

28 APRIL 1971

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

28 APRIL 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 17)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 19 - 25 APRIL 1971

Moscow (3067 items)

| | | |
|---------------------------|--------|-----|
| Soyuz 10 | (--) | 13% |
| CPSU Congress | (40%) | 12% |
| Lenin's Birth Anniversary | (--) | 9% |
| Bulgarian Party Congress | (0.3%) | 7% |
| Finnish Premier in USSR | (--) | 6% |
| May Day Slogans | (2%) | 4% |
| GDR Party Anniversary | (0.2%) | 3% |
| Indochina | (11%) | 3% |
| Middle East | (5%) | 2% |
| China | (1%) | 2% |

Peking (1521 items)

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------|------|
| Indochina | (23%) | 19% |
| [Summit Conference Anniversary | (4%) | 10%] |
| [U.S. Demonstrations | (--) | 7%] |
| DPRK Supreme Peoples Assembly | (8%) | 5% |
| Afro-Asian Journalist Day | (--) | 4% |
| Soviet-PRC Marine Accident | (0.05%) | 3% |

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi and Front media continue to exploit the U.S. antiwar demonstrations in standard fashion. Propaganda includes official messages to the U.S. sponsoring organizations and a NHAN DAN editorial on 26 April, entitled "The Days that Shake the United States," which observes that the participants this year include more people "from the upper strata and political circles" than previously. On the same day Front and Hanoi media publicized a PLAF Command Order instructing the communist forces in South Vietnam on the proper attitudes and actions to be taken toward U.S. servicemen who oppose the war.

Vietnamese communist comment on action in South Vietnam claims that the fighting shows the strength of the PLAF and the losing position of the allies in central Vietnam; and a PLAF Command message to combatants in the central highlands calls for more vigorous attacks and "uprisings" leading to total victory. Calls for intensified struggle also appear in propaganda pegged to May Day and the 27 April anniversary of the founding of the South Vietnam Liberation Trade Union Federation.

The first anniversary of the Indochinese people's summit conference (24-25 April) provides the occasion for reiterations of communist claims of "strategic victories" in the recent operations in Laos and Cambodia. Propaganda on the anniversary includes publicity for a Peking banquet hosted by Sihanouk and addressed by Chou En-lai, who again described the Indochinese struggle in glowing terms.

Peking comment on the U.S. antiwar demonstrations includes a 27 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial which says that "a new revolutionary storm is rising vigorously among the people of the United States."

Moscow has carried no editorial comment on the U.S. antiwar activities, but there is some routine comment in addition to TASS reports. Soviet broadcasts in Mandarin continue to castigate Peking for rejecting united action in aiding the Indochinese and to note that Peking's friendly gestures toward the United States come at a time when the United States is escalating the war; a 26 April commentary goes so far as to say that the "real meaning" of the Sino-U.S. contacts is "to obstruct the Indochinese people's war" against U.S. aggression.

U.S. ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATIONS HAILED BY INDOCHINESE COMMUNISTS

The NHAN DAN editorial of 26 April, carried by Hanoi radio and
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people" and says the Vietnamese people "regarded it as a valuable support and encouragement to them." Also on the 26th, VNA reported a meeting held in Hanoi that evening by the Committee for Solidarity with the American people to welcome the 1971 U.S. spring offensive "demanding immediate and total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and an end to the war." Hoang Minh Giam, chairman of the committee, opened the meeting*; the main address was given by Vice Chairman Dang Thai Mai, who according to VNA "warmly welcomed the spring offensive" and cited the "mammoth" demonstrations of the 24th. VNA reported that Mai "warmly hailed the antiwar movement" which is "valiantly confronting the most bellicose and barbarous administration ever seen in the history of America." The movement, he said, constituted "great encouragement to the fight of the Vietnamese people."

The VNA report notes that the meeting passed a resolution "warmly welcoming" the spring offensive, "vehemently denouncing" Vietnamization, "resolutely demanding" that the United States end the war, and "pledging determination to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Lao and Cambodian peoples to fight until total victory."

PLAF COMMAND ORDER Coincident with the focus of propaganda attention on the U.S. demonstrations, both Hanoi radio in its English-language program for U.S. servicemen and Liberation Radio publicized a PLAF Command order--dated the same day--instructing PLAF forces on the proper attitude and actions to be taken toward U.S. servicemen who oppose the war. The order pictures a growing U.S. opposition to the war, including servicemen who have returned to the United States. And it says many American servicemen still in South Vietnam have urged an end to the war, opposed orders of their commanders, and demanded an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops. It states that on a number of occasions the NFLSV and PRG have made clear that their policy is to welcome U.S. servicemen who oppose the war and to give humane treatment to U.S. soldiers captured or wounded on the battlefield.

The order instructs troops to refrain from attacking certain U.S. troops, to give them "proper treatment," to assist deserters,

* VNA on the 17th had reported a message from Giam to the American people. See the TRENDS of 21 April 1971, pages 4-5.

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and to "hail and appropriately reward the U.S. servicemen who support the NFLSV and PRG." The order calls on U.S. officers and men to "seek by all means to contact and inform the South Vietnamese people and the southern PLAF of their planned antiwar action so that the southern people and PLAF can help them."

BACKGROUND: Appeals to allied soldiers to desert or defect is a low-level staple of Vietnamese communist propaganda. But there have also been appeals in the past on an official level. The PRG issued an appeal on 23 December 1969 which urged U.S. servicemen to oppose the war by "refraining from conducting sweeps, from staging shellings, and from taking hostile action against the PLAF." Liberation Radio on 10 July 1970, in announcing that permission had been granted John M. Sweeney to leave Vietnam for Sweden, said the action was in line with the "humanitarian" policy spelled out in the December 1969 appeal. On 15 November 1967 the South Vietnam People's Committee for Solidarity with the American People--established the preceding month--addressed a letter to American soldiers in South Vietnam urging them to refuse to fight and offering them help.

NATURE AND SCOPE OF DEMONSTRATIONS Hanoi and the Front are inconsistent in identifying the organizations sponsoring the U.S. demonstrations. But messages have been addressed to both the National Peace Action Coalition and the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice from NFLSV Central Committee Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho (on the 25th) and from the South Vietnam Liberation Youth Union (on the 22d). The South Vietnam People's Committee for Solidarity with the American People addressed its letter (on the 23d) to the American people. Tho's message, as broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 27th, says the spring offensive "will certainly score great success and advance toward a new high tide that will force Nixon to immediately end the war" and withdraw all U.S. troops unconditionally.

The propaganda notes that there were "massive" demonstrations in San Francisco as well as in Washington on the 24th, and the figure of 500,000 demonstrators is claimed for both cities. Earlier, Hanoi had duly hailed the activities of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. VNA noted on the 25th that a "coalition of militant antiwar activists announced that they would try to shut down Congress and other government activity"

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in the coming weeks. And on the 27th VNA cited foreign sources as reporting that the "second phase" of the spring offensive had begun on the 26th. Liberation Radio on the same day pointed out that the second phase has been organized by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, and it mentioned such specific actions as the sit-ins at the Selective Service and Internal Revenue Service offices.

**ATTACKS ON THE PRESIDENT
IN NHAN DAN AND AT PARIS**

The NHAN DAN editorial of the 26th is notably abusive toward the President, claiming that while speaking of U.S. honor, "it is Nixon himself who has cast slurs on the honor of the United States" through the "crimes" committed in Indochina. It charges that since the President took office, his Indochina policy has consisted of two parts: "to prolong and extend the war and fool the American people." It claims that to "defuse" the antiwar movement the Administration has resorted "to all means--slanders, threats, terror, and division coupled with empty promises, dilatory moves, and the fanning of great-nation chauvinism." The version of the editorial broadcast by Hanoi radio elaborates: It says that the Administration has tried to silence U.S. congressmen "through their unsigned threatening letters from the FBI" and that it has "terrorized the press and refused to disclose news on the Indochinese battlefields in an attempt to make the American people know and believe what they want them to know and believe."

At the 110th session of the Paris talks on 22 April, both DRV delegate Xuan Thuy and FRG delegate Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh used the current demonstrations to highlight their negotiating demands. Scoring the President's 7 April TV address in which he announced an additional 100,000-man troop withdrawal and his 16 April remarks to newspaper editors, in particular his refusal to set a deadline for all U.S. troops to be withdrawn from South Vietnam, the communist delegates cited the demonstrations as evidence that U.S. public opinion is "indignant" at the President's refusal to set such a deadline. In remarks summarized broadly by VNA, Thuy asserted that at present, "all over the United States, the American people are waging an energetic spring offensive to compel the Nixon Administration to respond to the imperative demand that a deadline be fixed" LPA says Mme. Binh "laid particular stress on the vigorous development of the movement of the South Vietnam townsfolk and the unprecedentedly strong growth" of the

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American people's movement for an end to the war, a deadline for total U.S. withdrawal, and renunciation by the Administration of the "Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique of traitors."

SOUPHANOUVONG LETTER
TO AMERICAN PEOPLE

The Pathet Lao news agency on 25 April reported what it called Prince Souphanouvong's "second" letter to the American people, dated the 21st. He says that in his "first" letter, dated 19 February and carried by the Pathet Lao news agency the next day, he had called attention to the "grave situation" in Laos as a result of the invasion of southern Laos by "U.S. and Saigon puppet troops." In his latest letter he tells the American people of the "important victories" of the Lao "patriotic forces and people," saying that the victories cannot be separated from the solidarity and support of the peoples of the world, including the American people "who, by their waves of antiwar protests spreading across the country, have struck vigorously at the war policy pursued by the White House leaders." He praises the American spring antiwar campaign, noting that it includes diversified sectors of the population ranging from veterans to "Democratic and even Republican senators."

Although Souphanouvong calls his 19 February message his first letter to the American people, he had in fact sent a similiar letter dated 8 November 1969 praising the antiwar demonstrations at that time. Other Pathet Lao leaders, Phoumi Vongvichit and Tiao Souk Vongsak, as well as the leader of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces, Khamsouk Keola, also sent messages in 1969. There were apparently no such letters in connection with the May 1970 U.S. demonstrations against the Cambodian incursion, however.

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PEKING SEES GROUNDSWELL OF SUPPORT FOR U.S. DEMONSTRATIONS

Highlighted by a PEOPLE'S DAILY worker-commentators' article on 26 April and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 27th, Peking's continuing publicity for the "unprecedented massive demonstrations and rallies" against President Nixon's Indochina policies stresses the involvement of Americans of all classes, races, and occupations, "standing on the same front with the three Indochinese peoples and the peoples of all the other countries struggling against U.S. imperialism."

