TO PRC There were indications that President Nixon's projected visit to the PRC--regarding which Hanoi expressed disquiet in polemics last summer--was also a subject of discussion. In a banquet speech on the 10th, Trinh made what could be interpreted as an allusion to the visit when he condemned the U.S. Administration for "making propaganda blasts about their hypocritical 'peace plans' and resorting to many perfidious maneuvers to try to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 10 -

divide the Indochinese peoples and weaken the anti-imperialist forces and the world people's movement in support of the peoples of Indochina." An allusion to the President's visit had appeared in a 10 November AKI commentary on Cambodian-Vietnamese solidarity, not specifically pegged to the Ieng Sary visit but obviously timed for it and mentioning it in passing. Asserting that President Nixon has been using "numerous deceitful tricks clamoring about 'cessation' of war, 'serious negotiations,' and 'search for peace for future generations,'" the commentator complained that "everywhere he shows his 'white flag' to pass for a 'messenger of peace.'" AKI charged that the President wants to mislead U.S. and international opinion "in the hope of having his presidential mandate renewed in the next election."

The image of the U.S. waving a white flag--which Kim Il-song had used in his 6 August speech endorsing Peking's invitation to the President--appeared in a speech by Ieng Sary at a Peking meeting marking Cambodian National Day on 9 November, the day before his departure for Hanoi. Without directly mentioning the President's forthcoming visit, Ieng Sary warned that "though U.S. imperialism is compelled to come to China with a white flag" it continues its "vicious intrigues" of denying the rights of weak and small countries and is resorting to "new trickery" to deceive public opinion. This passage--containing the first public reference to the President's visit to have been made in Peking, apart from announcements on the Kissinger missions--might be read as an expression of concern, shared with the Vietnamese communists, over what effects the presidential visit may have on the anti-U.S. cause in Indochina.

SOVIET ROLE Presumably in deference to their hosts' sensitivities, the Cambodians avoided pointed allusions to the USSR's failure to extend recognition to the RGNU. The AKI commentary on the 10th, however, aired the Cambodians' resentment toward the Soviets by pointing out that recognition of the RGNU "is the dividing line between genuine and fake" revolutionaries and between "those who actually oppose oppression and those who just profess to do so."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 11 -

COMMUNISTS CALL CAPTURE OF CAMBODIAN TOWN "STRATEGIC VICTORY"

The capture of the Cambodian town of Rumlong was officially hailed in a 13 November communique from the Route 6 command of the Cambodian National People's Liberation Armed Forces (CNPLAF). As carried by Sihanouk's news agency (AKI) on the 16th, the communique announced that on the night of 12-13 November, after three weeks of attacks, the CNPLAF and people "unleashed a decisive attack against the last enemy positions" at Rumlong and "recorded a smashing victory by annihilating the 46th puppet brigade and liberating Rumlong." It claimed that more than 1,000 government troops were killed or wounded in the fighting at Rumlong, that "hundreds of others" surrendered, and that "a large quantity" of arms and war materiel was seized.

This "strategic victory," according to the communique, marks the defeat of the Cambodian Government's Chenla 2 operation to clear Route 6 and "signals the defeat of the Nixon doctrine in Cambodia." Claiming that "numerous" government positions are being encircled and attacked, the communique called upon the armed forces on Route 6 to "exploit their victories" and "strike harder."

Hanoi's acclaim for "the brilliant victories" on Route 6 was expressed by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in a speech on the evening of the 16th at a reception given by the head of the visiting Cambodian delegation, Ieng Sary. Trinh singled out for praise the "resounding exploits" at Rumlong. On the 17th the Rumlong victory was welcomed in editorials in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. The NHAN DAN editorial termed the capture of Rumlong a "new and outstanding contribution . . . to the common victory of the Indochinese peoples" and said it proved that the CNPLAF is capable of "attacking and completely destroying an important troop concentration in a large operational area" despite the "greatest efforts" by the Lon Nol forces with "direct support" from U.S. and Saigon forces. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN acclaimed the engagement at Rumlong as a "big battle of annihilation and a brilliant feat of arms."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 12 -

DRV ARMY PAPER DISCUSSES STRUGGLE AGAINST PACIFICATION

The series of articles on pacification published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, also broadcast in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, presents an unusually candid discussion of the allied pacification program. The first article in the series, monitored on 11 November, was said to have appeared in the paper on that day. (Although the VNA press review mentioned an article on pacification in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 10th, no broadcast of this article was monitored.) Subsequent articles in the series were broadcast on 12, 14, and 15 November.

The article broadcast on the 11th takes note of allied claims of success in pacification when it discusses indicators--such as improvements in road security--used by the allies to demonstrate pacification progress. It ridicules the practice of measuring success by the frequency of attacks on lines of communications, declaring that such attacks represent only one of "hundreds of guerrilla combat methods." It is not possible, the paper argues, to assess "an entire guerrilla warfare movement" or "revolutionary activity in villages and hamlets" by measuring the results of a single combat method.

The article concedes that "in some areas the U.S.-puppets have edged outward triflingly," but it insists that this does not prove the success of pacification. Such "temporary" problems, it says, are due to the fact that "the regional people are not sufficiently vigilant and fail to cleverly combine various struggle methods." It goes on to repeat the routine claim that the balance of forces favors the communists and that the "total collapse" of the allied pacification program "is only a matter of time."

The article broadcast on the 12th describes various pacification plans, stressing the increased priority placed on the pacification effort by the Nixon Administration. It warns that the fight against pacification "can never be belittled or neglected, and we cannot be optimistic or belittle the enemy schemes."

The final article, spelling out methods to oppose pacification, advises, among other things, that efforts be concentrated on "annihilation" of "ringleader hooligans"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 13 -

and on the destruction of military posts. Calling for the destruction of strategic hamlets so as to enlarge "liberated areas" and achieve "liaison" and "mutual support" between bases, the article also maintains that "only by launching concerted, large-scale offensive waves under a unified plan will the southern armed forces and people be able to achieve high combat efficiency, deal the enemy vigorous blows, and demolish military subsectors."

