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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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13 JAN 1971


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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC



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13 JANUARY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 2)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 4 - 10 JANUARY 1971

<u>Moscow (3550 items)</u>		<u>Peking (2782 items)</u>	
China	(7%) 7%	Indochina	(16%) 31%
Indochina	(4%) 6%	[Laos, 15th	(--)] 13%]
Tashkent	(--)] 5%	Anniversary	
Declaration,		[NFLSV Delega-	(10%) 6%]
5th Anniversary		tion in PRC	
Angela Davis Case	(1%) 5%	PRC-Chile Diplomatic	(--)] 8%
Polish First	(--)] 2%	Relations	
Secretary Gierak		India-Nepal Relations	(--)] 3%
in USSR		Middle East	(1%) 3%
Middle East	(2%) 2%		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Secretary Laird's trip to Saigon provides a current peg for Vietnamese communist charges that the United States is intent on continuing aggression in Indochina through Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine. President Nixon's remarks in his 4 January TV interview as well as Laird's statements continue to be cited as evidence of U.S. hypocrisy regarding a political settlement of the Vietnam issue. And there is routine stress--at the Paris talks and in comment--on the basic demand that the United States agree to a timetable for a total troop withdrawal.

Propagandists continue to deplore U.S. "threats" of air strikes against the DRV, and on 11 January the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman protested U.S. action on the 8th in which planes "fired rockets on an area three kilometers off the coast of Ha Tinh Province."

Routine Moscow comment also scores both the President and Secretary Laird for only paying lip service to peace while continuing to expand aggression. Soviet commentators say that a prime motive of Laird's trip was to implement the Nixon Doctrine of "using Asians to fight Asians."

Peking's reaction to the President's 4 January remarks on Vietnam is limited to a single NCNA commentary, carried only in the news agency's Chinese-language transmission on the 9th. NCNA rejects the President's statements about U.S.-DRV understandings in connection with the halt to U.S. bombing of the North and denounces the President as a "war criminal."

EVIDENCE OF "AGGRESSION" SEEN IN REMARKS BY PRESIDENT, LAIRD

President Nixon's remarks on Vietnam in his 4 January TV interview were scored at the 98th Paris session on 7 January along the lines of initial Hanoi and Front comment, with both DRV delegate Xuan Thuy and PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh casting doubt on his sincerity regarding a political settlement. The VNA account notes that Mme. Binh questioned how the President could state that the United States was "on the way out of the Vietnam war in a way that would bring a just peace" when, she claimed, he in fact "has turned Johnson's

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war into his own and has even extended it to the whole of Indochina." According to the account, Xuan Thuy said that the President in his TV interview and Secretary Laird at his Paris news conference on the 6th "made a wholly erroneous analysis of the Vietnam problem, or to be more precise, gave a tendentious assessment of it."

VNA also reports Thuy's complaint that the President spoke only of the withdrawal of combat troops, not of all troops, and of ending the U.S. combat role, not the U.S. "military occupation," and that Laird "said explicitly" that a number of infantry as well as air force and logistic units will remain. The President's remarks on the troop-withdrawal issue are also scored by NHAN DAN on the 7th and 8th, with a Commentator article on the 7th complaining that the President "still refuses to announce a definite deadline for the withdrawal of all troops" and observing that after May 1971 there will still be 280,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam. Unlike other reaction to the interview, Commentator acknowledges that the President was asked whether the United States would intervene after the bulk of U.S. troops were withdrawn if--as Commentator puts it--the Saigon Administration "were in danger of being overthrown." Commentator says the President's "evasive" answer demonstrated his policy of prolonging the war, his refusal to withdraw U.S. troops, and his "persistent effort" to support the GVN.

Commentators and the delegates at Paris also took issue with the President's account of U.S. achievements in South Vietnam. VNA reports that Mme. Binh countered by noting that "420,000 enemy troops, including 110,000 GI's, were put out of action in 1970." These statistics from the PLAF Command's year-end communique--although Mme. Binh did not identify them as such--are cited in much of the comment in rebuttal of the President. Xuan Thuy in his statement not only cited the 1970 statistics but recalled the allegation that in 1969 the communists "put out of action" 640,000 troops, including 230,000 U.S. and other foreign forces. The VNA account, however, does not report this.

Like earlier Hanoi comment on the President's interview, Xuan Thuy referred to the "myth about an understanding," saying that although the DRV has rejected it, the President "persevered in reiterating it to have a pretext for resuming air attacks on north Vietnam." VNA does not note his

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citation of the President's remark that if the DRV says there is no understanding then "there is no restraint on us," which Thuy labelled even more "cynical" than the "understanding myth."

The NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 7th also notes that the President "brazenly" repeated the allegation about an "understanding" which the DRV has rejected. It adds that the President said that the United States will continue reconnaissance flights and that if these aircraft are fired upon, U.S. planes will strike at DRV anti-aircraft positions. But like earlier comment, the article glosses over the details of the President's explanation of his understanding.

Both Hanoi and the Front continue to comment on Laird's trip to Southeast Asia, with a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 13th saying he acted as an advertiser for the President's professed "peaceful desire." But commentators uniformly see the true purposes of the tour as connected with the effort to step up Vietnamization and with a quest for ways to improve Cambodia's "deteriorating" situation and to increase U.S. military aid to Thailand.

MEDIA IGNORE DRV SPOKESMAN ON POW LIST, KOSYGIN INTERVIEW

POW ISSUE The VNA account of the 7 January Paris session does not mention that Ambassador Bruce again raised the question of U.S. POW's held in the DRV. In keeping with standard practice, Hanoi media have not publicized the post-session briefing by DRV press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le in which he brought up the question of the POW list given by the DRV last month to Senators Fulbright and Kennedy. The VNA account of the session merely notes that the U.S. and GVN delegates "again resorted to perfidious allegations to plead for their aggressive stand." It thus ignores Ambassador Bruce's criticism of the DRV's "cynical exposure of prisoners of war to public curiosity for propaganda purposes" as demonstrated by the recent film made by a Canadian television correspondent.

Nguyen Thanh Le in the post-session Paris briefing on the 7th, transmitted in VNA's Paris-to-Hanoi service channel the next day, betrayed sensitivity to U.S. charges that the list of prisoners of war held in the DRV is incomplete. Le said that in response to requests "we provided a full and complete

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list of U.S. pilots captured in North Vietnam," and he went on to rebut U.S. references to inconsistency with a previous list.

The last known mentions of the POW list in DRV media were in the statement by the DRV spokesman in Paris released 26 December and in a NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 27th which scored remarks by Secretary Rogers at his 23 December press conference.

KOSYGIN Both Hanoi and Front media carried brief reports
INTERVIEW of some of Kosygin's remarks on Vietnam in his
 written response to the Tokyo ASAHI, but they do
not acknowledge his assertion--reported by TASS on 2 January--
that "the Soviet Union is ready, on its part, to further
facilitate the attainment of a political settlement in
Indochina."

DRV press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le was not directly responsive to a question about Kosygin's remark at his press briefing on the 7th, saying only that "in many statements the USSR has shown the United States the way to extricate itself from the Vietnam quagmire, namely to withdraw all its troops."

