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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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20 JAN 1971

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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20 JANUARY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 3)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 11 - 17 JANUARY 1971

<u>Moscow (3809 items)</u>			<u>Peking (2667 items)</u>		
Podgorny in UAR for	(0.4%)	18%	Domestic Issues	(28%)	38%
Aswan Dam			[Shanghai Party	(--)	4%]
Commissioning			Congress		
Mongolian Revolution,	(--)	6%	[Liaoning Party	(--)	1%]
50th Anniversary			Congress		
Luna 17, Lunakhod	(1%)	5%	Jordan	(--)	16%
Indochina	(6%)	5%	Indochina	(31%)	14%
China	(7%)	3%	[NFLSV Delegation	(6%)	5%]
Czechoslovak CP	(--)	3%	in PRC		
Documents on			Albanian National Day,(0.1%)		7%
1968-69 Events			25th Anniversary		
U.S. "Zionist" Anti-	(1%)	3%	PRC-Chile Diplomatic	(8%)	3%
Soviet Activities			Relations		
Angela Davis Case	(5%)	2%			
Commonwealth Conference	(1%)	2%			
in Singapore					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

The DRV and PRG foreign ministries on 19 and 20 January issued statements which protest U.S. "intensification of aggression" in all four countries of Indochina. The DRV protest leads off with the charge that "massive" operations in Cambodia have been conducted "under the direct command of the United States" and concludes with a denunciation of intensified "acts of war" against the DRV.

At this writing no communist source has acknowledged U.S. press reports of an operation on the 17th in which South Vietnamese paratroopers raided a camp in Cambodia where American prisoners were believed to be held. But the new charge that the United States has "dropped commando spies in a number of areas in the fourth military zone" of the DRV is made in a NHAN DAN editorial on the 20th which paraphrases many of the charges in the foreign ministry statement.

Soviet media promptly reported the DRV Foreign Ministry statement, and Moscow commentators follow Hanoi's lead in linking Secretary Laird's recent trip to Southeast Asia to U.S. "escalation" in Cambodia, in the DRV, and throughout Indochina.

Peking comments on Laird's trip along similar lines, in a radio commentary on the 14th and in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 19th which endorses a Sihanouk appeal for the Cambodian people to continue their struggle.

FOREIGN MINISTRIES PROTEST U.S. "ESCALATION" IN INDOCHINA

It is not clear from the DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements whether, as is usually the case, some particular U.S. action prompted the protests at this level* or whether they

* DRV statements at the foreign-ministry level protesting U.S. "escalation" were issued most recently on 11 December (on intensification of the war in Laos, including alleged stepped-up air strikes, some of them by B-52's, and introduction of Cambodian and Thai troops) and on 27 November (on the concentrated air strikes against the DRV at the time of the prisoner-rescue attempt at Son Tay.) The last, PRG Foreign Ministry statement was issued on 22 November, protesting the U.S. air strikes against the DRV.

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were responsive to a combination of actions. The DRV statement leads off with Cambodia, going beyond earlier routine propaganda when it charges that "massive operations" have been conducted "under direct U.S. command." It also singles out support from the U.S. air force and "warships of the Seventh Fleet" positioned off Sihanoukville. After routine attacks on air strikes and the dispatch of Thai "mercenary" troops to Laos, the statement says that the "U.S.-puppet" troops in South Vietnam have pushed ahead with "special pacification" operations and launched "large-scale raiding operations," especially in Tay Ninh Province. Turning to the DRV, the statement does not specify any of the air strikes which prompted protests from the foreign ministry spokesman in the past week but condemns in general terms the "recent" intensification of "acts of war" against the DRV, including alleged strikes by B-52's.

The PRG statement leads off with South Vietnam, discussing Cambodia second, and departs from the substance of the DRV statement. Thus the PRG says nothing specifically about operations in Tay Ninh, but it does interject a reference to the "scheme to herd hundreds of thousands of people in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces into the southernmost provinces"--an issue not known to have been discussed in routine comment. The PRG follows the lead of the DRV statement, however, in its remarks on Laos and North Vietnam.

Both statements routinely score--and predict failure of--the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine, and both charge U.S. hypocrisy regarding a political settlement. In the words of the DRV statement, "events have shown that President Nixon has betrayed his promise to 'bring the war to an early end' when assuming power two years ago and that his 'five-point peace initiative' is a complete hoax."

HANOI AND FRONT COMMENT SCORES U.S. ROLE IN CAMBODIAN ACTION

Prior to the release of the foreign ministry statements Hanoi and Front propaganda cited evidence of increased U.S. involvement in Cambodia, particularly assailing stepped-up air raids and support given the joint South Vietnamese-Cambodian government operation begun on 13 January to clear Highway 4. Thus both Hanoi and Liberation Radio on the 17th scored the use of B-52's and other planes in connection with the Highway 4 action and

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quoted U.S. officials in Saigon as confirming that American forces were giving logistics support to the allied clearing operation. Articles in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 18th and 19th and in NHAN DAN on the 19th also focused on the increased use of U.S. planes in Cambodia. NHAN DAN additionally scored "direct U.S. participation in looting raids" in Cambodia and protested the dispatch of U.S. ships "into Cambodian territorial waters to support ground raids" along the Cambodian highway.

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article of the 19th was more specific than NHAN DAN in its charges of U.S. involvement. It cited Western news reports that Laird had authorized the use of the U.S. air force to support the clearing operation and that a Defense Department spokesman had claimed a U.S. right to send South Vietnamese troops, war materiel, and other supplies by aircraft and helicopter to Cambodia. The paper added that "on 17 January 1971, the Americans further stepped up their direct intervention in the war in Cambodia by means of U.S. warships, armed helicopters, and liaison personnel" and that U.S. warships, including a helicopter carrier, have been used for many supporting tasks. The first known Hanoi reference to the alleged involvement of U.S. military personnel on the ground came in a domestic radio broadcast on the 18th which cited an AP report that U.S. officers had landed along the highway. The PRC Foreign Ministry statement, unlike the DRV's, alleges that there are U.S. advisers in Cambodia.

Fighting along Highway 4 in early January was reviewed in a 19 January VNA report which claimed that since the beginning of the year Cambodian insurgent forces had wiped out or captured nearly 1,500 enemy troops, including 125 South Vietnamese soldiers. VNA did not give specific figures on allied losses in the current operation, although the Hanoi domestic service broadcast on the 18th had cited AP's reports of allied casualties. The allied joint operation along Highway 4, according to VNA, is meeting with "an effective counteroffensive from the Cambodian patriotic forces."

MOSCOW SAYS U.S. ACTION IN CAMBODIA REPEATS THAT IN VIETNAM

Following Hanoi's propaganda lead, Moscow links U.S. "escalation" in Indochina to Secretary Laird's recent trip. Soviet media pick up DRV as well as Western accounts of the air strikes

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against North Vietnam and report the series of DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protests over the strike and the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on "intensification" of the war throughout Indochina.

Moscow plays up U.S. air strikes in the DRV and an increased U.S. support role in Cambodia as evidence of further escalation of the Indochina conflict that runs counter to earlier assurances by the Administration that it would not resort to direct military intervention to support the Lon Nol regime. TASS commentator Kharkov on 19 January said it appears that President Nixon's "promise" to Congress that the United States "would not increase its role in Cambodia and would refrain from direct military intervention" was intended to keep down protests from the American public, "which justly considers that the United States is following in Cambodia the same ominous path it followed in Vietnam."