NORTH VIETNAMESE SPOKESMAN ROUTINELY PROTESTS U.S. BOMBINGS

Alleged U.S. air attacks from 9 to 11 November in the demilitarized zone and Quang Binh Province are the subject of a routine DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 13th. The statement charges that U.S. planes, including B-52's, attacked Huong Lap village while U.S. artillery from ships and south of the demilitarized zone shelled Vinh Son and Vinh Giang--all of which it says are in the demilitarized zone "on DRV territory." The statement says U.S. planes "raided" a number of places in western Quang Binh during the same period. The last previous foreign ministry spokesman's protest, on 8 November, had atypically prompted a flurry of comment.*

None of the recent strikes is mentioned specifically in a 15 November QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial which says that each time the United States suffers a setback it embarks on a "new military adventure." The paper calls upon the people's local armed forces throughout the North--"especially in the fourth military region, in the coastal areas and along important communications lines"--to further "heighten their vigilance with a determination to crush all war adventures of the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, whenever and by whatever means they may come."

HANOI OUTLINES PROCEDURES FOR CHRISTMAS MAIL TO POWS

The procedures governing the mailing of Christmas packages and cards to U.S. prisoners-of-war in the DRV were announced by Hanoi on 11 November, two days later than last year. VNA's announcement says that the provisions which applied during the

* See the 10 November TRENDS, pages 17-19.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 14 -

holidays last year will be carried out again. It stipulates that parcels, to weigh five kilograms "instead of the usual three," are to "be sent by post via Moscow in accordance with the procedures already laid down." It warns that parcels sent in any other way will not be accepted. Cards may be sent to Hanoi by post or in care of the Committee of Liaison With Families of Servicemen in Vietnam, New York.*

* Last year's instructions are discussed in the 12 November 1970 TRENDS, page 15.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 15 -

SINO - SOVIET RELATIONS

NEW PRC BORDER NEGOTIATOR ATTENDS SOVIET EMBASSY CONCERT

In a curious development, Moscow on 13 November reported--to the Chinese radio audience only--that Ambassador Tolstikov on the previous day had hosted a concert at the Soviet embassy attended by a legion of PRC officials, including the new Chinese chief negotiator at the Sino-Soviet border talks. This represents the only confirmation thus far in either Soviet or Chinese media of the appointment of Han Nien-lung, a vice foreign minister in charge of Far Eastern affairs, to replace Chiao Kuan-hua, the original Chinese negotiator at the border talks and now head of the PRC delegation at the UN General Assembly session. Chief Soviet negotiator Ilichev and his deputy were also present at the concert. Peking has not mentioned the event.

The Soviet report made the exceptional gesture of referring to the Chinese officials as "comrades," a fraternal title that fell out of favor in Sino-Soviet relations as party ties were broken under the impact of the cultural revolution.* The concert, at which two Soviet artists performed, was also notable for being a half step toward resumption of cultural exchange, another victim of the deterioration of relations during the cultural revolution. Though the concert was sponsored by the Soviet ambassador rather than being held at Chinese invitation, the large turnout of Chinese officials marked another in the series of moves by the two sides toward observance of the diplomatic amenities and improvement of their working relations.

The Soviet gesture may have been intended to redress in some measure the effect of Moscow's attack on the Chinese in marking the October Revolution anniversary a few days earlier. While Peking used the occasion to send a conciliatory signal to the Soviets,** Politburo member Grishin, in his keynote address on 6 November, sharply denounced the Chinese for their "splitting, anti-Soviet line," an attack prompting a walkout by Chinese

* A notable exception was Brezhnev's reference to "Comrade Chou En-lai" in the CPSU chief's important speech on 27 October 1969 endorsing the Sino-Soviet border talks, which had begun a week earlier.

** See the TRENDS of 10 November, pages 15-16.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 16 -

diplomats. The Soviets have expressed concern over the effects on their interests of Peking's flexible diplomatic moves, particularly its invitation to President Nixon. But while seeking to impose discipline on the Soviet wing of the communist movement in order to meet Peking's challenge, Moscow has been willing to persevere in the protracted border talks, now into their third year without a change from the Peking venue. According to a 7 November article by a leading proxy spokesman for the Soviets, the Hungarian NEPSZABADSAG's Varnai, the Chinese have rejected new high-level talks with the Soviet leadership. That the Chinese wish to keep the talks going at the level of deputy foreign ministers seems reflected in the appointment of Han Nien-lung to replace Chiao Kuan-hua.

MOSCOW CAUTIOUSLY DISCUSSES CHINESE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviet central press has reacted cautiously to speculation that Lin Piao has been purged, limiting itself to publishing a TASS report citing the Paris AFP on the subject. The AFP dispatch on the 12th, noting signs that Lin has been ousted and citing a recent RED FLAG article attacking "sectarianism," concluded that the Chinese military were being "stripped of important political rights" and that civilians are in the ascendancy. The TASS version of the report was carried without comment in PRAVDA and the other Moscow dailies on the 13th.

In an effort to put current PRC developments into perspective for the domestic audience, Radio Moscow's weekly commentators' roundtable program on the 14th broached the subject after discoursing defensively on the triangular aspects of President Nixon's projected trips to Peking and Moscow. Citing "Western" news sources, the panelists recounted reports of "the reshuffle in the Chinese leadership" involving the disappearance of Lin, his wife, and a number of military leaders. One commentator seemed at pains to point out that the changes would not alter Peking's anti-Sovietism or its policy of rapprochement with the United States: "Judging from the continuing Chinese propaganda, the anti-Soviet course and the simultaneous revision of Chinese policy toward the United States are continuing, as is the development of Maoist concepts leading to further weakening of the front of the anti-imperialist struggle."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 17 -

Soviet agitational broadcasts to China have sought to fan party-military tensions, as in one of the special programs for the PLA, on 13 November, which said the army is being used as a pawn in the Maoist leadership's "political game." Calling attention to the disappearance of the Chinese defense minister and of other high-ranking military officers, the commentator explained that Mao is resorting to a purge of the military "to increase his influence on every aspect of the country's political and economic life and to limit the role of the PLA." The broadcast went on to warn that "this is only the beginning" and to forecast that "as in the past, hundreds and thousands of high-ranking and middle-ranking commanders will be replaced or persecuted."