DRV PROTESTS AIR STRIKE, RELEASES WAR CRIMES COMMUNIQUE

On 11 January a statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman charged that on the 8th U.S. planes "fired rockets on an area three kilometers off the coast of Ha Tinh Province to the east of the Cua Sot rivermouth, North Vietnam." The statement "sternly condemned that act of war" of the United States and routinely warned that DRV territorial waters, land, and airspace are inviolable. It expressed the determination of the Vietnamese people "to punish any U.S. encroachment on DRV sovereignty and security and any acts of war against it."

This incident appears to be one belatedly acknowledged by the U.S. Command in Saigon on the 12th.* Hanoi has apparently

* A U.S. spokesman said that a Shrike missile was fired at an antiaircraft missile site--whose radar was tracking an unarmed U.S. reconnaissance plane and its fighter escort--100 miles north of the DMZ but that the missile missed the site and landed in the sea.

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not acknowledged another incident on the 8th in which, according to the U.S. Command on the 9th, a U.S. strike was made in the DRV east of the Mugia Pass and some 55 miles north of the DMZ.

WAR CRIMES COMMUNIQUE VNA on 8 January released a communique of the DRV War Crimes Commission listing alleged U.S. war crimes during December in North and South Vietnam. The charges are for the most part routine, and there is the familiar complaint that U.S. "crimes" were intensified during the month. In South Vietnam, the communique enumerates such "crimes" as those committed during pacification operations and bombings, the supplying of U.S. naval equipment to the GVN navy, and "intensified activities of U.S. warships."

VNA says the communique "denounced with particular vehemence the intensified U.S. air reconnaissance flights in North Vietnam and the encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security." In addition, it lists alleged U.S. tactical air raids against Lai Chau, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and tactical and strategic B-52 raids against Vinh Linh area.

MOSCOW SAYS REMARKS BY PRESIDENT, LAIRD MEAN MORE ESCALATION

Moscow continues to score U.S. "aggression" in Indochina in routine-level comment on President Nixon's 4 January TV interview and Secretary Laird's trip to Paris, Bangkok, and Saigon. An 8 January SOVIET RUSSIA article assails the "hypocrisy" of the President's comment that "we can now see the end of America's combat role in Vietnam" and observes that on the eve of the interview U.S. planes, including B-52's, carried out heavy strikes on South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and that there are continued U.S. "threats" to renew bombing of the DRV. A 10 January PRAVDA article includes Laird's trip among "international developments in the first 10 days of 1971," saying that it has no connection with "genuinely peaceful efforts" and may even be "linked with reports of preparations for a resumption of widescale U.S. air operations against the DRV."

TASS on the 6th, reporting Laird's press conference in Paris, noted that he praised Vietnamization and expressed "pessimism" regarding the prospects of a peace settlement at the Paris

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talks. Reporting his press conference in Saigon, a domestic service broadcast on the 11th said that he indicated that the United States will step up its Vietnamization program but that he avoided specific numbers when he spoke of the "gradual withdrawal" of American troops.

Other comment also stresses that Laird's trip was aimed at assessing the progress of Vietnamization and at implementing the Nixon Doctrine. A domestic service broadcast on the 7th quoted Laird as saying "frankly" upon his arrival in Bangkok that the aim of his trip was to strengthen military aid to Washington's allies in Southeast Asia and that this was what the President meant when he spoke of Vietnamization in his TV interview. In this connection, a Moscow broadcast in Thai on the 8th said that American officials visiting Saigon inevitably stop off in Bangkok, not merely because it is en route but because they believe the success of the Vietnamization program depends on how much support Thailand gives the Saigon government. Commentaries have also cited U.S. aid to Cambodia as further evidence of plans for continued aggression in the area, and Moscow on the 10th said that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer, was being sent "urgently" to Cambodia to study the military situation there.

PEKING SCORES 4 JANUARY NIXON STATEMENTS ON "UNDERSTANDINGS"

Peking's only comment on the President's statements about Vietnam in his 4 January television conversation comes in a 9 January commentary by NCNA correspondent Ou Ping, transmitted only in the news agency's Chinese-language service. The NCNA correspondent routinely rejects the President's assertion that there is an "understanding" allowing unhindered aerial reconnaissance over the DRV. He notes derisively that the President, in addition, "nonsensically dished out a kind of new 'understanding'" that "only the U.S. aggressor troops are allowed to remain in South Vietnam, but the Vietnamese people are not allowed to oppose aggression," and that the DRV will be bombed if the security of U.S. troops is not insured.

Ou Ping maintains that "the Vietnamese people, the Indochinese people, and the world's revolutionary people will not now and can never reach an 'understanding' with the U.S. aggressors-- an understanding of the theory that it is right to commit aggression and the theory of aggression for security."

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Deriding President Nixon for citing the word of members of the former administration to document the existence of a U.S.-DRV understanding, Ou Ping says he used as witnesses "a group of stinking war criminals." The commentary lists President Johnson and Secretaries Rusk and Clifford but does not mention that the President also cited Ambassador Harriman in this context.

LPA COMMUNIQUE CONDEMNS ALLIED "VIOLATIONS" OF CEASE-FIRES

Liberation Radio on 7 January broadcast an LPA communique of that date accusing the allies of committing 303 violations of the communists' three-day cease-fires over the Christmas and New Year holidays.* LPA charges that the allies "brazenly violated" the PRG cease-fire order on a "widespread basis" and even conducted sweeps on Christmas day when the allied truce was in effect. The communist forces strictly observed the cease-fire order, according to the communique, and did not take the initiative in attacking. Numerous specific allied actions during the two cease-fires are charged in the communique, which declares that "the PRG severely warns the U.S. Government and its puppets about these crimes and that they will continue to be punished appropriately." The communique reiterates the PRG order for a four-day cease-fire over the Tet holiday--from 26 to 30 January.

EAST BERLIN REPORTS DRV POLITBURO MEMBER TRUONG CHINH IN GDR

The first indication of DRV Politburo member Truong Chinh's whereabouts since late October** comes in an 11 January East

* Alleged allied violations of the communists' cease-fires have been charged in low-level propaganda since 27 December. This is the first time since 1968 that the LPA is known to have issued an official communique on cease-fire violations.

** The last public function that Truong Chinh was reported as attending was the 19-22 October session of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee. He has appeared in public regularly in the period since Ho's death in September 1969, with no absence from the public eye for longer than three and a half weeks. His last prolonged absence was from 20 March to 19 July 1969; at that time there were no public reports on his whereabouts.

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Berlin ADN report that he is in East Germany "taking a cure" and that he was received on the 11th by SED Politburo member Friedrich Ebert.

Truong Chinh's absence from Hanoi had again been indicated in Hanoi radio's 9 January report that the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee, of which he is chairman, had held a regular meeting that day presided over by Nguyen Xien. Xien is a vice chairman third in line for the role, after Vice Chairman Hoang Van Hoan. Budapest's MTI on 30 December reported that Hoan had left Hungary that day, having remained "for a rest" after heading the DRV delegation to the 10th Hungarian party congress. His whereabouts is not known to have been reported since then.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW CAUTIOUS ON PROSPECTS FOR JARRING CONTACTS

Commenting on the resumption of the Jarring talks, Moscow continues to profess the opinion that "full objective conditions" exist for the success of the mission, but cautions that serious difficulties lie ahead. Propaganda asserts that Israel is making prior conditions, unacceptable to the Arabs, and is continuing to evade implementing the "main condition" for a settlement, that of full Israeli withdrawal. A panelist on the 10 January Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable maintains that success of the Jarring mission depends wholly on the approach of the two sides to the "key clause" of Security Council Resolution 242 on withdrawal, and routinely contrasts UAR and Jordanian positions with Israeli insistence on the impossibility of returning to old frontiers.

