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31 MARCH 1971

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

31 MARCH 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 13)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 22 - 28 MARCH 1971

<u>Moscow (2898 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1626 items)</u>		
CPSU 24th Congress	(39%)	32%	Indochina	(29%)	52%
Indochina	(13%)	13%	[FUNK 1st Anni-	(3%)	15%]
[Solidarity Week	(7%)	3%]	versary		
Middle East	(3%)	3%	[Le Duan, Other	(--)	14%]
China	(3%)	3%	Indochinese		
Zionism & Soviet Jews	(1%)	2%	Delegations		
Luna 17 & Lunakhod	(2%)	1%	Domestic Issues	(45%)	18%
Czechoslovak CP Theses,	(--)	1%	Paris Commune Centenary	(15%)	12%
50th Anniversary			Table Tennis World	(0.5%)	7%
			Championship		
			Romanian Government	(3%)	5%
			Delegation in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi comment in the wake of the South Vietnamese withdrawal from Laos claims that it was a decisive, "total" victory with strategic as well as tactical implications. Propagandists claim that all allied objectives in the operation were thwarted and that President Nixon's Vietnamization policy has been dealt a "mortal blow." Alleged allied losses in men and materiel are documented in a 24 March communique from the "Laotian People's Liberation Army" which says that 15,400 troops were "put out of action."

Continued condemnation of the concentrated U.S. air strikes against the DRV on 21-22 March includes a "special communique" from the DRV War Crimes Commission, released on the 26th, which stressed that "no threats, no war acts" can shake the Vietnamese people's determination to fight and win. Vietnamese communist media carried the statements by the DRV and PRG delegations in Paris boycotting the 25 March session of the talks, but there has been no acknowledgment of the U.S. and GVN retaliatory suggestion that the 1 April session be postponed until the 8th.

Peking's jubilation over the "brilliant" victories in Indochina, particularly the "rout" of allied forces in southern Laos, is expressed in a congratulatory message and a "victory" banquet during First Secretary Le Duan's stopover enroute to the CPSU congress. Peking's willingness to mute Sino-Soviet differences in an Indochina context was reflected in NCNA's report that the Indochinese delegations had left for Moscow. NCNA's announcement on Le Duan's arrival in Peking in May 1970 failed to acknowledge that he was returning from the Lenin centennial celebrations in Moscow.

Soviet support for a political settlement in Vietnam, based on DRV and PRG proposals, was reaffirmed in Brezhnev's 30 March report to the 24th CPSU Congress. He made no mention of the Laos operation in referring to "continuing" U.S. aggression against the peoples of Indochina, but routine Moscow propaganda pictures the operation as having demonstrated the failure of the Vietnamization policy.

### COMMUNISTS ASSESS "VICTORY" IN LAOS AS TURNING POINT IN WAR

In the wake of the "decisive" battle on 20 March in the Ban Dong area and the South Vietnamese withdrawal from Laos, Hanoi propaganda assesses the communist "victory." A particularly detailed

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analysis appears in an article on the 22d in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN by military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant).<sup>\*</sup> Official statistics on the communist "victory" are released in a communique of the Laotian People's Liberation Army (LPLA) Supreme Command on the 24th and welcomed with further authoritative Hanoi comment in a NHAN DAN editorial on the 25th. Feats in Laos are also praised in a message from DRV President Ton Duc Thang on the 25th. Other comment includes an article by "Quyét Thang"<sup>\*\*</sup> (Determined to Win), broadcast on 28 March and published in the March issue of the monthly QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine.

Uniformly, communist comment exultantly claims that the communist campaign in Laos against Operation Lam Son 719 achieved total victory, completely thwarted allied objectives, destroyed a major portion of allied troops and equipment, and defeated basic U.S. tactics. In arguing that allied objectives were not achieved, propagandists specify that the Laos operation, among other things, was aimed at cutting supply routes, preventing major offensives by the South Vietnamese and Cambodian insurgents, breaking down the "resistance" of the three Indochinese peoples, demonstrating the feasibility of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine, and assuring the reelections of President Thieu and President Nixon.

Hanoi press comment on the campaign holds that it was a major turning point in the war marking the inevitable defeat of Vietnamization and shifting the balance of forces on the battlefield. This comment also suggests that the communists actually sought the confrontation between main forces units in Laos, in a departure from the tactics they had followed in the past two years.

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\* Chien Binh earlier commented on the Laos incursion in the 26 February and 4 March issues of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. See the 10 March TRENDS, pages 10-11.

\*\* Quyét Thang is a military commentator whose articles have frequently appeared in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine. However, the last article known to have been attributed to him--on allied strategy in South Vietnam--was published in the January 1971 HOC TAP.

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LPLA COMMUNIQUE  
ON ALLIED LOSSES

The LPLA comm unique on Operation Lam Son 719 claiming "total victory" in this "historic campaign" was released at a press conference in Hanoi on the 24th. Hanoi radio remained on the air throughout that night and rebroadcast the communique along with battle reports. And it was featured in special "two-color" issues of the Hanoi press on the 25th. The communique says that the allies lost "an important part" of their armed forces and war materials including 15,400 troops put out of action, 200 of them Americans, and 1,000 others captured,\* "many" of them officers. The communists also claim to have destroyed or captured 496 aircraft (mostly helicopters), destroyed or captured 586 military vehicles (including 318 tanks and armored cars), destroyed or captured 144 heavy artillery pieces, more than 5,000 weapons of various kinds, a large quantity of important documents, and military equipment.

Elaborating on the communique's statistics on allied losses, the NHAN DAN editorial on the 25th stated that "more than four-fifths" of the troops sent into Laos were "exterminated," nearly all the military vehicles and artillery pieces lost, and most of the brigade- or regiment-size units "annihilated or heavily decimated." The editorial also claimed that the number of helicopters destroyed in southern Laos was nearly equal to the amount of aircraft mobilized when the operation first began and surpassed half the total number of aircraft "mobilized when the requirement was at its apex."

The matter of communist losses in the Laos campaign is predictably ignored in the propaganda, but the Chien Binh article on the 22d notes that one of the allied objectives was to "attract and exterminate" the adversary's troops. Elaborating, a 29 March Pathet Lao radio commentary charges that the allies "hoped to deceive the invincible strategic forces of the Indochinese countries into gathering on the Highway 9 battlefield so that they could use their air forces to put them out of action."

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\* Continuing to exploit ARVN prisoners captured in Laos, the communists on 28 March publicize a press conference the previous day, "near the Laos-Vietnam border," featuring ARVN prisoners, including Col. Nguyen Van Tho, commander of Saigon's 3d Airborne Brigade. Communist media had broadcast earlier statements attributed to Tho and had ridiculed Saigon claims that he had not been captured.

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SIGNIFICANCE OF "VICTORY,"  
IMPACT ON VIETNAMIZATION

The Chien Binh article is ebullient in its claims that the "defeat" of Operation Lam Son 719 marks a turning point in the war. It maintains that "it is obvious that Nixon has sustained a total defeat in a decisive strategic battle" and declares that the allies have "entered a new phase of decline." Chien Binh goes so far as to claim at one point that the allied "defeat" in Laos is "a strong blow to the Nixon clique's aggressive will." Later he adds that there will be "great catastrophes" in the days ahead and, thus, "no matter how stubborn Nixon may be, he cannot refuse to change his strategy in Vietnam and Indochina."

Chien Binh declares bluntly that the fundamental allied tactics vital to Vietnamization, went bankrupt in Laos, and that the most seasoned South Vietnamese units were routed. Deriding President Nixon for losing forces which he had carefully built up during his term in office, Chien Binh remarks: "Nixon has picked up two years' worth of firewood and burned it in one hour." He maintains that the Saigon army "will never be able to get back on its feet after receiving this mortal blow."