The Kharkov commentary, entitled "A Visit For Expansion of Aggression," developed the theme that Laird's trip resulted in further escalation of the war. Kharkov charged that the United States has discarded its "camouflage" and is now openly providing "direct support to combat operations of Saigon and Phnom Penh troops against the Cambodian patriots." He noted that "U.S. combat planes and helicopters" are now taking part in the fighting and stated that "the Pentagon threatens to throw the entire U.S. air power in Southeast Asia" into the conflict. A 16 January PRAVDA dispatch from Washington had similarly reported that U.S. helicopters were taking part in direct support of Saigon troops but was more specific in noting that "B-52's" were also participating.

A brief TASS account of Secretary Rogers' remarks in a 16 January TV interview also referred to the U.S. air role in the war. While citing the Secretary's "claim that the United States is not going to use combat forces in Cambodia," it added that he "admitted that the U.S. air force was rendering direct combat support to Saigon troops which invaded Cambodia and that U.S. B-52's were for the first time used in Cambodia." Radio Moscow on the 20th, reporting on White House Press Secretary Ziegler's press conference, said he "admitted that the scale of U.S. air force operations in Cambodia has increased and gave it to be understood that the United States is not bound by any limitations as regards the intensification of the air war in Cambodia." On the 19th TASS picked up a UPI report that the United States has "frozen the withdrawal of air units from Southeast Asia."

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Citing other "evidence of U.S. escalation," the Kharkov commentary reported that American "advisers are helping Saigon troops invade Cambodia." A TASS report on the 19th quoted the WASHINGTON POST as saying the United States was using "liaison officers" to intensify its operations in Cambodia.

At this writing there has been no Moscow mention of a South Vietnamese raid with U.S. air support on a Cambodian prisoner camp.

CRITICISM OF Moscow comment on the military action
CAMBODIAN REGIME along Highway 4, including a 16 January
radio commentary in Cambodian, criticizes
the government for taking part in a military operation against its own people but does not mention Lon Nol explicitly. The action, the commentary says, clearly demonstrates "that the Phnom Penh leaders are trampling on the national interest and that they have swerved from a neutral policy by joining foreign forces--that is, the U.S. imperialists and their Saigon puppets--in military operations against the Khmer people." The commentary predicts that the new offensive will be checked by the "patriotic forces" and that the Phnom Penh leaders' policy will only "evoke the anger of the Khmer people, who are rising up in defense of their fatherland." Despite the fact that it maintains relations with Lon Nol, Moscow in the past has similarly lauded the achievements of "patriotic forces." And a 31 December PRAVDA commentary, among others, accused the Phnom Penh "leadership" of having involved the country in U.S. aggressive policy and of distorting the country's economic life.

PRC SCORES LAIRD TRIP, ATTACK ON DRV, ARVN ACTION IN CAMBODIA

Peking's first reaction to Secretary Laird's Asian tour came on 14 January in a widely broadcast commentary which says the trip had the dual aim of "assuaging the U.S. running dogs" and "making a new deployment for aggression." It derides U.S. professions that the United States "still seeks a 'negotiated settlement' in Southeast Asia," charging that "Laird raved that 'the United States will meet its treaty obligations and commitments in this area of the world'" and "doggedly refused" to withdraw U.S. troops "immediately, unconditionally, and completely." The commentary also deplors allied "war blackmail"

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at the time of the tour, citing the air strikes against the DRV, heavy air raids by B-52's and other aircraft over lower Laos and Cambodia, and the intrusion of more South Vietnamese troops into Cambodia to reopen Highway 4.

PEOPLE'S DAILY ON SIHANOUK APPEAL A 19 January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article endorses an appeal made by Sihanouk the previous day, stating that it is "bound to give an enormous impetus to the victorious advance of the Cambodian people." Commentator maintains that the Lon Nol regime is "eking out a precarious existence" and is "liable to fall at any moment." The appeal, carried by NCNA on the 18th, claimed that the Lon Nol government is isolated and has been forced to "hide" itself in Phnom Penh, "completely encircled by our people's liberation armed forces." Sihanouk called upon the Cambodian people to be determined to carry out a prolonged struggle and to frustrate "perfidious maneuvers aimed at enforcing solutions of compromise and partition" Among other things, he also asked them to "multiply and strengthen the work inside the enemy camp and launch more and more powerful political movements in favor of our sacred cause in the cities not yet liberated in order to hasten victory."

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN, COMMENTARIES PROTEST AIR STRIKES

The flurry of DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements on 16, 17, 18, and 19 January protesting U.S. attacks above the DMZ coincided with the announcements by the U.S. Command in Saigon of air strikes against DRV missile sites in connection with the bombing of supply routes in Laos. However, the protests were ambiguous as to the precise locations and described broader action than that announced by the U.S. Command.* Thus, the spokesman's statement of the 16th charged that on the previous day the "Americans fired a series

* According to the U.S. statements, on 17 January U.S. fighter-bombers attacked two surface-to-air missile sites in the DRV 16 and 46 miles from the DMZ, respectively; on the 16th a Shrike missile was fired at a missile site 10 miles north of the DMZ; and on the 15th there were three similar strikes in the areas of the Mugia and Bankari passes--80 and 30 miles north of the DMZ, respectively.

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of artillery salvos from the southern bank of the DMZ at Vinh Son village, in Vinh Linh." The protest of the 17th charged that U.S. aircraft on 6, 9, and 15 January sprayed toxic chemicals on populated areas of Le Thuy, Bo Trach, and Quang Ninh districts, Quang Binh Province, causing damage to the vegetation and crops. It also alleged that on the 16th "U.S. planes fired rockets on several places in Vinh Linh," and it added that all of the places cited are on DRV territory.

The protest of the 18th contained the first description of an action that seems to accord with the U.S. announcements. It denounced the "firing of missiles on a locality of Quang Binh Province on 15 January" and also said that B-52's dropped demolition and steel pellet bombs on Huong Lap village in the northern part of the DMZ on the 15th and 16th. The spokesman "severely condemned" these U.S. "war acts" and "flatly rejected the so-called 'self-defense response' of the U.S. ruling circles aimed at covering up their piratical acts."

The foreign ministry spokesman's fourth consecutive statement,* on the 19th, charged that on 17 January U.S. aircraft "bombed and fired rockets at a number of places in the Vinh Linh zone and in Dien Bien Phu district, Lai Chau Province, which belong to DRV territory."

COMMENT Routine protests over air strikes by the foreign ministry spokesman normally prompt little supporting radio or press comment, but there is comment on the current ones--perhaps because of the coincidence of

* In the period between the concentrated U.S. air strikes on 21 November 1970 and the current series, the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman had issued four protests: the 30 November charge that U.S. strikes on 28 and 29 November hit two villages in the DMZ; a 14 December protest over use of "noxious chemicals" on the 6th on a populated area in Bo Trach district, Quang Binh Province; an 18 December protest over U.S. strikes on the 15th at Lai Chau Province and on the 16th at Huong Lap village in the northern part of the DMZ; and an 11 January protest over strikes on Ha Tinh Province on the 8th.

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propaganda charges of U.S. "escalation" throughout Indochina. Thus, the 20 January NHAN DAN editorial recapitulates the specific charges of air strikes as well as the general charges regarding actions throughout Indochina protested in the foreign ministry statement of the 19th. The editorial is notable for the additional charge that the United States "has dropped commando spies in a number of areas in the fourth military zone to surreptitiously sabotage our rear." No date is mentioned, but the sentence comes directly after a listing of the dates of U.S. actions as 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, and 17 January. The editorial says the United States is planning "military adventures" against the DRV, using the pretext of "self-defense reaction, interdiction, and protecting the lives of U.S. servicemen in the South." It declares that since the 10 December party-government appeal "a high tide of revolutionary action" has developed throughout the DRV and that the people are determined to fulfill their tasks, including that of "rear base duty to the vast frontline."

