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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

S U P P L E M E N T

TENTH ANNIVERSARIES OF NORTH KOREAN TREATIES WITH USSR, PRC



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23 July 1971
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TENTH ANNIVERSARIES OF NORTH KOREAN TREATIES WITH USSR, PRC

The observance of the 10th anniversaries of the signing of the DPRK's treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the USSR (6 July) and the PRC (11 July) reflected the current state of Pyongyang's relations with its two big communist allies. As decennial anniversaries, both received more publicity than the routine annual observances, but the Sino-Korean anniversary was celebrated far more lavishly than the Soviet-Korean one.*

Peking's warm treatment of the occasion came against a background of the return to cordial relations with Pyongyang over the past year and a half. Peking had given the 1970 anniversary considerable publicity after three years of token attention during the period of frigid Sino-Korean relations. The current observance followed other continuing Chinese moves to restore former bonds with the North Koreans. The Chinese senior representative at the Korean Military Armistice Commission was reported by NCNA on 16 June to have returned to his post after an absence of five years. On 3 July NCNA reported the conclusion of a bilateral Sino-Korean agreement on rescue at sea. In June 1967 Peking had refused to continue a joint sea-rescue agreement to which the USSR, the PRC, and the DPRK were signators. The following October Pyongyang had signed a bilateral agreement with the Soviets.

Leaders' messages were exchanged on both anniversaries, and Peking marked the occasion with a joint editorial and dispatched a high-powered delegation to Pyongyang. The North Koreans reciprocated by sending a major delegation to Peking. A Soviet delegation headed by a Politburo member went to Pyongyang, but the North Koreans were represented only by their ambassador in Moscow. Though both the Chinese and Soviets showed some restraint in failing to echo Pyongyang's more belligerent anti-American charges, the Chinese were clearly able to stake out a larger ground of mutual interests with the Koreans than the more circumspect Soviets. Both the big countries sought to score points with Pyongyang by portraying a Japanese threat in East Asia, but the Chinese went well beyond the Soviets in affirming mutual security interests with the North Koreans.

* Peking devoted more than 40 percent of its propaganda to the Sino-Korean anniversary in the week ending 18 July, while Moscow's comment on the Soviet-Korean anniversary accounted for only nine percent of its propaganda during the week of 5-11 July.

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Sino-Soviet polemics were muted on the occasion, though Moscow delivered some polemical jabs in broadcasts to the Chinese and Peking's comment included attacks on the "superpowers." Leaders from both sides were able to put on a show of fraternity in Pyongyang in connection with wreath-laying ceremonies in which each side honored the others' fallen soldiers.

CORRECT BUT RESTRAINED OBSERVANCE OF SOVIET-DPRK TREATY

A Soviet delegation headed by Politburo member and First Deputy Premier Mazurov* visited North Korea from 5 to 9 July for the anniversary, attending a rally and banquets and visiting Songnim. Kim Il-song entertained the guests at a luncheon on the 7th, after receiving them for a "friendly conversation." The anniversary was observed in Moscow in a routine way comparable to nondecennial occasions; no North Korean delegation visited the USSR, the DPRK Ambassador representing his country at the various events. He addressed a Moscow meeting which was attended by Politburo member Voronov and also addressed by Vice Premier Novikov. He also attended a luncheon hosted by Gromyko and gave a banquet at which Voronov spoke.

Moscow's comment reflected its general reluctance to associate itself with Pyongyang's anti-American bellicosity. Soviet propaganda characteristically emphasized the economic aid that the Soviets have given the North Koreans over the years. Speaking at the Pyongyang rally, Mazurov reviewed in some detail the economic and technical aid the USSR had given the DPRK, pointing out that "a substantial role in the fulfillment" of the DPRK's economic plans was played by Soviet assistance. Pyongyang's summaries of his speech omitted these passages, possibly reflecting sensitivity over its claim to self-reliance. North Korean spokesmen expressed gratitude in general terms for the aid given by the USSR during the Korean War and during postwar reconstruction, as well as for Soviet "support" today for the struggle for Korean unification.

* Mazurov had visited Pyongyang last August for the 25th anniversary of the Korean liberation. He also hosted First Vice Premier Kim Il when the latter visited Moscow in March 1967.

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Soviet speakers in Moscow particularly stressed the peaceful aspects of the treaty, but a 6 July IZVESTIYA article described it as "a serious warning to those who have not abandoned attempts to operate from a position of strength and to test the strength of the socialist system by force of arms." Soviet comment did not, however, name the United States in the context of reading a warning into the treaty. In his speeches in North Korea Mazurov used more militant formulations than the speakers at home, inveighing against "the reactionary and aggressive nature of the U.S. imperialists." He called the treaty "a resolute warning to people who like playing with fire that encroachments by an aggressor upon the socialist gains and sovereign rights of our peoples will encounter a worthy rebuff," and at a banquet on the 8th he acknowledged that the treaty contributes to "military cooperation" between the two countries.

Moscow's characterizations of the treaty's role were bland in comparison with those of North Korean speakers, who typically described it as an instrument for curbing the "criminal maneuvers of the imperialists, headed by U.S. imperialism," at a time when their "aggressive and war-provocative maneuvers are being further intensified." The DPRK ambassador was particularly outspoken in delivering this message at the Moscow meeting. Portraying a situation in which the "U.S. imperialists" are intensifying aggressive moves and the "Japanese militarists" are stepping up plans for overseas aggression, he declared that it "is of great significance for the two countries to further consolidate the relations of alliance and faithfully discharge the obligations they assumed under the treaty."

Both sides concentrated on depicting a threat in Asia arising from U.S.-instigated "Japanese militarism" rather than elaborating a picture of a U.S. threat. The Soviets generally avoided even their routine accusations that U.S. "provocations" against the DPRK and the military buildup in the ROK increase tensions on the peninsula.* At the Pyongyang rally Mazurov took note of the visits to South Korea of "those who are maintaining the Seoul puppets with bayonets and money," but he avoided naming Vice President Agnew and did not depict a U.S. threat to the DPRK.

* An atypically strong Soviet charge had appeared in a 25 June PRAVDA article on the Korean War anniversary which explicitly linked U.S. modernization of ROK forces and the moving of "fresh U.S. troops into the South" with a planned "march to the North" to "do away with the DPRK."

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The 6 July IZVESTIYA article described an atmosphere of "unceasing provocations by the American military and the South Korean regime," South Korean regime," but did not invoke the danger of renewed hostilities in Korea and went on to praise the DPRK's eight-point program for "peaceful" unification and demand the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.

North Korean speakers referred briefly to U.S. preparations for a "new war" in Korea, but they did not specify charges such as infiltration of spies and incursions by spy boats and aircraft as they did subsequently on the anniversary of the treaty with the Chinese. A speaker at the Pyongyang rally made one pointed effort to link Soviet security interests with those of the DPRK. In a passage describing Japanese designs on South Korea and Taiwan he added that the Japanese claim the "northern territories" occupied by the Soviet Union. Driving the point home, he stressed that it "stands out today as a very urgent task to fight against Japanese militarism . . . while struggling resolutely against U.S. imperialism." The closest Mazurov came to linking Soviet, Korean, and Chinese security interests was his remark at the rally that the Americans and Japanese are becoming "increasingly active in the direct proximity of the borders of the socialist states."

COLLECTIVE SECURITY Describing the Soviet "peace program," Mazurov mentioned "collective security" along with banning nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, liquidating foreign bases, and halting the arms race. He did not, however, resurrect the notion of an "Asian collective security system," a proposal with anti-Chinese overtones which he had mentioned in Pyongyang in August 1970 but which Pyongyang had censored in its account of his statement. This time the Pyongyang domestic service summary of his speech omitted his remarks on the Soviet proposals, while the KCNA account dismissed the passage containing the proposals by noting simply that Mazurov "referred to the question of nuclear disarmament."

COMMUNIST UNITY Speakers on both sides voiced standard and mutually acceptable appeals for communist unity against imperialism. Moscow's willingness to mute its polemics with Peking on this occasion was reflected in ceremonies in which Mazurov laid wreaths at monuments to fallen Korean, Soviet, and Chinese soldiers.

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Both KCNA and a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin reported that Mazurov met the Chinese ambassador at the memorial to the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV), the Moscow broadcast adding that after the ceremony Mazurov "held talks" with the PRC ambassador in which he stressed the need for Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean unity. Soviet central media did not report the meeting.

