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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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9 DEC 1970

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
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC



Confidential

9 DECEMBER 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 49)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 30 NOVEMBER - 6 DECEMBER 1970

<u>Moscow (3376 items)</u>		<u>Peking (2700 items)</u>	
Warsaw Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Berlin	(--)	14%	Domestic Issues (13%) 27%
Armenian SSR 50th Anniversary [Brezhnev Speech, 29 Nov.]	(7%)	12%	Japan (1%) 14%
Indochina [Air Raids on North Vietnam]	(11%)	8%	[Mishima Suicide (1%) 9%]
Constitution Day	(--)	5%	Indochina (25%) 11%
China	(5%)	4%	[Air Raids on North Vietnam (17%) 5%]
			Albanian Liberation (8%) 10%
			Anniversary (21%) 10%
			Guinea Invasion (21%) 10%
			Relations With Ethiopia (--) 7%
			Mauritania National Day (5%) 3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi continues its barrage of propaganda assailing the United States for carrying out last month's air strikes against the DRV and insisting that the November 1968 bombing halt was unconditional--that the United States has no "so-called right of protective reaction." U.S. statements that the Americans may fire first if a plane is being targeted by DRV radar prompted a protest statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 5 December, along with supporting radio and press comment.

There are passing, ambiguous references to the 21 November U.S. attempt to rescue prisoners in the DRV, with both Hanoi and the Front suggesting that there was in fact no such attempt but that Administration spokesmen fabricated the prisoner-rescue story to counter opposition in the United States and throughout the world to the U.S. strikes against the DRV.

The United States is also charged with duplicity in connection with the idea of an extended holiday cease-fire. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 9th notes that Secretary Rogers "informed Senator Jackson" that the Administration is considering a proposal for a cease-fire from Christmas through Tet at the end of January. Hanoi dismisses this as U.S. propaganda consistent with the President's "so-called" cease-fire proposal of 7 October; it says that a "reasonable" decision was that of the PRG, which called--on 30 November--for cease-fires of three days for Christmas and the New Year and four days of Tet.

Condemnations of the U.S. strikes against the DRV in Soviet media include the denunciation in the Warsaw Pact statement which TASS carried on 3 December. The statement and routine-level Moscow comment echo Hanoi in insisting that the 1968 bombing halt was unconditional. Soviet commentators again charge that the strikes are part of a U.S. policy of escalating the war and torpedoing the Paris talks.

Peking's continuing comment in the aftermath of the air strikes against North Vietnam includes a 7 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article endorsing the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 5th. Commentator claims that the "insane" and "outrageous" U.S. warnings of retaliation against North Vietnam are aimed at paving the way for "expanding the war of aggression" at any time.

HANOI REBUTS U.S. CLAIMS OF RIGHT TO STRIKE AT NORTH VIETNAM

Continued condemnations of U.S. air strikes against the DRV are marked by Hanoi's insistence that the 1968 bombing halt was unconditional and that there was no understanding whereby U.S.

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reconnaissance flights would continue unchallenged and the DRV would refrain from such actions as shelling of cities in the South and moving troops across the DMZ. There are repetitions of earlier attacks on the United States for now extending the "so-called" undertaking and for arguing that it could strike at the DRV with impunity if the lives of Americans were threatened in flights over Laos or in some other such circumstance.

Hanoi reacts with particular vehemence to Pentagon spokesman Friedheim's assertion on 3 December that the United States may fire first if its reconnaissance planes are targeted by DRV radar. On the 5th a statement was issued by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman, along with a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial and a Hanoi radio commentary on the same day and a NHAN DAN editorial on the 6th. Hanoi "severely condemns the insolent U.S. allegation" and asserts that all acts of encroachment on the DRV's sovereignty and security will be duly punished by "the Vietnamese people." In the words of the foreign ministry spokesman, nothing can shake the "iron resolve" of the Vietnamese people to fight until total victory. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial insists on the DRV's right to track and down U.S. reconnaissance planes and to set anti-aircraft batteries and assemble troops anywhere in the country. It charges that the Administration's "arguments are aimed at giving the Americans an excuse to strike" the DRV "at any time, against any objective, at any place and through all military methods."

PRISONER RESCUE Several of the current commentaries make passing reference to U.S. statements about the attempt to rescue prisoners held in the DRV, but Hanoi still describes these statements as "fabrications" and does not admit that such an operation took place. The foreign ministry spokesman's statement refers to U.S. "fallacies" including assertions that attacks on the DRV were aimed at "freeing pilots detained in North Vietnam." The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 5th, ignoring the mission of 21 November, says merely that "recently" Defense Secretary Laird again advanced "the argument about 'rescuing U.S. prisoners of war,' brazenly saying that 'the United States will make every effort, including the possibility of taking military action, in the future'" and that "the United States does not rule out any actions."

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The 5 December Hanoi radio commentary says that to conceal the "war crimes" of the 21st and to deceive public opinion and "excite the narrow-minded nationalist feelings of a number of Americans" the Nixon Administration went beyond earlier allegations about "protective reaction" and an "understanding": it put out a smokescreen by producing the pretext of rescuing U.S. prisoners of war. The broadcast also cites the "bellicose statements" made on 1 December by Secretary Laird and by Ambassador Bruce at his Paris press conference "to the effect that the United States will make every effort to free American prisoners of war in North Vietnam, including possible future military action." The NHAN DAN editorial on the 6th also refers to the remarks by Laird and Bruce. It echoes other propaganda in saying that "the Nixon clique covers up its scheme to carry out air raids" against the DRV "with the deceitful argument about rescuing U.S. prisoners of war."

An article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 7th--entitled "War Maniacs Unmasking Themselves"--pictures U.S. spokesmen, particularly Laird, as being under fire from U.S. public opinion concerning "the lack of logic" in Administration statements. The article says that the President and Laird "uttered very contradictory statements" ~~about the air strikes~~ and that roundabout arguments have stimulated a "credibility crisis."

Liberation Radio commentaries on 3 and 6 December, denouncing U.S. strikes at the North, also note expressions of U.S. intent to take "every measure" to rescue American prisoners. The broadcast on the 3d says, atypically: "We want to tell the U.S. war maniacs that all their reckless and cunning schemes will not be able to rescue the U.S. air raiders who are being detained in both North and South Vietnam, but will on the contrary cause more serious consequences and danger to those U.S. air raiders, as U.S. and world public opinion has clearly pointed out." The commentary goes on to say more routinely, like Hanoi, that the best way to rescue U.S. "air raiders" is to negotiate seriously on the basis of the PRG proposal, particularly the provision in the eight-point elaboration of 17 September regarding discussion of the release of all military prisoners.

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HANOI GLOSSES OVER SUBSTANCE OF 3 DECEMBER PARIS SESSION

The cryptic VNA account gives little indication of the nature of the exchanges at the 93d session of the Paris talks on 3 December. Thus, there is no acknowledgment that DRV delegate Xuan Thuy recalled that the session had not been held as scheduled on 25 November as a protest over U.S. "acts of war" against the DRV. Nor does VNA acknowledge that he mentioned, and ridiculed, the operation north of the 19th parallel "to rescue U.S. pilots detained in a camp 20 miles from Hanoi." VNA also ignores his remarks criticizing Secretary Laird for saying, on 1 December, that the United States might use military action, not excluding the use of commandos, to launch rescue operations against prison camps in North Vietnam.

The VNA account gives similarly brief treatment to PRG delegate Mme. Binh's statement at the session, but LPA carried a more substantial summary and Liberation Radio broadcast her formal statement textually. Unlike Thuy, she did not broach the U.S. prisoner-rescue mission directly. However, after observing that top Administration leaders "have arrogantly threatened" to repeat their "acts of war" against the DRV, she said--cryptically and without elaboration--that "Ky went to the length of volunteering as a commando of the United States." She also repeated past charges about Saigon's mistreatment of prisoners and went on to say that the United States "has resorted to the POW issue in order to deceive and exacerbate public opinion, thereby trying to cover up its crimes and adventurist acts of war."

The substance of the allied statements is totally obscured, with VNA saying only that both "tried to justify the world-condemned U.S. war moves" on 21-22 November. Consistent with standard practice, Hanoi media have said nothing about the give-and-take portion of the session or the briefings afterward; hence there is no acknowledgment that Ambassador Bruce proposed, as a first step regarding treatment of prisoners, that each side permit a committee of the International Red Cross, or some other impartial observer, to visit all prisoner camps in North and South Vietnam.

