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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

5 MAY 1971

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

5 MAY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 18)

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CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention i

INDOCHINA

Hanoi, Front Assail President's "Repression" of Demonstrators . . . 1
Allied Proposals on POW's Ignored; DRV "Initiative" Hailed . . . 4
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Again Protests U.S. Bombing of DRV. . . 6
Moscow Reports Protests, Pictures President as Unresponsive. . . 7
Peking Depicts Administration Running "Scared" Before Protests . . 9
Le Duan Remains in USSR as Other DRV Delegates Depart. 9

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

Peking Denounces U.S. Statements on Status of Taiwan 11
PRC Reaffirms Claim to Sovereignty over Senkakus 15

MIDDLE EAST

Moscow Sees Rogers Trip as Effort to Refurbish U.S. Image. 17

YUGOSLAVIA

Party Presidium Outlines Steps to Meet "Serious" Situation 19

EAST GERMANY

Honecker Takes Over in Orderly Transfer with Soviet Blessings. . . 22

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Kosygin Is Slighted in Supreme Soviet Nominations. 26

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

May Day Leadership Turnout Produces No Surprises 28

CONFIDENTIAL

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FBI'S TRENDS

5 MAY 1971

- i -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 26 APRIL - 2 MAY 1971

Moscow (2852 items)

Peking (1775 items)

Soyuz 10	(13%)	23%	Indochina	(19%)	39%
May Day	(4%)	18%	[Summit Conference	(7%)	16%]
CPSU Congress	(12%)	7%	Anniversary		
Indochina	(3%)	7%	[U.S. Demonstrations	(1%)	1.5%]
China	(2%)	3%	Domestic Issues	(43%)	22%
Middle East	(2%)	3%	May Day	(--)	17%
[Secretary Rogers' Trip	(0.1%)	1%]	Sierra Leone Independence	(--)	3%
Bulgarian Party	(7%)	2%	Anniversary		
Congress			Tanzanian National Day	(--)	3%
SEATO Meeting	(--)	2%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

5 MAY 1971

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist propaganda on the U.S. antiwar protests seizes on the mass arrests in Washington on 3 and 4 May as evidence of President Nixon's "obduracy" in pursuing the war and "repression" of peaceable citizens who demand a deadline for withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam. A notably abusive article in the DRV army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN calls the police actions, taken in "panic," an exposure of the President's "fascist, cruel face." The President's televised press conference of 29 April was pictured as an attempt to thwart the antiwar protests, and Hanoi radio said the President "brazenly declared" that neither the demonstrations in the streets nor the opposition in Congress will make him change his Vietnam policy.

Hanoi propagandists continue to take issue with President Nixon's insistence that there cannot be a total U.S. troop withdrawal until prisoners are released. There is no acknowledgment of the allied proposals--cited by the President on the 29th--for the immediate release of sick and wounded and the transfer of some prisoners to a neutral country. Instead, the media highlight what is called the DRV's "new initiative" at the Paris session of the 29th for immediate discussion of a withdrawal deadline so that the question of releasing prisoners can be taken up.

Routine Moscow comment on the antiwar demonstrations says the President is becoming more isolated as opposition to the war increases. Particular note is taken of calls in Congress for a troop-withdrawal deadline, and Moscow gives prompt pro forma support to the DRV "initiative" of the 29th.

Peking's propaganda on the U.S. protests is confined to reportage which focuses on the authorities' "brutal suppression" of the demonstrators but refrains from extensive personal abuse of the President.

Peking marks the first anniversary of the founding of Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union--announced 5 May 1970--with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and a greetings message from Chou En-lai to Premier Penn Nouth. Moscow thus far has ignored the anniversary, in keeping with its failure to recognize the Sihanouk government. It has been giving low-level publicity to a "solidarity week" marking the first anniversary of the U.S. incursion into Cambodia.

HANOI, FRONT ASSAIL PRESIDENT'S "REPRESSION" OF DEMONSTRATORS

Vietnamese communist media at first carried largely routine reports of the daily events in the antiwar demonstrations in Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 MAY 1971

- 2 -

But following the mass arrests on 3 and 4 May, there is a barrage of propaganda holding the President responsible for the "repression" of the demonstrators: VNA on the 5th carried a message of "sympathy" from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People, and Hanoi radio has broadcast articles from both the party paper NHAN DAN and the army organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.

Earlier VNA reports had taken note of the demonstrators' aim, on the 3d and 4th, of obstructing traffic in Washington in order to bring government operations to a standstill, but this objective is obscured in the propaganda attacking the President. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN is the most abusive when it declares: "Nixon's fascist, cruel face was again exposed completely. Panic-stricken by the protest movement which is mounting and spreading throughout the United States, Nixon used policemen and military forces to ruthlessly repress and terrorize the defenseless peace-loving Americans." Both papers report that 7,000 people were arrested, and NHAN DAN observes that "hundreds" were wounded. The party paper says that from California the President called the Washington police chief and ordered that he "take resolute measures" to cope with the protesters. It notes that "brothers Davis and Hoffman, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and many other demonstration leaders" were arrested, but it adds that the demonstrators were not deterred and that they held aloft the PRG flag and chanted "Hail to Ho Chi Minh! The NFLSV will certainly win."

The propaganda pictures the President as increasingly isolated and on the defensive but inflexible in his pursuit of "aggression." The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article of 5 May says that at his 29 April news conference "Nixon brazenly stated that he was not intimidated at all, that his government would continue to advance on the bellicose, dictatorial path, and that demonstrators who infringed the law would be appropriately dealt with." The army paper adds that on 1 May "on Nixon's orders" tens of thousands of U.S. troops, along with the police, began preparing for a counteroffensive against the "honest, peace-loving Americans." Earlier reaction to the President's press conference had pictured it as an attempt to thwart the antiwar movement, and two Hanoi radio broadcasts on the 30th reported the President as having "brazenly declared that neither the demonstrations in the streets nor the opposition in Congress will make him change his Vietnam policy." Much of the propaganda, including the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

- 3 -

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article of the 5th, notes the President's frequent public appearances in which he has tried to "justify" his Vietnam policy.

