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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda



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26 MAY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 21)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 17 - 23 MAY 1971

Moscow (2872 items)

Indochina	(8%)	8%
Zionism & Soviet Jews	(5%)	5%
Mars 2 Launching	(--)	4%
GDR Party-Government Delegation in USSR	(--)	4%
Trudeau in USSR	(--)	4%
Middle East	(4%)	3%
Georgian Jubilee	(11%)	3%
[Brezhnev Speech	(6%)	2%]
China	(2%)	2%

Peking (1447 items)

Indochina	(27%)	41%
[1st Anniversary	(--)	27%]
Mao Tse-tung Statement		
[Le Duan in PRC	(11%)	2%]
[Ho's Birthday	(--)	2%]
Domestic Issues	(43%)	32%
DPRK TU Delegation in PRC	(0.2%)	6%
Italian Economic Delega- tion in PRC	(--)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

The 81st anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth on 19 May provides the occasion for Hanoi and the Front to reiterate their determination to adhere to Ho's last will and testament and "resolutely fight the U.S. aggressors until complete victory." A commemorative address by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh contained standard propaganda fare: Trinh lauded recent victories throughout Indochina, warned of new U.S. "adventures" against the DRV, and denounced the United States for failing to accept the communist proposals for a settlement.

Attention to the fighting in South Vietnam includes Hanoi comment pegged to a communique, broadcast on 21 May, claiming that from 1 December 1970 to 10 April nearly 7,500 ARVN troops were put out of action in the operation in the U Minh jungle. Vietnamese and Cambodian communist media on the 25th for the first time took note of the ARVN operation launched into Cambodia on 11 May, claiming that by the 17th nearly 400 South Vietnamese had been put out of action in Svay Rieng and Prey Veng provinces.

The "new" 12 May Pathet Lao peace initiative calling for a bombing halt and a cease-fire received official support from the Vietnamese communists in DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements on the 20th and 21st, respectively. A VNA statement on the 24th dismissed as "slander" Souvanna Phouma's letters to the Geneva conference cochairmen and to the ICC on "the so-called aggressive acts of North Vietnamese troops." VNA did not, of course, acknowledge that Souvanna Phouma was complaining about attacks on Pak Song on the Bolovens Plateau and on Muong Dong Hene in Savannakhet Province. Hanoi media have publicized Pathet Lao reports on the communist advances in southern Laos, but there has been no DRV comment.

Moscow propagandists routinely reiterate that the Vietnamization policy is failing and that the United States must set a troop-withdrawal deadline in order to proceed to a settlement. Moscow continues to charge that Peking's friendly gestures toward the United States encourage the expansion of U.S. aggression in Indochina. And the anniversary of Mao Tse-tung's 20 May 1970 statement on the U.S. incursion into Cambodia prompts further Soviet claims that the PRC supports the Indochinese in words only.*

HO'S BIRTH ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY PLEDGES TO CONTINUE STRUGGLE

The anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth was marked this year as in 1970 by a Hanoi meeting on 18 May, jointly sponsored by the VWP

* Peking comment on Indochina in connection with the anniversary of Mao's statement is discussed in the PRC Foreign Affairs section of

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Central Committee, the National Assembly Standing Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee. President Ton Duc Thang opened the meeting and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh gave the main address, the text of which was carried by Hanoi radio on the 20th. From 16 through 18 May Hanoi had broadcast installments of Premier Pham Van Dong's address delivered at last year's Hanoi meeting commemorating the 80th anniversary of Ho's birth.* And VNA on the 19th reported that "all the Hanoi dailies" carried editorials marking the anniversary.

Except for Pham Hung,** the only Politburo member not reported attending the Hanoi meeting was Le Duc Tho. However, Tho's presence in Hanoi had been noted as recently as 16 May, when VNA listed him among those who met Le Duan upon his return from his visit to Peking and his sojourn in the USSR after attending the CPSU congress. Trinh's speech focused most attention on the construction of socialism in the DRV, but it also included standard discourse on U.S. "aggression" throughout Indochina. Among other things, Trinh repeated the characterization of the Laos incursion as resulting in "great strategic victories" for the communists; and he said that the Laos action, along with "important" communist victories in Cambodia, had left the allies more confused and divided. He pointed to growing opposition to the war in the United States but said the Nixon Administration "still balked" at accepting the NFLSV's proposals: The United States refuses to set a deadline for total withdrawal and persists in "maintaining" the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration. Pro forma criticism was also leveled at the United States for its "daily" strikes at the North and its "hatching of new military ventures against the DRV."

Trinh followed these denunciations by recalling Ho's warning that the war may drag on and "the people may have to face new sacrifices of life and property," but "whatever happens we must keep firm our resolve to fight the U.S. aggressors until total victory." He also noted that the 19th plenum of the Party Central Committee--announced last February--pointed out that "the foremost task of our entire party, army, and people at this moment" is to fight the "aggressors."

* See the TRENDS of 20 May 1970, pages 13-15.

** Pham Hung has not been reported present in Hanoi since September 1967.

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SOLIDARITY OF Trinh thanked the socialist countries and
SOCIALIST CAMP "our friends worldwide" who have "whole-
 heartedly supported and assisted" the DRV
in the war and in socialist construction. And in another
passage he said that "thoroughly imbued" with Ho's instructions,
"our party and people have always striven to contribute toward
protecting international solidarity and the internal solidarity
of the socialist camp and toward actively restoring the
solidarity bloc of fraternal parties." The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
editorial of the 19th also observes that Ho "untiringly
struggled for international unity," which he regarded as "an
indispensable factor for insuring the victory of the Vietnamese
revolution and the international revolution."

Pham Van Dong in his speech marking the anniversary last year
had quoted the passage in Ho's last will and testament on his
pain at the discord among the fraternal parties. And at the
31 August 1970 Hanoi meeting marking the 25th anniversary of
the DRV's founding on 2 September, Pham Van Dong said that
acting on Ho's "sacred" testament, "we have done all in our
power to contribute to the restoration and consolidation of
the solidarity of the socialist camp and the international
communist and workers' movement" It is standard for
Hanoi propaganda to pledge to work for the solidarity of the
"socialist camp," and this pledge was recently reiterated
authoritatively in the communique of the VWP Central Committee
19th plenum, publicized on 1 February 1971.

THE FRONT Ho's birth anniversary was also marked by a joint
 PRG-NFLSV-Alliance meeting on the 18th in "a
liberated area" in the South. As at last year's meeting, the
main address was given by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, and
PLAF Deputy Commander Mme. Nguyen Thi Dinh also spoke. Phat
said that the anniversary was being marked in a "very spirited
atmosphere when the revolutionary liberation war of the three
Indochinese peoples is gaining very great successes"
He reviewed "puppet" losses during the Laos incursion, and he
said that the result and "gaps" on all battlefields had
weakened pacification efforts. Phat prefaced a call to
persevere in the struggle with the declaration that "no matter
how the enemy may distort the truth, President Ho continues to
be our sacred national image and the personification of our
national unity"

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Other attention to the anniversary included a special edition of GIAI PHONG, organ of the NFLSV Central Committee, and an anniversary message from NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and President Huynh Tan Phat to President Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh and Pham Van Dong. Quoting Ho's saying that "nothing is more precious than independence and freedom, and so long as there is an aggressor in our country we will have to fight on to expel him from the country," the message expressed the determination of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people, "closely united behind the NFLSV and PRG," to "constantly raise high their absolute revolutionary fighting spirit, to achieve at all costs the sacred testament of President Ho"

HANOI PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES, REPEATS CALLS FOR VIGILANCE

The latest in the continuing series of statements from the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman came on 19 May with a protest against alleged U.S. action on the 17th.* The statement says that Tuong Lap village was bombed by U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, and that Vinh Son village was shelled by U.S. artillery based south of the demilitarized zone. (VNA English, in an apparent mistranslation, rendered this passage "based in the southern part" of the DMZ.) The protest claims that also on the 17th, U.S. fighters attacked the Le Ninh state farm in Quang Binh Province and on the following day attacked Ky Phuong village in Ky Anh district, Ha Tinh Province. These attacks, it says "caused losses in lives and property." The spokesman routinely condemned the U.S. "criminal war acts" and demanded an end to all acts of encroachment on DRV sovereignty and security.

VIGILANCE In addition to Nguyen Duy Trinh's reference on the 18th to "new military adventures" against the DRV, this theme recurs sporadically in other propaganda. An 11 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on increasing the combat strength of the local armed forces says it is necessary to

* Hanoi has not acknowledged action on 23 May when, according to the U.S. Command, fighter bombers and B-52's crossed the southern border of the DMZ to bomb suspected DRV rocket launching sites. The U.S. Command also reported that on the night of the 22d a U.S. F-105 fired a Shrike missile at an enemy SAM site 12 miles north of the DMZ.