Treating the two sides' attitudes in more detail, a Lunev domestic service commentary on 6 January noted that the UAR and Jordan are ready to end the state of war with Israel and sign a "corresponding multilateral document" with the "necessary condition" of full Israeli withdrawal. Israel, however, demands a revision of borders and insists on the conclusion of bilateral treaties with each Arab country separately, the commentator said, "although discussion of this question is not even within Jarring's competence."

JARRING IN ISRAEL Dealing with Dr. Jarring's 8-9 January talks in Israel, Moscow cites unspecified press comment and journalists' views to the effect that Israel is trying to replace substantive discussions with procedural issues. TASS' New York correspondent Pivovarov on the 11th says journalists at the United Nations believe the Israeli leaders have taken a stand which cannot facilitate a peaceful settlement, and he refers to press reports that Jarring was presented with "ultimatums" and a map of the Arab territories Israel intends to keep. A foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi on the 11th asserts that U.S. and Israeli propaganda is trying to create the impression that Jarring was given a "brand new and very constructive plan" for settling the Middle East question, but that the Western press has reported there is no real change in Israel's stand.

TASS on the 9th asserted that Israel was pressuring Jarring in order to channel the talks in the direction it wanted, that of indefinite prolongation of the cease-fire agreement and transferral of the contacts from New York to the Mediterranean. Noting that "a

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certain mechanism" for carrying out the talks had been formed at the United Nations, it characterized the demand for a change of venue as an effort to disrupt the talks.

The issue of the level of the talks as well as the venue is raised in a Moscow domestic service broadcast of a dispatch by Cairo correspondent Rassadin on the 8th: It says that Israel's desire "to take the talks away from UN control" is shown by its proposal to transfer them to Cyprus and hold them at foreign-minister level. On the other hand, TASS on the 9th reported without comment that UAR Foreign Minister Riyad in his Paris press conference said that he was empowered to hold talks with Jarring and "at the latter's suggestion their meeting is to be held in New York." (A Moscow Arabic-language broadcast, as well as Cairo radio, had reported Riyad's 23 December meeting with Jarring while in Moscow as a member of 'Ali Sabri's delegation.)

CEASE-FIRE EXTENSION While Moscow has seemed reluctant to publicly express its views on the desirability of a cease-fire extension, panelist Beglov, on the commentators' roundtable on the 10th, notes that the cease-fire period will end in less than a month, on 5 February, and comments that "it is clear that the Jarring mission can work only when the guns are silent." He goes on to cite UAR Foreign Minister Riyad as saying that if Israel is prepared to implement the Security Council resolution, the cease-fire agreement "could be extended for an unlimited period." TASS on the 6th had reported Riyad as making this remark at a London press conference; on the 9th it cited him as telling newsmen in Paris that it would be vain for Israel to hope for an "endless prolongation" of the cease-fire, which would mean permanent occupation of Arab lands.

TASS in reporting recent speeches by UAR President as-Sadat has pointed up remarks to the effect that Egypt does not seek to initiate military action after the expiration of the cease-fire agreement on 5 February. Thus it quoted him as refuting, in a speech to Asyut University professors on the 10th, "bellicose statements attributed to me in the Western press" to the effect that Egypt's intention not to prolong the cease-fire agreement means the UAR will declare war on 5 February. TASS cited him as stating that he never said he would declare war on this date, but only that "after this date we shall not consider ourselves bound by the cease-fire agreement." And in briefly reporting his speech at the Supreme Court in Cairo on the 12th, TASS highlighted his remark that "he and the government of the republic 'will make every effort to avoid bloodshed' after the expiration of the

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term of the cease-fire agreement." The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA)--to which TASS attributed its account--merely reports as-Sadat as saying that "it was announced in the United States that I am prepared to go to the end of the world if this prevents one of our soldiers from being wounded." This remark is not linked to the cease-fire expiration.

Since the Ponomarev communique of 20 December endorsed the idea of a withdrawal timetable, Moscow has given little further publicity to Cairo's variously stated call for a timetable, either for Israeli withdrawal or for implementation of Resolution 242, as a condition for further extension of the cease-fire agreement. TASS on the 11th did note as-Sadat as saying in his recent CBS interview that "if no settlement is reached" during the Jarring contacts, the UAR will not agree to prolongation of the cease-fire agreement. And in a speech at an Asyut rally on the 11th, according to TASS, he called for a "clear-cut plan" for withdrawal as the condition for an extension.

UAR ON BIG FOUR,
SECURITY COUNCIL

Moscow has also failed to give propaganda support to the Egyptian call--explained by AL-AHRAM on 13 January--for Big Four directives to Jarring* calling for a timetable for implementation of Resolution 242 or, failing this, for a Security Council meeting before the end of January to discuss implementation of the resolution. TASS' short reports on recent as-Sadat speeches do not touch on his proposals for the Big Four or the Security Council to guarantee a withdrawal timetable (Cairo University on the 8th), to intervene to implement Resolution 242 (to Asyut University professors on the 10th), to agree with Jarring on a timetable to implement the resolution (Asyut rally on the 11th), or to guarantee "specific steps" and a timetable (at the Supreme Court in Cairo on the 12th). Reporting the last speech, TASS merely cited the initial part of his remark, that the cease-fire agreement would not be prolonged if the Jarring mission "fails to produce serious results."

* As recently as 4 December, a PRAVDA article by Glukhov noted that Cairo supports continuation of the four-power consultations with the aim of formulating plans for implementing Resolution 242. TASS last summer had cited Nasir as stressing, in his 23 July anniversary speech, that Jarring should receive instructions from the Big Four. And Belyayev, in an article in the 7 August NEW TIMES, had declared it would be "perfectly logical" to activate the four-power consultations "to formulate coordinated recommendations" to Jarring.

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Similarly, TASS in reporting UAR Foreign Minister Riyad's recent statements in London and Paris did not mention his remarks along the same lines or his comment in Paris, reported by AFP on the 9th, that the UAR wants Big Four participation in a peacekeeping force and "the Soviets, British, and French have shown understanding on the matter." (A broadcast in Arabic on 7 August last year--apparently Moscow's sole propaganda reference to the idea of a joint U.S.-Soviet peacekeeping force--had rejected a Washington POST suggestion on a Big Two peace force, calling this an attempt to "drag the Soviet Union into U.S. diplomatic ways and methods alien to the Soviet Union.")

**NIXON INTERVIEW,
BIG FOUR ROLE**

NOVOSTI commentator Katin, in an 8 January domestic service commentary, noted President Nixon's remark in his 4 January television interview that the key to peace in the Middle East i. in the hands not only of the two sides directly involved, but also the Big Four. Observing that this is not a new idea, Katin added that it is however a "just one," and said that it applied first of all to the United States itself. He made no reference to the President's additional remark that "if the Soviet Union does not play a conciliatory peace-making role, there's no chance for peace in the Middle East." But he indirectly responded in going on to assert that the Soviet Union from the outset of the conflict had been "tirelessly" making every effort to achieve a just solution, and had contributed a "carefully and thoroughly drawn up plan for a political settlement."

