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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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1 OF 1

7 APRIL 1971

**Confidential**



# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

7 APRIL 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 14)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 29 MARCH - 4 APRIL 1971

Moscow (2577 items)

CPSU 4th Congress	(32%)	82%
[Brezhnev's Report]	(--)	31%]
Hungarian Liberation Anniversary	(0.1%)	2%
Indochina	(13%)	2%
East Pakistan Rebellion	(0.1%)	2%
Middle East	(3%)	1%
China	(3%)	1%

Peking (1855 items)

Indochina	(52%)	32%
[PRC Message on Laos Operation]	(--)	6%]
Domestic Issues	(18%)	25%
Table Tennis World Tournament	(7%)	13%
Mauritanian Foreign Minister in PRC	(--)	7%
Establishment of PRC-Cameroon Relations	(--)	6%
Establishment of PRC-Kuwait Relations	(--)	5%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item--radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi propagandists continue to claim that Operation Lam Son 719 in Laos was a strategic failure for the allies and a vital blow to President Nixon's Vietnamization program. And the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 2 April carries the second analysis of the operation within two weeks under the byline Chien Binh (Combatant). The latest article seems to press for communist offensive action even more directly than the article on 22 March: Chien Binh says that "big annihilating campaigns" are vital for victory and maintains that the Laos campaign demonstrated that the allies cannot successfully counter large-scale communist attacks.

Hanoi's continuing propaganda campaign on the communist "victories" gets new impetus with the 6 April release of a communique detailing defeats of the allied elements engaged in Lam Son 719 along the Khe Sanh front in South Vietnam. As in the case of the communique released two weeks ago on action in Laos, Hanoi radio broadcast a special program and the press has highlighted the communique with laudatory comment.

In the wake of the 26 March "grand victory banquet" in Peking, PRC media have continued to hail the "crushing defeat" suffered by the U.S.-supported ARVN forces in the Laos operation. Peking has also continued to probe the implications of the operation for the American political scene, liberally citing Western news reports to demonstrate that President Nixon's "credibility gap" has been widened by his effort to portray "defeat as victory."

Le Duan, addressing the 24th CPSU congress on 31 March, briefly noted the "glorious victories" by the "liberation" armies of Vietnam and Laos in the "Highway 9 theatre" as well as in Cambodia. Gromyko discussed Indochina only briefly in his speech at the congress on the 3d and, like Brezhnev in his report on the 30th, did not mention any such specific issues as the Laos operation. But routine Moscow comment continues to discuss the allied "failure" in the operation, and a domestic service broadcast on the 4th observed that the President was preparing for his 7 April TV speech on Indochina by studying a report on allied miscalculations in the operation.

### DRV ARTICLE PRESSES STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF LAOS OPERATION

CHIEN BINH           The 2 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article by Chien Binh  
ARTICLE               provides a concise summation of the jubilant  
                          communist evaluation of the campaign in Laos against  
the allied Operation Lam Son 719. Echoing claims he made in earlier

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articles,\* Chien Binh maintains that the communists' "defeat" of the Laos operation has strategic significance and has undermined Vietnamization because of the loss of elite ARVN troops and the failure of tactics relying on the use of aircraft, tanks, and artillery. In a notable departure from Hanoi's propaganda line of recent years, Chien Binh says flatly that the communists are fully able to defeat the allies "militarily."\*\*

In his 22 March article, Chien Binh had observed merely that the South Vietnamese army would be further strained by the continuing withdrawal of U.S. troops. Now, in his article on the 2d, he indicates that a significant change has already taken place: "After the withdrawal of 200,000 U.S. troops, the balance of power on the battlefield has undergone an important change." He adds at this point that "the test of Vietnamization has entered its fiercest phase." Chien Binh maintains that the test of strength which took place in Laos was inevitable and would have occurred sooner or later in one place or another; and he says sarcastically that "Nixon cannot act otherwise, because he cannot wrap the Saigon puppet army in cellophane and keep it forever in Saigon."

Chien Binh seems to use the Laos campaign to press the argument for big unit action--an argument advanced in a unique article last December by PRG Defense Minister and PLAF Commander Tran Nam Trung.\*\*\* Chien Binh stresses the "great importance" of "big campaigns of annihilation" such as the one in southern Laos. He asserts that "only by annihilating the enemy's military forces by big chunks can we gradually knock out the enemy, gradually crush his will, and gradually change the war situation in order to advance toward completely militarily defeating him." He maintains that the results of the fighting along Highway 9 reflect the relative strengths of the two sides

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\* Chien Binh commented earlier on the Laos incursion in the 26 February and 4 and 22 March issues of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. See the 10 March TRENDS, pages 10-11, and 31 March TRENDS, pages 2-5.

\*\* Hanoi propagandists typically speak in sloganistic terms that "we shall surely win, the U.S. imperialists will surely be defeated," leaving ambiguous how the victory is to be achieved.

\*\*\* See the 30 December TRENDS, page S 1-3, and the 31 March TRENDS, pages 5-6.

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in the Indochina conflict and demonstrate that the allied forces "cannot cope with the adversary's large-scale blows of annihilation."

Chien Binh addresses himself indirectly to the suitability of South Vietnam as a theater for large-scale confrontations in his discussion of the effects of the topography of southern Laos on the fighting there. He points out that there are areas in South Vietnam which approximate the conditions of the areas where heavy fighting has occurred in both Laos and Cambodia: "South Vietnam, like the southern Laos area, does not lack hills and mountains and, like the Kratie-Kompong Cham area in Cambodia, does not lack lowlands." Seeming to stress his recognition of the efficacy of various kinds of warfare, he not only notes that guerrilla fighting is appropriate to some areas but adds that "it is not true that there must be large-scale combat in all areas."

Chien Binh does not characterize the spate of attacks on allied positions in South Vietnam in the wake of the Laos campaign, but he claims that the fighting this spring shows that the "resistance" forces "can simultaneously swing many blows on many battlefields in southern Laos, Cambodia, northern Laos, the high plateaus, the central Trung Bo coastal areas, and the Nam Bo delta." He maintains that the allies have been "on the defensive everywhere" and that they are limited in their ability to reinforce even an important front.

**FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM** Hanoi media have greeted recent communist attacks in Kontum and Quang Nam as "outstanding annihilation battles" that demonstrate their "firm initiative" on the battlefield. This evaluation appears, for example, in a 2 April NHAN DAN commentary which acclaims the 27 March attack on the U.S. base Mary Ann in Quang Nam, the 29-30 March assault on Duc Duc district capital in the same province, and the overrunning of ARVN firebase 6 in Kontum (designated Hill 1001 by the communists) on 31 March, as well as other actions in South Vietnam. The paper comments that the attacks countered "Nixon's scheme to prolong the aggressive war and to reduce the U.S. troop casualties under the Vietnamization plan."