Observing that "a new revolutionary storm is rising vigorously among the people of the United States" and that the 24 April demonstrations "pushed the struggle to a new high tide," the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial pointed out that "workers, black people, students, and women, people of all classes and strata and of different occupations, beliefs, races, and ages have joined the demonstrations" despite intimidations and "threats from the U.S. Government." Taking particular note of the involvement of U.S. servicemen, including Vietnam veterans, the editorial asserted that "all this reflects the new awakening of the American people." It observed that "a situation like this is rarely seen in history--the people of a country so courageously opposing their own country's imperialist war of aggression."

In similar vein, the PEOPLE'S DAILY article by worker-commentators hailed "the American people's rising revolutionary storm against aggression" and stated that "the broad masses of the American people are an important battalion in the anti-U.S. united front of the people throughout the world."

Other Peking comment has highlighted the participation of the veterans, noting that they "staged dramatic scenes on the Capitol steps to expose the outrageous crimes committed by U.S. aggressor troops." They are said to have "won wide support from the American people, especially the Washington residents, many of whom took part in the protest activities organized by the veterans." NCNA on the 26th said that "U.S. imperialist chieftain Nixon was so frightened that he sneaked away from Washington" prior to the demonstrations on the 24th. Apart from this reference, however, Peking's propaganda on the demonstrations has avoided personal abuse of the President.

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MOSCOW GIVES DEMONSTRATIONS LIMITED, ROUTINE ATTENTION

Soviet media's news coverage of the U.S. antiwar demonstrations has featured the activities of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, the weekend "mass demonstrations," and plans for the 10-day "peace offensive" sponsored by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice. Brief TASS reports and correspondents' dispatches in the press have been accompanied by some routine-level comment. In a dispatch carried by TASS on the 26th, PRAVDA's correspondent pointed out that the Saturday demonstration in Washington had "new features," including the participation of middle-aged people, workers, and members of minority groups. He saw in this demonstration and in others a "new upsurge" of the antiwar movement in the United States, contrary to the expectations of "certain political observers" who had recently expressed the view that Vietnamization had taken the steam out of the movement.

A radio commentary in English, also on the 26th, said the demonstrations show that "the so-called silent majority is not so silent any more." Although the Administration has the mass media at its disposal and the widest publicity has been given to the President's speeches defending his policies, the commentator said, no arguments or propaganda can repair the split in the country or overcome the crisis of confidence.

MAY DAY, TU ANNIVERSARY PROMPT COMMENT ON SOUTHERN "STRUGGLE"

The 10th anniversary of the South Vietnamese Liberation Trade Union on 27 April and the approaching May Day holiday prompt comment by the Front radio hailing the workers' struggle in the South and calling for further efforts to overthrow the Saigon regime and force a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. A Liberation Radio commentary on 25 April scored a GVN ban on May Day demonstrations and declared that the workers and urban people are "determined not to retreat in the face of difficulties." It added that the ban will not prevent May Day activities in South Vietnamese cities such as the holding of meetings and the gathering of "struggle forces" during parades and demonstrations in the streets, at headquarters, in factories, and elsewhere.

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An appeal from the Liberation Trade Union Federation Executive Committee, broadcast by the Front radio on the 26th, marked May Day and the Federation anniversary with a more general call for stepped-up struggle against the Saigon regime. While warning of "hard, difficult, and complicated circumstances" to be faced in GVN-controlled areas before "total victory" is achieved, the appeal confidently claimed that "the final phase of our struggle" is underway and expressed determination to "advance the revolution to total victory."

Hanoi marked the Liberation Trade Union Federation's anniversary with a meeting organized by the DRV trade union federation on 24 April. A Hanoi broadcast to the South on the 26th reported that VWP Secretariat member Nguyen Van Tran and DRV Vice Premier Do Muoi attended the meeting and that the northern trade union's vice-president and secretary general, Nguyen Duc Thuan, delivered a speech hailing the workers' struggle in the South.

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DRV, NFLSV DERIDE "IMAGINARY" LAM SON 720 OPERATION IN A SHAU

The first Vietnamese communist acknowledgment of the details of Operation Lam Son 720 in the A Shau valley came in a 21 April Liberation Radio commentary attributed to the station's commentator "Nguoi Ban Tia" (The Sniper).* The commentator claimed that the Western press had "laid bare the deceitful nature" of this operation and he quoted, among other things, a Western news report speculating that the allies are "'spreading misleading news'" to "'confuse the communists'" and observing that only reconnaissance troops are operating in the A Shau valley. Dismissing Lam Son 720 as a "psychological plot aimed at making stupid people believe that the U.S.-puppets still remain strong" after Lam Son 719, the Front commentator concluded: "The U.S.-puppets tried at all costs to send a few small detachments to the jungle area in Western Thua Thien and then boastfully clamored that a big operation had been conducted there."

Hanoi first discussed Lam Son 720 in an article in the 22 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN which cited contradictory Western news reports about the operation and derided it as "fake." It charged that Gen. Abrams and President Thieu "boasted" about "this imaginary Lam Son 720" in order to conceal allied "setbacks" both in southern Laos and in the South Vietnamese highlands. Unlike the Liberation Radio commentary, the Hanoi paper took note of a Western news agency report that Abrams had raised the possibility of Saigon troops engaged in the operation crossing the border into Laos.

COMMUNISTS REVIEW THREE MONTHS OF "VICTORIES" IN CAMBODIA

Alleged victories of the Cambodian "liberation" forces in the first three months of the year are recounted in a 22 April report from the Cambodian Information Agency (AKI), an organ of Sihanouk's front. The report highlights action along Highway 4 and in the Phnom Penh area as well as communist attacks on South Vietnamese forces engaged in Operation

* An 18 April Liberation Radio commentary on President Thieu's speech in Hue on the 17th merely noted his reference to the launching of Lam Son 720.

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Toan Thang (Total Victory) 1/71 in northeast Cambodia. It also claims that "encroachment and pacification operations" by Phnom Penh's main forces have been rebuffed by the liberation forces.

The AKI report credits the "people" and the "Cambodian liberation army" (CNPLAF) in the first three months of 1971 with having "eliminated or captured" 25,000 troops, including 14,000 South Vietnamese. In addition, 350 aircraft were allegedly downed or destroyed and 1,400 military vehicles destroyed, including 600 tanks and armored cars. The allies, according to AKI, also lost 120 guns and over 60 vessels, and thousands of arms were allegedly captured by the CNPLAF.

The AKI report repeats communist claims that the GVN Toan Thang 1/71 has been "defeated"; but it acknowledges the continuation of the operation in noting that the allies are currently "throwing other units" into it, adding that they have "been unable to reverse their unfavorable situation." Beginning in mid-March Vietnamese and Cambodian propaganda claimed that Toan Thang 1/71 was defeated, with some comment stating that the allies had to abandon the operation only a month after its initiation on 4 February.

AKI echoes battle reports in recent weeks which have claimed that South Vietnamese units involved in Toan Thang 1/71 have been forced to abandon numerous positions. Thus it maintains that GVN troops have been "forced to retreat" from Chup, Suong, and Damber and find themselves "in a critical situation" in Khnar, Pratheat, and Kandol Chrum--on Highway 7--and Snoul--on Highway 13. It claims that the CNPLAF, in action since the start of the GVN operation, has killed, wounded, or captured nearly 13,000 troops, putting out of action 21 infantry battalions and 12 armored squadrons. In addition, 200 planes have allegedly been shot down or destroyed during this period and 1,100 military vehicles put out of action, including more than 550 tanks and armored cars.

These alleged achievements of the CNPLAF are hailed in 25 April editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN pegged to the anniversary of the Indochinese people's summit conference. NHAN DAN amplifies on the victory claims, commenting that the number of Saigon troops "annihilated" in Toan Thang 1/71 is more than three-fourths of the number lost on the southern Laos front and that the number of tanks and armored cars destroyed equals those destroyed in southern

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Laos. The editorials, like AKI, hold that military victories in Cambodia are a blow to the Administration's Vietnamization plan and Nixon Doctrine and to the Phnom Penh regime, which is said to be seriously isolated and plagued by internal contradictions. Hailing both the Laotian and Cambodian "victories" this year, NHAN DAN concludes that a "new situation" has arisen on the Indochinese battlefields and that the Indochinese people and armed forces "are ready to engage ourselves in new, resolute battles, to change the balance of forces increasingly in our favor, and to advance toward completely defeating the U.S. aggressors."

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN DENOUNCES U.S. BOMBING OF DRV

The nature of recent U.S. air strikes, reportedly aimed at North Vietnamese missile sites and air bases, is not acknowledged by Hanoi, which issued only routine DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements on 22 and 24 April protesting strikes in Quang Binh and in Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces, respectively, as well as in the northern parts of the DMZ. Typically the reported U.S. contact with North Vietnamese MIGs on the 23d is ignored.

The protest on the 22d says that on the 18th and 20th, U.S. aircraft "bombed and strafed a number of populated areas in Quang Binh Province, causing losses in lives and property."* Hanoi media on the 23d reported the downing of two U.S. planes in Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces on the previous day. And VNA specified that the downing in Nghe An "by the people's armed forces" occurred during a "counterattack against an air raid on a populated area in the western part of the province." These U.S. actions are scored in the foreign ministry spokesman's protest on the 24th which notes the downings and in standard language voices determination "to duly punish all U.S. reckless acts of encroachment on DRV territory." Hanoi on the 28th claims that another plane was downed that day in Ha Tinh, bringing its total to 3,392.

* The spokesman's statement of the 22d describes action which seems to correspond to the strike which the U.S. command in Saigon said occurred on the 19th against a surface-to-air missile site. Later in the week the U.S. command said that U.S. fighter-bombers on the 22d bombed DRV missile and antiaircraft sites and that one raid penetrated 185 miles into North Vietnam for strikes against a MIG air base.

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The protest of the 22d also charges that on 16-18 April U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, "on several occasions" bombed Huong Lap village and "used its artillery from positions on the sea and south of the DMZ to shell Vinh Son village." It stresses that these two villages are "located north of the 17th parallel in the DMZ." The foreign ministry spokesman in the protest of the 24th similarly charges that U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, bombed Huong Lap village--this time on the 21st and 22d. And it charges that U.S. artillery "off the coast and from south of the DMZ shelled villages north of the 17th parallel in the DMZ," but makes no specific mention of any village. It echoes the protest of the 22d that "all these villages belong to the DRV."

The alleged downing of U.S. planes on the 22d is lauded in a Hanoi radio commentary on the 23d which says that to make up for allied losses on all Indochinese battlefields the United States is "perpetrating military adventures against our North with many perfidious tricks." And a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 24th says that the U.S. "systematic acts of war against the DRV" were shown by the repeated air strikes on 16-18 and on 20 April and by the "admittance" of the U.S. command in Saigon on the 23d "that the order had been given to the U.S. Air Force and Navy to attack various parts of North Vietnam."