The propaganda has repeatedly stressed the diverse nature of the demonstrators, and a NHAN DAN commentary of 3 May says the massive demonstration in Washington on 24 April "will go down in the history of the United States as the greatest of its kind in composition, strength, and mettle." The earlier demonstrations of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War are also cited, as evidence of disaffection among servicemen. Both Hanoi and Front media report that U.S. troops in Saigon demonstrated on 28 April and that they handed out leaflets which, among other things, expressed support for the current demonstrations in the United States. A 3 May Hanoi radio commentary says the demonstrations in Saigon "have further motivated antiwar actions among the U.S. military ranks in South Vietnam" and have also "influenced the thoughts and feelings of the puppet soldiers and officers."

On 2 May, Liberation Radio carried a message from a group of captured U.S. servicemen, described as "against the war," welcoming the reported GI antiwar demonstrations in Saigon. The message recalls that the 26 April PLAF Command order* specified that the Liberation forces will not attack GI's who oppose the war. The PLAF order was also recalled in a speech at a meeting held by the South Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People. Liberation Radio reported on the 29th that the meeting took place "in a liberated area in South Vietnam," but it gave no date. DRV media on the 26th had reported a meeting in Hanoi that evening of its Committee for Solidarity with the American People. In remarks broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 30th, the vice chairman of the Solidarity Committee recalled the PLAF's 26 April instructions on attitudes to be taken toward U.S. servicemen who oppose the war. The speaker also reportedly called antiwar activities of U.S. veterans "the first important step of the antiwar movement of U.S. troops."

* See the 28 April TRENDS, pages 2-3.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 MAY 1971

- 4 -

ALLIED PROPOSALS ON POW'S IGNORED; DRV "INITIATIVE" HAILED

While comment on the President's press conference stresses his linking of a U.S. troop presence in South Vietnam with the POW's, it ignores most of his specific remarks on the prisoner issue, including his reference to allied proposals made in Paris that day. Similarly, Vietnamese communist accounts of the 29 April Paris session obscure the allied proposals; instead, communist media highlight what is called the DRV delegate's "new specific proposal." According to the VNA account, Xuan Thuy's "concrete proposal" was that the U.S. representative set "a reasonable time limit" for a total U.S. troop withdrawal to be considered by the parties "immediately today," so that they could then discuss the problem of releasing captured military men.*

VNA charges that the U.S. delegate "dodged this concrete proposal." Regarding the allied delegates' speeches, VNA says only that they "still resorted to perfidious contentions about the so-called prisoner-of-war problem" and that the Vietnamese communist delegates "exposed the U.S.-puppet dark scheme." (Ambassador Bruce proposed that POW camps in both North and South Vietnam be open to inspection by international humanitarian organizations or third party governments to be agreed upon by both sides. GVN delegate Lam recalled his government's 26 January proposal concerning the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners and its 8 April offer to transfer prisoners held captive for a long period of time to a neutral country. Lam also asked the North Vietnamese to propose adequate measures for the release of the sick and injured and to suggest their choice of a neutral government.)

* The communist delegates at the Paris sessions have routinely reiterated the PRG proposal that the United States announce its agreement to withdraw all troops by 30 June 1971 so that the parties can discuss "at once" the question of guaranteeing the safety of the withdrawing forces and the release of all captured military men. Sporadically, as at the last three sessions, they have indicated that if the United States does not find that date agreeable, it should "set another reasonable date to be considered by the other parties."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

- 5 -

Hanoi media have been at some pains to call attention to Xuan Thuy's 29 April "initiative" and to obscure the President's press conference remarks that day as well as his subsequent proposal that some of the POW's be transferred to Sweden. Thus, Xuan Thuy's "new specific proposal that the parties immediately discuss a time limit" for total U.S. withdrawal has been repeated in the DRV Paris spokesman's 30 April statement--carried by VNA on 1 May--on the President's press conference; in another VNA item on 1 May accusing the Nixon Administration of using the POW question for "propaganda" purposes; and in a 4 May statement by the DRV spokesman in Paris, carried by VNA on the 5th. This latter statement postdates the President's suggestion of a transfer of prisoners to Sweden; however, it is described merely as having been made "in connection with the Nixon Administration's references to the so-called question of prisoners." Completely obscuring the allied stand, the DRV spokesman complained that the President and the U.S. delegation at Paris "have refused to respond positively to the DRV's specific proposal." The spokesman also repeated the charge that "Nixon's raising the so-called prisoner-of-war question is nothing but a maneuver to cover up the Administration's crime of aggression and countless war crimes and to justify its stubborn refusal to fix a reasonable time limit for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops."

Hanoi and Front comment on the President's press conference noted that even people in the United States do not support the Administration's position on prisoners. Thus, Hanoi's initial reaction to the press conference in a radio broadcast on the 30th said the President's "arrogant argument" that troops would remain in South Vietnam as long as U.S. prisoners were not released has been rejected by such men as Senators Muskie, Javits, and Stevenson, who have pointed out that the way to get U.S. prisoners released is to withdraw all troops. On the same day Hanoi radio also cited Senator Mansfield as saying that the only correct way to settle the question is to set a troop-withdrawal deadline.

A Hanoi radio broadcast to U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam on the 4th cited Senator Muskie as stating that the continued presence of U.S. troops in Southeast Asia will prolong the war, not speed the release of U.S. prisoners. The broadcast also quoted Muskie as saying on the day after the President's press conference, "I can't recall a war in which prisoners have been exchanged before the war was settled."

CONFIDENTIAL

5 MAY 1971

- 6 -

The initial 30 April Hanoi broadcast alone acknowledged that the President reiterated his five-point peace proposal of 7 October, but it does not mention that an exchange of prisoners is one of the points. Instead, it focuses on his call for a mutual troop withdrawal.

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN AGAIN PROTESTS U.S. BOMBING OF DRV

The latest in the continuing series of protests over U.S. air strikes by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman is a 29 April statement which scores action in Vinh Linh area and Ha Tinh Province. It charges that from 24 to 27 April U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, bombed Huong Lap village, "north of the 17th parallel in the DMZ," and that U.S. planes bombed "a number of localities in Huong Khe district, Ha Tinh Province" on the 28th.* The protest says that the army and people of Ha Tinh, "fighting bravely," downed a U.S. plane. The alleged downing had been reported promptly on the 28th by DRV media in reports which claimed that the total of downed U.S. planes now stood at 3,392.

Routinely, the protest "energetically denounces and sternly condemns" the U.S. "acts of war" and demands an end to all encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security. Xuan Thuy at the Paris session that day, as reported by VNA, "energetically protested" the recent "continuous dispatch" of U.S. planes to violate the DRV's airspace and bomb "a number of places on its territory." He demanded that the Nixon Administration respect the U.S. commitment to "totally and unconditionally" stop all encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security.