Offering details on the three major attacks, the NHAN DAN article and other commentaries claim that the attack on the Mary Ann base "completely annihilated" a battalion of the

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196th Brigade of the Americal Division. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 6th reports that the attack was launched by Quang Nam regional troops and claims that they returned to their position "without suffering any casualties." The communists allege that a combined ARVN infantry-artillery battalion was wiped out and many U.S. advisers and ARVN troops captured in the attack on firebase 6. Nearly 300 allied troops are said to have been put out of action when Duc Duc was attacked and "controlled."

### PLAF TALLIES "VICTORIES" OVER LAOS OPERATION IN QUANG TRI

A PRG press conference in Hanoi on the 6th made public a 4 April communique of the PLAF command on the Khe Sanh front which tabulates alleged allied losses in Quang Tri along Highway 9 from 30 January to 31 March. Giving special attention to the communique, as it did to a similar 24 March communique from the Laotian "liberation" forces command, Hanoi publicized it in special radio broadcasts on the Quang Tri fighting on the night of the 6th and featured it, along with editorial comment, in two-color issues of the press on the 7th. Ridiculing the dispatch of allied forces to Highway 9 and the incursion into Laos as a "foolish strategic scheme," the communique repeats communist claims that Laotian and South Vietnamese forces along Highway 9 "dealt crushing blows of great strategic significance" to the allied troops.

All told, according to the communique, the forces in South Vietnam put out of action nearly 7,000 allied troops, including 4,054 GI's; destroyed 863 military vehicles, including 236 tanks and armored cars; and shot down or destroyed 234 aircraft on the ground. In addition, they are said to have wrecked 72 cannon and big mortars, sunk or set afire 42 warships and combat launches, destroyed 41 big logistic storages and materiel dumps, and set fire to millions of liters of gasoline and thousands of tons of weapons, ammunition, food, and military equipment.

The communique repeats the claim that Quang Tri forces overran a position of the ARVN 39th Ranger Battalion on Hill 500--a hill located in Laos according to allied maps, but placed inside South Vietnam by maps on the fighting published in the Hanoi press. Indirectly acknowledging the contradiction in locating the hill, the communique notes that the attack took

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place at a time when the prongs of the allied incursion were intercepted and besieged in Laos and that it "contributed to the smashing of the enemy's northern prong."\*

The 7 April NHAN DAN editorial spells out the communist claims, saying the communique's figures indicate that the fighters annihilated approximately one-third of the allied forces on the Khe Sanh front and destroyed more than two-thirds of the allies' military vehicles and one-third of their artillery pieces. Comparing the recent fighting around Khe Sanh to the siege of the Khe Sanh base in 1968, the editorial vows that "this generation and generations to come will always remember our compatriots and fighters who fought valiantly and resourcefully, surmounted all difficulties and hardships, twice accepted the U.S. aggressors' challenge, and on both occasions triumphed gloriously, scoring victories of strategic importance."

THIEU PRESS CONFERENCE      Hanoi media view President Thieu's 31 March press conference in Dong Ha as a maneuver to save face and bolster morale in the wake of the ARVN's "defeat" in Laos. An article in the 2 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN ridiculed Thieu's "braggings" and his announcement "with fanfare" that South Vietnamese commandos had been "lifted to some places near the Laos-South Vietnam border."

Acknowledging more details of Thieu's announcement, a Hanoi domestic service broadcast on the 2d said Thieu "created the false story that the puppet troops had just attacked a communist headquarters in southern Laos." Reflecting reports that the commando raid was aimed at communist base area 611, the broadcast declared that the allies "are trying to fool public opinion, pretending that they were not defeated in Laos and are sending hundreds of commandos to attack Hill 611 in Laos." It made no reference to Thieu's statement, at the same press conference, that South Vietnamese forces are capable of launching attacks against the DRV without U.S. support.

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\* Comment on the attack on Hill 500 is reviewed in the 24 February TRENDS, pages 4-5.

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## ROUTINE CRITICISM OF "AGGRESSION" IN INDOCHINA AT CPSU CONGRESS

DRV, NFLSV SPEAKERS Addressing the CPSU congress on 31 March, First Secretary Le Duan delivered a generally standard attack on U.S. "aggression" in Indochina. Both he and NFLSV delegate Nguyen Van Hieu, speaking on the 2d, said that the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine have received serious setbacks most recently during the allied invasion of Laos and in the operations along Highway 9. Both also reaffirmed the communist stand that a proper basis for a political settlement is provided by the 10-point NFLSV/PRG proposal and the eight-point elaboration. Consistent with the usual North Vietnamese even-handedness regarding its two big allies, Le Duan cited China as well as the Soviet Union in expressing gratitude for aid from the socialist countries.

In castigating the United States for continued "escalation" of the war, both Le Duan and Hieu denounced U.S. "threats" against the DRV\* and preparations for "new military adventures" there. They had not mentioned the alleged danger of action against the DRV at the 26 March "victory" banquet in Peking, an omission the more notable in that Chou En-lai did so in remarks on the same occasion.

SOVIET SPEAKERS Indochina was discussed only briefly and in general terms by Grechko on the 2d and Gromyko on the 3d. Both cited the war as an example of the perfidy and aggressiveness of U.S. foreign policy in general and, following the lead of Brezhnev's 30 March report, neither discussed the Laos operation specifically. Gromyko denounced the United States for propagating the "falsehood" that it would like to withdraw its troops from Vietnam while simultaneously committing aggression there and in Cambodia and Laos as well.

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\* The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 6 April issued another in the continuing series of statements on U.S. air strikes, this one protesting strikes from 31 March to 4 April on villages in the DMZ. On 1 April the media carried statements by the DRV and PRG spokesmen in Paris recalling that they had called off the session of the Paris talks on 25 March in protest over the concentrated air strikes on the 21-22 and that the United States, with "no justification," had cancelled the 1 April session.

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He did not discuss a political settlement, but in another section of his speech he cited Indochina as an example when he contrasted the honesty and peaceableness of Soviet foreign policy with efforts by the United States to mask its own "aggression." He said the United States had "adopted" the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962, which were designed to serve peace in Indochina, but was not "embarrassed" by this when it decided to unleash aggression there.

Grechko said that the "American imperialists," who have never stopped preparing for aggression, are using Vietnam as a "testing ground" for their strategy. He briefly called attention to the USSR's "selfless aid" to the Vietnamese as an example of the Soviet Union's devotion to its international duty.

Kosygin mentioned Indochina only in passing in his report on the five-year plan, pointing to the need to strengthen the USSR's armed forces in the face of a complex international situation in which imperialism resorts to "military adventures and direct aggression," exemplified by the "disgraceful, dirty, bandit war in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos."