Both the Chien Binh article and the article in the March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine by Quyet Thang go on, after stressing the impact of the Laos operation on Vietnamization, to point out that the South Vietnamese army will be further strained by the inevitable withdrawal of more U.S. troops. Chien Binh remarks that the U.S. Administration, following the defeat of the Vietnamization program in Laos, is now haunted by the question of what will happen when the South Vietnamese have to fight alone.

Chien Binh's claims for the importance of the Laos campaign are echoed in the 25 March NHAN DAN editorial which says that the "victory" on Highway 9 is a "major milestone in the history of the coordinated fight by the Indochinese peoples." In a possible deliberate mocking of the language of President Thieu's 8 February announcement of the campaign which noted it was "limited in time and space," the paper adds that the "tremendous" campaign has an importance which goes beyond the "operation's limits in time and space." According to the editorial: "The U.S. aggressors intended to launch a decisive battle and a test of strength with the Indochinese revolutionary forces. Their plan was accepted and they were overwhelmingly crushed in this fierce test of strength."

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The editorial also claims that the Laos operation has demonstrated that the Vietnamization of the war "is doomed to woeful defeat." Chiding Nixon for not "learning from the defeats of his predecessors," it lists his three "strategic errors" as the Vietnamization "scheme" and Nixon Doctrine, the incursion into Cambodia, and the "military adventure" on Highway 9. This "new error," according to the editorial, "will lead the aggressors to many unforeseen consequences."

COMMUNIST STRATEGY Propaganda on the Laos campaign not only predictably praises the communist forces' leadership in "defeating" the allies but also suggests that communists held the initiative and planned the confrontation in Laos. Typical of other comment, the LPLA communique claims that the communist "victory" was a victory for their political and military line, "talented strategic and operational leadership," and "superior military art." Like earlier comment on the 20 March battle in the Ban Dong area, it holds that the allied "defeat" came about according to careful plans. Chien Binh also suggests this when he observes that "the U.S.-puppet officers have come to realize that the troop movement toward Ban Dong was not a success but a quick fall into the enemy trap." The 25 March NHAN DAN editorial claims that the "liberation" forces "maintained their initiative from the start to the end" and "carried out with great precision the strategic design" of blocking the allies at Ban Dong to prevent them from entering Tchepone and then dealing them "decisive blows" in Ban Dong.

The suggestion that the communists trapped the allies into a "defeat" in Laos lends new significance to a unique argument for such major engagements voiced in Vietnamese propaganda last December. An article by PRG Defense Minister and PLAF Commander Tran Nam Trung differed from other propaganda in the previous two years by stressing the importance of "big-unit" fighting in people's war.\* Tran Nam Trung appeared to be arguing for an abandonment of conservative communist tactics and for a return to more action by main force units. He maintained that the stepping up of big-unit actions is "required in the development of the all-people and comprehensive people's war in order to

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\* The Tran Nam Trung article was first carried by Front media on 10 December and by Hanoi media on the 16th; it was discussed in the 30 December 1970 TRENDS, pages S 1-3.

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smash the U.S. imperialists' stubborn plots and to crush their aggressive will." Trung did not limit his attention only to South Vietnam and even suggested the possibility of a military move elsewhere when he stated that the "coordinated offensives" in Indochina have "created new offensive forces, new territories for offensives, and new abilities for large-scale offensives."

Trung's call for big-unit engagements was not repeated in subsequent Vietnamese communist propaganda, but there was other evidence last year that Hanoi was seeking a new strategy in the war and it is possible that the DRV leaders decided, in accordance with Trung's argument, to accept a major confrontation with the allies if circumstances were deemed favorable.

#### PEKING BANQUET, MAO MESSAGE CELEBRATE INDOCHINA VICTORIES

Peking's confident assessment of military developments in Indochina, particularly the "rout" of allied forces in southern Laos, evolved this week into jubilant celebration of the "brilliant victories" throughout Indochina. This mood of jubilation and the complementary belief that victory in "the campaign of Highway 9" is an event of "great strategic importance to the overall situation" in Indochina were expressed in speeches at a "grand victory banquet" in Peking on 26 March and by a message of congratulations on the 29th from Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai to the communist leaders in Indochina.

**CHINESE MESSAGE** In the message--addressed to the leaders of the Laotian Patriotic Front, the National United Front of Cambodia, the South Vietnam National Liberation Front and the PRG, and the DRV--Mao, Lin, and Chou extend "warmest congratulations" to the "three fraternal peoples of Indochina" on their recent battlefield performance, taking particular note of the "splendid battle of annihilation" in the "campaign of Highway 9." Characterizing the victory as one of "great strategic importance" which puts "the Nixon Government in a more difficult position and makes things tougher for it," the message contends that "the present situation in Indochina is unprecedentedly fine" and that the three Indochinese peoples "will certainly overcome all difficulties and win complete victory" by persisting in people's war.

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VICTORY BANQUET      Ebullient victory speeches by Chou En-lai, Le Duan, the Laotian Patriotic Front's Kaysone Phomvihane, the NFLSV's Nguyen Van Hieu, and Sihanouk marked the banquet celebrating the "tidings of victory" that are "pouring in from the front of resistance against U.S. aggression in Indochina." With particular emphasis on the "splendidly fought" battles along Highway 9, the banquet speakers claimed that a turning point in the Indochinese struggle had been reached--Chou called it a victory of "great strategic importance" creating a "new situation on the entire battlefield in Indochina"--proving that people's war can defeat "so-called air superiority" and that by coordinating closely with each other the forces of the three peoples of Indochina can bring about "a thorough defeat of the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs."

In his speech Chou elaborated on Peking's earlier predictions that in the face of the Laotian reversal the United States might resort to new measures such as intensified bombing of North Vietnam. Noting the recent bombings and suggesting that the Nixon Administration "is even preparing new military adventures," Chou added a new warning that during the dry season next winter and spring it "will embark on still greater war adventures in a last desperate struggle for Nixon's campaign for the next presidential elections." But, Chou contended, the United States cannot save itself from its "doomed defeat" regardless of the "military adventures" to which it resorts. In his banquet speech, Le Duan did not raise the issue of new U.S. military adventures or intensified bombing of the north.

The speakers stressed the united front of the three Indochinese peoples and the coordination of the various liberation forces--in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam--but placed particular emphasis on the "strategic victory" of the "campaign of Highway 9," generally depicting the forced withdrawal of the Saigon forces as a "rout" in order to avoid complete "annihilation." Kaysone Phomvihane alleged that the Nixon Administration undertook the Laotian operation "in order to save itself from its defeat," and Nguyen Van Hieu contended that the purpose of the invasion was to "obstruct the mutual support and assistance between the three Indochinese peoples, destroy the Laotian people's base areas for resistance, embellish the South Vietnamese puppet forces, and trumpet the so-called victory of the 'Nixon Doctrine.'" The speakers all agreed that the "campaign of Highway 9" spelled doom for the Nixon Doctrine and the Vietnamization policy.

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Although all contended that the Laotian incursion was a major disaster for the United States, only Sihanouk went so far as to call it "comparable to the unforgettable and highly historic victory of Dien Bien Phu."

**ASIAN UNITY** In addition to celebrating military victories, the banquet also served as an occasion for welcoming the three Indochinese delegations en route to Moscow for the CPSU congress. Though the DPRK was represented by no one higher than its ambassador, Peking turned the occasion into a show of Asian communist unity under its auspices, thereby flaunting a theme which had emerged following last spring's Indochina summit meeting and Chou's visit to Pyongyang. Chou declared at the banquet that the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Korea, and China have "a glorious tradition of unity against imperialism" and are now "all confronted with the aggression and threats by U.S. imperialism and its lackeys."

While demonstrating its enhanced role in Asian communist affairs in the past year, Peking's treatment of the delegations' stopover also reflected its willingness to mute the Sino-Soviet rivalry in an Indochina context. NCNA's reports on the arrival and departure of the delegations mention the presence of Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov, and the report on their departure notes that they left for Moscow. NCNA's announcement on the arrival of Le Duan in Peking on 10 May 1970 did not acknowledge that he was returning from Moscow, where he attended the Lenin centennial celebrations, but there is a precedent for Peking's acknowledgment that a Vietnamese delegation passing through the PRC also had Moscow on its itinerary: NCNA on 21 October 1969 reported that Pham Van Dong had arrived in Peking after visiting the Soviet Union and the GDR. During his visit Dong, in a speech in Peking duly reported by the Chinese, expressed good wishes for the Sino-Soviet talks which had just opened.