A 19 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary enumerates a number of charges that appeared in the foreign ministry statement, although the statement was not released until late that day. A NHAN DAN commentary on that day reviewed the incidents protested in the series of foreign ministry spokesman's statements and said that the Nixon Administration's "deceitful allegations" about self-defense reaction and protection of Americans in the South can fool no one.

A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of the 18th, unlike the other comment, notes that the U.S. Command in Saigon "admitted" on the preceding day that U.S. aircraft had fired rockets at North Vietnam territory.

DELEGATES AT PARIS DENOUNCE U.S. TROOP-WITHDRAWAL POLICY

The DRV and PRG delegates both denounced the U.S. troop withdrawal policy at the 99th session of the Paris talks on 14 January. The VNA and LPA accounts of the session note that PRG delegate head Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh said the "key problem" for ending the war and restoring peace is the complete withdrawal of all U.S. and allied troops from South Vietnam. LPA further reports her charge that the "main obstacles" to ending the war are created by the United States, which clings to "absurd conditions, namely 'mutual

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troop withdrawal,' and refuses to set an appropriate time limit for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops." VNA notes that Mme. Binh, in demonstrating and acclaiming the PRG's flexibility on the question of U.S. troop withdrawal, recalled the PRG's 11 December 1969 proposal that the United States declare it will withdraw its troops in six months, its 17 September eight-point initiative which included the call for U.S. agreement to withdraw by 30 June 1971, and its 10 December three-point statement on a cease-fire.

Both LPA and VNA note that Mme. Binh "refuted the U.S. Administration's contention about 'ending the U.S. combat role' in South Vietnam" as a "maneuver to fool and divert public opinion." In this regard, she charged though only LPA reports it--that the President's 4 January TV interview and Secretary Laird's statement during his recent trip "proved that the United States is still reluctant" to withdraw its troops and that in fact it is "undertaking adventurous military acts against the DRV" and expanding the war in Laos and Cambodia.

Xuan Thuy--in a statement devoted largely to castigating Secretary Laird's tour--also charged that the United States intends neither to withdraw nor to end its combat role in Indochina. Thuy brushed aside the President's declaration that the United States is on its way out of the Vietnam war by recalling that at the previous session, on 7 January, he had pointed out that the President's remark was for "propaganda purposes." VNA does not report this passage; however, nor does it mention his statements similar to Mme. Binh's on action in Cambodia and Laos.

STATEMENTS BY ALLIED DELEGATES In its usual manner, VNA brushes aside the statements of the allied delegates with one sentence each. Thus it says that "at U.S. bidding, the delegate of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration tried to sling mud at North Vietnam in an attempt to hide its own traitorous nature." And "the U.S. negotiator only rehashed his insolent and obstinate allegations." It ignores Ambassador Bruce's reiteration of U.S. complaints against the DRV on the POW issue and his attempt to hand over to the communist side an updated list of all American servicemen missing in Southeast Asia, in addition to the request for any information the other side may have on them.

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR EXTOLS ASWAN AS SYMBOL OF COOPERATION, FRIENDSHIP

Moscow gives voluminous attention to the ceremonies surrounding the 15 January commissioning of the Aswan hydropower complex in Egypt, Podgorny's visit for the occasion, the signing in Aswan of a "declaration" on the completion of the project, and the message of congratulations from Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin to President as-Sadat and Premier Fawzi. Material on the occasion pays tribute to Nasir while enumerating the benefits the UAR is deriving from the Aswan complex and holding it up as a symbol of Egyptian-Soviet friendship and cooperation. Aswan is repeatedly hailed as a firm foundation for the country's industry and agriculture, as well as proof of the effectiveness of cooperation of young developing states with the socialist countries.

Aswan is also seen as an illustration of the UAR's peaceful objectives of economic and social progress. For example, a foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi on the 16th says that while the UAR has been forced to devote immense efforts and resources to defense, it is successfully carrying through its "peaceful plans for development" while Israel's economy, in contrast, is being ruined because of its militarist development.

The joint communique, as well as Podgorny in his speeches in the UAR, reiterates the usual prescription for peace in the Middle East: Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, and fulfillment of UN resolutions concerning the lawful rights of the Palestinian people.

PODGORNY ON UAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL SOLUTION

In speeches during his 13-19 January visit, Podgorny puts considerable emphasis on Egyptian economic development, praising the Aswan complex not only as a symbol of Soviet-UAR friendship and cooperation but also as the basis for further Egyptian economic progress. He routinely pledges continued Soviet support and assistance to the Arabs in their struggle against "Israeli aggression" and for a "just political solution," but offers no specifics other than a brief announcement of Soviet assistance in rural electrification and land reclamation.

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Paying tribute to Nasir for his "progressive social and economic reforms" and his part in fostering UAR-Soviet friendship, Podgorny in his banquet speech on the 13th also praises President as-Sadat for his "great personal contribution to the advancement" of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation in political, economic, defense and other fields. Characterizing the talks held during his visit, Podgorny says in his Cairo television address on the 18th that they were "thorough and fruitful," and that the "exchange of views" again confirmed identity of opinions on major international issues.

SOVIET SUPPORT Podgorny repeats past Soviet generalized pledges of continued support and assistance to the Arabs, both in the context of the Middle East conflict and with regard to economic development. Such avowals of aid are typified by his Cairo television statement in which he says the USSR will continue to render the Arab states the necessary political, economic, and military assistance in defense of their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Not unexpectedly, he offers no details of such assistance, and fails to enlarge on his brief announcement, in his Aswan rally speech on the 15th, regarding the Soviet decision to assist in rural electrification and land reclamation--an announcement welcomed by Cairo media. Pointing out, in his banquet speech on the 18th, that the USSR knows from its own experience that a developed economy is a basis for insuring genuine independence and "strengthening its defense potential," Podgorny again says the Soviet Union is "trying to give all-round assistance" to the UAR in developing industry and agriculture.

At the same time, Podgorny seems to caution against any idea of unlimited Soviet largesse: In his Alexandria dockyard speech on the 17th, he says the USSR is prepared to assist Egypt "as much as it can," but that it is not giving assistance because of any surplus of capital since "we do not have it." "We are ready," he says, "to make certain material expenditures" to facilitate the development of young independent states, without seeking any advantage for the USSR. Comparing the "more difficult" conditions under which Soviet development took place with those prevailing in the UAR, he notes that "you have many friends" ready and capable of giving the necessary aid. At the same time, he acknowledges "certain difficulties" complicating development in the UAR, such as

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lack of capital and specialists and "other greater or lesser problems" in economic and cultural development. While he assesses them as "doubtless" temporary, he says they are "augmented by the scheming of internal reaction and external imperialist forces."

POLITICAL SOLUTION Podgorny again presses the theme of a political solution of the Middle East conflict, while eschewing any detailed discussion of the subject. He mentions the Jarring talks only once, remarking in his banquet speech on the 13th that although Israel finally announced agreement to begin negotiations through Jarring, it appears from "international press reports" that it does not approve full withdrawal. He does not refer to the issue of a cease-fire extension.

Podgorny repeatedly outlines Moscow's "realistic program" for peace which is reiterated in the communique. He portrays the Egyptians as committed to a peaceful course but impelled also to strengthen their defenses, and on the 13th promises continued Soviet support for the "diversified" policy which includes political and diplomatic activity. Speaking at the banquet on the 18th, he points to the difficulty of the "many-sided" struggle ahead and says it will call for "realistic assessment" of the situation, statesmanlike wisdom, self-control, and flexibility.