ANNIVERSARY OF INDOCHINESE PEOPLE'S SUMMIT CONFERENCE MARKED

The first anniversary of the Indochinese summit conference (24-25 April) provides the occasion for reaffirmations of the pledge to persist in the struggle against the U.S. "aggressors." Propaganda on the anniversary includes editorials in the Hanoi and Peking press and publicity for a Peking banquet, hosted by Sihanouk and attended by Chou En-lai, a Hanoi meeting, sponsored by the Vietnam Fatherland Front and attended by Pham Van Dong, as well as meetings in South Vietnamese and Laotian "liberated areas."

At the Peking banquet, the Indochinese speakers voiced explicit gratitude for Chinese assistance as well as general appreciation for support and assistance from "other socialist countries." The PRG charge d'affaires and the DPRK ambassador at the banquet recalled that Chou En-lai, during his March visit to Hanoi, had warned that if the United States expanded the war the Chinese

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people would "take all necessary measures, not flinching even from the greatest national sacrifices, to give all-out support and assistance" to the Vietnamese and Indochinese peoples. Peking's comment has not on its own authority repeated this pledge since the 11 March PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on Chou's visit.*

In his banquet address, Chou routinely said that the Chinese "firmly support and assist" the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. And consistent with propaganda on the Laos incursion, he professed optimism regarding the Indochinese situation. Referring to growing opposition to the Nixon Administration's war policies at home and abroad, as well as the "struggle" of the Indochinese people, Chou said that "the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys have never before been so isolated and in such a difficult position as they are today." Similarly optimistic, the 25 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial recalled the assertion in Mao's 20 May 1970 statement that "the situation is getting better and better" in the Indochinese struggle, and it praised the victories of the Indochinese people in the past year since the summit conference. The editorial said that President Nixon "is having a much tougher time," particularly since the Highway 9 battle, as the American people's struggle demanding an end to the war has grown and "internal disputes" within the "ruling clique" and "contradictions" between the United States and its "puppets" have become more acute. The editorial concludes with a routine pledge to give "all-out support" to the Indochinese people.

Sihanouk routinely referred to China as the "reliable and invincible great rear area" of the Indochinese people, and the DRV ambassador similarly said that the victories of the three countries are linked to "the devoted, precious, timely, adequate" support of the Chinese people who are acting as "a firm rear."

The Pathet Lao speaker at the Peking banquet was NLHS vice chairman Kaysone Phomvihane, in Peking after participating in

* On 17 April, however, NCNA reported the recollection of this formulation by DPRK Foreign Minister Ho Tam at the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly session. The DPRK ambassador at the Peking banquet had also echoed Ho Tam at the Assembly session in stressing Asian unity. See the 21 April TRENDS, pages 38-41.

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the CPSU congress in Moscow.* He routinely thanked the Chinese for their "tremendous and valuable support and assistance," calling them the "staunch rear area of the Indochinese people." He departed from the usual theme of mutual support and assistance among the Indochinese people to single out for praise North Vietnam's aid to the other Indochinese. He said that "North Vietnam has not only become the staunch rear area of South Vietnam, but also has given all-out support and assistance to the struggle in Laos and Cambodia." This statement is consistent with NLHS expressions of gratitude to the DRV for its "support and assistance" to the Lao battlefronts in the wake of the Highway 9 battles. The usual Hanoi practice, however, is to limit itself to assertions that it fights "shoulder to shoulder" with the Laotian and Cambodian people, renders them "support," or fulfills its "international obligations" to them.

MOSCOW Moscow gave the anniversary minimal attention, in keeping with its cautious stance regarding Sihanouk and the fact that the summit conference was sponsored by Peking. (The PRC, DPRK, and Albania had greeted the conference last year with government statements, but Moscow had given it only routine-level attention.) TASS briefly reported the meeting in Hanoi and an address on the anniversary by Nguyen Huu Tho to the people of South Vietnam, but apparently did not mention the Peking banquet.

PRAVDA commentator Mayevskiy, in an article scoring the U.S. refusal to withdraw its troops, summarized by TASS on the 27th, briefly mentioned the anniversary in passing. He said that the conference marked a "new stage" in the struggle of the peoples of Indochina, adding that the "anti-imperialist front of the peoples of Indochina" plays a "paramount part" in rallying the patriotic forces and has achieved "remarkable success" in repelling the enemy.

* Le Duan, who led the DRV delegation to the CPSU congress, is still in the USSR, now visiting the Black Sea, while Nguyen Duy Trinh, who was a member of the delegation, is now in Sofia for the Bulgarian party congress. Nguyen Van Hieu, who represented the PRG at the CPSU congress, is also at the Bulgarian congress. All three Indochinese delegations had stopped in Peking on their way to the CPSU congress and attended a banquet celebrating the Indochinese victories along Highway 9. See the 31 March TRENDS, pages 6-9.

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HANOI SCORES U.K. COCHAIRMAN'S CHARGE OF DRV INVASION OF LAOS

On 23 April the Hanoi domestic service carries a commentary castigating the British Government for circulating on 21 April a note to the signatories of the 1962 Geneva agreement "slanderingly accusing the DRV of repeatedly encroaching upon Laos' neutrality and violating the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos." It scores the British Government for having approved of the U.S.-supported Saigon operation in Laos and having "slandered" the DRV for "invading" Laos. The commentary does not acknowledge that the British note is a covering memo to a Souvanna Phouma 1 April letter to the Soviet and British Geneva Conference cochairmen, the British having decided to circulate the letter unilaterally after having failed to enlist Soviet cooperation.* Soviet media have not mentioned the Souvanna Phouma letter and the British response, in accordance with their usual silence on such exchanges. On at least one occasion in the past, however, in August 1969, Moscow did belatedly note a June Souvanna Phouma letter in a routine-level Lao-language broadcast.

Although the Hanoi commentary does not mention Souvanna Phouma's current letter, it does recall that on 4 March the British circulated a 5 February letter from Souvanna Phouma to the Geneva cochairmen which contained "slandering accusations" against the DRV, and notes that the NLHS had protested that British move with a central committee spokesman's statement.**

Since mid-1969 Hanoi media have apparently ignored the various letters from Souvanna Phouma to the Geneva cochairmen and Britain's unilateral circulation of them. Prior to that, however, in 1968 and early 1969, Hanoi had responded with NHAN DAN articles and on one occasion, 22 March 1969, issued

* Souvanna Phouma's letter focused on charges that DRV troops attacked the outskirts of Luang Prabang on 21 March. Although it acknowledges that U.S.-supported Saigon troops entered Laos on 8 February and that on the same day the RLG condemned all foreign forces using Lao territory, the letter states that the incident would not have occurred had North Vietnamese forces not been present in Lao territory.

** See the 10 March 1971 TRENDS, page 25.

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a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement denouncing a letter from the "Vientiane authorities" to the Geneva cochairmen.

The Radio of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces and the Pathet Lao news agency carry commentaries on 25 and 28 April castigating the current British message and noting that Souvanna Phouma had sent a letter to the British, but not acknowledging that the letter was sent to the Soviet Geneva cochairman as well. Normally the NLHS responds to the British circulation of Souvanna Phouma's letters with a central committee spokesman's statement, but none has been monitored so far in this instance.

FIFTH CONGRESS OF HANOI VIETNAM WORKERS PARTY HELD

DRV media have reported the convening of the fifth congress of party organizations in the Hanoi area. The Hanoi newspaper HANOI MOI in early April had reported that a municipal party conference, held 10-13 March, had taken the decision to hold the fifth congress in the latter half of April.

VNA on the 23d, reporting the congress, noted that a report by Nguyen Van Tran, secretary of the Hanoi committee and member of the VWP Secretariat, reviewed "achievements recorded over the past three years." It noted also that the congress dealt with Hanoi's future tasks from 1971-73. The only other available propaganda on the congress is a 26 April Hanoi domestic broadcast which said that the congress "was extremely elated" in welcoming Premier Pham Van Dong, who spoke. According to the radio, Dong hailed the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance and spelled out the tasks of the North--to provide support for the frontline, stand ready to fight, and strengthen the North in all fields. The radio added that he hailed Hanoi's determination to carry out its share of the tasks. HANOI MOI had indicated that the municipal party executive committee would be reelected at the congress, but there is no mention of this in either the VNA or Hanoi radio reports.

The fourth Hanoi congress was held in April 1968 and was addressed by Party First Secretary Le Duan. The fourth congress of party chapter delegates reportedly reviewed "the leadership over tasks during the past four years and set forth new trends and tasks for coming years." Nguyen Van Tran read a political report. A 17 April 1968 radio report of that congress noted that the previous third Hanoi congress was held in July 1963.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW ASSAILS MAOIST POLICIES; ILICHEV RETURNS TO PEKING

In Moscow's first substantial reaction to recent Sino-U.S. developments, the weekly NEW TIMES has accused Peking of easily betraying its friends and of persisting in efforts to obstruct the relaxation of tensions across a wide range of international issues. The thrust of the NEW TIMES comment is that Peking's recent moves do not indicate a change in its basic line of seeking world power in order to pursue nationalistic aims at other countries' expense.

Soviet concern over the impact of "ping-pong diplomacy" has surfaced in the Moscow domestic radio's weekly roundtable discussion program, a forum for airing current international topics for the home audience. On 25 April panelists discoursed at length on suggestions that Sino-U.S. developments may have adverse implications for Soviet interests and for the Indochinese communists. In a sign of Soviet irritation, both NEW TIMES and the roundtable panelists referred to the Chinese leaders as "the Maoists" rather than by a neutral term. This usage also accords with Moscow's line that Chinese policy has not really moderated or departed from radical goals commonly associated with Maoism.

While showing its displeasure, Moscow has demonstrated restraint in responding to Peking's recent moves. There has still been no direct comment in the Soviet central press on the recent events in Sino-U.S. relations, nor has there been an authoritative response to Peking's major ideological pronouncement on the centenary of the Paris Commune on 18 March. (Moscow took just less than four weeks to reply in kind to Peking's authoritative statement on Lenin's centenary last spring.) In the major Soviet address on Lenin Day this year, CPSU Secretary Katushev on 22 April limited his anti-Peking remarks to a slap at "petit-bourgeois and pseudorevolutionary ideas" without naming the Chinese.