**OTHER PEKING COMMENT** A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 28 March, entitled "Warm Congratulations on the Spectacular Victory on Highway 9," claimed that the results of the southern Laos operation represented "not only a tactical but also a strategic defeat" that "will surely affect the whole Indochinese battlefield in an overall situation." The editorial supported this contention on the ground that the ARVN has been greatly weakened, thus helping to "accelerate the bankruptcy" of Vietnamization and the Nixon doctrine.

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As in Chou's banquet speech, the editorial addresses itself to U.S. presidential politics as a factor in future developments. Claiming that the Highway 9 campaign has "aggravated the political crisis" of the Nixon Administration, the editorial notes that the President staked his political future on the southern Laos operation, hoping to win "an easy victory so as to gain political capital" for the next presidential election. Quoting the President as admitting that he faced a credibility gap, the editorial said this means more bitter opposition to his policy from the American people and "new quarrels and strife" among U.S. political leaders. An NCNA commentary on the 25th took particular note of the President's television interview on the 22d, observing that he "once again resorted to the trick of lying in a vain attempt to cover up defeats, disclaim his criminal responsibility, and continue to deceive the American people."

Another NCNA commentary, on 27 March, was somewhat more specific in spelling out the Laotian operation's aim of disrupting communist supply routes than was the 23 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. Whereas the earlier article attributed the incursion to a desire to "occupy southern Laos, cut off the close ties among the peoples of the three Indochinese countries, and avert their defeat in Indochina," the commentary on the 27th notes allied claims that they would occupy Tchepone, a "strategic point in lower Laos," and asserts that "they even tried to set up a blockade line in the panhandle of lower Laos so as to sever the close contacts among the three Indochinese peoples."

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**BREZHNEV IGNORES LAOS OPERATION, MOSCOW SAYS ALLIES "FAILED"**

Brezhnev in his 30 March report to the 24th CPSU Congress discussed Indochina only briefly and in general terms. Thus, he did not mention the operation in Laos in scoring U.S. spread of the war to all the Indochina countries and its Vietnamization policy.\* In standard terms, he asserted that the Vietnamese resolve to become masters of their own country cannot be broken by "direct military intervention," by "sabotaging negotiations," or by "wide employment of mercenaries." He reiterated that the only way to solve the Vietnam problem is on the basis of the DRV and PRG proposals which the USSR "firmly supports." Brezhnev reaffirmed Soviet "support" for the struggle of "people of Vietnam and other countries of Indochina against the imperialist interventionists," and to "fraternal support" of the DRV in both the "armed struggle" and in "peaceful work."

Moscow's postmortems on the Laos operation echo Vietnamese communist propaganda in continuing to count it as a failure of the Vietnamization policy. Foreign-language commentaries by Aleksey Leontyev on 27 and 28 March, for example, say that Vietnamization cannot "supersede negotiations, but will only bring about new adventures similar to the one attempted in Laos, which can only prolong the war and will never settle any problem."

Much of the comment centers on the growing "crisis of confidence" in the United States in the wake of the Laotian "failure" and efforts by U.S. spokesmen, including the President in his 22 March TV interview, to present the operation as a victory for the GVN troops. Some comment, including a 26 March PRAVDA article by Strelnikov, asserts that Defense Secretary Laird, in his remarks of the 24th to reporters after a hearing on Capitol Hill, finally "publicly acknowledged that the

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\* Brezhnev has made no substantial statement on foreign policy since November 1970, and it has been left to Kosygin, in a 10 February speech, and the 25 February Soviet Government statement to denounce the Laotian incursion.

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interventionist troops 'have left Laos because of the extreme, violent reaction of the enemy.'" Strelnikov notes that the "catastrophic failure" of the intervention "aroused a storm of critical remarks and caustic commentaries" in the United States aimed at the Pentagon and White House.

TASS on the 26th says that "those senators and congressmen who repeatedly spoke against the senseless course of aggression in Indochina received convincing proof that their warnings and misgivings had been justified." Another TASS item the same day, commenting in a similar vein, says that official Washington claims that the GVN staged an "orderly retreat" after accomplishing its mission are "ridiculed by all except the most loyal of Pentagon apologists." Concluding that the growing lack of confidence in Administration utterances is yet another symptom of the desire "shared by a clear majority of the American people for a prompt liquidation of the slaughter in Southeast Asia," TASS notes that this is manifested in the Democratic Party Policy Council's approval of a resolution urging Congress to cut off all funds for American operations in Indochina after 31 December.

An IZVESTIYA article by Sagatelyan on the 28th is the only known propaganda to repeat the warning in the 25 February Soviet Government statement on the Laos operation that U.S. actions in Indochina "cannot but affect Soviet-American relations." The IZVESTIYA commentator quotes from a Jack Anderson column in the Washington POST to demonstrate military pressure on President Nixon to take such extreme actions as bombing and mining Haiphong harbor, an action which, Anderson noted, would create a threat to Soviet ships.\* IZVESTIYA quotes the London DAILY MIRROR as saying that the President must not allow his generals to convince him that one more "military adventure" will bring a decisive success, and that the "defeat" in Laos shows that the sooner the Americans withdraw the better. IZVESTIYA concludes that undoubtedly the realism of the British editorial was evoked by the Soviet Government statement's warning of an adverse effect on Soviet-American relations.

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\* The issue of mining Haiphong harbor has of course rarely been broached since the October 1968 bombing halt. However, in April 1969 an atypical routine-level domestic service commentary cited the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT as reporting that President Nixon's military advisers recommended the resumption of the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.

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Some other Moscow comment continues to charge that the Americans want to "avenge" their defeats in Laos by bombing the DRV, and there are low-level references to the possibility of expanded aggression against the DRV. A foreign-language commentary by Soltan on 25 March, for example, reiterates that in Saigon and Washington "one hears threats of open invasion of the territory" of the DRV. Soltan warns that the Americans must not assume that the Indochinese countries cannot stage any serious resistance, going on to point to Soviet aid to Vietnam. From 25 to 27 March Moscow media report low level meetings held in various parts of the Soviet Union protesting the 21-22 March air raids on the DRV and expressing approval of the Soviet Government's policy of aiding Vietnam.

#### DRV, PRG SCORE U.S. "ACTS OF WAR," "THREATS" AGAINST NORTH

In the wake of the 21-22 March U.S. strikes against the DRV, Hanoi and the Front continue to warn of U.S. "adventures" against the DRV, albeit with less frequency than in recent weeks. Vietnamese communist media have not carried Xuan Thuy's remarks to this effect in a speech in Paris commemorating the first anniversary of Sihanouk's Front. But such warnings do appear in the 24 March DRV War Crimes Commission "special communique"--publicized on the 26th--which documents "the most recent war acts" against the DRV, and in a NHAN DAN editorial on the 27th. The war communique says that the North Vietnamese along with their Indochinese allies "are ready to smash all new military adventures" of the United States. The editorial in a now-routine affirmation of heightened vigilance says that "we are determined to destroy all U.S.-puppet forces that dare to encroach upon the North either from the air, the sea, or land." Xuan Thuy had used a similar formulation in his speech. (In the wake of the operation into Laos, Hanoi had stressed the buildup of allied forces near the DMZ and increased U.S. naval activity in the Tonkin Gulf, as well as air "provocations" against the DRV.)

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Le Duan speaking at the 26 March banquet in Peking did not raise the question of a threat to the DRV, although Chou En-lai speaking on the same occasion did so. Le Duan after hailing the "strategic victory" of the communist forces in Laos stopped with the assertion that "no matter what schemes and maneuvers the U.S. imperialists may resort to" the Vietnamese people are determined to "strictly continue and to step up their struggle against the U.S. aggression until total victory."