#### PATHET LAO DELEGATE AT CPSU CONGRESS THANKS MOSCOW FOR AID

The speech at the CPSU congress by NLHS delegate Kaysone Phomvihane on the 3d was notable for an expression of thanks to the Soviets for their "tremendous and invaluable aid and support" to the Laotian people's struggle against the "U.S. imperialists." This speech was publicized in Moscow media as well as by the Pathet Lao and was published in PRAVDA on 4 April. The reports of the speech were followed on the 7th by a Moscow domestic service report that at a meeting in the Lao "liberated areas" held to celebrate recent "military victories," participants spoke of the "Laotian patriots'" gratitude for Soviet "aid and support."

Moscow elite propaganda has generally been less direct than this regarding aid to the Pathet Lao, but such explicit references have appeared in routine comment originated by Moscow as well as in Pathet Lao statements publicized by Soviet media. The 25 February 1971 Soviet Government statement on the Laos operation promised continued aid to the "patriots of Indochina," thus implicitly including the Pathet Lao. Brezhnev had conveyed a similar implication in his 12 June 1970 election speech when

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he followed an expression of support for the "just principles and demands advanced by the patriotic forces of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos" with the pledge that "we shall render all the necessary assistance to those who are fighting for their freedom and independence."

At the routine propaganda level, more explicit references to aid appeared, for example, in connection with the 15th anniversary of the NLHS on 6 January 1971 and the 25th anniversary of Laotian independence on 12 October 1970: There were promises on those occasions of continued Soviet "assistance" or "help" to the "Laotian patriots." Statements publicized in Moscow media in which NLHS leaders expressed gratitude for Soviet "assistance" included remarks by NLHS Chairman Souphanouvong in an interview in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 27 November 1970 and by NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit in a PRAVDA interview on 12 May 1970.

**"VANGUARD PARTY"** While Kaysone Phoumvihan is attending the CPSU congress in his capacity as vice chairman of the NLHS Central Committee, the role of the clandestine Lao communist party was hinted at in a passage in his speech in which he noted that the Lao people's struggle is being carried on "under the correct leadership of the vanguard party." He has been identified as secretary general of the clandestine "Lao People's Party." On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Laos independence on 12 October, he authored an article--carried by the Pathet Lao news agency on 5 October--on the history of a "genuine revolutionary party" in Laos.\*

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\* See the TRENDS of 7 October 1970, pages 11-12.

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**CONVICTION OF CALLEY FOR SON MY MASSACRE CALLED "COVER-UP"**

DRV AND PRG      The first monitored reaction in Vietnamese communist media to Lieutenant Calley's conviction and sentencing to life imprisonment for his role in the March 1968 Son My "massacre" came early on 3 April when Hanoi radio broadcast an item from the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and Liberation Radio carried a commentary. The DRV and PRG spokesmen in Paris at a 2 April press conference had denounced what they called President Nixon's decision "to temporarily set free" Lieutenant Calley, but these statements were not carried in communist media until the 3d.

Comment uniformly says that the trial was held to cover up crimes committed by the U.S. "aggressors" for years in Vietnam and that public opinion is demanding that Calley's superiors also be punished. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article and one in the party paper NHAN DAN on the 4th say the United States tried to cover up the Son My "massacre," the latter recalling that the Central Trung Bo Liberation Front committee "had immediately protested" the 1968 "massacre." NHAN DAN adds that the United States still refused to admit that the massacre took place even when the case was brought to light by the New York TIMES in November 1969.\*

Consistent with the line that U.S. public opinion has become increasingly appalled at U.S. "crimes" in South Vietnam,\*\* the comment blurs the fact that a strong current of opinion believes Calley should not be punished at all. NHAN DAN says the U.S. public is indignant "not because the sentence was too harsh or too lenient but because the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam had piled up such horrible crimes." Both papers cite press assessments that Calley is only a "scapegoat" convicted to relieve higher-ranking officials of responsibility; they also quote Senator Fulbright--in a 1 April TV interview--to the effect that to shift responsibility onto a lieutenant is

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\* For a discussion of communist propaganda at that time, see the TRENDS of 19 November 1969, page 12, and 26 November 1969, pages 11-12.

\*\* On 5 April VNA carries one of the regular communiques by the DRV War Crimes Commission scoring "crimes" during March, including alleged killings of civilians in the course of the "pacification" program in South Vietnam and as a result of U.S. bombings of villages in the North.

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"debatable" and that the investigation should be carried up to the level of the commander-in-chief.

MOSCOW Unlike the Vietnamese communists, Moscow promptly reported the conviction and sentencing of Calley. A domestic service broadcast on the 30th said that the majority came out unscathed while Calley became the "scapegoat." According to TASS on the 31st, PRAVDA's New York correspondent Kolesnichenko said that the history of the trial is one of Pentagon efforts to first suppress the crime and then see that most of those involved escape justice. The PRAVDA correspondent acknowledged the various currents of U.S. opinion when he said that during the trial "the gap between the democratic and reactionary parts of America became wider," with the "authorities" trying to present Calley as a "lone maniac" and "reactionary circles" wishing to make him "almost a hero," while indignation at U.S. "crimes" in Vietnam is mounting throughout the country.

Reporting the sentence of life imprisonment, TASS on 1 April said that the Pentagon put Calley on trial "under pressure by the indignant public" but that "the main initiators of this bloodbath escaped punishment." The next day TASS cited Fulbright's statement that such "representatives of principal political authorities and the supreme military command as, for example, former commander-in-chief of the U.S. forces in South Vietnam General Westmoreland, should be held accountable." On the 3d TASS reported Westmoreland's denial that he was responsible, commenting that he thus tried to "shift responsibility" to the lieutenants and sergeants.

The President's actions in the case--the transfer of Calley back to his quarters and the announcement that he would give the final review--were noted without comment by TASS on the 4th.

On 7 April TASS reported that Captain Daniel, prosecuting attorney at the Calley trial, sent a message to President Nixon protesting his "direct interference in the administration of justice" and expressing shock that the President had "ordered the Son My hangman to be released from prison." TASS added that "many Americans" see politics behind the decision of the President, "whose sharp loss of prestige makes him flirt with the more reactionary forces."

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PEKING Peking's only mention of the Calley verdict thus far came on 5 April in an NCNA commentary calling the trial a "farce" designed to "defend the 'commander' at the expense of the 'pawns.'" The commentary notes that complex appeal procedures will now go into effect and that it may take several years to obtain a final conviction. NCNA calls attention to the fact that President Nixon ordered that Calley be "released from Army custody and remain in his quarters." Remarking on the President's "deep sympathy" for Calley, it asserts that Son My was not an isolated incident and that "the number-one criminal of all these violent acts is none other than the supreme commander of the U.S. forces, U.S. imperialist chieftain Nixon." In this connection, NCNA briefly notes Fulbright's view that the responsibility for Calley's crimes should be "traced to the supreme commander (Nixon)."