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carry out this task in order to "readily smash all new military schemes" of the United States against the northern part of our country. An 18 May NHAN DAN editorial as broadcast by Hanoi radio, on strengthening the militia and self-defense forces, claims that the United States "is plotting to make use of its air and ranger forces to bomb, strafe, and carry out surprise attacks by ground units against the northern part of our country. That is why our people and armed forces should be ready to fight and to annihilate the enemy."

A discussion of how to combat "the enemy's heliborne attacks" appeared in a column on practical military matters serialized in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN from 21 to 24 April. In a possible allusion to the November Son Tay prisoner-rescue raid, the paper said that use of helicopters "to drop rangers and stage raids in the hinterland of North Vietnam is one of the craftiest and most reckless schemes of the Americans and their lackeys"--a scheme aimed at destroying important military, political, and economic targets, "kidnapping cadres, seizing weapons, freeing pilot pirates, and sowing confusion among our people"

NLHS PROPOSAL: OFFICIAL DRV, PRG SUPPORT; PRAISE FROM MOSCOW

VIETNAMESE STATEMENTS Hanoi and Front propaganda support for the 12 May peace initiative of the NLHS is raised to an official level with DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements on 21 and 22 May.* The statements repeat the line that the Lao issue has thus far not been settled because the Nixon Administration continues a policy of aggression and intervention in Laos, has "rejected" the five-point proposal,** and has sought to prevent the Laotians from contacting each other to solve the Lao problem peacefully. They add that the Lao armed forces and people have "duly punished" the U.S. and "puppet" military adventures and are now showing their good

* Peking has not endorsed the NLHS proposal on its own authority, but NCNA has publicized the DRV and PRG statements, as well as statements by Sihanouk's government and by a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman.

** The NLHS' five-point peace plan of 6 March 1970 had been supported by DRV and PRG Government statements on 9 and 11 March.

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will by making the present proposal. If the United States continues the aggressive war in Laos, the statements warn, the Vietnamese people will strengthen their solidarity with the Lao and Cambodian peoples and fight together until "total victory."

The Vietnam Fatherland Front also sent a message to the NLHS, reported by VNA on 26 May, which hails the new proposals and praises the Lao people's "great victories." It expresses "indignation" over continued intensification and expansion of U.S. aggression in Laos which it says is "torpedoing" the 1962 Geneva agreements and preventing the Lao parties concerned from meeting.

A 24 May VNA statement denounces Souvanna Phouma's 18 and 19 May letters to the Geneva conference cochairmen and to the chairman of the ICC/Laos "on the so-called 'aggressive acts of North Vietnamese troops on Lao territory.'" VNA does not, of course, acknowledge that Souvanna Phouma was complaining about attacks on Pak Song on the Bolovens Plateau and on Muong Dong Hene in Savannakhet Province. VNA does not mention the latest NLHS proposal when it says routinely that Souvanna Phouma has engaged in "brazen slander" to mislead U.S. and world opinion, which is demanding that the Nixon Administration put an end to intervention and aggression in Laos, ending the bombing of the whole territory of Laos as "an immediate step," so that the Laotians can settle their affairs themselves.

PATHET LAO COMMENT A 20 May NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement, carried by Radio Pathet Lao on the 25th, denounces continued U.S. aggression in Laos and charges without elaboration that the United States and the Vientiane administration are "slandering the NLHS and the DRV" to counter public opinion which supports the new NLHS peace proposal and opposes U.S. aggression.

A Pathet Lao Radio commentary of 24 May scores Souvanna Phouma for avoiding acceptance of the new proposal "under pressure from the U.S. imperialists and reactionary ultrarightist clique." It complains that Souvanna Phouma leveled "charges against the Lao patriotic forces and the DRV" and "distorted the true situation in the country" in his letter to the Geneva cochairmen, and that in a 20 May AFP interview he parroted "arguments of his U.S. imperialist masters" and refused to put pressure on

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the United States to stop bombing Lao territory. The commentary adds that the Sananikone "clique," the "reactionary ultrarightist clique which controls Prince Souvanna Phouma," also opposes the NLHS proposal. It concludes that the attitudes of Souvanna Phouma and the Sananikones show that they do not want to see an end to the U.S. war in Laos and that they are spreading "slanderous propaganda" to cover up U.S. aggression.

SOVIET SUPPORT Moscow supports the NLHS proposal in routine-level press and radio comment, including propaganda on a week of solidarity with Laos which began on 17 May, the seventh anniversary of the inception of U.S. bombing of Laos. (A 22 May IZVESTIYA article says the solidarity week was called for by the ninth session of the Council of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, held in Tripoli last November.) The commentaries condemn the United States for expanding the war in Laos and for trying to prevent a settlement, saying that peace contacts over the past year have failed because of "sabotage" by "U.S. militarist circles and Laotian reactionaries."

Some commentators, including Shchedrov in a 22 May PRAVDA article, accuse the United States of "rejecting" or maintaining silence on the new proposal while plotting a "new invasion" of Laos. But a 20 May domestic service commentary by Professor Mikhail S. Kapitsa is somewhat less negative. It says the proposal "could serve as a stimulus for getting the whole problem of a settlement in Laos moving again and restoring peace and a coalition government in that country," and it concludes that "it is now up to the Vientiane authorities and the Administration of the United States."

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PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MAJOR CAMPAIGN MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF MAO'S 20 MAY STATEMENT

Peking has marked the first anniversary of Mao's 20 May anti-U.S. statement with a major propaganda campaign, highlighted by a joint editorial calling the statement a "brilliant document of historic significance" that "has become a program for the anti-imperialist struggle" by the Chinese together with revolutionary people throughout the world. Against the background of recent moves to improve relations with countries which have been the targets of Chinese enmity, Peking has used the anniversary as an occasion to reaffirm its commitment to revolutionary causes and to give ample airing to Maoist ideology on the international scene.

In view of Peking's practice of using milestone occasions for reaffirming fundamentalist doctrines and commitments, the anniversary propaganda does not seem to signal a reversal of recent Chinese efforts to broaden international contacts and to enhance the PRC's diplomatic and political leverage. Though Peking has taken the occasion to play up "the revolutionary mass movement" in the United States and communist-led insurgencies in Southeast Asia, it has steered clear of bilateral issues bedeviling Sino-U.S. relations and has avoided attacking the Southeast Asian noncommunist leaders. Peking has also taken care, while viewing developments in the past year as confirming the tenets contained in Mao's statement, to avoid direct claims that Maoist ideology is the guiding force behind these developments.

The propaganda campaign on the anniversary suggests Peking's judgment of a need to reassure its clients and allies that it is not abandoning their cause and to preserve its revolutionary assets. In addition to the joint editorial, carried in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, the anniversary material has included articles by workers, peasants, and soldiers in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 20 May and a stream of reports on the state of the revolution in various areas of the world. Accounts of this sort have been issued by Peking around the turn of the year in the past, but this year Peking has timed them for the anniversary of Mao's 20 May statement. Also on the 20th, Peking issued the 492d "serious warning" to the United States, the first since 22 April (Lenin's birthday).

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INDOCHINA Mao's statement, issued on the day on which a session of the resumed Sino-U.S. talks in Warsaw had been scheduled to take place, was prompted by the U.S. incursion into Cambodia and the formation of Sihanouk's government in exile. (Peking's 19 May 1970 announcement of the postponement of the Warsaw meeting cited "the increasingly grave situation" caused by the Cambodian operation.) Indochina has been prominent in the anniversary propaganda, as exemplified in the joint editorial's assertion that at present Indochina is "the main battlefield in the world people's struggle against U.S. imperialism." The editorial's claim that Washington's strategic plans in Indochina "have failed completely" is spelled out in detail in a 20 May NCNA account of how the Indochinese have proven the "brilliant thesis" in Mao's statement that "the people of a small country can certainly defeat aggression by a big country."

The NCNA account, noting that President Nixon has been "steadily expanding" the war in Indochina behind "the smoke-screens of his empty talk of 'peace' and 'troop withdrawal,'" displays the mood of buoyant confidence that has marked Peking's assessment of the military situation in Indochina. In the past year, according to NCNA, the three Indochinese peoples have formed "a solid anti-U.S. united front" which has enabled them to win "victories of enormous strategic significance." Indicating that Peking's prescription is for more of the same in Indochina, the account concludes by quoting from Mao's statement calling on the Indochinese peoples to strengthen their unity and to persevere in "a protracted people's war."

An effort to reassure the Indochinese and other anti-U.S. forces of Peking's backing seems reflected in a passage in the joint editorial insisting on "high vigilance" and warning that the United States will "make desperate struggles and even embark on a hazardous adventure." Pointing out that the danger of a new world war still exists, the editorial offers a notably pointed warning against letting down one's guard: "It is dangerous if we see only the raging revolutionary flames but not the enemy who is sharpening his knife, and think that in view of the excellent situation we can lay our heads on our pillows and just drop off to sleep."