PROTEST OF Hanoi on 31 March issues its first DRV Foreign  
DMZ STRIKES Ministry spokesman's statement--protesting U.S.  
actions against the demilitarized zone and  
Quang Binh Province--since the 22 March Foreign Ministry state-  
ment scoring the concentrated 21-22 March U.S. strikes against  
the DRV. The statement protests action on the 29th and 30th,  
and the strikes on the 30th are apparently those which U.S.  
spokesmen described as being in response to the DRV's moving of  
artillery into the northern part of the DMZ. But, Hanoi, of  
course, handles them as part of what it claims is continuous  
bombing of the DMZ. Since the first of this year, Hanoi had  
issued 19 foreign ministry spokesman's protests scoring U.S.  
actions against North Vietnam of which 12 have accused the  
United States of bombing and artillery action in the northern  
part of the demilitarized zone, territory which Hanoi claims  
belongs to the DRV.

The current protest, similar to the 12 others this year cryptically charges that on the 29th and 30th, U.S. aircraft "repeatedly dropped demolition and steel pellet bombs over Huong Lap village and launched artillery attacks from positions south of the demilitarized zone against many villages situated north of the 17th parallel inside the DMZ." It emphasized that "these villages belong to the territory of the DRV."

The protest also charged that on the 28th, U.S. planes "bombed and strafed a certain number of localities of Quang Binh Province." In routine fashion, the protest "strongly denounced and sternly condemned the above acts of war" and demanded an immediate end to all actions violating the DRV's sovereignty and security.

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## LUANG PRABANG INCIDENT NOTED, LAO PRINCES' CONTACTS CONTINUE

The 21-22 March firing of rockets at Luang Prabang airfield by the "armed forces and people of Luang Prabang Province" was belatedly mentioned in a brief Pathet Lao radio report on the 25th, subsequently also carried by VNA and LPA. Communist media have offered no followup comment, and have also predictably ignored another demarche on the incident by Khamphan Panya, the Prime Minister's representative, with the British and Soviet ambassadors. On 25 March the Vientiane domestic service reported that Khamphan Panya had informed the ambassadors of a Souvanna Phouma message to the two governments concerning the "serious matter" of the attack on the airport and requesting that the governments "take urgent measures as stated in the Geneva agreements." Communist media had similarly failed to report Khamphan Panya's earlier 22 March request that the two ambassadors notify their governments of the extreme seriousness of the Luang Prabang incident so the latter could take action in accordance with the Geneva agreements.

A Hanoi domestic service commentary on 30 March did, however, display sensitivity over an interview Souvanna Phouma gave to AFP on the 25th in which he said that the only explanation for the attack on the airport was a North Vietnamese desire "to control Luang Prabang and possibly seize King Savang Vatthana." The Hanoi commentary protested that Souvanna Phouma once again "slandered North Vietnam as being an aggressor in Laos," and "distorted the DRV Government's policy toward the Laotian King," but did not mention the Luang Prabang bombardment. It recalled that the NLHS five-point statement "clearly pointed out that it respects the royal throne," adding that the DRV has always supported the "proper stand" of the NLHS.

**CONTACTS BETWEEN PRINCES** In his AFP interview, Souvanna Phouma revealed that he had received a message from Souphanouvong rejecting his previously unpublicized proposal that the two princes meet in Luang Prabang without any preconditions, an offer Souvanna said he made on 6 March. According to Souvanna Phouma, Souphanouvong once again demanded cessation of "all bombings" and withdrawal of all Thai and U.S. forces, but again failed to mention the presence of DRV troops.

On 21 January, at a meeting with Souphanouvong's special envoy Tiao Souk Vongsak, Souvanna Phouma had proposed that the long-sought plenipotentiaries' meeting be held in Luang Prabang

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"because agreement could not be reached on the Khang Khay site"--a site which Souvanna had proposed on 25 June. Souvanna sent two subsequent messages to Souphanouvong--on 11 February and 1 March--repeating his proposal that talks be held in Luang Prabang.

On 28 March the Pathet Lao news agency reports that Souphanouvong sent Souvanna Phouma a message in reply to the latter's two messages of 11 February and 1 March. (This is presumably not the same message discussed by Souvanna Phouma in his AFP interview.) The message denounces Souvanna Phouma for "colluding" with Saigon in the military operation in southern Laos and for "ignoring" NLHS "concessions" regarding the plenipotentiaries' meeting in Khang Khay, but it does not explicitly reject the notion of a meeting in Luang Prabang. It repeats demands that the United States "cease its bombing of Laotian territory" and withdraw all U.S., Saigon, and Thai troops, asserting that while the troops remain there can be no basis for a peaceful settlement "wherever the meeting between Laotian parties may take place, including Luang Prabang as you proposed."

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## CPSU CONGRESS

## BREZHNEV DELIVERS CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT ON FIRST DAY

The congress convened on 30 March with Brezhnev delivering the Central Committee report to a gathering which included representatives of 101 foreign communist and noncommunist parties. Preceding Brezhnev's report, Podgorny welcomed the foreign party delegations by name, including a roster of nonruling communist parties about the same in number--though not in composition--as that attending the last CPSU congress in 1966. The Chinese and Albanians are absent, as was the case in 1966.

TANYUG on 26 March said the Chinese "were not even invited" to the congress, but the same source on the 29th said the Chinese and Albanian parties "have not replied" to invitations. These parties refused bids to the 23d Congress in 1966. As in 1966, Brezhnev did not note the absence of these two parties in his remarks on CPSU relations with these and other ruling communist parties.

**JAPAN CP** The Japan Communist Party, absent from the 1966 CPSU congress as well as from the Moscow international party conference in 1969, is represented at the present congress by a three-member delegation headed by Tomio Nishizawa, a member of the Presidium. On the eve of the delegation's departure for Moscow, AKAHATA on the 27th carried an interview with Miyamoto in which the JCP chairman based his party's acceptance of the congress invitation on "the Soviet side's essential assurances," in recent bilateral talks, "against interference in our internal affairs and against contacting anti-party elements." He prefaced this statement with the remark that there are still differences between the two parties "on a variety of problems such as, for instance, the Czechoslovak issue and the Kuriles problem, which seem to be in no way ready for immediate reconciliation."

**OTHER ASIAN REPRESENTATION** As in 1966, the Vietnamese Workers Party is represented by First Secretary Le Duan, who repeated his procedure of 5 years ago by stopping in Peking before continuing on to Moscow. This year, NCNA on 27 March reported that Le Duan "left here by air for Moscow" that morning--in contrast to an NCNA report on 27 March 1966 which said the VWP leader had been on a "friendly" visit in Peking but gave no indication that he had continued on to Moscow.

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The North Korean party delegation, which had been headed in 1966 by the aging President and Central Committee Vice Chairman Choe Yong-kon, is headed at the present CPSU congress by KWP Politburo member and secretary Kim Il-sung. As it did in 1966, the Korean delegation evidently went directly to Moscow without visiting Peking.

The NFLSV, represented at a higher level this year than in 1966, is led by Nguyen Van Hieu, identified as a member of the Front Presidium. The NFLSV delegation in 1966 was led by Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh in her capacity at that time as Front Central Committee member.

The Pathet Lao has sent a delegation to the CPSU congress for the first time. The group is headed by a deputy chairman of the NLHS Central Committee, Kaysone Phoumvihane, who has also previously been identified with the clandestine Lao People's Party.

**EUROPEAN RULING PARTIES, CUBA** As at the last CPSU congress, Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies are represented by their party first secretaries. These delegations also include chiefs of state and premiers in all cases except Romania, whose premier, Maurer, is absent--possibly because of his slow recovery from injuries from an automobile accident last year. The Yugoslav party delegation, headed in 1966 by Rankovic--subsequently purged--is headed this year by Todorovic, a member of the Executive Bureau of the Presidential Council of the LCY. The Cuban delegation headed by President Dorticos is higher ranking than in 1966, when it was headed by party Secretary Armando Hart.

