

14 OCT 1971

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

14 OCTOBER 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 41)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 4 - 10 OCTOBER 1971

Moscow (2780 items)

Indochina	(9%)	21%
[Podgorny in DRV	(3%)	20%]
Kosygin in Algeria	(1%)	8%
GDR National Day	(0.1%)	6%
UK Spy Charges	(4%)	4%
Against USSR		
China	(4%)	2%
Yemen Premier in USSR	(5%)	2%

Peking (1526 items)

Domestic Issues	(32%)	33%
Haile Selassie in PRC	(--)	17%
PRC National Day	(27%)	16%
Indochina	(17%)	8%
[South Vietnam	(--)	3%]
Elections		
PRC Seat in UN	(6%)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi media have not mentioned the announcement on 12 October of President Nixon's plans to visit the Soviet Union in May 1972. The DRV's silence is consistent with its failure to have ever directly mentioned the President's projected trip to China. Hanoi made clear its general opposition to such travels in a final blast in the polemic sparked by the China trip announcement-- a charge by NHAN DAN's Commentator on 22 August that "Nixon has taken every opportunity to 'visit'" places in "the socialist world with the objective of dividing and destroying."

The joint statement issued at the close of Soviet President Podgorny's 3-8 October Hanoi visit warns of "imperialist" efforts to undermine the unity of socialist states. While couched in innocuously general terms, the passage accords both with Hanoi's earlier polemical line and with Moscow's charges that Peking's invitation to the President was motivated by anti-Sovietism. The statement says the two sides expressed "unanimity" on all questions discussed, but only Soviet comment has echoed this evaluation and DRV propaganda reflects Hanoi's resolve to maintain its neutral posture vis-a-vis Moscow and Peking.

The 3 October GVN presidential election continues to be denounced in Hanoi and Front broadcasts which dismiss the results as "fabricated" and claim that the election has further demonstrated Thieu's "dictatorial" nature and thus exposed him to mounting attacks by opposing forces in South Vietnam. The statements by both communist delegates at the 131st Paris session on 7 October were devoted to routine denunciations of the election.

Peking echoes the Vietnamese condemnation of the GVN election "farce" in a 9 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which also reiterates China's support for the PRG's seven-point proposal of 1 July as the basis for a Vietnam settlement.

Vietnamese communist media have not mentioned the Viet Cong release of a U.S. prisoner on 8 October and the reciprocal allied release of a North Vietnamese lieutenant on the 10th. This was the first release of a U.S. POW in the South since three were freed in January 1969.

## COMMUNIQUE ON PODGORNY VISIT REGISTERS "UNANIMITY" IN TALKS

Podgorny's 3-8 October visit to Hanoi produced new agreements on economic and military aid and predictably profuse thanks from the

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North Vietnamese; at the same time, the differing approaches and concerns of the two sides show through in the propaganda surrounding the visit.

The 8 October joint statement, signed by Podgorny and Le Duan, says the two sides "exchanged views in an atmosphere of fraternal friendship, cordiality, and comradely openness." It adds that "expressing unanimity on all the questions discussed, the participants in the talks decided to continue strengthening and developing in every way friendship between the two countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism." The reference to "unanimity" seems to have been included at Moscow's behest; where the Soviets have repeatedly described the talks as being marked by "complete mutual understanding and unanimity," Hanoi has avoided these characterizations. A 9 October followup editorial on the visit in NHAN DAN says the joint statement "clearly expressed both sides' positions concerning burning international issues," with no reference to "unanimity."

No claim of "unanimity" was contained in the last comparable Soviet-DRV joint statement, on Pham Van Dong's October 1969 trip to the USSR, and Hanoi exhibited a reluctance to express an identity of views with Moscow during Le Duan's talks with Brezhnev in May of this year after the conclusion of the 24th CPSU Congress: Where TASS said those talks took place in an atmosphere of "complete unanimity and cordiality," VNA described the atmosphere as one of "militant solidarity and fraternal friendship." Against the background of the Laos incursion, the joint communique on Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi last March recorded "completely identical views" specifically on "questions of how to deal with possible military adventures by U.S. imperialism."

The Soviets also seemed more inclined than the North Vietnamese to stress the links between the two parties consolidated by the visit and reaffirmed in the joint statement. At a reception on the 7th, Podgorny called the joint statement "an important political document" which "not only sums up and consolidates the experience of fraternal interaction but also outlines prospects and the main lines of development of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in the years to come." This view is repeated in an 11 October PRAVDA editorial on the visit, but NHAN DAN's 9 October editorial is more reserved in its evaluation. NHAN DAN hews to the terminology of the joint statement in pointing to the

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two sides' resolve to do everything possible "to further strengthen friendship and all-sided cooperation between the two countries."

