

16 JUNE 1971

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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1 OF 1

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

16 JUNE 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 24)

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FBI'S TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

## CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . i

### INDOCHINA

Hanoi Publicizes First Session of Fourth National Assembly . . . 1  
National Assembly Makes Few Changes in Roster of Officials . . . 6  
Action in Quang Tri Said to Demonstrate Strength of PLAF . . . 8  
Attacks in Cambodia Viewed as Threat to Phnom Penh Defense . . . 9  
DRV Foreign Ministry Spokesman Protests U.S. Strikes at DRV . . . 10  
Soviet Comment Stresses Demand for U.S. Withdrawal Deadline . . . 11  
Moscow Says Documents in N.Y. TIMES Show "Policy of Deceit" . . . 12  
Laos: British Circulation of Souvanna Phouma Letter Scored . . . 15  
Criticism of Souvanna Phouma Reply to NLHS Proposal Continues . . 16

### EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Leaders Review Major Issues in Election Speeches . . . . . 18

### GERMANY AND BERLIN

Honecker, Brezhnev Present Show of Unity on Berlin Talks . . . . 24  
Honecker Advances Concept of Separate German "Nations" . . . . . 27

### CYPRUS

President Makarios Pays Official Visit to Soviet Union . . . . . 29

### CUBAN FISHING BOATS

Havana Denounces U.S. Trial of Cubans as "Judicial Farce" . . . . 34  
Cuba Fines Five U.S. Citizens, Announces Eight More Held . . . . 36  
TASS, NCNA Report Cuban Charges, Stress Cuban Indignation . . . . 37

### PRC AND YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Visits PRC; Coexistence Hailed . . . . 38

### YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR

Belgrade Charges Increased Meddling by "Foreign Enemies" . . . . 41

### USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Brezhnev Is Lavishly Praised in Election Campaign . . . . . 46

- i -

## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 7 - 13 JUNE 1971

Moscow (2601 items)

Soyuz XI & Salyut	(5%)	27%
Soviet Elections	(8%)	23%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	10%]
[Kosygin Speech	(--)	4%]
[Podgorny Speech	(--)	3%]
Mongolian Party	(1%)	6%
Congress		
Middle East	(3%)	3%
Indochina	(8%)	2%
China	(3%)	2%
Kosygin Greetings to	(--)	2%
World Petroleum		
Congress		

Peking (1309 items)

Domestic Issues	(22%)	30%
Ceausescu Tour	(29%)	28%
[in PRC	(29%)	21%]
[in DPRK	(--)	5%]
Indochina	(31%)	21%
[PRG Anniversary	(8%)	8%]
[Sihanouk Tours	(3%)	4%]
PRC		
[DRV National	(--)	3%]
Assembly Session		
Yugoslav Foreign	(--)	4%
Minister in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 1 -

## INDOCHINA

The first session of the fourth DRV National Assembly, which under normal conditions should have been elected in 1968, provides a platform for high-level reiteration of standard lines on both domestic and foreign policy. The Assembly's election of officials of government organs was largely a pro forma reaffirmation of the current leadership. And the NHAN DAN editorial on 12 June remarked that "our system does not need sudden changes of leaders but needs stable leadership and a natural succession." Premier Pham Van Dong in his speech at the closing session on the 10th reiterated in routine terms that the peoples of Indochina are determined to continue the struggle against U.S. "aggression." Consistent with other propaganda, Dong exuded confidence in the ultimate failure of Vietnamization and said the situation in the South is favorable for "stepped up" struggle.

Communist reports on fighting in northern Quang Tri claim that the ARVN's Operation 810 has been "smashed" and that the allies have failed in their effort to prevent Viet Cong offensives. Propaganda on the fighting in Cambodia lauds intensified attacks on government forces around Phnom Penh, claiming that the communists are threatening defense lines to the south and east of the capital.

The Vietnamese communist spokesmen in Paris as well as propagandists continue to insist that the United States set a date for total troop withdrawal from South Vietnam, after which other questions could be discussed, including the release of prisoners. Otherwise the prisoner issue is ignored, and the accounts of the Paris session on the 10th typically ignored the allied statements deploring DRV refusal to receive the 13 sick and wounded prisoners who had agreed to repatriation by the GVN.

Kosygin and Podgorny in their election speeches routinely promised continued assistance to the peoples of Vietnam and "the other Indochinese countries." The Soviet leaders did not broach the question of a settlement, but other comment stresses that the United States must set a withdrawal date. Moscow notes growing demands in the United States for such a deadline, and the leak to the New York TIMES of secret documents on U.S. policy decisions on the Vietnam war is seen as evidence of the acuteness of the political struggle.

## HANOI PUBLICIZES FIRST SESSION OF FOURTH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

DRV media on 11 June began to publicize the 7-10 June session of the DRV Fourth National Assembly, elected on 11 April, with Hanoi radio

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 2 -

broadcasting lengthy descriptive accounts of the proceedings.\* As is usual, Truong Chinh, National Assembly Standing Committee chairman, gave the opening and closing remarks of the session. Premier Pham Van Dong delivered the main address on the 10th. Reports on the DRV's "diplomatic struggle" and the "military task" were presented by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap respectively. But following previous practice, these reports have not been publicized.

Truong Chinh in his opening remarks claimed that the National Assembly is beginning its term at a time when "encouraging strides" have been made. He said that the Indochinese people, "developing the resounding and strategically significant victories on the Route 9-Khe Sanh front," are continuing to fight vigorously and to score great victories on all battlefields. He also made the usual call for the party, army and people "to strengthen solidarity and strive to fulfill the revolutionary duties of the entire nation in compliance with President Ho's sacred will . . . ."

In outlining the business of the session Chinh noted that among other things the deputies "as the constitution stipulates" will elect the state's leaders and high-ranking organs including the president and vice president, the Standing Committee and other committees of the National Assembly, and the Council of Ministers.

Hanoi radio on the 11th reports that Ton Quang Phiet, secretary general of the National Assembly Standing Committee, presented to the National Assembly the report on the election results. And on the 12th the radio reports that "after two days of intensive work during which it broke into small groups to study and discuss reports, the National Assembly resumed its plenary sessions." It reportedly "unanimously passed": 1) a resolution approving the National Assembly membership of 420 deputies elected on 11 April on the basis of the 22 May recapitulative report from the Electoral Council, and 2) a resolution ratifying all the resolutions that the National Assembly Standing Committee passed between the 7th session of the Third National Assembly, held in March, and the current session.

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\* For background on the delayed election of the Fourth Assembly, see the FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 16 March 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 3 -

A broadcast on the 13th reports that Ton Duc Thang spoke briefly at the closing meeting of the session on the 10th. Hailing the elections of the state leaders as "a new success of our people in exercising the right to be masters of their own country," he promised that he and the others elected would strive to serve the people and "overcome all difficulties and hardships in order to implement at all costs" President Ho's testament. He said that it is the state's and people's "unshakeable, steel-like determination" to completely defeat the "U.S. aggressors," defend and build the North, liberate the South and advance toward peacefully reunifying the country.

PHAM VAN DONG                      In his Assembly speech on the 10th, Pham  
ASSEMBLY SPEECH                    Van Dong reiterated in standard terms  
   Vietnam's determination to continue the  
struggle against U.S. "aggression." While he routinely noted that the struggle is carried out on the political and diplomatic as well as the military front, he mentioned the Paris talks only briefly--when he said that the communists' solution for a settlement "remains undiscussed" there "because the other side wants the war to drag on and keeps going after the mirage of a 'military victory.'"

Although mentioning none of the substance of the communist proposals at Paris, Dong observed that growing antiwar sentiment in the United States is developing under such slogans as "end the aggressive war now, set a deadline for total U.S. troop withdrawal." (Hanoi media continues to carry reportage--citing foreign press sources--of antiwar activities in the United States, with current stress on lobbying for the passage of Senate and House bills calling for a 31 December 1971 deadline for troop withdrawal. A radio commentary on the 10th rounds up antiwar activities since April; it observes that growing disillusionment with the war was evidenced at the President's 1 June TV press conference when newsmen "raised a series of questions which reflected the worries and doubts of U.S. opinion" about the war.)

The Premier said that the results of recent military action, particularly the Laos incursion, have substantiated DRV assertions "made long ago that the policy of Vietnamizing the war will inevitably end in failure."\* Dong said that the

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\* Dong in his speech at the seventh session of the Third National Assembly in early March this year similarly said "right at the outset we predicted the inevitable failure of Vietnamization. Two years of confrontation on the battlefield have eloquently shown the prediction coming true."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 4 -

Vietnamese and the Laotians along Highway 9 "knocked the daylights out of [big and seasoned units], engaging them in an annihilation battle which not only foiled their adventurous designs, but also defeated all kinds of their much touted weapons and tactics." He went on to say that with Vietnamization "shaken to its roots" in the South it is a favorable time to step up the military and political struggle "from the mountain areas to the plains and even in the urban centers."

The Premier seemed to place unusual stress on the significance of the Vietnamese struggle for the world revolution. In addition to reiterating the stereotyped prediction of eventual victory, which he called a victory of "tremendous international significance," he also said: the Indochinese peoples' "just, protracted, arduous but certainly victorious struggle is gradually exerting its deep and far-reaching influence on the international situation, on the revolutionary struggle of the world's peoples, on the evolution of history. It is one of the events of epoch-making significance since World War II." He went on to say that "our strength and our certain victory" are derived from the "world people's front" against U.S. imperialism and in support of the Indochinese struggle.

Dong also cited socialist aid in the context of the global impact of the Vietnamese war: "Our struggle, being part of the world people's struggle against U.S. imperialism, has received an extremely vigorous and precious support from the Soviet Union, China and the other fraternal countries . . . ."\* Dong said that events have proved the "clearsightedness of our party and state in their foreign policy and diplomacy," and he noted that this included increasing militant solidarity and fraternal friendship with the socialist countries and the international communist and workers movement. But oddly, he did not on this occasion--as DRV leaders normally do--speak of the solidarity of the socialist camp.