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## CPSU CONGRESS

### SOVIET POLICY OF PEACE ENDORSED BY GROMYKO, KOSYGIN

In his 3 April rundown of foreign policy issues before the CPSU congress, Foreign Minister Gromyko followed the broad outlines of Brezhnev's 30 March Central Committee report in stressing the Soviet policy of coexistence and avoidance of war. Gromyko made explicit what Brezhnev had only implied when he reaffirmed that the USSR supports the resolution of all outstanding international problems "by peaceful means, by means of negotiations."

In his 6 April report on the Soviet economy, Kosygin touched briefly on foreign affairs, following the lead of Brezhnev and Gromyko in pledging the USSR to a policy of peaceful coexistence and in indicting the United States for its "bandit" war in Indochina and its support for Israel. But unlike the other two spokesmen, he takes the occasion to reassert the thesis that the USSR does "not regard war as inevitable."

In the defense of the "Leninist" peaceful coexistence policy and the concluding of agreements with capitalist states, Gromyko's remarks seem implicitly aimed at the Chinese and other radical critics, both on the right and the left. Thus he asserted that it is "equally alien to us to shrink back in the face of the imperialists' threats or to be attracted by ultrarevolutionary phrases." Both postures, Gromyko says, reflect an underestimation of the strength of the socialist countries and the progressive forces of the world. In Gromyko's words, true Marxism-Leninism is shown neither by failing "to keep one's nerve under control when clashing with imperialism" or by "ostentatious placard ultrarevolutionariness." Gromyko also observed that the USSR's policy of peaceful coexistence does not extend to the ideological sphere.

Gromyko contrasts the honesty and openness of Soviet foreign policy with U.S. policy based allegedly on "falsehood," citing as the prime example of the latter U.S. expressions of readiness to withdraw troops from Vietnam while simultaneously committing "aggression" there and in Laos

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and Cambodia. He characterizes the Indochina conflict as "the most dangerous military conflict since World War II and the most bloody." And he routinely takes the United States to task for its support of Israel and for its role--along with other Western powers--in maintaining tension in Europe.

At the same time, Gromyko observes, as did Brezhnev, that better relations with the United States are both desirable and possible, and he implores Washington to weigh "in all seriousness" everything that Brezhnev said in his speech of the 30th. He urges that the United States back its professed desire for talks with practical deeds, and complains that it has not always shown a readiness to do this. The USSR for its part, he observes, favors "serious talks," those in which the participants "do not try to trip each other up but really try to find agreement." In this connection, he charges that the United States has engaged in "zigzags" in the current talks on Berlin, on the talks on convening a conference on European security, "on questions of the Middle East, and on controlling the strategic arms race."

Notably absent from the speech--which appears in PRAVDA on the 4th--are references to the potpourri of disarmament measures which Brezhnev had mentioned in his remarks. Routine propaganda since the 30th has, however, mentioned them in passing, including the call for a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarmament. In one instance, at least, propaganda has credited France with the initiative for such a conference. A Paris-dated TASS dispatch in PRAVDA on the 2d, reporting French reaction to Brezhnev's remarks on the proposal, said that circles in Paris are recalling that France has supported such a proposal "over the course of 10 years."

Gromyko sustains the USSR's rejection of the notion--pressed by the United States and FRG, among others--that a European security conference cannot be convened before the Berlin problem is resolved. According to him, the ratification of the FRG's treaties with the USSR and Poland, the settlement of the FRG's relations with the other socialist states, the successful conclusion of the Berlin talks, and the holding of a conference "have to be implemented in parallel, without waiting for the end of proceedings in one direction before passing on to another."

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Kosygin also mentions a European security conference, noting that its convening would help to increase confidence on the continent and would open the way for broad economic and scientific-technological cooperation. Additionally, he says, it would create conditions for solving such problems as the building of large power-transmission lines and the establishment on this basis of a single European power grid.

### BREZHNEV GETS UNEVEN FOREIGN CP SUPPORT ON UNITY ISSUES

Speaking at the windup of the CPSU congress' discussion of his 30 March report, Brezhnev on 5 April ritualistically expressed gratification over the delegates' unanimous approval of the Central Committee's policies and went on to register the CPSU's aspirations for international communist unity in words almost identical to his windup speech at the 1966 congress: The conclave, he said, was proceeding "in an atmosphere of passionate, Bolshevik international solidarity with all the socialist countries, the communists of the whole world, all the fighters against imperialism."

The speeches by foreign party guests at the congress, generally available in TASS summaries followed by Radio Moscow broadcasts of texts in the languages of the countries concerned, registered a general effort to submerge the pivotal issues underlying dissensions in the international movement. Thus Brezhnev's 30 March attack on Peking--echoed almost to a man by the Soviet republic speakers--drew only scattered support from spokesmen for parties outside the Soviet bloc, in contrast to the chorus of anti-Chinese attacks by delegates at the June 1969 Moscow international communist conference. And the foreign guests, except for Husak himself, almost uniformly avoided the still rankling issue of the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Despite the evident effort to mute divisive subjects, undercurrents of continuing dissension in the movement were present in the speeches of the independent-minded party spokesmen in particular. The vigorous defense of the intervention in Czechoslovakia by Brezhnev and Husak did not appear to set well with past critics of

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the Warsaw Five's action. The Italian CP organ L'UNITA reported that some of the delegates, including the Italian, failed to applaud Husak's address out of displeasure over his defense of the intervention. And French CP delegate Marchais, in an interview with L'HUMANITE, expressed displeasure over Husak's speech--an obvious embarrassment to the nonruling European parties. Ceausescu's strong emphasis on the impermissibility of interference in the affairs of other parties and his lecture on the need to resolve disputes through talks, not polemics, registered the Romanians' reaction both to the treatment of the Czechoslovak issue by Brezhnev and Husak and to the Soviet leader's attack on Peking.

CHINA Support for Brezhnev's attack on Peking was notably absent from the speech of the SED's Walter Ulbricht, who had vigorously backed Moscow on the issue at the 1969 conference. Outside the congress, however, Ulbricht's heir apparent, Erich Honecker, attacked "the group around Mao Tse-tung and its furious anti-Sovietism" in a speech in Magnitogorsk reported by ADN on the 4th. And an attack on "the Mao Tse-tung group," a formulation generally avoided by Moscow in its own name in recent months, appeared in a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial on the congress summarized by PRAVDA on 29 March.

The party chiefs of Moscow's other Warsaw Pact allies, with the predictable exception of Ceausescu, repeated the positions taken by their parties at the 1969 conference in openly taking the Chinese to task in their congress speeches. The Polish party's new First Secretary, Gierk, given the honor of being the second foreign party speaker after the DRV's Le Duan, followed up his 29 March PRAVDA article in registering strong support for Moscow, declaring that "the attitude toward the CPSU, toward the country of the Soviets, constitutes the best proof of action in favor of the unity of the socialist and anti-imperialist forces." Assailing "those who do not understand this truth" and "from anti-Soviet positions are bringing splits" into the movement, Gierk stated that "the present policy of the leaders of the CCP aimed against the unity of the socialist states, and especially its attacks on the CPSU, cannot undermine the solidarity of the fraternal parties with the Soviet communists" but "can only lead to progressive isolation" of those following this course.