A muted assertion of the DRV's insistence on its right to determine its own fate and pursue an independent foreign policy is incorporated in the joint statement, and recognized by the Soviets, in the avowal that both sides "believe the solution of topical international problems must be carried out in accordance with the vital national strivings of the peoples."

Differences between Hanoi's and Moscow's policies toward Cambodia are reflected in the joint statement when it registers both sides' support for the "political program" of the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK) as well as for the five-point proposal of the Patriotic Front of Laos. Normally Hanoi would have expressed support specifically for Sihanouk's 23 March 1970 five-point declaration on Cambodia; Le Duan reaffirmed support for Sihanouk's stand in his speech at the 4 October meeting honoring Podgorny, and such support was proffered in the 10 March 1971 joint statement signed by Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong. Moscow has previously endorsed the FUNK "proposals," but in the absence of Soviet recognition of Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) it avoids referring to Sihanouk in his capacity as leader of the RGNU. The statement on Vietnam issued at the 24th CPSU Congress expressed the Soviet Union's conviction "that the proposals made by the DRV, the PRG, the Patriotic Front of Laos, and the National United Front of Cambodia serve as a constructive basis for settling the Indochinese problems."

Some passages in the joint statement seem noteworthy in the context of Hanoi's polemics this summer reacting to the prospect of a Sino-U.S. detente. The statement's reference to efforts by "imperialist reaction" to "split the ranks of the anti-imperialist front" and to "undermine the unity of the socialist states and the world communist movement" is couched in innocuously general terms. But it could be read--against the background of Hanoi's polemical reaction to the PRC's invitation to President Nixon and of Moscow's charges that the invitation reflected anti-Sovietism--as a muted expression of shared concern over the moves toward Sino-U.S. rapprochement. The October 1969 joint statement on Pham Van Dong's visit to the Soviet Union said nothing about efforts to split the communist movement.

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Both sides make a general call for communist unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, with the latter principle specifically cited as the basis for party relations. While invocation of the principle is standard in descriptions of Soviet-DRV relations, its appearance in the statement and in DRV speeches during the visit brings into sharpened relief Hanoi's evident reluctance in recent months to similarly characterize its relations with Peking. The DRV message on the PRC's 1 October National Day did link the principle of proletarian internationalism to the relations between the two peoples, but references to the principle were pointedly absent from Hanoi statements during the September visit of the PRC economic delegation led by Li Hsien-nien as well as from authoritative North Vietnamese statements last August.\*

Hanoi's propaganda on the Podgorny visit again demonstrates the determination of the North Vietnamese to sustain their balancing act between Peking and Moscow. The NHAN DAN editorial on the visit and speeches by Le Duan and Ton Duc Thang specifically mention Chinese as well as Soviet aid, just as Hanoi gratuitously referred to Soviet along with Chinese aid in September during Li Hsien-nien's visit. The DRV-USSR joint statement notes that the Vietnamese side "emphasized the exceptional importance" of aid from the USSR and "from other socialist countries."

#### USSR AND DRV SIGN AID AGREEMENTS, DISCUSS FUTURE COOPERATION

Just as the Chinese broke with precedent last month to send Li Hsien-nien to conclude the annual PRC aid agreements in Hanoi, rather than in Peking, so the Soviets departed from past practice by signing their annual agreements in Hanoi during the Podgorny visit. The accords were signed, as usual, by Vice Premiers Le Thanh Nghi and V. Novikov, a member of the Podgorny delegation.\*\* Podgorny and Le Duan were among the officials

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\* See the TRENDS of 6 October, pages 1-3, and 29 September, pages 4-5.

\*\* Last year the annual aid agreements were signed by Vice Premiers Nguyen Con and N.A. Tikhonov, but in previous years Le Thanh Nghi and Novikov have usually had this responsibility. For a discussion of the signing of the accords last year, see the 28 October 1970 TRENDS, pages 4-5.

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attending the 7 October signing ceremony, reported by both Hanoi and Moscow media that day.

A VNA report on the 8th listed three agreements: on nonrefund military aid for 1972, on nonrefund economic aid for 1972, and on new loans to the DRV. These agreements, VNA explained, "provide that in 1972 the Soviet Union will deliver to the DRV a great quantity of food, fuel, transport facilities, complete equipments, ferrous and nonferrous metals, chemical fertilizers, weapons, ammunition, and other materials."