In his remarks on domestic issues, the Premier focused on the need to improve economic management, a continuing concern for the DRV regime. Addressing himself to the newly elected

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\* At the Assembly session in March, he had said "with the justice of our war against the U.S. aggressors, we have won sympathy and firm and vigorous support and assistance of the brother socialist countries and of the world's people."

CONFIDENTIAL



- 6 -

specifically called for an improvement in the quality of industrial products, production of more goods for consumers and export, and increased efforts in agriculture. Touching on an issue not mentioned by Pham Van Dong in his survey of the domestic scene, Truong Chinh added that it is also "necessary to constantly pay attention to socialist reforms in agriculture, light industry, and handicrafts."

Like Dong, Truong Chinh took note of the question of conscription. He remarked, with regard to the "carrying out of military obligations," that the first six-month plan had been fulfilled, and he urged that "comrades learn from the experiences of this recruitment phase so as to better carry out the six-month plan for the second half of the year."

#### NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MAKES FEW CHANGES IN ROSTER OF OFFICIALS

The elections of officials of government organs by the new DRV National Assembly was largely a pro forma reaffirmation of the current leadership. The absence of changes in the leadership was pointed up in the 12 June NHAN DAN editorial's assertion that sudden changes of leadership were not needed. In a similar vein, an editorial on the 14th, which mentioned the importance of maintaining the stability of state organs while "gradually strengthening them with new forces," went on to observe that the assembly had elected leaders who had "assumed the state tasks for many years."

VNA reported the results of the elections on the 11th and Hanoi radio on the 12th described in detail exactly when and how the various offices were filled. The broadcast reported that on the afternoon of the 9th Ton Duc Thang and Nguyen Luong Bang were reelected president and vice president, respectively, and that Truong Chinh was reelected chairman and Ton Quang Phiet secretary general of the National Assembly Standing Committee. All of the Standing Committee's vice chairmen were also retained. Hanoi radio reports that Pham Van Dong's nomination by President Thang for the position of premier was confirmed by the National Assembly on the morning of the 10th.

It is in the National Defense Council that there were notable changes: Ton Duc Thang assumed the chairmanship left vacant by Ho's death. But of the two vice chairmen, Pham Van Dong and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 7 -

Vo Nguyen Giap, only Dong was reelected, with Giap becoming a regular member. Le Duan and Truong Chinh, were added to the Council membership along with Nguyen Con and Tran Huu Duc. Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh and Secretariat member Nguyen Van Tran were dropped from the council.

The list of vice premiers remains the same, except for the omission of Pham Hung and the addition of Hoang Anh, who was named vice premier by the National Assembly Standing Committee at a meeting on 1 April this year. The removal of Politburo member Pham Hung formalized his relinquishment of his duties as vice premier since his last reported public appearance in North Vietnam in September 1967. The 1 April Standing Committee meeting also named Hoang Anh chairman of an Agriculture Commission established by merging the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of State Farms, and the Managerial Board of Agricultural Cooperatives. At that time, Minister of Agriculture Nguyen Van Loc and Minister of State Farms Nguyen Xuan Yem were both named vice chairmen of the new commission, positions in which they are again listed.

There was a shift in the leadership of the Ministry of Interior, with Duong Quoc Chinh replacing Ung Van Khiem as minister. Neither Chinh nor Khiem has been publicly active in recent years: Duong Quoc Chinh has been reported to have appeared in North Vietnam on only two occasions--in May 1968 and September 1969--since he was replaced as Minister of Agriculture in April 1965, to assume other unnamed tasks. Ung Van Khiem last was noted in public in July 1970 and prior to that only was mentioned at public occasions about three times a year.

The list of ministers provides the first known confirmation in DRV media that Dinh Duc Thien, formerly identified as chief of the VPA's Rear Services Department, has been given the post of Minister of Machinery and Metallurgy. No one was publicly named to this post when the ministry was formed in December 1969; however, Prague and Peking media referred to Thien as head of that ministry in reporting a tour he made in late 1970--a tour unreported in Hanoi media.\* Thien's last reported public appearance in North Vietnam was in September 1970.

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\* Dinh Duc Thien was first identified in this position by Prague media during his visit to Czechoslovakia in October and November 1970. See the TRENDS of 9 December 1970, page S-2.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JUNE 1971

- 8 -

For the first time, Nguyen Lam was named as the Chairman of the State Price Commission; he is also a vice chairman of the State Planning Commission. (Former Chairman of the State Price Commission Do Muoi was named by the National Assembly Standing Committee on 16 April to chair the Capital Construction Commission.)

The three Boards of the Premier's office are not mentioned in reports on the National Assembly meeting and presumably have been abolished. The Chairman of the Internal Affairs Board Nguyen Van Tao died in August 1970 and was not replaced. The other two board chairmen, Do Muoi of the Economic Board and Tran Quang Huy of the Board of Culture and Education, were reported to no longer be in these positions in the 16 April National Assembly Standing Committee communique. Tran Quang Huy appears to be continuing his functions in the Premier's office, however, since he is now identified as a minister at the Premier's office in charge of cultural affairs and education.

#### ACTION IN QUANG TRI SAID TO DEMONSTRATE STRENGTH OF PLAF

Action in northern Quang Tri in the first week of June is reviewed in a commentary in the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 9 June and in an article in the party paper NHAN DAN on the 13th. The papers hail attacks in which the "armed forces and people" of the area allegedly wiped out a total of some 1,000 allied troops, including 184 U.S. soldiers, downed 19 aircraft, including a B-57, and destroyed or captured large quantities of war material.

NHAN DAN claims that the ARVN's Operation Lam Son 810 in northern Quang Tri has been "smashed" and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN cites widespread attacks in Quang Tri to refute allied "boasts" that they could stop Viet Cong offensives. The army paper, as summarized by VNA, claims that the PLAF's attacks prove their preparedness and ability to "concentrate their strength into mortal punches." Similarly, a Hanoi radio commentary on the 9th, pegged to the Quang Tri fighting, echoes earlier propaganda in ridiculing President Nixon for suggesting that events in coming months would demonstrate that Operation Lam Son 719 had damaged the communists' offensive ability. The radio adds that, "instead, a wave of offensives and uprisings is rising throughout the South."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

Intensive allied air strikes in northern Quang Tri are acknowledged in much of the propaganda. The NHAN DAN commentary, for example, charges that the allies, following "bitter defeats" in southern Laos and at Khe Sanh, "sent B-52's to wantonly hit many regions in northern Quang Tri with a view to preventing the attacks of the liberation forces." Reports on the fighting point to successes in dealing with the allied air attacks, both through antiaircraft fire and by keeping close contact with the ARVN forces so as to restrict bombing attempts. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, for example, claims that "hand-to-hand fighting" by the PLAF had greatly limited the allied artillery and air power.

#### ATTACKS IN CAMBODIA VIEWED AS THREAT TO PHNOM PENH DEFENSE

Recent attacks on Cambodian Government forces are praised in Hanoi's press on 15 June. An editorial in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and an article in NHAN DAN laud the Cambodian liberation army (CNPLAF) for achievements during the period from 7 to 10 June when they allegedly destroyed five battalions of Phnom Penh forces and a battle group command post and badly mauled three other battalions. NHAN DAN describes the two areas where the major attacks were launched--the district capital of Srang southwest of Phnom Penh and in the Tonle Toch area northeast of the capital--as "important links in the Phnom Penh defense system." The paper goes on to claim that the CNPLAF are "seriously threatening" lines to the south and east of the capital city. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial routinely holds that the "victories" are "heavy blows" at the Nixon Doctrine and the policy of using "puppet" troops along with U.S. firepower.

A 14 June report on the Tonle Toch fighting, transmitted by Sihanouk's news agency AKI, claimed that the CNPLAF in the area had wiped out 423 government troops, between 3 and 10 June, and shot down seven planes. Among other details of the fighting, the AKI report noted that on 9 and 10 June the communist forces captured 93 parachutes carrying supplies and drugs that were dropped for "beleaguered" troops at Kompong Chamlang and Kompong Ampil. It said that the CNPLAF attacked the troops at Kompong Ampil on the 9th and forced them to surrender. Also on the 14th, the news agency claimed that the entire headquarters of a government multi-battalion unit was captured by the CNPLAF in fighting in the Srang area on the night of 9-10 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

### DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES AT DRV

A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest of 15 June, publicized in Hanoi media the same day, condemns U.S. "acts of war" against the DRV in standard fashion and reiterates the demand for an immediate halt to all acts of encroachment on the DRV's sovereignty and security. The protest charges that from 8 to 12 June, U.S. aircraft including B-52's bombed Huong Lap village, "north of the 17th parallel, in the DMZ." It also claims that on the 11th U.S. planes "rocketed" Phu Quy state farm in Quang Binh Province.

On 6 June, Hanoi had claimed that an unmanned U.S. plane was downed on the previous day in Nghe An Province. The alleged downing brought Hanoi's total of downed U.S. planes to 3,395.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 11 -

### SOVIET COMMENT STRESSES DEMAND FOR U.S. WITHDRAWAL DEADLINE

While the top Soviet leaders in their election speeches did not broach the question of an Indochina settlement, routine Soviet comment continues to emphasize demands that the United States fix a deadline for withdrawal of troops from Vietnam.

Kosygin and Podgorny routinely promised continued assistance to the peoples of Vietnam and "the other Indochinese countries," and Kosygin assailed the U.S. Administration for "dragging out and expanding the war" and pursuing a policy that does not attest to serious intent to "find a way out of that shameless war." Brezhnev mentioned Indochina only in passing in decrying the presence of U.S. naval fleets off the shores of China and Indochina as well as in the Mediterranean.