MILITARY RELATIONS Assessing bilateral relations in his banquet speech on the 13th, Podgorny remarks, with respect to military relations, that they "have no secret goals that represent a danger to peace." The meaning of these relations, he says, is to "consolidate the defenses of the UAR and its readiness to give a worthy rebuff to the Israeli aggressors."

Speaking at a luncheon in Alexandria on the 17th, Podgorny makes one of the infrequent Soviet references to USSR naval visits to Egypt, mentioning that Soviet warships stationed in the Mediterranean call at Alexandria, and that these visits are of a "friendly nature and serve the interests of our two countries." He adds that the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean is a "serious factor restraining imperialism from all sorts of intrigues and ventures" directed against the national liberation movements of peoples of the area. (Neither Cairo nor Moscow media confirmed a report in AL-AHRAM, carried by MENA on the 16th, that Podgorny and as-Sadat would visit the destroyer Leningrad, which just arrived in Alexandria.)

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COMMUNIQUE CALLS WITHDRAWAL NECESSARY FOR PEACE

The Middle East section of the joint communique concluding Podgorny's visit to the UAR repeats the formula for peace along the lines of the Nasir communique last July: Both sides express the conviction that peace in the Middle East can only be insured by Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, and fulfillment of UN resolutions concerning the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine. There seems no particular reason for reversal of this order in the December 1970 communique on Ali Sabri's Moscow visit, which listed implementation of Resolution 242 before withdrawal.

The current communique does not include certain points in the December document, such as its reference to the Jarring talks and its reaffirmation of support for efforts "in and outside" the United Nations aimed at a peaceful settlement. It does refer to the "dangerous situation" in the Middle East as a result of "Israeli aggression," but does not repeat the December communique's statement on the danger of continuation of the present situation created by Israeli efforts to continue occupation of the Arab territories. As usual, Israel's "aggressive expansionist policy" is said to be possible only because of the support of "imperialist forces, first of all the United States."

Paralleling the December communique, the current one notes Soviet assurances that the USSR will further support the UAR people in their struggle against "Israeli aggression," for liberation of all occupied territories and a just settlement in the Middle East.

The sides note the importance of developing and strengthening inter-Arab cooperation in the struggle against Israel. Podgorny had also underlined this point in his 18 January banquet speech, remarking, in connection with Arab unity, that the "overcoming of differences and lack of coordination still manifesting themselves" acquires "an increasingly greater significance" in present-day conditions.

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BILATERAL RELATIONS The usual "extensive exchange of opinions" is routinely said to have taken place in an atmosphere of "cordiality and full mutual understanding" and, as is customary, a "unity of views" was noted in discussion of other topical international questions. (TASS, reporting the talks on the 18th, said they were held in an atmosphere of "friendship and frankness," a not unusual description: The communique on Nasir's July 1968 visit, for instance, had spoken of a "friendly and cordial atmosphere and spirit of complete mutual understanding" and immediately gone on to say that "frank views were exchanged" on bilateral matters and the Middle East situation.)

The sides noted "with satisfaction" the friendly ties and fruitful cooperation in political, economic, defense, and other fields and discussed further "long-term" development of cooperation. The communique notes without elaboration that the USSR will give the UAR "all possible assistance" in rural electrification and land reclamation "and in other fields as well." The UAR side requested Soviet specialists to provide technical assistance in operation of the Aswan complex until Arab specialists have been fully trained. (According to MENA on the 15th, Podgorny, meeting at Aswan with Soviet experts, said that after completion of the dam "a number of Soviet experts will return to the Soviet Union while others will remain in Aswan"; the chairman of the High Dam Authority had been reported by MENA on the 7th as saying 40 experts would remain during the warranty period.)

In the field of party ties, the communique advocated exchanges of delegations; the Nasir communique last July had noted the sides' agreement to continue "this fruitful and useful practice."

MOSCOW DISCUSSES "WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE," U.S. POLICY

The first Moscow comment on the Egyptian notion for a timetable for Israeli withdrawal as a condition for an extension of the cease-fire comes in the characterization of it as "reasonable" by PRAVDA's Primakov, speaking in the radio's domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 18th. The only previous known instance in Soviet propaganda when a cease-fire extension was linked to a withdrawal timetable was in a TASS report that President as-Sadat had stated on 30 November that the UAR would agree to an extension of the cease-fire "only if an accurate calendar plan is set" for Israeli withdrawal. Soviet support for the idea of drawing up a timetable--for the

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withdrawal of troops and the implementation of "other provisions" of Security Council Resolution 242--was voiced in the communique on Ponomarev's December visit to the UAR, but there was no mention of a cease-fire in this connection.

Primakov complains to his roundtable colleagues that Israel not only will not raise the question of withdrawal, but is conducting a policy aimed at assimilation of the occupied territories. He concludes that it is "reasonable" for the UAR to say "that it cannot officially continue the cease-fire after 5 February unless Israel agrees to a timetable for the withdrawal of its troops" from occupied territory. Egypt, he explains, does not want to legally justify, by prolonging the cease-fire period, the occupation by Israel of Arab territory.

The Western press, Primakov says, presents this position as a demand for unconditional withdrawal and nothing else. But, he argues, if the Egyptians say that they are not prepared to continue the cease-fire without a timetable, "that they do not limit themselves to the withdrawal of troops, then they take upon themselves obligations on all the complex of questions" envisaged in Resolution 242. Touching earlier on this complex, he calls for a "package-deal solution"-- a concept outlined in the first public presentation of Moscow's Mideast proposals, in the Vasilyev PRAVDA article in January 1969--calling for withdrawal and simultaneous resolution of the question of ending the Arab-Israeli state of war, freedom of navigation of all sea routes, "and so on, including the question of Palestinian refugees."

Primakov notes that the U.S. press is pointing out that the United States has brought pressure to bear on Israel and it has allegedly already made concessions--"utterly invisible," he says--and "now it is up to the USSR to say its piece." Failing to take up the challenge, Primakov instead asserts that while "transferring some of the responsibility" from itself to the USSR, the United States is instigating Israel to thwart a "compromise settlement," remarking that the delivery of new offensive weapons cannot be described as pressure on Israel.

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JARRING MISSION Moscow's scanty coverage of the Jarring mission tends to convey an impression of pessimism in that no change is seen in Israel's attitude toward withdrawal. Primakov, maintaining that the Soviet Union had "persistently advocated" renewal of the Jarring mission, rhetorically asks what Jarring brought back from his trip to Jerusalem, and replies that according to the U.S. press, Israel is in no way considering the question of withdrawal. And TASS correspondent Pivovarov reported from New York on the 15th that Prime Minister Meir submitted to Jarring "new 'proposals' on the Middle East peace settlement which do not move the solution even a single step forward." Citing "reliable sources" at the United Nations, he said the proposals were based on Tel Aviv's "old territorial claims."

Moscow's domestic service on the 17th also attributed to "informed UN circles" the view that the Israeli language had undergone some changes, but the essence of its policy was unchanged, and it forecast the danger of a "breakdown" in Jarring's mission. The broadcast reported that Egyptian UN delegate az-Zayyat had handed Jarring a written statement from the UAR Government on the 15th calling for fulfillment of Resolution 242, "which demands withdrawal," and asserted that there was nothing about the resolution in Mrs. Meir's letter to Jarring.

On the 18th, TASS did report U Thant as expressing, at a press conference that day, "cautious optimism" as to prospects for Jarring's contacts.

PEACEKEEPING FORCE Typically evasive on the issue of Big Two or Big Four participation in a Middle East peacekeeping force, TASS reported U Thant as saying at his press conference that the question of the establishment and composition of an international peacekeeping force in the Middle East falls under the competence of the Security Council. According to U.S. press accounts, U Thant said he had doubts as to the wisdom of active participation of the two superpowers in a UN peacekeeping force, particularly in an area such as the Middle East, although he saw no difficulty in British and French participation.