BORDER TALKS At the same time, Moscow has called attention to the Sino-Soviet border talks, as if to signal its intent to attain progress in the negotiations amid speculation that the Soviet position is adversely affected by improved relations between the other two sides in the triangular relationship. TASS reported on 19 April that L.F. Ilichev, the chief Soviet negotiator at the talks, and Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov had returned to Peking

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that day after having attended the CPSU congress. Reversing the order in which Moscow had given the two Soviet officials' names when reporting their meeting with Chou En-lai on 21 March, before they had gone to Moscow, TASS listed Ilichev ahead of Tolstikov.* TASS identified the talks as concerning a "settlement of border questions," a formulation Brezhnev had used in his report to the congress on 30 March. Moscow has referred to the talks in various ways, sometimes specifying that they concern a border settlement (earlier examples were speeches by Kosygin and Podgorny last June) and at other times noting more broadly that they deal with unspecified topics concerning bilateral relations. Moscow's original announcement on the agreement to open talks said they would deal with questions "in which both sides are interested," and Brezhnev on 27 October 1969--a week after the opening of the talks--declared Soviet readiness to settle "border and other questions."

The TASS report on Ilichev's return could indicate that he has been given fresh instructions for making progress in the border negotiations, though it may simply reflect a judgment that with results obtained on other issues--notably the resumption of ambassadorial relations and improved trade relations--the focus should now be on the border question. At any rate, the identification of the talks as concerning a border settlement accords with the way the Chinese have consistently defined the subject of the negotiations from the very beginning.

The TASS report noted that the Soviet officials were met at the airport by the chief and deputy chief of the PRC delegation to the talks, Chiao 'Kuan-hua and Chai Cheng-wen. The two Chinese were also reported by Moscow on 23 April to have attended a film show at the Soviet embassy commemorating Lenin's birthday. Reverting to its practice during the late 1960's, Peking this year ignored Lenin Day, apart from opening radio broadcasts on that day with a quotation from Lenin rather than from Mao.

Peking reported neither the return of Ilichev and Tolstikov nor the Soviet embassy film show, just as it had failed to report the 21 March meeting of the two Soviet officials with Chou. Peking's failure to match Moscow's efforts to portray Sino-Soviet state relations as proceeding normally was thrown in sharp relief by

* As a party Central Committee member, Tolstikov outranks Ilichev, but the latter as a deputy foreign minister is superior to the ambassador.

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NCNA's report on an 18 April PRC Foreign Ministry note "expressing indignation" over a collision between a Soviet ship and a Chinese fishing boat in the Tonkin Gulf. Moscow had sought to head off trouble over the accident by a prompt TASS announcement on 31 March--less than 24 hours after the collision--that the Soviet Government had expressed "deep regrets" over the accident. The TASS effort was denounced by NCNA as "a sheer distortion."

NEW TIMES ARTICLE SAYS CHINESE "EASILY BETRAY FRIENDS"

The NEW TIMES article on "Peking's Diplomatic Game," published in issue No. 17 over the signature of L. Kirichenko, follows familiar polemical lines in seeking to isolate Peking as an outlaw among responsible members of the family of nations despite recent Chinese diplomatic moves. Available thus far only in summary, the article also seems to play on North Vietnamese and North Korean concern over Chinese gestures toward the United States. This aspect was highlighted by a 21 April TASS summary which began by quoting the article's charge that "the political practices of the Maoists show that they easily betray friends and quickly come to terms with those whom they just called enemies" if "they consider it necessary to meet the great-power nationalistic interests" of Peking. Apart from the TASS summary, versions of the article have been heard only in broadcasts to Asia in French and English over Radio Peace and Progress.

Judging from the NEW TIMES article, Moscow has come up with no new approach to the challenge posed by Peking's more flexible policies and has fallen back on old and tried themes depicting the PRC as a disruptive force in the international community. The article grudgingly acknowledges "some new aspects in Peking's recent moves," but it stresses that Peking's unchanged basic strategy continues to be directed toward achieving world power in order to impose its will on other states in "the traditional spirit of sinocentrism." This was the line Moscow took in its effort to isolate Peking during the period of heightened Sino-Soviet border tensions.

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS Though the article takes the Chinese to task on a wide variety of issues, its timing was clearly occasioned by recent Sino-U.S. developments--a subject that had been discussed in an earlier NEW TIMES article (in issue No. 13, dated 26 March) anticipating further developments in "the diplomacy of smiles" between Washington and Peking. NEW TIMES, a foreign-affairs weekly published in several languages, frequently conveys

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Soviet views on international issues on which the principal Moscow press is avoiding direct comment.

The Kirichenko article seeks to disparage the recent Sino-U.S. developments, noting that Washington has rewarded Peking's "conciliatory gestures" with only "minor steps" and that the United States "does not intend to liquidate its bases on Taiwan and to return the island to China." As for China's representation in the United Nations, the article scornfully observes: "Well, Washington is prepared, as a present to Peking, to offer the latter . . . the two-Chinas combination" (TASS' ellipses).

As in other Soviet reaction to the visit of American table tennis players and correspondents to China, the article brings up the question of strategic implications of "this fact of minor importance" for the future of Southeast Asia and the Far East. It cites Western commentators as analyzing this event against the general background of developments in those areas and as making "far-reaching conclusions." However, the TASS summary does not discuss Indochina.

SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS A significant dimension of Soviet concern over the impact of Chinese diplomatic moves shows through in the NEW TIMES article's attempt to depict Peking as an obstructionist element in efforts to settle international conflicts. Stating that the Chinese oppose any measures which could contribute to "a real relaxation" of tension, the article in effect reminds the United States that it has a greater stake in cooperating with the Soviet Union in the interests of international stability than in seeking to gain leverage by improving relations with the PRC. Thus, the article points out that Peking opposes the Soviet-FRG treaty and objects to any move toward a Middle East settlement. It also takes note of Peking's campaign against the two superpowers in the name of small and medium-size nations, which "reveals clearly a desire to make China the principal superpower of the world." In short, the article reflects Soviet concern that Peking's more flexible maneuverings will complicate Moscow's own diplomatic objectives while enhancing Chinese influence.

In seeking to depict the PRC as a menace to international security, the article takes a familiar polemical tack in imputing to Peking a wish to trigger an armed clash between the Soviet Union and the United States. This charge has long figured in Moscow's effort to discredit Chinese motives in the international arena, particularly in connection with arms control issues. The TASS summary does not, however, mention arms control as one of the subjects on which the Chinese have taken a negative stand.

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THIRD WORLD Following still another familiar line, the article seeks to play on fears of Chinese influence among the independent states of the third world. It charges that "the Maoists continue to meddle with the affairs of India and Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon, the Arab states and several countries of Africa." Moscow's special interest in India is reflected in the article's claim that one Chinese aim is "to encircle India by states which would follow in the wake of Peking's policy."

SOCIALIST
COMMUNITY Soviet concern over Peking's East European policy is registered in a passage accusing the Chinese of intensifying their attempts to "undermine the socialist community" in pursuit of their "great-power, hegemonic line." With the growing Sino-Romanian ties evidently in mind, the article argues that the Chinese seek to isolate other communist countries in order to impose Peking's political line on them one by one--an implied warning to Romania that it could become another Albania.

Moscow's allies--except for Bucharest--have weighed in with comment supporting the Soviets and probing anti-Soviet implications of recent Sino-U.S. developments. In one commentary, the Polish ZYCIE WARSZAWY on 28 April spelled out some of the sensitive issues underlying Moscow's concern over the impact these developments could have on its bargaining position. Stating that there would be no cause for concern over an improvement in Sino-U.S. relations were it not for a desire by both Peking and Washington to strengthen their hands against the Soviets, the article observes that the Sino-Soviet talks are at "a complete deadlock" and that Washington has not shown any readiness to meet Moscow halfway at the strategic arms limitation talks or in the talks on Berlin.

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CEYLON

MOSCOW REPORTS "ULTRALEFTIST" REBELLION; PEKING REMAINS SILENT

While Peking media maintain total silence on the armed insurgency which broke out in Ceylon on 5 April, Moscow has reported the government moves against the rebels and has identified them--in a broadcast for Chinese listeners in Southeast Asia--as "ultra-leftist terrorists" who profess socialist objectives but are in fact supported by "reactionaries." They are directly identified as "Maoist" in the Hungarian party daily, quoting the chairman of the pro-Soviet Ceylon Communist Party. But there has been no comment in the Soviet central press, and in most of its radio comment Moscow has obscured the causes and nature of the insurgency. It has nowhere alluded to the USSR's supply of military aid to the Ceylon Government in response to the latter's request.

Pyongyang acknowledged the insurgency obliquely on 20 April in officially protesting the Ceylon Government's expulsion of the DPRK embassy staff, complaining that the action was based on "fabricated" charges linking the DPRK to the "domestic unrest" in Ceylon. Pyongyang's protest coincided with Peking publicity for a Ceylon Government statement refuting "malicious rumors" (vaguely defined) about Chinese activities in Ceylon.

Havana media, publicizing the visit of Ceylon Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike's son to Cuba, have taken only the briefest notice of the insurgency.

MOSCOW During the first two weeks of the insurgency Soviet media confined their coverage to scattered brief reports on the "resolute measures" taken by the Ceylon Government to restore order and to put down what were described as "rebels" organized by "reactionary forces" seeking to overthrow Mrs. Bandaranaike's United Front Government. There was no allusion to the insurgency in a Moscow commentary in English to Southeast Asia on the 17th expressing the Soviet people's "full understanding and support" for the "progressive course" of the Ceylon Government during its first 10 months in office; the commentary was pegged to Brezhnev's CPSU congress remarks grouping Ceylon with Afro-Asian countries following a noncapitalist path.

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It was in a broadcast in Mandarin to Southeast Asia on the 18th that Moscow media elaborated on the nature of the insurgency and explained who the rebels are. The broadcast said the Ceylon Government had uncovered many "secret arms caches" and a "plot" by "ultraleftist terrorists and reactionary forces to launch large-scale attacks on government organs, to create confusion by staging a revolution, and to overthrow the legitimate government by means of armed violence." Identifying the insurgents as belonging to "the People's Liberation Organization," which is "mainly composed of young students and unemployed secondary school and university students," the commentary asserted that although the organization "terms itself socialist," it is "pursuing objectives that have nothing in common with genuine socialism"; and although it "proclaims itself a leftist progressive organization," it has "resorted to terrorism." The commentary charged that in addition to receiving support from "Ceylon's reactionaries," the insurgents had been funded by "Western espionage organizations, including the CIA."

Subsequent Moscow radio commentaries in other languages have refrained from elaborating on the causes or nature of the insurgency, and the characterization of the rebels as "ultraleftists" has not recurred. Brief news reports on continuing Ceylon Government efforts to "liquidate pockets of resistance" portray the insurgents as "terrorists backed by the reaction."

BUDAPEST, The Soviet line that reactionary forces are
WARSAW behind the rebellion has been echoed in East
 European media. In an interview reported by
Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG on 20 April, Ceylon Communist Party
Chairman Dr. S.A. Wickremasinghe contended that "rightist
groups opposing the implementation of a progressive program
and nationalization" are behind the "antigovernment uprising"
in Ceylon. He stated that the rightist groups had been
assisted by the unemployed, well-educated young people, and
"Maoist groups of the workers movement, which were also
supported from abroad." By implication, he also sought to
include the U.S. embassy and the opposition United National
Party, ousted by Mrs. Bandaranaike's United Front in May 1970,
among the conspirators.