Nor did Katin mention--in keeping with Moscow's long silence on the question of an embargo on arms to the Middle East--President Nixon's further comment on the importance of the Big Four joining together in a process of "not having additional arms and additional activities go into that area." Katin did note that the President said the United States would continue to support Israel and that he recalled that the Administration had just provided Israel with a \$500 million aid program. This "vast sum" will be used to buy arms, Katin said, "inflaming the atmosphere" in the Middle East.

PODGORNY ATTENDS ASWAN DAM CELEBRATIONS IN UAR

Moscow announced on 7 January that Podgorny would pay an official visit to the UAR and would "also attend" celebrations in Aswan on 15 January marking completion of the construction of the Aswan hydropower complex. TASS material in connection with his departure for Cairo on the 13th focuses on the "great construction project" as the symbol of Soviet-UAR "friendly cooperation" and

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a demonstration of the Egyptian people's "loyalty to the road of revolutionary reforms chosen by the people." Throughout December Moscow in its Arabic-language service had broadcast features, radio quizzes and other material lauding the high dam.

Podgorny's delegation, according to TASS, includes the minister and first deputy minister of electric power development and electrification and the chief engineer of the Aswan project, as well as chairman of the USSR state foreign economic relations committee Skachkov, first deputy defense minister Sokolov, and deputy foreign minister Rodionov.

On arrival in Cairo, Podgorny is reported by Cairo radio as saying that during the coming meetings with UAR leaders the sides will "exchange views" on further strengthening the "friendship and comprehensive cooperation" between the Soviet and Egyptian peoples and will discuss "vital questions" in general and problems connected with the Middle East situation in particular.

MOSCOW BLAMES JORDAN CLASHES ON "IMPERIALIST AGENTS"

As during the fighting in Jordan last September, Moscow reportage treats the Jordanian-Palestinian clashes which began on 8 January in essentially even-handed fashion, with TASS generally ignoring Arab criticism of the Jordanian Government. Limited comment from PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent, and in a foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi, professes to see "imperialist agents" behind the incidents. And both Moscow's domestic service and TASS report Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) official Ibrahim Bakr as blaming the CIA for the latest events.

TASS, following developments in Jordan and Cairo, noted as-Sadat's call to Arab heads of state to send representatives to Amman for an emergency conference. Sudanese and Libyan leaders were reported in one dispatch as viewing the clashes as a violation of the Cairo agreement on normalization of the situation in Jordan; while this item failed to mention their criticism of the Jordanian Government, a subsequent report from Khartoum noted "strong criticism" by Sudanese officials of the actions of the government and the Jordanian army command. TASS on the 12th reported the joint statement by Bakr and Jordanian Premier at-Tall calling for a cease-fire and subsequently reported from Beirut on the 13th that Amman was calm, and from Cairo that firing had continued overnight in the Jordanian capital.

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MOSCOW COMMENT PRAVDA's Glukhov on the 10th cited UAR sources to the effect that the fault lay with the Jordanian authorities," quoting AL-AHRAM as reporting that the Jordanian army had been instructed to "conduct wide-scale operations" against Palestinian camps, and noting that an official UAR announcement said the "surprise operations" of Jordanian troops were conducted "without any justification." On the 11th, reporting further developments, Glukhov found it "impossible not to agree" with the Cairo press conclusion that the skirmishes serve only the purpose of the Arabs' enemies. Asserting that there are "serious grounds" for supposing that the situation was provoked by imperialist agents, Glukhov pointed out that the flareup coincided with the resumption of Jarring's mission, which aims at realization of Security Council Resolution 242 envisaging Israeli withdrawal and "the just settlement of the problem of the Palestinian refugees."

Similarly linking the renewal of clashes with the Jarring mission, the Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 11th recalled that Jordan is a party to the talks and more pointedly observed that the incidents "are distracting Jordan's attention from the problem of providing an overall political settlement within whose framework the Palestinian question could also be solved."* Tsoppi likewise attempted to lay the blame on "imperialist agents" with the aim of creating inter-Arab friction. Noting that the UAR took the lead in proposing collective Arab efforts to eliminate the dispute, he expressed the hope that the Arabs "will become friends again" in the shortest time.

* Moscow had used the same argument last summer in bolstering Nasir's acceptance of the U.S. initiative in the face of Arab charges of a sellout on the Palestinian issue: A broadcast in Arabic on 4 August had explained that implementation of Resolution 242 was bound to "make Tel Aviv take into consideration the legitimate rights and interests" of the Palestinian people, and the next day the same service insisted that realization of Resolution 242 "would be an important step along the path of completely solving the Palestinian question."

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW PROPAGANDA SEEKS TO COUNTER CHINESE CHALLENGE

In the wake of the authoritative polemical exchange triggered by the Polish troubles, Moscow has moved to defend its claim to authority in the communist movement and to take the measure of Peking's more flexible tactics in the ongoing Sino-Soviet rivalry. Moscow has recently made special use of the Hungarians as spokesmen in its behalf, presumably calculating that the Hungarians have the most independent reputation among those of its allies willing--as the Romanians would not be--to play such a role. The Romanians, in fact, appear to be a prime object of Soviet concern over the impact of Peking's political and diplomatic advances.

Following up its 31 December editorial article responding to Peking's anti-Soviet comment on the Polish situation, PRAVDA on 6 January belatedly carried a Hungarian assessment of Chinese foreign policy that had been published before Peking's outburst. The Hungarian view--that Peking has changed its tactics in order to better pursue its "basic course" of rivalry with the Soviet bloc--accords with the line taken in Moscow's broadcasts to the Chinese. In departing from its previous practice of restricting comment on China (apart from rejoinders to specific attacks) to these broadcasts and to weekly publications, Moscow has underscored its concern and impatience over Peking's challenge. Similarly, the 31 December editorial article represented a more authoritative response than the Mikhaylov PRAVDA article on 20 September which answered Chinese attacks on the Soviet-FRG treaty.

In another use of the Hungarians as proxy spokesmen, Moscow has broadcast an article by the Hungarian official in charge of interparty relations, Z. Komocsin, who played a central role in the preparations for the 1969 Moscow international conference and who commented on current relations with China at the Hungarian party congress last November. In an otherwise unidentified article broadcast by Moscow to various communist countries, including Romania, Komocsin looked ahead to the forthcoming CPSU congress as an occasion for acknowledging Moscow's pre-eminent authority in the communist movement. He invoked the 1969 conference in stressing the importance of a party's correct--duly dependent--relationship with Moscow.

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Recent Soviet comment has similarly sought to reinforce Moscow's claim to primacy and to demand cohesion against the Chinese. An 8 January PRAVDA article by I. Pomelov, a discourse on Soviet patriotism at a time of Jewish protest, referred to "Maoism" as exemplifying the danger of nationalism in the communist movement. The article aimed an indirect rebuke at the Romanians for selectively determining the extent of their cooperation with their Soviet bloc allies.* In the past year Bucharest has enhanced its leverage by means of added political and economic support from Peking.