Moscow has avoided airing speculation about the crash of the PRC jet in the Mongolian People's Republic on the night of 12-13 September. TASS on 30 September had carried the Mongolian MONTSAME agency's report on the crash, and on 1 October TASS dismissed as "fantasy" a Tokyo report that Liu Shao-chi had defected to the USSR. Soviet media have not picked up rumors circulating in the Western press that the crashed jet was carrying Lin Biao or other Chinese military leaders.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FRIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 18 -

CHINA

RED FLAG ARTICLES ATTACK "SWINDLERS," CALL FOR UNITY

Lin Piao's name has gone unmentioned by Chinese media for the sixth consecutive week. Meanwhile press articles continue to indicate that unnamed high-level "political swindlers" have tried to split the party. An article by the writing group of the Liaoning CCP Committee, published in the 12th issue of RED FLAG and reprinted on 13 November in all Peking dailies, added new fuel to the campaign with the charge that anonymous enemies at one point distorted Mao's five requirements for party members as outlined in the party constitution, "lowering the requirements." In 1967, Lin had issued "three criteria" for training, selecting, and promoting, which are similar to Mao's party requirements.

Lin's three criteria seem quite uncontroversial, having as their main message the need to follow Mao, keep in touch with the masses, and maintain revolutionary vigor. They do, however, seem to fit the article's attack on those who "pass off fish eyes as pearls" by "wantonly altering the five requirements set forth by Chairman Mao."

The precise issues in question are illuminated very little by the RED FLAG article, although the trappings of a major purge are obvious enough. The article notes that a bourgeois political style "among some persons has resulted in their political degeneration," which has led in turn to "serious errors in orientation and line." "Just as" in the cultural revolution, "swindlers" have opposed the revolutionary integrity of the proletariat. Although the party constitution does not say so, the article claims that the five requirements were advanced as a specific reminder "to be vigilant against individual careerists and schemers like Khrushchev and to guard against such bad persons usurping the leadership of the party and state at all levels." Since the army under Lin apparently controlled the apparatus at all levels, the reference seems most applicable to him.

The RED FLAG article seems to take special aim at those "leftists" who, during the cultural revolution, failed to adhere closely enough to the zigs and zags of Maoist policy. "One who adheres to an erroneous line can commit even greater errors if he displays greater enthusiasm," the article observes. "Leftist" targets are indicated again via a critique of certain

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 19 -

incorrect "standards for communist party members and revolutionary cadres" which made no mention of Marxism-Leninism--a rather common flaw during those periods of the cultural revolution when Mao alone was the declared fount of all knowledge. (The new winter-spring schedules for the Peking domestic radio, effective 15 November, drop certain programs entitled "selected readings" or "study" of Mao's works in favor of programs entitled "study Marxist-Leninist works and Chairman Mao's works.")

COMMENT The 12th issue of RED FLAG also contains a commentary
ON SONGS on the two songs now being widely popularized throughout China, the "Internationale" and "Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention." The latter song, based on rules long associated with Lin as well as their author Mao, was last popularized during the early stage of the Red Guard movement in the fall of 1966. The major theme of the song, as stressed by the commentary, is the need for unity. The song is presented as an injunction to the army, party and people to "observe discipline, implement policy and unity" under Mao's line.

The rules and points as presented in the commentary are revised to make them somewhat more applicable to the modern context. The first rule, "obey orders," receives special attention, and the other two rules are combined into a general plea for "building the nation with diligence and thrift." Of the eight points, the commentary singles out only two for special attention; the first, "speak politely," is now interpreted as an injunction to respect the masses and guard against arrogance, themes that broadcasts indicate have special relevance for some PLA cadres at local levels. The fifth point for attention, "don't hit or swear at people," is now interpreted as an injunction "not to issue orders arbitrarily" and to strengthen ideological education among the masses.

The popularization of the "Internationale" is apparently also related to the leadership situation. The commentary echoes earlier articles in quoting from the song the phrase "never has there been a savior"--an implicit rebuke to Lin, who during the cultural revolution constantly hailed Mao as the genius responsible for the Chinese revolution.

PROVINCIAL In their turn, the provincial radios increasingly
BROADCASTS reflect elements of discord between army and party personnel. The Hunan provincial radio on 5 November, for example, after reviewing the various historical attempts to undermine party unity, confidently predicted the inevitable doom

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 20 -

of all "political swindlers" who plot to "sabotage unity and attempt to split the party." Leveling direct criticism at PLA members of local party committees, the broadcast warned that "it is certainly not right to issue compulsory orders, and still less is warlordism permitted." Leading bodies were instructed to adopt methods of "persuasion and education" and to cast aside the "attitude of commandism and methods of compulsion."

The Hunan commentator also forcefully argued the need to counter the influence of "political swindlers like Liu Shao-chi" who pretend to be "humble little commoners" (a reference to Chen Po-ta), and of those who "frantically preach the idealist theory of genius" in order to "lead us astray." But the developing bill of indictment against Lin--for his erroneous view of the role of human genius and resultant "excessive" adulation of Mao--was spelled out more directly in a Szechwan broadcast on 5 November. After asking its audience to "please listen carefully," the Chengtu radio followed RED FLAG's lead in quoting from the song "Internationale"--"never has there been a savior, nor will we ever rely on gods and emperors"--to buttress its condemnation of "political swindlers" who have claimed to be gifted with genius but in fact "did not know how to work, til the land, or fight a war." Claiming that those "schemers and careerists" who pretended to be heroes have been "crushed to pieces by the advancing wheel of history," the broadcast firmly declared, "Let the absurd theory that 'heroes create history' go to hell!"

Current party-army tensions were also discussed in a Shensi broadcast on 8 November which reported on the activities of a local PLA unit to increase the soldiers' perception of the harm done by previous attempts to split the party and army. Members of the unit turned to Mao's works to deepen their understanding of the "antiparty behavior of Chang Kuo-tao in splitting the red army" and concluded that since the question of "to unite or to split" separates "genuine and sham Marxism-Leninism" the goal of "party unity should be as dear to us as our own lives." They also recalled the crimes of "political swindlers like Wang Ming and Liu Shao-chi" who plotted to "split the party while constantly waving the signboard of Marxism-Leninism and putting forward a set of reactionary theories to deceive the masses." Those cadres who had been "fooled thereby" were instructed to intensify their study of Mao's works "and unite closely around the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 21 -

The specific need for greater civilian control over local PLA members engaged in the "three supports and two militaries," administrative tasks entrusted to the PLA during the cultural revolution, was argued in a 6 November Changsha broadcast. Leading PLA cadres in local party organizations were instructed to understand fully that "the higher their authority, the more should they be modest and prudent and the more effort should they make to strengthen their concept of the party" and obey the "unified leadership" of local CCP committees. The broadcast asserted that military personnel, "no matter how high their positions are," must all place "themselves inside the CCP committees, not outside and above the CCP committees."