In some low-level comment broadcast in Mandarin, Moscow used the anniversary as an opportunity once again to attack Peking's "splittist" policies. A broadcast on 6 July was particularly outspoken, saying that Chinese policy harms the interests of the Korean people at a time when the United States "directly threatens" DPRK security. Saying that the Soviet-Korean treaty guarantees that "the DPRK is truly capable of defending itself against any aggression," the commentary made a rare Soviet reference to the Pueblo incident, claiming that "the firm stand and resolute action taken by the Soviet Union" in the spirit of the treaty in that episode "stopped Washington from resorting to armed force on a large scale on the Korean peninsula."

EFFUSIVE COMMENT ON PRC-DPRK TREATY HIGHLIGHTS SOLIDARITY

Peking and Pyongyang exchanged high-ranking delegations from 10 to 16 July. The Chinese group, led by Politburo member and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, included the head of the General Political Department of the PLA, the head of the CCP's International Liaison Department, and the minister of foreign trade as well as vice ministers. The North Korean delegation was led by Kim Chung-nin, a Political Committee member, and included such luminaries as a vice premier and the first deputy chief of the KPA General Staff.

Activities in both capitals included rallies and banquets, and the delegations took side trips to Hamhung and Shanghai, respectively. On 11 July Kim Il, Pak Song-chol, Political Committee member O Chin-u, and alternate member Yang Hyong-sop had "very cordial and friendly talks" with the Chinese visitors, and on the 13th Kim Il-song received them for "a fraternal and friendly talk" before hosting them at a luncheon. The Korean representatives were received in Peking on 10 July by Chou En-lai, Huang Yung-sheng, and other leaders for talks in what NCNA termed "a warm atmosphere of great friendship and revolutionary unity of the parties and peoples of China and Korea."

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On the 12th NCNA reported that Chou and Huang received the Koreans for talks in "an extremely cordial and friendly atmosphere." Mao took no part in the activities, apart from the greetings message.

In contrast to the routine-level press comment from Moscow, Peking marked the treaty anniversary with a joint editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY. Another feature of the Sino-Korean anniversary that was not part of the Soviet-Korean observance was the inauguration of a "friendship week" marked in the PRC and the DPRK. There was also an exchange of provincial delegations to attend provincial rallies. (There had been only one brief Soviet report that a Korean provincial delegation visited the Soviet Maritime Province for the USSR-DPRK anniversary.)

Unlike the Soviets, the Chinese joined with the North Koreans in describing their treaty as being directed against "U.S. imperialist aggression." The Chinese also explicitly quoted the passage of the treaty committing them to provide military assistance to their ally in case of attack. Chinese willingness to link their security interests with those of North Korea was stated most forcefully by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng at a 10 July Peking banquet at which he said that the security of the two countries is "closely interrelated." Historical experience has proven, he declared, "that when the enemy invades China, it invariably invades Korea first, and that when it invades Korea, it invariably further invades China."

In portraying a common threat Peking focused on a menacing "Japanese militarism" which, in "collusion" with the United States, plots aggression against Korea, China, and other Asian countries. Although Chinese speakers accused the United States of "carrying out provocations" against the DPRK as well as occupying Taiwan and resorting to a "two Chinas conspiracy," the Chinese left it to the North Koreans to make specific charges that the United States sends "armed agents, armed spy ships, and high-altitude reconnaissance planes" to intrude into the DPRK and carries out "armed attacks" along the demilitarized zone. In none of the propaganda was there an explicit reference to the Pueblo or to the downing of the U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane, although as recently as the 25 June Korean War anniversary Peking recalled the Pueblo incident in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. Peking also treated Vice

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President Agnew with a measure of restraint in denouncing his visit to South Korea. While the Korean speakers typically called him an "imperialist warmonger," the Chinese avoided epithets except for the relatively mild characterization--by Chang Chun-chiao at a Shanghai rally--of the Vice President as a "chieftain of the U.S. aggressors."

Peking recalled that the CPV had helped the Koreans during the Korean War but did not otherwise refer to Chinese aid. The Koreans thanked the Chinese for having dispatched the CPV and also expressed gratitude for the "tremendous" assistance given by the Chinese during postwar reconstruction and for currently "supporting" the Korean struggle for unification. Peking continued to express support for the North Koreans' eight-point program for "peaceful" unification, as it did on the Korean War anniversary. Peking had resurrected this modifier in its discussion of Korean unification last fall for the first time since 1966.

ASIAN UNIT: As expected, propaganda on both sides was pervaded by the theme of Asian unity, with repeated invocations of a "united front" of the people of Korea, China, the Indochinese countries, and other "revolutionary" countries of Asia. Speaking at the Peking rally, Yao Wen-yuan put a new gloss on the theme, observing that a strong front opposing U.S. aggression is developing and growing "in the eastern part of Asia." Once again, as has become habitual on such occasions, the theme was further served by the presence at the festivities in Peking of representatives of Sihanouk's government, the DRV, the PRG, and the NLHS.

Unlike the Korean War anniversary, when Peking avoided anti-Soviet remarks, the Chinese used the treaty anniversary for attacks on the "superpowers" and "modern revisionism." Yao Wen-yuan praised "medium-sized and small nations" for uniting to oppose the "politics of hegemony of the superpowers," a remark duly reported by KCNA. Peking's joint editorial, after a passage depicting the development of Asian unity against U.S. aggression and Japanese militarism, said it would be daydreaming for "any superpower or any 'economic power'"--an allusion to Japan--to try to "ride roughshod" over the Asian people and "turn back the wheel of history." The North Koreans may have been reluctant

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to permit anti-Soviet politicking on the occasion, which could have accounted for the fact that Li Hsien-nien at the Pyongyang rally had recourse to the April 1970 joint communique on Chou's visit to North Korea to get in a dig at "modern revisionism."

The Chinese visitors in North Korea, like the Soviet delegation before them, laid wreaths at monuments to fallen soldiers from all three countries. Both Pyongyang and Peking reported that the memorial to the Soviet soldiers was included, but only the North Korean account noted the Soviet ambassador's meeting with the Chinese at that ceremony.

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torn the agreements of the two Geneva conferences to scraps with its own hands dripping with blood." A 13 October 1970 PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, reacting to President Nixon's 7 October Indochina proposals, said that the Geneva agreements "have long been torn into pieces by U.S. imperialism," adding that the United States had cast the agreements "into oblivion." At that time, two months before Peking's first endorsement of the PRG's proposals at Paris, Peking's comment on the President's proposal made no mention of the Paris talks or the communist negotiating position, and these topics were also omitted from Peking's accounts of Vietnamese comment.

In now marking the Geneva anniversary with an editorial, including another endorsement of the PRG's peace proposal, Peking has taken another step toward restoring its political and diplomatic options following a period of single-minded opposition to a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict. Peking's last previous editorial on the anniversary was in 1965, when PEOPLE'S DAILY lauded the signing of the accords as "a major victory" for the Indochinese. While ignoring the anniversary in 1966, Peking comment at that time--pegged to a fighting appeal to the Vietnamese by Ho Chi Minh--declared that the Geneva agreements were "already nonexistent." During that period the Chinese showed great sensitivity to invocations of the Geneva agreements in connection with appeals for Vietnam peace talks.

In addition to publishing its own 20 July editorial, Peking marked the anniversary this year by publicizing the texts of NHAN DAN's 20 July editorial and of a Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (RGNUC) statement and summarizing 20 July editorials of the Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN and the Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT. Both the RGNUC statement and the NODONG SINMUN editorial praised the intent of the 1954 Geneva agreements--the RGNUC statement characterized the accords as "a shining victory won by the Vietnamese people"--and accused the United States of "systematically violating" them. Also on the 20th, Peking reported a meeting in Hanoi between a delegation of the DRV National Assembly's committee on national reunification and the PRG's "special representation" to the DRV. The next day NCNA carried a correspondent's account of the "heroic" achievements of the three Indochinese peoples in "smashing the enemy's new military adventures in the first half of this year." Contending that battlefield developments this year have been "of great strategic importance" and have "brought about an increasingly excellent situation," the account observed that the principal characteristic of this period was "the three peoples fighting in unity to foil the enemy's new military adventures and the three battlefields merging more completely into one."