* The U.S. Command in Saigon reported on the 29th that U.S. planes attacked missile and antiaircraft sites 85 and 115 miles northwest of the DMZ on the previous day, after they had been fired upon.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

5 MAY 1971

- 7 -

MOSCOW REPORTS PROTESTS, PICTURES PRESIDENT AS UNRESPONSIVE

Moscow deplores what it portrays as a failure on President Nixon's part to be swayed by the big U.S. antiwar demonstrations, but its treatment of the protests has been limited and almost entirely at the routine propaganda level. The 30 April May Day editorial in PRAVDA did bring up the subject, but only briefly in the statement that "mass antiwar demonstrations, in which 750,000 people took part in Washington and San Francisco alone, have recently spread through the United States." A commentary by Kozyakov in English on the 3d says the continuing demonstrations show that the "silent majority" on which the Administration relies for support has now spoken and is not supporting official policies; instead, the antiwar protesters demand a deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Limited, low-level Soviet reaction to the President's 29 April press conference stressed that he tried to "justify" and "explain" continued aggression in Indochina in the face of the growing antiwar demonstrations. A domestic service broadcast on the 30th observed that the American public was "disappointed" at the President's stand--advocacy of a "tough line" in Indochina at a time when the antiwar campaign is going on all over the country. The initial TASS report of the press conference said the President was "compelled to admit" that the demonstrations were of a massive nature, but it added that his remarks that "lawbreakers would be prosecuted" contained an "unconcealed threat" to the demonstrators. TASS on 29 April also saw an effort at intimidation in the decision by the House Internal Security Committee to investigate organizations sponsoring the Washington demonstrations--the National Peace Action Coalition and the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice.

Soviet media noted plans by the demonstrators to block traffic in Washington on 3 May and thereby close down the government. Subsequent reports acknowledged that the traffic arteries remained open but stressed police use of truncheons and tear gas. TASS also noted the "record number" of more than 7,000 arrests, including the arrest of organizer Rennie Davis. The domestic service on the 3d cited press reports that the President--who remained in California--sent Police Chief Wilson a message instructing him to treat the demonstrators "fairly but firmly." Moscow observed that the "firmness" was evident in the arrests and use of tear gas but that "fairness" was not to be found.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 MAY 1971

- 8 -

OPPOSITION IN CONGRESS A dispatch from IZVESTIYA's New York correspondent Sturua, published in the paper on 29 April, took note of increasing Congressional opposition to the President's Indochina policies and concluded that the present "troubles" in the Capitol are symptomatic of the "storm" shaking the entire United States. It is no coincidence, he said, that the "mutiny" in Congress coincides with the antiwar "spring offensive." Documenting a shift of opinion in Congress against Administration policies, Sturua pointed out that Senators Church and Cooper have introduced a bill proclaiming as a "national objective" the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam; that the Hatfield-McGovern bill calling for withdrawal before 31 December 1971 is getting increasing support in the Senate; and that Senator Hartke is sponsoring a resolution calling for immediate withdrawal. Sturua also noted that in the House the Democrats passed a resolution to withdraw all troops by the end of 1972--the first time the Democratic majority has refused to support the President on the war. Commenting that the approach of elections is whipping up the "infighting" all the more, Sturua said that the Democrats are making political capital out of "Nixon's war" while the Republicans are preparing an "escape route."

Moscow also continues to publicize statements by members of Congress critical of the President's Indochina policies. On 1 and 2 May TASS briefly reported remarks by Senators Fulbright and Muskie criticizing the President's refusal to set a withdrawal date. TASS singled out Fulbright's comments on ABC's Issues and Answers, but it ignored his critical remarks on violent demonstrations. TASS has also reported that more than 20 senators and representatives will take part in a nationwide "antiwar tour" to explain legislative proposals for fixing a deadline.

POW ISSUE The 30 April Moscow domestic service account of President Nixon's press conference notes that in reply to a question the President said a contingent of troops would remain in South Vietnam for "an unlimited length of time," but it does not acknowledge his statement that the residual force would remain as long as the DRV holds U.S. POW's and until South Vietnam can defend itself.

Moscow's reports fail to acknowledge the exchange at the press conference in which the President criticized the DRV's stand on POW's and pointed to the allied offer at the Paris conference that day to repatriate sick and wounded DRV prisoners and send

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

5 MAY 1971

- 9 -

others to a neutral country. However, Moscow has commented favorably on the "new initiative" of the communists at the 29 April Paris session in which they again offered to discuss the release of prisoners if the United States agreed to a troop-withdrawal deadline. A TASS commentary by Kharkov on 30 April and a Glazunov foreign-language radio commentary on 3 May praise the "constructive" initiative and criticize the United States for dismissing it as "nothing new." The U.S. "who-cares attitude" toward the Paris talks and "negative reaction" to all DRV and PRG proposals, Glazunov says, amount to the position of a "persistent aggressor" who aspires to victory on the battlefield.

PEKING DEPICTS ADMINISTRATION RUNNING "SCARED" BEFORE PROTESTS

While continuing to spare President Nixon extensive personal abuse, Peking's reportage on the U.S. antiwar demonstrations--at the Capitol, the Pentagon, Selective Service headquarters, and the Justice Department--portrays a wave of brutal police and military repression undertaken by a frightened U.S. Administration. The Chinese reports picture a massive influx of demonstrators undaunted by repression and determined to continue to make themselves heard.

The "scared Nixon Administration hurriedly called out large numbers of police and troops for brutal suppression," NCNA said on 4 May, and a "scared" President Nixon "came out himself on 29 April threatening to 'punish' the demonstrators if they refused to 'obey the law.'" The NCNA item did not specifically mention the President's press conference, however. It added that the demonstrators camping in West Potomac Park were forcibly dispersed by "helmeted police armed with truncheons" and that "nearly 1,500 persons had been arbitrarily arrested earlier in the week." Underscoring the demonstrators' resolve to "carry on the struggle," NCNA quoted one protest leader to the effect that "the police atrocity 'in no way stops our plans.'"

LE DUAN REMAINS IN USSR AS OTHER DRV DELEGATES DEPART

Vietnam Workers Party First Secretary Le Duan, who arrived in Moscow as head of the VWP delegation to the CPSU congress on 27 March, is apparently still in the USSR. VNA on 2 May

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

reported his "recent" visit to Sebastopol, where Moscow had said he had arrived on 25 April. There are no available mentions of his whereabouts since then. His stay of more than a month in the USSR is unusual; his past visits to the USSR, for the 23d CPSU Congress in March-April 1966 and for the Lenin centenary in April-May 1970, each lasted about three weeks.