Moscow's announcement of the agreements contained no such detail on their substance, but Soviet propaganda continues the practice of regularly citing specific aid to the DRV. No details of the agreement signed last year were publicized at the time of its announcement, nor were details mentioned in the announcements of accords in 1965, 1966, or July 1968; however, announcements in September 1967, November 1968, and October 1969 listed some of the types of materials to be given as aid. Hanoi does not report specific aid provided for in the annual agreements with the Chinese, presumably because Peking itself is always silent about such details.

The VNA reports on the 7th and 8th noted that a further agreement on Soviet military aid was signed by Vice Ministers of Defense Tran Sam and Sokolov. The latter report added that the accord dealt with Soviet assistance to the DRV in improving military techniques in 1972. Both VNA reports also noted that a trade agreement between the two countries was signed on the 7th by DRV Minister of Foreign Trade Phan Anh and Soviet Deputy Minister of Trade Ivan Grishin. Unlike the usual annual trade accords, this pact is said to cover the exchange of goods for both 1972 and 1973.

Further information on Soviet assistance to the DRV is contained in the joint statement on the Podgorny visit, which notes that the two sides "reached agreement on entrusting corresponding organizations and offices with working out measures aimed at a long-range development of economic cooperation, trade, cultural, scientific-technical and other exchanges between the two countries." It adds that proposals on these measures will be submitted to the two parties' central committees and the two governments.

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Highlighting one aspect of future Soviet assistance, the statement also announces that the two countries agreed to "continue to explore the possibilities for building a hydroelectric station on the Da River" and that a group of Soviet specialists will be sent to begin surveying and other preparations. The statement notes that the Podgorny delegation took part in a ceremony opening the first section of the Thac Ba hydroelectric plant, built with Soviet aid.

#### TIRANA SEES PODGORNYY VISIT AIMED AT DIVIDING DRV AND CHINA

While Peking has remained predictably silent on Podgorny's visit to Hanoi, its Tirana ally issued a blast against the Soviet President's diplomatic efforts in a 7 October editorial article in the party organ ZERI I POPULLIT. Calling on Hanoi to be vigilant in the face of Soviet "intrigues," the article warned the North Vietnamese that Moscow "pretends to be their friend only to stab them in the back." The purposes behind Podgorny's visit, it said, are to undermine the North Vietnamese "struggle," to "save the Yankee imperialists," and "to drive a wedge between the DRV and China." Elaborating on the latter point, the paper went on to say that the Soviet leaders are "sabotaging" the Vietnamese struggle by "their limitless insinuations concerning the fraternal aid provided by the PRC to Vietnam, as well as by their efforts to cast dark shadows on the just and profoundly internationalist policy of the PRC."

Defensively insisting that North Vietnamese-Chinese friendship is based on "Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism," ZERI I POPULLIT added that this is "precisely why the Soviets want to belittle and liquidate this friendship." The article also sought to exploit Soviet vulnerability on the score of support for Indochina by noting that Moscow still maintains normal diplomatic relations with the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia, thereby demonstrating "the hypocrisy of the Soviet revisionists toward the Vietnamese people." ZERI I POPULLIT lectures that "American aggression is one and indivisible in Cambodia as in Vietnam, and there is no distinction between a Thieu or a Lon Nol."

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## C H I N A

## NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL MEDIA CEASE REFERRING TO LIN PIAO

A survey of published FBIS-monitored material indicates that since 15 September the name of Lin Piao has virtually disappeared from Peking media except in the case of foreign messages addressed to him, as on National Day. Scattered references to Lin have continued in provincial media, with his name last appearing in such sources on 8 October when the Kirin radio referred to his instructions on grasping company-level units and on studying Mao.

Lin began to draw less media attention this past summer, and Army Day observances on 1 August notably downplayed his role, with the usual quotation from Lin dropped from the Army Day editorial.\* Accounts of a provincial congress of Mao activists and "four-good, five-good" representatives in Kiangsi last August suggest that the clampdown on mentions of Lin may have been reinforced at the provincial level toward the end of August. Texts of two KIANGSI DAILY editorials on 22 and 30 August, on the opening and closing of the congress, are available. The first one makes a normal closing obeisance to the party Central Committee with Mao as leader and Lin as deputy leader. The second concludes with a bow to Mao, but nowhere does it refer to Lin. Kiangsi First Secretary Cheng S' u-ching, delivering the opening speech at the congress, referred twice to Lin as deputy leader.