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USSR CALLS FOR RESPONSE TO PRG, QUESTIONS SINO-U.S. MOTIVES

Routine Moscow comment continues to criticize the United States for procrastinating on a response to the PRG peace plan.* An IZVESTIYA article on 17 July says that the United States tried to "distract" world and U.S. opinion from the PRG proposals by announcing the replacement of Ambassador Bruce by Ambassador Porter. Some propaganda, including a 15 July TASS item, notes White House spokesman Ziegler's denial that Bruce's retirement had any political meaning, but also reports his statement that the White House does not plan a specific reply to the PRG proposal. TASS cites American press conjectures that Bruce's resignation will lead to a "new delay" in the Paris talks.

A 16 July IZVESTIYA article speculates that Vietnam was the main topic of President Nixon's consultations with Kissinger in San Clemente upon the latter's return from his Asian tour. IZVESTIYA says the Administration does not dare openly reject the PRG proposals and claims that the talks in California were aimed at finding a more convincing justification for "procrastination." The commentator also points to American press speculation that there will be no U.S. reply before the October elections in South Vietnam. A panelist in the 18 July domestic service roundtable discussion refers to Kissinger's meetings with Saigon politicians in observing that the United States is planning to do all it can to preserve the Thieu regime. The panelist says that the U.S. answer to the PRG proposals may be seen in Thieu's speech--given after Kissinger left--expressing his intention "to continue the blood-letting on South Vietnamese territory."

* Judging from the TASS summary, Gromyko does not specify the latest PRG plan in his 13 July letter in reply to UN Secretary General U Thant's inquiry on the implementation of a UN declaration on international security. TASS on the 20th reports Gromyko as saying that "a constructive foundation for a solution of the problems of Indochina" has been furnished by the proposals put forward by the DRV, the PRG, Sihanouk's FUNK, and the Laotian NLHS.

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PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO PEKING Some of Moscow's propaganda reacting to President Nixon's announcement of his planned trip to Peking speculates on its effect on a Vietnam peace settlement.* An 18 July international review in SOVIET RUSSIA, stating that the latest PRG peace proposals provide the United States with an opportunity for withdrawing from Indochina honorably, adds that "perhaps Washington, which is now attracted to a flirtation with Peking, is risking letting this chance slip." KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA cites the London DAILY MIRROR as saying that the invitation to Nixon means that "China is using all its influence to help America extricate itself from Vietnam on terms more acceptable to it." On the 19th TASS quotes the CPUSA organ DAILY WORLD as asking whether Nixon is really making his trip in the name of peace since the United States continues the bombing in Indochina and uses the troop-withdrawal question for "political aims."

TASS briefly summarizes the 19 July NHAN DAN editorial on the Nixon Doctrine, including its assertion that an aspect of the doctrine is the effort to "split the socialist countries by winning one part of them to its side and setting it against the other," a passage which is compatible with Moscow's "socialist unity" line. A summary printed in PRAVDA on the 20th also includes this passage along with NHAN DAN's assertion that Nixon is engaged in a "search for the way out," but that he "has set off in the wrong direction." Both summaries omit the warning that Nixon's policy also tries to achieve a "compromise between the big powers" to make "smaller countries bow to their arrangements."

GENEVA AGREEMENTS ANNIVERSARY Moscow marks the 17th anniversary of the Geneva agreements with a "solidarity day" and inauguration of a "solidarity month." Last year no solidarity month was publicized although it was observed every previous year back to 1966. The customary Moscow public meeting is held and messages from public organizations are reported. TRUD carries an editorial and

* Such comment, some of it more pointed than Moscow's, has also come from Eastern Europe. See the Sino-U.S. relations section of this TRENDS.

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other comment includes a 20 July PRAVDA article by Mayevskiy.* The comment routinely expresses Soviet determination to continue assisting the Vietnamese people in their struggle and demands the implementation of the Geneva agreements and the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Commentators support the new PRG initiative in standard terms, Mayevskiy, for example, reiterating that the proposal "opens a prospect of peace in Indochina," and that it now "depends on Washington whether it will avail itself of the new opportunity or will stubbornly continue the line for expansion of the criminal war."

INDOCHINA
SETTLEMENT

An IZVESTIYA article by Kudryavtsev on 17 July links U.S. failure to respond to the PRG proposal with its actions in Laos and Cambodia. Kudryavtsev scores the United States for "pressuring" Souvanna Phouma to reject the NLHS' latest peace proposal in Laos** at the same time that it exhibits a "negative attitude" toward the PRG proposal. The U.S. attitude shows its reluctance to end aggression, says Kudryavtsev, and since the aggression has spread to Cambodia and Laos, "it is impossible to speak of peace in Indochina while aggression continues in even one of these countries." Kudryavtsev recalls that President Nixon himself said in his 7 October 1970 speech that the Indochina war is a "single whole" and cannot be ended by concern with just one of the regions where it started, although he does not recall that President Nixon proposed a broad international conference on Indochina. Kudryavtsev concludes that the "propaganda fuss" about gradual withdrawal from Vietnam is meaningless unless concrete steps are taken "simultaneously" to end the aggression in Cambodia and Laos.

Moscow in the past has followed Hanoi's lead when, in rejecting proposals for a broad conference on Indochina, it has implied that a Vietnam settlement should be separate from settlements in the other countries. In denouncing President Nixon's

* There had been no editorials last year and only a RED STAR one in 1969. The three previous anniversaries had been marked with PRAVDA editorials. The 10th anniversary in 1964 had received minimal attention and there were no editorials.

** See the TRENDS of 14 July, pages 8-9, and of 30 June, pages 8-10, for a discussion of the latest NLHS proposal, put forward by Souphanouvong in a letter to Souvanna Phouma on 22 June.

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7 October proposal for an international conference, Moscow had said that Vietnam could be settled at Paris and settlements in Laos and Cambodia were "the business of the peoples in these countries."

Kudryavtsev in his IZVESTIYA article also refers to Chinese security interests in Laos but does not go on to criticize Chinese policies. It notes that Laos borders on the PRC as well as on Burma and the DRV, and cites the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW for a report that the CIA mission in Laos sends intelligence and diversionary groups into China's Yunnan Province.

MEDIA OBSCURE CALLS AT PARIS FOR CLARIFICATION OF PRG PLAN

The Vietnamese communist delegates' statements at the 15 July session of the Paris talks again denounced the Nixon Administration's lack of response to the PRG's 1 July peace package and accused the United States of distorting their good will and continuing to wage war. Other propaganda continues to stress worldwide acclaim and support for the seven-point proposal. This support is contrasted with the President's failure to respond to communist demands that he set a troop withdrawal deadline and stop backing the Thieu administration. DRV delegate Xuan Thuy at the Paris session said that the President reaffirmed his "old erroneous policy" when he said on 6 July that the United States was actively pursuing negotiations and Vietnamization simultaneously. Thuy asked: "How can one seriously negotiate" while carrying out Vietnamization, which means prolonging and expanding the war, and "deliberately" maintaining the Thieu administration "which is the greatest obstacle to the progress of the Paris conference?" (Earlier comment had scored the President's 6 July remarks to news media executives in Kansas City for ignoring the 1 July PRG peace initiative.)

At the session, the communists studiously avoided further clarification or explanation of any of the seven points; DRV delegate Xuan Thuy only briefly capsulized point one on a U.S. troop withdrawal and prisoner release, while Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh merely repeated the gist of point one on U.S. withdrawal and point two on the question of power in South Vietnam. The efforts of Ambassador Bruce and GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam to obtain further clarifications are ignored in the VNA account of the session, which merely says the allied delegates "again

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avoided responding seriously to the PRG's seven-point peace plan by setting forth perfidious contentions." It adds that the U.S. delegate "rehashed the absurd claim about 'mutual troop withdrawal' and still schemed to maintain the Nguyen Van Thieu bellicose group." VNA thus ignores Ambassador Bruce's and Lam's reiteration of the U.S. suggestion last week that the talks be moved into restricted sessions away from the glare of publicity. And it does not reflect the fact that Bruce answered the four questions posed by Mme. Binh last week* and asked five of his own. Similarly, the account of the session ignores the fact that GVN delegate Lam again sought clarification of a number of issues.

Following standard practice, Vietnamese communist propaganda did not carry accounts of the post-session press briefings at which the additional remarks of the communist delegates were revealed. According to VNA's service transmission from Paris to Hanoi, PRG spokesman Duong Dinh Thao reported that Mme. Binh charged that Bruce's questions were aimed "not at clarifying the problems" but at "distorting" the proposals and "avoiding the questions which have been clearly posed." She then repeated the last three of the four questions she had raised last week--suggesting that she may have been satisfied with Bruce's remarks, in response to her first question, to the effect that the United States is willing to consider for negotiation any proposal by the other side "as well as our own."