Propaganda at the routine level includes TASS reports of statements by various U.S. public figures--including Senators Humphrey and Mansfield, former Defense Secretary Clifford, and Ambassador Harriman--criticizing Administration policy and pressing for a troop-withdrawal deadline. TASS says there is support in particular for the 31 December 1971 date proposed in the McGovern-Hatfield amendment and takes note of the Senate debate on the amendment. TASS also reports briefly that in a 13 June TV interview Secretary Laird refused to fix a deadline on the grounds that the United States could not be bound by such a commitment.

Comment pressing for a withdrawal deadline includes a talk in English on 12 June by military observer Aleksey Leontyev, who responded to a "listener's question" by disputing the President's reasoning that setting a deadline would cause the Vietnamese communists to lose interest in the Paris talks and endanger American troops in Vietnam. Leontyev called the troop-withdrawal issue the chief cause of the deadlock in Paris and remarked that if a withdrawal date is set, "the Vietnamese side would have an even greater interest in the talks, not lesser." He added that "thousands" of American lives would be saved because the PRG has repeatedly declared that after a date is announced, talks could be started immediately on the release of captured American pilots and on security guarantees for the troop withdrawal.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 12 -

A participant in the 13 June domestic service roundtable discussion, commenting on the U.S. refusal to set a withdrawal deadline, recalled that last week a White House spokesman had said the 31 December date was too early and would not enable the South Vietnamese to determine their own fate. The commentator concluded that emphasis would continue to be placed on Vietnamization. Another panelist added that the United States not only does not intend to curtail its military operations but continues to escalate the war while making "declarations of intent" to withdraw troops by stages. In this context he pointed to the "astounding facts" of growing U.S. interference in Laos divulged in the Senate last week.

A Kozyakov commentary in English on 16 June said the fact that Congress is considering the Hatfield-McGovern amendment testifies to the "profound crisis" confronting the Republican Administration's policies in the face of the American people's "justified dissatisfaction." Stating that the Administration is trying to fight the amendment by playing on popular sympathy for the captive U.S. pilots, Kozyakov disputed the argument that a withdrawal deadline would prevent the return of the prisoners and once again repeated the PRG's stand on this point. The "crux" of the issue, he said, is Washington's intention to preserve the existing government in Saigon. He foresaw a "stormy" debate in the Senate but concluded that the opponents of the Hatfield-McGovern amendment will not be able to stem the growth of the antiwar movement in the United States.

#### MOSCOW SAYS DOCUMENTS IN N.Y. TIMES SHOW "POLICY OF DECEIT"

The publicity in the New York TIMES for a Pentagon study and official documents on U.S. decisions regarding U.S. involvement in Vietnam was promptly reported by TASS and in Moscow radio broadcasts for foreign and domestic audiences on 15 June. The reports said the airing of the documents has aroused "panic" in Washington official circles and is growing into "a huge political scandal."

The documents reveal, according to Moscow's reports, that the U.S. "justification" for escalating the war--the Tonkin Gulf Resolution--was based on an attack on U.S. ships that was actually "fabricated" by the Pentagon and that plans for a major attack against the DRV were made even before the Tonkin Gulf incident. The reports briefly cited statements

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 13 -

by Senator McGovern and Congressman McCloskey criticizing the "policy of deceit" and noted Senator Symington's announcement that he intends to propose a full investigation of the history of the emergence of the Vietnam war.

A 15 June TASS dispatch from New York said the documents "confirm that the United States deliberately escalated and broadened the war in Indochina and misled the American public in giving its reasons for doing so." The correspondent commented that the publication of this "record of official duplicity" came at an "awkward moment" for the present Administration, with the vote on the McGovern-Hatfield amendment impending. He noted that some congressmen have expressed the view that the publication of the documents will strengthen the position of the antiwar elements in Congress. The dispatch reported Secretary Laird as stating that the Administration is "highly disturbed" by the revelations and has asked the Justice Department to determine whether the publication constitutes a violation of security laws.

On the 16th TASS promptly reported that a federal judge had placed a temporary injunction on further publication of the documents. The day before, reporting Secretary Rogers' press conference, TASS had mentioned briefly that he "supported" the Defense Department's decision to institute legal proceedings against the TIMES. (The Secretary in fact merely "took notice" of the Justice Department's proceedings, although he did observe that the law clearly provides that classified documents should not become public.) TASS also reported that the Secretary said the publication of the documents "would give a lot of trouble to the United States," but it did not explain that Rogers was speaking of relations with foreign governments.

Some Soviet comment has linked the "deceit" revealed by the documents with the policies of the present Administration. Zorin observed in a domestic service commentary on the 15th that the leak reflects a political struggle in the United States and was a "well-thought-out action" by "certain circles." The Nixon Administration, he said, has been trying to oppose demands for an end to the war, and the latest events "can be interpreted as the result of the bitter struggle in the Washington leadership."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 14 -

Zorin said the U.S. Government is now in a "very difficult position," being deprived of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution which had served as the only legal justification for sending troops to Vietnam. He commented that the Administration is feigning innocence and trying to shift full blame to the preceding Administration, but that the Republicans in fact had access to all the documents and chose to keep silent about them, using the "provocation that served as a pretext" for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to continue aggression. A commentary in English by Shakov on the same day similarly cited the "American press" for reports that the present Administration "has known from the very outset that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was a falsehood," but that it still denies it "in order to justify its own share of escalation."

Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress announced in its English-language program for Asia on 16 June that on the 18th it would begin broadcasting the documents from the New York TIMES for U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam.\*

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\* The only available Hanoi acknowledgment of the New York TIMES action appeared in a brief item broadcast in English to U.S. servicemen. It said that "war critics seized upon top secret documents stressing U.S. involvement in Vietnam as proof that Congress and the public had been deceived about the war all along." The broadcast cited UPI for the report that the New York TIMES had publicized "the second installment of its series on the documents, quoting from secret strategy meetings, diplomatic cables, and military directives" in the period before the large-scale U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 15 -

## LAOS: BRITISH CIRCULATION OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA LETTER SCORED

A VNA "authorized" statement on 15 June scores Britain for unilaterally circulating on 9 June a message sent to the British and Soviet Geneva conference cochairmen by Souvanna Phouma on 18 May.\* It assails the British for releasing the letter and "slandering" the DRV at a time when public opinion is condemning U.S. aggression in Laos and "the Lao people and many Lao political figures of good will" are voicing approval of the 12 May NLHS peace proposal for a U.S. bombing halt and subsequent cease-fire and talks on a coalition government. Charging that the British move is aimed at justifying U.S. aggression in Laos, VNA asserts that the British Government has "utterly contravened its responsibility" as a Geneva conference cochairman. It "flatly rejects" the slanders against the DRV, but does not of course acknowledge that in his letter Souvanna Phouma had charged that DRV troops captured Pak Song and other RLG positions on the Bolovens Plateau.

A few hours before the VNA statement was released a Pathet Lao radio commentary had similarly attacked the British move. The commentary assailed both Souvanna Phouma's letter and the British cover message for trying to justify U.S. aggression--the most "concrete proof" of which was Lam Son 719--by accusing North Vietnam of "committing aggression in Laos." Counter-charging that "many additional battalions" of Thai troops are being mustered on the border ready to undertake action on the Bolovens Plateau and in the Highway 9 area, the broadcast said that U.S. "henchmen" in Vientiane--such as the Sananikone brothers and Sisouk Na Champassak--are urging stronger preparation of public opinion for new military ventures in the rainy season. It commented that this military activity is the U.S. answer to the new NLHS peace proposal and went on to score the British for their role in supporting U.S. aggression.

The commentary concluded by praising the Soviet Union for its "correct attitude" in consistently rejecting the unilateral acts of the British Government; Moscow, as usual, ignores the exchange.

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\* See the 28 April TRENDS, pages 15-16, for a discussion of and background on communist reaction to the circulation by Britain on 21 April of Souvanna Phouma's last letter to the Geneva cochairmen.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 JUNE 1971

- 16 -

## CRITICISM OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA REPLY TO NLHS PROPOSAL CONTINUES

Pathet Lao propaganda, since its first acknowledgment on 6 June, has continued to criticize Souvanna Phouma's 20 May response to the NLHS 12 May peace initiative, and to claim that there are other circles in Vientiane who support the initiative. An 11 June statement by a spokesman of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces (PNF) Alliance Committee, reported by the Pathet Lao radio on the 15th, is similar to a "communique" of the NLHS Central Committee "office," reported on the 8th, in its claim that Souvanna Phouma's response "runs counter" to the NLHS proposals and was made "under pressure" from the "U.S. imperialists" and the "ultrarightist reactionaries." It goes beyond the NLHS communique--but echoes earlier routine propaganda--when it complains that Souvanna Phouma's reply indicates that he intends to avoid talking about a bombing halt and that his proposals "to hold negotiations in Vientiane without conditions" and "to negotiate without limit" are aimed at gaining time and serving U.S. aggressive intentions.\*

A radio broadcast on the 8th provided the only known acknowledgment in Pathet Lao propaganda that Souvanna suggested that in order to expedite prompt talks full authority be given Souphanouvong's envoy in Vientiane, Thao Souk Vongsak, or that he be replaced by someone with that authority. The broadcast did not directly criticize this notion, saying only that his proposal is only "one vague theme dealing with Prince Souphanouvong's plenipotentiary representative" which does not explain how discussions can be held while the United States continues its aggression and bombing.