BANQUET TOASTS      Peking references to Lin during the first  
TERMINATED            two weeks of September, before and during  
                          the first few days in which anomalies were  
noted in PRC behavior, were minimal, averaging less than one  
a day. Most of these were obligatory mentions in messages  
to the DRV and DPRK on their national days and in toasts to  
Mao and Lin by foreign visitors to China. Since early  
September Peking has dropped the practice of reporting  
banquet toasts in the media; in the past toasts offered  
during a major visit such as Haile Selassie's would have  
been reported and would have included wishes for the good  
health of both Mao and Lin.

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\* See FBIS TRENDS, 4 August 1971, for a discussion of this and other indicators of diminished status for Lin, page 23.

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The only Lin reference in central media during September which singled him out for special praise was the 12 September announcement that 50 photographs of Mao, including some with Lin, were to be disseminated in honor of the 50th anniversary of the party. Of the half-dozen provincial radios reporting local activities in distributing the photos, only Tsingtao (in Shantung) on 30 September singled out Lin for praise or even mentioned him. The Hupeh radio on 27 September did note that Lin appeared in five pictures with Mao in a photo book printed locally. There were scattered provincial references to Lin through September. In October, apart from the Kirin reference noted above, he was mentioned by the radios of Hunan and Tsinghai on 1 October, Tibet on 4 October, and by Sinkiang on the 6th. In none of these accounts was he singled out for any special praise.

Several top PLA leaders besides Lin have been absent since 10 September, most notably Politburo members Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, and Li Tso-peng. Lin himself has not appeared in public since he met Romanian chief Ceausescu on 3 June. Issues reflected in the media which might reflect discord with or within the military are minimal, although there is some evidence that an attempt has been made to place the PLA more under party control, and that there may have been some disagreement over the budget priority to be accorded advanced weapons.\*

The joint RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial on Army Day placed stress on party control of the army, a theme missing from such editorials since 1967. This line has been reflected to some extent in a number of provincial articles in the past month emphasizing that the party must assume a leading role in militia work on the county level. The theme of "absolute leadership of the party over the work of militia building" was most recently sounded by Ningsia on 5 October. Most of the provincial articles indicate that the local armed forces departments will still exercise much control, but that the principle of party control must be firmly adhered to in militia organization.

\* For a discussion of the advanced weapons controversy see FBIS TRENDS, 18 August and 1 September 1971.

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## MAO HAS "FRIENDLY CONVERSATION" WITH HAILE SELASSIE

Underscoring Lin's continued absence was Mao's reappearance to receive Haile Selassie on 8 October. Mao's last previous appearance had been to greet Ne Win on 7 August, an occasion also missed by Lin. As in the case of the Ne Win reception, Peking merely noted that Mao and Haile Selassie had a "friendly conversation" and named those present. For the party-state visit of Ceausescu last June, Lin and almost the entire Politburo made appearances; for Yahya Khan's trip in November 1970 Lin did not appear, but most other top Politburo members did.

Notably fewer Politburo members showed up at occasions honoring Haile Selassie than had appeared for any of the previous visitors who were heads of state; even many who have appeared in public since 10 September made no appearance, which may suggest that a meeting was being held outside Peking. Li Hsien-nien's appearance in Canton to greet Chou and Haile Selassie, and Chou's apparent failure to return immediately to Peking after Haile Selassie's departure on the 13th, may relate to this possibility.

## KWEIYANG RADIO REVERTS TO SOLID RELAY OF RADIO PEKING

Kweiyang radio, Kweichow provincial service, reverted to a nearly solid relay of Radio Peking following its morning broadcast of 8 October. Since that time, Kweiyang has relayed Radio Peking except for brief local announcements, weather forecasts, and an occasional musical program.

Radio behavior of this sort has been a fairly reliable indicator of local dissensions at the provincial level since the onset of the Cultural Revolution. The practice of reverting to a solid relay of Radio Peking for a few weeks, sometimes for months, was common during the 1966-69 period. But the last time a provincial-level radio went over to a solid relay of Peking--after once resuming local broadcasts--occurred in January 1970. It was the Inner Mongolia radio that ceased local broadcasting at that time, and since last August it has been the only provincial-level radio not carrying any local news.

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Previously, the Kweiyang radio carried no local news and relayed Peking for a 20-month period, from 30 September 1969 until 18 May this year. The return to local broadcasting, which lasted until 8 October, coincided with the announcement that a provincial party congress meeting at Tsunyi--site of the 1935 conference which placed Mao in control of the CCP--had established the Kweichow Provincial CCP Committee. Among the party secretaries named, there was only one survivor of the group that headed up the early "model" Kweichow Provincial Revolutionary Committee formed in February 1967.