A similar broadcast on 8 November by the Kwangsi provincial radio noted that the members of the Nanning garrison CCP committee are sharpening their understanding of "the importance of rifles being commanded by the party." Apparently, however, there are still a few who resist this concept; the broadcast called for greater vigilance within all garrison departments to guard against those who "oppose the red flag with one of their own" and seek to "usurp our party and state."

SHANSI PARTY-GOVERNMENT CHIEF LOSES POST AS MD COMMANDER

In a move that may portend a coming trend, one provincial leader has given up his post as commander of the military district while continuing to serve as party and government chief of the province. A 13 November Taiyuan broadcast, reporting on a local PLA rally for a martyr, identified Tsao Chung-nan as the commander of the Shansi Military District (MD), a post that had been previously held by Hsieh Chen-hua, first secretary of the Shansi Provincial Party Committee and chairman of the Shansi Revolutionary Committee.

Both Hsieh and Tsao have had military responsibilities within Shansi since 1967. Tsao became a vice-chairman on the provincial revolutionary committee last November and was named a secretary on the new provincial party committee announced last April. Hsieh's vice-chairmanship on the revolutionary committee dates back to 1967. In May 1970 he was identified as commander of the Shansi MD and in September this year as chairman of the revolutionary committee.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 22 -

This shift in MD leadership may have occurred, unannounced, sometime ago. Although Hsieh has appeared regularly in recent months, including a 6 November appearance at a provincial conference on publishing work, he has not been identified as commander of the Shansi MD since October 1970. Since the formation of the provincial party committee last April, he has been listed only as first secretary of the provincial party committee and chairman of the revolutionary committee.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 23 -

MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW SUPPORTS CAIRO CALL FOR UNGA DEBATE ON MIDDLE EAST

Soviet propaganda on the Middle East, sustained at a low level this fall, responds in low key to Cairo's request, reported in the 13 November AL-AHRAM, for an UNGA debate on the Middle East at the end of November. Moscow does not deal with specifics of Egypt's plan of action, with a domestic service commentary by LITERARY GAZETTE observer Kurov on the 13th merely noting that Egypt is striving for a UN decision on fulfilling Resolution 242. (As outlined by AL-AHRAM, Egypt will seek a resolution calling on Israel to give a positive reply to Jarring clarifying its commitments toward implementation of Resolution 242, and, if Israel rejects such a solution, will ask the General Assembly to take several steps, including imposition of sanctions against Israel.)

Other Soviet press and radio comment praises the decision as exemplifying Egypt's desire for a political settlement. An Arabic-language talk and an English-language commentary on Radio Peace and Progress on the 14th reaffirm the Soviet position, stated by Podgorny during Egyptian President as-Sadat's October visit to Moscow, of continued efforts for a political settlement while assisting Egypt and other Arab countries in strengthening their "defense capacity."

The Peace and Progress commentary provides the first available Soviet reference to what the broadcast calls Washington's decision "not to renew deliveries" of Phantom planes to Israel "at the moment." It calls this "another of Washington's maneuvers" timed to coincide with the UNGA debate in an effort to forestall expected criticism of U.S. policy. The radio's remark was presumably prompted by--but does not allude to--Secretary Rogers' U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT interview, in the issue dated 22 November, in which he said that up to now the military balance has not shifted, that a review is "in train" in light of the recent Soviet-Egyptian communique, and that President Nixon has made it clear he will be sure that the military balance is continued. Rogers added that the USSR in the last four or five months "operated with some restraint as far as shipments are concerned."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 24 -

AS-SADAT The Kurov domestic service commentary on the 13th
SPEECH cited as-Sadat as saying, in his 11 November speech
 at the inaugural session of the People's Assembly,
 that the Middle East question concerns withdrawal of Israeli
 troops and restoration of Palestinian rights, not the opening
 of the canal, and that Egypt will never agree to the substitu-
 tion of an agreement on opening the canal for an overall settle-
 ment of the crisis. Kurov dismissed the idea, reported by Israeli
 and U.S. media on the 11th, that Israel is prepared to let Egypt
 begin clearing the canal, without withdrawing Israeli troops from
 the east bank of the canal. Such assertions, Kurov said, would
 lead one to believe that the entire Middle East crisis was just a
 matter of navigation through the canal. And in a 15 November
 PRAVDA article, Glukhov noted that as-Sadat's "peace initiative"
 regarding the canal is viewed as a first step on the road toward a
 general settlement.

Glukhov cited as-Sadat's new condition--an affirmative Israeli
reply to Ambassador Jarring's 8 February 1971 memorandum--as a
preliminary condition "for discussing the question of opening
the Suez Canal." The Egyptian president had called it an
"indispensable condition that must precede any other step" and
had said that without an affirmative answer from Israel "there
will be no room for any debates or discussions." While as-Sadat
did not specifically link his condition with discussions on the
canal issue, AL-AHRAM made this connection in a 13 November arti-
cle.

Moscow's first known acknowledgment of as-Sadat's declaration
that 1971 will be "a decisive year"--first made in remarks to
troops on the Suez front in early June and subsequently repeated--
appeared in the TASS report of his Assembly speech on the 11th.
TASS said he "reiterated" that 1971 must become the year of the
solution of the Middle East crisis. The "decisive year" formula-
tion is also pointed up in a PRAVDA article by Demchenko on the
16th: Demchenko charged "imperialist propaganda" with trying
to distort Egypt's real position as well as the meaning of
as-Sadat's "statement that 1971 should become the decisive year."*
Judging from the TASS report, Demchenko, without explanation,
said that an end has been put to these propaganda "concoctions"
by Cairo's new initiative in proposing an UNGA debate.

* AL-AHRAM editor Haykal, in his 5 November article, explained
that decisiveness did not mean "reaching the ultimate result,"
whether through peace or war, but only "making a decision."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 25 -

ROLE OF
BIG POWERS

Moscow has not yet publicly addressed itself to the matter of PRC participation in big power consultations on the Middle East. In the days immediately after the 25 October UNGA vote on PRC seating in the United Nations, Moscow had continued to press for renewed efforts by the "Big Four" in promoting a settlement. Propagandists had been pursuing this line since Gromyko's complaint in his 28 September UNGA address that Israel and "its patrons" had paralyzed Jarring's mission and stalled the four-power consultations. However, a possible allusion to a Chinese role appears in a 4 November PRAVDA article by Demchenko: He assailed U.S. initiatives and mediation attempts undertaken without consulting "other member states" of the Security Council. TASS' 31 October account of a press conference statement by Elysee spokesman Baudoin on the Brezhnev-Pompidou talks had failed to include his "wait-and-see" reply to a question about the effect of Peking's entry into the Security Council on the four-power discussions.