TASS in reporting Secretary Rogers' 15 January CBS television remarks noted without comment that he said the United States "was 'prepared to play a responsible role in peacekeeping in the area.'"

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While Moscow's Middle East proposals, as made public from time to time, envisage the stationing of UN forces in certain areas, Moscow has been reticent with regard to Cairo's proposal--outlined in the 13 January Al-AHRAM--for Big Four participation in a UN peacekeeping force. According to the paper, this was the "principal point" in Foreign Minister Riyad's recent contacts in London, Paris, and Rome; MENA noted that he discussed this trip during the Arab-Soviet talks in Cairo on the 14th.

BIG FOUR ROLE While not publicly promoting UAR urgings for Big Four action in providing recommendations to Jarring, Moscow indirectly suggests an interest in the possibility. Thus the TASS account of U Thant's press conference represents him as saying--in the context of the Middle East--that the Big Four "play an important role in the questions concerning international peace and security." U Thant is quoted in the U.S. press, however, as having seen "some merit in the statements of some governments that for the moment, at least, the four permanent members of the Security Council should not be too active in arriving at a consensus or agreed principles or guidelines." And in its brief account of Secretary Rogers' 15 January television remarks, TASS the next day gratuitously injected the observation that the Secretary did not say whether the United States intended to return to the Middle East consultations of the deputies of the Big Four UN representatives, which had been "stalled by it."

In an earlier reference to a Big Four role, a Ryzhikov domestic service commentary on the 12th said that if the Jarring mission resulted in an impasse due to Tel Aviv's present "extremist position," only the negotiations between the Big Four "will be able to succeed, as is hoped in Cairo, in arriving at a timetable" for implementation of Resolution 242. Ryzhikov recalled that in his 4 January television interview President Nixon emphasized the role of the Big Four and "even urged them to join efforts to promote the establishment of peace" in the area. Referring to the anti-Soviet activities of the Jewish Defense League, Ryzhikov asked why Israel's "paid agents" are allowed "to drive a wedge between two members of the Big Four who also, to use President Nixon's graphic terms, hold the key to the maintenance of peace."

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

GDR LEADERS ADAMANT ON NO "INTRA-GERMAN RELATIONS"

Strong reiterations of the GDR's policy toward relations with West Germany, calling for "normal" diplomatic ties between equally sovereign states and rejecting the West German concept of special "intra-German relations," have appeared amid a flurry of statements by FRG Government leaders and politicians in the first half of January on West German policy toward the GDR, the four-power talks on West Berlin, the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, and the Ostpolitik in general.

In a relatively low-keyed speech to the diplomatic corps at a New Year's reception on 9 January, published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the next day, Ulbricht again gave his stock interpretation of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties. Ascribing their "great importance" to the fact that Bonn, by signing them, has "recognized the inviolability and immutability under international law" of the present European borders, including the border between the FRG and GDR, he added that the FRG Government had pledged itself to conduct its relations with the GDR on the basis of full equality and nondiscrimination. Bonn, he said, has adopted the policy that neither state can represent the other abroad or act in its name, thereby creating "more favorable conditions" for establishing "contractual relations" between the FRG and the GDR on the basis of international law. He reiterated the GDR's readiness to begin negotiations with all states, including the FRG, on the establishment of "normal diplomatic relations."

On the 14th, the day before State Secretaries Bahr of the FRG and Kohl of the GDR met in Bonn for the latest session in their current series of talks, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND published a long report it said had been delivered by Ulbricht to a 17 December session of the committee on preparations for the SED's 25th anniversary, 21 April. After a lengthy review of the evolution of the East German SED, through a merger of the former Communist and Social Democratic parties, and a glowing account of the SED's accomplishments, Ulbricht strongly denounced the FRG for trying to draw the GDR closer to the FRG on the basis of a "fictitious 'national community of interests'" and for seeking to gain a foothold in the GDR by propagating "social democratism." Repeating the GDR's insistence that there never can be any "special intra-German relations" or "so-called unity of nation," he stated that GDR policy is based on establishing relations with Bonn in accordance with international law, thereby thwarting all notions of any kind of "intra-German relations."

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On 17 January, at an East Berlin ceremony marking the 52th anniversary of the deaths of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, SED Politburo member Norden took the occasion to deliver a diatribe against anticommunism in general and the Federal Republic in particular. In the speech as broadcast live by East Berlin radio, Norden said flatly that there will be no "so-called dialogs" between the GDR and the FRG. There can be no bridge between the two states, he said, "but only the sharpest delimitation. There will never be so-called special internal German relations or so-called dialogs conducted between the FRG . . . and the GDR." Peace and detente, he continued, require "normal relations under international law between the GDR and the FRG."

BAHR-KOHL The communique issued after the 15 January Bahr-Kohl
TALKS meeting, the third in the current series and the
 first in Bonn, stated for the first time that the
two sides had agreed not only to continue their talks but to meet again on a prearranged date--26 January, in Berlin. CDR media treated the third meeting much as they did the first two: ADN tersely reported on the 13th that Kohl had suggested to Bahr that they meet in Bonn on the 15th, and on that date it announced without elaboration that the two state secretaries had "another meeting." TASS took note of the meeting on the 15th, also without comment.

The decision to hold the third meeting on 15 January came against the background of a succession of developments involving both German states and Moscow. On the 11th, FRG spokesmen Ahlers had been quoted by DPA as stating at a press conference that although the second Bahr-Kohl meeting on 23 December had been "fruitless," Bonn was waiting for East Germany to propose a date for the third one but believed it could not take place before the next--19 January--round of the four-power ambassadorial talks on West Berlin. On 11 and 12 January, the two days preceding the customary session of the four ambassadors' deputies in preparation for the meeting of their principals, the Soviet authorities held up Allied military traffic between the FRG and West Berlin, ostensibly over improper documentation--a holdup typically unacknowledged in Soviet or GDR media. During the same two days, Kohl and GDR Foreign Minister Winzer were meeting in Moscow with Gromyko and Valentin Falin, the USSR ambassador-designate to the FRG, to discuss--according to TASS and ADN--"topical international problems of interest to both states that primarily concern the consolidation of European security." The announcement on the scheduling of the third Bahr-Kohl meeting was made the day after Kohl and Winzer returned home.

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GDR SEES PLANNED FDP MEETING IN WEST BERLIN AS "PROVOCATION"

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 14 January published a brief ADN dispatch from West Berlin that charged the Springer press in West Germany with calling for "further provocations" in West Berlin. Specifically, the dispatch noted that the West German MORGENPOST had lauded the announced intention of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) leadership to hold an "illegal session" of FDP parliamentary leaders in late January "outside the borders of the FRG--in West Berlin." The plan for such a meeting, ADN concluded, is "directed against detente in Europe." The dispatch contained no direct warning of possible GDR retaliatory action, however, and the GDR Foreign Ministry has yet to release a statement on the order of those it issued prior to the similar CDU/CSU and SPD meetings in West Berlin in November and December, respectively. Those meetings also occasioned traffic slowdowns on the autobahns linking the Federal Republic and West Berlin.