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Mao's statement included the dictum--duly cited in the joint editorial as "a most important" thesis--that the danger of a new world war still exists but that "revolution is the main trend in the world today." Mao's statement signaled a shift from the previous emphasis on the war preparations campaign arising out of the Sino-Soviet border confrontation to a focus on anti-U.S. struggle stressing the efficacy of local protracted warfare. The warning inserted in the anniversary editorial seems designed to counterbalance any excessive expectations that may have arisen from Peking's recent favorable readings of international developments.

SOUTHEAST ASIA Peking has used the anniversary, with its keynote of world revolution, as an occasion to balance recent moves toward improving relations with noncommunist neighboring states with a reminder of the existence of armed insurgencies led by client parties. A 19 May NCNA account of revolutionary armed struggle in Southeast Asia listed communist-led movements in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia,* the Philippines, Indonesia, and North Kalimantan. The account did not, however, engage in direct attacks on any of the leaders of these countries, thus striking the balance Peking has sought to maintain between propaganda support for its client parties and efforts to open the door for better relations with governments in the area.

In the manner of the authoritative ideological statement marking the Paris Commune centenary in March, the NCNA account discusses the communist movements in Southeast Asia in terms exemplifying Maoist strategy while at the same time crediting the local parties with integrating "the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution in their own countries." Peking has been leaving it to the local parties to acknowledge directly their debt to Mao's thought.

UNITED STATES The shift to an anti-U.S. focus signaled by Mao's statement is celebrated in the joint editorial's claim that the "international united front against U.S. imperialism" has "expanded enormously" in the past year.

* The account refers to "Malaya" in discussing the insurgency in north Malaysia, and to "Malaysia" in a passage on the North Kalimantan situation. Peking has implicitly acknowledged the legitimacy of the federation by using its official name in connection with the recent visit of a trade delegation from Malaysia.

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The editorial calls on the people of the world to further expand this united front to "isolate and strike at the chief enemy," the United States. As has been the case in the past year, the Soviet Union is only a secondary target as one of the two "superpowers" and is not mentioned by name in the anniversary propaganda.

The joint editorial and supporting NCNA accounts picture "violent revolutionary storms" shaking the United States and providing "powerful support" for the Indochinese struggle. As in Peking's coverage of recent demonstrations, however, President Nixon is spared the sort of virulent personal vilification that has marked Chinese comment in the past. Mao's statement referred to "Nixon's fascist atrocities" in connection with the shootings of students last May. This passage was quoted in a 20 May NCNA report on American antiwar and other protest movements. The joint editorial depersonalizes the charge of fascism by referring to "U.S. imperialism's . . . fascist rule over the American people."

While commenting on the Nixon Administration's domestic affairs, its policies in Indochina, and various other aspects of U.S. foreign relations, Peking's propaganda on the anniversary has ignored substantive bilateral issues in Sino-U.S. relations.

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MIDDLE EAST

Moscow continues to give only sparse coverage to developments in Egypt in the wake of President as-Sadat's purge of leaders in the government and the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). But Soviet concern seemed underlined in the 23 May announcement of the "unofficial friendly" visit by a Soviet delegation headed by Presidium Chairman Podgorny and including Ponomarev. The announcement has been accompanied by a spate of Soviet propaganda effusively praising Soviet-UAR relations and publicizing as-Sadat statements and Cairo press comment to depict deep Egyptian gratitude for Soviet aid, support, and friendship. Reminiscent of comment following Nasir's death last fall, Moscow recalls that Nasir viewed Soviet-Arab friendship as a permanent factor in the struggle for peace and expressed boundless gratitude to the Soviet Union.

With the propaganda focus on Arab-Soviet relations, there is little comment on the current status of the Arab-Israeli dispute following Secretary Rogers' visit to the Middle East. But Belyayev, in the domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 23d, did complain that the Jarring mission has practically been torpedoed and that the Big Four consultations have to all intents and purposes become sporadic--all the fault of the United States. He outlined what he called a "certain American variant" of a Middle East settlement which would "isolate" the Suez Canal question from the settlement problem. Arab public opinion, he claimed, is actively opposing this idea, insisting that the Suez reopening be part of an overall settlement which would provide for "liberation" of all Arab territories and for accommodation of the Palestinian Arabs' just demands.

Speaking at an 18 May luncheon for Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, Kosygin expressed support for programs for political settlement put forward by Indochinese patriots and--in unusual phraseology--by "Middle East," not Arab, states. His subsequent remark that such programs open up "realistic" ways toward restoring peace in these regions was in line with routine propaganda praise for Cairo's constructive and realistic peace initiatives. An article by Ovchinnikov in the 23 May PRAVDA quotes without attribution Kosygin's additional remark that the aggressor must

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quit foreign territories and that the peoples' right to independent development and to organization of their own domestic affairs must be respected. PRAVDA explains that this applies equally to Indochina and to the Middle East, where "the United States is currently using all available means to exert pressure directly or indirectly on the Arab countries" and attempting to "speculate on the role of self-styled 'mediator'" while in fact obstructing a settlement.

PODGORNYI VISIT HIGHLIGHTS COMMENT ON STRONG TIES WITH CAIRO

Identical announcements from Moscow and Cairo radios on 23 May of Podgorny's visit to Cairo "in the next few days" at as-Sadat's invitation were followed on the 24th by a MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) report that the Soviet delegation would arrive on the 25th for talks on "the latest developments in the Middle East crisis." Podgorny would be accompanied, MENA said, by Ponomarev, Gromyko, Deputy Defense Minister Pavlovskiy, and several aides and advisers.*

Reports of the visit were circulated in advance by correspondents of Arab media in dispatches from Cairo to their home offices: A report on the 22d to AN-NAHAR in Beirut said that Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov, meeting with as-Sadat on the 21st, raised the question of a visit soon of a Soviet delegation, probably led by Podgorny. And dispatches to Syrian media on the 23d, prior to the official announcement, reported that Podgorny's visit, to start on the 25th, was expected to last three days.

According to the 25 May AL-AHRAM, as reported by MENA, the sides will make a comprehensive review of the results of contacts and consultations held recently on the Middle East crisis, discussing the situation from military and political aspects, and will also cover Soviet-Egyptian military, political, and economic cooperation. AL-AHRAM added that the Soviet delegation's visit will not be restricted to any timetable. The paper also reported that Gromyko and the UAR ambassador in Moscow met on the evening of the 24th to discuss some of the issues to be raised in the Cairo talks. Moscow radio on the 24th merely cited the Cairo press as saying the

* Podgorny was in Egypt as recently as 13-19 January, heading a delegation attending commissioning ceremonies for the Aswan hydro-power complex. Ponomarev had led a CPSU delegation to Egypt 10-20 December, just prior to the Moscow visit of a UAR party-government delegation led by 'Ali Sabri.

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present Middle East situation as well as further Soviet-Egyptian cooperation will be discussed.

A "preparatory meeting," as AL-AHRAM described it, was held by as-Sadat and Podgorny on the 25th in what TASS called a "friendly, comradely atmosphere." Formal talks began on the 26th.

SKACHKOV DELEGATION Another Soviet delegation, led by Semyon Skachkov, chairman of the Soviet State Committee for External Economic Relations, arrived in Cairo on 20 May to attend the launching of the first ship at the Alexandria shipyards, according to TASS. MENA reported that the delegation would hold economic talks during its four-day visit. TASS only briefly reported Skachkov's remarks at the Alexandria ceremony on the 23d, but MENA cited him as pledging continued Soviet assistance to Egypt in its struggle to liberate the occupied territory. He pointedly expressed Soviet confidence in Arab victory in the struggle against "the Israeli aggressors and against U.S. imperialism" as well as confidence in the people's "adherence to their freedom along the course" set by Nasir. Judging by MENA's account, Skachkov made no reference to as-Sadat's most recent speech to the People's Assembly on 20 May but praised his May Day speech for stressing the USSR's friendship and firm stand alongside the UAR.

MENA on the 24th reported a meeting between Skachkov and Deputy Premier and Industry Minister Aziz Sidqi to discuss "continuation of implementation of projects" agreed on during Sidqi's March visit to Moscow to sign an economic and technical cooperation agreement. There appears to have been no indication in material on that visit of any planned Skachkov trip, although AL-AHRAM on 17 March had cited Sidqi as saying that Novikov would come to Cairo in June to sign another long-term agreement.

MOSCOW ON CAIRO PRESS Soviet media portray the Egyptian press as giving a warm and cordial welcome to Podgorny while emphasizing the "sincere and strong" UAR-Soviet relations and expressing gratitude, respect, and friendship for the Soviet Union. Moscow says the Cairo papers devote attention to the USSR's part in developing the country's economy and also speak highly of the Soviet Union's "principled stand" on the Middle East conflict. AL-AKHBAR is cited as saying that Egyptian-Soviet relations assume various forms and aspects "in accordance with the demands of every stage" but that their basis remains unchanged.