Recent elite references to the Big Four talks have included Brezhnev's remark in Paris, at a 27 October dinner for Pompidou, that the four powers have a duty to facilitate a peaceful settlement. The French-Soviet communique called it necessary to give Jarring an opportunity to resume consultations and added that the USSR and France would use all available possibilities, including the quadripartite consultations, to explore ways for a Middle East settlement. The 26 October communique on Kosygin's visit to Canada said the sides agreed on the need to support the efforts of the four powers and Ambassador Jarring.

Moscow again spelled out its grievances against the U.S. position in the talks in a 28 October article by PRAVDA's New York correspondent Kolesnichenko, who in two previous articles this year--in February and August--had detailed, and attacked, Washington's "negative stand" in the talks.

PRC ENVOY IN UNGA REAFFIRMS PEKING SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS

In his maiden speech at the 15 November UNGA session, Peking's delegation head Chiao Kuan-hua sustained the PRC focus on the Palestinian element in the Middle East problem, mentioning the Palestinians six times in one paragraph. But while expressing the belief that the Palestinians "and other Arab peoples" will recover the lost Arab territories and restore Palestinian "national rights," he seemed to be keeping the diplomatic options open on the question of a settlement by failing to advocate armed struggle.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 26 -

He defined the Middle East question as aggression by "Israeli Zionism" with the "support and connivance of the superpowers," and took another swipe at the United States and the USSR in concluding that no one has the right "to engage in political deals" behind the Arabs' backs, "bartering away their right to existence and their national interests."

Chiao made no mention of the various efforts within or outside the United Nations to promote a settlement, and there has been no indication from Peking media of Chinese views on the problem since the 25 October UNGA vote on PRC seating. Cairo sources, however, have evinced interest in the PRC position: AL-AHRAM revealed on the 10th, according to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA), that "important contacts" had taken place recently between Cairo and Peking to learn China's opinion and the line it would take in the United Nations. And the paper reported on the 13th that Egyptian Foreign Minister Riyad is expected to visit Peking in January at the invitation of the Chinese Government.

MENA on the 10th said that the Chinese delegation to the United Nations, in a statement made during a stopover at Cairo airport, expressed China's firm support for as-Sadat's "attitude and efforts to achieve a just peace," and pointed out that the Middle East crisis would be a top item on the delegation's agenda at the United Nations. The following day, MENA reported that PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, in a statement published in AL-JUMHURIYAH that day, affirmed the need for Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories and implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution. MENA quoted Li as saying that nonimplementation of Resolution 242 and "failure of the talks"--nature unspecified--would create a complicated situation in the area.

RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL According to MENA, Li expressed astonishment that Israel voted in favor of the Albanian draft resolution on China; he denied rumors, MENA said, about the existence of PRC-Israeli trade relations and declared Peking's determination not to develop relations with Israel in any field, whether economic, political, or cultural.

However, Chou En-lai in his ASAHI SHIMBUN interview, as reported in the ASAHI EVENING NEWS on 8 November, ruled out diplomatic relations with Israel but left the door open with regard to "friends" "with the Jewish people." Noting that among the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 27 -

countries which voted for the Albanian resolution there are some, such as Israel, with which Peking cannot have official governmental relations, he explained that Israel started an aggressive war and this problem has not yet been resolved. Thus while Israel voted for China, there nevertheless could not be diplomatic relations-- which he called a "major problem."

Peking had earlier reacted to "fabrications" in some Israeli and Western newspapers regarding Israeli-PRC contacts "on 'the establishment of diplomatic relations.'" A PEOPLE'S DAILY article on 13 August attacked TASS for "spreading these lies," in turn accusing the Soviet agency of trying to divert attention from the "sinister activities which social-imperialism itself is engaged in, including its collusion with Israel."*

MOSCOW KILLS, RESURRECTS REPORT ON GOLDA MEIR IN WASHINGTON

A series of recent reports by Moscow media alleging that Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was visiting Washington seems to indicate the bureaucratic difficulties involved in killing an erroneous story once it gets into Moscow's propaganda pipeline. On 4 November, the day Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi began her Washington visit, a New York datelined TASS report said that Mrs. Meir had arrived in Washington and was expected to have meetings with President Nixon and other U.S. officials. The item was transmitted in TASS' Russian-language service at 0647 GMT. TASS English transmitted the item at 0806 GMT and repeated it about an hour later, meanwhile having reported Mrs. Gandhi's visit.

Some eight hours later, at 1559 GMT, TASS English finally transmitted a service message killing the item on Mrs. Meir. But three hours after that Moscow's Arabic-language service had still failed to get the word: A brief commentary in the 1900 GMT program on Israel's demand for more Phantom planes began with the statement that Golda Meir had arrived in Washington to meet with American officials.

Curiously, the story surfaced again a week later, when Moscow's domestic service at 2230 GMT on the 11th carried a commentary by LITERARY GAZETTE observer Kurov on the Israeli budget debate.

* See the 11 August FBIS TRENDS for a discussion of Soviet propaganda speculation on reports of Israeli-PRC contacts.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 28 -

Charging that war hysteria was being whipped up in Israel, Kurov said that Israeli Air Force commander Hod had gone to the United States to demand new arms shipments and that "Golda Meir flew to Washington for the same reason."