A direct reference to the traffic situation by CPSU Central Committee candidate member V.A. Demchenko, heading a CPSU delegation to the FRG as a guest of the German Communist Party (DKP), was predictably omitted in an ADN account of his remarks at a press conference on the 14th. TASS did not report the press conference. The West German DPA quoted Demchenko as remarking that "the incidents in the Berlin traffic will cease only after a satisfactory Berlin solution is reached." He also said, according to DPA, that there is no direct "causality between the difficulties in the transit traffic and the discussion of the link between ratification of the Moscow treaty and a satisfactory Berlin settlement," but that the USSR nevertheless supports the GDR's "justified" wishes. A Soviet commentator on 8 December had called the GDR authorities' actions--not specified--at the time of the November traffic slowdown "justified countermeasures." During the December slowdown both Soviet and East German official statements and accompanying propaganda disclaimed responsibility for the--again undefined--"consequences" of the "illegal" SPD meeting in West Berlin.*

MOSCOW COMMENT Recent Soviet comment has strongly criticized Bonn for contradictions between its words and deeds pertaining to West Berlin and the socialist countries. Noting that "a number of provocative working sessions of the heads of the ruling Bonn coalition parties are planned to be held in West Berlin in January and February," a Zakharov commentary beamed to Germany on 16-17 January typically called this a

* For a discussion of this propaganda see the TRENDS of 23 December, pages 28-29.

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"relapse" into the "adventurous policy" of the past 20 years. Against the background of Western reports about a widening gulf between Bonn and its allies--primarily the United States--over the rate of development of Brandt's Ostpolitik, Zakharov said, Bonn is now trying to remove "a whole mountain of doubts and distrust" in Washington through its "provocative acts and attacks against the socialist countries." And Bonn's "stilted phrases" about efforts to contribute to the normalization of the situation in West Berlin, he added, cannot be used "to camouflage the unlawful claims and provocative acts which continue to be staged in West Berlin."

A NOVOSTI commentary carried in the domestic service on the 16th similarly argued that "illegal journeys to the city on the Spree cannot in any way give juridical effect to the illegitimate pretensions of the FRG to West Berlin"; they can only increase tension in Central Europe, the commentary said, asking rhetorically if that was "truly in the interests" of the West Berliners. Asserting that Bonn "has no objections" to using the Moscow and Warsaw treaties as a cover for its policy toward West Berlin and for its "malicious campaign" against the GDR and other socialist countries, Zakharov charged West Germany with contravening both the "letter and spirit" of the treaties.

FOUR-POWER TALKS Reporting the 13th meeting of the ambassadors' talks on West Berlin on 19 January, ADN and TASS followed the pattern of their coverage of the previous meeting. TASS merely noted that the ambassadors met "for another meeting in the framework of the exchange of views on questions pertaining to the situation in and around West Berlin." ADN again carried the more detailed report, using the same formulation that appeared in the TASS account but adding that there was a "businesslike discussion" and noting that the next meeting would be held on 9 February, preceded by consultations at the expert level.

Ulbricht, who in his New Year's address to the nation had accused Bonn of using the four-power talks to delay a Berlin settlement; by insisting that a settlement must await four-power agreement, did not mention the talks at all in his 9 January speech to the diplomatic corps in East Berlin. In brief remarks on West Berlin, which seemed considerably more restrained than his New Year's comments, he stated that the West Berlin problem should be settled in the interests of peace in Europe and added: "Even though this involves complicated questions, we believe that settlements will be possible if the other side furnishes proof of its serious desire to come to an understanding by displaying a corresponding spirit of accommodation."

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Moscow comment has continued to stress that there can be no linkage between ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties or the convening of a conference on European security with a "satisfactory settlement" on West Berlin at the four-power talks. For example, a Zakharov commentary in German on the 6th said that the four-power negotiations are "not directly connected" with the Moscow and Warsaw treaties. Zakharov reminded his listeners that in the discussions on West Berlin "there is no talk about maintenance of the status of West Berlin, but rather about an improvement in its situation." To convert the "diplomatic goal" of the talks into a "political demand," he continued, would be "detrimental" to the course of the four-power talks and to the entire process of establishing "new relations" between the FRG and the USSR, Poland, and other socialist countries and would "torpedo" efforts to normalize the situation in Europe.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PARTY GOES ON RECORD AS SAYING 1968 INVASION WAS "REQUESTED"

After a delay of more than a month, Czechoslovak media on 13 and 14 January released a lengthy document adopted by the 10-11 December CPCZ plenum entitled "Lessons Drawn From the Crisis Development in the Party and Society After the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia." In this document, the CPCZ for the first time goes beyond its heretofore official line that the August 1968 intervention was a gratefully received initiative taken by the Warsaw Five. It declares now that "thousands" of Czechoslovak party leaders and organizations actually "begged" for the invasion.

Soviet media had said nothing about the document's existence in their coverage of the December CPCZ plenum, although Prague reports at the time mentioned its adoption as one of the plenum's actions. The long delay in Prague media's release of a text may be taken as circumstantial evidence that the content was under review with Moscow and that the Soviets wanted some changes made. They might have been displeased with the indictment of Novotny's post-1966 leadership--still strong in the text as now released--and the new formula on the invasion may have been injected at Soviet insistence.

In its first mention of the document, TASS carried a summary on 14 January that was virtually identical to the CTK summary of the day before, and the TASS summary covered about half a page of PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 15th, including lengthy portions of the indictment of Novotny. Radio Moscow has carried favorable commentaries on the CPCZ document in Romanian, Czech, Polish, Mandarin, and the languages of other communist and noncommunist countries. One by Soltan, given fairly wide dissemination on the 15th and 16th, largely paraphrases the document itself in highlighting the new formulation on the invasion as "the only correct decision."

THE CPCZ'S NEW ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS OF 1968	In its most striking passages, the CPCZ document, after reiterating the usual thesis on the "counter-revolutionary situation" in August 1968 and the Dubcek leadership's alleged ignoring of internal "appeals," adds
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that "thousands of communists" including "members of the CPCZ Central Committee . . . began to turn to the leaderships of the fraternal parties" and governments, "begging them in this historically grave moment to grant international assistance to the Czechoslovak people in the defense of socialism." It goes on to explain that these alleged requests were made "in the profound conviction that their class brethren would not leave Czechoslovakia at the mercy of the counterrevolution, which threatened bloodshed, and that they would prevent our country from being torn out of the socialist community."

The document does not identify any leaders who joined in calls for the invasion, but the new formulation reflects the continued prestige of such leading conservatives as Vasil Bilak, CPCZ Presidium member and secretary in charge of international party affairs. In the days just following the 1968 invasion, there were calls by Czechoslovak rank-and-file liberals for the trial of Bilak, Indra, and other conservatives on treason charges for having allegedly made the "request" which the Soviets initially claimed as the justification for the intervention.

The document goes into greater detail than heretofore on the personnel involved in the working out of the "Moscow agreement" in the days following the invasion. It says that on 23 August 1968, "despite opposition from rightist representatives," President Svoboda left for Moscow accompanied by a delegation made up of "Comrades Gustav Husak, Vasil Bilak, Alois Indra, Jan Piller, Martin Dzur, and Bohumil Kucera." Still withholding a direct acknowledgment that Dubcek and other liberals had been taken to the Soviet capital under arrest, it adds that "in Moscow, they were joined by Alexander Dubcek, Oldrich Cernik, Josef Smrkovsky, Josef Spacek, and Bohumil Simon." Two days later, it says, Oldrich Svestka, Emil Rigo, Frantisek Barbirek, Milos Jakes, Jozef Lenart, and Zdenek Mlynar--all conservatives--arrived in the Soviet capital.

On the score of the invasion, the document concludes that "any solution which did not include immediate outside help from the Soviet Union and other of our allies could have had no hope of success" in "saving socialism in Czechoslovakia." In this connection, it rejects anew, as Husak had done at the June 1969 Moscow international party conference, the "abstract concept of the sovereignty of a socialist state as

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is being spread by bourgeois propaganda." In effect reaffirming the Brezhnev doctrine, the document says the CPCZ supports the principle of "the class and international imbalance of a socialist state" and "therefore considers the entry of the allied troops into the USSR as fraternal international assistance to the Czechoslovak people."