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AL-AHRAM is repeatedly quoted as declaring that the permanent and firm UAR-Soviet relations will remain unaltered in spite of efforts "in certain Western quarters" to drive a wedge between the two states. In the most explicit reference thus far to Western press reports of the pro-Soviet leanings of the dismissed Egyptian officials, TASS on the 25th attributed to AL-AKHBAR the observation that "allegations of the Western press that 'supporters of the West won over supporters of the Soviet Union in the UAR' are nothing but an absurdity."

BROADCASTS TO MIDDLE EAST Prior to the announcement of Podgorny's visit, Moscow broadcasts in Arabic were already replete with assurances of Soviet friendship and support, depicting the Arab countries as convinced that friendship and cooperation with the USSR are a "vital necessity" for them. A broadcast on the 17th claimed that Arab papers "stress the idea" in Brezhnev's 14 May Tbilisi speech that the Soviet Union is and will continue to be the "sincere and loyal friend" of the Arab peoples--a remark that Brezhnev in fact did not make in that speech.

A commentary in Arabic on the 21st provided the first rebuttal, against the unspoken background of the events in Cairo, of Western and Zionist "clamor over the so-called Soviet influence on the Arab countries." It insisted that in offering great political backing and material assistance to the Arabs the Soviet Union does not set any prior conditions that might affect, "even remotely, the national sovereignty" of the UAR. This line has been reiterated in other broadcasts to the Middle East: A commentary in Persian on the 25th stressed that the Soviet Union is not seeking to obtain unilaterally any advantages for itself in the Middle East or any other part of the world since it harbors no covetous designs. And Turkish listeners were told on the same day that the USSR has given extensive political, military, and economic aid to the UAR without imposing conditions "and without intervening in its internal affairs." Podgorny's visit, the commentary added, will undoubtedly help strengthen "peaceful and progressive forces" in the Middle East.

PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF UAR EVENTS CONTINUES RESTRAINED

Moscow continues to report sparingly and selectively on developments in Cairo, ignoring announcements of further arrests and new appointments and references to investigations. TASS reports

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have underlined the role of the president, noting in an account of the first new cabinet meeting that governmental and ASU changes have been carried out "in keeping with decrees" issued by the president and mentioning that the ASU interim committee, meeting to discuss measures for reorganization, "was guided by the directions" of as-Sadat. On the 25th TASS reported that "in conformity with a decision" by President as-Sadat, Aziz Sidqi will be acting ASU secretary general until the ASU's general national congress, scheduled to open 23 July.

Journalists were told, TASS said, that as-Sadat at the cabinet meeting "touched on several questions of the country's internal situation" and again stressed that the country's foreign policy rests on no concessions regarding territory or regarding Palestinian rights. TASS has also briefly reported the president's decree on reorganization of all ASU organs on the basis of elections and his message empowering the People's Assembly to draft a permanent constitution of the Egyptian Arab Republic. PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov, reporting on the UAR draft budget on the 23d, concluded that "progressive forces" in the UAR regard cooperation with the Soviet Union as a guarantee of further successes on the road of progress.

POLISH COMMENT While available East European propaganda has been reticent with regard to the events in Cairo, one forthright assessment of the developments did appear in the Polish weekly POLITYKA, reviewed by PAP on 21 May. The paper observed that as-Sadat's present policy suits the aspirations, generally speaking, of all those who want to end the war with the help of the Americans or anybody else. Without explaining the current status of Jum'ah and 'Ali Sabri, POLITYKA said it is not known what forces they still have at their disposal; the article added that with ASU influence still strong among the town population and students, "it cannot be precluded that counteraction might be launched." Listing the aspirations of various segments of Egyptian society, POLITYKA concluded that as-Sadat has no easy problem since practically everybody would like something else, and it predicted that, like Nasir, he would try to keep a balance which would satisfy each social group. One thing is certain, it said: The country has entered a period of "sharp internal struggle" which could have a great impact on its political and social system.

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TASS ACCOUNT OF AS-SADAT SPEECH GLOSSES OVER DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

FOREIGN POLICY TASS devotes most of its account of President as-Sadat's 20 May speech to the National Assembly--now People's Assembly--to his remarks on the Middle East conflict, predictably highlighting his statement that the UAR would never have made progress if it were not for aid and support "from our honest and sincere friend," the Soviet Union. Where as-Sadat reviewed the positions of the Big Four, TASS focuses on his remarks regarding the United States, noting in passing that he "went on to speak about the recent visit to Cairo by Secretary Rogers" and then quoting him as saying that Washington supplies the "Israeli aggressors" with everything from bread to Phantoms. TASS reports Egypt's reply to the United States on the reopening of the Suez Canal as outlined by as-Sadat, citing him as saying that Cairo has asked the United States to define its position and that if the U.S. Government really wants peace, pressure must be put on Israel if the cause of peace demands it.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS The TASS account brushes off the second half of the speech, on domestic affairs, with the observation that as-Sadat "indicated that he would not dwell on the events of last week, when several ministers and top officials of the ASU resigned." TASS does note that much of the speech concerned the drafting of a permanent constitution which as-Sadat said must lay stress on Arabism and defend the gains of socialism, and must envisage broader representation of peasants and workers in all government bodies. The account does not, of course, refer to his statement that "currents are now sweeping this world under the guise of science and dragging peoples to fearful materialism in which all values and morals are lost; we cannot live without values and morals because this would be tantamount to not believing in our religion."

ASU AFFAIRS TASS does report that in concluding his address as-Sadat said the ASU would be reorganized from top to bottom, with the People's Assembly performing the functions of the ASU Central Committee until its new membership is elected. Moscow has naturally failed to make any mention of the ASU "secret organization" referred to by as-Sadat in both his 14 and 20 May speeches and reported in Cairo media as the

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focal point of the "plotters." MENA on the 23d revealed that Jum'ah,* "who was running the ASU secret organization," ordered the destruction of the organization's files.

It may be recalled that Moscow for some years has referred sporadically to the need to create a "vanguard" grouping within the ASU composed of "progressive" Egyptians to guide the organization in the proper socialist, mass-oriented direction. An article in the March 1970 issue of the Russian-language journal PROSTER, published in Alma-Ata, had cited Jum'ah as saying it was necessary to have "an ideological framework, a form of political vanguard inside the ASU in the person of the apparat and activist group of the party," and that "the political apparatus is assigned the role of a vanguard political party of a socialist nature."**

As opposed to Moscow's reticence on the status of Egyptian leftists, the British CP organ MORNING STAR addresses itself directly to the situation of the Egyptian communists in the course of a 21 May article listing "dangerous moves" against Middle East communist parties. In Egypt, the paper says, "communists are not at present being persecuted, but they have no legal right to form a communist party." It recalls that the former communist organizations dissolved themselves and that after release from prison, the "former communists" were allowed to play a part in building the new Egypt, but only as individuals.

* LE MONDE's Eric Rouleau in a 15 May article said that Jum'ah made a secret trip to the USSR--in early February, according to a Lebanese press account of the incident--and that as-Sadat took this initiative "very badly," the more so since the Soviet leaders had complained to Jum'ah that as-Sadat took diplomatic initiatives without consulting them, contrary to a gentleman's agreement concluded with Nasir.

** See the FBIS TRENDS of 18 November 1970. pages 11-13.

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TRUDEAU IN USSR

MOSCOW REGISTERS SENSITIVITY TO IMPACT ON RELATIONS WITH U.S.

Soviet publicity for Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's 12-day visit to the Soviet Union, which began on 17 May, reflects evident sensitivity on the question of how developing Soviet-Canadian relations may affect the USSR's relations with third countries, primarily the United States. Kosygin's speech on the 19th, the day the Soviet-Canadian protocol was signed, and subsequent Soviet commentaries have underscored the shared concern of hosts and guest expressed in the protocol, which provides for bilateral consultations at least once a year on "important international problems of mutual interest as well as questions of bilateral relations." These consultations, the document stipulates, have "no bearing on the earlier commitments of the sides in regard to third countries and are not aimed against any one of them."

Speaking at a Canadian Embassy luncheon on the 19th, Kosygin declared that Soviet-Canadian cooperation in areas of mutual interest can be extended as a result of the "businesslike and friendly" talks, then hastened to add that this cooperation "is not directed at anyone." It not only meets "the national interests of both sides," he said, but "simultaneously helps ease international tension and preserve peace." TASS gave prominence to this passage in reporting Kosygin's remarks.

In a similar vein, in a Moscow radio talk broadcast widely beginning on the 20th, commentator Belobrov declared that the "important steps" taken by Canada and the USSR in the sphere of bilateral relations will not only promote the welfare of the two peoples but will "also help improve relations among all countries." This, Belobrov emphasized, is "a very important consideration." Other Soviet comment has made substantially the same point, though less sharply--for example, in likening the USSR's relations with Canada to relations with France in the interests of mutual advantage and the cause of peace.