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As the first foreign party speaker at the 1 April session, Husak "condemned the malicious, slanderous campaign and the destructive aims of the leadership of the CCP against Czechoslovakia, against other socialist countries, and primarily against the Soviet Union," according to the apparent text broadcast by Radio Moscow in Czech and Slovak on 1 April. At the same session, Hungary's Kadar assailed "the disruptive activity of the Chinese leaders" and stressed that his party had "firmly condemned" this activity, "as is generally known, from the beginning."

The most slavish followers of the CPSU line, Bulgaria's Zhivkov and Mongolia's Tsedenbal, delivered strong attacks on the Chinese at the 1 and 2 April sessions, respectively. While TASS' report of the 2 April proceedings reported Tsedenbal only as attacking "the splitting activity of the Chinese leaders," the text carried in PRAVDA on the 3d quoted him also as stigmatizing "the Chinese apostates from Marxism-Leninism"--stronger words than any Brezhnev had used on the subject at the congress.

Where some 50 foreign parties had joined the chorus of anti-China attacks at the 1969 international communist conference, however, only a minority of spokesmen for nonruling parties joined the leaders of the Soviet-lining ruling parties in directly assailing Peking this time. Numerous others who had spoken out on the issue in 1969 joined the independent-minded Romanians, Cubans, Yugoslavs, and Italian communists in staying silent on the issue now. The parties whose spokesmen again, as in 1969, attacked Peking included the Indian, Danish, Portuguese, and U.S., as well as several pro-Soviet Latin American CP's.

Radio Moscow's broadcasts in Mandarin have pressed home the congress attacks on the Chinese. One on the 2d carried excerpts from Tsedenbal's congress speech, including the reference to the Chinese as apostates. Another on the next day, a commentary by Latyshev entitled "The Isolation of the Chinese Leaders on the International Stage," noted among other things that "the anti-Soviet activity of the Chinese leaders was also widely condemned" by the CP's of "various" countries among the "more than 100" foreign delegations. A broadcast on the 4th quoted a Soviet worker delegate to the congress to the effect that "by making no mention of our congress, the Chinese propaganda machine has slandered our party and people "

CZECHOSLOVAKIA With the exception of Husak, who obediently "thanked" the Soviets for responding to the Czechoslovak's "appeal" for the August 1968 intervention, most foreign party speakers confined themselves to general support for

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Brezhnev's denunciation of "rightwing opportunism"--the orthodox tag applied to the 1968 Prague liberalization--without direct reference to Czechoslovakia. Although an article in the 3 April Bratislava PRAVDA, reported by CTK, commented that the congress speeches of Gjerak, Ulbricht, Kadar, Ceausescu, and Zhivkov "all paid great attention to the Czechoslovak events of 1968 and 1969," available texts of the speeches indicate that none of them mentioned these events directly.

Of the nonruling party spokesmen whose statements are available, only Argentina's Ghioldi explicitly supported the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. According to TASS on the 3d, he recalled at that day's session that "imperialist reaction, with the aid of revisionists, renegades, and bourgeois elements, made an attempt to sever Czechoslovakia from the world socialist system," but "the community of the socialist states, led by the Soviet Union, has proved beyond any doubt its strength and inviolability."\* These remarks were included in a version of the speech broadcast on the 4th by Radio Moscow in Spanish to Cuba, with the added comment that by the 1968 intervention the world socialist system, led by the Soviet Union, had proven "that it possesses everything necessary to repel aggression."

#### INDEPENDENT-MINDED PARTIES STRESS NONINTERFERENCE, DIVERSITY

**CEAUSESCU** Without mentioning either China or Czechoslovakia directly, Romania's Ceausescu made it clear in his 1 April address to the congress that Bucharest's view of the 1968 events and its resolve to stay neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute remain unchanged. His notably pointed emphasis on the independence of parties and the necessity of avoiding interference in their internal affairs may also have been responsive in part to Brezhnev's call for CEMA integration and his stress on the Warsaw Pact's role in "coordinating" foreign policy. Ceausescu's firm defense of Romania's own national course also came against the background of the recently concluded visit to Peking--the second in five months--by a Romanian delegation led by Deputy Premier Radulescu, which served in effect to balance off Ceausescu's attendance at the CPSU congress. The Peking visit resulted in an announcement that Chinese technical personnel are to be sent to Romania.

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\* At the June 1969 Moscow party conference, the invasion of Czechoslovakia the preceding August had been explicitly defended by the CP's of El Salvador, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Costa Rica, Luxembourg, and Guyana--and explicitly criticized by those of Australia, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, and Great Britain.

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Ceausescu began his remarks, as reported by Radio Bucharest, by referring to Moscow's "remarkable accomplishments" as "a very important contribution to strengthening the world socialist system." But he indicated Romania's order of priorities by devoting the major portion of his relatively brief speech to an outline of Romania's own accomplishments, adding wryly in this context: "In all our activity we are guided by the well-known Marxist-Leninist thesis according to which the main duty of the governing communist party is to build the new social system."

After paying brief tribute to the importance of Romanian-Soviet relations, Ceausescu went on to indirectly challenge the Soviet view of party relations and of how to handle disputes among parties. Noting that "differences" among parties exist on ways to build socialism and on some international questions, he in effect lectured those who had censured the Chinese at the congress that differences are not properly resolved by such polemical attacks: "The way to resolve differences is by having discussion from party to party, from leadership to leadership in a spirit of mutual faith and esteem." In an apparent allusion to such Soviet actions as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he added: "Our party speaks out against any interference in the internal affairs of other parties, for this leads to the weakening of their unity and fighting capacity against the class enemy."

Ceausescu promised once again that Romania will continue to foster good relations with "all" communist parties "in the spirit of mutual trust and esteem and recognition of every party's right independently to elaborate its political line in keeping with the concrete conditions prevailing in its country." He added: "We will also expand our relations with other socialist, progressive, and anti-imperialist forces."

In the wake of Brezhnev's call for CEMA integration, Ceausescu limited himself to expressing Romanian willingness for further "cooperation" in that body, stipulating that CEMA cooperation "must lead to the development of each socialist country and to the strengthening of their independence as free and sovereign states." He pointedly failed to mention the Warsaw Pact.

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The TASS account of Ceausescu's remarks predictably focused on his brief comments on Soviet achievements and Soviet-Romanian relations; it omitted his recitation of Romanian accomplishments and did not reflect his comments on CEMA and on the way to handle interparty differences.

TODOROVIC In a speech to the congress on 2 April as reported by Radio Belgrade, Yugoslav Executive Bureau member Todorovic played the independence and noninterference themes in less emphatic fashion than Ceausescu, expressing satisfaction with the favorable development of Yugoslav-Soviet relations "on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual respect, and noninterference, which represent the best guarantees for the successful development of relations between peoples and states."