Nguyen Duy Trinh, a member of Le Duan's delegation to the 24th CPSU Congress, went on to Sofia to attend the Bulgarian party congress and left Bulgaria for home on 27 April via Moscow and Peking. According to TASS and VNA, Kosygin received Trinh on the 29th for talks on the Indochina situation and on "further development of the all-round fraternal cooperation between the USSR and the DRV." VNA reports that he stopped in Peking on 1 May, and NCNA reported his departure "for home" on the 3d. There is no available indication that Trinh conferred with top Chinese leaders.

The leader of the NLHS delegation to the CPSU congress, Kaysone Phomvihane, went home from Moscow via Peking without attending the Bulgarian congress. While in Peking he was received by Chou En-lai and attended Sihanouk's 25 April banquet marking the first anniversary of the Indochinese people's summit conference, after which he visited cities in southern China. NCNA reported on 30 April that he left "for home" from Nanning.

Nguyen Van Hieu, who led the FRG delegation to both the CPSU and Bulgarian congresses, was reported by the Sofia radio to have left Bulgaria on 3 May. There has been no further report of his whereabouts.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

- 11 -

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PEKING DENOUNCES U.S. STATEMENTS ON STATUS OF TAIWAN

Peking has reacted sharply and authoritatively to State Department spokesman Bray's 28 April statements that sovereignty over Taiwan represents an unsettled question subject to future international resolution and that it should be resolved by the two rival Chinese regimes. In the customary pattern of authoritative comment on a current development, Peking's reaction took the form of a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article accompanied by a heavily editorialized NCNA report on 4 May characterizing Bray's press briefing as new evidence of U.S. hostility and interference in China's internal affairs. The NCNA report contains Peking media's first direct response-- a negative one--to recent U.S. gestures toward improving relations with the PRC.

Peking's rejoinder to Bray's statements provides the sharpest expression to date of its concern lest the international community seek an accommodation on the China question that would fall short of the PRC's major objectives. In comment on its diplomatic moves in recent months and on the question of UN representation, Peking has displayed apprehension over efforts to arrive at a formula that would in some measure preserve the international standing of Chiang Kai-shek's regime and leave the formal resolution of the China question indeterminate. This issue became especially topical after the PRC-Canadian recognition agreement, in which Canada was permitted merely to "take note" of Peking's claim to Taiwan without endorsing it. At that time, Peking voiced concern over a tendency within the international community to have recourse to what a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 15 October called "the new gimmick" of a "one China, one Taiwan" formula as a variation of the "two Chinas" policy.

STATUS OF TAIWAN Taking issue with Bray's statement that Taiwan's status remains an unsettled question, the Commentator article and the NCNA report advance unusually specific historical and juridical arguments for the PRC's claim that Taiwan and the Pescadores are a part of its territory. Thus, after recalling Japan's occupation of Taiwan at the end of the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

5 MAY 1971

- 12 -

19th century, Commentator cites the Cairo and Potsdam declarations as proclaiming the restoration of Taiwan to China and recalls a January 1950 statement by President Truman acknowledging Chinese authority over the island. Taking exception to Bray's clarifying statement that the Cairo and Potsdam declarations represented a statement of purpose that has never been formally implemented, Commentator rejected this "barefaced lying" on the grounds that "the then Chinese Government" assumed control of Taiwan in 1945 and that thus "China has resumed the sovereignty over Taiwan" from that time on. The PRC's position, then, is that the international question has long since been resolved and that its recovery of Taiwan remains purely a Chinese internal affair.

The thrust of Peking's argument is directed at Bray's statement that sovereignty over Taiwan is unsettled. His suggestion that the two Chinese governments might resolve the question between themselves is not examined separately and on its merits; rather it is cited only in conjunction with the statement that the sovereignty question is subject to international resolution, as indicating the "self-contradictory and nonsensical" character of Bray's remarks and as representing "a flagrant interference" in China's internal affairs.

Apart from quoting Bray's references to the two Chinese governments, Commentator makes no mention of the Chiang regime. The NCNA report, citing Bray's references to U.S. diplomatic and treaty relations with "the Chiang Kai-shek gang," follows a standard line in reading into these references a "sinister design" of the Nixon Administration to "continue to be hostile towards the Chinese people and to perpetuate its forcible occupation of China's territory Taiwan."

TAIWAN "LIBERATION" Characteristically, Peking has been vague about how it intends to gain control of Taiwan. The Commentator article, after denying that Taiwan is a question for international resolution and reaffirming Peking's opposition to any two-Chinas arrangement, reiterates the line that "when and how the Chinese people liberate Taiwan is entirely China's internal affair" in which no foreign country has any right to interfere. Quoting Mao as declaring that the Chinese "are determined to liberate Taiwan," Commentator deals with the U.S. presence in the area in the following imprecise terms: "The U.S. armed forces must pull out of Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. The U.S. aggressors have to pull out in any case and are not allowed to behave otherwise."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

- 13 -

Peking has not reported Chou En-lai's statement to Edgar Snow last year distinguishing between liberation of Taiwan as an internal matter and the U.S. military presence as an international one. According to Snow, Chou expressed Chinese readiness to negotiate on the latter question. This formulation of the Taiwan issue had been advanced by Chou in the past. In official pronouncements in recent years, notably the foreign ministry statement of November 1968 proposing resumption of the Warsaw talks, Peking has coupled a demand for withdrawal of U.S. armed forces with a call for Sino-U.S. relations to be based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. As in its current reaction to Bray's press briefing, Peking has insisted that the status of Taiwan and the island's future control are not subject to international negotiations.

Peking has not demanded abrogation of the U.S.-ROC treaty, presumably preferring to regard this as a dead letter if the United States undertakes to withdraw from Taiwan.

TWO CHINAS Peking's forceful reaction to Bray's statements attests to its overriding concern over anything smacking of a two-Chinas solution-- a concern overshadowing any satisfaction it may have drawn from Bray's remarks as implying erosion of U.S. support for the ROC's claims. The NCNA article notes that Bray's briefing followed the submission on 26 April of a presidential commission's report on U.S. policy on the United Nations. According to NCNA, the report advocates a "one China, one Taiwan" formula for resolving the China representation issue in the United Nations. NCNA also quotes President Nixon's remark at his 29 April press conference that the report is being given consideration in high councils of the government. This sequence of events, according to NCNA, shows that the United States is intensifying efforts in behalf of a "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" formula and that Bray's statement about Taiwan's unsettled status was "precisely aimed at preparing public opinion for this plot."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

- 14 -

NCNA's account does not mention the President's dismissal of the suggestion for negotiations between the Chinese regimes as "completely unrealistic." Beyond his reference to the commission's report, the President's discussion of Sino-U.S. relations and the Taiwan question is ignored in the report.

PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY While the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article is confined to a rebuttal of Bray's statement on the juridical status of Taiwan, the NCNA report discusses this issue within a broader context of Sino-U.S. relations. According to NCNA, there has been "a new development in the friendship between the American and Chinese people" since the visit of the U.S. table tennis team. In Peking's first comment on Washington's recent initiatives toward the PRC, NCNA scornfully observes that the Administration "hastily made various gestures . . . as if it wanted to improve relations" in an effort to gain political capital at a time of "unprecedented isolation at home and abroad." Bray's statements and the other evidence of an attempt to separate Taiwan from the mainland, NCNA concludes, show that the Administration's professed intention to establish normal relations with the PRC "is all humbug."

Before the NCNA report on Bray's statement, Peking had not commented on the political implications of recent Sino-U.S. developments. Apart from an anomalous Shanghai broadcast, the uniformly friendly PRC propaganda on the American table tennis players' visit even avoided making a distinction between the American people and their government. An authoritative endorsement of people's diplomacy was given in Peking's May Day joint editorial, which commended friendly exchanges between the people of various countries and the Chinese people.

While Peking had taken care to keep the atmosphere surrounding Sino-U.S. relations clear in the wake of the table tennis team's visit, the recent U.S. statements on the sensitive Taiwan issue have moved it to make a more direct pitch for political pressure on the Administration to change its China policy. This application of people's diplomacy is reflected in the closing passage of the 4 May NCNA report, which says the American people "always wish to be

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

- 15 -

friendly with the Chinese people" and portrays the American people as supporting Peking's aims regarding Taiwan. NCNA ends with a warning that the Nixon Administration "will only make itself more isolated at home and abroad and end in utter failure" if it should "cling to its hostility toward the Chinese people"--that is, if it seeks a compromise on the China question falling short of Peking's fundamental objectives.

Peking's sharp reaction to U.S. statements on the Taiwan issue accords with the position set forth in a major policy address by Huang Yung-sheng on 27 June 1970, the 20th anniversary of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan. After reiterating opposition to any formula for separating Taiwan from the mainland, Huang stressed that "U.S. occupation of Taiwan by armed force" is "the crucial issue" in Sino-U.S. relations and that a relaxation of relations is "out of the question" until the United States undertakes to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan. As in its current reaction, Peking's comment at that time derided the Nixon Administration's call for improved relations with the PRC as a maneuver to circumvent public pressure for a change in policy.

PRC REAFFIRMS CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER SENKAKUS

While taking exception to U.S. statements raising the question of Taiwan's status, Peking has also reacted to recent disclosures that administrative control over the disputed Senkakus will be acquired by Japan as part of the Okinawa reversion plan. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 1 May and an NCNA report the following day forcefully reassert the PRC's claim to sovereignty over the Senkakus and excoriate "the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang" for allegedly selling out Chinese territory and resources by taking part in joint development projects with the Japanese and the South Koreans. While denouncing the United States for being hostile to the Chinese by acceding administrative rights to Japan, Peking has ignored the U.S. distinction in this case between administrative rights and sovereignty. As in its comment on the Taiwan question, Peking is concerned to deny that the question of sovereignty is unsettled and subject to negotiations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

5 MAY 1971

- 16 -

The 1 May article is the most authoritative Peking comment on the Senkakus since a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article of 29 December. Unlike the December article, which focused mainly on the offshore oil and other resources of the Senkakus, it is essentially concerned with juridical questions of sovereignty. Peking's current propaganda is also notable for an effort to rally patriotic support. Thus, Commentator scorns the Nationalist Chinese for acting "servilely and humiliatingly" toward the Japanese and says "burning wrath among all the patriotic Chinese" has been aroused over the Senkakus issue.

Commentator commends the Overseas Chinese for launching "a patriotic campaign" over the issue. Peking's first endorsement of agitation by Overseas Chinese on this matter appeared in a 23 April NCNA account of a demonstration held in Washington on 10 April. The account reflected Peking's effort to turn the Overseas Chinese against the Nationalist regime, quoting the demonstrators as angrily denouncing "the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang for its treacherous act in selling out China's territory and sovereignty." Peking has not mentioned the recent demonstrations in Taiwan on the Senkakus question.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

- 17 -

MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW SEES ROGERS TRIP AS EFFORT TO REFURBISH U.S. IMAGE

Soviet propaganda on Secretary Rogers' Middle East tour, which began on 1 May in Saudi Arabia, sustains Moscow's ongoing criticism of U.S. motives in the area. In line with comment since the 23 April announcement of the trip, Soviet propagandists reject the notion that it represents a serious effort at mediation of the Middle East situation, citing Washington's "pro-Israel bias." Commentators continue to criticize U.S. aid to Israel--including the shipment of "offensive" Phantom aircraft--and alleged U.S. opposition to the reopening of the Suez Canal as proposed by the UAR. Reports on Rogers' stops in Jordan and Lebanon, on the 2d and 3d respectively, have highlighted local protests over U.S. support for Israel.

Primakov on 2 May, in the first of three installments of an interview with a Radio Moscow correspondent broadcast to Arab listeners, said the Secretary's trip can in no way be called a mediation mission; the only such mission, he added, is the one undertaken by Dr. Jarring. Primakov remarked that no one had entrusted Rogers with his mission--"neither those at the United Nations nor anyone . . . from the Big Four, whose delegates are conducting consultations" on the Middle East. Pointing up continuing U.S. support for Israel, he concluded that the trip is not taking place because of a change in Washington's policies, "but because the United States is forced to camouflage still further the objectives of its policy." In his interview on the 3d, Primakov said the Rogers mission "contradicts" that of Jarring.