Soviet media's accounts of the Canadian Prime Minister's 20 May press conference registered Moscow's sensitivity on the score of how the results of the visit could affect relations with the United States. A TASS account on the 20th

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and a TASS-attributed report appearing in the central press the next day entirely omitted Trudeau's several remarks on the subject. According to Western news agencies, Trudeau said his visit had been prompted in part by a judgment that it will be increasingly important for Canada to diversify its contacts with "significant world powers" because of the "overpowering presence" of the United States. This judgment, he said, is reflected in a "growing consciousness among Canadians of a danger to our national identity." Pointing to Canada's independence in foreign policy, he reportedly commented that the Soviet-Canadian protocol on mutual consultations does not imperil Canada's relationship with the United States through membership in NATO and NORAD, and he found an analogy to Canada's approach to the Soviet Union in Bonn's Ostpolitik and the U.S. negotiations with the Soviets in SALT. He also denied that he was acting as an intermediary for the United States in Moscow.

The Soviet accounts of the press conference reported only Trudeau's explanations of certain aspects of the newly signed protocol, his reference to Kosygin's acceptance of an invitation to visit Canada, his remarks on his discussion with Brezhnev and Kosygin of the Soviet proposal on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and his expression of interest in developing and exploring the Arctic regions. TASS quoted him to the effect that Canada and the Soviet Union "see eye to eye" on the last point.

While Moscow would have been expected to defer to Trudeau's concern for the U.S.-Canadian relationship, it might also have been expected to capitalize on the visit in some measure to promote the stereotyped propaganda picture of Western disunity and alienation of the United States' allies. But the thrust of Moscow's comment has been precisely to offset any view of Soviet courting of Canada as an exercise in traditional Soviet politicking designed to isolate the United States or to maneuver in the context of the Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangular relationship. Viewed alongside other recent Soviet moves, notably in SALT and in connection with possible negotiations on force reductions in Central Europe, the treatment of the visit emerges rather as an effort to enhance an image of Soviet readiness to negotiate across a broad front--bilaterally and multilaterally--with "business-like" objectives in view.

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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

MOSCOW PLAYS U.S.-SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT IN LOW KEY

Moscow's domestic service at 1600 GMT on 20 May carried as the third item in its newscast the text of the joint U.S.-Soviet announcement that the two countries have agreed to concentrate their efforts this year at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) on an accord limiting the deployment of antimissile defense systems and to work toward "certain measures" limiting strategic offensive arms. TASS subsequently transmitted the announcement, and PRAVDA carried it on an inside page on the 21st.

Initially, in releasing the announcement, Soviet media did not mention that President Nixon read it in Washington. The next day, however, a TASS roundup of favorable foreign reaction noted that the President "in his radio and TV speech" called the agreement "a very important event." The same TASS item--which appeared in PRAVDA on the 22d--reported that U Thant said the agreement "can prove to be an important step forward in the complex and prolonged talks" and that numerous U.S. Senators had reacted favorably.

On the 23d, participants in the domestic service commentators' roundtable show reviewed the joint announcement and described foreign reaction as "overwhelmingly" positive. Commentator Belyayev linked the results at SALT with Brezhnev's 14 May initiative on force levels in Europe, saying that these developments show the beneficial nature of the USSR's struggle for peace and against war. Beyond this observation, Moscow has not originated any comment.

EAST EUROPE All of Moscow's East European allies have reported the announcement, and comment is available from all but Sofia and Bucharest. Warsaw domestic service commentaries on the 20th noted the relative speed with which an agreement was reached, and a TRYBUNA LUDU article reviewed by PAP on the 22d challenged Washington to match its words with deeds. PAP also quoted GLOS PRACY for the observation that "the fairly optimistic initial views" on SALT were not unfounded, with the "impasse" on the talks now broken. A 25 May TRYBUNA LUDU article reviewed by PAP observed that missile-equipped submarines, nuclear-armed

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bombers, and MIRV's are not to be discussed in the present stage of negotiations, adding that in this connection "some experts point out that even in the event of a possible conclusion of initial agreements, the arms race and the perfecting of armaments will go on."

Prague's CTK on 21 May, noting that the House Armed Services Committee has approved funds for further development of the Safeguard ABM system, complained that this action is "in contrast to the recent Soviet-American announcement on progress" at SALT. A Budapest broadcast to Western Europe on the 21st viewed the U.S. acquiescence in the announcement as an effort to quiet domestic opposition. In the words of the commentary, the domestic opposition to the Nixon Administration is exerting such pressure that the President, "to strengthen his position, definitely needs to show progress in a question of decisive importance." Similarly, an East Berlin domestic service commentary on 21 May said that the United States accepted the "Soviet initiative" only because "it had become aware of the changed power ratio in the nuclear field and because of increased public pressure."

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FORCES IN EUROPE

USSR CLAIMS SUPPORT FOR BREZHNEV PROPOSAL, IMPUGNS U.S. STAND

Moscow continues to claim widespread favorable reaction to the Brezhnev proposal of 14 May to "start negotiations" on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. A domestic service commentary on the 21st, for example, said that "the world public is devoting a great deal of attention" to the proposal and that "not a single newspaper" has opposed it. The commentary also noted Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's remarks at a Moscow press conference the previous day that Canada "will carefully weigh what can be done" to implement the proposal. A participant in the 23 May domestic service commentators' roundtable show cited AFP for the report that the foreign ministers of 10 West European countries, meeting in Paris on 18 May to discuss Common Market questions, "expressed satisfaction with Brezhnev's initiative and characterized it as a gesture of good will." The panelist went on to cite Senator Mansfield as believing that the United States, instead of merely studying this "significant" proposal, "should react to it in a positive manner and set a concrete date for a start of the talks."

Soviet commentators have taken note of West German Chancellor Brandt's initial reaction to the Brezhnev proposal. Among others, a Grigoryev article in PRAVDA on the 23d said Brandt has declared that the proposal "merits great attention." FRG resistance to the proposal, according to Grigoryev, "is to be observed, as always," in the ranks of the CDU/CSU and among the Bonn generals. Soviet media have not so far been heard to mention FRG spokesman Ahlers' 21 May statement that Bonn believes talks on force reductions "could not be independent of the negotiations over Berlin."

Consistent with Moscow's failure to acknowledge that Ambassador Beam had met with Gromyko on 17 May to explore the Brezhnev proposal, low-level propaganda has pictured the United States as reluctant to engage in serious talks. Thus a 20 May TASS report concluded that Administration pressure to block Senate passage of the Mansfield resolution calling for a 50-percent reduction in U.S. troop strength in Europe "cannot but call into question the sincerity of statements of American leaders concerning their interest in a reciprocal reduction of armed

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forces in Europe." A domestic service report on 23 May declared that the United States "not only does not wish to reduce its troops in Europe, but is also bringing pressure to bear on its NATO partners with a view to forcing them to increase military preparations within the framework of the bloc." And a foreign-language commentary by Glazunov on the 24th questioned the sincerity of U.S. interest in talks when Secretary Laird has indicated he will raise the issue of NATO's military capabilities at the Ministerial Council session in Lisbon on 3-4 June.

Reporting the opening on 25 May of a two-day meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in Mittenwald, West Germany, a Moscow domestic service talk asserted that the alliance is "not only not rejecting the wild plans for making use of weapons of mass destruction in Europe, but is intending to give an even more dangerous character to these plans." The broadcast called such plans particularly "absurd" when the European public "has given broad approval to the important initiative" of the USSR.

FEW DEPARTURES FROM SOVIET LINE IN EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT

All of Moscow's East European allies have essentially followed the USSR's lead in treating the Brezhnev proposal. With the notable exception of Romania, they have stressed widespread favorable responses and in varying degrees have cast doubt on U.S. sincerity. Bucharest, which reported the proposal in a straightforward manner, has so far offered no comment but has continued to press its own call for withdrawal of troops from foreign territories.

Unlike Moscow, some East European sources have acknowledged the 17 May meeting between Ambassador Beam and Foreign Minister Gromyko to discuss the proposal. A Bratislava radio commentary on the 17th, for example, said Beam has been instructed "to start soundings" on the Soviet initiative. And Budapest's NEPSZAVA on the 19th said that the United States has not openly rejected Brezhnev's proposal, instead resorting to the "diplomatic step" of having Beam request a meeting with Gromyko.

Pointing to Senator Mansfield's support for the proposal, some East European comment has gone beyond Moscow's in noting that he has suggested that talks could begin as early as June. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 20th, for example, said Mansfield has

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urged the President to accept the proposal "and to begin talks as early as June." Prague's ZEMEDLSKE NOVINY said on the 17th that Mansfield has indicated the talks could start "at the beginning of June."

At least one East European commentary has brought up the question of an asymmetrical reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe, a long-standing NATO proposal which Moscow has opposed. An article in the Bratislava PRAVDA on the 18th said this "maneuver" is based on the claim that U.S. forces would have to withdraw across the Atlantic, whereas Soviet troops would remain closer to Europe because of geography. Such a "trick" involving a disproportionately large Soviet troop reduction would in fact strengthen the position of both NATO and the United States, the paper argued.