The Yugoslav representative also used the occasion to reaffirm Belgrade's opposition to any leading center in the world movement and to appeal for diversity in the movement's ranks: "The equality of paths and wealth of forms are the expression of the breadth and intensity of the modern socialist transformation of the world. Differences which stem from this reality are the source of the creative force and of the consolidation of socialism under conditions of a democratic exchange of views and cooperation among equal and sovereign movements and countries."

In remarks that may have been responsive to Brezhnev's statement that "the Soviet people want to see socialism in Yugoslavia strengthened," Todorovic defended Yugoslavia's self-management course and assured his listeners that planned constitutional changes--and resultant further decentralization--are designed to "strengthen" the Yugoslav community and are under the disciplined control of the Yugoslav League of Communists.

BERLINGUER Italian Communist Party (PCI) deputy leader Enrique Berlinguer, addressing the CPSU congress on 1 April, transparently reasserted the Italian party's dissent from the Soviet concept of internationalism that was used to justify the intervention in Czechoslovakia, as well as its objections to Moscow's present views on

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communist unity. Berlinguer stated that "our international solidarity" does not and cannot mean "our full identification with the choices which each socialist country, and more generally each communist and workers party, has made and is making on its own responsibility." And "our internationalism," he said, is based on "recognition of the full independence of each country and each party and leaves the way open, as has already happened, to moments and circumstances of dissension and divergence, without in any way, as a result of this, weakening solidarity and duty in the struggle for the great aims which unite us."

As if to document an approach combining unity with diversity, Berlinguer promised that his party will continue the fight against any "manifestations of anti-Sovietism"--an apparent allusion to the PCI's ouster of the dissident IL MANIFESTO group--and will continue to study the experiences of other parties, while developing its own specific contribution deriving from its own experiences and ideas.

An unattributed statement in the PCI organ L'UNITA on 3 April, explaining why the PCI delegation failed to applaud Husak's address to the congress, linked Berlinguer's statement on internationalism to the PCI's opposition to the intervention in Czechoslovakia. The paper commented that the concept of sovereignty expounded by Husak in defense of the 1968 action "confirmed and even mentioned further developments along the same unacceptable line." It added: "Our line, confirmed by Berlinguer," is shared by other parties, and "this is why Husak's speech has aroused reactions among various delegations at the CPSU congress, including the Italian one--delegations which did not in fact applaud the concepts expressed in that speech."

MARCHAIS In an orthodox address to the congress on 31 March, French Communist Party (PCF) Deputy Secretary General Georges Marchais expressed the PCF's general support for the independence and sovereignty of all parties, then seemed to cancel this out by adding: "but at the same time, we believe that proletarian internationalism, the joint action of all the communist parties on a Marxist-Leninist basis, is a sacred duty and indeed the prerequisite of our struggle"--a statement that smacks of the Brezhnev doctrine.

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For evident domestic political purposes, Marchais sought to mitigate the impact of such a pro-Soviet line for his domestic constituency in an interview with a L'HUMANITE correspondent the next day, published in the paper on the 3d. He explained that he had failed to "recall the well-known and unchanged attitude" of the PCF toward the August 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia because the PCF delegates were "guests" in the Soviet Union and wished to avoid polemics in the interests of communist unity. Marchais also displayed sensitivity to the "regrettable" fact that Husak "saw fit to devote the main part of his address" to a presentation of the CPCZ's views on the issue--a presentation "which implied criticism of our own attitude." The CPCZ's concept of sovereignty, he added, "seems to us alien to the principles of the 1969 Moscow conference."

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**EFFORTS TO BUILD UP BREZHNEV'S STATURE APPARENT**

In speeches on the first day of discussion following delivery of his report, Brezhnev received considerable personal attention, quite in contrast to the 1966 congress. The effort to set Brezhnev apart from the collective and to attribute to him a personal leadership role--an effort evident at a handful of the pro-Brezhnev republican congresses in February and March, those of Kazakhstan, Azerbaydzhan, Moldavia, and Kirgizia--is clearly continuing at the CPSU Congress. No speaker, however, has yet used the controversial formulation, the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev.

More significant than the flattery on the part of obvious Brezhnev supporters such as Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev and Gorkiy First Secretary Maslennikov is the unusual praise expressed by Belorussian First Secretary Masherov, Leningrad First Secretary Romanov, and Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze, who have been reticent in the past. Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest, however, followed his past practice of avoiding praise of Brezhnev.

Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev, pacesetter for those who seek to laud Brezhnev, hailed his report as an important contribution to Marxism-Leninism and declared that it is "necessary to stress especially comrade L.I. Brezhnev's ability to unite the collective and direct the efforts of the whole Central Committee for fruitful work . . ." (PRAVDA, 1 April). Uzbek First Secretary Rashidov, who was the most flattering to Brezhnev at the 1966 congress, spoke of the party information system as the "enormous accomplishment of the Politburo, the Central Committee Secretariat, and L.I. Brezhnev personally"; he also credited Brezhnev with overseeing the working out of initial measures to aid Tashkent after its earthquake (PRAVDA, 2 April). Gorkiy First Secretary Maslennikov, a follower of Brezhnev's protege Katushev, praised the Central Committee, the Politburo, and General Secretary Brezhnev for courage and vigilance against antisocialist forces and for doing everything necessary to strengthen the unity of socialist countries (PRAVDA, 1 April). Krasnodar First Secretary Zolotukhin praised the Central Committee, the Politburo, and General Secretary Brezhnev for leading the party and country "with great mastery and in a Leninist way," and he hailed the land improvement program adopted by the Central Committee "on the initiative of comrade L.I. Brezhnev" (PRAVDA, 2 April).

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Apparently influenced by the pro-Brezhnev atmosphere, Masherov, Romanov, and Mzhavanadze showed new willingness to give Brezhnev praise and personal credit. Masherov stated that the "huge efforts" in agriculture undertaken by the Politburo and "comrade L.I. Brezhnev personally" have already brought good results (PRAVDA, 1 April). Romanov praised Brezhnev's reports on the 50th anniversary of the revolution and on Lenin's anniversary as an "important contribution" to theory and noted approvingly the constant readiness of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and General Secretary Brezhnev "personally" to give counsel and aid to Leningrad (PRAVDA, 1 April). While Mzhavanadze did not go so far as to give Brezhnev "personal" credit for anything, he did praise Brezhnev's report as "brilliant" (PRAVDA, 2 April).

In contrast, Shelest avoided praising Brezhnev's report. Additionally, Moscow First Secretary Grishin--who often has led in praising Brezhnev--was relatively reticent on this occasion.