A hint of intensified communist military pressure if the NLHS proposals are not accepted appears in a 12 June broadcast reporting a 20 May rally held by PNF officials, soldiers, and police of Phong Saly Province to praise the initiative. The PNF command in the province is quoted as warning that if the "U.S. imperialists" and their "flunkeys" continue to reject the NLHS proposals and intensify their aggression, the PNF will "continue to cooperate with the NLHS, the LPLA, and people to

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\* See the 9 June TRENDS, pages 14-15, for a discussion of the initial reaction to Souvanna Phouma's letter which called for "immediate serious discussions" on "all problems which are regarded as suitable for discussion."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 17 -

counterattack and inflict more humiliating defeats" on the Americans and their "flunkeys." A broadcast on 7 June on Souvanna Phouma's 26 May reply to Souphanouvong had noted recent "victories" on the Bolovens Plateau and said that if the Vientiane side persists in "dragging out the war," then "heavier attacks should be made."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JUNE 1971

- 18 -

## EAST-WEST RELATIONS

## LEADERS REVIEW MAJOR ISSUES IN ELECTION SPEECHES

Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny, in speeches to their constituents on the eve of the 13 June election to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, took the occasion to sustain Moscow's challenge to the West to respond to Brezhnev's 14 May call for negotiations on force and armament cuts in central Europe. And Brezhnev surfaced yet another initiative--for talks on the problem of restricting the cruising areas of the large powers' navies. The three speakers in pro forma fashion reaffirmed Soviet adherence to a policy of peace, at the same time noting the adequacy of Soviet defenses.

**NAVAL TALKS** Less than a month after his Tbilisi speech in which he had called for talks on force levels in central Europe, Brezhnev on 11 June raised the possibility of East-West negotiations on the problems of restricting the cruising areas of the navies of the large powers. He charged that the "U.S. propaganda machine" has launched a campaign against the Soviet navy, warning of the "menace" created by Soviet ships cruising in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and "other seas." Brezhnev said U.S. officials nevertheless consider it normal for the Sixth Fleet to ply the Mediterranean--"next door, as it were, to the Soviet Union"\*--and for the Seventh Fleet to cruise off the shores of China and Indochina. Commenting that it is not ideal for the navies of the great powers to be "cruising about for long periods far from their own shores," he said that "we are prepared to solve this problem . . . on an equal basis. On the basis of such principles, the Soviet Union is ready to discuss any proposals."

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\* Moscow has long opposed the U.S. naval presence in the Mediterranean, said to be "in direct proximity to the USSR's southern borders." Brezhnev himself had declared in his 24 April 1967 Karlovy Vary speech that "the time has come to demand the complete withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean." Possibly foreshadowing the current initiative, Brezhnev said in his 30 March CPSU Congress report that after a Middle East settlement it will be possible to "consider further steps aimed at reducing war tension in that region," in particular at turning the Mediterranean into a sea of peace.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 19 -

There has been limited followup propaganda to this demarche so far. A domestic service roundup of foreign reaction on the 13th, citing "news agencies," said that the State Department's refusal to express an immediate opinion was seen as an indication "that the Nixon government intends to study this proposal carefully before issuing any statement."

Background: While the Brezhnev proposal is new to the USSR's catalogue of partial disarmament measures, Moscow has in the past offered initiatives which in effect would limit areas of navigation for warships. Thus the Warsaw Pact Declaration on European Security of 5 July 1966, signed by Brezhnev and Kosygin, called for a ban on the entry of foreign submarines and surface ships with nuclear arms into European ports. The 1 July 1968 Soviet Government memorandum outlining partial disarmament measures called for a limitation on the zones of navigation of missile-armed submarines. And restrictions on zones of navigation are implicit in the USSR's calls over the years for creation of nuclear-free zones encompassing the world's oceans.

**FORCE-CUT PROPOSAL** Challenges to the West to respond positively to the 14 May proposal for force-cut talks were made by Brezhnev on the 11th and by Kosygin and Podgornyy on 9 and 10 June. In keeping with Soviet comment over the past month, however, none of the three elaborated in any way on a possible forum for such talks. Brezhnev, who complained that the 3-4 June NATO Council meeting in Lisbon did not give a "clear answer" to his proposal, reaffirmed Soviet readiness to discuss foreign armed forces in Europe as well as national forces. Podgornyy, like Brezhnev, remarked that the NATO meeting was compelled to consider the Soviet proposal and claimed wide support for it. It is necessary, he said, to enter into negotiations "in order to test the intentions of the parties."

Kosygin, who did not mention the NATO meeting, said that the USSR is ready for a reduction of forces and armaments in central Europe "if the NATO countries do in fact show a serious attitude to the solution of this task." Progress in this area, he said, might mark the beginning "of a completely new stage of international relations in Europe and create a favorable atmosphere of confidence and fruitful cooperation between all European peoples." But he cautioned that the USSR cannot ignore the fact that in Europe and elsewhere, there are still

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JUNE 1971

- 20 -

forces "hostile in their attitude to everything that serves the cause of peace and international security."

EUROPEAN SECURITY Podgorny alone of the three broached the matter of a European security conference, a topic which continues to be treated with regularity in routine propaganda. He observed that the recent easing of tension and strengthening of peace in Europe have advanced the chances of holding such a conference. The socialist countries for their part, he said, have concluded that the time has come to move from general words about the usefulness of a conference "to the active phase of practical preparation." Earlier, in an apparent reference to those in the West who would link the calling of a European security conference or talks on force cuts to progress on the Berlin problem, he said that the USSR considers that "all European questions can and should be solved simultaneously, in parallel, and without tying them up into a single knot." More pointedly, a foreign-language commentary on 14 June said that the participants in the NATO meeting in Lisbon "decided to link the proposed talks on a European conference, and on cutting arms in central Europe, with the present negotiations on West Berlin." Citing Washington POST columnist Chalmers Roberts, the commentary observed that this is "the old diplomatic trick of using procrastination in one matter to delay another."

While Kosygin failed to mention the proposal for a European security conference, he did deal at length with the situation in Europe, noting that the USSR has endorsed the principle of strengthening European security and citing as evidence of a trend toward relaxation on that continent the developing of Soviet-French ties and the FRG's 1970 treaties with the USSR and Poland. Possibly in response to the West's alleged foot-dragging on a European security conference, Kosygin said that opponents of Soviet proposals stress that time is required to study them and raise "various preliminary conditions." He added that the USSR is not opposed to careful preparation, but that "one must distinguish between what is a question of preparation and what, under the guise of preparation, is a question of thwarting peace proposals."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 21 -

SALT, OTHER  
DISARMAMENT ISSUES

Brezhnev and Podgorny touched on the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), with Podgorny taking note of the 20 May accord at the Vienna session between the USSR and the United States "to concentrate their efforts at present on preparing an agreement on limiting the development of antimissile defense systems, and to agree on some measures in the sphere of limiting strategic offensive armaments also." In his remarks on SALT--the first by an elite spokesman since the 20 May accord--Podgorny pointed up the importance of strategic arms agreements for the halting of the arms race which in turn would allow allocation of resources to peaceful uses.

Brezhnev observed that the significance of the U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitation is "certainly increasing," and said that a positive outcome would be in the interests of both countries and universal peace. As he had done in his 30 March report to the 24th CPSU Congress, he declared that hopes for success in these talks lay in abandonment of all efforts to gain unilateral advantages and adherence to the principle of equal security.

In what is seemingly a swipe at Defense Department concern over a growing Soviet threat, Brezhnev said that the United States "systematically makes a noise about Soviet defense programs, particularly on the eve of adopting the current war budget."\* The measures the USSR takes to strengthen its defenses are described, according to Brezhnev, as "something verging on treachery, a direct threat to the success of the talks. But what grounds does Washington have . . . to expect us to give up a program which has already been adopted, if the American Government itself has taken several very substantial decisions on increasing its strategic forces during the talks?"

Brezhnev pledged the USSR to a continuing effort at achieving both general and complete disarmament and partial disarmament measures. He denied that the proposals set forth at the 24th

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\* Soviet accounts of Secretary Laird's 21 April speech before the American Newspaper Publishers Association and his 27 April Pentagon press conference pointed up his warnings about a "Soviet threat," but did not indicate the nature of his charges--that the USSR is involved in a new ICBM construction program and has resumed activity at ABM sites around Moscow.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JUNE 1971

- 22 -

CPSU Congress are mere "propaganda slogans," and he rejected the contention of unnamed parties that disarmament and the limitation of the arms race are "unrealistic" where "capitalism is still in existence, where the imperialist powers continue exerting quite a substantial influence on the international situation." He ticked off several of the measures outlined in the 30 March report to the congress--the banning of all types of weapons of mass destruction, the reduction of military budgets of states, the complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests, and the convening of a conference of the five nuclear powers--and observed that "we are awaiting an answer to these proposals." Earlier he had voiced support for the "replacement of military blocs and groups by systems of collective security."

Kosygin also touched briefly on the proposal for the convening of a conference of the five nuclear powers, citing it as one of the "clear and concrete proposals" put forward by the USSR.

**U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS** Kosygin alone addressed himself directly to the question of U.S.-Soviet relations, declaring that the state of relations is far from satisfactory but echoing the 30 March report to the CPSU congress that improved relations are both possible and desirable. He warned that the USSR cannot draw a line between bilateral relations and the "aggressive policy of the imperialist circles of the United States, the barbarity committed in Indochina by U.S. troops, the disregard for other peoples and the crude trampling of their lawful rights and interests." Relations cannot but be affected negatively, he added, by such acts of the United States as "practical support of the expansion of Israel in the Middle East and opposition to the lessening of tension in Europe." He urged that the United States choose a path in quest of mutually acceptable solutions of pressing problems, and pledged that the USSR is "prepared to hold talks with the United States in a businesslike manner on a wide range of questions of mutual interest." In effect answering Chinese charges, most recently pressed during the just-concluded Ceausescu visit to the PRC, he added that Soviet policy has nothing in common "with the so-called 'policy of two superpowers.'" The USSR, he said, "will never agree to the sanctioning of world hegemony of one or several powers because this utterly contradicts both our policy and our communist ideology."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JUNE 1971

- 23 -

MIDDLE EAST Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin all played up the Soviet-UAR treaty in their speeches; Brezhnev otherwise made no reference to the Middle East. Podgorny's and Kosygin's remarks were directed mainly at the United States for its activity as "alleged intermediary," and neither took the occasion to press for Israeli withdrawal. Kosygin did declare that the USSR is undertaking "active efforts" for a peaceful settlement in accordance with the 1967 Security Council resolution, the only "sane way" out of the crisis. Blaming the lack of a political settlement on Israel, Kosygin decried "various diplomatic maneuvers" by "the opponents of a just settlement." And Podgorny echoed previous charges that imperialists seek to assume the role of peacemakers while trying to undermine the Arabs' pursuit of social progress and cooperation with socialist countries. He also denounced imperialist attempts to exploit "internal political complications" to split the Arab patriotic forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 24 -

## GERMANY AND BERLIN

## HONECKER, BREZHNEV PRESENT SHOW OF UNITY ON BERLIN TALKS

In their speeches to the Eighth SED Congress in East Berlin, SED First Secretary Honecker joined Brezhnev in calling for "success" in the four-power ambassadorial negotiations on Berlin, and the CPSU leader spoke of "concerted efforts" by the USSR and GDR to solve the West Berlin problem. The tenor of both leaders' remarks, and in particular an assertion by Honecker of "complete unanimity" between the Soviets and East Germans on "all questions," suggested a resolution of differences over Berlin that had seemed implied in the joint communique issued after the one-day visit of Honecker and GDR Premier Stoph to Moscow on 18 May--their first talks with the Soviet leaders after Ulbricht's step-down on the 3d. The communique had noted that the two sides "expressed their views" on the four-power negotiations and had reported unanimity only on a desire for a settlement acceptable to all parties concerned.

