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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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1 OF 1

*Dozier*

**Confidential**



# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

15 SEPTEMBER 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 37)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 6 - 12 SEPTEMBER 1971

<u>Moscow (3331 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1288 items)</u>		
West Berlin Accord	(5%)	11%	Domestic Issues	(25%)	31%
China	(7%)	10%	DPRK	(3%)	31%
[Aleksandrov in	(3%)	7%]	[National Day	(--)	18%]
PRAVDA			[Military Delega-	(--)	9%]
DPRK National Day	(--)	6%	tion in PRC		
Bulgarian National	(--)	5%	Indochina	(42%)	10%
Day			TASS Account of	(--)	3%
Indochina	(17%)	3%	Kissinger PRC Trip		
Gromyko Letter to	(--)	2%			
UN on World					
Disarmament Conference					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

The gravity of the recent floods in North Vietnam, acknowledged by Pham Van Dong in his national day address, is pointed up again in an 11 September Hanoi report quoting Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh as stating that the North has not experienced such a "great flood" in "nearly a hundred years." Hanoi continues to publicize little specific information on the flood damage, but the nature of some of the most pressing problems is suggested in the propaganda. Concern over food losses in flooded areas, for example, is underscored in a 10 September report on decisions by DRV party and government organs, including a promise that the state will provide allotments of rice to families which have lost their food supplies.

A 12 September Liberation Radio commentary promptly scored President Thieu's 11 September speech in which he explained that the voters in the 3 October election can indicate whether or not they have confidence in him and that he will resign if a majority fails to support him. The commentary said that compatriots in the southern cities do not believe "Thieu's boasts" about insuring a free and democratic election and that they are demanding that Thieu resign, the elections be canceled, and new elections "be organized democratically." Hanoi has reported briefly and without comment Senator Jackson's 10 September statement calling for postponement of the election if a legitimate contest cannot be assured.

Moscow presses routine charges that the United States is blocking the Paris talks and planning further aggression in Indochina. Commentators continue to claim that Peking wants to discuss the Indochina problem with President Nixon "behind the backs" of the peoples concerned. But Podgorny, speaking on the 14th, said only that "the United States continues to maneuver" on a Vietnamese settlement.

TASS and VNA report the arrival in Moscow of a DRV National Assembly delegation led by Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan on 13 September for a 10-day visit. The DRV group has already visited Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania on a tour which began on 18 August and included stopovers in both Peking and Moscow.

### PROPAGANDA CONTINUES TO REFLECT CONCERN OVER FLOODS IN DRV

Serious concern over the damage caused by the recent floods is underscored in an 11 September Hanoi report that North Vietnamese

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Politburo and Secretariat members are visiting flooded areas-- the second such report within three days. Hanoi reported on the 9th that Le Duân, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong had toured the stricken areas.\* No such tours by top DRV officials were publicized during 1968 and 1969, the most recent previous years in which serious flooding occurred.

The 11 September report highlighted the activities of Foreign Minister and Politburo member Nguyen Duy Trinh and noted his acknowledgment, in remarks to villagers, that "North Vietnam has not experienced such a great flood in nearly a hundred years." Trinh assured the villagers, according to the report, that the regime was able to mobilize the strength and efforts of the people, party, and army and successfully restrict the damage from the floods. The broadcast also noted that Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi and Secretariat members To Huu, Hoang Anh, and Nguyen Van Tran had visited local areas affected by the flooding.

On the 10th a Hanoi broadcast reported that the party Secretariat and the Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers had "recently" decided on a number of "policy matters concerning compatriots in the flooded areas."\*\* The radio said the two organs decided that it was necessary to "expeditiously solve" a number of problems, including the provision of food and housing for the people and treatment of diseases. Listing "urgent, immediate tasks," the "decision" led off with a pledge that the state would provide rice to people who had lost food supplies in flooded areas, insuring

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\* The peak of Hanoi radio's attention to the floods was reached on the 9th with broadcasts including the account of the leaders' tours and a NHAN DAN editorial. Radio attention to the floods has since continued at a reduced volume; no further editorials on the floods have been broadcast, although press articles on the subject continue to be publicized.

\*\* This is not the first action by the Secretariat and Standing Committee. On 1 September Hanoi carried an account of an undated joint resolution from the two organs on overcoming the floods and restoring production. Although subsequent comment referred to this single joint resolution, it is not clear whether it was the only pronouncement issued. A Hanoi broadcast on 7 September referred to two resolutions by the two organs dated 25 and 27 August.

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that each person has at least 13 kilograms of rice. It also noted the responsibility of the state to supply other commodities, including clothing, fuel, roofing materials, seed, and fertilizers. The decision urged the people to be as self-reliant as possible and asked for help from areas which had not suffered flood losses. There were no high-level party-government directives on coping with the floods in 1968 and 1969; instructions were, however, issued by the Premier's office, as has also been the case this year.

MOSCOW Soviet aid to the DRV in connection with the floods was publicized in a 13 September TASS report on the landing of three Soviet cargo planes in Hanoi that day with medicines, food, and clothes sent by the Soviet Red Cross Society. The aid was accepted by Minister of the Premier's office of the DRV Tran Huu Duc, who expressed gratitude for the Soviet Union's "constant assistance" and for this new manifestation of friendship and solidarity.

PEKING Normally more reticent than Moscow in regard to specific aid, Peking has made no mention of flood assistance to the DRV since it publicized the 2 September message from Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai which promised that the Chinese people would "do everything possible to give all-out support and assistance to the fraternal Vietnamese people in overcoming the floods."