On another front of the Sino-Soviet contest, an article in the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES (No. 1, 1971) took sharp issue with the Australian CP for assuming an independent stance in the communist movement and for demonstratively--as a show of independence--deviating from Soviet-style orthodoxy on such crucial issues as the Czechoslovak reform movement. The article expressed resentment over the Australians' failure to criticize Peking's "splitting and adventurist" course. Peking's continued development of a more flexible and less sectarian line will make it increasingly difficult for Moscow to sustain this portrayal of Chinese policy. That the Soviets are intent on maintaining their ideological pressure is reflected in the article's assertion that the struggle for Marxist-Leninist purity "has special meaning" at the present time.

HUNGARIAN PRAVDA on 6 January reprinted substantial excerpts
ARTICLE of an article by F. Varnai published in the
Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG on 20 December.
An indication of the concern underlying the article--and of Moscow's motivation in reprinting it in PRAVDA--is contained in Varnai's observation that an assessment of Peking's current foreign policy is essential because "some people" are inclined toward "far-reaching conclusions" on the basis of initial favorable developments. In noting changes in Sino-Soviet relations, the PRAVDA account refers to the exchange of ambassadors, trade expansion, and the border talks being held in Peking--"as yet unsuccessfully." The account also mentions Peking's call for peaceful coexistence

* The Pomelov article is discussed in this TRENDS under the heading "Jewish question."

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and its establishment of diplomatic relations with Canada and Italy. The account suggests, in line with an earlier article in NEW TIMES (No. 47, 1970), that the Nixon Administration, inhibited by domestic political constraints from acting on its desire to improve ties with Peking, is "for the time being" leaving the initiative to the NATO allies.

According to the article, Peking's "basic course" remains unchanged, since it bases relations with the Soviet bloc on the same principles as govern normalization of its relations with the capitalist states. The article welcomes measures to improve relations with the PRC, although limited by Peking to state and trade ties; but it stresses that readiness to develop relations on the basis of anti-imperialist unity in no way signifies basic ideological concessions.

The PRAVDA account is notable for what it omits from the article as well as for the above points included in the excerpts. Thus, PRAVDA deletes the article's statement that although Peking refuses to consider interparty relations "as yet" (it was announced at the Hungarian congress that the CCP had rejected an invitation to attend), "we nevertheless regard it as a promising sign and a good beginning that after the past decade we can look forward to the prospects of drawing closer, rather than farther, from each other." This was also the line taken by Komocsin at the congress, but at that time PRAVDA duly reported the Hungarian assessment. The change in PRAVDA's treatment may reflect a darker atmosphere following the recent troubles in Sino-Soviet relations.

PRAVDA's editing exhibits Soviet sensitivity over comment regarding factions within the Chinese leadership. The account omits a paragraph in the Hungarian article that refers to the emergence into prominence in Peking of "some people" who, while also guided by "nationalist and great-power interests," are beginning to assess matters "more realistically" and to "redress the mistakes" previously made. PRAVDA also omits a passage which contains a provocative reference to "the Mao Tse-tung group." Still another deleted passage mentions "armed provocations" by the Chinese on the border in 1969--a sensitive subject which Soviet media carefully avoid.

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TASS ON NPC In another sign of heightened Soviet attention to China, TASS on 11 January reported on preparations for an overdue session of the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC). The report was printed in PRAVDA on the 12th. Although couched in nonpolemical terms, the report noted that the four-year term of the NPC delegates had expired in 1968 and that the NPC chairman, "Marshal Chu Te," and the PRC chief of state, Liu Shao-chi, had fallen victim to the cultural revolution.

The reference to Chu Te's military title has provocative overtones in that military ranks were abolished by the Chinese in 1965--a move with anti-Soviet implications that struck a blow at elements in Peking, notably then Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ching, who favored an accommodation with Moscow for security reasons--and in light of the sympathy shown for Chu in Soviet comment on the cultural revolution purges. Whether or not Moscow's reference to the old marshal represents a signal of interest in the Chinese military as a group favoring a reduction in Sino-Soviet tension, it has been the military--particularly the current chief of staff, Huang Yung-sheng--who would seem to fit the NEPSZABADSAG article's description of newly prominent elements in Peking who view matters more realistically.

Comment broadcast in Radio Moscow's Mandarin-language program for the PLA has persistently lectured on the perversion of the PLA's role in Maoist campaigns, the threat posed to a vulnerable China by the United States, and the benefits in modern weaponry available to socialist countries on good terms with the Soviet Union. A recent broadcast in this program, on the 12th, deplored Mao's recurrent purges of the PLA--Lo Jui-ching, Peng Te-huai, and Ho Lung were named as victimized heroes--and said discontent is rife over the PLA's role as a gendarmerie, its poor equipment, and its separation from the armed forces of the Soviet Union and other communist states.

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JEWISH QUESTION

SOVIETS EVINCE CONCERN OVER CENSURE OF TREATMENT OF JEWS

Concern over the possible impact at home and in the international communist movement of foreign censure of the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union is reflected in a lengthy theoretical article by I. Pomelov in the 8 January PRAVDA which invokes Marxism-Leninism to rationalize the present "class" approach to the Jewish question.* The article is in large part devoted to indoctrinating Soviet citizens in the proper attitude toward Soviet "patriotism," a concept that encompasses love of country and communism and eschews "local nationalistic tendencies." But Pomelov's emphasis on the organic relationship of patriotism to internationalism and his condemnation of "revisionist" as well as imperialist propaganda on the question suggests that the article is also aimed at communist critics who have aired independent views on the Jewish question and whose "nationalist" approach to the subject could impair international communist unity. Radio Moscow broadcast the article widely in its foreign-language services, including its services in Romanian, Slovene, and Italian. The article comes against the background of criticism of the Leningrad trials by the Italian Communist Party and a blast against Soviet anti-Semitism in the Yugoslav press, as well as a 5 January CBS telecast on the freedom Romania accords its Jews to practice their faith or emigrate to Israel.

The Pomelov article, entitled "Soviet Socialist Patriotism," perceives an intensifying campaign by "imperialist" propagandists and their "revisionist accomplices" to provoke discord among

* I. Pomelov has been a previous contributor to PRAVDA's "Questions of Theory" column. In a 20 February 1967 article, a disquisition on the leading role of the party in socialist countries, Pomelov followed a polemical approach similar to his current one: The 1967 article combined an indirect rebuke aimed at one country--in that case Yugoslavia--with a direct attack on Mao's China as the prime example of deviation from the orthodox policy line.

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"certain" Soviet nationalities and to "undermine Soviet patriotism" in general. In particular, Pomelov rejects "imperialist arguments" that the Jews' motherland is Israel and that there are "indissoluble ties" among Jews everywhere. Pomelov argues from a class position that "the interests of working Jews, no matter what country they may be citizens of, are opposed to the interests of the Jewish capital magnates, bankers, and entrepreneurs, no matter where they may live." Soviet patriotism, Pomelov continues, eschews "narrow-minded" concepts "divorced from social systems and ideology"; true patriotism means "not only loyalty to one's native land and definite historical values but also loyalty to the most progressive socialist social system and to Marxist-Leninist ideology."