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Playing a similar theme, an article in the Warsaw daily SZTANDAR MLODYCH, reported by PAP on 16 April, charged "the Ceylonese reaction" with "creating appearances of attacks launched by the pseudo-leftwing circles" in order to "provoke tension and create political and economic confusion, setting Premier Bandaranaike at variance with the leftwing forces which support her."

PEKING Silent on the insurgency, NCNA reported on 19 April that the PRC ambassador to Ceylon had been received by Prime Minister Bandaranaike and, with no linking of the two events, noted on the 20th that the Ceylon Government had issued a communique "refuting malicious rumors aimed at disrupting Ceylon-China relations." The communique sought to discredit rumors circulating in Ceylon about Chinese technicians working on the PRC-supported construction of the Bandaranaike memorial international conference hall in Colombo and about "materials" being brought in from China for the project. NCNA did not elaborate on the substance of the rumors, which apparently included speculation that materiel for the insurgents was being brought in along with the construction materials.

PYONGYANG The DPRK Foreign Ministry on 20 April issued a statement contending that "unfriendly action" by the Ceylon Government had made it impossible for the DPRK embassy staff "to perform their functions as a diplomatic mission in Ceylon" and that the staff "had no alternative but to leave the country on 16 April." Alleging that the expulsion of the embassy staff "stemmed from the sinister and sly scheme of imperialists" and reactionaries to wreck Ceylon-Korean relations, the statement asserted that the expulsion was taken "without any reason or foundation whatsoever," that it was based on "fabricated facts" which sought to link "the domestic state of unrest" in Ceylon with the DPRK, and that it was part of "a wicked plot to mislead public opinion and slander the DPRK." The statement predicted that the "sinister scheme" will be "shattered" and that Korean-Ceylon relations "will be normalized again in the interests of the peoples of the two countries."

HAVANA The single, brief report of the insurgency monitored from Cuban media was a domestic service news item on 9 April noting that a factory and a school had been bombed by the Royal Ceylon Air Force and that armored

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units had repulsed "insurgent groups" at two other locations. The nature of the insurgent groups was not defined: neither Cuban nor any other monitored communist media have taken notice of the designation of the insurgents as "Che Guevarists," reported in the Western press.

On 11 April Cuban media reported the arrival in Havana of Mrs. Bandaranaike's son Anura, and on the 16th he was reported to be taking part in cane-cutting activities. PRENSA LATINA said on the 11th that he had come to Cuba "to learn of problems related to youth, its incorporation into productive labor, and the historical process of the Cuban revolution."

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PAKISTAN

Apparently judging that the rebellion in East Pakistan is winding down and that Soviet interests lie in good relations with Pakistan President Yahya Khan's government, Moscow confines its now infrequent coverage of the situation to reports attributed to Pakistani sources portraying a return to normalcy in the rebellious region and a complete rout of the secessionist forces. Previously, Moscow had balanced reports on events from the Pakistan Government's standpoint with Western news accounts depicting widespread armed opposition to the Pakistan military forces attempting to restore control in the Eastern region.

Peking has sustained its silence on what it Pakistan's internal affairs while focusing on alleged i. erence by India abetted by the two "superpowers."*

MOSCOW PUBLICIZES OFFICIAL PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT LINE

After having stated its concern over events in East Pakistan in President Podgorny's 3 April message to Yahya and then retreating to an essentially neutral stance, Moscow now associates itself with the Pakistan Government's line that the rebellion has been brought to heel. Thus, TASS on 19 April noted a Pakistan press agency report that "the last major town controlled by the supporters of Mujibur Rahman" had fallen to the Pakistan Army, and it cited a Dacca radio report on the restoration of public transportation and the improving availability of foodstuffs in East Pakistan. On 22 April TASS quoted "official reports from Dacca" as saying that "life is gradually returning to normal in the cities and towns of East Pakistan." On the 27th TASS cited a Pakistan Radio announcement that "mopping-up operations" were being conducted against secessionist units in various areas of the Eastern wing, and it took note of other claims that normalcy had been restored.

The considerations underlying Moscow's approach were reflected in a 15 April commentary in English to South Asia which was particularly defensive regarding Pakistani press reaction to the Soviet position on the Pakistan crisis and to Podgorny's message to Yahya. This commentary, the only elaboration of Podgorny's message in Soviet media, reiterated what it said was "the essence of the Soviet

* Earlier Soviet and Chinese treatment of Pakistan developments is discussed in the TRENDS of 7 April, pages 24-27, and 14 April, pages 30-33.

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message" and stressed that the Soviet interest was simply in ending the bloodshed and encouraging a peaceful solution. It emphasized that "the public in many other Asian countries friendly to Pakistan share the [Soviet] alarm and concern about the events in that country." Soviet media never acknowledged Yahya's reply to Podgorny's message.

Soviet media have also ignored Pakistani appeals--repeated by Peking--for Moscow to urge India to cease its alleged interference in Pakistan's affairs. Moscow's first public acknowledgment of Indian-Pakistani tension appeared in a TASS transmission on 28 April which, in a studied show of neutrality, juxtaposed Pakistani and Indian accounts of border trouble. A Karachi-dated report quoted a Dacca radio announcement that two soldiers from an Indian frontier battalion had been taken prisoner during Pakistani operations against infiltrators, while a Delhi-dated report cited an Indian news agency as saying Pakistani Government troops have repeatedly crossed the border and fired on Indian border posts.

Moscow's suspicions regarding Chinese interests in the area were conveyed in a NEW TIMES article, reviewed by TASS on 21 April, which stated that "the Maoists continue to meddle with the affairs of India and Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon" and seek "to encircle India by states which would follow in the wake of Peking's policy."*

PEKING CONTINUES TO DECRY INDIAN, "SUPERPOWER" INTERFERENCE

Peking has continued to focus its propaganda on alleged interference in Pakistan's internal affairs by the "Indian reactionaries, Soviet revisionism, and U.S. imperialism" while avoiding comment on the secessionist movement and the fighting in East Pakistan. PRC media have not acknowledged messages of support to Yahya from Chou En-lai (reported by both Pakistani and Indian news sources) and from Mao Tse-tung (reported by Indian sources). Peking has publicized material from Australian communist, Albanian, and Congolese organs to condemn the Indian Government, the United Nations, the Soviet Union, and the United States for interference in Pakistan events. In addition, Peking has continued to publicize

* See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS.

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Pakistan protests to the Indian Government alleging armed activities against Pakistan forces.

NCNA on 18 April, in what seems a glaring oversight by its editors, carried a Rawalpindi-dated report on East Pakistan protests against Indian interference which included a quotation from a Karachi paper that should have brought a blush to the editors' cheeks:

On more than one occasion Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had publicly stated that India could not sit idle--a notorious euphemism for military action interminably used by would-be aggressors.

Also on 18 April, NCNA reported a banquet in Peking in honor of Pakistan Air Force Commodore Kamal Ahmad, commandant of the staff college of the Pakistan Air Force, and an accompanying group of instructors and cadets. It took note of toasts "to the constant consolidation and growth of the friendship between the peoples, the armies and the air forces of China and Pakistan."

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR NOTES ROGERS' MIDEAST TOUR, REJECTS ISRAEL'S SUEZ IDEAS

Moscow dismisses the 23 April announcement of Secretary Rogers' forthcoming Middle East tour as a maneuver aimed at white-washing U.S. policy and asserts that no diplomatic stratagems can force the Arabs to abandon their just demands. Propagandists focus on portraying the United States as too aligned with Israel to be objective, and depict Israel as trying to substitute U.S. mediation for that of Jarring. But TASS made no mention of the Secretary's trip in reporting the continued suspension of Jarring's mission, announced on the 23d, linking it only with Israeli efforts to "wreck" a Middle East peace settlement.

At the same time, Moscow continues to press a Big Four role, calling attention to world expectations that the four-power consultations will produce some realistic effort for peace, and charging the United States with cynicism and obstructionism in its attitude to the talks.

The propaganda claims that Israel desires some purely American rather than international and UN guarantees to accompany the reopening of the Suez Canal. Moscow terms as unacceptable the reported Israeli ideas on reopening the canal, describing them as aimed only at retention of the occupied territories.

ROGERS' TOUR Reporting Secretary Rogers' 23 April press conference at which he announced his forthcoming visits to the UAR, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, TASS singled out his statement of continued U.S. support for Security Council Resolution 242 and for the Jarring mission. In this connection, TASS said, the Secretary stated that his tour aimed at supplementing, rather than substituting for, the Jarring mission. Washington's deeds, TASS asserted, contradict Rogers' statement, and it pointed to U.S. military and political aid to Israel and charged the United States with obstructing Big Four consultations by proposing that the four powers "not 'impose peace on the Middle East.'" The role of the Big Four is also underlined by other propagandists, Kolesnichenko in PRAVDA on the 23d quoting Ambassador Bush as stating, in an interview for an Israeli radio audience, that the United States views the four-power consultations

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"merely as 'conversations and nothing more,' as a 'communications line,'" and that the United States has nothing "serious and specific" in its portfolio for the talks, particularly regarding peace guarantees.

TASS and Moscow broadcasts in Arabic have quoted comment from the Cairo papers AL-AKHBAR and AL-JUMHURIYAH criticizing U.S. policy, the former saying Secretary Rogers' visit could be useful only if it aimed at honest observance of Resolution 242, and the latter claiming that the purpose of the tour is to strengthen American interests. An Arabic-language broadcast on the 27th described Arab press reaction to the Rogers trip as further affirmation of the UAR's "constructive stand" in desiring to solve the crisis peacefully. While describing the trip as a new maneuver of U.S. diplomacy, it added, the Arabs "are not rejecting the possibility of expressing their views once again" on the question of establishing a durable and just peace.

ISRAEL'S SUEZ PROPOSALS Israel's ideas on a partial settlement relating to reopening the Suez Canal, discussed by Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Alon and Secretary Rogers on the 20th, were promptly branded by TASS on the 21st as testimony to "further sabotage" by Israel of UAR efforts to settle the crisis and reopen the canal. Israel's proposals are regarded in Cairo, according to a foreign-language commentary on the 26th, as aimed at perpetuating the occupation by attempting to isolate the problem of the canal reopening from a general settlement.

Primakov, in the domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 25th, summed up the essence of the "so-called proposals": Israel is "supposedly ready" to partially withdraw its troops 10 miles, "beyond the range of medium-caliber Egyptian artillery," on condition that Egypt end the state of war with Israel and no Egyptian soldiers cross the canal. In other words, Primakov said, Israel demands legalization of the occupation, and he viewed the proposals as completely unacceptable. In recalling President as-Sadat's initial proposal, on 4 February, for reopening the canal, Primakov noted that the question of distance of withdrawal was not "definitely stated" and that it "therefore remains a subject of further discussion." (In his NEWSWEEK article released on 15 February, however, as-Sadat had defined partial withdrawal to mean withdrawal to a line behind al-Arish--a point noted by Moscow at the time.)