#### HANOI LINKS U.S. STRIKES AT DRV WITH ACTION IN QUANG TRI

Hanoi propagandists have used the reported downing of a U.S. F-4 plane on 7 September over DRV territory to denounce alleged U.S. attacks against Vinh Linh and Quang Binh during recent weeks and connect these "attacks" with current military activity in northern Quang Tri in South Vietnam. This comment contains Hanoi's only known comment on the Lam Son 810 operation in northern Quang Tri; communist reports on current fighting in Quang Tri make no reference to the allied operation.

In first reporting on 9 September the alleged downing of a U.S. F-4 aircraft on the 7th "by the Ha Tinh armed forces and people," Hanoi claimed that this brought the total of U.S. planes downed over North Vietnam to 3,397. (The two most recent previous claimed downings occurred on 31 July and

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6 June.) Comment pegged to the downing includes two Hanoi radio commentaries on the 9th and articles in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 10th. The comment uniformly protests what it calls stepped-up U.S. attacks against Vinh Linh and Quang Binh in recent weeks, but the NHAN DAN article, at least as briefly summarized by VNA, differs from the other three items in failing to mention action in Quang Tri. Instead it refers to the allies' "critical political and military situation" in South Vietnam.

One of the radio commentaries of the 9th says that the U.S. military command "has continued to arrogantly defend its provocative acts, pretending that they are aimed at reducing the military pressure of the North on its defensive frontline along Route 9, northern Quang Tri." It adds that "no one is fooled by such slander" and that the Pentagon papers proved that "all U.S. excuses" to strike at the North are aimed at coping with public opinion. The commentary charges that "realities have proven" that when the allies are badly hit in South Vietnam the United States uses its planes and artillery to strike at the North. Noting the launching of operation Lam Son 810, it says that "such violence cannot conceal the enemy's confusion and passiveness on this battlefield."

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 10th, claiming that the allies have been "dealt heavy blows" by the forces in northern Quang Tri, charges that the allies are "frenziedly countering these blows in addition to indiscriminately bombing the southern side of the DMZ," launching operation Lam Son 810, and attacking Vinh Linh and Quang Binh. This is the only known Hanoi allusion to U.S. bombing of DRV positions in the southern part of the demilitarized zone which began in early August. However, U.S. attacks in the southern part of the zone had been protested in a 19 August PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement.

Hanoi does not always comment on alleged downings of planes, although it did so in two instances this year--at the time of the large-scale attacks in March and in April.\* The only comment on strikes in the DRV since then came on two occasions following spokesmen's protests in August. Most recently, a radio commentary on 17 August and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article the next day, like the current comment, went beyond a

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\* See the TRENDS of 28 April, pages 11-12, and 24 March, pages 9-11.

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16 August protest to suggest that U.S. attacks on the North were prompted by "painful blows" suffered in the South.

**SPOKESMAN'S PROTESTS**      The latest in the series of DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements on alleged U.S. attacks in the North and against the DMZ make no mention of strikes in the southern part of the DMZ. The statements, issued on 9 and 15 September, both charge that U.S. planes bombed areas of Quang Binh Province. The protest of the 15th says U.S. planes "bombed and strafed a number of localities" in Quang Binh on 12 September, while the one of the 9th says U.S. planes bombed many places in Bo Trach and Minh Hoa districts, Quang Binh on 6 and 7 September. In addition, the protest of the 15th claims that U.S. planes, including B-52's, bombed a number of areas in Vinh Linh on the 14th. And the 9 September spokesman's protest charges that from 5 to 7 September U.S. planes, including B-52's, and artillery based south of the 17th parallel attacked Vinh Giang, Vinh Thanh, Vinh O, Vinh Son, and Huong Lap villages--described as being north of the 17th parallel in the DMZ--and Vinh Thuy village.

Like four out of five of Hanoi's protests in August, both of the current statements claim that the alleged attacks caused casualties.\* The 15 September protest says human lives and property were lost, and the one of the 9th specifies "serious losses" to the population.

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\* See the 1 September TRENDS, page 16, for background on protests in August and earlier this year.

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### JAPANESE CP DELEGATION IN DRV AFTER VISITS TO USSR, ROMANIA

The 10 September arrival in Hanoi of a Japanese Communist Party (JCP) delegation led by Kenji Miyamoto, party chairman, is reported by VNA on the 11th. Among the officials welcoming the delegation at the airport, according to VNA, were VWP First Secretary Le Duan, as well as Truong Chinh and Nguyen Duy Trinh. VNA also mentions that the Soviet and Romanian charges d'affaires were at the airport. (The JCP delegation had visited the USSR 19-20 August, Romania 20 August-1 September, and Rome immediately before coming to Hanoi.)

On 14 September VNA reports that a "grand banquet" was held for the delegation on the 11th and party talks were held on the 12th, with Le Duan leading the VWP side. While noting that the talks "proceeded in a cordial and friendly atmosphere," VNA reveals nothing of the substance.

The VNA report of the banquet does, however, report some of the remarks by Le Duan and Kenji Miyamoto. Le Duan reportedly "warmly welcomed" the delegation which he said brought to the Vietnamese people "the solidarity of comrades-in-arms against the common enemy, the U.S. imperialists, greatly encouraging the Vietnamese people to advance towards complete victory." He expressed the Vietnamese party's and people's "sincere gratitude" to the JCP and the Japanese people for their "previous support and assistance" and expressed the wish that the "militant solidarity and close friendship" between the VWP and JCP strengthen and develop. Miyamoto reportedly said the visit "will contribute to developing the friendship of the two parties and enhance the militant solidarity" between the Japanese and Vietnamese peoples.