**NONRULING CP'S** The sizeable array of first secretaries from nonruling communist parties does not include those from the French and Italian CP's, whose chief delegates are deputy general secretaries Marchais and Berlinguer, respectively. Opening the congress, Podgorny said there were "101 delegations" from "90 countries," but greeted by name only some 72 ruling and nonruling communist parties and 22 "national democratic" parties, with the remainder presumably included in his category of "other parties." In addition to the Japan CP, communist parties named as present at this congress, but not at the 1966 congress, are those of the Dominican Republic, East Pakistan, Puerto Rico, Guyana, the new West German Communist Party (DKP), and the Socialist Unity Party of New Zealand--recognized by Moscow since the last CPSU congress, in place of the pro-Peking New Zealand CP. Identified as present in 1966, but not at the present congress, were the CP's of Iceland, the Netherlands, Morocco, Basutoland, Nepal, and "the Algerian communists."

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## EAST-WEST RELATIONS: STRESS ON SOVIET ROLE IN WORLD PEACE

Brezhnev in orthodox fashion contrasts the aggressive policy of imperialism with the Soviet policy "of the active defense of peace and the strengthening of international security." In outlining the aims of Soviet foreign policy--which he says were formulated at the 23d Congress in March-April 1966--he reaffirms Moscow's pursuit of a peaceful coexistence policy, a policy of "rebuffing the aggressive imperialist forces," and one striving to save mankind from a new world war. And he says that the world socialist system is making "a tremendous contribution to solving the vitally important task" of preventing a new world war. But he does not take the occasion to restate the doctrine on the preventability of a world war,\* perhaps because of its close identification with Khrushchev. At the 23d CPSU Congress, Brezhnev had approached the question in more doctrinal terms, saying that "it is our deep conviction that the conclusion of the international communist movement that the aggressor can be curbed and another world war averted remains valid."

Implicit in Brezhnev's stress on maintaining world peace is the need to settle outstanding disputes by negotiations, but he again does not discuss this in doctrinal terms. Thus, there is no echo of his explicit assertion in the congress in 1966 that the Soviet Union advocates a settlement of outstanding issues by negotiations.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS In his attack on U.S. policy, Brezhnev says that the "main crime of the modern colonialists" is the continuing "aggression" in Indochina. And he is graphic in his description of the operations of the "interventionists" there, noting that "tons of napalm" have been used and that nearly 1.5 million Vietnamese have been poisoned by chemical weapons. Brezhnev does not, however, declare--as did the 25 February Soviet Government statement on the Laos incursion--that operations in Indochina could adversely affect U.S.-Soviet relations.

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\* The thesis on preventability of war has been repeated only infrequently in elite statements since 1966. The main document on the June 1969 international party conference had stated that a new world war can be averted through a joint struggle of peaceloving peoples; and the conference's "Appeal in the Defense of Peace" had said that this joint struggle "can do away with the fatal inevitability of a new world war."

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Improved relations between the United States and the USSR, Brezhnev says, are both desirable and possible. But he observes that "we cannot pass by the U.S. aggressive actions in various parts of the world." He questions U.S. sincerity "at the conference table." And he complains that the United States has "hardened its position" on a number of international issues, "including those which touch on the interests of the Soviet Union"; that it has engaged in "frequent zigzags"; and that it has sought to resurrect "the myth of the Soviet threat." Brezhnev declares that the USSR threatens no one and has no territorial claims, concluding that "no one [should] talk with us in the language of ultimatums and strength."

STRATEGIC ARMS  
LIMITATION TALKS

In his remarks on disarmament--which he says remains "one of the most important international problems"--Brezhnev briefly touches on the current strategic arms limitation talks. In the first elite remarks on the talks since Kosygin's on 11 February at the seabed treaty signing, Brezhnev observes that their favorable outcome would help to curtail another round in the arms race and would allow the diversion of resources to more creative purposes. The USSR for its part, he declares, is seeking to insure that they will have positive results. But in the vein of the 3 February Shestov article in PRAVDA, he warns that no talks on disarmament "can be productive unless the interests of the security of the parties are considered equally and no one seeks unilateral advantage."

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**DISARMAMENT: PARTIAL MEASURES LISTED, CONFERENCES ENDORSED**

In a notable departure from the format of his 1966 speech, Brezhnev ticks off the "main concrete tasks" of the USSR and other peace-loving states in their pursuit of peace--tasks which range from the liquidation of "hotbeds of war" in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, through insuring collective security in Europe and implementing various disarmament measures, to international cooperation on environmental problems.

In the course of listing various disarmament measures, Brezhnev says that the USSR favors nuclear disarmament "by all states that have nuclear weapons, and are for convening to this end a conference of the five nuclear powers--the Soviet Union, the United States, the PRC, France, and Britain." Moscow in 1965 had endorsed a French proposal along this line; most recently, the 13 October 1970 Soviet-French communique following Pompidou's visit to the USSR said that both sides "confirmed their common conviction that the great powers having at their disposal nuclear weapons should get together to discuss the questions of disarmament in this field." Moscow's domestic service on the 30th reports without comment that the British Government in a statement has indicated that it will seriously study the Soviet proposal for five-power talks; the broadcast adds that, according to REUTER, the proposal has attracted the attention of the participants at the Geneva disarmament talks.

Brezhnev follows his remarks on a five-power conference with the observation that the USSR favors the convening of a worldwide conference "to examine every aspect of the disarmament question." The proposal for a world disarmament conference--surfaced at the October 1964 Cairo Nonaligned Conference--was endorsed by Gromyko in his December 1964 UNGA address and was hailed with regularity in Soviet propaganda through the end of 1965, when the General Assembly unanimously approved it. Since then the proposal has been broached only infrequently by Moscow, and not at all since February 1967, when the UK-USSR joint communique on Kosygin's visit to Britain noted that both sides were ready to attend such a conference.

Brezhnev repeats the USSR's familiar call for treaties prohibiting nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, the banning of underground nuclear tests, the creation of nuclear-free zones "in various parts of the world," and the liquidation of foreign military bases. Additionally, he urges that measures be taken to

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reduce the likelihood of "accidental occurrence or premeditated fabrication of military incidents and their development into international crises and war." Brezhnev's list is the first such comprehensive list to appear in Moscow propoganda since the 1 July 1968 Soviet memorandum on disarmament. The 1968 memorandum did not include the proposal for a nuclear-free zone--which does, however, appear with some regularity in both elite and routine comment.

In listing disarmament measures Brezhnev also includes a reduction of armed forces and armaments "in areas where armed confrontation is especially dangerous, primarily in central Europe." While a variation of this proposal was part of the comprehensive partial disarmament program set forth in a December 1964 Soviet Government memorandum, it subsequently has normally been discussed in the context of European security (and it was not included in the July 1968 disarmament memorandum). In a recent example, the 26 June 1970 memorandum of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers' conference in Budapest observed that reduction of foreign armed forces on the territory of European states would promote security in Europe.

Brezhnev ressurects another partial disarmament measure that had been mentioned in the December 1964 memorandum--reduction of military expenditures, "primarily by major states." This measure was last mentioned at the elite level by Gromyko in his 27 June 1968 Supreme Soviet speech, when he complained that in the past the Western powers have rejected this and other Soviet-sponsored disarmament measures.

#### EUROPEAN ISSUES: RENEWED CALL FOR SECURITY CONFERENCE

In his rundown of the main tasks facing the peace-loving nations, Brezhnev repeats the call for the convening of a conference on European security. Elsewhere in his address, he noted that the "majority of European states" have come out in favor of the proposal for a conference, and that preparations for it are moving along. But he does not take the occasion to mention the 25 November 1970 Finnish proposal--to which Moscow had responded favorably--that heads of missions or other representatives in Helsinki hold consultations both with the Finnish Foreign Ministry and at multilateral meetings on the organization of a conference.