**COLLECTIVITY DISCUSSED** The subject of collectivity was raised by Brezhnev himself in his report and also by his supporters Kunayev and Rashidov (who asserted that the Politburo's work was characterized by collectivity), as well as by Mzhavanadze. Brezhnev, while warning against leaders abusing their power, argued the need to combine collective leadership with "personal responsibility" and cited Lenin to the effect that responsibility for a specific task must be placed on a specific person. Mzhavanadze also noted the need to combine collectivity with personal responsibility and acknowledged that the Politburo's work, Central Committee plenums, and statements in Brezhnev's report indicate "that now, in connection with new, more complicated tasks, the role and responsibility of a leader is immeasurably growing." This--Mzhavanadze continued--is precisely why a responsible leader "must always and in everything" be an example in observing discipline and "listen attentively to criticism, not ignore it but draw the necessary conclusions therefrom" (PRAVDA, 2 April).

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## PAKISTAN

### PODGORNYI DECRIES BLOODSHED; PEKING OBSCURES DISORDERS

After Soviet media had for a month carefully straddled the fence on the Pakistan domestic crisis, counterposing West Pakistan reports of "normalcy" to Western news agency reports of fighting and deaths, Moscow took an official position in a 3 April message from President Podgorny to President Yahya Khan expressing the Soviet people's concern at the "continuation of repressive measures and bloodshed" in East Pakistan and appealing to Yahya for "a peaceful political settlement." On the same day, Peking came out with its first, belated acknowledgment of the existence of a troubled situation in Pakistan, citing a Yahya speech mentioning "secessionist elements" who had attacked the country's "integrity" but nowhere specifying that there had been bloodshed or even disorders.

Sino-Soviet politicking in the troubled waters of Indian-Pakistani relations seemed an element in the reactions from both Moscow and Peking. Soviet media have publicized warm Indian approval of the Podgorny message. The thrust of Peking's sole report is that Indian interference and "subversion" are to blame for exacerbating the Pakistan crisis.

**PODGORNYI MESSAGE** Podgorny's message to Yahya, carried by TASS on the 3d and broadcast widely in foreign beams, registered concern over "the numerous casualties, sufferings, and privations" being caused in East Pakistan by the use of armed force, with caveats contrived to ward off any charges that the Soviet Union was meddling in Pakistan's internal affairs. Podgorny said his words were coming from "true friends" and were "guided by the generally recognized humanitarian principles recorded in the universal declaration of human rights," by concern for the welfare of "the friendly people of Pakistan," and by a belief that a "peaceful political settlement" would meet the interests "of the entire people of Pakistan" and of "preserving peace in the area." He expressed the Soviet Union's "great alarm" at the breakdown of the Dacca talks between Yahya and East Pakistan leader Mujibur Rahman and at the use of "repressive measures and bloodshed" by Yahya's military administration; and he called for "urgent measures" to stop the bloodshed and repression and to return to methods of a peaceful political settlement.

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The message carefully skirted acknowledgment of the underlying issue of East Pakistani secessionist aspirations and retained elements of balance--and future options, depending on events--in the Soviet position. Thus the call for a political settlement in the interests of "the entire Pakistani people" was balanced by recognition, in a passage deploring the "arrests and persecution" of Mujibur Rahman and other East Pakistan politicians, that they had received "convincing support from the overwhelming majority of the population of East Pakistan in the recent general elections."

The break in Moscow's stance of aloofness was foreshadowed by a TRUD article, broadcast in English to South Asia and in Bengali, the day before the message was released. Relying heavily on "alarming" Western news reports of "bloody clashes" in East Pakistan, TRUD asserted that the Soviet public was "worried by the cruel measures being taken against the East Pakistani population." Anticipating the approach taken in the message, it noted that Mujibur's "influential" Awami League had received 167 of the 314 seats in the assembly and contended that "force and repression will not help solve the problems facing the country," which can only be settled "by political means."

Podgorny's message appears to have been publicized in part with an eye toward the Indian position on the East Pakistan situation. Moscow's domestic service reported on the 5th that the message had been "greeted in India with great approval" and that the Indian central press had stressed that the Soviet Union "is the only big power which has called for a cessation of the fratricidal conflict." Monitored Moscow media have not reported any Pakistani reaction to the Podgorny message.

**EARLIER COVERAGE  
IN MOSCOW MEDIA** Following Yahya Khan's 1 March speech announcing postponement of the convocation of the newly elected National Assembly, originally slated for 3 March, Soviet media limited their coverage of the ensuing Pakistan domestic crisis to brief, scattered factual reports on such developments as the strike initiated by the Awami League and the Mujibur-Yahya talks in Dacca. Soviet comment on the 23 March anniversary of Pakistan's independence contained no substantive discussion of the crisis; one TASS commentary on the 22d merely noted that talks were being held in Dacca "on the future constitutional system of the country."

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After the breakdown of the Dacca talks and the outbreak of warfare in East Pakistan on 26 March, Moscow duly reported Yahya's speech reasserting military control over East Pakistan, prohibiting biting all political activities, and accusing Mujibur of treason. Subsequently Moscow cited "conflicting reports" of the situation, balancing official West Pakistan reports of "normalcy" and "full control" in East Pakistan with Western news agency reports of "fierce fighting" and bloody repression of East Pakistanis by the West Pakistan military forces.

PEKING Peking media have not acknowledged the existence of civil war in East Pakistan, and Chou En-lai's 22 March message to Yahya on Pakistan National Day made no allusion to any untoward situation in Pakistan. Peking's first and to date only mention of East Pakistani events was in a 3 April NCNA report, based on both Pakistani and Indian as well as Western sources, of three Pakistan Government notes to the Indian Government on alleged Indian interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. NCNA quoted passages from Yahya's 26 March speech referring to the "grave situation" in the country, to the "very serious turn" of recent events in East Pakistan, and to "anti-Pakistan and secessionist elements" who have "attacked the solidarity and integrity of this country."

NCNA used selected quotations from Western and Indian news agency reports of Indian comment to depict active Indian interference in East Pakistan. For example, it cited a 31 March PTI report that Indira Gandhi had tabled a resolution in Parliament stating that India "cannot remain indifferent" to the East Pakistani situation and calling on governments of the world to take steps--as NCNA put it--"to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan." NCNA noted that the Indian Government "is also reported to be encouraging Indian nationals to intrude into Pakistan territory for subversive purposes."

In thus limiting its reaction to an account focused on alleged Indian interference, Peking has expressed support for the Pakistan Government in the international community while refraining from comment on the internal conflict. The NCNA report took note of reported Indian efforts to enlist support from the United States and the Soviet Union and within the United Nations in behalf of common steps regarding the East Pakistan situation. By attacking outside interference, Peking has updated its line of support for Pakistan in the context of South Asian affairs.

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Apart from quoting Yahya's reference to secessionist elements, PRC media have not identified the contending parties or issues in the internal dispute. There was no Chinese report on the postponement of the National Assembly or on any of the events leading up to the outbreak of the civil war.