Attention to the visit also included brief reports on other activities of the delegation, such as a wreath-laying ceremony at the Hanoi war cemetery. The party organ NHAN DAN--in a 15 September article which VNA described as "filling almost three entire columns"--discussed the role of the JCP in Japan and its assistance to the Vietnam resistance. A Hanoi radio broadcast on the 12th also expressed appreciation for the Japanese people's assistance to Vietnam.

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## PARIS TALKS: AMBASSADOR PORTER FIRST MENTIONED IN VNA ACCOUNT

The VNA account of the 8 September Paris session for the fifth consecutive time dismisses the allies' statements in a single sentence when it says: "The Saigon puppet administration's delegate rehashed his previous fallacious allegations, while the new U.S. chief negotiator William Porter said nothing new but only repeated the proposal for restricted meetings made by his predecessor, David K. Bruce." This is the first reference to Ambassador Porter in Hanoi media, which ignored his appointment to succeed Ambassador Bruce and his arrival in Paris on 30 August.\* VNA accounts of the Paris sessions after Bruce's final appearance on 29 July referred only to the "U.S. representative," never mentioning Ambassador Habib by name or indicating that he was acting delegation head pending Ambassador Porter's arrival.

The VNA account gives an unusually detailed account of the give-and-take portion of the 8 September session, however, and in the course of reporting DRV delegate Xuan Thuy's remarks it reflects some of the substance of Porter's statement. Noting the impromptu remarks by the PRG's Dinh Ba Thi\*\* first, VNA says he stressed that the Nixon Administration must change its policy, withdraw all U.S. and allied troops in 1971, and discard the Thieu "clique." He added that if the U.S. head delegate "wishes to meet the PRG delegation privately for further clarifications on the seven-point peace plan, then the PRG representatives will readily receive him and give him the necessary explanations."

According to VNA, Xuan Thuy noted that "the new head delegate of the United States expressed the wish that his presence at this conference would be an opportunity to settle the Vietnam problem peacefully and said that President Nixon had entrusted him with that goal." Replying to Porter, Thuy said that "at

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\* TASS on the 10th, reporting that Ambassador Porter participated for the first time at the Paris session the previous day, said that "the change of diplomats did not change the U.S. position at the talks."

\*\* Thi was substituting for Mme. Binh, who visited Poland from 6 to 11 September. Soviet media, but not Vietnamese communist media to date, reported that she stopped in Moscow on the 11th "en route home."

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the first words of your statement, I thought you were going to say something new. But it turned out that you followed up by just repeating Ambassador Bruce's proposal of 8 July for restricted sessions." Emphasizing that "we have already criticized that proposal" and thought it had "followed Ambassador Bruce in leaving the Paris conference," Thuy supported the PRG proposal with regard to the form of the conference as "reasonable." This means, Thuy said, that the Paris talks would continue to meet each Thursday as usual and "if the U.S. delegate wants further explanations about the seven points, the PRG will be ready to receive him privately and give the necessary clarifications."

The VNA account of the session contains no acknowledgment that GVN Ambassador Lam recalled GVN willingness to talk directly with the NFLSV--first offered on 25 March 1969--as well as with the DRV and to meet either or both privately or in restricted sessions. VNA similarly ignores GVN support for expanding the four-party conference.

Both Vietnamese communist delegates in their formal statements again criticized the President for not responding to the PRG's 1 July peace proposal. Both also spelled out points one and two of the proposal--on a U.S. troop withdrawal and release of prisoners in 1971, and the formation of a government of national concord in South Vietnam. The two delegates also again scored Vietnamization, the Saigon elections, and U.S. "intensification" of the war against Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam and increased "war acts" against the DRV.

MCGOVERN, BAYH           The meetings of Senators Bayh and McGovern  
PARIS VISITS            "at their request" with PRG deputy delegation  
                          head Dinh Ba Thi on 7 and 10 September were  
reported in virtually identical broadcasts on the 12th by  
Liberation Radio in Vietnamese and Hanoi radio in English. The  
broadcasts stated that "in an atmosphere of understanding," Thi  
exchanged views with the senators "on matters concerning the  
ending of the war and the restoration of peace in Vietnam."  
They also said Thi explained that the PRG's "correct stand and  
attitude" had been clearly expressed in its seven-point proposal  
and blamed the Nixon Administration's "negative attitude" for  
the current deadlock at Paris.

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The only available mention of McGovern's meeting with DRV delegate Xuan Thuy on 11 September was in a Liberation Radio broadcast in English to U.S. servicemen on the 13th. The broadcast said that in "telling newsmen about the talk" McGovern conceded that it was "fruitful and Mr. Xuan Thuy very open-hearted and sincere."\* Liberation Radio also noted that the meeting was held at McGovern's request.

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\* TASS on the 12th also ignored the prisoner issue in reporting McGovern's press conference that day, quoting him as saying only that setting a date for the withdrawal of U.S. troops before the end of the year and stopping military operations by American troops is a "key" to solving the Vietnam problem.

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## PODGORNY, PROPAGANDISTS ASSAIL U.S. "AGGRESSION" IN INDOCHINA

Moscow's pervasive attacks on U.S. "aggression" in Indochina and obstruction of the Paris talks were carried forward on an authoritative level in Podgorny's 14 September speech at a dinner for the visiting King of Afghanistan. According to TASS, he said that the situation is not in the "aggressors'" favor, with the Indochinese peoples determined to uphold their independence and sovereignty and the U.S. Administration facing growing opposition both at home and abroad. Observing that "real preconditions" now exist for a just settlement in Southeast Asia, Podgorny expressed support for the DRV stand and the PRG's seven-point proposal, as well as the proposals made by the "patriotic forces" of Laos and Cambodia. He criticized the United States for its "unconstructive" position at the Paris talks and for not responding to the PRG proposals.