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AMERICAN "MEDIATION" Soviet commentators claim that Washington, responding to Tel Aviv's appeal, agreed to serve as an intermediary in the Suez Canal question, with Israel thus addressing its ideas to the United States and ignoring the Jarring mission. Primakov in his 27 April commentary speculated as to whether the United States assumed the "so-called mediation mission" to substitute for the Jarring mission, or to ease world criticism of Israel by saying that mediation was still going on, or to try to reestablish U.S. positions in the Arab countries. A Tsoppi commentary broadcast in English to Africa on the 22d asserted that Tel Aviv, relying for mediation not on Jarring but on the United States, seemed to think that Washington has some right to shape the course of Middle East developments. Tsoppi cited the Egyptian weekly ROSE AL-YUSUF as commenting that the UAR would have nothing against a positive contribution to the Jarring mission, but was absolutely against Washington's attempt to act the part of sole benefactor of the two sides in the dispute.

EGYPTIAN STATEMENTS On the 25th, TASS reported a UAR Foreign Ministry statement, pegged to the Rogers tour, as declaring that any questions relating to a partial Israeli withdrawal can be discussed only within the framework of an all-round settlement of the crisis envisaging, first of all, Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories. The statement stressed Cairo's hope, TASS said, that the mission Secretary Rogers intends to carry out "will correspond to the general stand of the UAR." TASS at the same time cited AL-AHRAM as noting that the UAR Foreign Ministry was studying news agency reports that Washington supports a partial settlement based on limited Israeli withdrawal, and said the paper pointed out that the ministry was also studying calls from different world capitals to convene the Security Council or the UN General Assembly to discuss Israel's "negative stand."

TASS the same day reported UAR Foreign Minister Riyad as declaring that any partial troop withdrawal is out of the question, and there can only be full withdrawal, which "could be carried out in two stages but must be accompanied by international guarantees and Israel's written commitment to Jarring."

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H A I T I

MOSCOW, HAVANA BROADCASTS IN CREOLE URGE "PATRIOTS" TO REVOLT

Following the death of Haitian President Dr. Francois Duvalier, announced on 22 April, Moscow and Havana have evoked a threat of U.S. intervention in behalf of the regime against "patriotic" opposition forces and have used their special radio services in Creole to call for a popular uprising against Duvalier's heirs. Havana has long used its broadcasts in Creole and Moscow the Creole service of its purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress to excoriate Duvalier and openly promote revolution.

INITIAL REACTION Both Cuban and Soviet media briefly reported Duvalier's death soon after it was officially announced in Haiti, and both promptly speculated on the possibility of U.S. military intervention. TASS reports and a 23 April Radio Moscow broadcast in Portuguese to Brazil charged that Washington, "alarmed" by the possible consequences of Duvalier's death, was "undertaking threatening steps" aimed at giving "psychological comfort to the supporters of the late dictator and butcher of the Haitian people." Such steps were said to include "a virtual sea blockade of Haiti." Moscow said the United States was preparing to intervene against "the Haitian people's progressive forces" on the pattern of the intervention in the Dominican Republic. In a similar vein, a Havana domestic service commentary on the 22d noted speculation about "a new intervention by U.S. troops, as in 1915 when they invaded Haitian territory on the pretext of protecting foreign interests."

Such comment, however, has not been extensive from Radio Moscow or in the Havana radio's regular services, which have paid little attention to events in Haiti since the period immediately following Duvalier's death.

BROADCASTS IN CREOLE Inflammatory Soviet and Cuban broadcasts in Creole, on the other hand, have fired a barrage of personal abuse at the late president's daughter Marie Denise--described by Havana as "the real power" in the new government--and at Jean Claude Duvalier, who has succeeded his father as president for life. Broadcasts in both Creole services have called upon the Haitian people to institute revolutionary action, picturing the regime as unchanged by Duvalier's death and

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seeking to lend urgency to the call to arms by dramatizing the threat of foreign intervention.

A Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Creole on the 24th cited the contention of the Central Committee of the Unified Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH) that the Haitian people must be "very vigilant not to allow foreign intervention" and must unite "so that the action against Duvalierists can be successfully initiated and be crowned with complete success." In its greetings to the CPSU Central Committee on the occasion of the 24th CPSU Congress, carried by PRAVDA on 12 April, the Haitian party Central Committee had asserted that the struggle against the Duvalier regime "must be of the nature of a popular armed struggle for national liberation, opening the way for the building of socialism."

Jean Claude and Marie Denise came in for particularly vituperative personal attack in a Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Creole on the 25th, which warned the "imperialists" and "the Duvalierist band of sons of bitches" to "prepare themselves for the rebellion of the people." The broadcast said "things are getting tougher in Haiti now" and declared that "the battle is ready to begin in which the people will definitively cleanse the country of all the filth and grease from the Duvalier family." It called on the people to be alert and appealed to "all the patriotic forces to unite, so that they can rise up together against Duvalierism and the Yankee imperialism that is supporting it."

Havana broadcasts in Creole on the 23d and 24th said the Haitian people have many demands "that only a people's government can meet" and emphasized that the people "do not want a tyrant to replace a tyrant." The commentary on the 23d called on Haitians to "mobilize on a patriotic, revolutionary base," to "take the initiative, stand up for their rights," and "prepare our forces." The commentary said: "Our souls are united and ready to attack the neocolonial, pro-Yankee society and finally begin the revolution in Haiti."

Citing the U.S. Navy's "vigilance over Haiti" since "the old tyrant died" and blaming the United States for all of "Duvalier's crimes, infamies, and murders," a Havana commentary in Creole on the 24th urged Haitians to "join forces to destroy the social roots of Duvalierism--that is, to change the semicolonial regime into a national liberation regime, a revolutionary regime." It added that only when that occurs will

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the U.S. Government "take its troops off alert status, because it will know--as it knew with Cuba--that the Marines would not come to Haiti to have a nice time; that they would be stopped on Haiti's plains and in the mountains of a new Vietnam."

BACKGROUND Both the Soviet and Cuban radio services in Creole had for years been forecasting the imminent downfall of Duvalier in the face of an armed revolt.* Peace and Progress commentaries since the beginning of this year had been picturing increasing unrest under a "wave of terrorism," denouncing Duvalier's constitutional machinations to establish Jean Claude as his successor, and publicizing calls by the PUCH for the people to "overthrow the dictatorial, antipopular, greedy regime." On 9 April a commentary in Creole carried a PUCH appeal to Haitians to "be alert" and prevent "Duvalier's heirs from coming to power." A 13 April commentary depicted "a major crisis" in Haiti and declared that "the struggle against Duvalier should be a people's armed struggle for national liberation and should open the path to the building of socialism." It added that the Haitian people "have the support of all the progressive forces in the world, and especially that of the Soviets."

Havana's Creole broadcasts have been in similar vein. A typical commentary on 17 March called on "all patriots and revolutionaries in Haiti" to unite in the creation of "a movement for a second independence of our homeland, to change the social system and this rot, and to build with the courage and heroism of the people . . . another Haiti, another society that is anti-imperialist, democratic, independent, sovereign, and socialist." On 13 April a Creole commentary characterized the Haitian revolutionary movement as "more enthusiastic, more vigorous, more dynamic, and more communist than ever" and concluded that "only a socialist revolution will enable Haiti to emerge from underdevelopment and from the conditions which now prevail."

* For a discussion of earlier Moscow and Havana broadcasts to Haiti in Creole, see the FBIS SURVEY of 23 May 1968, pages 4-7.

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SPACE FLIGHTS

SOVIET SPACE DOCKING HAILED AS STEP TOWARD ORBITING STATIONS

Moscow propaganda hailing the two-day flight of Soyuz 10 and its brief docking, on 24 April, with the unmanned Salyut craft lays stress on creation of orbital stations as a chief aim of the Soviet space program. Writing for TASS on the 26th, a Soviet scientist observed, for example, that "we are on the way to space stations and laboratories, which is to be done by combining automatic devices with man's operation aboard a spaceship." In a similar vein, Soyuz 10 commander Shatalov, at a 25 April press conference held by the crew of the ship in Karaganda, asserted that "we are continuing to advance along the road of creating orbital research stations."

An IZVESTIYA article on the 24th stated that "one of the chief aims" of the Soyuz program is the assembling of orbiting stations to perform scientific tasks as well as to resolve problems in the national economy. On the latter score, the IZVESTIYA article and other commentaries point up such benefits of space research as the discovery of mineral deposits and the accurate forecasting of weather. Such stress on practical results--perhaps aimed at justifying the expenditures on space research--has been prominent in Moscow's comment on Soviet space activities since 1967.

Available propaganda offers no explanation for the short duration of the linkup of the two craft and of the flight of Soyuz 10. As in the past, Moscow's reporting conveys the impression that all went well. Summing up the results of the flight at the 25 April press conference, Shatalov said that while it was short, it was complex in its work, aims, and tasks. One of the most important tasks, according to the TASS account of Shatalov's remarks, was to try out the system of searching for and approaching an unmanned object in space and to test a new system of docking. This line was echoed by cosmonaut Feoktistov, among others, in an interview with TASS on the 25th. That some problems were met is implicit, however, in Feoktistov's observation that "it will become necessary in the future to learn to dock a relatively small transport spaceship with a huge multipurpose laboratory." A docking of this type, he added, is a more difficult task than the docking of two Soyuz or Cosmos spaceships--"craft of roughly the same

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Moscow has given no indication that the Salyut craft will serve as a docking target for other Soyuz flights. But in line with statements in the media that experiments with the craft will be continued, the 26 April message of congratulations from the leading Soviet organs to those responsible for the flight of Soyuz 10 observed that research "which constitutes the beginning of work with Salyut" was carried out during the flight of the manned craft.

DELAYED REPORT OF DOCKING Soviet coverage of the flight of the two craft stopped short of stating directly that a docking maneuver was scheduled-- in keeping with past practice of withholding advance publicity for planned experiments on space flights. But Moscow's reports had hinted strongly at the possibility. The TASS announcement of the 23 April launch of Soyuz 10 stated that the orbital inclination was 51.6 degrees-- the same figure given for the orbital inclination of Salyut in the TASS announcement of that launch on 19 April.

The biographies of the three crew members of the Soyuz craft--released by TASS on the 23d--noted that two of them had flown in the craft involved in a docking maneuver in January 1969 and in the "group flight" of three ships in October 1969; the third member of the crew, according to TASS, had been trained as a test engineer of an orbital station.