In effect holding up the Soviet view of patriotism and internationalism as the only acceptable one for the international movement, Pomelov further argues: "In the Marxist-Leninist concept, which expresses precisely the coincidence of vital national interests and the common interests of the working people of all countries, patriotism and internationalism are inalienable aspects of the single ideopolitical position of the working class; and any belittling and, all the more so, any discarding of one of the aforementioned aspects signifies an undermining of this position, a slipping back to the platform of nationalism, national egoism or national nihilism, and wounding of national interests and feelings."

Pomelov censures only China by name, referring to "Maoism" in passing as an embodiment of the evils of nationalism, but his discourse has evident implications for the Italian communists, the Yugoslavs, and particularly the Romanians. Recalling that the parties which attended the 1969 international communist conference in Moscow had concluded that "the defense of socialism is an internationalist duty of communists," Pomelov goes on to assail those who emphasize national peculiarities and "disregard the regularities of socialist development." In a passage that seems directed especially at the Romanians, he lectures: "The Leninist principle of the unity of patriotism and internationalism is incompatible with the slightest weakening of links between any fraternal country and its natural and reliable allies--the socialist states and Marxist-Leninist parties." It is also incompatible, he says, "with a limitation of the sphere of cooperation merely to questions which are allegedly 'beneficial' at the given moment or to any attempt to use the contradictions between socialism and capitalism for national egoistic aims"

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In a passage that could apply to the Italian communists, who have disclaimed any anti-Soviet sentiments but have been critical of the Leningrad trials, Pomelov warns the Soviet "patriot" to distinguish "true from false and friendly foreign propaganda from hostile, no matter how well the latter is concealed by illusory 'objectivity' or assurances of 'good' feelings toward our people."

ITALIAN PARTY, YUGOSLAV PAPER CRITICIZE LENINGRAD TRIALS

Apparently anxious to get its critical view of the Leningrad trials on the public record for domestic political purposes, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) issued a communique on 6 January, published in L'UNITA, recalling that following the Leningrad verdict the PCI had called on "interested parties" to commute the death sentences and had also raised issues of "a more general nature." The party said it was issuing the communique in response to a letter from 93 Soviet Jews, published in the Western press, which among other things accused the PCI of indifference to the fate of Soviet Jews. While disclaiming knowledge about the authors of the letter, and hence by implication begging the question of its authenticity, the communique said the party had taken these allegations into account and had used the appearance of the letter as an occasion to define its attitude on the question of Jews in the USSR and in "certain other socialist countries." It did not elaborate.

The PCI's public stand on the Leningrad trials was set forth in a 27 December article in L'UNITA. While defensively disclaiming any intention of taking part in an "anti-Soviet campaign," the PCI organ objected to violations of the legal rights of the accused, termed the death sentences imposed on the two hijackers "incomprehensible," and "demanded" that they be commuted.

Although the Yugoslav party has remained silent on the Leningrad trials, an article in the Ljubljana (Slovenia) DELO on 30 December took the Soviet Union to task for practicing anti-Semitism from the time of the "Tsarist pogroms" to the prosecution of the Leningrad hijackers. It observed that in his day Stalin "took care to insure that Yiddish culture and schools would languish" and that "one

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year before his death he had two prominent Yiddish writers executed by firing squads." It went on to charge that although the present Soviet leadership does not officially encourage anti-Semitism, "a furious anti-Israeli campaign serves as a cover for it" and "unofficial outbursts of anti-Semitism are not curbed in any way." The Leningrad trials, it said, are designed as "exemplary punishment" and as "a warning" to Jews who wish to emigrate.

ROMANIAN PRESS REPORTS LENINGRAD VERDICT WITHOUT COMMENT

The Romanian regime, which has long insisted on a strict--essentially self-serving--policy of noninterference in other countries' internal affairs, has abstained from comment on the question of Soviet Jews. The Romanian press confined itself to brief factual reports of the death sentences passed on two of the hijackers in Leningrad and on the subsequent commutation of the sentences. But Bucharest may have aroused Moscow's ire by allowing a CBS news team to film a special report on Jews in Romania, telecast in the United States on 5 January. In sharp contrast to the situation of Soviet Jews, the Romanian Jews were depicted as practicing their religion, learning Yiddish, and freely emigrating to Israel. The CBS commentator made the point that the news team was permitted to travel anywhere it wished in Romania, unescorted, and emphasized Romanian pursuit of an independent line with respect to the Jews both domestically and internationally.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW CHARGES U.S. "CONNIVANCE" IN HARASSMENT BY ZIONISTS

The 8 January bombing at the Soviet embassy annex in Washington prompts a "resolute" statement of protest from the embassy which is summarized by TASS that day. Three days before the bombing a Soviet embassy statement to the State Department had warned that the USSR Government could no longer assure the preservation of normal conditions for U.S. institutions in the Soviet Union in view of the continuing hostile anti-Soviet campaign being carried on in the United States by the Zionists with the "virtual connivance" of U.S. authorities. A TASS commentary on the 8th cited U.S. press charges of alleged threats to U.S. diplomats in Moscow. But Soviet media have not acknowledged the harassment in Moscow of U.S. diplomats and newsmen or the U.S. embassy protest on the 11th over the harassment.

Soviet propaganda has given no undue attention to the latest incidents in the United States. But TASS on the 12th reported receiving letters and telegrams expressing "indignation at the hooligan actions of Zionists," a step which may be a prelude to protest meetings in the Soviet Union.*

The Soviet embassy protest on the 8th and supporting comment blames the "notorious 'Jewish Defense League'" (JDL)--"a mob of fascist thugs, little different from Hitlerite storm troopers"--for the bombing as well as the other threats and intimidations of Soviet personnel in both Washington and New York. JDL leader Kahane's trip to Israel provided the peg for the charge by commentator Ryzhikov on the 12th in the domestic service that "the whole activity of American Zionists is directed from Tel Aviv" through the Israeli embassy in Washington. Citing Kahane's statement that the JDL's purpose is "to provoke a crisis in Soviet-American relations," Ryzhikov asserted that Israel sought to sabotage the possibility of U.S.-Soviet cooperation regarding a Middle East settlement.

* Soviet reports of meetings in the USSR demanding the return by Turkey of two hijackers of a Soviet plane on 15 October had been preceded by central press reports of receiving a flood of letters and telegrams.

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Ryzhikov attributed the "obvious indulgent attitude" of U.S. authorities to the fact that the incidents distract the American public's attention from Indochina, inflation, and the threat of economic crisis. The commentator pointed out that the Zionist campaign had "already been instrumental in the recent curtailment of the planned U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange program"* and warned that the Zionists, encouraged by their ability to "act with impunity," had decided "to assail the whole spectrum of relations between the two states." A 10 January "mailbag" program, broadcast in English to North America, noted that although the Soviet Union favored a wide exchange in both cultural and scientific fields "a lot depends on the international climate" and, citing the recent harassment and bombing, observed that "you cannot expect cultural exchange to go on under conditions such as these."

* TASS on 11 December 1970 reported a foreign ministry representation to the U.S. ambassador in Moscow informing him that inaction by U.S. authorities regarding provocations had rendered impossible the "implementation of the 1971 tours to the United States by the Moscow Bolshoy Theater's ballet and opera troupes."