Podgorny did not mention the President in saying that "the United States continues to maneuver on the question of a settlement in Vietnam, trying to solve this problem to the detriment of the Vietnamese people's interests." But other Moscow propaganda continues to claim that Peking's invitation to President Nixon to visit the PRC has enabled him to avoid answering the PRG proposal. A 10 September Moscow domestic service broadcast, for example, warning the socialist countries against Peking's splittist policies, makes this claim along with the charge that Peking wants to discuss the Indochina problem with the President "behind the backs" of the people of the region.

In the domestic service roundtable discussion on the 12th, PRAVDA correspondent Shchedrov--said to have just returned from Vietnam "via Peking"--observed that he had talked about the President's planned trip with "eminent figures" in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia who say they will not allow anyone to solve the problems of the Indochinese countries "behind their backs." Shchedrov named only PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, whom he said he had "recently interviewed." The interview was published in PRAVDA on the 10th and summarized by TASS and Moscow radio in foreign languages, including Vietnamese and Mandarin. In the interview Phat routinely criticized the U.S. failure to respond to the PRG initiative and said the Vietnamese are inflicting defeats on U.S. military plans "thanks to a correct political and military policy" along with the assistance and support of the "compatriots in the North" and friends on all continents. He concluded by specifically thanking the USSR for its "great support and assistance."

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## FUNK DELEGATION MEETS WITH USSR PARTY, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

The delegation of Sihanouk's National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK), led by Politburo member Gen. Duong Sam Ol, which arrived in the USSR on 1 September at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, departed on the 10th after having talks with CPSU Secretary Katushev and Soviet Government officials. Reports on the visit, carried by TASS on the 10th and published in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 11th, note that the delegation had been received by Katushev, and also "at the Foreign Ministry, and at the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations."\* These reports do not name any of the Soviet officials, but according to a Moscow broadcast in Cambodian on the 11th, Duong Sam Ol in a speech on Soviet television said that he had been received by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin.

Consistent with Moscow's general avoidance of references to Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU), Soviet media during the visit did not mention Duong Sam Ol's RGNU post as Minister of Military Equipment and Armament but identified him only in his Front role. There was an atypical reference to Sihanouk as FUNK Chairman and Cambodian "head of state" in the reports on the conclusion of the visit. And during the visit Sihanouk was so identified in at least one Moscow broadcast in Cambodian quoting Duong Sam Ol. But TASS and PRAVDA avoided such identification on their own and deleted Duong Sam Ol's remarks in reporting his statements. Moscow's general practice has been to refer to Sihanouk as "Prince" or "Samdech."

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\* This is the first Sihanouk delegation to officially visit the USSR for bilateral contacts. In October 1970 a FUNK delegation had taken part in a Moscow meeting marking a solidarity week with the Indochinese peoples. Thiounn Mumm-- FUNK Politburo member and RGNU Minister of Economy and Finance-- paid what Western press agencies described as a private visit to Moscow in June 1970, though he did meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin. On 29 December 1970 PRAVDA reported that Thiounn Mumm had been received by Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev during what was apparently a brief stopover in Moscow. See the TRENDS of 9 September 1971, pages 11-13, for further background as well as a discussion of initial propaganda on Duong Sam Ol's visit.

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The FUNK radio in its first announcement of the visit on 2 September had said that one of the delegation's aims was "to create favorable conditions to obtain Soviet recognition of the RGNU." There was no further mention of this in available FUNK propaganda on the visit, which has been confined to reportage. But it was probably not coincidental that an 8 September AKI commentary, reviewing Cambodian developments, once again listed all the countries which have recognized the RGNU and called upon peace-loving governments all over the world--unnamed--to support the Cambodian people's struggle, the "most effective support" being to recognize the RGNU. And remarks by RGNU Premier Penn Nouth, in a speech on 12 September in Urumchi, seemed even more pointed. As reported by NCNA on the 13th and FUNK media on the 14th, he once again complained that "there are some countries that claim to be friends of our people but refuse to recognize the RGNU." He went on, in unusually strong language, to charge that "on the pretext that the Royal Government is a 'government in exile' or dividing the government of the Kingdom into a government at home and a government abroad, they have done serious harm to the struggle of our people, subverting and interfering with our country's internal affairs. This is intolerable."

It may have been with the issue of diplomatic recognition in mind that a 12 September Moscow Cambodian-language radio report of the departure ceremony quotes Kudryavtsev--whom it identifies both as IZVESTIYA commentator and deputy chairman of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee--as saying that "we desire close militant relations, for this will help to promote other kinds of relations."

Despite the fact that the delegation was received by the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and that Duong Sam Ol is Minister of Military Equipment and Armament, the issue of aid was generally avoided in Moscow propaganda on the visit. The only available mention was in the Moscow Cambodian-language broadcast on the 12th reporting the departure ceremony at the airport on the 10th. It quoted the executive secretary of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee as having expressed the readiness of Soviet public organizations to "expand relations" with the FUNK and to give "all-out assistance to the Cambodian people by sending them goods and equipment." The official added that the committee had "considered" the FUNK proposal for the training of Cambodian

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experts. The reports on the conclusion of the visit carried by TASS and the press referred only to Soviet "support" for the struggle of the Cambodian "patriots."

No communist media are known to have publicized Sihanouk's remarks to AFP's Peking correspondent on the 11th criticizing Soviet policy toward his government. AFP quoted him as saying that Soviet proposals during the FUNK delegation's visit included a suggestion that aid, particularly economic aid, be given. But in denigrating this, Sihanouk said that what was needed was weapons and ammunition. According to AFP, Sihanouk also said that Kim Il-song had told him, during his visit to Pyongyang last month, that the USSR would never recognize him unless he retook Phnom Penh. Sihanouk added sardonically, AFP said, that on that day the United States would also recognize him.