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Brezhnev reaffirms the readiness of the member states of the Warsaw Pact simultaneously to liquidate that alliance and NATO or, "as a first step, to liquidate the military organizations" of the two groupings. This proposal, which dates back to 1966 when it was included in the Bucharest declaration on European security, has been broached in elite Soviet propaganda only infrequently in recent years. Most recently, the 17 June 1969 main document of the Moscow world communist conference had called for simultaneous dissolution of the two blocs. But the document said nothing about the liquidation of their military organizations as a first step.

In reviewing the situation in Europe, Brezhnev hails the positive effect of Soviet-French relations, and he points to the "substantial shift" in the USSR's relations with the FRG. Regarding the ratification of the FRG's treaties with the USSR and Poland, Brezhnev says that there is a "sharp demarcation of political forces." He observes that "one must believe that realistically-minded circles in Bonn and certain other Western countries and capitals understand the simple truth: Delay of ratification would give rise to a new crisis of confidence in the whole FRG policy, and the political climate in Europe would deteriorate, as would the prospects of lessening international tension."

On Berlin, Brezhnev says that if the United States, France, and the United Kingdom will respect, as the USSR does, "allied agreements which determine the special status of West Berlin," and if they respect "the sovereign rights of the GDR as an independent socialist state, the talks which are now being conducted can be successfully concluded to the mutual advantage of all interested parties, including the population of West Berlin itself." The phraseology differs somewhat from that which Brezhnev used in his 29 November 1970 speech in Yerevan, his last discussion of the Berlin problem. He said then that it was quite feasible to reach an agreement regarding West Berlin, "the only thing needed" being "for all sides concerned to display good will and to work out decisions that would meet the wishes of the West Berlin population and take into account the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the GDR." By now calling for the Big Three to respect both "the special status of West Berlin" and "the sovereign rights of the GDR as an independent socialist state," Brezhnev appears to be laying down more stringent preconditions for a settlement.

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**MIDDLE EAST: USSR ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES FOR AREA**

Brezhnev's brief remarks on the situation in the Middle East contain the usual call for a political settlement, praise for the UAR for accepting UN special representative Jarring's proposals, and indictment of both Israel and the United States for allegedly blocking settlement. Most notably, Brezhnev's remarks represent the first elite affirmation of Soviet readiness "to take part with other powers who are permanent members of the Security Council in creating international guarantees for a political settlement in the Middle East." Prior to Brezhnev's speech, there had been passing references to the issue of international guarantees and an international peacekeeping force, Moscow only indirectly suggesting support by indicating Egyptian acceptance and Israeli objections.

Brezhnev takes note of the fact that the UAR has "proposed to undertake measures for the resumption in the nearest future of navigation on the Suez Canal." A foreign-language commentary by Glazunov on the 25th, reporting on UAR President Anwar as-Sadat's recent interview on French television, had also broached the matter of navigation through the canal. The commentary said that as-Sadat has indicated that "the Suez Canal could be reopened to foreign ships if Israeli armed forces are partially withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula; the UAR considers this the first step" toward implementation of the 1967 Security Council resolution.

Brezhnev concludes that after a political settlement it would be possible to consider further steps aimed at reducing tension in the region, "in particular, at turning the Mediterranean Sea into a sea of peace and friendly cooperation."

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**USSR-EAST EUROPE RELATIONS: INTEGRATION, COORDINATION STRESSED**

As part of Moscow's effort to preserve the facade of a united community and to discourage outside efforts to penetrate its East European sphere, Brezhnev underlined "the close and diverse cooperation, friendship, and cordiality" that pervades Moscow's relations with "the Warsaw Treaty countries--Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia." In his more general comments on socialist construction in the world movement Brezhnev acknowledged the need for a "correct" combination of "general regularities" and "national specifics"; but in regard to relations with his East European allies, he made it clear that national policies must evolve within the disciplined framework of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. Thus, after acknowledging that "the possibilities for the socialist division of labor are not yet being fully used," he called for economic integration of the bloc and laid particular emphasis on the "coordinating foreign policy function" of the Warsaw Pact. These are serious areas of disagreement with the Romanians, who continue to oppose bloc integration and to insist on maintaining an independent foreign policy course.

Soviet displeasure with Romania, among others, seemed to be reflected in a general passage by Brezhnev attacking "negative phenomena" in the communist movement and calling for a manifold struggle against "right and 'left-wing' revisionism, and against nationalism." He added: "It is precisely the nationalistic tendencies, especially those which assume the form of anti-Sovietism, that bourgeois ideologists and bourgeois propaganda have most willingly relied upon in their fight against socialism and the communist movement."

Briefly touching on relations with the maverick Albanians, Brezhnev reiterated the line that the USSR is prepared to "normalize" relations with Albania; but the avowal came directly after his assault on Tirana's Peking ally for following an anti-Soviet line in its propaganda and policy. This expression of Soviet willingness to improve relations with its ideological enemy is apparently designed to portray Moscow as the innocent party in the dispute and to put the onus on Tirana for disrupting communist unity.

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Turning to relations with another ideological adversary, Brezhnev vaguely noted that relations with Yugoslavia "have continued to develop." He added that "the Soviet people want to see socialism in Yugoslavia strengthened and her ties with the socialist community grow stronger"--sentiments that the Yugoslavs might find presumptuous. Despite such reservations about Yugoslav socialism, however, Brezhnev made it clear that he would like to improve party and state relations by calling for Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation and developing contacts between the CPSU and the LCY.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Brezhnev updated the Soviet rationale for  
POLAND the intervention in Czechoslovakia and touched in general terms on the developments in Poland since December. While his remarks on Czechoslovakia are explicit and fairly extensive, his brief discussion of Poland amounts only to a grudging Soviet acknowledgment that "difficulties" had arisen in that country. Brezhnev declared, in obvious response to conjectures on this score, that Soviet friendship with Poland "is unshakeable" and registered Moscow's "deep satisfaction that the difficulties which arose in fraternal Poland have been overcome." Without referring directly to either the coastal riots or the economic troubles which had sparked them, Brezhnev approvingly noted the Polish party's current measures to strengthen its ties with the workers and to "consolidate the positions of socialism" in that country.

On the subject of Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev provided an explicit Soviet endorsement of the position taken by a December 1970 CPCZ plenum document--belatedly released in January 1971--that the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion was in response to "appeals" by the Czechoslovaks themselves. Following a lengthy defensive explanation that the "counterrevolutionary" threat endangered not only Czechoslovakia but "the positions of socialism in Europe as a whole," Brezhnev declared that "in view of the appeals by party and state leaders, communists and working people of Czechoslovakia" and the danger to socialist gains in that country, "we and the fraternal socialist countries jointly took the decision to render internationalist assistance to Czechoslovakia in defense of socialism." He added that "we agree with the conclusion" drawn by the CPCZ plenum document.

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Without explicitly endorsing the leadership of Husak, present at the congress, Brezhnev declared: "We are sincerely glad that the communists of Czechoslovakia have successfully withstood the trials that fell to their lot." Brezhnev may have indicated partial disagreement with the compromise aspect of the CPCZ document: He referred to the document only as "Lessons of the Crisis Development" without giving the rest of the title--including "following the 13th Congress" of the CPCZ in 1966. Husak had apparently been allowed, in the document, to indict the Novotny era--not just the post-January 1968 Dubcek era--for the 1968 crisis, in return for the document's statement that the August invasion had been carried out at the Czechoslovaks' own request.

#### SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: PRC'S HOSTILITY SAID TO IMPEDE UNITY

In the most critical Soviet elite comment on China since leaders' election speeches last June, Brezhnev used the congress as a forum to deplore persisting Chinese hostility in the face of Soviet efforts aimed at normalizing relations. He noted that "useful steps" had been taken at Soviet initiative to normalize relations, citing the border talks, the exchange of ambassadors, and the signing of a trade agreement for the first time in several years. But while professing Moscow's readiness to proceed further in this direction, Brezhnev declared that the Soviets cannot ignore Peking's anti-Soviet line and denounced Peking's "slandorous fabrications" concerning Soviet policy.