In reporting Xuan Thuy's statement, VNA highlights his "strong rejection" of the U.S. justification for the bombing of North Vietnam, as well as his reaffirmation that the 1968 U.S. halt in the bombing and "all other acts of war" against the DRV

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was "total and unconditional and that there was no 'understanding' whatsoever." As at the 92d session on 19 November, he stressed that he could reaffirm this "speaking as the DRV representative" at the 1968 bilateral Paris talks. VNA reports Thuy's rejection of a Defense Department statement to the effect that U.S. "protective reaction" rights extend to saving the lives not only of American pilots carrying out reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam but also of pilots bombing Laos and "even saving the lives of U.S. troops in South Vietnam." VNA also records his assertion that the best way to save lives is to end the war, along with his warning that if the United States is really concerned about defending the lives of American pilots it must respect the sovereignty and the security of the DRV.

The VNA account reports, briefly, that Thuy also scored U.S. "escalation" in Cambodia and Laos and pledged strengthened Indochinese solidarity against this "aggression." It does not, however, record his assertion that U.S. escalation throughout Indochina "further proves" that President Nixon's 7 October five-point proposal is "utterly fallacious"; and it fails to note that he spelled out the basic points in the PRG's eight-point "elaboration" of 17 September--on a U.S. agreement to withdraw by 30 June 1971 and a renunciation of the Thieu regime and establishment of a provisional coalition government.

DRV PROPAGANDA CONTINUES CALLS FOR VIGILANCE, COMBAT READINESS

Hanoi sustains its attention to vigilance and combat-readiness* with editorials in NHAN DAN on the 4th, 6th, and 8th as well as other press and radio comment. The NHAN DAN editorial on the 8th seems to direct its exhortations at the DRV population-at-large rather than at the self-defense militia or basic units, as earlier propaganda did. It describes the entire North as "now seething with a new combat mettle," and it urges the launching "under the new situation" of a mass movement "to engage in revolutionary activities and resolutely fight and defeat the U.S. aggressors." With the United States "preparing for new military adventures," it says, "the fighters and people" throughout the DRV must further heighten their "readiness to fight and fight well." It adds that "under any circumstances, at any time, and whatever the form and scale of enemy attacks, or whatever force they may involve, we are determined to fight

* See the TRENDS of 2 December, pages 4-7, and 25 November, pages 3-4, for background on earlier DRV calls for vigilance.

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with complete initiative . . . as one man . . . unremittingly, vigorously, and victoriously." Other comment similarly calls for combat spirit and preparedness.

The NHAN DAN editorial echoes previous propaganda exhortations to continue accelerating production while improving combat tasks. It repeats the statement that each area must have its own combat plans; and like the NHAN DAN editorial of the 6th, it notes the necessity of "maintaining security and order, demolishing in time the propaganda arguments and sabotaging actions of the reactionaries, protecting the people's life and property, protecting the organs, cadres, documents, and public property."

Other comment echoes earlier propaganda in pointing out the necessity of carrying out patrol and guard activities and preparing combat plans. The 4 December NHAN DAN editorial stresses improvement of self-defense forces, while several Hanoi radio items highlight current activities regarding defense in various provinces. There are also more claims that shelters and trenches are being repaired.

The concern of higher authorities is again manifested in a Hanoi radio broadcast of the 4th on Hai Hung Province. The broadcast notes that the provincial administrative committee recently issued an instruction on satisfactorily carrying out the air defense task and achieving combat readiness in order to cope with "the new combat situation." Implementing this instruction, it says, "the provincial unit command has helped the district unit commands check combat plans and improve them . . . and has also sent officers to help villages grasp the tactics of countering enemy attacks and ranger activities and to help guerrillas and militiamen train themselves in accordance with their combat plans."

The village militia and guerrilla unit which downed the U.S. reconnaissance plane on 13 November is singled out as an example in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on 9 December. As broadcast by Hanoi radio that day, the article highlights and describes the village's vigilance and concentrated efforts on military training over the past two years. It points out how a village in Ha Tinh Province has maintained leadership over production and its militia and guerrilla unit, emphasizing combat tasks and combat readiness. It claims that "in the past two years, although there was no fighting, the village continued to apply the 'alert unit' system" and carefully followed U.S. reconnaissance patterns in consideration of the "geographical importance" of the village. "Thanks to these careful preparations," it asserts, the village militiamen, guerrillas, and people cooperated with army units in downing the U.S. reconnaissance plane on 13 November "with the first burst of gunfire."

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WARSAW PACT STATEMENT, MOSCOW COMMENT SCORE ATTACKS ON DRV

Continuing Soviet condemnation of last month's U.S. air strikes against the DRV includes publicity for the statement on Indochina issued by the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee,* carried by TASS on 3 December, which says that by its "massive attacks" the United States has "violated its commitment" on an unconditional end to the bombing which made the Paris talks possible. The statement does not echo routine-level Soviet propaganda charges that the bombings are aimed at "disrupting" the Paris talks; it does criticize President Nixon's five-point peace plan, saying the plan "turned out to be only a cover for continuing and expanding aggression." The statement promises "support" for the Indochinese people in their struggle against armed American intervention and for a political settlement, specifying the "constructive" FRG proposals.

Routine-level denunciation of the U.S. bombing of the DRV includes a 5 December domestic service commentary by Aleksey Leontyev which says the Vietnam problem can be solved "only by negotiations," a military solution being "impossible." The Republican leaders who recognized this truth "a short time ago," says Leontyev, now refuse to reach an agreement with the Vietnamese and accept their proposals, instead resorting to bombs. Leontyev calls the raids the result of "a preconceived and prepared turning point" in the Administration's Vietnam policy in the direction of escalating aggression and "torpedoing" the Paris talks.

U.S. RIGHT TO REACT On 3 December Moscow media briefly reported that the Pentagon press spokesman said American planes have the right to attack DRV anti-aircraft installations if they feel themselves to be in danger. On the 6th TASS promptly reported the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement denouncing the Pentagon statement. Moscow comments that this means the United States has arrogated to itself the right to "strike at will" against DRV territory.

* The Pact's Political Consultative Committee had issued a statement on Vietnam in July 1966. A statement on Vietnam issued in December 1969 by a Moscow meeting of party and state leaders of "fraternal countries" was not linked with the Warsaw Pact in Soviet propaganda, although the seven countries listed as attending constitute the Pact's membership and other bloc propaganda did tie the meeting with the Pact.

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Commentators recall that Secretary Laird made a similar statement to the effect that the United States, in exercising its right of self-defense, intends to attack DRV anti-aircraft installations. A domestic service commentary on 4 December says Laird added that this also applies to planes which bomb Laos--that is, that they are allowed to strike DRV anti-aircraft installations near the Laotian border. Stating that Laird has obviously given the green light for "widescale renewal" of the air war, the commentary says it was "not accidental" that he said in a press conference that "he does not preclude future actions similar to the troop landing in the DRV on 21 November." A 7 December TASS commentary, also denouncing Laird's "threats" against the DRV, cites the New York TIMES as reporting that the United States threatened strikes against the DRV also if "anti-aircraft guns are discovered close to its southern frontiers with Laos and if there is a concentration of troops on the territory of the DRV which Washington regards as dangerous."

PEKING ASSAILS U.S. WARNINGS ABOUT RETALIATION AGAINST DRV

Peking media continue to publicize Vietnamese statements on the U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam. The 5 December statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman is endorsed in a 7 December PEOPLE'S DAILY commentator article which denounces as "insane and outrageous" U.S. warnings of retaliation and the policy of preemptive attacks when U.S. planes are targeted by DRV radar. Commentator makes no mention of the issue of a U.S.-DRV understanding on the bombing halt, but he ridicules the notion that there are any "rules" restricting Vietnamese action against U.S. planes. He questions whether such rules would not allow the United States to fly over any country for reconnaissance or raids and whether they would undermine state sovereignty throughout the world.

The U.S. attacks on the DRV were also scored in a 4 December NCNA correspondent's commentary which charged that "it is customary for Nixon to talk of 'peace' while dropping bombs" and that the President has "frequently resorted to counterrevolutionary dual tactics" one after the other. It noted that the recent bombing of the North came on the heels of the 7 October U.S. peace initiative. Claiming that the United States is failing while the people of Indochina are winning, NCNA concluded that "the people of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos will neither be taken in by U.S. imperialism's 'peace' fraud, nor be intimidated by its bombs."

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HANOI, FRONT PRAISE MILITARY GAINS OF "CAMBODIAN PATRIOTS"

A 5 December VNA report on attacks by the "Cambodian national liberation armed forces" in November claims that "clashes" took place "inside and around" Phnom Penh and that a "series of attacks" was mounted in "most" of the provinces. Among specific actions cited are attacks on government troops at the Pich Nil Pass on Highway 4 and on the ammunition factory and power station in Kirirom--taken by the communists on 22 November. A 3 December Liberation Radio commentary entitled "Heavy Blows at the Puppet Lon Nol Troops on Route 4" deals with the exploits of the Cambodian "liberation forces" in the Kirirom Highlands from 25 to 27 November and asserts that their position is "developing favorably" in all battlefields.