C O R R E C T I O N TO THE TRENDS OF 9 SEPTEMBER 1971:

In the article on the DRV floods, page 6, third paragraph under the heading "Extent of Disaster," the third line should read x x x as soon as the flood waters recede, states that "the greater part of the flooded areas consists of ricefields."  
(Correcting the translation of the quoted passage.)

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## NCNA DENOUNCES TASS-REPORTED ACCOUNT OF KISSINGER-CHOU TALK

A TASS report on a Japanese paper's account of the Kissinger mission to the PRC has elicited a prompt NCNA retort accusing "the desperate Soviet revisionist leading clique" of hostility toward the Chinese. An NCNA report on 8 September, reacting to a Tokyo-dated TASS dispatch of the 6th, denounced the account originally appearing in the TOKYO SHIMBUN as "full of most odious fabrications and lies." Taking exception to "rumors" that Kissinger had offered U.S. cooperation in exploiting offshore oil deposits and building an aircraft factory, NCNA derided the Soviets for their recent economic dealings with the United States and Japan. It also got in a jab at the recent Berlin agreement, Peking's first comment on that development. The NCNA report has been given domestic and international dissemination.

NCNA's reaction to the TASS dispatch represents Peking's first--and limited--response to the vigorous Soviet polemical campaign against the Chinese that has developed since the announcement of President Nixon's projected visit to the PRC. NCNA managed to discuss the Kissinger mission without mentioning the invitation to the President. While Peking has presented an ideological rationale for its invitation, it has not directly broached the subject since the original announcement except in comment attributed to foreign sources. Most recently, a 31 August NCNA account of a Japan-China friendship association meeting cited a statement calling the visit a sign of "U.S. imperialism's bankruptcy." In line with earlier comment from Prince Sihanouk and the North Koreans which Peking had publicized, the statement was quoted as saying "the victory in China's consistent foreign policy" of supporting revolutionary struggles and opposing imperialist policies "is of great strategic significance" for the world anti-U.S. struggle. In its own name, Peking has implied rather that flexibility toward the United States is required in order to isolate the Soviet Union as the main enemy.\*

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\* Peking's comment is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 August, pages 19-22, and 1 September, pages 17-19.

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TASS DISPATCH      As NCNA pointed out, TASS obscured the fact that the Japanese paper's account was based on material attributed to "an authoritative source" in Taipei. TASS said the Japanese paper had published "information it possesses," neglecting to mention the source. The TASS dispatch cited the Japanese account as saying Chou En-lai agreed in principle to the alleged Kissinger proposals on oil exploration and an aircraft factory and that the two sides agreed to establish a "hot line" and to increase trade and travel exchanges. In discussing the alleged Kissinger-Chou exchange on the Taiwan question--"the most difficult question"--the TASS dispatch omitted the Japanese paper's report to the effect that Kissinger defended dual representation in the United Nations by citing the precedent of the USSR's three seats.

Mentioning President Nixon's projected visit, TASS quoted the Japanese article as saying he would be welcome at any time and that Mao himself would meet him at the Peking airport.

NCNA REACTION      In addition to omitting the reference to the President's visit, NCNA ignored the TASS dispatch's discussion of Taiwan and UN representation. It also passed over the parts on a hot line and expanded trade and travel between the United States and the PRC. NCNA chose rather to hit back at the Soviets for implying that the Chinese were ready to "sell the dignity and sovereignty" of their country for "a few U.S. dollars" by accepting the alleged U.S. offers of aid in oil exploration and aircraft manufacturing. Without naming Moscow, NCNA turned the accusation back on the Soviets by pointing out that "certain people in the world who style themselves as builders of 'communism'" did not hesitate to "beg obsequiously" for funds from capitalist countries to build a truck plant and "do not scruple to invite robbers in and auction off their country's natural resources" for a loan from the Japanese to exploit oil deposits.

In Peking's first comment on the four-power agreement on Berlin, NCNA charged that those unnamed "certain people" had "unscrupulously" sold out the GDR's sovereignty through the Berlin accord in order to induce West Germany to ratify a treaty and to extend economic aid. Peking had heretofore maintained a total silence on the agreement, announced 23 August and signed on 3 September, failing even to carry Albanian comment castigating Moscow for selling out to the West.

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Peking had waited over a month before commenting on the Soviet-FRG treaty signed last August. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 13 September 1970 denounced the treaty as a betrayal of the GDR, an encouragement of West German "militarism," and a part of "the diabolic 'global Munich' scheme" of the Soviet Union and the United States. Peking's one-month delay last year and its limited reaction to the Berlin agreement now suggest sensitivity to the interests of European countries which the Chinese have carefully cultivated and which have special interests in European detente. Thus, Peking has shown in the course of its growing relations with the Romanians in the past two years that it is now inclined to take their interests into account in reacting to European developments. Moreover, Peking may be hesitant about pressing a line opposed to European detente at a time when it is undertaking flexible diplomatic initiatives itself and is seeking to accent the positive rather than appear to be an obstructionist element in the international community.

Peking's thrust at the Soviets on the Berlin question in responding to TASS' account of the Kissinger-Chou meeting seems to have been a riposte to Moscow's polemics accusing Peking of selling out the Vietnamese. Moscow has sought to discredit Peking's recent initiatives, particularly the invitation to President Nixon, by suggesting that these moves undercut the Vietnamese communists' position. (Moscow's comment on NCNA's criticism of the Berlin agreement is discussed in the Germany and Berlin section of this TRENDS.)