Primakov and others press the line that oil is a major factor in a U.S. effort to refurbish the American image in the Middle East. In Primakov's words, the United States had dispatched Rogers to the Middle East at least in part to safeguard American oil monopolies--which "cover about 60 percent of the American balance of payments deficit"--against "the blows of the Arab national liberation movement." Taking a different tack, commentaries in Persian and Arabic on 29 April mentioned profits accruing to American oil companies

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

- 18 -

from the closing of the Suez Canal. The broadcast in Arabic concluded: "We can see how American oil companies stand behind the Israeli policy of destruction which aims at disrupting the operation of the Suez Canal."

A 3 May broadcast in Arabic, quoting the Arab press, said Rogers' visit is viewed as an attempt by the United States to portray itself as a neutral in the Arab-Israeli dispute; Rogers is in fact, however, "submitting suspect proposals which amount to Arab surrender." The commentary also quoted a joint statement by "progressive" Lebanese organizations to the effect that the United States is "seeking not only to impose surrender on the Arabs and deal a blow to the Palestinian people, but also to consolidate the regimes which are pursuing a pro-American course in the Arab countries," allegedly hoping to set up "a bloc directed against the Federation of Arab Republics."

TASS on the 4th, reporting Rogers' arrival that day in Cairo, cited the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY for the statement that along with the UAR initiative on opening the Suez Canal to international shipping, "the stand of the United States in the question of a settlement of the Middle East crisis" would be discussed. A 28 April Moscow commentary in Arabic, more forthcoming than the bulk of Soviet comment, had stated that the USSR "is ready to support any positive initiative aimed at the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East, including an initiative from the United States."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

- 19 -

YUGOSLAVIA

PARTY PRESIDIUUM OUTLINES STEPS TO MEET "SERIOUS" SITUATION

A lengthy communique issued on the League of Communists (LCY) Presidium meeting held on Brioni from 28 to 30 April, broadcast by Radio Belgrade, acknowledges that the economic and political situation in Yugoslavia is "serious." But it seeks to assure foreign and domestic audiences that the country is not on the brink of disintegration by portraying the LCY as in "complete unity" in its efforts to find solutions to pressing problems. Although Tito appears to have induced the participants in the session to curb public polemics and to agree on general approaches in speeding up reforms, the vagueness of some of the proposals enumerated in the communique suggests that many of the specifics remain to be worked out.

The document announces that an LCY conference--the highest party body between congresses--will be held soon to discuss the party's "role and organization." TANJUG reported on 4 May that the Croatian Central Committee will meet on the 11th to consider Presidium decisions, and other republican parties may be expected to take similar action.

Analyzing Yugoslavia's current situation, the communique broadly attributes present difficulties to insufficient development of self-management relations, structural disruptions in the economy, discord among the republics, and increased nationalism. Although prior to the Presidium session Tito had promised to name names and threatened to purge the LCY of those who violate unity--a course he may yet pursue during the planned party reorganization if party officials try to frustrate LCY decisions--the communique limits itself to a general call for a struggle against bureaucratic centralism and nationalism. It comes down particularly hard on the latter: "The LCY is unanimous in its assessment that nationalism is the basis for rallying all anticommunist forces, that it undermines the trust and unity of the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia and leads to the undermining of the unity of the League."

The communique goes on to cite the need for the LCY to strengthen its political and ideological role and to take a more active part in trying to solve the nation's problems. In particular, it calls on the party to vigorously implement economic stabilization measures and to work to create conditions for a general agreement on

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

5 MAY 1971

- 20 -

the economic system. Noting that opposition to the LCY's course has appeared in the public media, the communique calls on party officials to "take measures to insure that communists will more resolutely" crack down on opposition to LCY policy.

In an apparent effort to paper over the Serb-Croat dispute over alleged Croatian ties with Ustashi emigres abroad, the communique accepts the Federal Executive Council's conclusions, released in a statement on 28 April, that "hostile elements" abroad had tried to discredit the Croatian party leadership but that federal organs had no part in the "conspiracy." In an ostensible non sequitur, the communique adds vaguely that "the session also noted shortcomings in the work of certain security services which must be eliminated in the shortest time through the work of superior organs." The Executive Council's statement, as reported by TANJUG, had made no mention of "shortcomings" in the state security apparatus, but it did call on both federal and republican organs to "strengthen the personnel of the security services" in order to combat "hostile activities."

The Croatian Central Committee had specifically charged in a communique on 8 April that hostile elements abroad and some federal organs were disseminating allegations that the Croat leadership was linked with Ustashi emigres abroad. Although the Croatian Central Committee communique did not name the State Security Service (SDB) as the responsible federal organ, subsequent Croatian calls in the Federal Assembly for reorganization of the SDB clearly reflected a view of the SDB as the culprit.

TITO SPEECH In a May day speech in Labin, Istria, Tito gave a rambling report on the Brioni meeting in which he underlined the need to proceed from words to deeds and promised "energetic" action against opponents of the LCY's course. Although he acknowledged that the debate at the Presidium meeting was "sharp" at the beginning, he said that unity was achieved on all questions. Noting that similar League discussions had taken place in the past (and by implication without significant results), Tito firmly added that "the question of execution of decisions is not a matter which should be left on paper. No, this matter must move into practice and be carried out." Although he urged communists to start immediately to resolve the present crisis, he noted that it will "probably take a few months" and added that during that period "there will be cadre changes" and a "regrouping" in the Federal Government. Stating that the planned reorganization of the LCY will make it "a more efficient protagonist of the further building of our country," he added: "We shall do this in the shortest time, too."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

- 21 -

As if to underscore the urgency of the need to implement party and government reforms, Tito raised the spectre of unnamed domestic and foreign enemies trying to disrupt Yugoslavia. Warning against "all deformations among ourselves," he assailed universities which "retain and tolerate lecturers who work against our system, slander our leadership, and serve foreign interests," thereby misleading the youth. He was also critical of the Yugoslav press for disseminating "misinformation" and "slanders" and promised to take "energetic action" against unnamed papers that are "introducing trouble among the people." He went on to express concern over the activities of unnamed foreign "intelligence services" which he said were exerting "incredible pressure" against Yugoslavia. Adding that the Presidium had decided to "discover the roots of these various intelligence attempts," he called for national vigilance against the introduction of "misinformation from outside" designed to discredit Yugoslavia.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 22 -

EAST GERMANY

HONECKER TAKES OVER IN ORDERLY TRANSFER WITH SOVIET BLESSINGS

Warm personal tributes from Soviet and East European leaders as well as from his own party have accompanied Walter Ulbricht's resignation as party First Secretary in favor of his long-time heir apparent, Erich Honecker, in the kind of well-oiled transfer of power that is a rarity in East European communist history. The only other publicly untarnished stepdown of a top East European leader in recent years was Janos Kadar's relinquishing of the post of Hungarian premier shortly after the reemphasis on collective leadership in the USSR with Khrushchev's removal in October 1964.