The Kweiyang radio's report on National Day activities in the province was less substantial than the reports from most other provinces. No reference was made to provincial leadership organs, let alone individual leaders.

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## NIXON TRIP TO USSR

## MOSCOW STRESSES CONSISTENCY WITH "CONSTRUCTIVE" SOVIET POLICY

TASS and Radio Moscow on 12 October carried the announcement that President Nixon will visit the USSR in the latter half of May 1972 with no acknowledgment that it was a joint announcement released simultaneously in Washington. About an hour and a half later, a one-sentence TASS report under a Washington dateline said the President told a press conference he would be visiting the Soviet capital. While TASS totally ignored the questions and answers at the press conference, a 14 October Kiev radio report singled out the President's remarks dissociating the USSR trip from his planned journey to the PRC and quoted his statement that neither trip was being made "for the purpose of exploiting what differences may exist between the two countries."

The first substantial Soviet comment, by TASS commentator Kornilov on 14 October, views the planned U.S.-Soviet summit as "a big and important event that may have a positive influence on the international situation." Kornilov underscores the idea that the trip accords with the "constructive" foreign policy worked out at the 24th CPSU Congress and "unswervingly promoted" by the USSR. Such a policy, Kornilov says, goes hand in hand with the USSR's equally unswerving resolve to firmly rebuff "aggression." But he reiterates that the USSR proceeds from the assumption that there are no political or other problems, "however complex they may appear, that could not be resolved at the conference table given a mutual striving for agreement and good will." He cites the four-power Berlin accord and the two recent U.S.-Soviet SALT agreements as examples but does not specify areas of possible discussion during the President's visit.

An earlier brief reference to the visit had appeared in a Moscow radio commentary in Czech and Slovak on the 13th, in the context of a discourse on consistent Soviet pursuit of a policy of peaceful coexistence. And TASS on the 13th quoted extensively from an ADN summary of a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article that day which observed that the agreement on the trip "shows once more that there is no basic issue of international politics which can be solved without the Soviet Union." Notably absent from the TASS report of the article was a passage--cited in a Prague CTK version as well as by ADN--that the agreement "clearly thwarts the plans of the Peking leaders, who intended to knock together an anti-Soviet bloc by flirting with Washington."

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Peking media have ignored the announcement of the Moscow visit. There has also been silence from Hanoi, which has never directly mentioned the President's projected trip to China and has made abundantly clear its concern and misgivings about such journeys.

COMMENT FROM EAST EUROPE All of Moscow's East European allies, including Romania, have reported the announcement of the trip, and comment has been monitored from Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak as well as East German media. Prague's domestic service on the 12th and a RUDE PRAVO article reviewed by CTK the next day emphasized the point that the visit will not be directed against any third party. Polish media have touched on the likely agenda for the talks, with a PAP commentator on 12 October saying the discussions will treat the problem of ending the war in Indochina, the Middle East conflict, and disarmament issues. A 13 October PAP review of dispatches in ZYCIE WARSZAWY and TRYBUNA LUDU said that the former paper, citing "foreign correspondents in Moscow," listed strategic arms limitation and the Middle East problem as "the most probable platforms of rapprochement" during the President's talks in Moscow.

PAP said TRYBUNA LUDU pointed up the fact that the President chose to announce the trip personally and concluded that he "certainly had in mind" the 1972 elections. In the same vein, an article in Warsaw's EXPRESS WIECZORNY, summarized by PAP on the 13th, said that if the visit ends in success the President's predicted "era of negotiation" will have been realized and his victory in the elections will be assured.

A TRYBUNA LUDU roundup of world reaction on the 13th said the announcement of the visit has placed the British in an "embarrassing" position in view of the cooling of London's relations with Moscow following the expulsion of Soviet diplomats from the United Kingdom.

Substantial Hungarian press comment on the 14th welcomed the announcement of the trip, forecasting a general improvement in international relations as a result. MAGYAR NEMZET, while questioning whether the President's decision to make the trip reflects any real change in U.S. policy, found it significant that a U.S. politician aspiring to election or reelection as President is "compelled" to go to Moscow to meet the Soviet leaders rather than meeting them on "neutral" ground.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## AS-SADAT VISIT: MOSCOW REAFFIRMS STAND ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

Extensive Moscow publicity for the 11-13 October visit of President Anwar as-Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) lays stress on the USSR's continuing efforts to achieve a political settlement of the Middle East conflict but indicates little flexibility in the known Soviet position. Thus Podgorny in his 12 October luncheon speech honoring as-Sadat, leveling the customary attack on Israel and the United States as the "procrastinators" in a peaceful settlement, observes that the "only possible realistic program" for establishing peace in the area is the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied by them since 1967, the implementation "in full volume of the Security Council's known resolution," and respect for the lawful rights of all the peoples of the Middle East, including the Arab people of Palestine.