Delivering the Central Committee report to the SED congress at its opening session on 15 June, Honecker prefaced the statement of unanimity with a reference to the "high value" placed by the SED on "the political consultations between the party and state leaderships of the GDR and USSR, which are being systematically developed." He went on to declare that the SED "reconfirms that complete unanimity on all questions exists between our parties and states"--the kind of all-encompassing statement that had been missing from the communique.

Brezhnev, according to a TASS summary of his congress speech the next day, followed up his reference to concerted Soviet-GDR efforts regarding West Berlin with a declaration that the Soviet side in the four-power talks is "prepared to make efforts to bring this matter to a successful completion and to insure that the agreement reached will be effective and carried into life." The implication appeared to be that with tactics and objectives successfully coordinated, the USSR could now give assurances that the GDR will not try to block implementation of an agreement reached by the Big Four.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 25 -

HONECKER ON BERLIN Honecker broached the Berlin problem in the course of a discussion of five areas in which the SED could contribute to the safeguarding of peace in Europe: 1) the convening of a European security conference, 2) admission of the GDR to the United Nations and its specialized agencies, 3) GDR willingness to establish normal diplomatic relations with "all" states, 4) the establishment of "normal relations under international law" with the FRG, devoid of any special "inter-German relations," and 5) a GDR contribution to settlement of the West Berlin question.

On the fifth point, stating that the GDR "is prepared to contribute to the normalization of relations vis-a-vis West Berlin," Honecker went on to declare that the GDR "wishes success for the four-power talks on West Berlin"--a more forthcoming statement than any made by Ulbricht. In his report to the 14th SED Central Committee plenum on 9 December 1970, Ulbricht had expressed "hope" that the negotiations would reach "a mutually acceptable agreement" meeting the needs of the West Berliners and the interests and sovereign rights of the GDR, the formulation introduced by Brezhnev in his November Yerevan speech and adopted by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee on 2 December in Berlin.

Honecker proceeded to quote from the 18 May Soviet-GDR communique in his congress report: "An understanding on this question would correspond to the interests of everyone and do away with the grounds for disputes and conflicts concerning West Berlin." The joint communique, pronouncing the two sides in full accord on this point alone, had not gone on to spell out any of the bases for such an understanding; it contained no reference to GDR sovereignty or "interests" with respect to West Berlin, no statement that West Berlin is "within" or "on" GDR territory, no assertion that West Berlin is an "independent political entity"--all standing elements of the Soviet and GDR public positions. Honecker at the congress introduced a revision of the "independent political entity" formula, replacing it with a more open-ended description of Berlin as having "special political status," but he did so in the context of the GDR talks with the West Berlin Senat, not the four-power negotiations. Declaring that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S FRIENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 26 -

the GDR had underlined its desire for an understanding on Berlin "by deeds," as declared:

Our proposals in the talks with the West Berlin Senat are, as a matter of course, based on the condition that both sides show good will. This requires recognition of the reality that West Berlin is a city with a special political status, that it has never belonged to the FRG, and that it never will. On this basis it is possible to solve all problems in the interest of strengthening European peace and, last but not least, in the interests of the people of West Berlin.

Without directly addressing himself to the issue of the relationship between the Big Four negotiations and talks between the GDR and the West Berlin Senat, Honecker in effect served notice of an intention to continue pressing the Senat to come to an agreement independently of the four-power negotiations. Soviet media have publicized the GDR-Senat talks in brief news reports and limited, low-level comment.

BREZHNEV           Where Honecker--like the 18 May joint communique--  
ON BERLIN           did not bring up the matter of GDR interests  
                      regarding West Berlin, Brezhnev reintroduced  
this aspect in his congress speech. After declaring that  
the "concerted efforts" of the USSR and the GDR "are directed  
to securing a state of affairs where West Berlin will cease  
to be a source of tension and critical situations and where  
normal conditions will be provided for the life of the city  
and its population," he added, "naturally, with due consideration  
of the lawful interests and sovereign rights of the GDR." He  
went on to make a strong plea for a successful conclusion of  
the four-power talks, in the most optimistic characterization of  
the recent progress in the talks yet made by a top Soviet  
spokesman:

We believe that the talks on West Berlin now in progress  
have made it possible first and foremost to make clear the  
positions of the sides concerned. It is legitimate, there-  
fore, that now the talks enter the stage of examining  
concrete proposals on the content of a possible agreement.  
I cannot speak for our partners in the talks, but we, on  
our side, are prepared to make efforts to bring this matter  
to a successful completion and to insure that the agreement  
reached will be effective and carried into life.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PBIJ TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 27 -

**HONECKER ADVANCES CONCEPT OF SEPARATE GERMAN "NATIONS"**

Discussing GDR-FRG relations in his report to the SED congress, Honecker carried one step further the East German concept of complete "demarcation" (Abgrenzung) between two separate, sovereign, and independent German states, the worker-peasant, socialist GDR and the bourgeois, monopolistic, imperialist FRG--a delineation emphasized in East German propaganda since the turn of the year, after Ulbricht elaborated it at the December SED Central Committee plenum. Decrying Bonn's "spurious claim" about a "homogeneous German nation" divided into two German states, a claim he said was designed to support the FRG's "revanchist" line of "intra-German relations," Honecker argued that the development of Marxism-Leninism and the advances made by the socialist society in the GDR had produced "a new type of nation--the socialist nation." The effect of this refinement of terminology is to sharpen the "demarcation," countering the notion of one German nation, two German states with a concept of two German "nations."

Honecker also assailed the notion of "special intra-German relations" in his discussion of GDR diplomatic relations with other countries. His five-point program for European peace called for "normal diplomatic relations with all states, based on equality of all states and the principle of recognition of the GDR's sovereignty by every state and recognition of the other states by the GDR," then devoted a carefully raised separate point to the question of East-West German relations. Asserting that "the GDR, as before, advocates the establishment of normal relations under international law with the FRG," he criticized the FRG for refusing to abandon its concept of special intra-German relations--a concept uncommon among "sovereign" states, he said, and one that "torpedoes" bilateral relations and European detente.

Brezhnev, notably, failed to call for FRG recognition of the GDR in his congress speech, although he was glowing in his praise of "the German socialist state" and of Ulbricht and Honecker personally.

MOSCOW AND WARSAW  
TREATIES WITH BONN

Honecker repeated the GDR line on the "importance for European security" of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn and called for their ratification. He

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 28 -

also reiterated the standard line that "to artificially construe an interrelationship" between ratification of the treaties and the Berlin negotiations was "a disservice to the cause of detente." He appealed for the simultaneous solving of all problems facing Europe, "without preconditions and artificial links between one problem and the other."

Brezhnev denounced allegations "in the West" that the FRG had made concessions to the USSR in signing the Moscow treaty. He said: "We think that our commitments under the treaty of 12 August are by no means less if not more important for the FRG than its analogous commitments are for the Soviet Union. What matters is not some 'unilateral concessions'--there are none on either side--but the political essence and the general trend of the treaty." In an apparent allusion to the FRG's delay in ratifying the treaty, Brezhnev belittled West German "figures" who would engage in "political speculation" regarding the treaty; he remarked pointedly that the "inviolability" of the borders of the USSR, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, "and other fraternal countries" are guaranteed by the might of the Warsaw Pact states, "irrespective of the existence" of the Moscow-Bonn treaty. But ratification would, he said, "largely contribute to a renovation of the political climate in Europe."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 29 -

## C Y P R U S

## PRESIDENT MAKARIOS PAYS OFFICIAL VISIT TO SOVIET UNION

Moscow in the main adheres to established lines on the Cyprus issue in propaganda surrounding the 2-9 June official visit to the USSR by Cyprus President Makarios. Formal announcements of the forthcoming official "three-day" visit were carried by TASS and Nicosia radio in late April; the Soviet invitation, reported in mid-February by the Greek Cypriot paper I MAKHI, apparently originally had been extended for the enthronement of the new Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. Following one session of talks on the day of his arrival, the Archbishop attended the enthronement of Patriarch Pimen on 3 June, and the balance of the visit was occupied by trips to various cities.

**BILATERAL RELATIONS** Bilateral relations are treated by Moscow in pro forma fashion, with no indication of any specific requests, proposals, or agreements under discussion. TASS reported that in the talks held in a "friendly atmosphere" on the 2d, the sides had an "exchange of opinions" on further advances in bilateral relations as well as on major international problems. The communique appraises, in general terms, the "positive cooperation" in various fields, noting that trade and economic ties are developing on a long-term basis, and routinely records the sides' belief that there are possibilities for further developing cooperation and broadening political contacts at various levels. In his banquet speech on the 2d Podgornyiy remarked "with satisfaction" that relations were developing favorably, while Kosygin in his luncheon speech on the 4th merely expressed confidence that the visit would help strengthen relations "in all areas of our cooperation."