Ulbricht tendered his resignation in a speech to the SED Central Committee on 3 May. After informing the plenum of his decision--"which has not been easy for me"--to step down as party leader because of "old age," he received encomiums from Honecker and in a letter from the SED Central Committee read by Premier Stoph. TASS promptly recounted the plenum proceedings and publicized cordial messages from Brezhnev both to Honecker on his election as First Secretary and to Ulbricht on his election to the honorary post of "Chairman" of the SED.* The Soviet leader's message to Honecker underscores continuity, noting that the new SED leader's career has been guided by "the outstanding leaders of the German working class movement, Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht." It notes Honecker's "big contribution" to strengthening friendship between the SED and CPSU and the East German and Soviet people.

The new division of powers in the GDR is described by Brezhnev as "an embodiment of the important Leninist principle of the successiveness and collectivity of party leadership." His message to Ulbricht says "we all know very well and highly appreciate the immense contribution" the veteran GDR leader has made to the building of socialism and to friendship between

* ADN announced on the 5th that the eighth SED congress in June will be opened by new SED Chairman Ulbricht, presumably the ceremonial function of welcoming visiting delegations by name, after which Honecker will deliver the Central Committee report.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
5 MAY 1971

- 23 -

the East German and Soviet parties and people. The message also echoes the passage in the SED Central Committee's letter of appreciation to Ulbricht which recognizes his new status as that of another member "working in the collective of the Politburo." Ulbricht had said, in concluding his resignation speech, that he would "continue working in the collective body of the Central Committee and the Politburo according to my strength" while "conscientiously" carrying out the function of State Council Chairman, which he retains.

From East European sources, prompt reports of the SED leadership change have come from Czechoslovak, Polish, Hungarian, Romanian, and Yugoslav media. In the only available comment from any of these sources so far, TANJUG said the change "did not come as a surprise" and went on to highlight the factor of Ulbricht's age--a factor of obvious import also for the Yugoslav leadership picture. The commentary added that "it is clear now why, a number of days before, Ulbricht did not leave for a visit to Romania as scheduled," to sign the new GDR-Romanian friendship treaty.

The first monitored telegram of congratulations from East Europe came from Husak to Honecker on the 3d--released by CTK before TASS released Brezhnev's. Summing up the East European response, TASS quoted ADN late the next day as reporting that "cordial felicitations" to Honecker and messages to Ulbricht "paying tribute to his outstanding work" had been sent by Gierak, Husak, Kadar, and Zhivkov. AGERPRES had carried messages from Ceausescu to the two GDR leaders several hours earlier.

HONECKER Firm solidarity with the CPSU pervaded both
SPEECHES Honecker's acceptance speech and his speech
presenting to the plenum the report of the SED
delegation, officially headed by Ulbricht, to the March-April
CPSU congress. In accepting his "heavy responsibility,"
Honecker declared that "the guarantee of our further secure
and successful progress lies primarily in our unbreakable
fraternal alliance with the party of Lenin, with the CPSU."

In introducing the SED delegation's report to the CPSU congress, Honecker said the Soviet congress results were "of inestimable value for the shaping of the developed socialist social system in the GDR," adding that the SED delegation report "stresses explicitly in this context

CONFIDENTIAL

- 24 -

that the way to socialism and its main characteristics are determined by general laws." He also heavily stressed economic "integration" in CEMA, as he had done in a 20 April article in PRAVDA on the 25th SED anniversary, and praised Brezhnev personally for his remarks at the congress on the virtues of "businesslike" economic planning.

Commenting on GDR policy toward the FRG and West Berlin, Honecker used language very similar to that used by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in his 3 April speech to the CPSU congress. First pointing out that ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn would have "favorable" repercussions throughout Europe, Honecker said that the ratification of these treaties, the convening of an all-European security conference, and "the settlement of West Berlin's problems" are "necessary and important steps" toward a lasting peace in Europe. But he immediately added--as Gromyko had done--that these steps "must be carried out in parallel, without waiting for the solution of one question before moving on to the second," and noted that the policy of solving issues in parallel "is the point of view of the CPSU as well as of the SED." He described West German efforts to link ratification of the treaties with a West Berlin settlement as "hopeless attempts" and remarked that Bonn's "babbling about so-called intra-German relations" had been rebuffed at the CPSU congress.

Again asserting complete unity between the CPSU and the SED, Honecker said that "both parties, and with them the other fraternal parties, are also agreed that nothing has changed with regard to the reactionary and aggressive character of imperialism and the FRG." The East Berlin radio account of the speech does not, however, make it clear whether Honecker directly mentioned the Bonn government or the SPD/FDP coalition.

BACKGROUND Although Ulbricht has periodically been out of the limelight because of illness in recent years, his own remarks and the plenum announcement cited only "age" and not health as the reason for his stepdown as First Secretary. On 21 April he delivered a lengthy speech on the SED's 25th anniversary, carried live by the East Berlin domestic service, in which he may have implied his impending stepdown in a passing remark on the subject of plan fulfillment: "I do not want to prejudge the Central Committee report to the eighth party congress," scheduled to open on 14 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 MAY 1971

- 25 -

As at the CPSU congress, he did not include any direct attack on Peking in that speech. Honecker, however, assailed "the Mao Tse-tung group" in a speech outside the congress, in Magnitogorsk on 4 April, and the Chinese leadership came under similar attack in a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial on the CPSU congress summarized by PRAVDA on 29 March.

The East German press in the last few years has amply hinted at Honecker's status as heir apparent in almost invariably including him in group pictures involving Ulbricht and Stoph, usually with Honecker and Stoph at a similar distance just behind or beside Ulbricht. In GDR party-government delegations to international communist gatherings, Honecker has regularly been included as an extra man, with no counterpart in delegations from the other Soviet bloc countries. He has been Ulbricht's stand-in at domestic functions and as the SED representative on such occasions as a GDR party-government delegation's visit to Moscow in July 1969; during another such visit to Warsaw that same month on the Polish 25th anniversary, a celebration also attended by Brezhnev, Kosygin, Husak, and Svoboda; and at the Bulgarian party congress of 20-25 April this year. After the close of the CPSU congress, TASS on 12 April reported Brezhnev's "cordial" meeting with both Ulbricht and Honecker; Stoph, who was also a member of the SED delegation, was not mentioned in the report.