Thao further reported that Mme. Binh said she had the "impression" that all seven points were "considered negative"--an apparent allusion to Bruce's request for further clarification of individual points before he could state which ones the United States considered positive and which negative.

PRG SUGGESTS VOTING FOR "PEACEFUL CANDIDATE" AGAINST THIEU

In a departure from the standard propaganda fare which dismisses the forthcoming South Vietnamese presidential election as a "fraud," a 17 July Liberation Radio broadcast seemed to suggest that the elections could be used to change the Saigon regime in

* The questions were whether the United States agreed to consider the seven points as a basis for negotiation, which of the seven points it found positive and which unacceptable, whether it was ready to set a date to end the war, and whether it was ready to end its support of the GVN.

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order to proceed to a peaceful settlement. The commentary quoted the view of "officers and civil servants" that a vote for Thieu is a vote for war and that "if you want peace, you should vote for a peaceful candidate." It added that "our people do not lack talented and virtuous men of good will; although their views may differ on a few points, their aspiration for peace is unanimous."*

A similar positive note was struck in another Liberation Radio broadcast on the 18th which reported that an "expose" by the Citizens' Political Office (vawn phongf chans trij coong daan) in Saigon had appealed for the National Assembly and presidential elections to be free and honest and proclaimed that: "the forthcoming elections must provide an opportunity for the people to arise to demonstrate their indomitability, to sweep away the filthy and unskilled elements who have decayed this nation, and to create a new, clean, democratic, progressive, and peaceful situation for this country."

Further evidence that the communists may seek to use the GVN's political machinery for their own ends was contained in a 19 July Liberation Radio report on activities of "compatriots" in areas adjacent to the Rach Gia provincial capital. According to the broadcast, the "compatriots" have formed committees to determine the aspirations of the local people and then inform "candidates for political office." The broadcast said the candidates would be asked to pledge to meet these aspirations once they win the elections. It noted that similar committees have been set up in a number of precincts in Saigon.

* The thrust of the Front commentary seems consistent with Le Duc Tho's reported remark in his 6 July New York TIMES interview that the October presidential election could provide an opportunity to remove Thieu and thus help settle the war. Communist media have not publicized the interview.

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DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S. STRIKES IN DMZ

Two DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements, on 12 and 17 July, charged the United States with using B-52's and artillery against villages in the DMZ. In addition, the protest of the 12th charged that U.S. planes fired rockets against localities in Quang Binh Province, on 10 July.*

Recounting the alleged U.S. action in the DMZ, the protest of the 12th said that U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, on 9 and 10 July bombed Huong Lap village "north of the 17th parallel in the DMZ." The protest of the 17th claimed that on 15 July U.S. B-52's bombed Huong Lap village and that from the 14th to the 16th U.S. artillery on ships off the coast and based south of the DMZ repeatedly shelled Vinh Giang, Vinh Quang, and Vinh Son villages, which the spokesman said are in the DMZ and on DRV territory. Both statements "energetically condemned" these "war acts" and demanded that the United States permanently stop all "acts of encroachment" upon DRV sovereignty and security.

* The U.S. Command in Saigon reported on the 11th that U.S. fighter-bombers had hit a cluster of antiaircraft sites in North Vietnam that day in the area of the Mugia Pass about eight miles northwest of the DMZ.

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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PEKING CARRIES NO COMMENT ON ANNOUNCEMENT OF NIXON VISIT

Apart from rebroadcasts of the announcement in PRC domestic and foreign services, Peking has made no further mention of President Nixon's acceptance of an invitation to visit the PRC before next May, announced simultaneously by the President and NCNA at 0230 GMT 16 July. The original announcement was carried in NCNA's English service sandwiched between reports on a PRC delegation in North Korea for the anniversary of the PRC-DPRK treaty. The announcement was broadcast in the Peking domestic service's national hookup program at 1200 GMT 16 July as the fifth of 10 news items. As usual, Peking has not reported the substance of Chou En-lai's remarks to a group of Americans on 19 July.

Chinese comment on a wide range of issues involving U.S. interests has followed standard lines, converging particularly in a portrayal of a joint U.S. and Japanese threat in extensive comment marking the 10th anniversary of the PRC-DPRK treaty. Peking's special concern over territorial questions was again reflected in a speech by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng at the DPRK embassy on the 16th, shortly after the announcement of plans for President Nixon's visit. Taking note of Philippine and South Vietnamese claims to disputed islands in the South China Sea, Huang declared that the PRC has "indisputable legitimate sovereignty" over the Spratly and Paracel Islands and "absolutely allows no country to encroach upon this sovereign right." Huang did not mention Taiwan, but calls for the "liberation" of Taiwan recurred in other Chinese comment on the anniversary; such a call was voiced in the most urgent tones by Li Hsien-nien at a Pyongyang mass rally on the 11th, when he said the Chinese people have not forgotten that the United States is "still occupying" Taiwan and affirmed that the goal of liberation "must be attained" and "can certainly be attained."

None of Peking's comment during this period has been addressed directly to the state of Sino-U.S. relations, nor has there been any personal vilification of the President in the course of attacks on U.S. policies. Territorial questions--specifically, those raised by State Department spokesman Bray's 26 April statement that sovereignty over Taiwan represents an unsettled question--

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had occasioned adverse comment on Sino-U.S. relations in early May. Though an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 4 May was confined to a rebuttal of Bray's remarks on the status of Taiwan, an accompanying NCNA report offered Peking's first comment on Washington's recent initiatives in the wake of the visit to the PRC by the American table tennis team the previous month. Noting that the Administration had "hastily made various gestures . . . as if it wanted to improve relations" with Peking, NCNA concluded that U.S. statements on the Taiwan question showed the Administration's professed desire for normalized relations to be "all humbug."

Peking all but ignored the question of improving Sino-U.S. relations in comment marking the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War and the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan--an occasion last year for a Chinese policy statement ruling out any relaxation of tension. The only direct comment on Sino-U.S. relations appeared in a 27 June broadcast to Taiwan over the PLA's Fukien Front Radio which accused the President of "doubledealing" by professing to improve relations with the PRC while seeking a permanent severance of Taiwan from mainland authority. The same transmitter has been a unique source of comment on relations with the United States in the wake of the announcement regarding the President's forthcoming visit. A commentary broadcast on 17 July, taking note of the stream of American visitors to the PRC since the table tennis team, claimed that the U.S. policy of isolating the PRC for over 20 years has gone bankrupt. Depicting the American people as being in "the same frontline with us" in struggle against "U.S. imperialism," the broadcast cited Mao for a distinction between the people and the government of the United States. This distinction had been cited by the Shanghai radio, but not by the PRC central media, at the time of the table tennis team's visit.

Peking's continuing practice of "people's diplomacy" was reflected in an NCNA report that Chou En-lai had "a cordial and friendly conversation" on 19 July with "the friendship delegation" of the American Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. The importance Peking attaches to these contacts is indicated by the presence at the meeting of Politburo members Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan along with the Premier. Following its usual practice, Peking has not

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reported Chou's remarks to the group. According to Western news reports from Peking, the visitors said Chou indicated to them that U.S. withdrawal from Indochina has top priority and that normalization of Sino-U.S. relations would not deflect Peking's support for that demand.*

HANOI, PYONGYANG IGNORE ANNOUNCEMENT; DRV BETRAYS DISQUIET

Vietnamese communist media have not mentioned the announcement on President Nixon's visit to Peking, but Hanoi has registered misgivings over the development in a flurry of authoritative comment stressing its resolve to pursue an independent foreign policy and not to succumb to pressure from the big powers. Hanoi's comment emphasizes that the Vietnamese communists took the initiative in giving the President a way out of Vietnam when the 1 July PRG peace proposal was presented. (Hanoi's comment is discussed in the Indochina section of the TRENDS.)

Pyongyang, in keeping with its militant anti-U.S. line and opposition to detente politics, has ignored the announcement. Like Hanoi, Pyongyang had also remained silent on the visit of the American table tennis team to the PRC in April. With motives similar to those of the truculently anti-U.S. North Koreans, Peking's militantly anti-imperialist Albanian ally has also kept silent so far.

* PRC propaganda on Vietnam is discussed in the Indochina section of the TRENDS.