Meanwhile, in Israel, Mrs. Meir was reported by Jerusalem radio as meeting with the four visiting African presidents on 3 and 5 November and addressing public functions in Israel on the 9th and 10th.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 29 -

ARMS CONTROL

SEMENOV REPLEDGES USSR TO SERIOUS EFFORT AT VIENNA SALT

Negligible Soviet propaganda attention to the opening of the sixth round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Vienna on 15 November has been confined to reportage on the arrival statements and activities of the U.S. and Soviet negotiators. By contrast, on the eve of the opening of the previous round in Helsinki on 8 July, a lengthy article by V. Viktorov in PRAVDA had recapitulated Soviet propaganda attacks on U.S. opponents of an agreement on arms limitation, at the same time noting that the 20 May U.S.-Soviet announcement said the two countries had agreed to concentrate their efforts this year on an accord limiting the deployment of antimissile defense systems and to work toward "certain measures" limiting strategic offensive arms.*

Chief Soviet delegate Semenov in his arrival remarks on the 14th, reported by TASS, repledged the USSR to serious negotiations, noting that the Soviet Government had instructed his delegation to "conduct the talks in a constructive manner." Recalling that the course of the upcoming talks was specified in the 20 May U.S.-Soviet agreement, he said there is now "a real opportunity for obtaining positive results." In the pattern of his arrival remarks in Helsinki on 7 July, Semenov did not spell out the issues to be discussed. He said only that the agreements reached at the last round--on improving the means of preventing accidental or unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons and on improving the Washington-Moscow hotline--are proof that positive results can be achieved when there is "mutual good will."

The same TASS report on the 14th said that Ambassador Smith, in a statement for the press, had expressed hope for "a successful completion of the talks in the near future." A TASS report of President Nixon's 12 November press conference noted briefly that the President, in answer to a question, said "he believed in the possibility of

* The Viktorov article is discussed in the TRENDS of 8 July 1971, pages 24-26.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 30 -

progress toward the achievement of an agreement before the end of the year." TASS did not go on to cite his observation that an agreement must limit both defensive and offensive weaponry.

Moscow continues routinely to attack U.S. opponents of strategic arms limitation, with a lengthy article in the November issue of the journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNAYA OTNOSHENIYA by A. Kalyadin, for example, complaining about "influential forces" in the United States which are striving "to retain as much freedom as possible for the military-industrial complex in building up military might." Signed to the press on 21 October, the article said that the participants in the "polemic" around SALT are divided into three groups--those who see a need to curb the growth of armaments through international agreements or through the policy of mutual example and who grant the possibility of some reduction in the existing level of world armaments; those who advocate limiting certain types of arms in favor of accelerating the development of others; and the "extremists" who are "sharply hostile to SALT, condemn the existing international agreements in this sphere, and oppose any attempts to prevent the buildup of military might and the improvement of the instruments of war." The last group, the author asserted, is made up of businessmen who have grown rich on military contracts, "rightist" politicians, certain senators and congressmen, research corporations, centers for strategic studies, and activists from ultraright organizations like the John Birch Society.

CHIAO MENTIONS LIQUIDATING BLOCS IN UN POLICY STATEMENT

Chiao Kuan-hua, delivering the maiden PRC speech before the UN General Assembly on 15 November, in the main recited familiar Chinese formulations on disarmament issues. In one notable passage, however, Chiao took the occasion to hail what he described as the demand of the peoples of the world for the dissolution of military blocs, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the dismantling of foreign military bases. While Chinese spokesmen over the years have frequently called for troop withdrawal and liquidation of foreign bases, they have only rarely mentioned the third element of the trinity, the liquidation of military blocs. That demand was last broached in the 9 June communique following Ceausescu's visit to the PRC--evidently reflecting a Chinese effort to identify yet another point

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 31 -

of convergence with the Romanians, who have long called for the liquidation of blocs.* The last known high-level Chinese reference to the subject before that had been in November 1963, when the Chinese delegate at a World Peace Council meeting in Warsaw outlined a program to prevent world war; among other steps, he called for the liquidation of foreign military bases, withdrawal of foreign troops, and dissolution of "aggressive" military blocs.

In the UN speech, carried in full by NCNA on the 16th, Chiao disavowed any Peking intent to be a "superpower," at the same time assailing the "one or two superpowers" which would "manipulate and monopolize" the United Nations and are engaged in arms expansion while talking about disarmament. Without mentioning the Soviet proposal of last June for a conference of the five-nuclear powers, but in language reminiscent of the 30 July PRC statement rejecting that proposal, Chiao asserted that China "will never participate in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks between the nuclear powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries." The nuclear disarmament sought by the superpowers, he said, is "entirely for the purpose of monopolizing nuclear weapons."

Defending the PRC's development of nuclear weapons, which he said are still in the experimental stage, Chiao insisted that the PRC's weapons are solely for purposes of defense, for breaking the nuclear monopoly, and for ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons and nuclear war. He repeated the long-standing Chinese proposal for a world summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament and, as the first step, to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Reaffirming that the PRC will never be the first to use nuclear weapons, Chiao went on to challenge the United States and the USSR--as in the 30 July PRC statement--to commit themselves not to be the first to use the weapons.

* Sino-Romanian affinities in the diplomatic arena seemed reflected in a 13 November NCNA report on visits by Chiao to the Albanian, Romanian, and Algerian delegations to thank them for their efforts in behalf of PRC representation. It would be natural for the Albanians and Algerians--principal cosponsors of the pro-PRC resolution--to be singled out in this way, but the inclusion of the Romanians appears to be a special gesture in their favor. After his visit to Peking, Ceausescu picked up the Chinese theme of common interests uniting the "small and medium-size countries."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 32 -

GERMANY

AXEN IN FINLAND: GDR MEDIA IGNORE DETAILS OF FINNISH PROPOSAL

GDR media's coverage of SED Politburo member Hermann Axen's 7-12 November visit to Finland, at the invitation of the Finnish Communist Party (SKP), has portrayed it not only as a party-to-party contact but also as a public step forward in the development of state relations between the GDR and Finland. Reporting on Axen's activities and meetings throughout the six-day visit, including talks with President Kekkonen, Prime Minister Aura, and Foreign Minister Mattila, East Berlin's ADN and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND have noted that problems of European security and the development of GDR-Finnish relations were discussed. However, in keeping with past avoidance of any discussion of the details of the 10 September Finnish Government proposal to establish full diplomatic relations with both German states, East Berlin has refrained from reporting the substance of Axen's public remarks on the subject in Finland.

That the aim of the trip went beyond the mere holding of talks with a fraternal party was made clear in Axen's statement upon arrival back in East Berlin on the 12th. The SED Central Committee, he said, had assigned him two tasks: to strengthen relations with the SKP, and "to contribute, through talks with the leading political figures of the Republic of Finland, to fully normalizing relations between Finland and the GDR." Axen concluded that his talks with the Finnish leaders had promoted the latter goal, looking toward eventual full diplomatic relations. The joint communique on the visit, however, sought to play down the official state aspects of the visit by noting only that Axen was received by Kekkonen, with no mention of his meeting with the Finnish premier and foreign minister, and by omitting any reference to the Finnish Government proposal.