CRITICAL COMMENT FROM YUGOSLAVIA, WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS

There were prompt critical reactions from independently-oriented communist sources: A Sundic commentary carried by the Zagreb domestic service on the 15th, while welcoming the solution of the "riddle" of an invasion request, remarked sarcastically that even now in the CPCZ's restored "healthy" state "no one has the courage to accept responsibility for sending the appeal." This shows, Sundic added, that the invasion "has solved nothing." The Yugoslav commentator concluded that "the existence of the danger of a repetition of the Czechoslovak affair gives us the right not to retreat by a hair's breadth from the attitude adopted by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1968."

Also on the 15th, the Italian CP daily L'UNITA carried an unattributed dispatch from Prague reporting the publication of the CPCZ document and taking particular issue with the document's attack on the "abstract" doctrine of the sovereignty of a socialist state. "As Italian communists," the dispatch asserted, "we do not admit that the sovereignty of a socialist country can be contrary to its 'class and internationalist' nature." Sovereignty, it added, "is an inalienable right." The dispatch asked rhetorically how it was possible for a country like Czechoslovakia, "after 20 years of a socialist system, to come to the point of having to entrust the 'safety' of socialism itself--as the document states--to foreign intervention."

The document elicited from the French CP a response, in a L'HUMANITE editorial on the 18th, which departed from that party's muted treatment of the Czechoslovak scene after its initial denunciation of the August 1968 invasion. After a fairly lengthy, essentially objective summary of the document's main points, the editorial remarked that "the PCF position is well known. Our party voiced its opposition to the military intervention in Czechoslovakia. It always advocated a

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political settlement of the crisis." L'HUMANITE added that the French party, "while insisting on the need to counter the anti-socialist activities," believed that the Czechoslovak party and government were "capable" of doing this themselves, and "nothing induces our party to modify its position." The CPCZ document's thesis on sovereignty, it continued, are at variance with the 1969 Moscow conference document's defense of "sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs." The editorial concluded with an assertion that "our party adheres resolutely to the letter and spirit of these principles." The British CP daily MORNING STAR on the 20th carried an approving report of L'HUMANITE's editorial.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

ILICHEV RETURNS TO PEKING; PRC AMBASSADOR SEE'S KOSYGIN

Moscow and Peking have again shown a desire to control and limit the level of their hostility while pursuing the political and ideological rivalry. Following the sharp exchange of polemics pegged to the Polish situation and Peking's New Year's Day joint editorial, Moscow announced the return to Peking on 12 January of L. Ilichev, the Soviet chief negotiator at the border talks, and reported that Premier Kosygin had given an audience to the Chinese ambassador on the 18th. Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov, who also had left Peking unannounced last month, is back at his Peking post, according to TASS' report on Ilichev's return there.

Peking has adhered to its pattern of polemical restraint interrupted occasionally by sharp thrusts at targets of opportunity--most recently the Polish disturbances and before that the August Soviet-FRG treaty, which evoked a belated Chinese attack on Moscow for selling out the GDR. Peking's treatment of the 25th anniversary of the Albanian People's Republic on 11 January, an occasion on which the Chinese could have pressed provocative charges of Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe, was moderate in tone and avoided direct attacks on Moscow. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the anniversary contained only vague references to "modern revisionism" and failed even to mention "social imperialism." Peking left it to the Albanians to voice harsh anti-Soviet charges: NCNA carried Albanian comment denouncing "the Brezhnev-Kosygin Khrushchev traitorous clique" and "Soviet social imperialism." On 11 January NCNA quoted a speaker at a Tirana meeting who raised the PRC's banner as "the powerful bulwark of socialism and Marxism-Leninism" and the "main obstacle" to U.S. and Soviet domination of the world.

ENVOYS' ACTIVITIES According to TASS on 14 January, Ilichev returned to Peking that day and was met at the airport by his Chinese counterpart at the talks, Chiao Kuan-hua, as well as by Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov. An AFP dispatch from Peking on 5 December had reported the departure that day of both Ilichev and Tolstikov. In December 1969 the former head of the Soviet delegation, Kuznetsov, had left Peking for the announced purpose of attending the Supreme

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Soviet senator; he returned to Peking on 2 January and was met by the deputy head of the Chinese delegation. Both sides reported his return last January, but Peking has not yet mentioned Tlichev's return.

Kosygin received PRC Ambassador Liu Hsin-chuan on 18 January for "a talk," according to both TASS and NCNA. Liu had arrived in Moscow on 22 November and presented his credentials to President Podgornyy two days later. As in the case of the Liu-Kosygin meeting, both sides reported without any elaboration that Liu and Podgornyy had a talk. Tolstikov had arrived in Peking earlier, on 10 October, and had presented his credentials to Tung Pi-wu three days later. He was received by Chou En-lai on 18 November--that is, in less than six weeks, compared with the more than eight weeks before Liu saw Kosygin. Whether or not this disparity represented a calculated move by Moscow, the Chinese seem to have snubbed the Soviets earlier by their long delay in announcing their appointment of an ambassador and by their treatment of Tolstikov's meeting with Tung; several hours after TASS had reported that the meeting was "marked by a friendly atmosphere," NCNA announced merely that the two had had "a talk." The Soviets, possibly reacting to this Chinese behavior, may also have delayed Liu's audience with Kosygin to convey displeasure at the Chinese polemical assault in connection with the Polish disorders, which postdated Liu's arrival in Moscow.

MOSCOW ON CHINA Polemical comment on China has again disappeared from the Soviet daily press, as Moscow returns to the low-level anti-Chinese routine it followed before Peking's recent polemical outbursts. Beginning on 15 January TASS has carried daily excerpts of travel notes by a Polish correspondent stationed in Peking, but these have not been carried in the Soviet daily press. The Polish correspondent was one of several newsmen--including a TASS correspondent, according to a dispatch from Peking by a Hungarian correspondent on 23 October--who were given a tour of parts of China last year. As serialized by TASS, the travel notes convey in a low key the correspondent's impressions of China at a time when Maoist evangelism and anti-Soviet propaganda have been moderated. But while acknowledging this moderation, he observes that a photograph of Damanskiy (Chenpao) Island bears an inscription--in Chinese only--about readiness to rebuff "border provocations by Soviet revisionism."

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In its broadcasts to the Chinese, Moscow has referred to photographs of this sort in complaining that Peking has continued to indoctrinate the Chinese in anti-Soviet sentiment. Moscow has not, however, drawn implications for the Peking talks from its charges that the Chinese have not demonstrated sincerity in seeking normalization of relations. In a rare reference to the talks in polemical comment, a Radio Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 16 January expressed a hope that progress can be achieved at the talks in the long-term interests of both sides.

A commentary in Radio Moscow's program for the PLA, on the 16th, was unusually explicit in referring to military leaders still in power in the course of a discussion of factionalism and discontent within the Chinese military. Typically, the commentary deplored the purges of Peng Te-huai, Ho Lung, and Lo Jui-ching; but it also went on to mention several military commanders--in addition to the fallen Sinkiang boss, Wang En-mao--who became provincial revolutionary committee chairmen during the cultural revolution. One of those mentioned, Hsu Shih-yu, is a member of the CCP Politburo as well as first secretary of the Kiangsu provincial party committee.*

According to the commentary, these and other local military commanders defied directives from Peking during the cultural revolution and protected local party organizations. Noting that some of these were dismissed, the commentary asked pointedly: "But is it possible to dismiss, persecute, and intimidate all those who are concerned with the destinies of the state and its armed forces?" Pointing out the high turnover rate of PLA chiefs of staff in the political infighting, the commentary observed that "even the running dog of the cultural revolution, Yang Cheng-wu," had a short stay in the post and was replaced by Huang Yung-sheng.