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SPARSE SOVIET REACTION NOTES SINO-U.S. "FLIRTATION"

Soviet reaction to the announcement on the President's forthcoming visit to the PRC has been sparse and chilly, reflecting the disquiet over Peking's "flirtation" with Washington that has been expressed in Moscow's reaction to earlier developments in Sino-U.S. relations. As in the reaction to developments in the wake of "ping pong diplomacy," the daily press has carried only brief references to Sino-U.S. relations and has relied mainly on selective reporting from foreign sources to convey comment. Extensive comment on earlier developments was confined to the Soviet weekly press and foreign broadcasts by Radio Moscow.

Moscow's initial reaction to the announcement appeared in a TASS transmission more than seven hours later which juxtaposed a Peking-dated report and one datelined Washington telling of the Kissinger-Chou meeting and disclosing the President's acceptance of the invitation. TASS said the President "motivated his decision by the desire to establish new relations" with the PRC. The account did not cite his remark that the visit is not directed against any other nation. The Soviet press carried the account the next day.

The announcement was mentioned briefly in two international reviews in the press on the 18th. A PRAVDA article by Ovchinnikov, taking note of the recent travels of Vice President Agnew, Secretary Laird, and Henry Kissinger, cited a report from San Clemente that the latter received an "exceptionally cordial and courteous" reception in Peking. Characteristically, a review of the week by A. Yefremov in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA cited a foreign paper for the view that the invitation to the President means Peking is using its influence to help the United States extricate itself from Vietnam on terms acceptable to Washington. Vietnam also figures in an oblique reference to the invitation appearing in a SOVIET RUSSIA article by Gerasimov on the 18th. After stating that the latest PRG peace proposals offer the United States an opportunity of withdrawing from Indochina with honor, Gerasimov added: "Perhaps Washington, which is now attracted to a flirtation with Peking, is risking letting this chance slip."

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An effort to score points in the Vietnam context--which has figured prominently in Moscow's reaction to earlier Sino-U.S. developments--comes through clearly in a 19 July TASS account of an editorial in the U.S. communist paper DAILY WORLD. According to the account, the editorial asks whether the President is really undertaking his voyage in the name of peace, noting that B-52's were sowing death in Vietnam at the very time the President announced his forthcoming visit to Peking. TASS quoted the paper as saying broad circles of the American public are demanding that Washington accept the PRG's latest proposals.

There has been no comment in Soviet media on the implications of the latest Sino-U.S. development for the triangular relationship.

BUDAPEST, SOFIA MOST VOCAL PROXIES FOR MOSCOW IN EAST EUROPE

Soviet bloc concern over the possible repercussions of President Nixon's projected Peking visit have been expressed most extensively by Hungary, which has served in the past as Soviet proxy spokesman in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and by Moscow's faithful Bulgarian satellite. Most notably, the Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG on 18 July implied that a Sino-U.S. detente may be detrimental to Hanoi's interests and warned of the "dangers" inherent in a visit motivated by "anti-Sovietism." The same article contained a new Hungarian blast at Romania's China policy, lecturing on the impermissibility of a neutralist posture. And Poland's first--belated--authoritative reaction in TRYBUNA LUDU on the 20th took pointed note of the presence of Romanian visitors at a recent rally at which the Chinese expressed their "anti-Soviet line."

Like Warsaw, Prague waited until the 20th to come out with comment on the projected visit in its leading party daily, RUDE PRAVO. East Berlin's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND has yet to comment.

HUNGARY Hungarian media have paid lip service to the notion that the President's trip to Peking could serve the cause of peaceful coexistence but have expressed apprehension over its possible adverse effects on Hanoi and its "anti-Soviet" overtones.

Articles in both the party and government newspapers have contained passages evidently contrived to suggest the possibility that the Chinese might sell out the DRV for their own national interests. An article in the government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on the 18th said the projected trip "creates a pretext for further American delays in Paris and for postponement of answers to constructive proposals." MAGYAR HIRLAP added that the move,

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which "according to the facts available was not coordinated by Peking with the DRV and the PRG," could thus "inflict grave damage and suffering on the struggling people of Vietnam." On the same day, NEPSZABADSAG's "weekly editorial foreign policy review," after granting that exchanges of views between two major powers and the lessening of world tensions are regarded "as useful and desirable by everybody favoring peaceful coexistence," went on to caution that the President's trip should not be appraised from the viewpoint of "diplomatic niceties." The only applicable criterion, the paper said, is: "How will it affect the life-and-death struggle of the Indochinese peoples? . . . Will it weaken or strengthen them?"

On the score of Soviet interests, taking note of the President's assurance that his decision to go to Peking was not aimed against any state, NEPSZABADSAG commented that the Chinese-American rapprochement had taken place so far on an "anti-Soviet platform" and that "this junction is an extremely dangerous one" even if Washington and Peking "are led by different motives." Nobody who is dedicated to the cause of progress in international relations, it warned, "must forget these dangers and their possible serious repercussions."

Pursuing its role as Soviet surrogate with respect to the Romanians, NEPSZABADSAG stopped short of bringing up Western press speculation about a Romanian role in the Sino-U.S. developments but took the occasion to repeat recent Hungarian criticisms of Ceausescu's Peking visit and to lecture again on the impermissibility of neutrality in the struggle between ideologies. Remarking on the ways in which the Peking press has exploited Ceausescu's visit to press its "anti-Soviet" line, particularly by coupling the USSR with the United States as "superpowers" opposed to small and medium-sized nations, the paper clearly implied that Romania's attraction for Peking lay in its resistance to Soviet tutelage and that the Romanians were letting themselves be used as Chinese pawns in the Sino-Soviet conflict. A similar implication had been drawn by Hungarian party secretary Zoltan Komocsin in a Hungarian National Assembly speech on 24 June which prompted a defiant rebuttal from his Romanian counterpart in the Bucharest SCINTEIA on 9 July.*

* See the TRENDS of 14 July, pages 10-15, for a review of the Hungarian-Romanian polemic.

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Pointing to "erroneous views" in the international communist movement, NEPSZABADSAG argued that "it is the responsibility of every communist party to adopt a clear and principled stand in connection with the vital questions of mankind." The paper added pointedly: "We reject neutrality in the struggle among ideologies, in politics, and in the strivings for unprincipled compromises because we maintain that Marxism-Leninism is a commitment. It is impossible to condone a defined stand and at the same time approve of those who represent the opposite."

BULGARIA Moscow's Bulgarian acolyte has discerned sinister Sino-U.S. "collusion" in the announcement of the planned visit. An authoritative Bulgarian news agency commentary entitled "'Normalization' of Relations Only?", published in all the Bulgarian national newspapers on 17 July, placed the projected visit in the context of U.S. "anticommunist policy" worldwide and of "the Chinese leaders' effort to split the anti-imperialist powers." The announcement from Washington and Peking, the BTA commentary said, "vividly demonstrates who it is that joins in secret collusion at present with imperialism in the name of unworthy political aims." The question could be raised, BTA added, whether the desire for "normalization" on both sides "has not been dictated above all by the longings to unite their forces in a definite direction which has nothing in common with a genuine concern for peace and international understanding."

On the 17th Sofia's military daily, NARODNA ARMIYA, interpreted the President's decision to visit China as part of a U.S. effort "to take advantage of Peking's isolation from the socialist camp and of Peking's overt anti-Sovietism." The article added that normalizations of relation with Peking would be of "great strategic significance for the United States in the Far East, since the Pentagon would be assured of a more tranquil military presence in Pacific countries." An article in Sofia's VECHERNI NOVINI on the 16th brought up the U.S. elections: "It is obvious that relations with Peking will be Nixon's ace of trumps in the election campaign; he will try to balance the Vietnam policy with the PRC policy, at least until election day."

POLAND Following limited, cautious comment in lesser Polish papers and what seemed essentially time-marking first reactions in the party's TRYBUNA LUDU and the government's ZYCIE WARSZAWY, the Poles came out with their first authoritative appraisal in TRYBUNA LUDU on 20 July. On the 18th, a roundup of foreign reactions in the party daily had tied the President's announcement to the U.S. election campaign, seeing the visit as "a high point" of moves to improve his chances of reelection; and the government paper, also mentioning the elections, commented that the President's decision to go to Peking should be welcomed if the trip "would really indicate a turnabout in the American

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way of thinking about the contemporary world" but that only the future will tell what the "real motives" are.