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ROMANIA

CEAUSESCU TO VISIT ASIAN COMMUNIST CAPITALS IN JUNE

The Romanian press on 20 May frontpaged an announcement that President Ceausescu will lead a party and government delegation to Peking, Pyongyang, and Hanoi in June. As if to avoid giving unduly provocative prominence to the Peking leg of the tour, the announcement contained three paragraphs of equal length on the projected visits, each noting Ceausescu's acceptance of an invitation from the respective capital. The order of the paragraphs--the PRC first, North Korea second, and North Vietnam last--may indicate the order of the itinerary.

No specific dates were cited; the announcement said Ceausescu will go to China "early in June," to North Korea "in the first half" of June, and to North Vietnam "soon." It mentioned no other visits or stopovers, but Ulan Bator's MONTSAME news agency reported on the 24th that a delegation led by Ceausescu will "arrive in the MPR in the second 10-day period of June." The vagueness about the timing may indicate that some details have yet to be arranged or that Ceausescu wants to maintain as much flexibility in his itinerary as possible.

The groundwork for the tour was evidently laid by Deputy Premier Radulescu, who visited Peking and Hanoi in November 1970 and made a trip to Peking in March of this year. Apart from the bilateral aspects of the visits, the inclusion of both the DPRK and the DRV on the itinerary--both neutrals in the Sino-Soviet dispute--will enable Bucharest to underline its policy of good relations with "all" the socialist countries, to mute any appearance of capitalizing on Sino-Soviet rivalry, and to enhance its image as honest broker in the cause of unity.

So far, Soviet media have not mentioned the announcement of the tour.

BUCHAREST GIVES CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER WARM WELCOME

Romanian media gave prominent play to Chilean Foreign Minister Almeyda's 20-23 May visit to Bucharest, which resulted in the signing of new agreements on trade, industrial cooperation,

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and technological aid to Chile. Almeyda is currently on a tour of the Soviet bloc seeking closer cooperation with the socialist countries. According to AGERPRES, the Chilean minister was received on the 21st by President Ceausescu and Premier Maurer; he later had talks with his Romanian counterpart, Manescu, as well as with Foreign Trade Minister Burtica and Minister of Mining, Oil, and Geology Almasan. Also on the 21st, Ceausescu gave a dinner in Almeyda's honor and stressed the common goals of the two countries in seeking "national independence and cooperation among all states." In response, Almeyda was effusive in his thanks for Romania's "generous receptivity" to Chile's problems and expressed confidence that the two countries are on "an ample and promising road toward strengthening their relationship on the basis of mutual advantage."

The communique on the visit carried by AGERPRES, registers similar warm sentiments noting that the talks were "conducive to full understanding" and expresses the two sides' "determination to develop relations on all levels-- political, economic, technical-scientific, and cultural-- based on full equal rights and mutual esteem, trust, and advantage." It adds that "concrete projects of industrial cooperation" were agreed upon and that the two sides are working out the details "by which Romania can grant Chile loans for some of these projects as well as for the purchase of Romanian equipment and machinery." The two parties defined "concrete domains" in which Romania will grant Chile technical assistance that will contribute to Chilean development on a mutually advantageous basis, the communique says, noting that cooperation in the mining and copper industries will continue. The results of the talks are in keeping with Almeyda's definition of the purpose of his Soviet bloc tour, as quoted in an AGERPRES account of a press conference for Romanian and foreign correspondents on the 22d: He hoped, he said, "to define the domains of cooperation in the common interest."

On more general topics, the joint document upholds each country's sovereign right to dispose of its natural resources and emphasizes a need to eliminate discriminatory practices from economic relations between states. It also calls for the PRC's admission to the United Nations and points to the importance of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Santiago and Peking.

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The communique makes no mention of either the Soviet Union or the United States. It does, however, condemn "the aggression in Southeast Asia" and call for the withdrawal of "aggressor troops." And AGERPRES, reporting the 22 May press conference, quoted one passage in which the Chilean foreign minister took a direct swipe at the United States. Answering a question on the political situation in Latin America, according to AGERPRES, Almeyda said that "the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states is gaining ground while the interventionist policy as practiced by the United States against Cuba and the Dominican Republic has fallen into disrepute." He reportedly added that "an external military intervention in Chile is impossible, but economic and financial pressures might occur."

BACKGROUND Against the backdrop of continuing efforts to lessen its dependence on the Soviet Union for its raw materials and to resist Soviet pressures for CEMA integration, Romania has been cultivating good relations with Chile since the reestablishment of full diplomatic relations in June 1965. Vice Premier Radulescu visited Chile in 1968. In the past few years the two countries have been cooperating in the mining industry, and last September they concluded an agreement to create a joint stock company for constructing two copper refining plants. According to the agreement, one plant would be built in each country and each would have a 51- to 49-percent holding in the company on its own territory.

Romania moved to capitalize on possibilities of further improving its ties with Chile after Allende's advent to power, sending Radulescu and Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu to Santiago for the inaugural ceremonies in November. An article in the party daily SCINTEIA on 12 April, hailing the victory of Allende's Popular Unity coalition in the 4 April municipal elections, pointed to "the significance of this success for Chile's economy and for the nationalization of Chile's basic resources."

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CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS

HUSAK THANKS SOVIETS, ALLIES FOR 1968 INTERVENTION

In his most abject public gesture to date, Gustav Husak used the occasion of his report to the opening session of the 14th Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress on 25 May to thank Brezhnev by name and the other visiting Warsaw Five leaders collectively for invading the country in August 1968. At the same time, the CPCZ leader characteristically discoursed at length on the culpability shared by Novotny's pre-1968 leadership for the problems that developed after Dubcek's takeover as First Secretary--an aspect of the Czechoslovak situation that has consistently been played down in Soviet propaganda.

The congress was opened with a brief, general speech by President Svoboda, and the honor of welcoming the visiting party delegations by name and conducting the procedural voting fell to CPCZ Presidium member and secretary Vasil Bilak. The ultraconservative Bilak, who had preceded Husak as Slovak CP first secretary in the preinvasion period and was the target of liberal attacks for allegedly colluding in the invasion, was singled out for lavish praise by both Husak and Slovak CP First Secretary Lenart at the congress of that party on 13-15 May 1971.

Heretofore, Husak has shown notably less zest for the subject of the invasion than the ultraconservatives of Bilak's stripe. He did not publicly endorse the intervention as a positive phenomenon until his speech on a visit to Moscow in October 1969--six months after his election as CPCZ First Secretary. He did not express public gratitude for the invasion until after the release in January 1971 of the CPCZ plenum document "Lessons From the Crisis-Ridden Development in Party and Society After the [1966] 13th CPCZ Congress," which he had presented at a CPCZ plenum in December 1970. That document said officially for the first time that the invasion was in response to "requests" from the Czechoslovaks. At the 24th CPSU Congress on 1 April, Husak briefly voiced "sincere thanks" to the CPSU and the Soviet Government and people "for having understood" the Czechoslovak communists' "appeals for help."

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Now, after hailing the intervention as having, among other things, "saved the lives of thousands of people," Husak again expressed "sincere thanks" to the CPSU and the Soviet Government and people, adding thanks now to "you personally, Comrade Brezhnev and the other socialist friends from the fraternal parties whose first secretaries are present today." He went on to spell out at length the line of the "Lessons" document that "in a difficult situation" the Warsaw Five leaders "understood the fears of the Czechoslovak communists for the cause of socialism, the request by many party and state functionaries, by many communists and collectives of working people for assistance." That assistance, he said, saved the country from "civil war and counterrevolution" and "defended the achievements of socialism."

In leading up to his remarks on the invasion, Husak briefly disposed of the sensitive subject of the anti-Soviet "extraordinary 14th congress of the CPCZ" held in secret at Vysocany the day after the 21 August 1968 invasion--a subject which had been dealt with at length at the Slovak CP congress earlier this month to cast Husak's role in the post-invasion period in a favorable light. Now, in attacking "Alexander Dubcek and his followers," Husak said their policies "ended up in the bankruptcy which resulted in the hostile platform of the well-known antiparty Vysocany meeting." He charged that an attempt was made at that congress to "create under the name of the CPCZ a counterrevolutionary staff" to break off ties with Moscow and its allies and eliminate socialist achievements in the CSSR.

At the same time, Husak presented the January 1968 leadership change, as he had done before, as a good idea gone wrong. He charged that the demands of the 1966 CPCZ congress to correct "certain unhealthy trends in our domestic political life" were not heeded by Novotny, whose "frequent administrative interventions and insensitive attitude toward solving the national question" (Czechs and Slovaks) led to "bureaucratic centralism" and "formalism in intraparty life." The "decisive measures" needed to correct the situation, he added, "included the departure of Antonin Novotny as first secretary," but the new leadership headed by Dubcek failed to combat "the growing rightist opportunism and antisocialist trends" manifested particularly in the communications media.