Answering journalists' questions on his return, Makarios said, according to Nicosia radio, that the Cyprus side had proposed the signing of a new five-year trade agreement, but he gave no indication of the Soviet reply. The Cyprus communist party organ KHARAVYI reported on the 10th that Makarios declined to answer a question on whether there was discussion of "Soviet technical aid" to Cyprus, but he did say that no agreement of any kind was signed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TBI'S TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 30 -

Nicosia radio on the 16th reported that during a visit to the Soviet Union by Cyprus' commissioner for cooperative development, which coincided with Makarios' visit, it was decided to form a common trade committee, and various agreements were reached on the sale of Cypriot products to the USSR.

**CYPRUS**        The communique contains two departures from standard  
**ISSUE**        Soviet phraseology on the Cyprus issue. Where Moscow customarily expresses opposition to outside interference in Cypriot affairs, it now adds Soviet opposition to the use of or threat to use force against Cyprus. And the communique calls for respect of Cyprus' "unity" in addition to supporting, as usual, the republic's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. These new elements would not seem to add up to any shift in Moscow's posture on the Cyprus question. For example, a followup commentary in IZVESTIYA on the 13th does not employ the language of the communique, excluding the phrase on "threat to use force" and the word "unity," and reverting to the stereotyped phrases.

+ In the first instance, the Soviet side declares its "firm and active opposition to any intervention, interference, use of force, or threat to use force" against Cyprus. Moscow has long been on record as opposing outside interference, advocating solution of the problem by the Cypriots themselves.\* The usual formulation is generally employed in the context of alleged intrigues by NATO and the Greek regime against Cyprus. In the case of Turkey's air attacks on Cyprus in August 1964, Moscow had weighed in with a government statement warning that the USSR would help Cyprus defend its independence in the event of a foreign armed invasion.

+ Cyprus' "unity" is referred to twice in the communique in addition to its appearance in the call for respect of the republic's sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity. The Soviet side calls for creating conditions safeguarding a peaceful life for the Cypriots on the basis of "absolute sovereignty and unity" of the state. And the Cypriot side refers to their efforts to counter "machinations" aimed at imposing inadmissible solutions or undermining the state's sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.

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\* A communique issued on 1 October 1964 marked the only other visit of a Cypriot government delegation to Moscow, led by Foreign Minister Kyprianou. The communique said that Khrushchev told the delegation the people of Cyprus as a whole should settle their internal problems without outside interference, and it recorded agreement reached on "practical measures of assistance" to Cyprus for safeguarding its freedom and territorial integrity.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 31 -

The use of the word "unity," infrequent in Soviet elite statements on Cyprus, might relate to the idea of a federation as a solution to the Cyprus question.\* Gromyko had made what is an apparently unique Soviet reference to federation in a rare discussion of Cyprus' internal structure in a January 1965 IZVESTIYA interview. He did not rule it out as a solution, but viewed such a system as presupposing the existence of a single central government, single defense organization, and a centralized administrative and judicial system. Remarking that the republic's internal organization was a matter for the Cypriots themselves to determine, Gromyko had said that they must choose any form of state which would take into account the specific position of the two national communities within a single, sovereign, and "united" Cyprus.

+ The Soviet side again expresses a desire for a favorable outcome of the intercommunal talks, regarded approvingly by Moscow since their inception in the summer of 1968. Podgorny and Kosygin, in speeches on 2 and 4 June respectively, reiterate hope for success of the talks, Kosygin carefully remarking that "we have equal respect for Greek and Turkish Cypriots" and wishing them success in settling their differences through negotiations.

+ In the communique the Soviet side repeats the standard support for withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus but does not include the usual call for the elimination of foreign bases on the island. Podgorny in his banquet speech does warn, however, of the "serious danger" to the eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus itself posed by foreign military bases on the island.

+ There is, of course, no reference in the communique to observance of the "lawful rights of both national communities," a phrase which has appeared in several Soviet-Turkish communiqués, along with a call for recognition of the existence on the island of two national communities. In the present document, the Soviet side merely refers to the "Cypriot people as a whole."

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\* Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash was quoted by the Turkish Cypriot clandestine Bayrak Radio on 10 June as explaining that the terms "unitary" and "unity" both include a form of a federative system. (U.N. Secretary General U Thant in his 20 May report on Cyprus expressed hope for an agreement based on the independence and sovereignty of "a unitary state" of Cyprus.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 32 -

**ASSURANCES TO TURKEY** Turkish and Turkish Cypriot media report assurances by Soviet Ambassador to Turkey Grubyakov that Soviet policy on Cyprus remains unchanged. The Turkish Cypriot paper HALKIN SESI reported on 2 June that Grubyakov had called on Turkish Foreign Minister Secretary General Eralp and informed him that the Soviet Union continues to support the territorial integrity of the island as well as the rights of the two communities. Any change in this previously stated Soviet position is out of the question, the ambassador reportedly said. And Ankara radio on the 11th, reporting that Foreign Minister Olcay had invited Grubyakov in for clarification of some points in the Makarios communique, said that the ambassador stated he would convey the request to his government and assured Olcay the question of change in the general Soviet policy on Cyprus does not arise.

The visit is given some publicity in Moscow broadcasts in Turkish either to Turkey or to Cyprus or both, including reports on Podgorny's and Kosygin's speeches and the communique, reportage on Cypriot public and press reaction to Makarios' reception in Moscow, and a resume of Soviet press material.

**COMMENT IN LIFE ABROAD** A LIFE ABROAD article by Kraminov, signed to press 26 May, recapitulates past occasional Soviet criticism of the 1959 documents giving Cyprus "restricted" independence. Reviewing the history of the issue, Kraminov said the problem has exacerbated not only Athens-Ankara relations but also relations between groups of countries and "even between the greater powers." He accused the colonialists, "aided by Athens and Ankara," of doing everything possible to perpetuate the country's partition on national and religious grounds and make both communities dependent on the "so-called 'guarantors'" of Cyprus' independence. The London and Zurich agreements granted "extremely limited" independence, he said, and the constitution provided for the creation of "two inter-linked but opposing states or at least state formations." He charged the Greek regime with attempting to seize Cyprus by encouraging enosis--union with Greece, long opposed by Moscow. Remarking that "only resolute action by Turkey, which has threatened military operations," halted this, he then turned on "noisy voices" in Ankara advocating annexation of the island to Turkey, and proceeded to tick off alleged designs on the island by Britain, NATO, and the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 33 -

Kraminov accused these parties, and Athens and Ankara, of supporting the idea of dual enosis--partition of the island between Turkey and Greece--and said the concept was at variance with the interests of the island's population. He even expressed some muted criticism of the leaders of the two Cypriot communities, remarking that they were leaving a decision on the island's fate to Athens and Ankara. And he later expressed dismay that the "bosses of the two communities"--he parenthetically referred to the two chief negotiators, Kliridhis and Denktash--are bitterly opposed to attempts at rapprochement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot working people. Kraminov seemed encouraged by "new sentiments" developing in the Turkish Cypriot community through the efforts of Turkish students from Ankara. He observed that a "leftist movement" is emerging inspired by a wish toward independent development shared by the Greeks, to make Cyprus a community of two nationalities forming a united Cypriot people.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 34 -

## CUBAN FISHING BOATS

Cuba has reacted to the 9 June conviction, fining, and sentencing of four Cuban fishing boat "captains" for violating U.S. territorial waters off the U.S.-owned Dry Tortugas islands with sustained denunciation of the entire trial procedure, followed by publicity for its own trial, conviction, and fining of five U.S. citizens who--according to Havana's domestic service on 15 June--"admitted having entered Cuba's jurisdictional waters without any authorization and having landed illegally on national territory." As if to suggest that Cuba retains a further bargaining lever, the use of which will be determined by U.S. disposition of the fines and prison sentences meted out to the fishermen, the 15 June broadcast noted that "an appropriate investigation is still under way" concerning a U.S. tugboat and barge with eight U.S. crewmembers which entered Cuban territorial waters on 8 June.

Other reaction has included widespread protest meetings, rallies of fishermen on the high seas, and the creation of a "permanent" Cuban fishing fleet of 60 vessels, with an average of 17 men on each, at the site in international waters where Cuba claims the fishermen were seized by U.S. authorities on 26 May.

Castro denounced the trial of the Cuban fishermen in a conversation on 13 June with delegates to a Merchant Marine and Ports Ministry production meeting, publicized by PRENSA LATINA, but apparently chose not to press the issue in his speech to the closing session of the conference the next day. To judge from a domestic radio summary on the 15th, he merely referred to Cuban fishermen who defy "the perils of the sea as well as the political perils of aggression" and mentioned a fishermen's meeting in the Gulf of Mexico, which he called "the first outpost that is beginning to hold the aggressors in check."

### HAVANA DENOUNCES U.S. TRIAL OF CUBANS AS "JUDICIAL FARCE"

A 10 June editorial in the party organ GRANMA, as reviewed that day in the Cuban radio's Armed Forces Political Information Program, called the U.S. trial a "judicial

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 35 -

farce" characterized by "irregularities and partiality" and resulting in a "prefabricated verdict" and "arbitrary and illegal" sanctions. Contending that "flagrant contradictions" in the statements of "the prosecutor's leading witnesses . . . left no doubt as to the nonexistence of the supposed crime," GRANMA labeled the entire affair "a hostile, deliberate, and premeditated maneuver" designed to pressure Cuba into "foregoing its right to fish in international waters" off the Dry Tortugas and to carry forward the U.S. policy of "criminal economic blockade . . . against the Cuban revolution."

To bolster the argument that the conviction was purely a political act, and to justify the Cuban Government's decision not to appeal the sentence because "it does not consider the American courts worthy of consideration and trust," GRANMA quoted the presiding judge as telling the fishermen he was "well aware that you are innocent victims of the political circumstances of your country." In "a clear example of barefaced blackmail," according to GRANMA, the judge also suggested that in entertaining a motion to amend the judgment he would "take into consideration the payment of the fines by the Cuban Government." GRANMA concluded that "the four Cuban fishermen must be set free."