In the pattern of the communique following ARE Foreign Minister Riyad's 29 June-4 July visit to the USSR, the 13 October communique on as-Sadat's visit treats in detail the elements of a peaceful settlement. The document endorses the Jarring mission and says that the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution and the call for an Israeli pullback to the lines of 4 June 1967 have the support of all peace-loving states and peoples. And it calls for insuring the rights and interests of all the countries of the area, including the Arab peoples of Palestine.

In the recent flurry of Soviet communiqués signed jointly with other Arab states, the Middle East issue has been treated in less detail. Thus those following Kosygin's 4-8 October visit to Algeria and his 8-10 October visit to Morocco, as well as the joint Soviet-Yemeni communique following Prime Minister 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's 30 September-9 October visit to the USSR, failed to mention the Jarring mission, the 22 November Security Council resolution, or the 4 June 1967 lines. All three assailed the Israeli and U.S. roles in the Middle East and noted the need to support the Palestine Arabs; the Soviet-Algerian and Soviet-Moroccan communiqués went on to call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

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The Soviet-ARE communique does not detail the nature of military aid which will be forthcoming from the USSR, noting only that the two sides "agreed specifically on measures aimed at further strengthening the military might of Egypt." And Podgorny in his 12 October speech pledged that as long as the aftermath of Israeli "aggression" remains, the USSR will combine efforts toward a political settlement "with the adoption of energetic measures to help the Arab Republic of Egypt and other friendly Arab countries in the further strengthening of their defenses."

Reflecting continuing Soviet concern over the treatment of "progressive" elements in the Arab world, including those in the ARE, Podgorny on the 12th took note of the "anti-communist and anti-Soviet campaign fanned by the imperialists and their agents" which serves purposes alien to the Arab peoples. Observing that the Arab peoples "know full well who is their ally . . . and who is their enemy," Podgorny cited as evidence the "growing rebuff to subversive, hostile actions of reactionaries." (In a 14 September speech at a dinner honoring the visiting Afghan king, Podgorny had decried attempts by "reaction and imperialism" to disunite the Arab countries, undermine them from within, and "strike a blow against the patriotic forces.")

In what appears to be a concession by the ARE, and no doubt as a result of hard bargaining, the Soviet-ARE communique similarly notes that "attempts to spread anti-communism and anti-Sovietism" are designed to split the ranks of the Arab revolutionary fighters and disrupt solidarity. According to the communique, the "two sides strongly condemn anti-communism and anti-Sovietism as prejudicing the peoples' urge for liberation and their national interests and as serving only the interests of the international imperialist forces."

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## FORCE CUTS IN EUROPE

## MOSCOW CHIDES NATO FOR DILATORY RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV PROPOSAL

Soviet media continue to laud the Brezhnev proposal for the opening of talks on force and armaments reductions in Europe and to chide NATO for allegedly dragging its feet on the issue. Attention currently centers on the 5-6 October meeting in Brussels of high-level NATO officials at which it was decided to appoint former NATO Secretary General Brosio as the representative to Moscow to explore the possibility of force cuts.

Acknowledging Brosio's appointment, a 7 October domestic service commentary by Levin complained that his functions are "only to sound out positions." Levin cited UPI for the observation that Brosio will carry with him "no detailed proposals," concluding that the promise in the NATO communique in early June to appoint a plenipotentiary to hold talks on arrangements concerning the site, date, and agenda for talks has not been fulfilled.\* In Levin's words, NATO is continuing to pursue "tactics of procrastination . . . by again avoiding a clearcut answer."

Also on the 7th, a Moscow radio commentary for foreign audiences complained that the NATO countries have repeated their call for "mutual and balanced reduction of troops" and have argued that because of geographical factors the Soviet Union should pare a larger number of its troops in Europe. But with the development of troop transport capabilities, the commentary added, this argument "seems an attempt to obtain certain military advantages."

Current Soviet comment on the issue of force and arms reduction at times calls for cuts in "Europe" and at times for cuts in "central Europe," the area specified by Brezhnev when he first raised the matter in his 31 March 1971 report to the 24th CPSU Congress. The Levin commentary referred to the NATO meeting's discussion of reductions in "central Europe," for example, while the foreign-language talk mentioned only "Europe." At the elite level, the most recent pronouncements--including Gromyko's 28 September UNGA address and the 25 September statement signed by Brezhnev and Tito--have referred simply

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\* For a review of propaganda surrounding the 3-4 June meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Lisbon, see the TRENDS of 9 June 1971, pages 22-23.