TRYBUNA LUDU's assessment in a signed article on the 20th, as reported by PAP, set out to make points in the international communist movement at Peking's expense. The trip must be judged, the paper said, in a broad context of "the global confrontation between aggressive U.S.-led imperialism and the forces of socialism and national liberation movements." Against this background, it charged, "the rapprochement between the Nixon Administration and the Chinese leadership was made easier by Peking's anti-Sovietism and schismatic policy in the socialist community." The article insinuated that the Romanians were abetting these machinations. It is "significant," TRYBUNA LUDU said, that before the news about the invitation to the President was announced, the Chinese reiterated their "anti-Soviet line" at a rally marking the visit of "a Romanian delegation," as well as in a press article on the Chinese party's 50th anniversary.

TRYBUNA LUDU went on to suggest that the Washington-Peking "rapprochement in the past two years" has been detrimental to Hanoi's interests, "for this was a period of escalation of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, which was extended to Cambodia and Laos." Alleging that "reactionary" forces in the United States and elsewhere have welcomed the President's plan to go to Peking, the article remarked that they did so because they "expect that the visit will be followed by pressures on the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and they see Peking's invitation as a help in the pursuit of their policy aimed against the forces of socialism and national liberation."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA Prague and Bratislava media at first played down the announcement of the trip in meager news coverage and limited comment. Almost identical, very brief reports of the President's announcement appeared in all the dailies on 17 July. Through 19 July, comment appeared only in the Bratislava trade union daily PRACA and the Bratislava PRAVDA. The regular "weekly review" in the Bratislava paper on the 17th traced the warming trend in U.S.-PRC relations and observed that now "Peking has offered a helping hand in view of next year's presidential elections." It recalled Husak's statement at the 14th CPCZ Congress to the effect that the Chinese leadership's views constitute "a danger for the interests of socialism." And it remarked on the relevance of the President's Peking visit to the war in Vietnam: "If, with hidden Chinese help, President Nixon tries to evade direct roads such as those suggested by the Vietnamese patriots, this will most decidedly not benefit world peace one little bit."

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RUDE PRAVO did not comment until the 20th, when it published a review of world reaction interlaced with attacks on U.S. Indochina policy and President Nixon personally. After noting that world reaction has been essentially favorable and that commentators believed the trip could be "useful for understanding among nations" and for bringing peace to Asia, the paper added caustically that it is the United States which is responsible for the present conflict in Asia and observed that "the Pentagon papers revealed that the signatures of five American presidents, including President Nixon, are stained with the blood of the Indochinese peoples." Quoting Bulgarian and other communist sources, RUDE PRAVO went on to question the sincerity of the President's motives: "The U.S. President does not regard relations between the PRC and the United States as an instrument of peace and understanding among nations, but rather as a means of disturbing the unity of anti-imperialist forces."

THE GDR East German media have so far been marking time on the news of the projected trip. The party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 17 July carried a short ADN report on the President's announcement. On the 19th the paper carried a brief report citing the NEW YORK TIMES on the President's consultations in San Clemente, as well as short accounts of articles in the 18 July Moscow PRAVDA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA concerning U.S. diplomatic activity and Western press reaction to the announcement. At this writing, the paper has carried no original comment on the subject.

In reporting the President's announcement, East Berlin Radio on the 16th remarked that Mr. Nixon, while emphasizing that his journey would be made for peace, avoided the most important point: "When will American troops be withdrawn from Vietnam?"

ROMANIA HAILS PLANNED VISIT AS CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD DETENTE

Romania abstained from comment on the announcement of the visit for five days, then released an **authoritative assessment** in the party organ SCINTEIA which welcomed Sino-U.S. detente as a contribution to world peace and in effect disputed the line pressed by Moscow's orthodox allies that it endangers "socialist" interests. Unlike the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries, Bucharest media reported not only the announcement released by the President and in Peking but went into some detail on the President's 16 July televised statement, quoting among

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other things his expression of a deep conviction that all countries will benefit from better U.S.-PRC relations. Bucharest also noted that UN Secretary General U Thant had released "a statement stressing that this event is auspicious not only for relations between the two countries but also for the future of the United Nations."

The 21 July SCINTEIA article, under the authoritative signatures of the paper's leading political commentators Caplescu and Fintinaru, developed similar themes in hailing the projected visit as "an important contribution" not only to Chinese-American relations but to international detente. "It is a gladdening fact," the article added, that the United States has taken what amounts to "the first step toward giving up the unrealistic policy promoted for more than 20 years in relation to China." Arguing that Sino-U.S. detente is "an imperative of peaceful coexistence," the article made the point that it is therefore also in the best interests of socialism: "Unquestionably, the increasingly active world role of China, a socialist country, favors the growth of the anti-imperialist forces. . . . Therefore, it is only natural that everybody desirous of seeing international detente should view Peking's increasing international activity with satisfaction."

In an evident attempt to counter the charges issuing from Soviet bloc media that a Peking-Washington rapprochement might be injurious to Hanoi's interests, the paper declared: "Our country has also stressed, and now stresses it equally clearly and consistently, that there is an imperative need to end the war in Vietnam and throughout Indochina and to find a political solution for the Vietnam issue, based on the recent seven-point proposals of the PRG." In the wake of Western press speculation--and innuendo in Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU--about a possible Romanian role in the latest move in the Sino-U.S. **rapprochement**, SCINTEIA reiterated a stock rationale for its independent line: Romania favors contacts among all states, regardless of systems, and "makes her own contribution."

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PROLIFIC YUGOSLAV COMMENT GREETES ANNOUNCEMENT WITH ENTHUSIASM

Against the background of Belgrade's own recent normalization of relations with Peking and its vested interest in detente, Yugoslav media have reacted enthusiastically to the President's announcement, with the press hailing it as "sensational," "bomb blast," "passing the Rubicon," and "a major historic change." The most authoritative comment came on the 17th in the daily BORBA, which called the President's decision to visit Peking "a great event of enormous importance" that represents a triumph of "realism" over "self-delusion." While cautioning that no one should hope for spectacular results overnight, the paper was optimistic about the chances that the visit might open the way "for a general improvement of the situation in Asia, the United Nations, and the entire world."

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CHINA UN SEAT

PEKING PROMPTLY PUBLICIZES ALBANIAN RESOLUTION ON MEMBERSHIP

Peking media beginning on 17 July publicized the draft resolution--sponsored by Albania and 17 other nations--on the question of PRC membership in the United Nations. The resolution, dated the 15th, calls on U Thant to include the membership issue in the agenda of the 26th session of the UN General Assembly, scheduled to open on 21 September. Calling the PRC the "sole legitimate representative of China" in the world organization and "one of the five permanent members of the Security Council," it demands restoration of the PRC's "rights" and expulsion of "the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the seat which they illegally occupy" in the United Nations and in all the organizations attached to it.

NCNA, in transmitting the text of the resolution, recalls that for the first time in 20 years the General Assembly last November approved a similar resolution. But because "the United States, Japan, and other countries" had succeeded in passing a resolution declaring PRC membership an "important question" requiring a two-thirds vote, NCNA notes, the restoration to the PRC of its legitimate rights was blocked.

The prompt publicity for the draft resolution, while not unprecedented,* is notable when cast against the recent announcement of President Nixon's scheduled visit to the PRC and the spate of statements by Chinese spokesmen since last November welcoming the support of others for restoration of the PRC's "legitimate rights" in the world organization. The NCNA dispatch wrapping up last November's vote on the PRC membership issue had held its fire against the United Nations as an organization, instead attacking the "superpowers" who were allegedly colluding via the UN machinery.**

* In 1963, for example, an NCNA dispatch on the opening of the General Assembly noted in passing that the Albanian foreign minister had sent a letter to U Thant on 16 September demanding inclusion of the PRC membership issue on the session's agenda.

** Last year's vote on the membership issue is discussed in the TREND'S for 25 November 1970, pages 24-26.

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Most recently, acting PRC Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, in remarks at an Iraqi embassy reception reported by NCNA on 17 July, hailed Iraq's support for the restoration of the PRC's rights in the United Nations and its opposition to "the imperialist plot of creating 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan.'" Two days earlier, an NCNA dispatch said that the acting foreign minister thanked France--at an embassy reception on Bastille Day on the 14th--for "upholding justice in the United Nations" and supporting the restoration of the PRC's rights there. Peking has not reported Chou En-lai's remarks to visiting American scholars on the 20th: According to Western news reports, he said that the PRC would never join the United Nations if the world organization sought a compromise which would give China's seat to Peking while retaining Taiwan as a member.