In his informal remarks on 13 June, according to PRENSA LATINA, Castro took note of the "contradictions of the North American authorities who arrested the fishermen," criticized the "hasty arrival at a verdict," and described the sentence--six months in jail and a \$10,000 fine for each--as "arbitrary." Cuban media emphasize that the fines will not be paid--that Cuba "will not falsely pay for freedom." The four fishermen are described as determined "to remain in prison so that the Cuban Government will not be forced to pay an amount of cash which they believe is necessary to take care of more important things in their country."

These themes have been struck in various commentaries on the jury's verdict and the court's sentence. Calling the trial "phony justice," a domestic service commentary on the 11th claimed "violation of due process" and "lack of proper defense." The "aim of this brutal outrage," it said, was "to provoke our people," to "reinforce the blockade against Cuba," and "to compel us to renounce fishing in international waters, in an area traditionally worked by Cuban fishermen." A communique released by the Cuban Gulf fishing fleet fishermen, also on the 11th, stated that "by convicting the four fishermen

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 36 -

American imperialism has tried to punish the attitude of a whole nation." And a GRANMA editorial on the 12th called the "arbitrary and criminal conviction" an "expression of a policy systematically pursued against Cuba by the U.S. Government," adding that this "aggression" by U.S. "imperialists" will "turn against them in the end like a boomerang smashing them square in the face."

#### CUBA FINES FIVE U.S. CITIZENS, ANNOUNCES EIGHT MORE HELD

The nature of the "boomerang" was made clear by a 10 June announcement over Havana's domestic service--in the midst of the initial reports of the conviction and sentencing of the Cuban fishermen--that the Cuban Government "has decided to refer to revolutionary courts the cases of the crews of two boats which violated Cuban territorial waters and illegally entered our territory." A one-man boat was said to have entered Cuban waters on 22 May, and a large yacht-- "completely outfitted with telephone communications equipment"-- was said to have arrived on 6 June with four crewmembers aboard. All five were "arrested by the authorities" for entering Cuban territorial waters and landing on national territory "without permission."

In addition, the announcement said, on 8 June a U.S. tugboat, towing a 6,000-ton barge and manned by eight U.S. citizens, entered Cuban waters and "was brought into port." The report added that Cuban personnel were repairing the mechanical damages "which were used as pretext to justify violating our territorial waters," but cautioned that "this peculiar event will be carefully investigated by Cuban authorities."

The linkage to the U.S. treatment of the Cuban fishermen was made clear in a radio talk by the freewheeling commentator Guido Garcia Inclan on the 11th: "The Yankees are making a great to-do now that the shoe is on the other foot," since Cuba is "holding a few Yankees" who "will have to be tried by our revolutionary courts" for "arriving on our natural shores." Contrasting the "hospitality" which the Cuban Government accorded the passengers of the Pan American plane hijacked to Cuba on 29 May with the alleged U.S. ill-treatment of the Cuban fishermen, Garcia suggested that the U.S. citizens now being held might well be "spies" and that "it is logical that they will be tried by revolutionary courts."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 37 -

An indication that the Cuban Government intends to recoup some of the fines paid in the past for the release of its fishermen-- it paid \$25,000 for each of four fishermen arrested and fined earlier this year--was contained in the announcement on the 15th that the first five U.S. citizens had each been fined \$20,000.

#### TASS, NCNA REPORT CUBAN CHARGES, STRESS CUBAN INDIGNATION

Moscow's TASS and Peking's NCNA have both been carrying sporadic brief accounts under Havana datelines of developments relating to the arrest, trial, and conviction of the Cuban fishermen. Neither Moscow nor Peking has commented. TASS has echoed Cuban media in terming the seizure "illegal and provocative" and denouncing the treatment of the detained fishermen; its reports have highlighted the "legitimate indignation" and mass protests and demonstrations of the Cuban people. NCNA has concentrated almost exclusively on the meetings and demonstrations in Cuba in protest of the "kidnapping" of the fishermen and the "outrageous" and "arbitrary" sentences.

Only the Soviet news agency has reported on the detention, trial, conviction, and fining of the five U.S. citizens for allegedly violating Cuban territorial waters. TASS also mentioned on 11 June that the crew of the tugboat-barge combination had been detained by Cuban authorities, but it has said nothing further on this incident.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 38 -

## PRC AND YUGOSLAVIA

## YUGOSLAV FOREIGN SECRETARY VISITS PRC; COEXISTENCE HAILED

The 8-15 June visit to the PRC by a Yugoslav government delegation, coming on the heels of Romania's Ceausescu, has further highlighted the role of Peking's East Europe policy in its effort to gain leverage against the two superpowers. Though not given anything like the exceptionally lavish treatment accorded the Romanians, the Yugoslav delegation--headed by Foreign Secretary Mirko Tepavac--had "a friendly conversation" with Chou En-lai, held "extensive" talks with Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, and toured Nanking and Shanghai. In the joint communique released on 15 June, the Chinese joined their visitors in endorsing a formulation of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence that accords with Yugoslavia's long-standing opposition to a bipolar international system and provides a rationale for the more differentiated, less ideological approach to foreign relations now being taken by Peking.

There was no attempt to conceal the political and ideological differences between the two sides, though the very fact of the visit demonstrated Peking's revised sense of priorities and what Li described as "a turn for the better" in Sino-Yugoslav relations in recent years. The communique says the talks were conducted in an atmosphere of "frankness, understanding, and friendship"--a formulation indicating an agreement to disagree while developing friendly relations. Accordingly, the communique, while calling for a further enhancement of their renewed friendship and an increase in economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation, contains no reference to international issues. But the communique registers the two sides' satisfaction over the visit, and the Chinese accepted an invitation to send a government delegation to Yugoslavia at a time to be decided later. The Chinese having earlier accepted Ceausescu's invitation to send a party-government delegation to Romania, a visit to these two countries would dramatize Peking's inroads in the Balkans in the last few years.

Tepavac had been frank in acknowledging the likelihood of differences when he spoke at a welcoming banquet on the 9th, but he adroitly turned this fact of life to advantage by scoring a point at the expense of the Soviet bloc. Observing

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 39 -

that differences of view among equal partners are not unnatural, he pointed out that "what is unnatural is the absolute concordance of views among those who are not equal." He defined Yugoslavia's position as "independent, socialist, and nonaligned." The Chinese expressed respect for Yugoslavia's independence and nonalignment, but they were not likely to have savored the revisionist flavor of Tepavac's remark about the Yugoslavs' belief in "the humane and democratic nature of socialism."

That the turning point in Sino-Yugoslav relations to which Li alluded can be traced to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was reflected in Chinese expressions of admiration for Yugoslavia's resolve to defend its independence. A slogan greeting the visitors expressed support for the Yugoslavs "in their struggle against foreign interference and threat of aggression," and Li on the 9th assured them that they could "expect firm support from the Chinese people" in defending their independence. As in the case of the Romanians' visit, the Chinese attacked the Soviets only indirectly as one of the "superpowers" and avoided the more provocative charge of "social imperialism."

As expected, there was no hint during the visit of a revival of party relations. In the only reference to either side's communist party, Tepavac in his speech on the 9th paid tribute to the Long March led by the CCP and "your leader, Chairman Mao." On the same occasion Li saluted the Yugoslavs' "glorious revolutionary tradition," but he mentioned President Tito only during his toast.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE            According to the joint communique, the two sides "stressed that all countries, whether their social systems are the same or different and whether they are big or small," should base their relations on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. This formulation represents a revision of the orthodox doctrine, as expounded by Moscow and formerly by Peking, which applies the principles of coexistence only to relations between states having different political systems. The formulation used in the communique reflects Yugoslavia's long-held position of opposition to bloc politics and to pressures for communist states to fall in line with "the socialist camp" in a bipolar global duel.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 40 -

Peking had introduced the revised formulation on the occasion of Yugoslav national day on 27 November, when Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua declared that the principles of peaceful coexistence underlie the improved PRC-Yugoslav relations and should apply to relations between "all countries, whether they have the same or different social systems." It appeared for a time that the Chinese might have made use of this bit of revisionism merely to accommodate the Yugoslavs, but subsequently Chou En-lai, speaking at an 8 June rally for Ceausescu, reiterated the formulation in the course of a disquisition on the superpowers.

The Sino-Yugoslav context was a fitting one for Peking's introduction of the revised formulation on peaceful coexistence. During the period of destalinization strains following the 1956 CPSU congress, when the Chinese were also seeking influence in East Europe, Peking had urged (in a government statement on 1 November 1956, during the Hungarian crisis) that relations among socialist countries be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. But when the Chinese made a sharp turn in 1957 toward a tough line on bloc unity in the name of "the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union," they launched a vigorous ideological campaign against the Yugoslavs for opposing blocs and for seeking to stand outside what the Chinese portrayed as the fundamental struggle between two camps representing two different political systems.\* In now seeking support from among the "small and medium-sized countries" in opposition to the superpowers, Peking finds Yugoslavia's nonaligned position attractive and is prepared to make ideological revisions conducive to a more flexible approach in the international community.

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\* The Yugoslavs' pleasure over the turn for the better in relations with the Chinese may have been enhanced by the continuing absence of Politburo Standing Committee member Chen Po-ta, who, as one of the leaders of the anti-Yugoslav campaign, authored a sharp attack on "the revisionism of the Tito group" in the first issue of RED FLAG, in 1958.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 41 -

## YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR

## BELGRADE CHARGES INCREASED MEDDLING BY "FOREIGN ENEMIES"

Yugoslav media have escalated their expressions of concern over alleged outside efforts to exploit the economic crisis in the country and to capitalize on the political turmoil fanned by the debate over Tito's proposed constitutional changes. Such concern extends to the possible impact on the army. Warnings against stepped-up "hostile actions" of "foreign enemies" directed against the country and army were elaborated in a report to a 10 June Belgrade conference of communists in the army, publicized by TANJUG, four days after Army Col. Vasilije Cerovic had charged in the Belgrade daily POLITIKA that "foreign" forces are waging "psychological warfare" against Yugoslavia in an attempt to influence its internal course at a critical juncture.