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## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

### USSR SILENT ON REPORTED ACCORD AT SALT, INCIDENTS-AT-SEA TALKS

Moscow has not acknowledged Western press reports of an agreement between the United States and the USSR regarding the handling of nuclear accidents through use of a new communications satellite hotline. According to the New York TIMES report of 13 September, the agreement was reached in late August following meetings of experts working in parallel with the delegations at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Vienna and Helsinki. There has been no public Soviet complaint about the press leak, in keeping with Moscow's correct and very low-keyed treatment of the SALT proceedings. Soviet media had similarly ignored the New York TIMES' disclosure on 23 July of the U.S. proposal at SALT to halt construction of both land-based missiles and missile submarines.

There have been no known reports of the meetings on the Moscow-Washington hotline in Soviet media since early this spring. On 31 March TASS noted briefly that experts were meeting in Vienna under the direction of the SALT delegations, and on 7 April TASS said "another meeting" had been held to discuss the improvement of the hotline but did not indicate that the meeting was under the aegis of SALT. Soviet comment on SALT has ignored the question of nuclear accidents.

The U.S.-Soviet agreement to open discussions in Moscow on 12 October on incidents at sea, announced by State Department spokesman Bray on 8 September, has not been mentioned in available Moscow propaganda.

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## GERMANY AND BERLIN

## ABRASIMOV: ACCORD IS DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF GDR BY WEST

In remarks publicized by East Germany but unmentioned in Soviet media, Soviet Ambassador to the GDR Abrasimov used an interview with the organ of the GDR Society for German-Soviet Friendship, FREIE WELT, to make the first authoritative public Soviet statement of support for East Berlin's contention that in signing the four-power agreement on "West Berlin" the West has in effect recognized the sovereignty of the GDR. East German spokesmen at all levels have emphasized this claim insistently since the signing of the four-power accord on 3 September. Moscow has publicized the East German statements but has made the claim on its own authority only in a scattering of commentaries at the routine propaganda level.

In the interview with the weekly FREIE WELT, carried in full by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and the East Berlin radio on 13 September, Abrasimov declared that the signing "of the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin is evidence of the de facto [faktisch] recognition of the sovereign competence of the socialist German state by all four participants in the negotiations, that is, including the Western powers." Rejecting in advance any Big Three repudiation of this interpretation, the Soviet envoy added: "Whether it pleases the GDR's opponents or not, no one can alter this fact." In an apparent allusion to the difficulties arising over the German translation of the agreement in the followup talks between FRG State Secretary Bahr and GDR State Secretary Kohl and between West Berlin Senat representative Mueller and GDR State Secretary Kohrt, Abrasimov added--somewhat ambiguously, as rendered in the East German text--that it is equally "impossible to interpret individual provisions of the agreement differently from the way in which it was signed by the representatives of the four powers."

Abrasimov also gave support to the GDR position that the agreement does not affect "the integrity of Berlin" as the capital of the GDR. While consistently referring to the agreement as "on West Berlin," Moscow has been chary of pressing this view; as in its treatment of the theme of alleged Western recognition of GDR sovereignty, it has publicized East German statements on "Berlin" as the GDR capital and on the "special political status" of West Berlin

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and has now echoed these statements in some routine propaganda, but it has avoided the issue in editorial comment and official statements.

Telling FREIE WELT that the positions of the four powers during the negotiations "in many ways did not correspond and were contradictory," Abrasimov remarked, according to the East German text: "I am not betraying a great secret when I say that some of our negotiating partners attempted to conduct talks on Berlin as a whole, refusing to take into account the sovereign rights and legitimate interests of the GDR, and put forward other unrealistic demands." He hastened to add that "a sensible approach," taking "all the realities" into account, prevailed. At a 12 September East Berlin ceremony granting him "freedom of the city," in remarks similarly publicized in East German media but unmentioned by Moscow, Abrasimov denied that the four-power agreement affects the GDR capital and asserted that "socialist Berlin" was never a subject of negotiations.

MESSAGES FROM  
SOVIET LEADERS

The issue of Big Three recognition of GDR sovereignty and the GDR capital was skirted in replies from Brezhnev and Kosygin to messages from Honecker and Stoph welcoming the four-power agreement. In a message to Brezhnev on 9 September, Honecker had said the Big Three "have for the first time confirmed the sovereignty of the GDR's relations with the other German state and with West Berlin." Brezhnev on the 10th simply replied that the agreement "on West Berlin" is based on the "territorial and political realities" in Europe and "fully takes into account the sovereign rights and interests of the GDR," adding that the GDR's "international authority and its role and influence in international affairs" have been raised.

Although Stoph did not specifically raise the sovereignty issue in his message to Kosygin on the 8th, Kosygin came a shade closer to broaching it than Brezhnev did but still avoided explicit language: He stated that the agreement "on questions relating to West Berlin" is, together with the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn, "intended to become an essential part of a system of international agreements based on recognition of the territorial and political realities" in Europe. Both Soviet leaders said the agreement creates favorable preconditions for solving other "urgent" European and world problems.

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### MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN REACT CAUTIOUSLY TO FINNISH PROPOSAL

Soviet and East German media have reacted cautiously to the Finnish Government's 10 September proposal to establish full diplomatic relations with both German states. Although the proposal could give a psychological lift to the GDR campaign for international recognition on an equal footing with the Federal Republic and could serve as another recognition of "territorial and political realities" in Europe, the selective reporting of it by both Moscow and East Berlin pointed up countervailing aspects of the Finnish demarche.