A 1 December Liberation Radio commentary took note of the fighting at the town of Puok, in Siem Reap Province, and claimed that the action demonstrated that the insurgents have not only encircled Phnom Penh but have also developed their strength and exerted strong pressure on the north-western area. The 1 December explosion at the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh was reported in a Hanoi broadcast on the 2d, citing Western news reports. The blast was credited to "Cambodian patriotic combatants." A 9 December Hanoi domestic service commentary on 6-7 December battles 50 kilometers northeast of Phnom Penh cites AP as saying the Lon Nol regime has decided to allow the communists to occupy more land, thereby renouncing a "scheme to regain important areas in the heartland of Cambodia." The commentary further attributes to AP the statement that "if the communists continue to cut off main highways, Cambodia will die."

LAOS: NLHS SHORTENS PROPOSED TIME PERIOD FOR BOMBING HALT

At a 1 December meeting with Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prince Souphanouvong's "special envoy" Tiao Souk Vongsak shortened the time period proposed by the NLHS for a limited bombing halt to make possible a meeting of the two princes' plenipotentiaries in Khang Khay. According to a 3 December NLHS "statement" on the meeting, carried by Pathet Lao radio on the 5th, Souk relayed Souphanouvong's proposal that the bombing in Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua provinces be halted for 10 days prior to the meeting, during the

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meeting, and 7 days after it ends. The 26 November NLHS "communique" on the meeting between Souvanna and Souk on the 24th had reported that the NLHS proposed a bombing cessation in these two provinces for 15 days before the meeting,* during the meeting, and 10 days after it.

The current statement says Souk stressed that there must be a cessation of "bombing and strafing by the U.S. Air Force as well as all activities of the Vientiane puppet forces and all pro-U.S. forces" in the two provinces. He rejected a proposal by Souvanna for a "15-kilometer radius safety area" around Khang Khay.

The statement once again criticizes Souvanna for clinging to "his old unreasonable stance, insisting on the so-called 'withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from Laos,'" thereby showing that he "still allows himself to be pressured by the Americans and the ultrarightist reactionaries" who want to delay the meeting. (The communique of 26 November had similarly absolved Souvanna of direct personal responsibility for such obstructionism, remarking that his "insincere and vague attitude" obviously "results from pressure and is aimed at serving U.S. imperialism's dark objectives.") Souvanna's position, says the statement, "reciprocates the current large-scale attacks and operations of the Vientiane clique and Americans" in the Xieng Khouang/Plain of Jars area. It notes, however, that discussions will continue.

A 2 December telegram from Souphanouvong to Souvanna Phouma, reported by the Pathet Lao radio on the 4th, also complains about attacks in the Xieng Khouang area by "U.S.-supported bogus forces" and the U.S. Air Force which have created "obstacles" to the Khang Khay meeting. Saying he knows that Souvanna "is also facing some difficulties," Souphanouvong professes to see nothing surprising in Souvanna's "rejection" of the proposals regarding security for the Khang Khay meeting. He asks Souvanna to "force the warmongers" to cease their operations in the Xieng Khouang area and expresses hope that Souvanna will "be able to evade all difficulties created by the U.S. imperialists and lackeys" so that the plenipotentiaries' meeting can be held as soon as possible.

* The TRENDS of 2 December, page 15, incorrectly reported that a Pathet Lao radio report of the communique said it called for a halt 10 days before the meeting. A recheck of the broadcast confirms that the figure was 15 days.

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POLAND - FRG

PUBLICITY FOR TREATY SIGNING NOTES BERLIN LINKAGE ISSUE

Polish media, extensively publicizing the visit of the delegation led by Chancellor Willy Brandt to Warsaw for the signing of the FRG-Polish treaty, have heaped lavish praise on Brandt personally and carried all his public statements in Poland in full--including his reference to the Berlin issue as part of a package with the Polish-FRG and Soviet-FRG treaties. Polish spokesmen broached this issue only obliquely. The communique issued on 8 December, at the conclusion of the three-day ceremonies, describes the talks between the Polish and West German leaders as "useful and fruitful," held in a "businesslike atmosphere" in which both sides presented their views "with full candor."

In the vein of the communique, Polish comment and statements by Polish leaders during the visit emphasized the importance of the treaty not only for the two states but for detente in Europe generally. The communique calls it an "essential contribution" to European detente. Additionally, Polish propaganda has reiterated Gomulka's statement--made at a 3 December Zabrze Miners Day rally the day after the Warsaw Pact Berlin meeting--that the treaty "finally ends the problem of frontiers." During the ceremonies Gomulka also called the agreed declaration on Poland's western frontiers "the most important statement" in the treaty. Polish commentaries, generally terming the treaty a "first step" or foundation for the normalization of Polish-FRG relations, are replete with praise for Brandt's "positive attitude." Ample coverage of the West German delegation's activities includes publicity for Brandt's gesture in kneeling before the memorial to the victims of the Warsaw ghetto.

RATIFICATION, The Polish statements and comment, balancing
BERLIN ISSUES their praise for the Brandt-led forces in the
 FRG with the usual censure of CDU/CSU forces
bent on "hampering" ratification of the treaty, stop short of coming directly to grips with the issue of linking ratification with settlement of the Berlin problem. Thus Cyrankiewicz, in a formal toast at a luncheon for Brandt after the signing on 7 December, noted that both sides had agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations "immediately after the treaty comes into force"--the language of the communique--and went on to express the wish that ratification of both this treaty and the one with the USSR will occur "without complications and hindrances."

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PAP reported FRG Federal Press and Information Office deputy head von Wechmar as explaining, at a 7 December Warsaw press conference, that the point when the treaty "comes into force" means the moment of ratification. PAP also noted that von Wechmar said ratification by the FRG "will not take more than one month." PAP's texts of Brandt's statements, however, include his remark--in his toast replying to Cyrankiewicz on 7 December--that Bonn's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw as well as an impending one with Prague, plus desirable "treaty-binding regulations" on FRG-GDR relations, would be

incomplete if there was no agreement on the improvement of the situation in Berlin and around it because--I could tell much on this subject from my own experience--tension is still arising over Berlin. So I treat separate treaties and agreements, concluded separately, as one whole in which each of them holds an indispensable and unalterable place.

A reassuring comment was attributed by PAP to Bonn press spokesman Ahlers at a 6 December press conference. Ahlers, PAP reported, did not exclude the possibility of the treaties "entering into force before the solution of the problem of West Berlin." According to PAP, he said "the connection that exists between the question of ratification of the treaties [with the USSR and Poland] by the Bundestag and the Berlin problem does not constitute a 'junktin' [linkage] from the legal point of view. The federal government has full freedom of action in this field, irrespective of the conditions" raised by the CDU/CSU. At a late evening press conference on the 7th, also reported by PAP, Ahlers said that Brandt, Cyrankiewicz, and Gomulka had discussed a wide range of problems, including Berlin and East-West German relations. The Polish report quoted Ahlers as saying the discussion spanned "a broad exchange of views in which not decisions but better understanding of the stands of the two sides mattered."

Cyrankiewicz, responding to questions at a press conference held shortly before Brandt's departure from Warsaw on 8 December, as reported by PAP, stated that the FRG and Polish governments are in "constant contact" regarding a date for the ratification of the treaty. PAP reported him as remarking that "there is no need to make a race" over whether the Warsaw treaty is ratified

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earlier than the Moscow treaty. Cyrankiewicz noted, however, that the Moscow treaty had been signed "earlier and concerned a broader scope of matters." Regarding the Berlin problem, he observed that Poland is not one of the four powers holding talks on Berlin. He "emphasized," according to PAP, that the Soviet Union is "in favor of detente" on the issue of Berlin, adding that "we would be satisfied" if "other powers, too, show similar intentions--obviously while respecting the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic and taking its rights into account."

THE QUESTION OF
"ETHNIC GERMANS"

The problem of the ethnic Germans still living in Poland is not explicitly mentioned in the communique on Brandt's visit. It notes merely that the normalization process initiated by the signing of the treaty "should, in the opinion of the two sides, pave the way to the overcoming of problems that still remain in the field of interstate and human relations." PAP reported that Ahlers, in his press conference on 6 December, noted that "humanitarian problems were tackled during a general exchange of views," explaining that many of these problems were solved during the recent talks by Red Cross representatives of the two countries. Polish propaganda throughout the period of the treaty negotiations had characterized the problem of the ethnic Germans as a Polish "internal" question.