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SOVIET ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE

FIRST DIRECT PROPAGANDA MENTION OF SOVIET ABM'S SINCE FEBRUARY

An article in the journal USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY (No. 12 for 1970) by retired Soviet Air Force Maj. Gen. B. L. Teplinskiy contains the first direct--albeit passing--reference in Moscow propaganda to a Soviet ABM capability since last February on the occasion of Soviet armed forces day. The article, signed to the press on 9 December, reviews U.S. military strategy and weaponry, including development of the Safeguard ABM system and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's). With regard to the latter, Teplinskiy asserts that Secretary Laird and the "entire reactionary American press" has sought to justify the expenditures on these weapons on the grounds that the USSR "is allegedly 'creating forces for a preemptive strike' and that the MIRV program is supposedly the answer to the development of the Soviet ABM system." Teplinskiy does not go on, however, to comment on the references by Laird and others to Soviet development of an ABM system.

Articles last February by Defense Minister Grechko, Chief of the General Staff Zakharov, and Kazakh SSR Military Commissar General Beykenov had broken a two-year pattern of reticence on the part of Soviet spokesmen to claim a capability to destroy incoming enemy missiles. The Zakharov article, in IZVESTIYA on 22 February 1970, was notable for reintroduction of the April 1966 Malinovskiy formulation that the USSR's air defense forces have the means to insure the destruction of "any aircraft and many rockets" of the enemy.

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BERLIN

GDR PROTESTS FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S ACTIONS IN WEST BERLIN

A GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman on 5 January "resolutely condemned" the "official" presence of Federal Ministers Jahn and Genscher in West Berlin and a meeting of the Bundestag's penal commission there as representing "new illegal claims" by the FRG against West Berlin which violate the city's status and the "legitimate interests of the GDR and other states." Demanding an end to these recent "illegal state activities" by Bonn in West Berlin, the spokesman said they are detrimental to the interests of the West Berliners, who are interested in normalizing relations "between their city and the GDR."

Two days after ADN released this protest, Moscow's PRAVDA and RED STAR reported it without comment in a TASS dispatch citing ADN. IZVESTIYA, however, published a brief comment by V. Kukushkin, who remarked that Bonn was beginning a new year by again flaunting its "illegal claims" on West Berlin, "which has never belonged and never will belong to the FRG." Going beyond the GDR protest, Kukushkin added that "such visits are far from conducive to success" for the four-power talks on normalization of the situation in West Berlin.

GDR RESPONSE TO
AHLERS' CHARGES Answering West German government spokesman Ahlers' charges on 11 January that the GDR is responsible for the lack of progress in the four-power talks, East German radio commentators the next day accused Bonn of delaying any development in the efforts toward European detente by linking the issues of a European security conference, ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, the four-power talks on West Berlin, and specific GDR proposals--especially on GDR-FRG relations. The only way for the Federal Republic to show its good will, one commentary concluded, is to abandon its "nonsensical and inadmissible demands and preconditions."

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POLAND

PARTY LEADERS TRAVEL ABROAD AS DOMESTIC TENSION PERSISTS

Six days after their one-day visit to Moscow, Polish First Secretary Gierek and Premier Jaroszewicz turned up in East Berlin on the 11th for another one-day "friendly" visit. Their trip to the GDR had been preceded by a 6-8 January visit there by Foreign Minister Jedrychowski; GDR Foreign Minister Winzer had then flown to Moscow where he presumably reported on his talks with his Polish opposite number, described as "cordial and comradely" in the communique published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 9th.

Also on the 9th, the Warsaw domestic service reported that during the period 4-8 January "representatives of the Secretariat of the PZPR Central Committee paid friendship visits to the Central Committees of the fraternal parties of the socialist countries." The radio listed PZPR Secretary Tejchma as visiting the SED, Olszowski the Hungarian and Romanian parties, and Moczar the Bulgarian CP. The Prague domestic service reported on 10 January that PZPR Secretary Kociolek had paid such a visit to the Czechoslovak capital on the 5th. Like the Warsaw radio, the Prague broadcast said the purpose of the series of visits was to "exchange information about current political problems and cooperation."

GDR-POLISH Held against the background of reports in
COMMUNIQUE Western as well as Polish media indicating
 continued tension in the northern seacoast
region, the talks on the 11th between Gierek and Jaroszewicz and their East German opposite numbers, Ulbricht and Stoph, produced a communique virtually identical in length and phraseology to the 5 January statement on the Polish leaders' talks in Moscow. As broadcast by the East Berlin radio late on the 11th, the communique says the talks in the GDR took place in an atmosphere of "cordial friendship and mutual understanding" and "demonstrated complete identity of views on all questions discussed." The two sides are pledged to strengthen cooperation bilaterally and within CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, to strengthen the unity of the socialist states and the world communist movement, and to support "ratification and entry into force" of the Soviet and Polish treaties with the FRG as well as full diplomatic recognition of the GDR by all European states, including the FRG.

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Like the Moscow statement six days earlier, the communique registers no specific endorsement by the hosts of the new Polish leaders' reform measures taken to assuage the current crisis. It says "the Polish comrades gave information about the present situation in the social development of People's Poland" and about the resolutions adopted by the 20 December PZPR plenum "in the interest of the working class and the entire Polish people, in the interest of the further socialist construction of People's Poland." While the talks in Moscow had also been attended by high-level Soviet economic figures, the East Berlin communique lists only high-level SED leaders--Ulbricht, Stoph, Honecker, and Axen, the SED Secretary in charge of international party affairs who was promoted to full Politburo membership in December.

POLISH MEDIA REPORT EXPRESSIONS OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION

Polish media have yet to confirm or deny Western news reports of a new work stoppage in the Gdansk shipyard.* The only indication in Polish media of any possible current work stoppage has been a brief report in the Szczecin domestic service on the 9th to the effect that "the management of the port of Gdynia"--in the Gdansk-Sopot-Gdynia tricity complex--"is recalling the entire reserve of port workers on all shifts beginning Sunday, 10 January at 2300 hours."

There was a candid report, however, in the Gdansk, Szczecin, and Koszalin domestic service on the 11th of a stormy meeting then in progress between the Gdansk voivodship party committee leadership and the aktiv of the Gdansk harbor party organization. The announcer remarked at the outset that it was impossible to mention "in an orderly manner at this early hour" the "many essential problems" which had been raised at the meeting, but the broadcast included recordings of two frank protest statements: A female voice said "we feel not only like managers of our

* The Vienna radio on the 7th mentioned a Stockholm AFTONBLADET report from Gdansk on a strike, then underway, of 3,000 shipyard workers who demanded the release of 200 coworkers arrested in the December riots and a personal appearance of PZPR First Secretary Gierak in Gdansk.

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enterprise, but also in part like co-managers of our country" and "as such, we want to know what is happening in this country." A male voice aimed critical remarks at an aspect of the international socialist division of labor under CIEMA, declaring that "we have raised objections so often regarding our contract under which we are getting 'Rekord' loading machines from Bulgaria." The speaker continued: "Let us take a look at this equipment. Is it suitable to work with it here, where we are transloading general cargo? There are parts missing, and spare parts are unobtainable." In late 1967, a Prague commentator had similarly ventured into this sacrosanct area, questioning the building of a certain plant in Czechoslovakia by the Poles when the Czechoslovaks were themselves building the same kind of plant in other countries.