Thus the media neglected to mention that the proposal calls for negotiations on claims advanced by Finland for settlement of damages caused in 1944-45 by troops of the Third Reich and that it stipulates that the treaties with both German states must come into force simultaneously. The first proviso could oblige East Germany to accept partial responsibility for damages inflicted on Finland by the Germans in World War II, and the second would in effect give Bonn power to delay a third country's recognition of the GDR until its own conditions are met.

The identical draft treaties with the FRG and GDR proposed by the Finnish Government stipulate that both German states must recognize Finland's "policy of neutrality" and must renounce the use of force or threat of force in relations with Helsinki. TASS's report of the Finnish proposal on the 11th ignored the stipulation on recognition of Finland's neutrality as well as the provisos on reparations and on the treaties' coming into force simultaneously. ADN's report on the same day said the Finns proposed to both German governments a "comprehensive" draft providing "among other things for diplomatic recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations"; it also noted that the Finnish Government saw a "positive trend" in European political life leading to a lessening of tension and "a stable new order," and it mentioned that the proposal "is based on" Finnish neutrality.

Later on the 11th, ADN quoted a GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying the GDR Government "welcomes the decision of the Government of Finland" and, without mentioning that the FRG is involved, expressed GDR "willingness to enter into negotiations on the conclusion of a state treaty for the regulation of all relations and the establishment in this connection of diplomatic

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relations between the GDR and Finland, according to the Finnish proposal." PRAVDA briefly reported the GDR spokesman's comment in a brief TASS item the next day, citing ADN.

Both TASS and ADN on 12 September reported President Kekkonen's explanatory speech to the Finnish people the preceding day, ignoring his discussion of the proviso in the Finnish proposal on negotiation of Finland's reparations claims as well as his remarks on Finland's desire for a "package deal" with both German states. There has been no further publicity for the proposal in Soviet or East German media.

#### SOVIET BROADCASTS IN MANDARIN ANSWER NCNA CHARGE OF SELLOUT

Moscow radio reacted promptly to the NCNA charge of 8 September that the Soviet Union, in signing the agreement "on West Berlin," has "unscrupulously" sold out the GDR to obtain ratification of the Moscow treaty and FRG economic and technical aid. Anticipating the charge before it was made, a Moscow radio commentary in Mandarin on the 7th had observed that Peking's propaganda "has always chimed in with" the "imperialists" in attacking Soviet foreign policy, including an "all-out" attack on the signing of the Bonn-Moscow treaty and an attempt to "sow seeds of dissension between the Soviet Union and the GDR." On the 9th, saying that the agreement "explicitly stipulated" that West Berlin does not belong to West Germany and that it took account of the "actual political situation" in Europe and the sovereignty of the GDR and the FRG, another broadcast in Mandarin denied the NCNA charge of a "brazen sellout" of GDR sovereignty as "slanderous" and in total disregard of "the facts, logic, and correct thinking." Citing statements by Honecker and Stoph welcoming the agreement, the radio placed the NCNA charge in the context of Peking's foreign policy of "aggravating world tension and splitting the socialist community."

Moscow pursued the counterattack in a broadcast in Mandarin on the 13th concluding that the Peking "propaganda machine opposed the agreement in collusion with the West German revanchists and neonazi forces," thereby exposing "the Chinese leaders' unprincipled foreign policy."

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## ROMANIA

## BUCHAREST DEFENDS PURSUIT OF INDEPENDENT BALKAN POLICY

Against the background of Soviet propaganda pressing for a European security conference and recent Soviet bloc psychological pressures on the Romanians, Bucharest's AGERPRES transmitted a rare unsigned commentary on 14 September which defended Romania's Balkan policy and in effect rejected the view that there can be one policy for the Balkan socialist countries and another for Central Europe--that is, the Brezhnev doctrine for Moscow's East European sphere and a policy of noninterference and sovereignty for the portion of Europe outside the Soviet orbit. Defending Romania's Balkan policy as a "realistic" and integral part of its "consistent" foreign policy, the AGERPRES commentary argued that the development of a peaceful atmosphere in the Balkans is "an inseparable component of the fight for security in Europe and in the world, and that is why all the Balkan countries are duty-bound to take initiatives and actions with the objective of improving the climate in that zone."

In effect rejecting East European charges exemplified by a 13 August article in Budapest's MAGYAR HIRLAP, which speculated on the possibility that a pro-Peking "Tirana-Belgrade-Bucharest axis" was being formed in opposition to the Soviet Union, AGERPRES declared that Romania's Balkan policy stems from the concrete situation in the region: "the fact that four countries--Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania are socialist countries and that the geographical closeness has created objective conditions for and mutual interests in economic, political, and cultural cooperation with a regional character." Stating that "large possibilities exist" for the development of closer economic cooperation, AGERPRES concluded that the evolution of inter-Balkan relations is aimed at "erecting the edifice of peace upon the only possible sound basis, since it is a moral one: to help each other without harming anyone."

Romania's defense of its developing contacts with its Balkan neighbors--particularly its special relationship with Yugoslavia--outside the framework of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA follows closely on the 10 September announcement that Brezhnev will pay "an unofficial, friendly visit" to Belgrade in the second half of September. The visit, in response to a long-standing Yugoslav invitation, will serve Soviet efforts to counter growing

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Chinese influence in the Balkans and to weaken Tito's support for Romania. Brezhnev may be expected to press the Soviet line on European security during the visit; Soviet comment welcoming the 3 September signing of the four-power agreement on Berlin has played the theme that the West now has no reason to delay a conference on European security, and some comment has gone on to discern an improved atmosphere for talks on arms and force reductions in Central Europe--proposed by Brezhnev at the CPSU Congress on 30 March.