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A lengthy TASS summary of Husak's speech on the 25th followed the lines of past Soviet treatment of his speeches by ignoring his remarks on the pre-January 1968 period, focusing instead on the Dubcek era and the achievements under Husak's stewardship since April 1969 in "normalizing" the situation. TASS reports in detail Husak's personal thanks to Brezhnev and the other visiting East European leaders for the invasion and also singles out his attack on "the Chinese leadership," leveled in connection with praise for the results of the 1969 Moscow international party conference.

The initial TASS report of Brezhnev's speech to the Prague congress on the 26th puts the CPSU leader on record as "fully sharing" the appraisal of the 1968-69 events set forth in the "Lessons" document and the CPCZ Central Committee report delivered by Husak the day before. Citing "the high prestige now enjoyed in the world communist movement by the CPCZ and its leaders--comrades Gustav Husak, Ludvik Svoboda, and other unbending fighters for the cause of socialism," Brezhnev declared that "no one will be able to sever Czechoslovakia from the socialist camp."

WARSAW FIVE SEND TOP LEADERS, ROMANIA LESSER FIGURE

The Warsaw Five demonstrated their solidarity in the 1968 intervention and endorsement of Husak's leadership by all sending their party first secretaries to the Czechoslovak congress, where only the CPSU and SED were represented at that level at the 13th CPCZ Congress in 1966. The Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian parties were represented only by Politburo-level figures--Ochab, Nemes, and Velchev, respectively--in 1966.

Romania and Yugoslavia underscored their disapproval of the Czechoslovak "normalization" by lowering the level of their representation from that of 1966. Romania sent Popescu, a member of the RCP Executive Committee but not of the elite Permanent Presidium. Yugoslavia sent Gazi, a member of the 45-member LCY Presidium, equivalent to only a Central Committee member. In 1966, Bucharest sent Permanent Presidium member Birladeanu (since purged), and Belgrade sent LCY Executive Committee member and Premier Stambolic.

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While the French CP is again represented, as in 1966, by a Politburo-level figure, Guyot, the Italian CP further demonstrated its hostility to the Czechoslovak events by lowering its representation from Politburo to Central Committee level. The Cuban party and the NFLSV raised the level of their delegates this time from Central Committee to Politburo members--Blas Roca and Nguyen Van Hieu, respectively. The North Vietnamese and North Korean parties sent Politburo-level figures as in 1966--Le Thanh Nghi and So Chol, respectively.

The Japanese CP, which was represented at the 24th CPSU Congress, further indicated its rapprochement of sorts with Moscow by sending Central Committee member Tosoda to the Czechoslovak congress. Only a few of the nonruling communist party delegations are reported as being led by their first secretaries--those of San Marino, Luxembourg, the West German DKP, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, South Africa, Brazil, and Panama.

SOVIET COMMENT ENVISIONS FURTHER "NORMALIZATION"

Comment in Moscow media on the eve of the Czechoslovak party congress credited Husak with having achieved a degree of "normalization" and expressed confidence that he would intensify the process. The day before the congress opening, a Volga commentary in the Moscow domestic service noted that after Husak's leadership was elected in April 1969, "the communists . . . managed to normalize the situation in the social life of the country," consolidated the economy, and "reestablished relations of mutual trust and cooperation with the CPSU." It said the congress, "completing a complicated and difficult period" in the CPCZ's life, would "analyze the past stage," make an "all-round examination of the present level of development of the socialist society," and work out "a real program for the further successful development of the CSSR."

An article in PRAVDA on 22 May by Chief Editor Valenta of the CPCZ journal ZIVOT STRANY recalled that "party training in 1969," after Husak's takeover, "did not embrace the whole party and was still far from bearing the nature of an integral system for the study of Marxism-Leninism," although it did

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"facilitate the overthrow of non-Marxist positions and promoted political differentiation." Valenta noted further that the "Lessons" document presented by Husak to the December 1970 CPCZ plenum had stressed that "the rightists, who have not reconciled themselves to their defeat, henceforth also represent the main political danger." This fact, the article added, "presupposes well-thought-out offensive political and ideological work by the party for a lengthy period." Also in keeping with its sober tone, the article remarked that "Czechoslovakia has paid dearly in the recent past for disregarding Lenin's warning" on the weakening of socialist ideology.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

HONORARY POLITBURO NOMINATIONS TO REPUBLIC SOVIETS ANALYZED

In late April and early May, the republican newspapers reported on nominations for deputies to the supreme soviets of the union republics, to be elected 13 June. All Politburo members except the five who hold regional posts--Grishin, Voronov, Shelest, Kunayev, and Shcherbitskiy--were given honorary nominations in most of the republics. Many of the press reports of such nominations included standardized epithets of praise such as "prominent state figure" and "true son of the party"; the application of these epithets varied considerably in different republics, suggesting preferences for individual leaders.

The pattern of preference, both in regard to epithets and number of nominations, tended to remain the same as for the April-May 1970 nominations in the union republics for the USSR Supreme Soviet, with no significant change in Brezhnev's favor. In fact, Armenia is the sole republic reporting praise only of Brezhnev this year; Kirgizia and Azerbaydzhan, which last year reported praise only of Brezhnev, this year provide epithets for Podgorny and Kosygin as well.

Georgia and Tadzhikistan seem to slight Brezhnev. The Georgian press accounts of local nominations report less praise for Brezhnev than for Podgorny and Kosygin. Podgorny is called an "important party and state figure" and "skilled, energetic leader," while Kosygin is termed a "prominent state and party figure." The most complimentary thing said about Brezhnev is that he is a "brilliant example of serving the cause of Lenin, the Communist Party, and the interests of the people." (Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze is himself portrayed as a "glorious son" of the people). In 1970 also, Brezhnev had been slighted in Georgia. While all three leaders had been named "true Leninists" (as was Mzhavanadze), Kosygin had also been termed an "important political and state figure," Podgorny a "prominent state figure," and Brezhnev a "brilliant example."

Tadzhikistan rates both Brezhnev and Kosygin as "prominent figures of the Communist Party and Soviet state" and Podgorny and Shelepin as "true sons" of the party, while

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others receive no epithets. In 1970 the Tadzhiks had appeared to rate Shelepin even higher, calling him a "true son of the party and people, a prominent state figure," while Brezhnev was termed a "true son of the Communist Party and Soviet people" and Podgorny; a "true son of the party and people."

Podgorny appears to be downgraded in Kazakhstan and Lithuania. The Kazakh reports reserve the titles of "true Leninist" and "outstanding figure" for Brezhnev and consistently attach lengthier, higher ranking epithets to Kosygin than to Podgorny. While Podgorny is given credit only for being a state figure, Kosygin is occasionally labeled a state and political figure. Podgorny's highest tribute ("prominent state figure") is no higher than that applied to Polyanskiy ("prominent state and party figure") or Pelshe ("prominent party figure"). Kirilenko, Suslov, Kunayev, and Kulakov are each categorized as "one of the prominent figures" of the party. The lineup in 1970 was similar: Brezhnev was the only "outstanding" leader, while Kosygin and Podgorny were "prominent state figures" (with Kosygin receiving slightly more extensive descriptions). Suslov was a "true Leninist," Voronov "a prominent figure of the party and Soviet state," and Pelshe and Kunayev "one of the prominent" party and state leaders.

Lithuania rates Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Kirilenko as "outstanding" political and state figures and Podgorny only as a "prominent political and state figure." It did not report epithets in 1970.

As it did in 1970, Belorussia appears to discriminate against Kosygin, who is praised less often than Podgorny and credited only with being a state leader. Brezhnev is called an "outstanding party and state figure" four times; Podgorny is labeled an "outstanding party and state figure" twice and a "prominent party and state figure" three times; Kosygin is called an "outstanding state figure" once and a "talented state figure" once. Suslov, Polyanskiy, and Mazurov are labeled "prominent" figures, while Kirilenko is called a "true son of the party." In 1970 Brezhnev had been a "prominent figure of the international Communist movement" and "true Leninist," Podgorny a "prominent figure," Suslov a "brilliant example," and Mazurov a "principled leader." The highest compliment Kosygin had rated was as an "example" in serving the cause.

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Latvia appears to place Podgorny and Kosygin, at best, on a par with Suslov and native son Pelshe. Brezhnev is repeatedly labeled an "outstanding" figure and a "true Leninist," Suslov a "prominent political and state figure" and "true Leninist," and Pelshe a "prominent party figure" and "staunch Leninist"; Podgorny and Kosygin are called "prominent political and state figures." Brezhnev had also been the only "outstanding" figure in 1970, while Pelshe was a "true Leninist" and "prominent figure" of the party and state, Kosygin a "prominent Soviet state figure," Kirilenko a "true Leninist," and Podgorny only a "brilliant example."