Against the background of Peking's recent ideological broadside on the centenary of the Paris Commune, Brezhnev made a play to the international communist gallery by remarking that to sow dissension between the PRC and the Soviet Union is particularly harmful now inasmuch as it coincides with an intensification of imperialist aggression. He claimed that the situation "more than ever before" demands unity and joint action rather than hostility between China and the Soviet Union. Respecting the Vietnamese communists' aversion to being caught in the Sino-Soviet crossfire, Brezhnev did not mention Indochina directly in this context.

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Brezhnev's report provided a brief review of Moscow's China policy in the post-Khrushchev period. He observed that Peking had followed an ideological and political line incompatible with Leninism and had demanded that the Soviets repudiate the line of the 20th CPSU Congress and the party program. He also took this occasion to refer to Peking's territorial claims against the Soviet Union and to the 1969 border clashes, a subject which the Soviet leaders have carefully avoided since the opening of the Peking talks. Seeking to show that Moscow had taken a balanced and responsible approach to Sino-Soviet tensions, Brezhnev claimed that the Soviets had rebuffed attempts to distort Marxism-Leninism and to divide communist ranks while maintaining restraint and "not yielding to provocations" in the interest of normalizing relations. He gave no hint of the existence of current tensions along the border.

As in his 28 August 1970 Alma-Ata speech, which had served as the basic text for the Soviet line on China, Brezhnev characterized the Peking talks as "going slowly." He added an implicit criticism of the Chinese approach to the talks by observing that not only one side must take a constructive position if they are to be successful. Brezhnev repeated the assurances in his Alma-Ata speech that the Soviets will not forsake their national interests and will continue to struggle for cohesion in the communist movement, and he reiterated his appeal for not only normalization of state relations but also the restoration of "good neighborliness and friendship" between the PRC and the Soviet Union. Curiously, in view of his censure of the Chinese for impeding joint action, he omitted the remainder of his appeal in Alma-Ata calling for unity of effort against imperialism.

Taking another swipe at the Chinese, in a passage discussing the international communist movement, Brezhnev noted that during the period since the last CPSU congress Peking had sought to form schismatic groups in an effort to develop a counterweight to Moscow's wing of the world movement. He lauded the June 1969 Moscow international communist conference, at which Brezhnev led a bandwagon attack by pro-Soviet loyalists against the Chinese, and he suggested that conferences of this sort become a regular practice. Characteristically, Brezhnev expressed concern over the threat to Soviet hegemony posed by nationalist trends and the attractions of an independent stand in the communist movement.

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EAST EUROPE COMMENT  
Prior to the congress Moscow had responded to Peking's ideological blast on the Paris Commune centenary largely through the proxy of its East European allies, apart from an extensive flow of polemical reaction in Radio Moscow's broadcasts to the Chinese. While Romania remained silent, the other members of the Soviet bloc came to the defense of their chief standard-bearer in comment appearing in both East European and Soviet media. Most notably, Polish party chief Gierk, in an article in the 29 March PRAVDA on the eve of the congress, picked up where the fallen Gomulka had left off in professing fealty to Moscow as the center of the communist movement. Serving notice that the changes in the Polish leadership offered no opportunities for driving a wedge between Warsaw and Moscow, Gierk declared that solidarity with the CPSU continues to be the most accurate test of loyalty to proletarian internationalism and that an overwhelming majority of the fraternal parties, including his own, react to Chinese splitting actions by strengthening their solidarity with the Soviets.

East European comment has spelled out the charge--hinted at in Brezhnev's congress report--that Peking's attack damaged the communist cause by taking place at a time of intensified enemy action in Indochina. A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial, summarized in PRAVDA on 29 March, severely condemned "the Mao Tse-tung group"--an offensive formulation generally avoided by Moscow in its own name in recent months--for directing its attack on Moscow instead of joining with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries at a time of military operations in Laos. PRAVDA did, however, edit its overzealous ally by omitting a passage in which NEUES DEUTSCHLAND recalled that the Sino-Soviet border clashes in the spring of 1969 coincided with tensions arising from the FRG presidential election in West Berlin.

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## SINO-BURMESE RELATIONS

## PRC APPOINTS AMBASSADOR, IGNORES BCP INSURGENCY ANNIVERSARY

Peking's failure to take note of the 23d anniversary of the launching of the communist insurgency in Burma, coming in the wake of the recent arrival in Rangoon of the newly appointed PRC ambassador to Burma, Chen Chao-yuan, accords with other recent indications of Peking's intent to improve state relations with the Ne Win government. Since last September Peking has virtually ceased propaganda support for the Burmese Communist Party (BCP); and since then its sparse treatment of Burma has consisted primarily of brief NCNA reports on state or diplomatic functions.

**BCP ANNIVERSARY** Peking media's omission of any comment on the 23d anniversary on March 28 of the launching of the communist insurgency in Burma stands in contrast to Peking's publicity for that anniversary in 1970, which, in turn, reflected a notably milder attitude toward the Ne Win government than the harsher attacks on the same occasion in 1969.\* In 1970 Peking marked the 22d anniversary with several NCNA articles detailing battle actions of the BCP-led insurgents, tempering recollections of "outstanding achievements" with warnings that the Burmese revolutionaries "will encounter various difficulties" and must "continue to display the spirit of waging hard and protracted struggle and persevere in their armed struggle under the leadership of the BCP." NCNA also disseminated reports of foreign communist support to the Burmese insurgents--for instance, from the Albanians and the communist parties of Thailand and Malaysia--but avoided implying any aid for the BCP by the PRC itself and omitted any direct expression of Chinese support for its armed struggle.

**STATE RELATIONS** Although Rangoon appointed U Thein Maung as Ambassador to the PRC in mid-October 1970 and NCNA announced his arrival in Peking, presentation of credentials, and meeting with Chou En-lai in late November and early December, Peking did not reciprocate until recently. NCNA on 21 March announced that Ambassador to Burma Chen Chao-yuan had departed that day for his post.

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\* For a discussion of Peking's evolving attitude toward the Ne Win government and its treatment of the 22d anniversary, see the TRENDS of 1 April 1970, pp. 24-25.

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Reciprocal appointment of ambassadors capped a two-year evolution in Peking media's treatment of the Ne Win government. Comment on Burma during 1969--for instance that surrounding the 1969 anniversary of the Burmese communist insurgency--employed hostile personal attacks on Ne Win, such as "the Ne Win fascist regime" and the "Ne Win clique." By late 1969 Peking had moderated its formulations, referring to the "reactionary government," and during 1970 this had been softened in Peking-originated comment to "Burmese reactionaries," with no direct criticism of Ne Win or his government.

Reflecting a further normalization of PRC-Burmese state relations, NCNA on 4 October 1970 reported a greetings telegram from Ne Win to Chou En-lai on the occasion of the PRC's 21st anniversary; and a January 4 reception in Peking, given by the Burmese Ambassador to the PRC and reported by NCNA, was attended by Kuo Mo-jo and Pai Hsiang-kuo, the Minister of Foreign Trade.

**SUPPORT FOR BCP INSURGENCY**                      Concurrently with the normalizing of Burmese-PRC state relations, Peking media have virtually ceased giving any propaganda support to the BCP's armed insurgency activities. Since the comment surrounding the 28 March 1970 insurgency anniversary, Peking has originated only three commentaries--one each in June, August, and September--on the exploits of the BCP-led Burmese people's revolutionary armed struggle. During this period Peking has also reported BCP messages and statements on the occasions of the Lenin centenary and the Chinese satellite launching in April 1970, Mao's 20 May 1970 statement on Indochina, and the 3 March satellite launching. In contrast to Peking's acknowledgment of Ne Win's message on the PRC's national day last 1 October, it did not mention any message of greetings from the BCP as it had customarily done in previous years. NCNA did take note, however, of the presence at Peking's national day celebrations of the head of the BCP resident delegation in the PRC, Thakin Ba Thein Tin. Thakin Ba Thein Tin has not been mentioned since that time in monitored Peking media.