Although TANJUG's account of the 10 June report stopped short of identifying the foreign enemies beyond linking them to "Cominformists," the Yugoslavs have left no doubt as to the principal target of their complaints. A POLITIKA dispatch publicized by TANJUG the preceding day had charged that "Cominform emigres" were giving lectures in the Soviet Union slandering Yugoslavia and noted that the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs had protested this activity to the USSR Ambassador in Belgrade.

Yugoslavia's purpose at this stage is apparently to register its concern without unduly exacerbating Soviet-Yugoslav state relations. Followup comment on the POLITIKA correspondent's charges has appeared in some other Yugoslav press organs but not in BORBA, and the Foreign Secretariat spokesman at his 10 June press conference declined to go beyond a confirmation that a protest had been lodged.

In the most recent of a succession of warnings about "pressure" from unnamed external sources, Tito told an audience of Belgrade businessmen on 15 June that Yugoslavia must not "panic" in the face of "any kind of threats or--I don't know--pressure on our country, and such pressure exists." But he went on to say that the situation is "calmer" than before.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 42 -

**ARMY CONFERENCE** As recounted by TANJUG, a considerable portion of the report read at the Belgrade conference of communists in the army was devoted to "the efforts of certain forces abroad to wage a perfidious hostile action under the cloak of concern for the fate of Yugoslavia and of an offer of assistance." The "offer of assistance" was not clarified, but the "cloak of concern" could allude to the kind of profession of Soviet concern that was registered at the highest level in Brezhnev's 30 March report to the CPSU congress. Brezhnev's remark that "the Soviet people want to see socialism in Yugoslavia strengthened," at a time when planned constitutional changes look toward still further decentralization, may well have been read in Belgrade as interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs.

The report to the 10 June conference, TANJUG said, charged that the "assistance" the inimical forces have in mind "amounts to an attempt to break up Yugoslavia and to deny its independent and self-managing policy. This goal is served by the dissemination of disinformation and intrigues which are aimed at provoking demoralization and attempts at breaking the unity of socialist Yugoslavia and its armed forces." Charging that the "foreign enemies" are "directly allied" with Cominformists, Chetniks, Ustashi, and Rankovic followers, the report called for vigilance against people who, "under the guise of the struggle against the breakup of Yugoslavia," are actually advocating a return to bureaucratic centralism.

In a May Day speech in Labin, Istria, Tito had similarly raised the spectre of unnamed domestic and foreign enemies trying to disrupt Yugoslavia. He expressed particular concern over the activities of unnamed foreign "intelligence services" which he said were exerting "incredible pressure" against Yugoslavia. Adding that the Presidium had decided to "discover the roots of these various intelligence attempts," he called for national vigilance against the introduction of "misinformation from outside" designed to discredit Yugoslavia. Given the special relationship that exists between Belgrade and Bucharest, Ceausescu may have had the possibility of Soviet interference in Yugoslavia in mind when he declared a week later, in his 7 May address on the Romanian party's 50th anniversary, that fraternal parties "have the duty to avoid any interference in the domestic affairs of other parties, not to encourage or add to party dissension under any circumstance."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 43 -

TANJUG's account of the 10 June conference report dwelt on concern over the vulnerability of elements in the army to hardline appeals in a time of economic difficulties, quoting it as saying the adverse economic situation has had "a considerable effect on the political attitudes within the army." The report pointed out, according to TANJUG, that people with low incomes are particularly affected and that "political indisposition" has afflicted, "among others, members of the Yugoslav People's Army." In this context, the report called for energetic action to meet the present crisis and pledged support for the planned reforms and constitutional changes.

Transparently addressing itself to frictions over Serbian dominance in the armed forces as well as over the army's place in the planned reorganization, the document warned that the party organization in the army "cannot allow individuals, in the name of false radicalism, to sow confusion" regarding the role of the army, its national composition, and the competences of the republican leaderships in relation to the army. The constitutional provision of optimal proportional representation of republics and provinces, the report said, "must be implemented." The document was particularly critical of "the insufficient numbers" of Slovene, Croatian, Albanian, and Hungarian nationalities in the armed forces and called for new efforts to determine the reasons why the representation of these nationality groups in military schools is "insufficient."

The question of Serbian dominance in the armed forces and security services had been in evidence at the 20th Central Committee plenum of the League of Communists of Croatia held in Zagreb in May. Rade Bulat, a Serb, attacked Croatian chauvinism in a speech at the plenum and defended the dominant position of the Serbs in the army and security services. He was sharply rebutted by other speakers. In an address to the 10 June army conference in Belgrade, Defense Minister Ljubicic, according to TANJUG, emphasized in particular the need to achieve unity of all army personnel and said that "accounts should be resolutely settled with those who would hinder this unity."

Tito had raised the issue of dissidence among the military in an 8 May Sarajevo speech in which he attacked critics of decentralization as well as "retired generals" who criticized

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 44 -

the regime while drawing fat pensions from it. He added that some of them are "megalomaniacs who would like to be presidents of republics or at least ministers," and he promised that their identity would be revealed "when they are called to account." Although Tito limited his criticism to retired generals, his warning may also have been meant for some who were still on active duty.

**SERAJEVO ARMY CONFERENCE** Another warning about inimical activity against Yugoslavia was made at a Sarajevo army area meeting of communists on 11 June, according to TANJUG. Maj. Gen. Ahmed Dzubo told the gathering that "increased enemy activity against our country and the army demands greater political vigilance and concrete security measures." Urging support of the proposed constitutional changes, Dzubo noted that "certain misunderstandings existed here and there, misunderstandings which are explained by the fact that there were still members of the army, including members of the LYC, who did not understand the full depth and complexity of the processes of change taking place in our society." TANJUG reported that the conference went on to express "unanimous support for the 36th amendment to the constitution, which expresses recognition of Comrade Tito's contribution to building our country."

**POLITIKA ARTICLE** Col. Vasilije Cerovic's article in the 6 June **POLITIKA** had developed the theme of the need for vigilance against foreign enemies. Entitled "Wishful Thinking," the article warned unnamed foreign forces that their efforts to influence internal developments in Yugoslavia by psychological pressure would fail. Cerovic came closest to identifying the Soviets as the culprits when he complained about people waging "psychological warfare" against Yugoslavia with attacks on the nonbloc policy of some socialist countries and with talk of "internationalist duty and the right to defend the achievements of socialism."

Cerovic's remarks may have been responsive to a 1 June article in **RED STAR** by Maj. Gen. Ye. Sulimov which warned of neutralist tendencies and "the so-called nonalignment" among socialist countries. The chief targets of these attacks appeared to be Romania and Yugoslavia. On 13 June Radio Belgrade, taking note of the appearance that day of a **PRAVDA** article attacking nonalignment, also cited a "recent" **RED STAR** article that similarly attacked the nonbloc approach.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 45 -

EMIGRES IN USSR      There has been limited followup to the charges that Yugoslav emigres in the USSR are publicly "slandering LCY policy and President Tito," surfaced in the POLITIKA correspondent's dispatch reported by TANJUG on 9 June.\* On the 11th TANJUG quoted the Slovene daily DELO as saying that the purpose of the emigre attacks is "to sully Yugoslavia at all costs" and as adding that the use of emigres is "impermissible in honest polemics." The news agency also quoted the Belgrade weekly NIN as observing that while it is fairly difficult to fix motives for this "open return to the old manifestations of Cominform campaigns," one motive may be "to inject polemical arguments denying our self-management and nonaligned concepts into our internal dialog, with the addition of external inspiration." The semiofficial BORBA has been totally silent on the issue.

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\* See the TRENDS of 9 June, page 30.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
16 JUNE 1971

- 46 -

## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## BREZHNEV IS LAVISHLY PRAISED IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN

PRAVDA's handling of the campaign speeches for this month's RSFSR Supreme Soviet elections tends to set Brezhnev further ahead of his colleagues than was the case in June 1970, during the comparable election campaign for the USSR Supreme Soviet. Brezhnev is now favored with lavish and extensive praise, while there is virtually no praise for Kosygin and Podgornyy.

In June 1970 the Bauman raykom first secretary, V.N. Makeyev, in introducing Brezhnev at the district meeting with electors in Moscow, praised him as an "outstanding figure of the Communist Party, the Soviet state, and the international communist and workers movement" and "a tireless and persistent fighter for communism . . . ." (PRAVDA, 13 June 1970). In his June 1971 introduction Makeyev reiterated these epithets but expanded on them with praise for Brezhnev as the "talented leader" of the party and an international figure who "enjoys huge authority among all progressive forces of the world," a reference to Brezhnev's "merits" in strengthening peace and unifying all anti-imperialist forces, a comment on the "infinite faith and limitless love" of the people for Brezhnev, and high praise for Brezhnev's 24th CPSU Congress report (PRAVDA, 12 June 1971).

While PRAVDA published a verbatim version of Brezhnev's speech with a quarter page of flattering introduction, it carried the speeches of Podgornyy and Kosygin only in summary format with very brief praise--as it did in June 1970. The only flattering comments in regard to Kosygin and Podgornyy are: "the Soviet people well know and deeply respect A.N. Kosygin" (PRAVDA, 10 June 1971), and "by his activity N.V. Podgornyy has won the deep respect of the Soviet people" (PRAVDA, 11 June 1971). In June 1970 it was said that Kosygin had "justified with honor" the faith of his electors (PRAVDA, 11 June 1970), and that Podgornyy "by his tireless, active work . . . had fully justified the faith of his electors" (PRAVDA, 12 June 1970). The other Politburo members' speeches received only very abbreviated summary treatment in PRAVDA and the other central papers.

CONFIDENTIAL