Reports on nominations from the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Moldavia, and Turkmenia contain no epithets for the Politburo members.

BREZHNEV TREATED WITHOUT EFFUSION AT GEORGIAN FETE

At Georgia's 50th anniversary ceremony on 14 May, Brezhnev was treated with proper respect but not as effusively as at the August Kazakh anniversary, the October Azerbaydzhan anniversary, or the November Armenian anniversary. Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze--who has displayed coolness in the past--introduced Brezhnev with far less enthusiasm than the Kazakh, Azerbaydzhan, and Armenian first secretaries had at their ceremonies. Instead of labeling Brezhnev an outstanding figure of the party, state, and international Communist movement, and head of the Central Committee, Mzhavanadze simply introduced him as "our good friend, our dear comrade, our militant party leader" (PRAVDA and ZARYA VOSTOKA, 15 May). He mentioned Brezhnev without praise a few times in his own speech, and at the end of Brezhnev's speech Mzhavanadze thanked him for his "very brilliant, deep, and comprehensive speech." Unlike the Azerbaydzhanis, the Georgians did not elect a presidium consisting of the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev.

The speeches by representatives of Moscow, Leningrad, and the other republics tended roughly to follow past patterns in their treatment of Brezhnev. The least enthusiastic about Brezhnev were Estonian First Secretary Kebin (the only one who did not even mention Brezhnev), RSFSR First Deputy Premier Shkolnikov and Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan (both of whom mentioned Brezhnev's 24th congress report but without comment), and Lithuanian First Secretary Snechkus (who described Brezhnev's Tbilisi speech only as "penetrating").

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Slightly warmer were Turkmen First Secretary Gapurov, who labeled Brezhnev's speech "deeply comprehensive," and Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest, who called it "remarkable." Half of the 16 regional speakers (the first secretaries of Moscow, Leningrad, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaydzhan, and Latvia, as well as Tadzhik President Kholov) used the term "brilliant" plus other adjectives for Brezhnev's Tbilisi speech or his 24th congress report. The most flattering to Brezhnev were the first secretaries of Uzbekistan, Azerbaydzhan, and Kirgizia, who described Brezhnev's 24th congress report as an important theoretical document of creative Marxism-Leninism, and the Moldavian first secretary, who spoke of Brezhnev as the "leader of the Communist Party and state."

MENTION OF STALIN Apparently the Stalin issue could not be completely avoided in the dictator's Georgian homeland. Mzhavanadze mentioned Stalin's name twice, but without comment. Brezhnev steered a middle course, citing Stalin as one of Georgia's "prominent revolutionaries" but also mentioning the struggle against "the cult of personality" (PRAVDA and ZARYA VOSTOKA, 15 May). In the live Tbilisi broadcast of his speech, Brezhnev put Stalin at the head of the list of historical Georgian figures, and the mention of Stalin's name was greeted with prolonged applause; in the PRAVDA and ZARYA VOSTOKA versions of Brezhnev's speech, Stalin's name came fifth, and it was followed by the same "applause" indicator as each of the other names.

The only other speaker to mention Stalin was Azerbaydzhan First Secretary Aliyev, who declared that "we are proud of the fact that in the ranks of the glorious revolutionary army of Baku workers" there grew up as "Marxists-Leninists and organizers and political leaders of the masses the remarkable sons of the Georgian people Joseph Stalin, Alesha Dzhaparidze," and so forth. Aliyev had also invoked the name of Stalin--as one of the "pupils and comrades-in-arms" of Lenin--in his report at his own republic's anniversary (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 3 October 1970). Armenia's Kochinyan in his Tbilisi speech also named several "outstanding sons" of the Georgian and Armenian peoples, but he did not mention Stalin.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CCP PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES SET UP FOR HOPEI, INNER MONGOLIA

Further indications of top-level leadership difficulties are seen in the makeup of the new party committees for Inner Mongolia and Hopei, announced on 22 and 24 May respectively. Li Hsueh-feng, alternate Politburo member and chairman of the Hopei Revolutionary Committee, was not named to the new party structure in his provincial bailiwick. All the other Politburo members with provincial ties have been appointed secretary at least--in most instances, first secretary--in their provincial bailiwicks.

Teng Hai-ching, the long-absent chairman of the Inner Mongolia Revolutionary Committee, was similarly excluded from the list of leaders of the new regional party committee. In the case of five of the last six provincial-level party committees established, the revolutionary committee chairman has not been named to the secretariat; in regard to each of the first 17 party committees established, the revolutionary committee chairman became the first party secretary.

HOPEI The top spot on the Hopei committee went to Liu Tzu-hou, previously the number two man in the province. Liu, a full Central Committee member, is also the original first vice-chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee. Cheng San-sheng, a newcomer to the province recently transferred from Inner Mongolia where he held responsibilities on the revolutionary committee, was named second secretary. Three military men were named secretaries. Ma Hui is commander of the Hopei Military District (MD) and holds a concurrent vice-chairmanship. Liu Hai-ching has held military responsibilities within the province since 1968. Ma Chieh, making his first appearance in Hopei, has been transferred from Shansi where he was a vice-chairman of the Taiyuan municipal revolutionary committee. Before moving to Shansi in 1970, Ma was an official within the Kiangsu MD. The two deputy secretaries--Lu Yu-lan and Ma Li--have both held vice-chairmanships on the provincial revolutionary committee since 1970.

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Highlighting the Inner Mongolian namelist is Chao Tzu-yang's surprise reappearance as a secretary on the new committee. Prior to the cultural revolution, Chao was first secretary on the old Kwangtung party committee and also served as a secretary on the former Central-South Bureau headed by purged Tao Chu. Chao's disappearance from public view in 1966 was followed by Red Guard attacks portraying him as a loyal lackey of Tao and charging him with mistakes in carrying out various rural work programs.

Chao is the second Tao Chu side to find a leadership spot on a rebuilt provincial party committee. Chang Ping-hua, former first secretary on Hunan's party committee during Tao's reign in the Central-South Bureau, recently surfaced as a secretary on the new Shansi committee.

The Inner Mongolian committee, composed of 77 full and 15 alternate members, was formed at the close of a party congress attended by 680 delegates meeting in Huhehot from 13 to 18 May. Speaking to the congress on behalf of the party core group of the region, Yu sounded themes also contained in the keynote addresses at party congresses in other border provinces. Noting that Inner Mongolia is on the "northern frontier of our country" and an "outpost of national defense," Yu declared that all tasks should be accomplished "in light of preparedness against war."

TIBET COMMITTEE Lhasa radio on 21 May indicated that a regional party committee would be set up soon. The broadcast, reporting on the opening of a regional activists congress, said it is being held amid "the upsurge of greeting the first Tibet party congress."

Increasing the likelihood that he has been counted out of the regional power structure, Tseng Yung-ya, chairman of the Tibet revolutionary committee, failed to attend the opening session of the activists congress. Tseng has not appeared publicly since October 1970. Jen Jung, a vice-chairman and first political commissar of the regional PLA units, headed the list of regional officials who turned out for the opening ceremony and delivered the major address.

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The Hopei committee, consisting of 79 full and 20 alternate members, was formed at a congress attended by 1,209 party representatives meeting in Shihchiachuang from 17 to 20 May. Reflecting current PRC propaganda themes, Liu's keynote address to the congress called for reading Mao's works more seriously in order to be able to distinguish "theoretically and in practice" the difference "between genuine and sham Marxism."

Li Hsueh-feng, not named to the new secretariat, has not appeared publicly since last October when he led local rallies celebrating National Day. Long a top CCP organizational specialist, he helped in organizing previous National People's Congresses, and it is possible he has been detached to aid in preparations for the forthcoming NPC. His failure to reappear in Peking, however, makes it more likely that his disappearance is connected with top leadership dissensions over the missing Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng.

INNER MONGOLIA Radio behavior suggests dissension may persist in Inner Mongolia despite the establishment of the regional party committee. The regional radio is continuing its solid relay of Radio Peking, as it has done since 5 January 1970. In contrast, Kweichow radio recently resumed broadcasting locally originated material on 18 May, the day following announcement of its new party committee. During the cultural revolution, provincial radios resumed local broadcasts prior to, or within 2 or 3 days after, revolutionary committees were announced.

Of the five-man leadership group that heads the new committee, four are new to Inner Mongolia. Recently identified as an official within the Peking Military Region (MR), which includes Inner Mongolia, Yu Tai-chung has emerged on top as first secretary of the new committee; he held military responsibilities within the Kiangsu MD before his move to Peking. Wu Tao, named a secretary, is the only holdover from the cultural revolution power structure: a vice-chairman since the revolutionary committee was formed in November 1967, he is first political commissar of the MD. Hsu Hsin, a newcomer to the province, not previously identified, was also named a secretary as was the newly arrived Teng Tsun-lun, a former vice-minister for the allocation of materials.

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