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## PROVINCIAL PARTY COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED IN KIRIN

Adhering to the usual format, NCNA on 30 March announced the formation of a party committee for Kirin Province. Within the last 4 months, 15 of the PRC's 29 major administrative divisions have reconstructed new provincial committees. As in all previous examples, NCNA specifically noted that the Kirin committee was elected in accordance with the formula of "old, middle-aged, and young."

The Kirin committee was set up at a gathering of 921 party delegates in Changchun from 18 to 24 March. A six-man leadership group--slightly weighted in favor of men with military backgrounds within the province--heads the new committee of 74 full and 15 alternate members. The top party spot went to Wang Huai-hsiang, chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee and since 1964 deputy political commissar of the Kirin Military District (MD).

Kirin's four vice-chairmen were named secretaries. Ho Yu-fa and Hsiao Tao-sheng are military men holding concurrent positions as commander of the Kirin MD and responsible person within the MD respectively. Veteran cadres are represented on the committee by Juan Po-sheng and Cheng Chi-chiao, both former secretaries on the old provincial committee. Chang Chao-jen, a newcomer to Kirin identified only as a responsible person within the province in June 1970, was also named a secretary.

Wang, making the usual speech on behalf of the party nucleus group, stressed the need to improve party leadership over economic work and step up overall production within the province. As in the case of the keynote addresses given by the first secretaries in Liaoning, Kwangsi and Kansu--the other border provinces with rebuilt party committees--Wang called for strengthening Kirin as an "outpost" on China's Northeastern border. Unlike the previous examples, however, he did not specifically link this task to the need to prepare for war.

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**FORMATION OF PARTY AND REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES COMPARED**

The attached table compares the formation of party committees with that of revolutionary committees at the same mid-point, when 15 of the 29 provincial-level units had managed to follow through on the center's instructions. It will be seen that five provinces, plus Peking and Shanghai, were among the first 15 in both instances, in forming their revolutionary committees as well as their party committees. Of the six areas that were not among the first 15 in either instance, four--Tibet, Sinkiang, Yunnan and Ningsia--share the obvious excuse of remoteness and a dispersed populace. The reasons for the dilatoriness of the other two--Szechwan and Fukien--are of a different order.

The table shows graphically that the old CCP North Region, which led the field in establishing revolutionary committees, has yielded primacy to the East in party reconstruction. The remaining four CCP regions show nearly the same rate of committee formation in both instances; there is a disparity of only one, plus or minus, for each of these four.

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## STATUS AT MID-POINT

## FORMATION OF PARTY AND REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES COMPARED

	<u>Provincial- level Unit</u>	<u>Party Committees 30 Mar 71</u>	<u>Revolutionary Committees 28 Feb 68</u>
EAST	Anhwei	+	
	Chekiang	+	
	Fukien		
	Kiangsi	+	+
	Kiangsu	+	
	Shanghai	+	+
	Shantung		+
CENTRAL- SOUTH	Honan	+	+
	Hunan	+	
	Hupei		+
	Kwangsi	+	
	Kwangtung	+	+
NORTH	Hopeh		+
	Inner Mongolia		+
	Peking	+	+
	Shansi		+
	Tientsin		+
NORTH- EAST	Heilungkiang		+
	Kirin	+	
	Liaoning	+	
NORTH- WEST	Kansu	+	+
	Ningsia		
	Shensi	+	
	Sinkiang		
	Tsinghai	+	+
SOUTH- WEST	Kweichow		+
	Szechwan		
	Tibet		
	Yunnan		

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## UKRAINE AND AZERBAJDZHAN CONGRESSES DIVERGE ON BREZHNEV

In the two final republican congresses, Azerbaydzhan and the Ukraine followed prior patterns in their treatment of Brezhnev. The Azerbaydzhanis praised him while the Ukrainians paid him little deference. Few sensitive issues were raised at either congress, but each, in contrast to the other republican congresses, was marked by sniping at incumbent or previously dismissed republic leaders.

The Ukraine, unlike Brezhnev's other former home bases of Kazakhstan and Moldavia, has not gratuitously hailed Brezhnev and did not do so at its congress. First Secretary Shelest paid less deference to Brezhnev in his congress report than any other republic First Secretary except Estonia's Kebin, who had ignored him entirely. Shelest's only mention of Brezhnev was a short, innocuous quotation of his on the role of the party. Moreover, unlike other republic or regional leaders (Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev, Uzbek First Secretary Rashidov, Belorussian First Secretary Masherov, and Moscow First Secretary Grishin) who had praised Brezhnev's 50th anniversary and Lenin centennial reports, Shelest conspicuously praised only the party "documents" on these anniversaries. Shelest likewise cited only the translation of Lenin's works into Ukrainian and ignored the Ukrainian translation of Brezhnev's works which had been announced just the week before.

Among other Ukrainian congress speakers, Brezhnev's old colleague, Premier Shcherbitskiy, quoted him twice, and President Lyashko and Kiev city first secretary A. P. Botvin cited him once. The only unusual deference was shown by the Ivano-Frankovsk obkom first secretary, V. F. Dobryk, who expressed his oblast's "sincere and warm thanks to the CPSU Central Committee, Soviet Government, Central Committee Politburo, and personally Central Committee General Secretary Leonid Ilich Brezhnev" for their concern for and aid to the Ukraine (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 20 March). Dobryk, former first secretary of Brezhnev's home town of Dneprodzerzhinsk, probably had special reason to be grateful to Brezhnev since he was the only provincial city first secretary (besides Leningrad) to be elected as CPSU Central Committee candidate member in 1966.

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The Azerbaydzhanis displayed their traditional deference to Brezhnev. Although they did not elect an honorary presidium consisting of the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev as they had done in October 1970, First Secretary Aliyev in his concluding speech reiterated the controversial formulation (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 12 March).

**OTHER ISSUES** In contrast to most republic first secretaries, who had avoided discussion of foreign affairs, Shelest joined Uzbek First Secretary Rashidov in praising the new treaty with West Germany. Zionism was attacked by Shelest, Zakarpatsk obkom first secretary Yu. V. Ilnitskiy, and writer Yu. K. Smolich, and ideological deviations were criticized by Shelest, Dnepropetrovsk first secretary Vatchenko, Kiev first secretary Tsybulko, Kharkov first secretary Vashchenko, and Ivano-Frankovsk first secretary Dobryk. Vatchenko and Vashchenko used these deviations to snipe at ideology secretary Ovcharenko (see FBIS TRENDS for 17 March). The economic reform received brief praise from President Lyashko and Lvov first secretary Kutsevol, while the production associations were encouraged by Shelest.

The Azerbaydzhan congress was largely preoccupied with the 1969-1970 purge of the republic leadership. Some speakers urged further punishment for the ousted republic leaders, and Academy of Science President G. B. Abdullayev, whose organization had become the refuge for former first secretary Akhundov, former premier Alikhanov, former president Iskenderov, and former agriculture secretary Kyazimov, complained about the difficulty of operating the academy with such scientifically unqualified cadres among its leadership (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 12 March).

In addition, most of the surviving pre-Aliyev leaders were attacked and removed from office. Ideology secretary D. G. Dzhafarov (attacked by name for "subjectivism") and longtime industry secretary A. D. Amirov (apparently blamed for the "sharp drop" in oil production) were dropped from the Secretariat at the end of the congress. Gosplan chairman M. I. Allakhverdov, condemned for his "harmful, unbusinesslike style of work," was dropped from the Central Committee and presumably will soon be removed as Gosplan chief. Second secretary S. V. Kozlov--who, as Russian supervisor of the republic, is not so directly under Aliyev's control--and A. I. Ibragimov--promoted to premier in 1970--are now the only survivors of the pre-Aliyev bureau.

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