The announcement that a docking had taken place did not come until late on the 24th. TASS on the 25th, reporting the safe landing of Soyuz 10 that day, stated that the docking had been accomplished at 0147 GMT on 24 April and lasted five and a half hours. A TASS Russian dispatch at 1054 GMT on the 24th--after the docking had occurred but before it was announced--had said that during the joint flight scientific-technical experiments and operations "involved in docking and undocking of the manned spacecraft with the Salyut orbiting station were carried out."

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COSMONAUTICS DAY BRINGS STATEMENTS OF INTEREST IN COOPERATION

Soviet spokesmen took the occasion of Cosmonautics Day, 12 April, to reaffirm Moscow's interest in cooperation with the United States in space. But available Soviet propaganda on the flights of Soyuz 10 and Salyut does not touch on this issue,* and Moscow media have not publicized Soviet cosmonaut Maj. Gen. Beregovoy's remarks in Italy on a joint space venture. As reported by AFP on 26 April, Beregovoy said that space flights "with mixed Soviet-American crews would be possible in the future." AFP quoted him as remarking that both countries have accumulated knowledge in a certain sector and that each would benefit if they pooled their experience.

The avowals of a desire for cooperation on Cosmonautics Day had been couched in the usual broad generalities. A letter from Soviet cosmonauts published in PRAVDA on 12 April said that in the interests of peace and friendship, "cooperation between space explorers of different countries, including the USSR and the USA, should develop and grow stronger." In the same issue of PRAVDA, Academician Boris Petrov took note of the fact that agreement has been reached on the development of Soviet-U.S. cooperation "in certain directions of space research." And Soviet Academy of Sciences President Keldysh, at a Kremlin meeting reported in the domestic service on the 12th, said that the "first steps" have been made toward cooperation with the United States. Petrov and Keldysh presumably alluded to the 21 January 1971 agreement between the Academy of Sciences and NASA to study a wide range of areas of cooperation, as well as to the 28 October 1970 accord looking toward the development of compatible docking systems.

The Central Committee report read by Erezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress on 30 March mentioned in passing the desirability of cooperating "with other interested states" in the conquest of space.

* While Moscow has long affirmed a Soviet interest in space cooperation with the United States, it has not often broached the subject in connection with the USSR's recent manned space flights. For a report on the treatment of the flight of Soyuz 9 in June 1970, see the TRENDS of 15 July 1970, pages 39-40.

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

GDR REPORTS, MOSCOW SILENT ON ABRASIMOV REMARKS ON BERLIN

East German but not Soviet media have publicized remarks by Abrasimov, the USSR ambassador to the GDR, on the Soviet draft proposals on West Berlin presented 26 March at the 18th session of the four-power talks. Abrasimov's comments--the most authoritative Soviet public discussion since the Polish press divulged details of the draft proposals on 15 April--were made on the 23d in the course of a report on the CPSU congress at a meeting of the German-Soviet Friendship Society's Central Executive in East Berlin.

The Moscow central press, which has yet to acknowledge the existence of the Soviet draft proposals, did not even report that the meeting took place. Moscow radio's domestic service took note of the meeting in a brief news item which did not mention that Abrasimov spoke. But East Berlin media have given the meeting extensive coverage: ADN reported the meeting and the content of Abrasimov's speech the same day, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND published the speech on the 24th, and East Berlin's Deutschlandsender broadcast a commentary on the speech and on the Soviet draft proposals on the 26th.

As quoted in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Abrasimov prefaced his references to the Soviet proposals with a recollection that the "peace" program outlined at the CPSU congress called for a European security conference, quick ratification of the Warsaw and Moscow treaties with Bonn, and "settlement of the problems involving West Berlin." Brezhnev, he said, "clearly stressed" to the congress "the Soviet Union's readiness to conclude the negotiations on the problems connected with West Berlin for the mutual benefit of all interested sides," provided the Big Three respect the allied agreements stipulating the "special status of West Berlin" and the "sovereign rights of the GDR as an independent socialist state."

Declaring that the Soviet Union has made a "maximum" effort to demonstrate its desire for "mutually acceptable solutions" in the year-long four-power negotiations, the USSR ambassador went on to note that the Soviet side had "recently submitted an extensive and comprehensive draft of an agreement" on West Berlin which "offers every possibility of arriving at

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mutually advantageous solutions" in the interests of all concerned. "According to our deepest conviction and from the viewpoint of its practical significance," he said, "this Soviet draft offers everything required to achieve an agreement in the near future." But he added that because the negotiations are multilateral, "the good will of all sides and a striving to find an agreement not in words but in deeds" are essential.

WARSAW PRESS CONTINUES DISCUSSION OF SOVIET DRAFT PROPOSALS

Along with the GDR's publicity for Abrasimov's remarks, further Polish press comment on the Soviet draft proposals seems part of a well-orchestrated effort to convey via the media of Moscow's allies--while the Soviet central press stays silent--the impression that the USSR has made appreciable concessions at the four-power talks in the interests of a West Berlin settlement.

In another in the succession of Polish press articles following up the disclosure of the Soviet proposals in a ZYCIE WARSZAWY editorial of the 15th,* a 23 April article in DZIENNIK LUDOWY reported--for the first time in monitored bloc media--Abrasimov's remark to the press just after the 18th session of the four-power talks to the effect that "progress is possible."

On 27 April, in his second major article in ZYCIE WARSZAWY in 10 days, Ryszard Wojna commented at length on the West German reaction to the Soviet draft proposals. Labeling the presentation of the Soviet proposals "a new fact of immense importance" and calling the proposals "the most far-reaching in the history of West Berlin," Wojna said that the Soviet Union submitted its draft at a time when the Brandt-Scheel government was pursuing a "realistic policy" despite strong internal political opposition. Deploring the CDU/CSU opposition to Brandt's Ostpolitik, and particularly to the Soviet proposals on West Berlin, Wojna added that some circles in Bonn believe that "in the face of definite Soviet concessions" the Federal Republic should "raise the price" of a settlement rather

* See the TRENDS of 21 April 1971, pages 29-31.

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than matching Soviet "good will." Wojna said the Soviet proposals had been offered in the same spirit of good will that had produced the signing of the Moscow treaty with Bonn, and he added pointedly that it was not the USSR that created the "linkage" between the ratification of the treaty and a West Berlin settlement.

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FRG - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PRAGUE RADIO REACTS TO WEST GERMAN COMMENT ON BILATERAL TALKS

A commentary in the West German weekly DER SPIEGEL of 12 April suggesting that the Czechoslovak side had been inadequately prepared for the initial round of exploratory talks on normalizing FRG-Czechoslovak relations, held in Prague on 31 March and 1 April, has prompted the first and only discussion of the talks in Prague media since they were held. In the vein of Czechoslovak propaganda preceding the bilateral talks, a Prague radio commentary on 24 April rejoined that it had been at Czechoslovak initiative that the talks were finally begun after "long hesitation" on the part of Bonn. The Czechoslovak Government had long been willing to hold the talks and had long been prepared for them, the broadcast said, while recognizing that it would not be "easy to remove the obstacles that had accumulated" in relations between the two countries over the "past decades."

After pointing out that the Bonn representative at the talks, State Secretary Frank, had praised the initial round for their "businesslike and frank atmosphere" and that West German media had for the most part treated them in a "serious" manner, the radio commentary went on to express concern over DER SPIEGEL's portrayal of a far less favorable West German reaction. It cited passages in DER SPIEGEL quoting "alleged" statements by Frank "or other officials of the Bonn foreign ministry" to the effect that the Bonn negotiators "did not know at the end of the talks what they were actually in Prague for" and that the Czechoslovak side "had obviously not been properly prepared for the negotiations." The officials indicated that Bonn welcomed this situation because it wants to "drag out the talks" in line with its general tactical approach to Czechoslovakia, the broadcast quoted DER SPIEGEL as reporting.

If the weekly's allegations are true, the broadcast said, they would be in "crass contradiction" to Bonn's initial appraisal of the Prague talks as "encouraging." And this, the radio added, could only "considerably shake the positive impression of the Bonn negotiators' seriousness" and their "professed interest in a positive outcome of the talks."

Declaring that the West German Government should dissociate itself from the DER SPIEGEL commentary, the broadcast reported the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs as stating, in response to a question from Radio Prague, that Bonn has

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"officially dissociated itself through diplomatic channels from the alleged statements" and considers such speculation "harmful" to the next stage of the talks. As if to leave the situation still in some doubt, however, the broadcast added that if there has indeed been such a diplomatic demarche from Bonn it "should be considered a satisfactory explanation by the appropriate quarters in Prague."

Scheduling of the second round of the exploratory talks for May in Bonn, reported by Federal Government spokesman Ahlers on 22 April, has yet to be mentioned in Prague media.

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BULGARIA

PARTY CONGRESS REASSERTS ORTHODOX, PRO-SOVIET LINE

The 10th Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) Congress, which met from 20 to 25 April, reaffirmed a predictably orthodox pro-Soviet line and was about as unspectacular as the March CPSU congress from which it drew its guidelines. According to Bulgarian media, the congress "unanimously" elected Todor Zhivkov as party first secretary and reelected the entire 11-man Politburo. It also expanded the Central Committee from 137 to 147 members. The only mild surprise was the ouster of Luchezar Avramov, who was not reelected as a candidate member of the Politburo. Avramov, the foreign trade minister, had been rumored for months to be in some difficulty because of an embezzlement scandal over a year ago in the Bulgarian Merchant Fleet enterprises which were doing business with the West. Venelin Kotsev, leading party ideologist, was elected to candidate membership in the Politburo in his place.

The congress also dutifully ratified the new five-year plan directives and the new party program--a highly orthodox, theoretical document that had already been published in the Bulgarian press on 14 March.

In deference to Bulgaria as Moscow's most loyal ally, Brezhnev led the Soviet delegation to the congress. Hungary's Janos Kadar and Poland's Edward Gierek were the only East European party chiefs present. The other bloc delegations were headed by East Germany's Erich Honecker, Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee; Czechoslovakia's Alois Indra, Presidium member and secretary of the Central Committee; and Romania's Gheorghe Pana, Presidium and Executive Committee member and Central Committee secretary. The Yugoslavs, whose relations with the Bulgarians continue to be strained over the perennial Macedonian issue, did not send a delegation, but Radio Sofia reported that the Yugoslav ambassador attended the congress as an "observer."

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Peking has not been heard to mention the congress, and Tirana has limited its coverage to a brief radio report on the 26th that the Bulgarian "revisionist party" had reelected Zhivkov first secretary.