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to "Europe." But Politburo member Kirilenko specified central Europe in a 19 August speech in Minsk, as did Gromyko in a 13 July letter to U Thant. Brezhnev also limited the area to central Europe when he elaborated on the proposal for force cuts in his 14 May speech in Tbilisi.

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## EAST EUROPE

### TITO TONES DOWN PREPARED TEXT OF SPEECH ON YUGOSLAV EXERCISES

Climaxing unprecedented fanfare surrounding the 2-7 October Yugoslav "Freedom 71" maneuvers, Tito's speech at the windup ceremony in Karlovac, Croatia on 9 October portrayed the exercises as a new rallying of the country's united nationalities in the spirit of the Yugoslav Partisan resistance to the Nazis in World War II. The import of what TANJUG on the 7th called Yugoslavia's "biggest postwar maneuvers" was underscored by their locale--the northwestern region of Yugoslavia in the vicinity of Hungary, where joint exercises were simultaneously under way involving Soviet and Hungarian forces.

Reflecting concern to avoid appearing unduly provocative in the wake of Brezhnev's Belgrade visit, Tito's speech as broadcast live in the Belgrade domestic service somewhat toned down the stance of defiance against the "foreign" threat that pervaded an embargoed pre-release by TANJUG some four hours earlier. Tito retained a reference to "forces and circles which are resorting to the means of force to achieve domination over other countries," but he dropped a passage that immediately followed in the prepared text: "The objects of this foreign pressure and attack are mainly small and medium-sized countries. Such pressures, as you know, are not bypassing our country either." Instead Tito launched into an elaborate disclaimer, in the style typical of his extemporaneous remarks, that the maneuvers were aimed against any foreign power:

A small section of the [foreign] press wants to harm us as much as possible, and if possible to give rise to uneasiness, conflicts, or suspicion between us and some countries which are close to and friendly with us, for instance the East European countries--that is, as if these maneuvers were directed against anyone in particular, instead of being a tryout which enables us to see what our army has achieved so far, what our territorial defense amounts to now, and so forth, that is, to enable us to see how we would defend ourselves if it became necessary to do so one of these days, not against one country or another but against anybody who would violate our integrity and sovereignty and imperil our country.

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Tito did, however, retain from the prepared text a pointed warning against any foreign power succumbing to the temptation to try to take advantage of the internal squabbling among the Yugoslav nationalities--a warning clearly aimed at Moscow. Those who think that the debates and disagreements in Yugoslavia are "splitting us, weakening our cohesion, and can be used for foreign pressures are badly deceiving themselves," he said, "because as far as the questions of defense of our country are concerned there have never been any disputes" and "all our peoples are united and firm."

Tito portrayed the successful conduct of the maneuvers as a vindication of the Yugoslav brand of socialism, declaring that the success of "our all-people's defense system also reflects the self-management consciousness of the citizens and producers, who regard the tasks and obligations concerning the defense of the country with full responsibility." He added to the prepared text the observation that the "spirit of unity" among all the Yugoslav nationalities which had prevailed in "the liberation war" also prevails today. The Yugoslav leader had been more candid on the nationality problem in a speech the previous day, also in Karlovac, to representatives of the municipalities where the "Freedom-71" maneuvers were held. In that speech he took note of "various elements sowing discord among us" and of the "very difficult" situation "in this part of Croatia," denouncing "both the Serbian and Croatian nationalists" who are trying to sow the discord and "anxiety."

SOVIET REPORT TASS on the 10th duly summarized Tito's 9 October remarks, predictably ignoring the "all-people's defense" and "self-management" keynotes of the speech. Saying nothing about the participation of "territorials" and "auxiliaries," TASS reported only that Tito congratulated the "servicemen" involved in the maneuvers. And in noting a statement by the Yugoslav leader on the subject of resistance "from anti-self-management and antisocialist forces," TASS referred only to resistance "from antisocialist forces."

While duly reporting Tito's statement that the exercises had showed the state of readiness "to uphold the sovereignty and inviolability of socialist Yugoslavia," the TASS summary appeared to deprecate the external threat: It concluded by reporting that Tito called for struggle against the enemies of the Yugoslav socialist system "which are in some degree or

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other connected with external enemies" of Yugoslavia. A brief reference by Tito to his "thorough and frank" talks with Brezhnev was unmentioned in the TASS account.