It is in a second document issued at the conclusion of the visit--a joint declaration entitled "For the Security of the Peoples of Europe," signed in the name of the SED and SKP central committees--that the SKP "welcomes the GDR's readiness to conduct negotiations on the conclusion of a state treaty on the settlement of relations between the GDR and the Finnish republic, including the establishment of diplomatic

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 33 -

relations." The SKP then restates its view, made previously in statements issued by its central committee in September and October, that "Finland must on no account make the establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR dependent on the attitude of the FRG."*

In publicizing the text of this document, East Berlin media carried their first acknowledgment that the Finnish proposal to establish relations with the GDR is contingent on simultaneous approval by Bonn for the establishment of FRG diplomatic relations with Finland. But where Helsinki radio reported Axen as stating at a press conference in Finland on the 12th that the GDR "understood the principle of equality contained in the Finnish proposal, according to which talks should be held simultaneously with the two German states," ADN reported only that he called for the opening of bilateral negotiations between the GDR and Finland. Helsinki's report said he added that while the GDR has given "an affirmative reply" to the Finnish offer, the "complete sovereignty of the sides" must be borne in mind.

Although Axen in Finland publicly broached the Finnish proposal for negotiations on settlement of damages caused by German troops in Finland in 1944-45, GDR media's brief accounts of his speeches ignored this aspect and it is unmentioned in the joint declaration. On the 9th, according to Helsinki media, Axen remarked that it would be difficult to appraise the grounds for Finland's claim to compensation for war damages and asserted that the important thing was to move ahead with negotiations on normalizing relations.

* Moscow media have not been heard to report the joint declaration, although TASS briefly summarized the joint communique, including passages in which the two parties jointly condemned the "anti-Soviet chauvinistic policy of the Mao Tse-tung group."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 34 -

FRG - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PRAGUE ANTICIPATES PROGRESS IN NEXT ROUND OF BILATERAL TALKS

In a speech one week before the fourth round of FRG-Czechoslovak talks, slated to be held in Bonn on 18 and 19 November, Czechoslovak party Presidium member Vasil Bilak foresaw "substantial" progress toward the talks' objective of bringing about negotiations to normalize relations. In the speech, delivered at an election meeting on the 11th and carried in Bratislava media, Bilak may also have publicly foreshadowed a muting of Czechoslovakia's unyielding approach on the pivotal issue of the Munich agreement in the next round of the talks.

Pointing out that the successful development of bilateral economic relations could serve as the model for normalization of relations in the political sphere, Bilak reiterated the basic Czechoslovak stand calling for West German recognition of the invalidity of the Munich agreement ab initio in order to give necessary impetus to the development of political ties. "Sooner or later," he said, "the responsible circles in the FRG must realize that whatever was committed by Fascist Germany against our people was a crime and must be fundamentally condemned from its very beginning." But he went on to indicate what may possibly be the basis for a face-saving gambit looking toward an accommodation on the issue: He argued that "no extenuating circumstance or any justification exists or can exist even for the temporary validity of the Munich diktat; no Czechoslovak government can ever recognize even the temporary validity of the Munich agreement. This was . . . a crime, and as a crime it cannot be acknowledged as an act of law." The customary Prague presentation of this point has stipulated unequivocally that the FRG must join with Czechoslovakia in recognizing the agreement as invalid ab initio. The implication of Bilak's more circuitous presentation may be that Prague would settle for a formula that would encompass the Czechoslovak Government's unqualified position on the nonvalidity of the accord while permitting Bonn to declare the agreement invalid in such a way as to exempt or gloss over the period from September 1938 to March 1939, when Hitler's troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 35 -

Czechoslovakia's inclination toward some kind of compromise that would enable the talks to move forward has seemed implicit in its comment since the third round of the talks on 27-28 September in Prague. There has been a marked emphasis on Prague's interest in doing its part to reduce tensions in Europe in line with the CPSU's "peace program," and the normalization of relations with the FRG has been cited in this context. Notably, at a Prague rally on 5 November marking the October Revolution anniversary, Premier Strougal prefaced remarks on Prague-Bonn relations with the statement that Czechoslovakia "is ready to contribute its share" to the Soviet peace program and went on to say, with respect to relations with Bonn, that "we are taking the necessary initiatives with the conviction that thereby peace and security in Europe will also be strengthened." On the 11th TASS noted that Czechoslovak First Deputy Foreign Minister Krajcir had met that day with Gromyko in Moscow to discuss "questions of mutual concern." Krajcir's one-day trip to Moscow had not been announced in advance.

Bilak in his speech on the 11th seemed to be seeking to assure West Germany that if the hurdle of agreement on the "fundamental" Munich agreement issue could be overcome, the talks could move ahead without difficulty. "All the other existing problems are of a secondary nature," he said, in apparent allusion to Bonn's concern over possible Czechoslovak reparations demands as well as the myriad of legal issues surrounding the Sudeten German citizenship question. A Radio Moscow commentary in German by "Soviet historian" Aleksandr Galkin on 28 September, at the time of the third round of the Prague-Bonn talks, had directly discounted FRG concern on these counts: Taking issue with the argument advanced in Bonn that the FRG must consider "possible legal consequences if the Munich agreement is declared invalid ab initio," Galkin pointed out that "the legal responsibility for the damage inflicted on the Czechoslovak Republic during the occupation has long since been apportioned by international accords on war criminals and by Czechoslovak laws which provide punishment for collaboration."*

The notion that the FRG need have no concern about the "legal consequences" had also seemed implicit in Prague's modification of its long-standing formula that Bonn must recognize the Munich

* See the TRENDS of 6 October 1971, pages 37-39.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 36 -

accord as invalid ab initio with "all the consequences arising therefrom." The quoted concluding phrase was dropped in the communique on the 2 August Soviet bloc summit meeting in the Crimea, and subsequent Czechoslovak elite statements have repeated the formula without it.