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NATO MEETING

MOSCOW SEES MILITARY DECISIONS AS COUNTER TO EUROPEAN DETENTE

Soviet press and radio comment on the 3-4 December NATO Council meeting in Brussels characteristically plays on the disunity theme and sees in the gathering a backward step "to the time of the cold war." Moscow deplores the "secondary attention" given to the problem of reducing tension in Europe, and in this vein it contrasts the NATO session--allegedly dominated by "hawks"--with the 2 December meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee in East Berlin. A 3 December domestic service commentary said that while NATO is discussing plans for "aggression" and putting forward "all kinds of conditions" for the convening of a conference on European security, the Warsaw Pact conference "called for good neighborliness and cooperation and noted that sufficient conditions already exist for holding all-European negotiations." TASS dispatches on the 3d and 4th concluded that East Berlin and Brussels serve today as "symbols of two fundamentally different ways, two different approaches to international problems."

MILITARY DECISIONS In documenting the charge that the NATO gathering was aimed against the trend toward detente in Europe, Moscow focuses on the military decisions--both at the full Council session and at the preliminary meetings, on 1 and 2 December, of the 10-nation "Eurogroup" and the Defense Planning Committee. The propaganda gives wide play to Secretary Laird's pledge, restated by President Nixon in his message read to the Council on 3 December, that the present administration would not reduce the number of U.S. troops in Europe. The pledge, according to a radio commentary in foreign languages on 2 December, followed "a drummed-up campaign involving claims of a forthcoming withdrawal of American troops" which in effect was a "threat" to "pressure" Washington's allies for additional military allocations. TASS on the 5th, reporting that the pledge has come under fire in Congress, noted that Senator Mansfield at a press conference the previous day indicated he would press for amendments to legislation providing for cuts in the numerical strength of U.S. forces in Europe.

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The 4 December TASS report on the wind-up of the Council session said the Eurogroup's decision to provide an additional one billion dollars for military spending over the next five years came as a result of "Pentagon pressure." TASS had taken note on the 3d of Laird's praise for the decision. A PRAVDA article that day said the decision was not taken without "sharp disagreements," citing the Belgian press for a report that both Belgium and Britain "stipulated the right to pay their contribution" in part by building up their own national forces. An article in RED STAR on the 3d saw the U.K. reservations on the Eurogroup decision as little more than an effort to carry out "imperialist plans, which envisage a partial 'return to East of Suez' and the strengthening of contacts with the racist regimes in the South of Africa."

Available Soviet propaganda has not yet treated in detail the document "Allied Defense for the Seventies," approved by the Defense Planning Committee. A TASS report on 4 December ignored its substance, concluding that both it and the communique on the Council session "are based in effect on the premise that the division of Europe and the world into hostile blocs will continue, while the arms race will be stepped up." A TASS dispatch the previous day noted that the document says NATO "should maintain a sufficient level of conventional armed forces and nuclear might while retaining a strong collective military structure." A "much more modest place" was given to problems relating to the reduction of tensions in Europe, the dispatch said, adding without comment that the document advanced "the old NATO proposal for a 'mutually balanced reduction of armed forces.'"

Similarly, Moscow propaganda has given little more than passing attention to press reports that the United States has resurfaced the proposal for laying a belt of nuclear mines in West Germany along the East-West borders. A TASS commentary on 2 December said that "some sober-minded people" have opposed such "provocative" plans. But the very fact that the plans exist, TASS observed, is "added eloquent proof of the intention of 'hawks' from across the ocean to prevent a further easing of tension and to torpedo the idea" of convening a European security conference. A foreign-language radio talk on the 2d, attacking the U.S. posture on disarmament issues, declared that the nuclear mines plan "shows that the enemies of peace intend to avail themselves of every opportunity to increase international tension, and to thwart agreements on liquidating the nuclear peril."

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EUROPEAN SECURITY While focusing on the military aspects of the Council session, Moscow propagandists take note of the fact that some "sensible statements" were made--by French Foreign Minister Schumann, among others--on the matter of a European security conference. They acknowledge that the communique expressed satisfaction over the FRG-Soviet and FRG-Polish treaties and the inception of talks between East and West Germany. Despite all this, a 5 December TASS report said, the NATO Council concluded that there was not enough progress in bilateral contacts to make possible a switch to multilateral contacts with the socialist countries.

Moscow has registered clear displeasure over the Council session's linkage of a European security conference to progress on other issues, notably the four-power talks on Berlin. Thus the 4 December TASS report on the communique said the NATO "allegation" that a conference is impossible without solving problems connected with West Berlin is tantamount to "putting up artificial obstacles" to an easing of the situation in Europe. A domestic service commentary on the 5th asserted that "the NATO ringleaders tried to get as far away as possible from the very pressing issue" of convening an all-European conference by linking it with talks on Berlin, strategic arms limitation, and the further development of relations between the FRG and GDR. An article in the 30 November PRAVDA had also deplored the efforts of those who would link the convening of a conference with progress in the Berlin talks and the strategic arms limitation talks now underway in Helsinki.

Additionally, Soviet propaganda has rejected attempts to tie the European security conference proposal to progress in the Middle East. A 3 December RED STAR article, for example, called the attempts to make the convening of a European security conference dependent on the Middle East situation "insidious."

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EUROPEAN SECURITY

WARSAW PACT STATEMENT UNDERSCORES SOVIET BLOC UNITY

Against the background of speculation about a rift between the GDR and the USSR over issues related to Berlin, the statement on European security adopted at the 2 December meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee* seems most noteworthy for its attempt to project the image of a united bloc solidly backing East Germany. After noting the importance of the conclusion of the Soviet-FRG treaty and the initialing of the accord between the FRG and Poland, the document says the participants in the Pact meeting "unanimously expressed solidarity with the peace-loving policy" of the GDR. Declaring that peace in Europe cannot be built without East German participation, it calls for the establishment of "equal relations" between the GDR and other states, including the FRG, "based on generally accepted norms of international law." And it urges admission of the GDR to the United Nations and other international organizations.

The statement breaks no new ground on substantive issues. It routinely reaffirms Soviet bloc interest in a conference on European security and states that there are no reasons "to advance any preliminary terms" for convening such a conference--an apparent allusion to West German and NATO linkage of the conference proposal to settlement of the Berlin problem. Without detailing the agenda or the participants in the proposed conference, the statement says that both matters have been resolved and goes on to welcome the recent Finnish proposal on the holding of preparatory meetings in Helsinki. As reviewed by Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen at a 25 November press conference, the proposal stipulates that these meetings would be between heads of mission "or other representatives." The Warsaw Pact states, according to the statement, are ready to take part in such meetings. A TASS report on 3 December said the Soviet ambassador in Helsinki had informed the Finnish Government of the USSR's agreement to preliminary consultations.

* The statement is one of four adopted at the meeting and released the following day. The other three are on Indochina, the Middle East, and Guinea.

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On the Berlin question, the statement expresses hope that the four-power talks will produce "the attainment of a mutually acceptable agreement meeting the interests of detente in the center of Europe, as well as the requirements of the population of West Berlin and the lawful interests and sovereign rights of the GDR." Brezhnev, in his 29 November speech in Yerevan, had also specified that the wishes of the West Berlin population and the interests of the GDR must be met. He had also expressed the view that an improvement of the situation with regard to West Berlin "is quite feasible"--a judgment not made in the Warsaw Pact statement.

The statement appears to register support for the pending talks between the FRG and Czechoslovakia in asserting that the participants in the Pact meeting fully support Prague's "just demand" that the FRG recognize the Munich agreement "as invalid from the outset, with all the resulting consequences." A move by West Germany to dissociate itself from the "diktat," the statement says, would facilitate an improvement of the situation in Europe and development of the FRG's relations with the socialist countries.

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MIDDLE EAST

WARSAW PACT PRESSES POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST

The basic theme of the need for a political settlement of the Israeli-Arab dispute is reiterated in the statement adopted by the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee on 2 December at its meeting in Berlin, and released on the 3d.* The relatively mild statement points vaguely to the "depth and scope of the dangers" in connection with the obstacles to a political settlement raised by Israel and "international reaction." It goes on to outline the opposite courses advocated by the two sides--a theme touched on in some routine Soviet propaganda.

With regard to the first course, the statement runs through the standard Soviet litany for a Middle East peace: a political settlement guaranteeing every people of the Middle East, including Israel, an independent, safe, national existence and "secure borders"; Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories; fulfillment of all provisions of the November 1967 Security Council resolution; and, as an "immediate practical step," the holding of talks between the conflicting sides through Jarring. Reminiscent of Brezhnev's 28 August Alma-Ata speech in pointing to the benefits of a peaceful solution, the statement says a political settlement would make it possible for the peoples of the Middle East to direct their resources and energy to the satisfaction of their pressing requirements; in urging Israeli withdrawal, the statement maintains that without this there can be no peace, and it is impossible to imagine the peoples of the area living like good neighbors.

* Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war five statements on the Middle East have been issued by Moscow in conjunction with various combinations of the East European countries, but not by the Warsaw Pact. Yugoslavia attended the four 1967 meetings, held at various levels, but apparently was not invited to the November 1969 meeting. Romania, the only one of the East Europeans to maintain relations with Israel after the war, was also absent from the 1969 meeting; it attended three of the four 1967 meetings, but failed to sign the statement issued after the first of these. The current Warsaw Pact meeting also issued a statement on Guinea in addition to those on the Middle East, Indochina, and European security--the third being a standard Pact topic.

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The other course, aimed at retention and annexation of the captured Arab territories, preservation of tensions, and overthrow of the "progressive Arab regimes," is espoused by Israel and its patrons, says the statement, which holds international imperialism, first of all American imperialism, responsible for the continued tension.

In the concluding paragraphs the statement presses the long-standing Soviet propaganda urgings for Arab unity, expressing confidence that the Arabs will further strengthen their cohesion. And it repeats Moscow's advice to the Egyptians to sustain Nasir's policies, expressing "profound satisfaction" that the UAR's leaders' statements reflect their intention to follow his course and to work for a political settlement. The participants pledge their readiness to further support the "just struggle of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine," against the "imperialist policy of aggression" in the Middle East. Unlike the last statement on the Middle East issued by Moscow and some of its East European allies, released on 26 November 1969, the present statement makes no reference either to bloc assistance to the Arab states or to Western "imperialist" assistance to Israel.

USSR BLAMES ISRAEL FOR DELAY IN RESUMING JARRING TALKS

Moscow's low volume of propaganda attention to the Middle East in the past few weeks has focused chiefly on Israel's delay in returning to the contacts under Jarring, and on U.S. "encouragement" of Israel's "aggressive, expansionist" designs by seeking a \$500 million appropriation for more military equipment for Israel. Brezhnev's general remarks on the Middle East in his 29 November speech in Yerevan did not touch on the Jarring talks. He observed that it was "difficult to predict with precision" how events would develop, but professed to see "favorable conditions" for a settlement in light of Israel's increasing "international isolation."

Propagandists charge that Israel's tactics of procrastination over the Jarring talks are aimed at retaining the occupied Arab lands. Moscow claims that Israel plans to agree to resumption of the Jarring mission precisely at the moment when Jarring is to submit his report to the Security Council in early January, and will then further delay resumption of

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the contacts until time for renewal of the cease-fire agreement in early February. While comment has noted that Dayan spoke favorably of resuming the Jarring mission and did not set any conditions, Moscow has at the same time cited Western news agency and Israeli press reports of various conditions drawn up by Tel Aviv for discussion with Washington. These conditions are said to include requests for long-term military assistance after 1971, and for U.S. assurances that it would use its veto in the Security Council to block resolutions unacceptable to Israel and would "waive the so-called Rogers plan" and not propose borders for Israel. The propaganda asserts that Dayan's forthcoming visit to the United States has nothing to do with a peaceful settlement, but only with discussing Israel's conditions for resumption of the talks.

A Belyayev article in the 2 December PRAVDA, cautiously optimistic that "all possibilities exist" for immediate resumption of the Jarring contacts, notes that President Nixon spoke in favor of negotiations in his November message to Congress and that Dayan had also spoken favorably of resuming the contacts with Jarring. On the other hand, he claims that the President's message to Congress took into consideration Israel's conditions for resumption of the negotiations, and charges that Washington's prime concern is for Israel to resume the contacts from a position of strength.

Reporting that Mrs. Meir's recent letter to President Nixon "insisted" on the expansion of Washington's diplomatic and military aid, Moscow observed, in connection with the President's reply, that his attitude to the request "is not in doubt" and confirms that Tel Aviv is being encouraged to resist a political settlement.

CAIRO ON Moscow has offered no opinion of its own on the
CEASE-FIRE desirability of another cease-fire extension in
 reporting remarks by UAR officials on the subject.

TASS on 27 November reported Egyptian Foreign Minister Riyad as stating that the UAR will not agree to another extension of the cease-fire agreement if it is not sure that Israel's contacts with Jarring are maintained without any covert aims and are in good faith. And on 1 December TASS reported President as-Sadat as telling UAR armed forces units, in a visit to the Suez front the day before, that the UAR will agree to prolongation of the cease-fire agreement only if an "accurate calendar plan is set" for Israeli withdrawal.

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UAR-U.S. EXCHANGE OVER "SPY FLIGHTS" NOTED BY MOSCOW

TASS has briefly taken note of the UAR-U.S. exchange over the issue of U.S. reconnaissance flights over the Suez Canal zone. Reporting that the UAR Government had issued a protest against American U-2 reconnaissance flights "over Egyptian positions," TASS on 23 November cited AL-AHRAM as claiming that day that Egyptian observation posts had repeatedly recorded flights by U-2 "spy planes" made "in direct proximity" to the front line to collect espionage information. AL-AHRAM added, according to TASS, that the planes come from the direction of the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula, and that all intelligence information collected during the flights "undoubtedly comes to the knowledge of our enemy." TASS recalled that the UAR called the U.S. Government's attention in October to the fact that U-2 reconnaissance flights are a violation of the terms of the cease-fire agreement.

UAR dissatisfaction with the U.S. response--delivered on the 25th--to its protest was noted in a TASS item on the 27th which reported AL-AHRAM as rejecting U.S. attempts to justify the flights. And on 5 December TASS reported that the UAR Foreign Ministry handed the U.S. representative in Cairo a memorandum declaring that U-2 planes were continuing flights "over the Sinai Peninsula," and that such flights "over Egyptian territory" serve the aims of Israel.

TASS on 3 December had picked up AL-AHRAM's charge that day that the Americans continue getting reconnaissance data on the Egyptian troops from space satellites, despite official U.S. assurances that it discontinued the U-2 flights. TASS added that AL-AHRAM, referring to the "acknowledgment of the New York TIMES," pointed out that the satellites transmit photographs of the positions of Egyptian troops to one of the U.S. receiving stations in West Germany, from where they are immediately relayed to the United States.

MOSCOW SILENT ON CAIRO REPORTS OF UAR-SOVIET TALKS

TASS on 4 December noted as-Sadat's decision, as reported by the Cairo AL-AHRAM that day, to launch a broad diplomatic campaign to explain to friendly governments and the international public the UAR's stand on settlement of the crisis before the current cease-fire agreement expires. The campaign, the dispatch added, is to show that the UAR exerts every effort to restore a just and lasting peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242. While

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TASS noted only that high-ranking delegations would visit countries of Eastern and Western Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the AL-AHRAM account, as reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA), listed some of the countries to be visited and delegation heads, including 'Ali Sabri to Moscow on a visit "scheduled previously." MENA on the 7th reported that 'Ali Sabri's delegation, including Deputy Premier 'Aziz Sidqi, Foreign Minister Riyad, and War Minister Fawzi, would leave for Moscow 17 December for talks on "cooperation in various fields." There has apparently been no Soviet acknowledgment as yet either of this visit or of that of a CPSU Central Committee delegation led by Ponomarev which, according to an 8 December MENA report, will arrive in Cairo on the 10th for a 10-day visit at the invitation of the Arab Socialist Union.

HUSAYN'S U.S. VISIT, JORDAN CLASHES PROMPT LITTLE COMMENT

Moscow has given little attention to Husayn's current tour, ignoring his visit to Saudi Arabia and briefly reporting his 2-3 December visit to Cairo and departure for talks in London. On the 8th TASS reports his arrival in Washington on an "unofficial" visit but with a program of meetings with high U.S. officials. The dispatch cites "well-informed political circles" as assuming that one of Husayn's main tasks is to convince Washington of the necessity of encouraging Israel to resume contacts with Jarring. It is also believed, TASS adds, that he will raise the question of an increase in U.S. military and economic assistance. Recalling that at the time of the recent crisis the United States supplied Jordan with several tanks and a squadron of modernized F-104 aircraft, TASS notes that the President has asked Congress to appropriate \$30 million for aid to Jordan, believed to be "purely symbolic" aid, and that Congress is "in no hurry" to approve this assistance. Reporting Husayn's meeting with President Nixon, TASS on the 9th cites White House press secretary Ziegler as saying that the two reviewed the Middle East situation, problems of resumption of contacts under Jarring, and questions of military and economic aid to Jordan.