MOSCOW A rare high-level Moscow reference to PRC membership in the United Nations appears in a letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko to U Thant outlining the Soviet posture on various international issues in connection with the UN Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. TASS summarized the letter on the 20th but did not indicate the date it was sent; according to the New York TIMES, it was dated 13 July.

In the passage treating the United Nations, Gromyko's letter says that the organization's universality would increase its effectiveness, and he calls for the admission of both German states and the PRC as well as the expulsion of the Taiwan representatives. After failing in his 1969 speech before the General Assembly to call for the admission of the PRC and the two Germanies, Gromyko reverted in his 21 October 1970 address to his earlier practice of urging admission for all three states. In his 1970 speech he did not restate the specific demand of previous years for expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese, but he characterized the PRC as "a power which alone can represent the Chinese people in the Security Council, at the General Assembly, and in other UN organs."

Since the Gromyko speech in October 1970, the matter of PRC membership in the United Nations has been broached only once by the Soviet leadership: A statement on Indochina at a Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting in Berlin in December 1970--signed by Brezhnev and Kosygin--took note of the fact that the United States has "prevented the restoration of the lawful rights of the Chinese People's Republic" in the United Nations.

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MIDDLE EAST

PONOMAREV ARRIVES IN UAR FOR JULY ANNIVERSARY, ASU CONGRESS

The arrival in Cairo on the 20th of a CPSU delegation led by Central Committee Secretary Ponomarev* to attend the 19th anniversary of the 23 July revolution and the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) national congress seems to underscore Moscow's interest in the newly reconstituted ASU following the UAR leadership purges in May. Attendance of such a high-level Soviet delegation at these functions appears to be unusual, although Nasir in his 23 July address to the congress last year did welcome unidentified delegations. There was no advance public announcement of the Ponomarev delegation's visit. The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) reported on the 21st that CPSU and ASU delegations held "preliminary meetings" that day, discussing "fraternal relations" linking the two countries and political organization. The sides also reviewed aspects of cooperation in various fields to be discussed, MENA said, in "official talks" scheduled to begin in Alexandria after the ASU congress meetings.

The communique on Podgorny's May visit had seemed to reflect strains in CPSU-ASU relations. Notably brief and more restrained with regard to party ties than Soviet-Egyptian communiqués in January and last December, it merely said that there were discussions of "questions of the development of relations" between the ASU and the CPSU and that "agreement was reached on concrete undertakings in fulfillment of the plans of the parties in 1971."

A Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on 2 July, however, "noted with pleasure" the "constantly developing close relations" of the ASU and the CPSU. Pegged to the ASU primary-level elections, the commentary justified the "rebuilding" of the ASU, calling this necessary to consolidate the organization's role in the country's life. It commented approvingly on the ASU's social structure and its close relationship with the masses. Like Podgorny in his speeches in Cairo in May, and the communique on his visit, the broadcast stressed that the UAR Government's program is based on the National Action Charter and Nasir's 30 March 1968 program, committing the UAR to a socialist path.

* Ponomarev led a CPSU delegation to the UAR 10-20 December 1970; a member of his current delegation, Y. Tyazhelnikov, headed a Komsomol delegation which visited the UAR 21-28 July last year.

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But an article by PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov, reviewed by TASS on 20 July, warned that "social contrasts in Egyptian society are rather marked still," and that it would be a mistake to think that the struggle is over. The Egyptian press, he added, constantly points out that the "sector in which capitalist relations exist is still rather large" in the UAR. The country's development, he concluded, is taking place in complex conditions of continued Israeli aggression, and he called for a high degree of organization, vigilance, and activity of the working class in view of the "constant threat of intrigues of internal and external reaction."

UAR-USSR MEETING A statement issued after a UAR cabinet session on the 20th said, according to Cairo radio, that there was a "further debate" on the outcome of Foreign Minister Riyad's recent visit to Moscow and some East European capitals, and that "it has been decided to hold a meeting between representatives of the UAR and the USSR soon." TASS, in a short account of this statement by the UAR information minister, noted that the cabinet heard a report by Riyad but failed to mention the decision on a UAR-Soviet meeting.

MOSCOW REPORTS ARAB ANXIETY OVER FIGHTING IN JORDAN

Moscow's coverage of the recent Jordanian operations against Palestinian fedayeen in northern Jordan again **refrains--as it did during the fighting last September--from initiating any criticism of Husayn**. And limited comment broadcast in Arabic again says the clashes will benefit only the Arabs' enemies, and expresses Soviet sympathy for both the Jordanian and Palestinian people. But reportage increasingly focuses on Arab criticism of the Jordanian actions rather than contriving, as last fall, to present relatively neutral, balanced accounts.

BROADCASTS IN ARABIC A commentary on the 16th routinely charged "anti-Arab forces" with circulating false rumors and allegations aimed at sowing dissension among the Arabs, and declared the Soviet people to be sympathetic to both "the friendly people of Jordan" and to the Palestinians. A broadcast on the 20th accused "certain elements" in Jordan of activity in harmony with imperialist and Zionist interests aimed at liquidating the Palestinian

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resistance movement. It claimed that current events can only please the Israelis and their patrons, particularly when some of the Palestinians were "forced to retreat" to occupied territory. The commentary recalled that during the September fighting the Soviet Union "issued a direct warning" to the imperialists and Israel, and it quoted Brezhnev as having said the USSR sought to contribute to halting the fighting. It expressed hope, in conclusion, that the Arab forces "are not dispersed to no avail," and called for a quick end to the fighting.

REPORTAGE ON DEVELOPMENTS Citing Palestinian sources in its first report on the new fighting on 13 July, TASS noted that according to "news services" there had been no official Jordanian communique or other confirmation of the Palestinian reports. An Arabic-language broadcast the following day said a Jordanian representative had stated that the events in northern Jordan "did not go beyond normal friction" between the fedayeen and government forces. Subsequent TASS dispatches have reported appeals by various Arab organizations for a halt to the fighting and protests against the Jordanian action, Syrian efforts to mediate, Iraq's decision to close the Iraqi-Jordanian border and to demand the recall of the Jordanian ambassador, and a UAR spokesman's statement regretting the Jordanian Government's stand.

In a review of developments in the 17 July PRAVDA, the paper's Cairo correspondent, Glukhov, placed Egypt's postponement of Husayn's scheduled visit to Cairo in the context of the Jordanian fighting, although he explained that the postponement "is motivated" by UAR preoccupation with the 23 July anniversary celebrations and the ASU congress. In a 19 July PRAVDA dispatch Glukhov reported that the 17 July communique on the Mersa Matruh meeting of Tripoli Charter states--the UAR, Syria, Libya, and Sudan--expressed profound concern over the Jordanian clashes and that the Cairo press attributed the fighting to a Jordanian desire to liquidate the Palestine resistance movement. He cited Cairo's AL-AHRAM as charging the United States with giving the "Jordan authorities" open support against the Palestinians. A TASS roundup on the 19th noted reports that the Jordanian Government had declared it considered the Cairo and Amman agreements of last fall on Jordanian-fedayeen relations

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as "senseless" in the changed conditions, although the spirit and principles of the agreements remained valid. PRAVDA on the 20th, reporting Jordan's "denunciation" of the agreements, recalled that they were signed by both Husayn and Palestinian leader Arafat. TASS the same day briefly noted that a UAR spokesman had expressed Egyptian support for a Libyan call for an Arab summit conference to discuss the Jordanian situation; the UAR cabinet, TASS also said, had assessed the operations against the Palestinians as harming Arab unity and interfering with the resistance movement.

ABORTIVE MOROCCAN COUP GETS LIMITED ATTENTION FROM MOSCOW

The abortive coup in Rabat on 10 July received minimal attention from Moscow, which has failed to comment on the incident and only belatedly expressed sympathy to King Hassan. TASS on the 17th briefly reported that the Soviet ambassador had conveyed Podgorny's "deep sympathy" in connection with the "recent tragic events"; Rabat radio on the 16th said the ambassador, after meeting with the king, stated that Podgorny had expressed his "deep satisfaction" with the failure of the attempt on Hassan's life. The head of a Soviet economic delegation which had arrived in Morocco on 7 July was reported on the 15th by Rabat radio--but not Moscow sources--as having expressed sorrow and condemnation of the "painful events and abhorred attack" at Skirate Palace.