In his Presidium report to the CPCZ Central Committee plenum on 21 October, remarking that economic relations with Bonn were being pursued "without any serious disturbing moments," Bilak noted that political relations were "developing on another level" and went on to call for FRG recognition of the Munich agreement as invalid ab initio. The communique on the 11-12 November visit of a GDR party-government delegation led by Honecker to Czechoslovakia registered the GDR's support for the "just" Czechoslovak demand regarding the Munich agreement. Winding up his remarks on relations with the FRG in his 11 November election speech, Bilak expressed the conviction that "steps will be taken on the part of the FRG Government" at the forthcoming bilateral session "which will substantially advance the present talks."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 37 -

POLAND - USSR

TOP LEADERS STRESS UNANIMITY ON EVE OF PZPR CONGRESS

Without prior announcement, Soviet and Polish media on 10 November reported the arrival that day in Moscow of Poland's Gierk and Jaroszewicz for "friendly" talks with their Soviet opposite members, Brezhnev and Kosygin. Held some four weeks before the 6 December opening of the Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR), the meeting was duly publicized in PRAVDA and TRYBUNA LUDU on the 11th with a report--not designated a communique--on talks which "confirmed a complete unity of views" in an atmosphere of "cordiality, friendship, and fraternity." The 1 November communique on Brezhnev's talks with Honecker in the GDR had included no reference to unity of views, although the Soviet and GDR leaders spoke of unanimity in their speeches that day.

Radio Moscow on the 12th, reporting that a PZPR Politburo meeting had "fully endorsed the results of the visit," noted an emphasis in Polish media both on "the complete coincidence of views . . . on all matters discussed" between the Polish and Soviet leaders and on "the truly inestimable importance" of Soviet bloc unity in light of "the cardinal shift toward international detente."

This was Gierk's third reported visit to the USSR this year: With Premier Jaroszewicz, he made his first visit abroad as PZPR first secretary to Moscow in early January, when unity of views was also reported, and he took part in the rump meeting of Soviet bloc party leaders in the Crimea on 2 August.

The 11 November report on the Moscow talks mentioned "a comradely exchange of opinions" on bilateral relations and "urgent" international topics--economic integration under CEMA, preparations for a European security conference, and "unity of action" of the socialist countries, the world communist movement, and "all anti-imperialist forces." Undoubtedly also discussed, but unmentioned in the report, was the internal matter of the impending Warsaw congress,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 38 -

which Brezhnev may be expected to attend.* Advance propaganda indicates that the conclave will be attended by an unprecedentedly large proportion of younger delegates drawn from the urban proletariat who will be expecting further evidence of the change in style in the conduct of party affairs promised by the Gierek regime. The new style is manifest, for example, in the use of the term "guidelines" to describe the congress directives which Gierek presented for adoption at the 4 September plenum of the PZPR. Gierek stressed at the plenum that the document was not "final" but was merely to serve as the basis for pre-congress discussion by the workers and party bodies. Soviet media, in reporting the congress document, adhered to the orthodox term "directives."

A Warsaw domestic service report on the 15th of a pre-congress party meeting in the Gdansk coastal area, where the riots broke out last December, exemplifies the Polish party leadership's concern to get across the idea that it has made good on its promises to the workers. Gdansk Voivodship PZPR committee first secretary Karkoszka is reported to have insisted at the meeting that "the party has consolidated its bonds with the workers of the coastal area." At the same time, he reminded the coastal workers of their "promise contained in the word 'pomozemy' [we will help] made during the meeting of comrades Gierek and Jaroszewicz with shipbuilders last January."

In contrast to the regional first secretary's claim of successful "consolidation," a congress delegate from the Lenin Shipyard was quoted by the Gdansk domestic service, also on the 15th, to the effect that the work of "regaining the workers' confidence in the party organization" was "not yet finished" and that "many comrades" were "somehow unable to grasp the essence of the seventh and eighth plenums" of the PZPR in December 1970 and February 1971, respectively. The delegate added a double-edged remark that "in our everyday work we assume that the sixth party congress will definitely and finally close the December events of last year."

* Brezhnev has attended virtually all the party congresses of Moscow's East European allies, including the Fifth PZPR Congress in November 1968, since taking over as CPSU leader in October 1964. A notable exception was the Romanian party congress in August 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 39 -

TOPICS IN BRIEF

ARBATOV ON PRESIDENT'S USSR VISIT

U.S. affairs specialist G.A. Arbatov's article in the November issue of the journal USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, the most authoritative comment to date to be pegged to the President's forthcoming Moscow visit, was signed to the press on 12 October--the day the announcement on the visit was released. In the pattern of the 15 October Nekrasov article in PRAVDA and other comment, Arbatov's article defended the agreement on the visit as "another practical result" of Soviet efforts to implement the foreign policy program of the 24th CPSU Congress, "a program fully in keeping" with principles of peaceful coexistence.

With these prefatory remarks, Arbatov proceeded to recapitulate stock Soviet lines on U.S. Soviet relations. He deplored the existence of "influential" opponents of detente in the United States, and he outlined broad "problems whose solution would be in the interests" of both countries without damaging the "legitimate interests" of others. He identified these problems as prevention of a world thermonuclear war, the quest for a more stable foundation for strengthening world peace and security, limitation of the arms race, and the broadening of trade and economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. At the same time, Arbatov cautioned against expecting too much from the visit in light of the "complexity" of the relationship between the world's leading military powers.

CCP-SPANISH CP MEETING

In a notable show of flexibility in interparty relations paralleling Peking's broadening diplomatic moves, the Chinese have disclosed the visit of a Spanish CP delegation headed by its general secretary, Santiago Carrillo. According to NCNA on 17 November, the delegation left "for Europe" the previous day after visiting Peking, Yenan, Canton, and Shanghai at the invitation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries. The Spanish CP's clandestine Radio Independent Spain, quoting the party organ MUNDO OBRERO, had reported on 28 October that the delegation was in China.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

17 NOVEMBER 1971

- 40 -

Though the delegation was not invited by a party body, NCNA reported that it was received and entertained by Keng Piao, a central committee member and head of the CCP's international liaison department. NCNA made clear that the two parties hold divergent views, noting that Keng had "a frank conversation" with the delegation in which the two sides "expressed their respective stands and views." It is nonetheless a significant sign of the times that Peking would publicize contacts with a West European party other than the ideologically subservient "Marxist-Leninist" parties. A key to Peking's willingness is the well-known independence of Moscow demonstrated by the wing of the split Spanish CP led by Santiago Carrillo.

CONFIDENTIAL