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SEPARATE TALKS A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 5 December claimed that, on the occasion of Husayn's visit to the United States, "imperialists and their Israeli agents" were again circulating rumors that Jordan was prepared to agree to separate talks with Israel. The broadcast claimed that the aims of such "fabrications" were to isolate Jordan from the Arab struggle and try to cause a confrontation between Jordan and other Arab countries. This presumably refers to remarks by Israeli Minister Galili on 25 November that Israel was ready immediately for talks with Jordan and Lebanon under Jarring's auspices. TASS on 28 November had reported the Lebanese Foreign Minister as refuting Galili's statement. Moscow had also taken note of a TIME magazine article on recent talks between Husayn and Israeli leaders: A Moscow domestic service report on 16 November declared that the Jordanian Government had "exposed these fabrications" and that Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon had told journalists the TIME report was without foundation.

JORDAN CLASHES The new clashes in Jordan were briefly reported by TASS in a Cairo-dated dispatch on the 7th which followed past practice in reporting statements by both the fedayeen and the government. On the 8th, TASS cited MENA for a report that the two sides had reached agreement on "elimination of tension" and "measures aimed at preventing incidents."

A Moscow commentary in Arabic on the 8th attributes the halting of the recent clashes to firm measures taken by the Higher Arab Followup Committee stemming from the Cairo conference of Arab leaders, headed by Nasir, which had aided settlement of the September fighting. It again praises the "great positive importance" of the Arab leaders' joint efforts in returning the situation to normal. Claiming that the "obstacles and difficulties" encountered in the process of settlement were not "self-created," the broadcast says they must be viewed in the context of the general Middle East situation, and goes on to denounce the "path of aggression" pursued by the Israeli "extremists" and their U.S. supporters. Accusing the "Arabs' enemies" of seeking to liquidate the Palestine resistance movement, the commentary asserts that the movement has "secured a high reputation" in the international arena as well as in the Arab world, and points to the UN Special Political Committee's resolution on the rights of Palestinians to self-determination as evidence.

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Reporting adoption by the UN General Assembly of draft resolutions submitted by the Special Political Committee on the activities of the UN Relief and Works Agency, TASS on the 9th says several Western powers objected to the resolution which stressed the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination, an "imperative condition" for the establishment of peace. TASS notes that the United States sided with Israel and was among the delegations voting against the resolution, but says nothing about the Soviet vote.

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PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

PEKING RENEWS DEMAND FOR U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM TAIWAN

While Peking in recent months has largely avoided comment on Sino-U.S. issues, it has been intent on reasserting its claim to Taiwan and counteracting any impression that it has softened its position at a time of resurgent diplomatic and political activity. The PRC's recent recognition agreements with four countries, along with the favorable vote on the resolution for its being seated in the United Nations; have occasioned reassertions of Peking's position on Taiwan that betray concern over a tendency in the world community to seek an accommodation on this issue falling short of Peking's full demands. In this context Peking has renewed its demand for U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan and has reserved for itself the right to determine the island's future.

Peking's comment on the UNGA vote on the China representation question--in the form of an NCNA report on 22 November--interpreted U.S. delegate Phillips' speech in the debate as indicating that the United States had "changed its tone for the sole purpose" of pursuing a "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" plan. "This is what the Chinese people can never permit," Peking emphasized. NCNA took note of Phillips' remark that the United States is interested in having the PRC play a constructive role in the family of nations but added that he emphasized U.S. opposition to UN expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

In the previous month, at the time of the PRC-Canadian agreement to establish diplomatic relations on the basis of a compromise on the Taiwan question, Peking had similarly taken note of "some superficial changes" made by the United States on this issue. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 15 October, pointing out with satisfaction that the two-Chinas approach had been increasingly spurned, directed attention to what it derided as "the new gimmick" of "one China, one Taiwan" advanced by the United States as a result of failure of the previous approach. It was natural that Peking should exhibit concern over the new approach in view of the compromise in which Canada recognized the PRC only as "the sole legal government of China" while remaining noncommittal on Peking's claim to Taiwan.

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Peking chose the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Ethiopia-- based on the PRC's preferred terms of being recognized as "the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people"--to repeat its explicit demand for U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan as well as its routine expression of determination to "liberate" the island. After expressing gratitude to Ethiopia for its pro-Peking stand in the United Nations, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 3 December declared that the U.S. policy of "hostility toward the Chinese people has met with ignominious failure" and that more and more countries are for friendship with the PRC. "It is exactly in these circumstances," the editorial claimed, that the United States is intensifying its efforts to "perpetuate its forcible occupation" of Taiwan.

The demand for U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan had most recently been asserted on an authoritative level in Huang Yung-sheng's 27 June speech on the 20th anniversary of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan. Defining the Taiwan question as "the crucial issue" in Sino-U.S. relations, Huang declared that a relaxation of relations is "out of the question" unless the United States withdraws from Taiwan. An NCNA commentary on the same occasion made much of the continuing U.S. commitment to the Chiang regime in documenting allegedly hostile actions by the United States despite President Nixon's call for improved relations with the mainland.

While taking note of the U.S. factor in the Taiwan equation, Peking has also shown concern over the Japanese role and has taken sharp exception to Tokyo's position on the issue. Thus, a 27 November NCNA report on Prime Minister Sato's policy speech two days earlier complained that the Japanese wish to have a part in determining Taiwan's future and to prevent Peking from realizing its irredentist goal. According to NCNA, Japan is trying to make use of the concern of the super-powers to advocate a renunciation of force in dealing with the Taiwan question. Once again it was in a Japanese context that Peking addressed itself--as it rarely does--to the question of the means it might use to incorporate the island. What method the Chinese will use, NCNA asserted, "is their own affair and no foreign country has the right to interfere." Since the Nixon-Sato communique a year ago, Peking has displayed particular concern over prospects of a growing Japanese role in Asia as a stabilizing force that would inhibit the realization of Peking's vital objectives.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONTINUED PRAISE FOR BREZHNEV AT ARMENIAN ANNIVERSARY

Brezhnev received considerable personal attention and warm praise at the Armenian 50th anniversary celebration on 29 November, as at the Kazakh and Azerbaydzhani anniversary ceremonies earlier, in August and October. The previous pattern of attitudes toward Brezhnev on the part of regional leaders was largely sustained. This time, however, Brezhnev received somewhat warmer treatment from leaders of the northwest--Belorussia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Leningrad--who had formerly tended to slight or ignore him.*

Armenian First Secretary A. Ye. Kochinyan almost matched in length and effusiveness the praise lavished on Brezhnev by his proteges, Kazakh First Secretary D. A. Kunayev and Azerbaydzhani First Secretary G. A. Aliyev, at their respective republic ceremonies. Kochinyan, however, failed to call Brezhnev head of the Central Committee, as Kunayev and Aliyev had at their ceremonies, and failed to repeat his own assertion at the Kazakh celebration that Brezhnev headed the Politburo. Nor did the Armenians nominate an honorary presidium consisting of the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev, as had the Azerbaydzhanis.

Kochinyan's introduction of Brezhnev also omitted any reference to Brezhnev's World War II role. Aliyev had spoken of Brezhnev's participation in the "heroic defense of the Caucasus" (PRAVDA, 3 October). Kochinyan spoke instead of the "big role of Comrade Grechko in the heroic defense of the Caucasus" (PRAVDA, 30 November), although both Brezhnev and Grechko had served in the 18th Army in the North Caucasus. Kochinyan showed unusual deference toward Grechko, calling him a "prominent military and state leader" and stressing his "enormous contribution to strengthening the military might of the Soviet army." In contrast, Aliyev had addressed Grechko only as "a glorious military leader and hero of the Great Fatherland War," while Kunayev addressed him only as "one of the glorious military leaders" (PRAVDA, 29 August).

* TRENDS issues of 10 September, 7 October, and 14 October 1970 discussed the treatment of Brezhnev at previous 50th anniversary ceremonies.

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As before, Moscow First Secretary V. V. Grishin, Azerbaydzhan First Secretary G. A. Aliyev, Moldavian First Secretary I. I. Bodyul, and Kirgiz First Secretary T. U. Usubaliyev were highly complimentary to Brezhnev. Uzbek First Secretary Sh. R. Rashidov reiterated his earlier praise (Brezhnev's "brilliant and moving speech"), and Kazakh First Secretary D. A. Kunayev was mildly complimentary (Brezhnev's "deeply comprehensive" speech).

RSFSR Premier M. A. Yasnov, who had termed Brezhnev's speech at Alma Ata "brilliant," called Brezhnev's Yerevan speech "comprehensive." Turkmen First Secretary M. G. Gapurov and Tadzhik First Secretary D. R. Rasulov, unusually laudatory at Baku, were more restrained this time. Gapurov mentioned Brezhnev but with no praise. While Rasulov praised Brezhnev's "moving and comprehensive" speech, he stressed the role of the collective by attributing Soviet successes to the "wisdom of the policy of our party and the huge organizational will and ability of the Leninist Central Committee and its Politburo to lead the masses" (KOMMUNIST, 30 November).