TASS dispatches from Rabat in the first few days after the coup attempt briefly summed up developments, reporting that military school cadets with the director of the royal military cabinet, General Medbuh, at their head, had attacked the palace at Skirate during a diplomatic reception marking the king's birthday. Royal troops, the report said, quelled the mutiny. A TASS report on the 12th mentioned in passing that the king's address to the nation, early on the 11th, contained a warning to opposition political and trade union leaders. TASS on the 15th picked up the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report--not received from Libyan media--that Libya had broken diplomatic relations with Morocco. TASS added that Libyan-Moroccan relations were "aggravated" following the coup attempt, but failed to explain that this stemmed from Libyan radio support for the Moroccan "revolutionaries" and attacks on the king. Also on the 15th, noting that the situation in Morocco was

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gradually returning to normal, TASS reported that General Oufkir in a LE MONDE interview announced the termination of the emergency powers with which he had been invested by the king after the coup attempt, and his return to his duties as interior minister. TASS also noted that according to the Oufkir interview, the investigation had established that the chief of the military school, Colonel Ababou, was the main leader of the plotters, rather than General Medbuh.

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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

RED STAR ARTICLE REVIVES ISSUE OF U.S. FORWARD BASES

The second article in the RED STAR series on "the present stage of the strategic arms race in the United States," appearing on 16 July, is most notable for its revival of the argument that the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) should take up the question of U.S. bases near the USSR--an issue largely quiescent in Soviet media since it was broached in V. Shestov's 3 February article in PRAVDA.* The RED STAR article is signed by Col. V. Kharich, who also wrote the first in the series on the 13th, this time with Engineer-Captain 2d Rank G. Koloskov as co-author. In keeping with the theme of the first article, it draws heavily on foreign press reports to document the conclusion that Washington "has set a course aimed at the qualitative development and reinforcement" of its strategic forces, accompanied by "a quantitative increase in nuclear might." The article says "it is hardly necessary to state what a threat this represents for peace and the peoples' security."

Denouncing "groundless attempts of the U.S. press" to prove that SALT should not deal with the question of U.S. forward bases, Kharich and Koloskov argue that the line between strategic forces and tactical forces located in Europe and elsewhere on the periphery of the socialist bloc is becoming "blurred." This, the authors say, is because use of tactical nuclear arms carries the threat of a chain reaction leading to a nuclear missile conflict, and it is also a function of "the asymmetry of the positions of the sides: vitally important targets on the territory of the European socialist countries can be threatened with nuclear strikes from U.S. air force bases in Europe, while U.S. targets overseas are inaccessible to tactical aircraft."

The article charges that the attempt to exclude these foreign bases is aimed at obtaining unilateral military advantage and "in no way corresponds in practice to the principle of equal security" sought by the USSR. It adds that "the Pentagon strategists" also hope to complement Washington's overseas bases, which would serve as "'nuclear magnets' in the event of

* The Shestov article is reviewed in the TRENDS of 10 February 1971, pages 22-23.

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war," with new weapons systems designed to pose a threat to the USSR from underwater. It cites the re-equipping of submarines with multiple-warhead Poseidon missiles and the development of an underwater long-range missile system (ULMS).

Other available propaganda on SALT--including foreign-language broadcasts on the 15th and 16th which treat the negotiations in the course of a review of the 31 March 1971 "Soviet peace program"--continues routinely to stress the need for adherence to the principle of "equal security." As in the past, Moscow picks up expressions of U.S. domestic opposition to various defense programs. Thus PRAVDA on the 16th reported that Senator Humphrey, supported by Senator Muskie, proposed before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control on the 14th that appropriations for further deployment of the Safeguard ABM system and for the development of MIRV's be cut off. According to PRAVDA, Humphrey stressed that "the creation of new nuclear missile systems may exert a negative influence" on the progress at SALT. The report did not go on to note that Humphrey planned to introduce a sense-of-the-Senate resolution calling on the President to propose that the United States and the USSR agree to freeze the deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons while the arms talks are under way.

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POLAND

POLITYKA GIVES CONFIDENT ESTIMATE OF GIEREK REGIME'S STATUS

Reflecting the increasing consolidation of Gierek's leadership, a commentary entitled "Accomplishments and Announcements" in the Warsaw weekly POLITYKA on 17 July uses the occasion of the upcoming 27th anniversary of People's Poland (22 July) to confidently contrast the present situation in the country with that of a year ago under the Gomulka regime.

POLITYKA's optimistic appraisal comes against the background of further moves by Gierek to shore up his position at home. At the party's 24-25 June 10th plenum he had removed his last-remaining high-level opponent, Mieczyslaw Moczar, as PZPR secretary though leaving him on the Politburo for the time being. On 18 July, according to TASS and PAP the next day, Gierek conferred with the Soviet leaders in Moscow for the third time this year; he had visited the Soviet Union in January and again in March-April for the 24th CPSU Congress. This time, while "having a holiday in the Soviet Union," he and State Council Chairman Cyrankiewicz had talks with Brezhnev and Podgorny in which the two sides "informed each other" on socialist construction in the respective countries and "exchanged views on a number of topical international questions." The atmosphere, as in January, was described as one of "cordial friendship and mutual understanding." Warsaw media reported both Polish leaders back home on the 20th, two days before the National Day observance.

The POLITYKA commentary registers the increasing regime self-confidence that has manifested itself in open denigration of the Gomulka leadership. As summarized at length by PAP on the 16th, it refrains from new direct attacks on Gomulka*

* There was an extensive recent airing of direct attacks on Gomulka in a 367-page supplement to the party monthly NOWE DROGI, signed to the press 15 May 1971, entitled "Materials From the Eighth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee" of 6-7 February. In addition to reproducing Gierek's plenum speech and the plenum resolution, which had been released in Warsaw media on 7 February, the supplement made public for the first time an anti-Gomulka "evaluation" of the December events by the plenum along with plenum speeches by rank-and-file Central Committee members attacking the former leader.

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but makes extensive use of innuendo to signal the final discrediting of the fallen leader and his high-level supporters. Stressing that the "climate" surrounding this year's National Day is "different than a year ago," the commentary remarks that "there are fewer cliches saturated with stereotyped optimism." A year ago, it recalls, "we felt with growing acuity the disproportion between the material and staff potential that had been accumulated and the anachronistic forms which blocked progress and forced the choice of urgent and sometimes doubtful solutions in situations where far-reaching, bold thinking was needed."

The commentary goes on to underscore both the solidity of the socialist system in Poland and the depth of popular support for Gierek: Polish "society has staked everything on socialism, on its vitality and ability to reject everything that is alien to it," and "the time of hardest trial [December 1970] confirmed the lasting nature of the transformations in the collective consciousness of the nation." On the score of ties with the USSR and the socialist bloc, POLITYKA declares that "even the most unfriendly observers" have had to admit that their calculations about a loosening of such ties "proved illusory when confronted with the real attitudes" of Polish society.

At the same time, the commentary makes an urgent pitch for popular support of Gierek's efforts against the entrenched Gomulka-oriented middle- and lower-level bureaucracy. People are confident, it declares, that "the 'top' will not get fatigued;" and the effectiveness of "the 'top' is the only guarantee that the process of change also embraces lower levels of management." The fact that "we have crossed a point of no return," it says, will sooner or later be realized also by "those who would like to hide for awhile and wait for life to return to its old tracks" and who "found life easier" before the leadership change. The commentary winds up with an enumeration of "basic trends" of the new regime, including a more consumer-oriented economy, "dismissals of persons not able to cope with the modern requirements" facing managerial cadres, and "improving information."

The regime appears to be continuing its efforts to demonstrate the sincerity of its promise of freer information, made by Gierek in his initial speech as First Secretary on 20 December. In addition to keeping up the innovative practice of issuing reports on meetings of the party Politburo and Secretariat, the

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regime has been more forthcoming than its predecessor in airing economic problems. In the recent period TRYBUNA LUDU on 13 July carried an article on the growing unemployment problem in Lower Silesia. The Warsaw domestic service on the 15th reported the firing of several Lublin building enterprise directors for "poor labor management" and "delays," and the radio on the 19th carried a report underscoring weaknesses in the machine industry. Minister of the Machine Industry Wrzaszczyk was quoted to the effect that directors of enterprises not implementing monthly production plans "must not go on holidays at this time."

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