#### SOVIET, HUNGARIAN TROOPS HOLD JOINT EXERCISES IN TRANSDANUBIA

The Budapest domestic service reported on 8 October that maneuvers involving "units of the USSR southern army group and troops of the Hungarian People's Army" had been under way "since the beginning of the week" in Transdanubia--the region of Hungary between the Danube and the Yugoslav border. The exercises are commanded by Soviet Lt. Gen. Ivanov. Neither this report nor another on the same day by MTI mentioned the Warsaw Pact in connection with the exercises, but the MTI report said they were observed by, among others, "several high-ranking representatives of the associated armed forces." The exercises were described as "large-scale," involving air and ground attacks as well as simulated "atomic strikes" against the "enemy." Both Budapest reports concluded with a special mention of the role played by Hungarian "reservists" in the maneuvers, possibly in response to the concurrent Belgrade propaganda on the "all-people's defense" aspect of the Yugoslav exercises.

The current exercises in Hungary are the second announced joint maneuvers in that country in a span of two months. The Warsaw Pact's "Opal 71" maneuvers were held in Hungary and Czechoslovakia from 2 to 5 August involving Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian troops. The Yugoslav press was unusually vocal regarding threatening aspects of those maneuvers, concurrently decrying the rumors circulating at the time about planned Pact exercises in Bulgaria. With Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia then in the offing, commentaries in Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG and MAGYAR HIRLAP indirectly responded to the Yugoslav comment as well as to Western press discussion of the maneuvers by stressing the "routine" nature of Opal 71 and denouncing speculation that those exercises were aimed at "neighbors."

There has been no monitored Yugoslav comment on the current Soviet-Hungarian maneuvers, in the aftermath of Brezhnev's visit. Tirana has roundly assailed the maneuvers: An Albanian domestic radio report on the 11th cited MTI on the involvement of "modern weapons, including nuclear weapons" and commented that "these military games are taking place at a time when the Soviet revisionists and their partners are making noises about peace and so-called European security."



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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### ARMENIAN PRESIDENT URGES RIGHT OF INTERPELLATION FOR SOVIETS

In an 8 October IZVESTIYA article N. Arutyunyan, the unconventional Chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium, has proposed that Supreme Soviet deputies be given the right to exercise control over government officials by parliamentary interpellations. Citing Brezhnev's call at the 24th party congress for a new law defining the rights of deputies--from the Supreme Soviet down to village soviets--and the obligations of officials in relation to deputies, Arutyunyan urges several measures to give deputies concrete legal recourse against the bureaucracy.

Arutyunyan notes that although officials are now required by law to act upon requests and complaints by deputies, there is no redress if the law is ignored since legislation provides no "concrete" responsibility. Therefore, he argues, administrative responsibility and, in some cases, even "criminal responsibility" should be established for officials insufficiently responsive to questions raised by deputies or permanent commissions of soviets.

In addition to this strengthening of deputies' powers to act on behalf of constituents with informal requests and complaints, Arutyunyan urges that a "very specific" process be set up whereby deputies can request official explanations at soviet sessions and receive clear, timely answers to these formal questions. He states that "interpellation is a powerful means for control by deputies and soviets as a whole over the work of the administrative apparatus." He cites as an example one of the Armenian Supreme Soviet sessions, at which a group of deputies addressed a question to the republic Council of Ministers on the trends and prospects of Armenian industrial development and location of production facilities, which was answered by a deputy premier. This action helped improve the decisions on this subject, he maintains.

Arutyunyan goes on to declare that "this form of control" is being insufficiently used; it must be strengthened by legislation and, in addition, extended upward, he argues. Union republic laws provide for the interpellation procedure for village, rayon and city soviets, he notes, but "corresponding provisions" must be introduced for sessions of soviets at "all other levels"--presumably including the USSR Supreme Soviet.

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Arutyunyan has previously indicated he holds unconventional ideas regarding Soviet democracy. In a March 1966 speech to the Armenian party congress (KOMMUNIST, 5 March 1966), he proposed that more than one candidate be nominated for deputies in Soviet elections. He rejected the "prevailing" opinion that there can be a choice of candidates only in bourgeois democracies.

Arutyunyan has long pressed for more rights for soviets. His 5 August 1965 IZVESTIYA article helped lead off a successful campaign to expand the power of local soviets over agricultural matters, and eventually his proposal to subordinate rayon agricultural administrations to rayon soviets was also put into effect (at the end of 1969).