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### NEW PARTY COMMITTEES ANNOUNCED FOR HUPEH AND FUKIEN

Quickening the pace, NCNA reported the formation of a new party committee for Hupeh on 31 March and one for Fukien on 6 April. Six such announcements were made during March compared with two in February, four in January, and four last December. Seventeen of the PRC's 29 major administrative units now claim new provincial committees.

With the formation of new committees for Hupeh and Fukien, the Wuhan Military Region (MR) and the Foochoo MR become the third and fourth military regions to set up committees for all provincial units within their jurisdiction. The Nanking MR, led by Politburo members Hsu Shih-yu and Chou Chun-chiao, reached this stage in January, followed by the Canton MR, Huang Yung-sheng's old stronghold, in late February.

**HUPEH COMMITTEE** The Hupeh committee was formed at a party congress meeting in Wuhan from 23 to 28 March. Officers from the Wuhan MR dominate the seven-man leadership group which heads the new committee of 80 full and 23 alternate members.

The top two positions on the committee went to military men who moved into the Hupeh power structure after the Wuhan Incident of July 1967. Tseng Ssu-yu, the new first secretary, moved from K's chief of staff post in the Shenyang MR to replace Chen Tsai-tao in July 1967 as commander of the Wuhan MR, a position he continues to hold. Tseng is also chairman of the revolutionary committee. Liu Feng, named second secretary on the new committee, has been based in Hupeh since 1958. Identified only as an air force officer for several years, Liu was promoted to his concurrent post of first political commissar of the Wuhan MR just after the Wuhan Incident. Liu is also a vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee.

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Of the five men named as secretaries, all but one have a formal connection with the military power structure in Hupeh. Chang Ti-hsueh is also first political commissar of the Hupeh Military District and holds a concurrent vice-chairmanship. Prior to the cultural revolution, Chang was the provincial governor and acting first secretary of the old provincial party committee. Kung Ching-teh is also deputy commander of the Wuhan MR while both Pan Chen-wu and Chang Yu-hua are deputy political commissars within the MR. Chiang Yi, a former secretary on the previous party committee and a standing committee member on the provincial revolutionary committee, is the only new secretary without a concurrent link to the military apparatus in Hupeh.

Tseng's keynote address to the congress gave more attention than usual to the "armymen" in the province whom he portrayed as responsible for the "excellent situation in revolution and production" within Hupeh. While members of the PLA were applauded for success in carrying out their civilian tasks, "leading cadres at all levels," were asked to increase their study of Mao's Thought in order to strengthen the centralized leadership of the party.

A joint HUPEH DAILY-YANGTZE DAILY editorial, broadcast by Wuhan radio on 1 April, welcomed the new committee but cautioned that we "must not think that everything will be all right once the CCP committee has been set up." The party's leadership should be strengthened, the editorial argued, by paying increased attention to the "building of leading groups" and by "unfolding a self-education movement" aimed at arrogance and complacency among party members.

**FUKIEN COMMITTEE** The Fukien committee was selected at a party congress attended by 977 delegates meeting in Foochow from 30 March to 3 April. A seven-man leadership group, composed of four military men and three civilians, heads the new committee consisting of 75 full and 18 alternate members.

The top spot on the committee went to Han Hsien-chu, chairman of the revolutionary committee and commander of the Foochow MR, who was named first secretary. Chou Chih-ping, a full

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Central Committee member and a former vice-minister of metallurgy identified as a responsible person within Fukien military units in April 1970, was named second secretary.\*

Five secretaries were named. Chu Shao-ching is a responsible person with the Fukien PLA units. Ni Nan-shan, making his first Fukien public appearance, has apparently been transferred from Kiangsi where he was listed as a responsible person with local PLA units. Three vice-chairmen, Huang Ya-kuang, Cho Hsiung, and Tan Chi-lung, were named as secretaries. Huang was affiliated with the People's Bank of China until the early '60's, after which he returned to his native Fukien. Cho is a newcomer to Fukien, first appearing in February 1970. Tan, also new to Fukien, first appeared in the province in October 1970 and was later identified as a vice-chairman. Prior to the cultural revolution, Tan was the first secretary of the Shantung committee. He failed to appear publicly during the cultural revolution but emerged at the Ninth Party Congress as an alternate member of the Central Committee.

Han made the usual address to the congress, routinely calling for greater unity and avoidance of interference from either "right" or "left" in carrying out future tasks. Echoing themes also contained in the keynote speeches of first secretaries in the other border provinces with new committees, Han called for strengthening militia work within Fukien-- "the Southeastern gate"--in order to prepare for war and "contribute to the liberation of Taiwan province."

PROGRESS            A party committee for Shantung appears in the  
ELSEWHERE            offing. On 1 April Tsinan radio claimed  
                                success in rebuilding "most" of the basic-level  
party units and establishing party committees for "nearly  
half" of the counties and municipalities within the province.  
Similar sweeping claims were made earlier this year by  
several provinces just before their new committees were  
announced.

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\* Four of the last five provincial-level party committees to be announced have named a second as well as a first secretary. In the case of the first 12 such committees to be established, only two--Shanghai and Liaoning--utilized this bureaucratic device.

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Shantung, the only East China province that has not yet formed its party committee, was a revolutionary vanguard during the cultural revolution under its chief Wang Hsiao-yu. Wang's relationship with some PLA leaders was unsatisfactory, however, and shortly after being elected to the Ninth Central Committee he dropped from public view. His last public appearance was on 1 October National Day in 1969, and even that appearance came after an absence of several months following early May post-congress appearances in Peking. In the interim no acting chairman has been named for Shantung.

The recent reemergence of Hsieh Fu-chih as Peking chief indicates that Wang cannot be counted out. Should he reappear as first secretary it would not necessarily indicate a radical resurgence over the PLA, however. For whatever reason, whether from weakness or strength, Peking seems to attach considerable importance to retaining revolutionary committee chairmen as provincial party chiefs and has done so in all 17 instances to date.

The formation of new lower-level committees continues throughout China. Most notable of those formed during the past week is the Urumchi Municipal CCP Committee; Sinkiang Chairman Lung Shu-chin was identified as leader of the regional core group when he addressed the municipal congress. Sinkiang clearly leads Inner Mongolia and Tibet as the most likely autonomous region to next form a party committee; Kwangsi formed its committee in February.

#### PEKING NAMES CHI PENG-FEI ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER

NCNA's identification of Chi Peng-fei as PRC acting foreign minister in its report on the 1 April signing of a PRC-Mauritanian economic agreement is the first confirmation in Peking media that Chi holds that title. Moscow had called Chi the acting foreign minister in its 23 March report on a meeting between Chou En-lai and Soviet representatives in Peking.

There is a precedent for Peking's identification of an acting minister during the ongoing rebuilding of the State Council: Lin Hai-yun as acting minister of foreign trade, in 1970. However, Lin was not destined to acquire full title to the position. Late last year, Peking reported that Pai Hsiang-kuo had become foreign trade minister.

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