Yugoslav comment anticipates a united front with the Romanians at a European security conference on the issues of Balkan detente and adherence to principles of sovereignty and noninterference in the region. Answering a question about East European press comment on tensions in the Balkans, Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat spokesman Vujica declared pointedly at his 2 September press conference: "European peace and security are indivisible, and they concern Europe as a whole." He added that Yugoslavia's Balkan policy is based on well-known principles: "all-embracing cooperation based on respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, and the settling of disputed questions through peaceful means."

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## KHRUSHCHEV'S DEATH

### ANNOUNCED "WITH SORROW" A DAY AND A HALF AFTER DEMISE

Moscow media began to report Khrushchev's death some 36 hours after it occurred. At about midnight Moscow time on 12-13 September, TASS transmitted in English and Russian the one-sentence announcement of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. The announcement was first broadcast by Radio Moscow's domestic service at 2 a.m. on the 13th, as the 11th item in the newscast. It was repeated on subsequent newscasts until 8 a.m., never as the lead news item but ranging from fifth to ninth place.

PRAVDA published the announcement on the 13th, at the lower righthand corner of the front page as is usual for such notices; but the makeup and format were markedly less prominent than usual, even than for two oblast first secretaries who died last July. The announcement was also published by IZVESTIYA and perhaps other papers, but there has been no further word from Moscow media.

The announcement was issued "with sorrow" rather than "with deep sorrow," the formulation almost invariably utilized in such instances. The failure to include the Supreme Soviet Presidium as one of the organs issuing the announcement, and PRAVDA's failure to publish even the briefest obituary or report on funeral plans, are further departures from normal practice.

The Yugoslav, Hungarian, and Polish radios briefly reported Khrushchev's death on the 11th, citing Western news agency dispatches. The Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and East German radios waited for Moscow's account and merely repeated it. Messages of condolence were sent to the widow by Tito, Kadar, and Ceausescu. The Hungarian news agency transmitted a brief summation of Khrushchev's life, in favorable terms, noting his work in behalf of socialism, peace, and friendship between the Soviet and Hungarian peoples. In publishing this item on the 14th, the Budapest morning papers inserted a counterbalancing phrase to the effect that Khrushchev's activity along these lines had been "not devoid of contradictions."

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Albania, which also reported the death in advance of Moscow, observed that the deceased had "led the Soviet revisionist treacherous clique" for a period of 11 years. Peking limited itself to repeating, for domestic and foreign audiences, the one-sentence announcement from Moscow.

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## CONTINUING PLA CONTROL OVER CIVIL AFFAIRS IS INDICATED

The triangular relationship between the CCP, the PLA, and the revolutionary committees is still not being elucidated to any marked degree in the propaganda, despite the successful conclusion of the provincial party-building campaign. Several local broadcasts have recently skirted around the issue, however, and in doing so have furnished additional evidence of the dominant role of PLA representatives.

A 29 August Harbin radio broadcast was unusually frank in indicating that the party in the army is in a position to dominate the civilian party. The broadcast discussed the role of the party branch of a municipal PLA "support-the-left" team, pointing out that the military representatives are under the control of the party in the army. At the same time the broadcast noted that the military team members "are assuming leading positions in party organizations and revolutionary committees at all levels."

Problems in PLA party branch control over the scattered PLA representatives are admitted, but such problems are said to have been solved through tightened up organizational control by the party branch. Party "teams" have been established below the branch level to exercise more direct control over the representatives' "thinking, work, work style, and daily life." And in a departure from the usual admonitions about reducing bureaucracy, the item stated that "the positions of full-time secretary and deputy secretary were added to the party organization" to insure better control.

The primacy of the support-the-left personnel within local civil organs was illustrated by a 31 August Kwangsi broadcast, which noted that local cadres say "the PLA cadres stand high and see far, and had better make all the decisions." Such a view is erroneous, the article said, but the examples it furnished of PLA humility only serve to enhance the prestige of PLA cadres, who are said to become more humble and to learn more from the masses the more they are praised. The local armed forces department political commissar was shown to be a model in learning from the masses. On one occasion, a group meeting wrote a paper when he was not available and sent it to him for approval.

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He avoided simply making a decision on his own and called a meeting of the county party committee, where "sitting as an ordinary member of the standing committee" he put forward his views, "with the result that the document was altered to better suit actual conditions in the county."

The guiding role of the military on a provincial level was illustrated by an Anhwei article broadcast on 4 September. It showed how "under the guidance of the Anhwei provincial CCP committee, the provincial revolutionary committee, and the support-the-left leading group of the PLA units," military units at the regiment level and above were called in to directly lead the agricultural effort in 29 counties. Again, in giving local examples, the article indicated that the PLA teams operated under the overall leadership of the PLA party committee. Genuflecting in the direction of civil control, the article pointed out that the PLA teams worked locally under "the unified leadership of the county party and revolutionary committees."

The united leadership of local party and revolutionary committees has also been an issue, with the experience of Tungkuang county in Kwangtung reported both by the local radio and by NCNA. The more detailed 31 August Canton broadcast noted that some members possessed only "a vague understanding" of the relationship between the county CCP committee and the county revolutionary committee." They felt that because "the majority of the standing committee members of the county CCP committee are also standing committee members of the revolutionary committee," any problems arising between the groups can easily be decided at a meeting. But the article denounces this view as one that would weaken party leadership. The party committee must lead the revolutionary committee, and meetings making policy decisions evidently must be held solely in the party context. The NCNA release on 30 August gave a general idea of the division of function: The party committee decided on the targets and on how to carry out the learn-from-Tachai ideological movement, while the revolutionary committee "followed up with overall planning and full implementation of those measures." The real divisions of power are left shrouded in vagueness, perhaps because the PLA representatives actually still dominate both bodies.

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