ZHIVKOV In his report to the opening session of the congress
REPORT on 20 April, as reported by BTA and published in
RABOTNICHESKO DELO, Zhivkov was typically effusive
in his praise of the Soviet Union and relatively restrained
in his criticism of China and the United States. Following
Brezhnev's lead at the Soviet congress, Zhivkov assailed the
Chinese for attempts "to bring dissidence within our
movement" but expressed Bulgarian willingness to "normalize"
relations with Peking "regardless of serious ideological
differences." The BCP chief also followed Brezhnev's cue
in asserting that Bulgaria had "fulfilled its international
duty as an ally by rendering international assistance to
the fraternal Czechoslovak people" in August 1968.

Despite the Yugoslavs' failure to send an official delegation
to the congress, Zhivkov was conciliatory toward Belgrade:
He remarked that Sofia is "guided by the view that cooperation
between the two socialist countries corresponds to the
interests of our peoples" and promised that the Bulgarian
Government would make "further efforts for the further
consolidation of Bulgarian-Yugoslav good-neighborly
relations." Turning to another Balkan neighbor, he
described the Albanian leaders as "sunk in the bog of
opportunism and anti-Sovietism" but added that "in spite
of this, Bulgaria is making and will further make sincere
efforts to normalize relations among the Balkan states."

In this vein Zhivkov asserted Bulgaria's readiness "to
participate actively in all many-sided Balkan events that
would lead to expanding economic, political, and cultural
ties among the Balkan countries." He went on to declare,
in the broader context of European security, that Bulgaria
was prepared to conclude "bilateral or regional treaties"
on renunciation of the use or threat of force in inter-
national relations--a point reiterated in Foreign Minister
Bashev's speech to the congress on the 21st.*

* According to Western news sources, a proposal for a six-
nation Balkan security conference was deleted from Zhivkov's
congress report at the last minute; a Bulgarian official was
quoted as telling newsmen it had been decided that the proposal
would be inappropriate in a party forum and should come as a
government initiative.

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Turning to relations with the West, Zhivkov limited himself to routine criticism of U.S. policies in Indochina and the Middle East--later formalized in routine congress resolutions on both subjects--and played the coexistence theme while expressing an interest in further cooperation with the West "on the basis of mutual benefit." On the domestic scene, with the lessons of the December riots and Gomulka's ouster in the background, Zhivkov put considerable stress on the need to increase the Bulgarian people's standard of living. In all spheres, he promised, "our efforts will aim at solving the main task: to further raise the material and spiritual level of the life of the people." In this connection, he promised an increase in the minimum wage and pensions as well as further efforts to improve housing and maintain price stability.

BREZHNEV SPEECH There was little of note in Brezhnev's speech to the congress on 21 April--the first by a foreign delegate, relayed live from Sofia by Radio Moscow. The Soviet leader did not repeat in Sofia his CPSU congress attack on the Chinese or defense of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, Zhivkov having echoed the Soviet position on both counts. The main thrust of Brezhnev's speech was aimed at portraying Bulgaria as the epitome of a flourishing, contented ally in tune with its Soviet mentor. After noting the similarity of focus and subject matter at the CPSU and BCP congresses, Brezhnev added: "In working to develop socialist economic integration, in defending socialist gains in the international arena (read: Czechoslovakia), in working out measures for further strengthening the Warsaw Treaty, the BCP has always acted and continues to act from the position of consistent socialist internationalism. For this we, friends and allies, pay the tribute of our deepest respect."

In his closing address to the congress on the 25th, broadcast by Radio Sofia, Zhivkov once again assured his Soviet patrons that Bulgaria would be "unwavering" in its "awareness that it is necessary to subordinate without hesitation the private and temporary interests to the common and lasting interests of the world communist movement."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SON OF POLITBURO MEMBER SHELEST DEFENDS SELF IN PRESS

In a move probably designed to fend off domestic criticism, the son of Petr Shelest, Politburo member and Ukraine first secretary, has charged the New York TIMES with distorting his earlier proposals in regard to increased contacts with foreign scientists and altered priorities for Soviet science. In the 16 April 1971 LITERATURNA UKRAINA, Vitaliy P. Shelest, deputy director of the Kiev Institute of Theoretical Physics, and the editors of LITERATURNA UKRAINA assail the TIMES for allegedly falsifying and sensationalizing their pleas for more basic research and for freer contacts with foreign scientists. But while renouncing the TIMES' interpretation, particularly the suggestion that their views are in dispute in the Soviet Union, Shelest and the editors reaffirm their positions and defend the public discussion of shortcomings in Soviet science.

A year ago, in May 1970, Vitaliy Shelest initiated a 5-month debate on the problems of Soviet science in LITERATURNA UKRAINA. In the 5 May issue of this newspaper, he argued in behalf of a step-up in basic research as against applied research, and proposed establishment of an advanced studies center along the lines of that at Princeton. In a PID PRAPOROM LENINIZMU article at about the same time, Shelest urged more contacts between Soviet and foreign scientists.

Soviet scientists participating in the subsequent public debate mostly approved of Shelest's proposals. The author of an article in the 28 July issue of LITERATURNA UKRAINA went so far as to criticize the bureaucratic nature of security regulations that make it difficult for scientists to travel abroad or subscribe to foreign scientific publications. On the other hand, a spokesman in the 7 July issue of the Ukraine paper--economist G. M. Dobrov--accused Shelest of improperly setting basic science against applied science and of creating the impression that different branches of science are disputing among themselves.

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On 13 October, a LITERATURNA UKRAINA article by Yu. M. Dadenkov, Ukrainian Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, abruptly terminated the discussion. Dadenkov concurred in the need for basic research and foreign contacts and in the proposal to set up new centers for advanced studies, but he stressed the importance of the faster returns from applied research and the primary need to resolve global political issues that hinder collaboration among the world's scientists and technicians.

A month later, on 8 November, writing in the New York TIMES, Prof. Harry Schwartz reported on Shelest's pleas for increased basic research and more opportunity for foreign contacts. Noting Shelest's dissatisfaction with Soviet scientific shortcomings, Schwartz recalled his suggestion that the USSR imitate Princeton's Institute for Advanced Studies. He suggested also that there is high-level Soviet opposition to Shelest's proposals.

Now, 5 months later, Shelest and the editors of LITERATURNA UKRAINA are accusing Schwartz of exaggerating and twisting their ideas and of "seeking out crises and conflicts in our country." Shelest claims Schwartz is making "attempts to create an atmosphere of unhealthy sensation" around his and the other LITERATURNA UKRAINA articles, trying to "present as a sensational innovation the fact of scientific collaboration between the USSR and foreign countries, which is steadily developing and which . . . is equally advantageous to both sides." Shelest goes on to quote several letters from prominent foreign scientists urging expanded exchanges with his institute, and he concludes that "it is well known" that the "development of international scientific contacts is the unchanging line of the Soviet government, which will develop more and more widely."

Shelest declares that Schwartz, "demonstrating his ignorance" of the history of Soviet science, falsely maintains that the USSR traditionally has favored applied science. In fact, declares Shelest, Soviet science "traditionally" has given deep attention to basic problems--"in contrast to American sciences, which is mainly pragmatic." In his original article, Shelest had complained that Soviet applied science "drowns out" basic science and had expressed high admiration for U.S. science.

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In an accompanying article, LITERATURNА UKRAINA's editors accuse the TIMES of trying to "set scientists of the Soviet Ukraine against the people and the Communist Party and perceiving in our science some sort of crisis or difficulties." They defend the discussion initiated in their paper by Shelest, noting that the organ of the Siberian Academy of Sciences had reprinted Shelest's article and citing his proposal for a Princeton-style institute as receiving an especially good response. The editors defend public exposure of shortcomings in science and state that all articles in the discussion were constructive. Cautiously, however, they disclaim responsibility for specific proposals made in the articles, saying they are not qualified to judge them and must leave such analysis to "the responsible establishments which the party and state have entrusted with caring for the development of science" in the Ukraine.

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P R C I N T E R N A L A F F A I R S

SLOGANS SIGNAL BEGINNING OF MAY DAY PROPAGANDA BUILDUP

Calling unusual propaganda attention to this year's celebrations, NCNA on 26 April released a list of 32 May Day slogans summarizing familiar PRC propaganda themes. Although formal May Day slogans were released during the early 1950's, none has appeared since 1955. Formal slogans were last released for the 20th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in October 1969.*

An interesting aspect of the current slogans is the fact that Mao's name, directly referred to only four times in the 1969 National Day slogans, now draws somewhat more attention, with eight direct references. Mao's name has also climbed from its pro forma placement at the end of the 1969 list to earlier mention in the current set of slogans where it is tied to the need to deepen one's study of Mao's works--a dominant theme in PRC propaganda since the party plenum last September.

The slogans concerned with domestic subjects introduce no new propaganda themes. Routine victory is proclaimed for the cultural revolution, and workers, peasants, Red Guards, and army men receive the customary salute. The usual prescription for success in the future is given in terms of fulfilling the tasks set at the Ninth Party Congress and undertaking additional doses of struggle-criticism-transformation. "New victories" are demanded to greet the 50th anniversary of the CCP and the convocation of the Fourth National People's Congress.

* Paralleling the sporadic use of May Day slogans over the years, slogans for National Day were issued during the early years of the regime up to 1953, followed by a long hiatus ending in 1967.

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NEW PARTY COMMITTEES AT COUNTY OR HIGHER LEVEL

| <u>Provincial- level Unit</u> | <u>Province</u> | <u>District</u> | <u>City</u> | <u>County</u> |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|
| Anhwei* | + | 5 | 4 | 17 |
| Chekiang* | + | 2 | 1 | 28 |
| Fukien | + | 2 | | 17 |
| Kiangsi | + | 3 | 2 | 24 |
| Kiangsu | + | 4 | 2 | 20 |
| Shanghai | + | | | 5 |
| Shantung* | + | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| Honan* | + | | 2 | 14 |
| Hunan* | + | 1 | all | all |
| Hupeh | + | 5 | 3 | 11 |
| Kwangsi* | + | | 1 | 20 |
| Kwangtung* | + | 6 | 6 | 19 |
| Hopeh | | | 1 | 13 |
| Inner Mongolia | (no local news on radio) | | | 1 |
| Peking | + | | | 3 |
| Shansi | + | | | 8 |
| Tientsin | | | | |
| Heilungkiang | | | 1 | 19 |
| Kirin | + | 2 | 4 | 13 |
| Liaoning | + | 1 | 4 | 23 |
| Kansu* | + | | 1 | 21 |
| Ningsia | | | | 4 |
| Shensi* | + | 2 | | 8 |
| Sinkiang | | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| Tsinghai | + | 3 | | 6 |
| Kweichow | (no local news on radio) | | | |
| Szechwan | (no local news on radio) | | | |
| Tibet | | | | |
| Yunnan | | | | 14 |

* Apart from announcing individual new party committees, the provincial radio has claimed that party committees have been formed in "a majority of" or "many" counties and/or municipalities ("all" in the case of Hunan).

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