The interim radio report of the 11 January Gdansk meeting wound up with the observation that the shipyard workers "realize the difficulties of our country and are able to understand them, but they believe that one must speak frankly of them."

Also on the 11th, the Gdansk, Szczecin, and Koszalin domestic service carried a report of a meeting the previous day between the Szczecin voivodship party committee and "student groups," recounting tough stands by the students regarding the party leadership and the official news media. The report said the students "stressed that those responsible for creating a situation in which the working class had to protest were not only those who have left the party leadership; the guilty ones should be sought at all levels of the party apparatus and of administrative and economic management." It added that "many sharp words were addressed to the press, radio, and television," whose "silence or omission are creating information gaps which are then filled by foreign propaganda."

Presumably as a direct result of this confrontation, PAP late on the 11th reported the "resignation" of Szczecin voivodship party organization first secretary Walaszek "because of difficulties experienced in directing the voivodship committee's work," as well as of secretary Huber of that committee, who had addressed the 10 January meeting with the student groups and borne the brunt of their "questions."

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An 11 January report by the radio of Bydgoszcz--some 90 miles south of Gdansk--reflected the incidence of unrest outside of the coastal area as well. Recounting a meeting of Bydgoszcz city party activists with first secretary Majchrzak of the voivodship party committee, it cited "a critical attitude" toward phenomena "hampering" labor organization and industrial production--the bonus system, for example--and toward the status of housing construction. Questions from the floor, it added, "mainly emphasized the need to restore links between the party and the workers' class."

MEETINGS OF SECRETARIAT The PZPR has continued its series of gestures toward making the party decision-making process more accessible to the party rank-and-file and the populace: A discussion on party work carried by the Warsaw domestic service on 10 January included the statement that henceforth meetings of the PZPR Secretariat would be held every Friday and that the population would be informed of the meeting results the following day. In late December the Politburo had announced that "short reports" of its proceedings would be made public.

Like the CPSU and most of the other East European ruling parties, the Polish party heretofore has regularly publicized only plenary sessions of the Central Committee. Normally there have been no announcements of Secretariat or Politburo meetings. The Czechoslovak party, however, has continued the practice--begun in 1968--of frequently publicizing the results of meetings of the latter two bodies.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

LINK SYSTEM OF FARMING ADVANCING RAPIDLY IN RSFSR

The link system of farm labor organization continues to make headway on the local and regional levels of the USSR even in the absence of all-out support from Moscow. The most significant breakthroughs, however, have occurred in the RSFSR where Politburo member Voronov--the only public supporter of the controversial innovation in the top leadership--presides. In the RSFSR full-scale conversions to the link system, which in the past were limited to individual farms or individual rayons, are now scheduled to take place on the oblast level as well.

According to a report in SOVIET RUSSIA on 7 January, the Orel obkom decided at a "recent" plenum to convert all farms in the oblast to the link system in the next two to three years. As a preliminary, each farm in the oblast was ordered to form one or two "unregulated" mechanized links this year. The Orel decision, which was called "bold" by the SOVIET RUSSIA correspondent, was said to be based on the results of several successful link experiments conducted there in recent years. Reportedly, the obkom decided in favor of the link system as a means of raising farm labor productivity, overcoming a labor shortage, and redeploying the farm labor force.

Similar though less spectacular breakthroughs have been reported in other parts of the RSFSR. For example, Kalinin obkom first secretary N. Korytkov reported that the number of mechanized links had increased fivefold in his oblast during the past three years, reaching a level of more than 3,000 (SOVIET RUSSIA, 21 November). "The future," Korytkov declared, "is theirs." This sentiment was apparently shared by P. Yelistratov, first secretary of the Mordovian obkom, who revealed that his obkom had recommended the link system to all farm party organizations in the oblast (RURAL LIFE, 27 October).

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Reports of conversions to the link system in other parts of the RSFSR and Belorussia have appeared in PRAVDA (6 December, 8 January), SOVIET RUSSIA (3 November), RURAL LIFE (1 January), KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (15, 30 December) and PARTY LIFE No. 21 (20 October). At the same time, articles publicizing the productive feats of mechanized links have appeared in PRAVDA (17 October), IZVESTIYA (11 October, 31 December), SOVIET RUSSIA (15, 23 October, 4 November), RURAL LIFE (9, 16 October, 17 December) and RED STAR (11 October). SOVIET RUSSIA has also continued to plug the reform editorially (2, 17 December).

Despite the steady flow of favorable commentary on the link system in the central press, continued resistance to the innovation may be inferred from some of the complaints raised by link spokesmen. (SOVIET RUSSIA, 29 October, RURAL LIFE, 10 November, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 8 December). They center on the continued failure of the agricultural establishment to prepare guidelines for the implementation of the reform-- guidelines originally scheduled to appear by the end of 1969.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SHANGHAI SETS UP PARTY COMMITTEE, FIFTH IN NATION

Shanghai established its party committee at the conclusion of a congress held from 4 to 10 January, according to NCNA on 13 January. It is the fifth such new committee to be organized at the provincial level of administration in China since the first one was set up in Hunan on 4 December.

The 1,000 delegates elected 59 members and 17 alternates to the Shanghai CCP Committee--somewhat larger than the precultural revolution committee of 41 members and 15 alternates. The top leadership group of seven secretaries--all chosen from among the leaders of the Shanghai revolutionary committee--is smaller than the former 13-man secretariat.

Politburo members Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, numbers one and two on the Shanghai revolutionary committee, were named first and second secretary respectively of the party committee. (No second secretary has been specified in the case of the other provincial-level party committees; perhaps it was thought necessary to grant Yao the title because of his Politburo standing.) Chou Chun-lin, commander of the Shanghai garrison, was named secretary, the only military man on the committee. Mao Tien-shui and Hsu Ching-hsien, two former secretaries on the old Shanghai party committee, were also named as secretaries as were two worker representatives, Wang Hung-wen and Wang Hsiu-chen, both full members of the Central Committee.

Although Shanghai set up the first party committee on the factory level in the nation on 21 June 1969, it seemed to lag behind other areas in rebuilding the party above the basic level. Throughout the nearly two-year drive to rebuild the party, only three of the 10 counties within the municipality have claimed rebuilt committees.

PROGRESS The rate at which party committees are now
ELSEWHERE being established suggests that most areas
 will set up party committees by the 50th
anniversary of the party on 1 July. There is, however,
no indication that provinces with serious unresolved
problems are being forced to set up committees on the

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basis of a central deadline. All the provincial-level committees set up so far have been in the relatively advanced East and Central-South regions of China. Two other eastern provinces, Anhwei and Chekiang, have established party committees in their capital cities, and provincial committees will probably follow in the near future.

The Northeast region also seems a likely candidate for a provincial CCP committee in the not too distant future: Shenyang, capital of Liaoning, has a municipal committee, and Heilungkiang, a traditional cultural revolution pace-maker, has announced 15 county party committees. Outside these areas the most likely prospects for a provincial committee would seem to be Tsinghai, which was among the leaders in forming a revolutionary committee in 1967 and recently announced party committees in two of its six autonomous districts, and Kansu, which on 26 December proclaimed that "in many counties and municipalities" new party committees have been formed.

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