The previous pattern of restraint was again maintained by Estonian First Secretary I. G. Kebin, Georgian First Secretary V. P. Mzhavanadze, and Ukrainian First Secretary P. Ye. Shelest. However, Kebin--in contrast to the previous four occasions--at least mentioned Brezhnev's speech this time, albeit with no praise. Mzhavanadze only noted that Brezhnev had presented the anniversary award to Armenia, while Shelest was the only speaker to ignore Brezhnev entirely in his speech.

NORTHWEST LEADERS The main variation from the previous pattern was the praise of Brezhnev by leaders of the northwest. Belorussian First Secretary P. M. Masherov spoke of Brezhnev's "brilliant speech, as always full of great warmth and rich, deep content." Although he had characterized the speeches of both Brezhnev and Shelest as "brilliant and comprehensive" at the December 1967 Ukrainian anniversary, he failed to praise Brezhnev's speech at the December 1968 Belorussian anniversary. The Belorussian representatives at the Kazakh and Azerbaydzhan ceremonies had ignored Brezhnev's speeches.

Latvian First Secretary A. E. Voss not only praised Brezhnev's "brilliant and moving" speech but devoted five paragraphs of his 23-paragraph speech to Brezhnev. At the December 1967 Ukrainian and December 1968 Belorussian ceremonies he had called Brezhnev's speeches "brilliant," but he had ignored Brezhnev's speech in Kazakhstan (he did not attend the Azerbaydzhan ceremony).

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Lithuanian Premier I. A. Manyushis labelled Brezhnev's speech "brilliant." The last anniversary at which a Lithuanian leader praised Brezhnev's speech was at the December 1967 Ukrainian ceremony, when first secretary A. Yu. Snechkus used the term "brilliant" also. New Leningrad First Secretary G. V. Romanov-- who had accompanied Brezhnev and Grishin on their recent trip to Hungary--departed from the pattern of his predecessors by praising Brezhnev's speech as "brilliant and profound."

OVERSEERS OF MOSCOW CULTURE TRANSFERRED TO NEW POSTS

Two more Moscow city cultural officials have been transferred to other posts. According to SOVIET CULTURE, on 26 November, N. T. Sizov, who was deputy chairman of the Moscow city executive committee, has been named general director of the Moscow film studio and deputy chairman of the USSR Cinema Committee; B. Ye. Rodionov, who was chief of the Moscow city culture administration and Sizov's direct subordinate, has been appointed deputy chairman of the RSFSR Publishing Committee.

These moves represent a further shakeup in the Moscow city organization's cultural leadership. Yu. N. Verchenko was removed from his post as city party committee culture section head earlier this fall; he was elected organizational secretary of the USSR Writers Union on 4 November. S. S. Gruzinov was removed from his post as rayon first secretary (where he had a special role in city cultural affairs) when he was appointed ambassador to Algeria last May. Moscow city committee ideology secretary A. P. Shaposhnikova thus remains the only survivor among the leaders of Moscow cultural policy in recent years.

The reasons for the shakeup are unclear. Gruzinov and Sizov (as well as Shaposhnikova) were appointees of former Moscow city first secretary Yegorychev in 1965, while Verchenko rose in the Komsomol central apparatus under Shelepin's protege Pavlov; Sizov also worked in the central Komsomol apparatus under Shelepin. These associations may have impaired their credentials in the eyes of present Moscow First Secretary V. V. Grishin, who has advertised his allegiance to Brezhnev by frequent personal flattery.

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The policy implications of these transfers are also unclear; the new appointees remain unknown, and the transferred officials have represented divergent trends in cultural affairs. While Verchenko and Sizov are clearly hardliners, Gruzinov and Rodionov have sometimes sided with unorthodox theater directors (for example, director A. Efros--see the 26 March and 16 April 1968 SOVIET RUSSIA).

Rodionov had managed to keep his post as supervisor of the troublesome Moscow theaters for over ten years. His administration was often criticized for permissiveness by such hardliners as Sverdlovsk raykom first secretary B. V. Pokarzhevskiy (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 23 February 1968, SOVIET CULTURE, 24 February 1968, and SOVIET RUSSIA, 22 October 1968), V. Selivanov (SOVIET RUSSIA, 26 March 1968), the SOVIET RUSSIA editors (SOVIET RUSSIA, 16 April 1968), and by his chief Sizov (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 13 July 1966 and 9 April 1970). In August, Shaposhnikova specifically criticized Rodionov's administration for "giving in" to theater directors and "not always giving skilled party evaluation to ideologically harmful works" (KOMMUNIST, No. 12). Moscow First Secretary Grishin, at an 11 November city committee plenum, also attacked "ideologically immature" works and "new readings" of the classics in Moscow theaters (PRAVDA, 13 November).

EX-MVD CHIEF NOW
MOSFILM DIRECTOR

Sizov's credentials as a hardliner are abundantly clear from his career in the MVD, his links to Shelepin and reactionary author V. A. Kochetov, and his defense of Stalin-era officials. Sizov rose through the Moscow Komsomol organization in the early 1940's--as did Shelepin. As editor of a central Komsomol organ and head of a Komsomol Central Committee section in the late 1940's and as Moscow oblast Komsomol first secretary 1950-1954, he had occasion for frequent contact with Shelepin, who was successively Komsomol Central Committee cadre secretary (1943-1949), second secretary (1949-1952) and first secretary (1952-1958). Later Sizov became an official of the radio broadcasting administration and in August 1962 became chief of the Moscow city MVD (Shelepin presumably supervised the MVD as Central Committee secretary at that time and his protege V. S. Tikunov was RSFSR MVD chief). In March 1965 he was promoted to Moscow city executive committee deputy chairman and soon dropped his police post.

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Sizov has simultaneously pursued a literary career, mainly in the reactionary journal OKTYABR. His first novelette, "Troubled Hearts," concerned the work of Komsomol leaders and apparently was drawn from his personal experiences (Boris Privalov noted in a 26 June 1964 LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA review that Sizov "has considerable experience in Komsomol and party work"). The most important of his works in OKTYABR was his early 1964 novel "The Difficult Years," which emulated OKTYABR editor Kochetov's own controversial novel, "The Obkom Secretary," in refuting the idea that all Stalin-era officials were bad and in presenting a relatively sympathetic--for the Khrushchev era--picture of Stalin.

Sizov's novelette "Arbat and Selenga" in the October 1965 OKTYABR was ridiculed in NOVY MIR (NO. 4, 1966). It was criticized as a prime example of OKTYABR's poor quality in a speech at an RSFSR Writers Union plenum (A. Nikulkov in the 29 April 1966 LITERARY RUSSIA). Now Sizov is general director of Mosfilm and presumably in a position to authorize the filming of more Stalinist hack works such as Kochetov's novel "Angle of Fall," produced by the Leningrad film studio and premiered earlier this year.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SPECIAL DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED IN LIAONING

Although it had previously claimed only two rebuilt county party committees, Liaoning Province has become the first to announce re-establishment of a special district party committee. This is the first report in public media on a new party committee at the special district or higher level since the Ninth Party Congress.

The report on the new party committee came from the Liaoning provincial radio on 3 December, and it has not yet been picked up by central media.* The report claimed that rebuilding of the Chaoyang special district's party committee started in October 1968, with the army representative of the party core group of the Chaoyang revolutionary committee "taking the lead in making a frontal attack on complacency among leading cadres." Party consolidation work continued until 95 percent of the party units had completed their ideological rebuilding and 52 percent of the basic-level units had actually established new party committees. Then, "in accordance with the stipulation of the new party constitution," the committee was set up "recently" following an election by 770 delegates attending a party congress within the special district.

The district congress was addressed by two vice chairmen of the Liaoning Provincial Revolutionary Committee, Yang Chi and Liu Sheng-tien, who are identified for the first time as members of the provincial party core group. Previously only Li Po-chiu, also a vice chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, had been identified as a member of the party core group. Both Yang and Li also hold high-ranking positions within the Shenyang Military Region.

* An NCNA domestic service item on 5 December reported that "party organizations and revolutionary committees at all levels in Liaoning Province" are leading a mass movement to learn from Tachai. A specific reference to Chaoyang special district refers only to the revolutionary committee there; a specific reference to Penchi county mentions the county party committee and the county revolutionary committee.

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Notwithstanding Liaoning's claimed success, Hunan Province appears the most advanced in terms of overall rebuilding at the lower levels. A 4 December Changsha broadcast claimed for the first time that a "great majority" of basic-level party branches and a "majority" of counties have set up new party committees. The broadcast reported that party members in Hunan are resolved "on the basis of the successes already achieved" to speed the remaining party-building tasks and greet the promised fourth National People's Congress with "new victories."

CIVILIAN POLITICAL COMMISSAR NAMED TO TSINGHAI PLA UNIT

An article broadcast over the Tsinghai provincial radio on 27 November by the political commissar of a PLA unit indicates that PLA commissars are still being recruited from civilian life. The author of the article, also secretary of the unit's party committee, said he was reluctant to take the assignment last year but as a party member accepted it "obediently." He had "no experience at all in serving PLA units, in doing political work for them, or in being a 'squad leader'," having previously been a college professor. Believing, however, that "only after one follows the leadership of higher authorities can one gain a correct orientation," he decided that the superior party organ knew best.

While the use of civilians as political commissars has been frequent in the past history of the PLA, during the period of army supremacy in the cultural revolution the few indicated appointments of this nature were on a high provincial level. Nonmilitary provincial chiefs were occasionally named political commissars, as were provincial party secretaries prior to the cultural revolution. The party in the army has in general seemed to be a discrete entity during the struggles of the past few years, perhaps even a rival to the civilian structure. The Tsinghai example indicates that the PLA party organizations do indeed retain some civilian coloration, particularly in light of the fact that the commissar in question is secretary of at least a division-sized unit composed of "several thousand commanders and fighters."

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MEETING IN CANTON MARKS REOPENING OF UNIVERSITIES

"A grand school-opening ceremony" in Canton to mark the reopening of nine provincial colleges and universities was reported by the Kwangtung radio on 2 December. Anhwei and Chekiang provinces had previously announced formally the reopening of their provincial institutes of higher education. Scattered media reports have indicated some individual reopenings elsewhere.

The Canton announcement, unlike those for Anhwei and Chekiang, failed to provide any hard information on how the new higher education system will operate in Kwangtung, but it did indicate measures apparently aimed at insuring the political reliability of the new worker-peasant-soldier students. Membership in the Young Communist League or the CCP itself appears to be close to a requirement for enrollment. The Canton report said that "80 percent" of the new students are either party or league members.

Wang Shou-tao, vice chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee, cautioned the new students that "although your environment has been changed, your work style of hard struggle must not be changed." In an apparent effort to maintain their work style, several "expedition teams" of worker-peasant-soldier students "took several days to walk to the schools" in Canton, the broadcast declared, and immediately upon arrival began "weeding, irrigating vegetables, repairing roads and cleaning up generally."

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

ANNUAL DRV ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

The annual DRV economic mission abroad, this year headed by Vice Premier Nguyen Con, returned to Hanoi on 25 November after a month-and-a-half tour during which economic agreements were concluded with the PRC, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and North Korea. After leaving the DPRK on 23 November, the delegation stopped over until the 25th in Peking, where it met with Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien; Li had signed the PRC-DRV aid agreement in October. At the same time, agreements with Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania were signed in Hanoi during the past month.* The DRV side at the Hanoi talks was headed by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, who from 1965 to 1969 had regularly led traveling economic aid delegations. No agreements with Poland, East Germany, or Hungary have been announced to date.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA The DRV delegation visited Prague from 2 to 12 November, and Nguyen Con was received by Czechoslovak Premier Lubomir Strougal. In reporting that the DRV-Czechoslovak agreement was signed on the 6th, Hanoi specified that it included military as well as economic aid; but the Prague CTK's report made no mention of military aid, saying the agreement was for "economic and technical assistance" for 1971. CTK added that Czechoslovakia would provide the DRV with "engineering and consumer goods." This is consistent with differing Hanoi and Prague reports on the signing of the agreements in 1968 and 1969. In 1968, however, CTK did quote Czechoslovak Vice Premier Frantisek Hamouz as mentioning military aid in speaking of the negotiations with the DRV. Neither side mentioned military aid in reporting the 1967 agreement, but the 1966 agreement--signed in Hanoi that year--was described by both sides as including military aid.

* The agreements with the PRC and the USSR are discussed, respectively, in the TRENDS of 7 October 1970, page 8, and of 28 October, pages 4-5. The DRV-Albanian agreement is also covered on page 5 of the latter issue. Additional PRC-DRV protocols are discussed in the 4 November TRENDS, pages 10-11.

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The nature of some Czechoslovak assistance was suggested in a 5 November CTK report on the departure of another DRV delegation led by alternate member of the North Vietnamese party Central Committee Dinh Duc Thien.* The report said that Thien, in meetings with Czechoslovak ministers, had discussed "the further extension of training of Vietnamese for the requirements of Vietnamese industry, possibilities for construction of a machine tool research institute in the DRV with the assistance and participation of Czechoslovak specialists, the construction of an apprentice center in the DRV with Czechoslovak assistance, and the use of Czechoslovak scientific and technical films for training Vietnamese experts."

Both VNA and CTK reported that a protocol on goods exchange for 1971 was also signed on 6 November. But only CTK noted that under this agreement Czechoslovakia will export to the DRV "machinery, rolled materials, pharmaceutical products, malt, and various fabrics and will import from the DRV tea, jute, ready-made clothes, woolen knitted garments, and products of domestic industry."

NORTH KOREA The Nguyen Con delegation arrived in Pyongyang on 17 November, and on the 19th the two countries signed an agreement on the DPRK's "free economic and military aid" to the DRV and another one on mutual delivery of commodities and payments for 1971. There is no further explanation of the contents of either agreement in propaganda media. Reports on last year's agreement with North Korea did not specify military aid, although it had been mentioned in reports on the agreements concluded in the previous two years.

The Nguyen Con delegation was received by Kim Il-song on the 22d and left for home via Peking on the 23d.

* Dinh Duc Thien was identified by Prague as minister of mechanical engineering and metallurgy. Available Hanoi propaganda has not confirmed this position, but NCNA identified him similarly in reporting his delegation's stay in Peking from 28 November to 5 December. This DRV ministry was formed in a major governmental reorganization announced by Hanoi on 9 December 1969; see the TRENDS of 10 December 1969, pages 13-14.

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BULGARIA A Bulgarian Government economic delegation arrived in Hanoi on 6 November, led by Pencho Kubadinski, Politburo member, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, and minister of construction and architecture. The delegation was met by DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, who headed the DRV economic delegation which began talks with the Bulgarians the next day.

On 12 November, according to VNA, representatives of the two countries signed an agreement on non-refundable economic aid and long-term loans, an agreement on military aid for 1971, and an agreement on economic and technical cooperation. A protocol on scientific and technical cooperation and an agreement on goods exchange and payments were also signed.

Bulgarian press reports on the signing of the aid agreements made no mention of military assistance. Sofia media similarly failed to acknowledge the military aid agreement last year, although such agreements had been noted in the media in previous years.

Kubadinski was received by First Secretary Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong on the 12th, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap received Col. Gen. Georgi Momekov, a member of the delegation. VNA's report of the group's departure on the 15th noted that the Bulgarians had toured Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa, and Ninh Binh provinces and the city of Haiphong during their stay.

ROMANIA On 15 November, as the Bulgarians departed, a Romanian Government economic delegation arrived in Hanoi, led by Gheorghe Radulescu, a member of the Romanian party Presidium and vice chairman of the Council of Ministers. Again Le Thanh Nghi met the delegation and led the DRV side in the ensuing talks.

Hanoi media on the 19th and Bucharest on the 20th reported the signing on the 19th of an agreement on non-refundable military aid and an agreement on goods exchange and payments for 1971.*

* A Romanian domestic broadcast on 23 October reported that an agreement with the DRV on goods exchange for 1971-1975 and a commercial protocol for 1971 were signed in Bucharest that day. Hanoi media are not known to have reported these agreements.

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VNA also noted that a convention on loans for 1971 was signed, while the Bucharest correspondent in Hanoi, according to AGERPRES, referred more generally to an economic agreement. Last year Hanoi reported only that agreements on economic and military aid were signed with Romania, while AGERPRES listed an economic agreement, an accord on non-refundable military assistance, a trade agreement, and an accord on postponement of the refund of sums resulting from previously extended credits.

Examples of past Romanian assistance to the DRV were cited in an AGERPRES report on the activities of the Romanian delegation. A dispatch on the 19th noted that during a visit by the delegation to Thanh Hoa the regional party first secretary cited support given the province by Romania: "the activity of Romanian doctors in that province, the support given by Romania to mechanize the road laying work, and the fact that youths from Thanh Hoa are studying in Romania." The Romanians also visited the city of Haiphong and Quang Ninh Province, according to the VNA report on their 20 November departure. The delegation was received by Le Duan and Pham Van Dong on the 19th.

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