* On 17 October 1969, three days before the opening of the Sino-Soviet talks, the Kiangsu provincial radio broadcast two commentaries which, drawing on the authority of Mao's report "On the Chungking Negotiations," sought to explain and defend the dual approach of negotiations and war preparedness. These commentaries were unique in PRC media at the time in their explicit treatment of the role of negotiations with the enemy.

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PEKING ON SUPERPOWERS The dominant theme in Peking's approach was illustrated by a PEOPLE'S DAILY article on 16 January entitled "Down With Hegemonism." Citing the nonaligned conference held last September and the UN anniversary celebrations as examples, the article claimed that the "medium-size and small nations" are becoming more united in opposition to the two superpowers, "U.S. imperialism and social imperialism." As for the PRC, the article struck the note introduced in Peking's New Year's Day editorial that "at no time will China ever behave like a superpower, neither today nor in the future."

The same theme was used by Li Hsien-nien on 18 January in welcoming a delegation from Equatorial Guinea, one of the countries with which Peking has established diplomatic relations in recent months. Attacking power politics as practiced by the superpowers and reiterating Peking's disclaimer of any intent to become one, Li sought to play on the Africans' desire for independence by deploring "big-nation chauvinism and power politics" and declaring that African affairs should be decided by the Africans themselves. Apart from a reference to armed struggles in the Portuguese colonies, the thrust of Li's remarks was directed against outside interference and subversion and in support of established governments. He noted that relations between the PRC and Equatorial Guinea were based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

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P R C I N T E R N A L A F F A I R S

LIAONING SETS UP PARTY COMMITTEE, FIRST IN NORTHEAST

In its sixth such announcement within the past 6 weeks, NCNA on 16 January reported on the establishment of a new party committee for Liaoning province--the first to be formed in the Northeast region of China. A local party congress attended by 972 delegates, larger than the 623-man body which selected the former provincial party committee, met from 9 to 13 January and elected 81 members and 28 alternates to the Liaoning CCP Committee. Figures on the total size of the old party committee are not available, but the five-man group which heads the new committee is smaller than the former 15-man secretariat.

Adhering to the pattern for the previously announced committees, top party positions on the new committee were given to local leaders within the provincial revolutionary committee-military establishment. Military men gained the top three positions on the new secretariat. Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee and commander of the Shenyang Military Region (MR), was elected first secretary, with Tseng Shao-shan, political commissar of the Shenyang MR, named second secretary. Li Po-chiu, vice chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee and deputy political commissar of the Shenyang MR, was named secretary. Veteran cadres are represented on the new committee by Yang Chun-fu, vice chairman on the provincial revolutionary committee and former secretary on the old provincial party committee, who was named one of the deputy secretaries.

Mao Yuan-hsin, nephew of Mao and a former Red Guard leader, was named a deputy secretary. He was identified by NCNA only in his concurrent position as vice chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, and once again there was no specific claim that representatives of "the mass organizations" are represented on the new committee. As in the case of the other provincial party committees, the Liaoning committee was said to have been formed on the basis of the three-in-one alliance of old, middle-aged, and young--with no mention of the older triple formula of PLA, cadres, and mass representatives still utilized in lower-level party rebuilding.

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NEW PARTY COMMITTEES AT COUNTY OR HIGHER LEVEL

<u>Provincial- Level Unit</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>County</u>
Anhui*			2 ^o	8
Chekiang			1 ^o	20
Fukien				5
Kiangsi	+			10
Kiangsu	+		2	14
Shanghai	+			3
Shantung				
Honan				14
Hunan*	+			34
Hupei			1	6
Kwangsi				4
Kwangtung*	+		1	15
Hopeh				1
Inner Mongolia				
Peking				2
Shansi				6
Tientsin				
Heilungkiang			1	15
Kirin				5
Liaoning	+	1	1 ^o	4
Kansu*				8
Ningsia				3
Shensi*				6
Sinkiang				4
Tsinghai		2		2
Kweichow				
Szechwan				
Tibet				
Yunnan				5

* Apart from announcing individual new party committees, the provincial radio has claimed that "a majority" of or "many" counties and/or municipalities have formed party committees.

^o The provincial capital has formed its party committee.

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COMPARISON OF ANNOUNCEMENTS After six such announcements of new committees, the stylized rigidity of the format is apparent. The only slight deviation from the pattern appears in the Shanghai announcement, which made no reference to a party nucleus group. In all other instances it was reported that the main address was given by the head of the party nucleus group on behalf of the party nucleus group; for Shanghai, it was specified only that "Comrade Chang Chun-chiao made a political report." Also, in Shanghai, committee members were reportedly elected in accordance with the Party Constitution; elsewhere, it has invariably been specified that they were elected in accordance with the five requirements of Mao, the three criteria of Lin, and the Party Constitution.

Statistically speaking, it is Kiangsu province that appears to break from the set pattern. With a larger population than any of the other areas that have formed their committees, Kiangsu invited the fewest number of delegates to its congress, elected the smallest committee (counting alternates, it is the smallest except Shanghai's), and named the fewest number of members to its standing committee (except for Hunan, which failed to specify). Perhaps Politburo member Hsu Shih-yu, chief of the province and the Nanking Military Region, sees a greater need for emphasis on proletarian centralism than on proletarian democracy in his area.

PROGRESS ELSEWHERE Anhwei province is a likely candidate for the next provincial party committee, having announced a rebuilt committee for Hefei, its capital city, on 4 January. The provincial radio on 15 January also claimed that after three "serious" party consolidation campaigns since 1968 "the overwhelming majority of the municipalities and counties have held party congresses and set up new party committees." The same sweeping claim was made by Hunan and Kwangtung just before they announced formation of their party committees last month.

Tsinan radio on 16 January evinced a rare sense of concern that party consolidation may in some cases be proceeding too quickly. Shantung, alone in the East region, has reported no committees at county or higher level; yet the radio report states that in general the movement is "in fine shape." It warns, however, that some units are now "hastily carrying out party consolidation work to progress faster," which makes it "impossible" for these units to achieve any success. The speed-up is said to have directly affected "the quality of party consolidation and party building."

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TOPICS IN BRIEF

CONSUMPTION OF COAL The question whether high-quality coal mined locally can be consumed locally still seems to be at issue. A Hopleh broadcast of 28 December, reporting the findings of a nationwide meeting hosted by the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Commerce, declared that towns in mining areas should popularize the use of gas and low-grade coal and "must not consume high-grade coal." NCNA on 10 January, however, released an unusual report praising factories and residents in Amoy, Fukien Province, for burning high-quality anthracite "as a substitute for bituminous coal." Some factories, it is said, use anthracite exclusively, and about 70 percent of the residents have switched to it to prepare meals. In Fukien, this shift is regarded as a good thing, "greatly reducing the consumption of ordinary coal in the province."

TEAM VS. BRIGADE While the draft constitution of the PRC apparently states that the production teams are to remain the basic units of income distribution, Shanghai radio on 6 January made the unusual revelation that some are still trying to revise the base upward. In one production brigade some teams which had not developed as quickly as others wanted the distribution carried out at the brigade level. Though this is closer to the general Maoist ideal, the dissidents were educated in the correct relations between state, collective, and individual interests, and teams "have now all properly handled the year-end distribution work in accordance with their actual production conditions."

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