ADN's biography of Honecker, carried on 3 May, says among other things that the new leader "last year attended all important meetings of the party and state leaderships of the socialist countries" and "took an active part in the preparation and execution of the international conference of communist and workers parties in Moscow in 1969."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

5 MAY 1971

- 26 -

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

KOSYGIN IS SLIGHTED IN SUPREME SOVIET NOMINATIONS

Downgraded to third place in Brezhnev's listing of the Politburo at the close of the 24th CPSU Congress, Kosygin is the victim of new protocol setbacks in the course of nominations to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The first nominating sessions took place on 27 April, and they were reported in the papers of the next day.

In the nominations from Moscow city--the only ones in which epithets are applied and hierarchical order is directly comparable to that of 1970--that of Brezhnev was listed first, Podgorny second, and Kosygin third, reversing the order of the latter two in the April 1970 Supreme Soviet nominations. Additionally, in PRAVDA, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, and most other papers, Kosygin was granted exactly the same epithets as Podgorny ("prominent political and state figure"); in 1970 Kosygin had been a "true Leninist and important political and state figure" while Podgorny was only a "prominent figure of the Leninist Communist Party and Soviet state." IZVESTIYA differs from the other papers in snubbing Kosygin further, by deleting his epithet while including Podgorny's.

On the other hand, Podgorny and Kosygin received the identical number of nominations--as had happened also on the first day in April 1970. At the May Day parade too, Kosygin and Podgorny followed their familiar pattern of flanking Brezhnev at the tribune, giving no further hint of any change.

Interestingly, Brezhnev stood out less from the leading troika this year than in 1970. Whereas Brezhnev received far more first-day nominations than Kosygin and Podgorny in 1970--from 16 areas as against six--this year his 16 regions were almost matched by the 15 which nominated Kosygin and Podgorny. Whereas PRAVDA's report on the first day in 1970 (25 April 1970) reported the epithets for Brezhnev but deleted those for Kosygin and Podgorny (IZVESTIYA did report the praise for Kosygin and Podgorny, and PRAVDA belatedly added epithets for them on 30 April), this year all papers except IZVESTIYA carried epithets for all three top leaders.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

5 MAY 1971

- 27 -

The first day's nominations in PRAVDA generally confirmed Brezhnev's 9 April ranking of Politburo members:

<u>Brezhnev's ranking</u>	<u>1971 nominations</u>	<u>1970 nominations</u>
1. Brezhnev	16	16
2. Podgorny	15	6
3. Kosygin	15	6
4. Suslov	3	4
5. Kirilenko	2	4
6. Pelshe	2	2
7. Mazurov	2	1
8. Polyanskiy	2	2
9. Shelest	1	1
10. Voronov	1	2
11. Shelepin	2	2
12. Grishin	1	
13. Kunayev	1	
14. Shcherbitskiy	1	
15. Kulakov	1	

Some papers differed from PRAVDA's count. Among them, RURAL LIFE and TRUD carried more complete listings, reporting nominations from 18 areas for Brezhnev, three for Kirilenko, two for Voronov, two for Kulakov, and two nominations in the Ukraine for both Shelest and Shcherbitskiy instead of PRAVDA's one.

The lineup at the 1 May parade also followed the order in Brezhnev's listing, except for Voronov, who stood in sixth place, instead of ranking 10th as he did in May 1970 and in Brezhnev's April 1971 congress listing.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

- 28 -

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

MAY DAY LEADERSHIP TURNOUT PRODUCES NO SURPRISES

The May Day festivities in China this year reflected Peking's increased attention to foreign affairs, with little attention paid to domestic affairs in the joint editorial or in rally comment. Mao and Lin Piao made their customary appearance at the massive Peking rally; NCNA portrayed Mao as "in excellent health and high spirits."

Three Politburo members continued their lengthy absence from the public scene by failing to appear at the Peking rally. Hsieh Fu-chih, although he was named head of the Peking CCP Municipal Committee in March, maintained his year-long absence. Politburo Standing Committee members Kang Sheng and Chen Po-ta also remain under the cloud which enveloped them last fall. As on National Day last October, when Chen Po-ta's appearances had already ceased, NCNA listed Standing Committee members along with other members of the Politburo. This time Peking offered some explanation for the absences by using a formula dating from October 1969 to the effect that the name list excludes those not present in Peking and "absentees on account of work or sickness."

Two former Politburo members made their first public appearance since 1969, listed as vice-chairmen of the Central Committee's Military Commission: Chen I, former foreign minister, and Hsu Hsiang-chien, one of the old marshals.

No comprehensive list of provincial appearances on 1 May is yet available, but provincial leaders listed as present in Peking on 1 May may provide some indication of which provinces are now undergoing central review before forming party committees. The two top leaders of Sinkiang, which has reported much lower-level party activity, were both listed among Central Committee members in Peking. A vice chairman from Yunnan, whose chief died last year, and from Szechwan, where leadership factionalism has been severe, also appeared in the listing. Several leaders from provinces that have established their CCP committees also appeared.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 MAY 1971

- 29 -

Editorial comment for this year's holiday came in the form of an unexciting joint RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial released by NCNA on 30 April.* Domestic issues were underplayed in the editorial, which stressed the PRC's international solidarity with the world's working class. The editorial merely outlined the need for greater work efforts to fulfill the 1971 national economic plan and to achieve the objectives set at the Ninth Party Congress. "Victories on all fronts" must also be won to greet the 50th anniversary of the CCP (1 July) and the promised Fourth National People's Congress.

The editorial made the usual plea that "senior cadres in particular" increase their study of Mao's works, a major PRC propaganda theme since the second party plenum last September, in order to meet "the arduous domestic and international tasks of our party." Some progress in the 9-month campaign for senior cadres to undertake intensive study of Mao's works was indicated in a 2 May NCNA review of May Day celebrations. NCNA offered unusual praise for "leading cadres at various levels in particular" for their "progress in criticizing revisionism." The report then applauded "many leading cadres" for their serious study of Mao's works. On 3 May, NCNA again portrayed upper-level cadres as playing an exemplary role in nationwide meetings held to celebrate May Day by studying Mao's Thought.

* Last year, May Day served as the peg for a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial which drew a connection between the utilization of Mao's Thought and the successful launching of the PRC's first artificial satellite. No editorial comment appeared for the holiday in 1969. A joint RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial was released in 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL