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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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18 NOV 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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18 NOVEMBER 1970
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 9 - 15 NOVEMBER 1970

<u>Moscow (3875 items)</u>		<u>Peking (2946 items)</u>	
October Revolution Anniversary	(39%) 11%	Pakistani President in PRC	(--) 26%
Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Tripoli	(--) 6%	Indochina [Cambodian National Day	(16%) 25% (1%) 15%]
Indochina	(3%) 5%	[Vietnam	(10%) 4%]
De Gaulle's Death	(--) 5%	Domestic Issues	(26%) 17%
WFDY Meeting in Budapest	(4%) 5%	Middle East	(2%) 7%
China	(4%) 4%	De Gaulle's Death	(--) 7%
Gromyko in Italy	(--) 4%	DPRK Party Congress	(3%) 4%
Middle East	(3%) 3%		

C O R R E C T I O N TO THE TRENDS OF 4 NOVEMBER

PRC SUMMIT PROPOSAL, page 26. In paragraph two, tracing background of the proposal, line eight should read: x x x would not be used. The proposal was repeated, though without the "first step" suggestion, in the communiqués announcing the second and third Chinese nuclear tests in May 1965 and May 1966. It recurred with and without the formula in other elite Peking propaganda during May and June 1966, and Chou En-lai repeated the 1964 formula in his 28 July 1966 message x x x .

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INDOCHINA

Current Vietnamese communist propaganda focuses on Defense Secretary Laird's 13 November comments following the downing of a U.S. plane over the DRV that day. Laird's enunciation of the U.S. policy on reconnaissance over North Vietnam prompts DRV and PRG foreign ministry spokesmen's statements on the 14th and 16th, respectively, as well as a statement by the spokesman for the DRV's Paris delegation. The statements, as well as lower-level comment, deny that there was an understanding allowing U.S. reconnaissance flights over the DRV after the 1968 halt in the bombing of the North and assail the U.S. policy of "protective reaction" when unarmed U.S. planes are fired upon. Laird's remarks are also decried in Moscow propaganda, including articles in IZVESTIYA and RED STAR, and in a commentary by a correspondent of Peking's NCNA.

With the 92d session of the Paris talks postponed until 19 November because of de Gaulle's funeral on the 12th, there is little Vietnamese communist propaganda on political settlement. Commentaries, chiefly from the Front, continue to deprecate President Nixon's 7 October peace proposal and to uphold the PRG's eight-point elaboration of 17 September. A 15 November NHAN DAN article claims that the U.S. elections on the 3d demonstrated that the "absolute majority" of the American people oppose the war and the President's policy "of prolonging and expanding it."

The heads of both Vietnamese communist delegations at the Paris talks, the DRV's Xuan Thuy and the PRG's Nguyen Thi Binh, attended de Gaulle's funeral, Mme. Binh interrupting an "official visit" to Bulgaria for the purpose. Her visit to Sofia, which began on 9 November, was resumed on the 13th.

The floods in South Vietnam's northern provinces continue to draw attention, with publicity for communist relief efforts and attacks on allied "crimes" in the area. International expressions of sympathy for the flood victims include high-level messages from Romania and North Korea. There is also a message from Chou En-lai and one from the Chinese Red Cross announcing a donation of relief materials. Moscow has acknowledged the floods only in routine-level propaganda.

REACTION TO LAIRD STATEMENT ON DRV DOWNING OF U.S. PLANE

OFFICIAL DRV AND
PRG STATEMENTSBoth the North and South Vietnamese
communists reacted officially to
Secretary Laird's 13 November remarks,

made at a meeting of the National Council of Community World

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Affairs Organizations at the Pentagon, in response to the downing of an RF-4C over North Vietnam's Ha Tinh Province that day. Uniformly, the comment--including the DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements and the one by the DRV delegation spokesman in Paris--denies that there was an understanding in 1968 allowing U.S. reconnaissance flights over the DRV and denounces Laird's statement that the United States stands ready to take appropriate action in response to attacks on its unarmed aircraft. The propaganda has not acknowledged Laird's remarks that the cessation of strikes against the DRV in November 1968 was premised on a North Vietnamese undertaking to negotiate in good faith in Paris and his expression of concern that the DRV has not negotiated in a substantive or productive way.

Hanoi treated the downing of the RF-4C on the 13th routinely, announcing on the same day that an "enemy reconnaissance jet" had been brought down, bringing to 3,364 Hanoi's total of U.S. aircraft allegedly downed over North Vietnam.* The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, issued on the 14th in reaction to Laird's remarks, rejects the Secretary's comment that such actions by the DRV are incompatible with a U.S.-DRV understanding: The spokesman says the DRV Government has "time and again" stated that the United States halted the bombing unconditionally and that there is "absolutely no 'tacit agreement'" between the DRV and the United States.

The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman claims routinely that U.S. reconnaissance flights are an "infringement" on DRV sovereignty and a "brazen provocation" against the Vietnamese people, and he affirms that the Vietnamese are "resolved to oppose and duly punish all U.S. encroachments." He charges that Laird's statement "aims at smokescreening the war acts" of the United States against the DRV and at "paving the way for the continuation and multiplication of these war acts"; and he says that the DRV Government demands an "immediate" end to "the above mentioned acts."

Unlike the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, the ones by the spokesman for the DRV Paris delegation and by the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman note that Laird mentioned

* A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 18th claims that 121 U.S. aircraft have been shot down over the DRV since the bombing halt began in November 1968.

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military infiltration across the demilitarized zone and the shelling of South Vietnamese cities, along with attacks on reconnaissance planes over the North, as actions which might prompt a U.S. response in accordance with the 1968 understanding. But there is no communist acknowledgment of Laird's reference to the shelling of Saigon with four enemy rockets on 2 November. The only monitored Vietnamese communist mention of that attack was in a 3 November Hanoi domestic service broadcast, in dictation, which referred briefly to an attack on Saigon with "big guns."

The consistency with which Hanoi insists that the U.S. bombing halt was unconditional is pointed up in the 14 November statement by the DRV delegation spokesman, carried by VNA on the 15th, which recalls that this view was affirmed in the DRV Government's 2 November 1968 statement and declares that it has been reaffirmed "many a time" by Xuan Thuy in Paris. The delegation spokesman charges that Secretary Laird's comments "constitute new evidence that the Nixon Administration has not given up its acts of provocation against the DRV and lay bare its intention of undertaking new adventures infringing upon the sovereignty and security of the DRV."

The 16 November PRG spokesman's statement, publicized on the 17th, expresses "full and unanimous" agreement with the DRV spokesman's statement and says that "no threat can shake the iron-firm determination of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people. None of the Americans' adventurous military acts against the DRV can avoid being appropriately punished" by the people in both parts of Vietnam nor save the United States from defeat.

RADIO & PRESS COMMENTARIES Like the official statements, lower-level comment mentions the possibility of future U.S. actions against the DRV. NHAN DAN on the 15th, in a commentary broadcast by Hanoi radio, cites AP in charging that Laird "brazenly threatened to have aircraft bomb our antiaircraft defense positions." The paper calls the Secretary's "threat" part of a "plot of the Nixon Administration to prepare for intensification of military activities against the northern part" of Vietnam.

A 17 November Hanoi radio commentary scores Laird's remarks along with a State Department spokesman's statement that the reconnaissance flights will continue. Their "prefabricated

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arguments can fool no one," the commentary says, and "can only further expose their true faces as stubborn aggressors and their plots of preparing public opinion in order to intensify their acts of war against the DRV." An 18 November QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, also citing Laird's remarks and the State Department spokesman's comments, claims that U.S. news agencies and Saigon radio "even spread the news that the United States might resume its bombing on storages in North Vietnam." The army paper concludes that the United States is "obviously feverishly preparing for new military adventures in North Vietnam in an attempt to intimidate the Vietnamese people and extricate themselves from their position of failure and passiveness." The commentaries uniformly express the determination of the North Vietnamese to punish U.S. "violations of DRV sovereignty."

MOSCOW Reporting on the 14th that Secretary Laird asserted U.S. readiness to take "retaliatory measures" in connection with the downing of the American reconnaissance plane the day before, TASS says Laird's statement shows that "the U.S. military" is not only arrogating to itself the right to violate DRV airspace but also demands complete safety in the process. TASS calls the reconnaissance flights a "gross violation" of the United States' "commitments on the cessation of raids on the DRV."* Commenting in a similar vein, a 15 November IZVESTIYA article adds that Laird is "threatening to renew the bombing of DRV territory."

A RED STAR article by Aleksey Leontyev, summarized by TASS on the 17th, denounces Laird's statement as "threats and blackmail" and repeats the charge that the United States is "violating the commitments" on cessation of the bombing. Terming the American actions "unjustifiable" and supporting the DRV's right to defend itself, Leontyev recalls the

* A 4 May USSR Government statement read by Kosygin, scoring the U.S. military operation in Cambodia, included a denunciation of the bombings of the DRV in early May. It charged that the United States had "grossly violated the commitments undertaken in the agreement that served as a basis for the four-sided talks in Paris" and added that through the war in Cambodia and the bombings, President Nixon "practically cancelled out the decision of his predecessor, President Johnson, on the cessation of the bombings." Comment on the current episode does not mention the Paris talks.

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DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 14th that "there is no 'tacit agreement' on this matter between the DRV and the United States."

A foreign-language radio commentary by Soltan on the 16th asks how the "provocations and threats" against the DRV can be reconciled with President Nixon's statements about peaceful settlement, though Soltan does not directly mention the five points.

PEKING A commentary by NCNA correspondent Ou Ping, broadcast by Peking on 16 November, welcomes the downing of the U.S. reconnaissance plane and scores Secretary Laird's statement that the United States is ready to "take appropriate action in response" and will "continue to take those actions necessary to protect the lives of our men." The commentary does not mention the Secretary's reference to the understanding allowing reconnaissance flights, but NCNA's 15 November summary of the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement includes its rejection of the notion that there is any "tacit agreement."

The NCNA correspondent claims that the Indochinese people have "smashed" the U.S. "war blackmail" and "punctured its 'peace' fraud," adding that "it is nothing but a daydream now for Laird to try to intimidate the Vietnamese people and tie their hands in carrying on the war . . . through 'appropriate action in response.'" Lecturing that the only way to deal with U.S. "imperialism" is to "trounce it severely and put it to death," Ou Ping concludes that "it can be decidedly said that the day when Laird takes 'appropriate actions in response' is precisely the time when U.S. imperialism suffers still more disastrous defeat on the battlefield in Indochina."

The NCNA commentary says nothing about Chinese assistance or backing for the DRV, and NCNA's summary of the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement omits its assertion that U.S. air intrusions are a "challenge to justice- and peace-loving opinion all over the world."

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MANIFESTO OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE "POPULAR FRONT FOR PEACE"

LPA on the 16th and VNA on the 17th summarized a 10-point manifesto said to have been issued by the "Popular Front for Peace" during a "formal appearance before the people" on 7 November at the Ngoc Phuong monastery, Gia Dinh Province. According to the press agency reports, the manifesto calls for the withdrawal of allied troops "as an inevitable precondition to end the war," the restoration of peace "on the basis of the national right to self-determination," and the establishment of a government that "genuinely represents the South Vietnamese people so as to end the war" and "meet the aspirations of the people." The reports of the manifesto do not bring up the role of the communist side in a political solution. Other points in the manifesto deal with social and economic questions and relations with "peace-loving" nations.

In another report on the 7 November meeting of the Popular Front for Peace, LPA noted on the 17th that the meeting was attended by two Americans--a journalist and a student--representing the "American people's antiwar movement." The Americans spoke at the meeting, LPA said, and were "admitted to the Popular Front for Peace and assigned the task of getting in touch with the antiwar movement in the United States and the world."

The manifesto of the Popular Front for Peace had been mentioned before by Hanoi and Front media, but with only a general indication of its contents. The adoption of the document was reported promptly in an 8 November Liberation Radio news item which noted that the Popular Front for Peace had issued a manifesto on the previous day urging formation of a government capable of satisfying the people's desires and the withdrawal of all allied troops. On the 10th the radio claimed that five Saigon papers had been confiscated and another censored because they carried articles or reports endorsing the Popular Front's 10-point manifesto. Other Hanoi and Front propaganda has cited the manifesto as an example of growing expressions of opposition in South Vietnam to the "Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique."

BACKGROUND The Popular Front for Peace was founded on 11 October this year at a meeting in Saigon which set up a "mobilization committee for a people's front struggling for peace and the people's right to self-determination" and elected a presidium board and a provisional

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secretariat committee. A lengthy Liberation Radio report on the 11 October meeting, broadcast on the 19th, identified Dang Van Ky as chairman of the presidium and said he had been a "deputy chairman of the 1965 peace movement." Liberation Radio listed more than 20 members of the presidium and secretariat, including National Assembly deputies Phan Xuan Huy and Kieu Mong Thu--both of whom spoke at the meeting, according to the radio report. Liberation Radio said that the founding meeting, attended by "more than 1,000 delegates," was sponsored by the Committee for the Compatriots' Right to a Decent Life and the Women's Committee for the Right to a Decent Life; the leaders of these two organizations are represented in both the presidium and secretariat of the Popular Front for Peace.

Liberation Radio reported that the Popular Front committee "made it known that it would broaden its composition and that a number of notables, intellectuals, and laborers would be elected and officially become members following a broad campaign." The radio added that the committee will "contact" other personalities and listed almost 30 such people, including Gen. Duong Van Minh.

A statement adopted by the 11 October meeting, carried in full by Liberation Radio, and speeches at the meeting, excerpted by the radio, dealt mainly with criticism of U.S.-backed economic policies of the Thieu regime. Like the later manifesto, the statement called for the withdrawal of allied troops as a prerequisite for peace. With respect to the Saigon regime, it commented that "because South Vietnam's leaders have proved incompetent in insuring a good life for the compatriots and satisfying their desire for peace, the Vietnamese people are themselves forced to settle their life-or-death problem and decide their country's future."

Liberation Radio claimed that "many persons" at the meeting repeated a "strong statement" by Mrs. Ngo Ba Thanh--chairman of the Women's Committee for the Right to a Decent Life and a member of the presidium of the Popular Front for Peace--that "criticized President Nixon's five-point statement: 'Because U.S. troops came here en masse, they must now withdraw en masse. Only this will bring forth a cease-fire and enable the South Vietnamese people to exercise their right to self-determination.'"

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Front media have also carried reports on a 1 November meeting of the Popular Front for Peace. Liberation Radio on the 13th and LPA on the 14th noted that Dang Van Ky, in a speech to the meeting rejected "slanders" by the "Thieu clique" against the leaders of "movements for peace and the right to live." LPA said he charged that the "slanders" were a pretext for a crackdown on the movements, and Liberation Radio said he maintained that "he and other members of the Front served as instruments for no one but instead served only the people."

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M I D D L E E A S T

MOSCOW UNDERSCORES ROLE OF ARAB SOCIALIST UNION IN UAR

In reporting the fifth session of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) National Congress, held in Cairo 12-13 September, Moscow has played up the organization's role in the UAR's internal life. TASS on the 12th promptly reported President as-Sadat's election as ASU chairman,* and Moscow has widely publicized Brezhnev's telegram of congratulations to as-Sadat, reported by TASS on the 13th. The telegram credits the ASU with a "leading role" in the Egyptian people's struggle against Israel and imperialism and with carrying out the program of "revolutionary progressive development." Brezhnev expresses the hope that CPSU-ASU "relations of friendship and cooperation" will continue to develop successfully.

AS-SADAT SPEECH,
CONGRESS DOCUMENTS

Summarizing as-Sadat's speech to the congress on the 12th, TASS highlighted his remarks on continuing Soviet support of the UAR. It singled out his welcome of British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home's interpretation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution, and it cited a number of his remarks critical of the United States. TASS also noted as-Sadat's explanation of the projected Egyptian-Libyan-Sudanese federation as a "nucleus" of three states whose state systems, world outlooks, aims, and policies are uniform. The account did not touch on the portion of as-Sadat's speech dealing with Kosygin's talks in Cairo after Nasir's funeral. It also failed to mention his comments on the UNGA resolution, in which he stipulated two conditions of UAR acceptance: that the UN Secretary General submit a progress report to the United Nations within two months, and that Cairo will not again extend the cease-fire--at least, not "unless we and Jarring reach a stage in the situation enabling us here to rethink our position."**

* Reporting Premier Fawzi's 15 November resignation and designation by as-Sadat to head a new cabinet, TASS on the 16th cited AL-AHRAM--a paper "close to government circles"--as pointing out that various considerations, including the need to elect the ASU chairman, had delayed reorganization of the cabinet.

** An article by Kudryavtsev in NEW TIMES No. 42 (Russian edition, 23 October) had cited as-Sadat as telling senior Egyptian officers on 19 October that the UAR would agree to extension of the cease-fire for another three months only if there were "serious and effective contacts" and that if the UAR agreed to an extension "it will be the last, for we shall not consent to any further prolongation."

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TASS' account of the ASU Central Committee's report to the congress similarly highlighted its "stress on the importance" of Soviet support and expression of gratitude for the "all-round aid." TASS said the report "gives much space" to the UAR's relations with the socialist countries, first of all the USSR. But TASS did not detail the report's references to Soviet political, economic, and military support, including the provision of military weapons and equipment and the role of Soviet experts in training the UAR forces on modern weapons, "particularly the means and equipment for electronic war." Underscoring the theme of continuity of the Egyptian political course emphasized in Moscow's propaganda subsequent to Nasir's death, TASS said the report stresses that the latest events "convincingly show" no vacuum occurred after his death.

Briefly noting as-Sadat's concluding remarks, TASS on the 14th summed up the congress resolutions, singling out the pledge to achieve "full liberation" of all occupied Arab territories and the statement that Nasir's 30 March 1968 program will remain the "guiding document" in strengthening and developing the UAR. It noted the ASU's decision on strengthening Arab cooperation, its determination to continue the anti-imperialist struggle, and its appreciation of Soviet support, as well as the declaration that all political and economic resources will be employed to achieve the building of a socialist society. Among other points not mentioned by TASS, the resolutions also call for strengthening the armed forces, assert full support for the Palestinian revolution, urge strengthened relations with African and Islamic states, and note Egyptian ties with Mediterranean countries, France in particular.

MOSCOW COMMENT Dealing with the ASU's role in a 2 November article, PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov asserted that the real test of the ASU's authority and viability came after Nasir's death, when "imperialist propaganda began blaring about a 'vacuum' in the UAR." The ASU showed that it was capable of assuming the leadership of the revolution, Glukhov declared, and all the most important questions were solved by the ASU Supreme Executive Committee and Central Committee. He said that transforming the ASU into an "effective political vanguard organization" is the key to solving the most important problems facing the UAR.

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Both Glukhov's article and an Arabic-language commentary on the 12th underlined the importance of the ASU in raising the level of consciousness of the working people, Glukhov citing National Assembly President Shuqayr to this effect as well as noting his remarks on the importance of socialism for the Egyptian revolution. Both Glukhov and the commentary in Arabic also approvingly cited as-Sadat, in his National Assembly speech on the eve of the presidential referendum, as saying the action program he suggested was that of the ASU's "national action charter" and Nasir's 30 March 1968 program. According to Glukhov, as-Sadat thus gave "utmost prominence" to continuation of Nasir's work.

The broadcast in Arabic pointed to the importance of the ASU congress in light of the tasks entrusted by the UAR's political leadership to this "mass political organization." Nasir's program of industrialization, agrarian reform, improvement of the workers' social and economic conditions, and development of close cooperation with the USSR are principles for the ASU, whose part in the country's life is "constantly increasing," it said. Calling the ASU a "major force" and "great weight" in the life of the country, the broadcast claimed that it has more than once demonstrated its vitality and influence among the masses; and it noted the decision "in the ASU session this year to proceed with the peaceful initiative" for a cease-fire and resumption of the Jarring mission.

BACKGROUND ON ASU "VANGUARD" Along with occasional carping in the past about the ASU's failure to become an effective political party, there have been sporadic Soviet references to the need to create an "activist," "vanguard" grouping within the organization--a party within a party, consisting of "progressive," leftist-oriented Egyptians--to guide the ASU in the proper socialist, mass-political direction. George Mirskiy stated this need in an article in NEW TIMES No. 48 of 1965 (Russian edition, 26 November) when he declared that the ASU "cannot act as a politically conscious vanguard" and added that "socialist development is inconceivable without a party, without ideological work among the masses." Mirskiy went on to comment approvingly on the appointment of the then new premier Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din--of whom Moscow does not approve now--as a sign that Nasir intended to concentrate on reconstructing the ASU; he would be assisted, the article said, by "such authoritative political leaders" as Ali Sabri and the premier's cousin, Khalid Muhyi ad-Din, "both of whom are regarded

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as the most left-oriented Free Officers leaders." Mirskiy concluded by underscoring the "urgent need" for "the process of creating within the ASU a vanguard party, the political core of the Union" (the quoted phrase was printed in italics) and called this the "central, key factor" in the reorganization scheme.

The same author, in an article in NEW TIMES No. 50 of 1968 (Russian edition, 18 December), commenting on the student unrest in the UAR in November that year, pointed out that some leftist students had demanded implementation of the reforms promised in Nasir's 30 March 1968 program. "All progressives," Mirskiy said, saw in this program "a guarantee of the implementation of the principles of socialism, the creation of a socialist vanguard party, and of resolute struggle against the reactionary, bourgeoisified elements ensconced in the state machinery."

PRAVDA's Primakov, in an article on 7 May 1969, noted both subjective and objective obstacles to the ASU's "becoming a party" and went on to comment that "the desire to form a party within the ASU is becoming increasingly strong." This, Primakov said, is "one of the most significant trends in the UAR's internal development at this time."

A RED STAR article by G. Savin on 25 September the same year, referring to Nasir's hopes of winning the broad masses over to the ASU and recruiting them into the country's active political and economic life, noted that

within the ASU organizations there is now in progress a broad and profound process of creating a really mass political organization which, as many activists of the ASU say, will make it possible in time to lay the foundation for a political party--a vanguard for all progressive forces participating in the building of a new society.

In an article in KOMMUNIST No. 16 of 1969 (signed to press 3 November), Rumyantsev recalled the establishment of the ASU and went on to remark that the UAR had also set up an institute of socialist problems and had abolished the ban on the dissemination of Marxist literature in the country, with the study of Marxist-Leninist classics becoming "a structural part of the party school programs." The situation of the Egyptian Marxists, "who were previously persecuted, was normalized," he said, and they were "given the opportunity to participate in the building

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of the ASU and to involve themselves in public and production life." Rumyantsev remarked at a later point that the "young national democratic organizations, the ASU and the Ba'th Party, have not yet become effective political parties with a socialist orientation."

In the March 1970 issue of the Russian-language journal PROSTER, published in Alma-Ata, Yakov Belousev brought up the ASU in recounting talks with Egyptian officials during a visit of Soviet parliamentarians to the UAR in January. He cited ASU organizational affairs secretary Sha'rawi Jum'ah as saying that for supervision of the large and heterogenous mass of party members, not all of whom are active,

it is necessary to have an ideological framework, a form of political vanguard inside the ASU in the person of the apparat and the activist group of the party, and such an apparat already exists. The political apparatus is assigned the role of a vanguard political party of a socialist nature.

USSR RETICENT ON SYRIAN BA'THIST LEADERSHIP CRISIS

Following the pattern of its treatment of the last major Syrian power struggle in February-March 1969,** Moscow has been reluctant to acknowledge the current developments, reportedly stemming from disagreements between the "civilian" and "military" wings of the Syrian Ba'th Party over Syria's military intervention in the Jordanian situation in September. There has still been no comment on the situation, with Moscow confining itself to short TASS dispatches belatedly acknowledging the holding of the "emergency" 10th National--pan-Arab--Congress of the Ba'th Party and Defense Minister al-Asad's 13 November takeover. Moscow had taken no note of mid-October reports of the resignation--later withdrawn or suspended--of al-Atasi, chief of state and premier and Ba'th secretary general, from his government and party posts. Prague's CTK had reported this development on 19 October, noting that the resignation was reportedly due to leadership controversies, and

* Sha'rawi Jum'ah, who is also interior minister, was identified by Mirskiy in his December 1968 article as a "representative of the left wing in the leadership." TASS on 16 January this year, reporting the activities of the Soviet delegation led by Kunayev, had mentioned that Jum'ah explained the creation, aims, and principles of the ASU, but gave no details.

** For a discussion of Soviet propaganda on the 1969 crisis, see the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA of 3 July 1969, pages 1-5.

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on the 25th it reported RUDE PRAVO as attributing to Western news agencies claims of a split between the political and military wings of the Syrian Ba'th. These "rumors," the paper said, were received "skeptically" in Arab political circles, although "they admit that these two wings may differ" in the stress one places on ideological and the other on military and practical questions. RUDE PRAVO conceded that there were "differences in evaluating" the Jordanian crisis, particularly the participation of "Palestine Liberation Army units stationed in Syria" in the fighting in Jordan. (Moscow in dealing with the 1969 wrangle had similarly scoffed at Western news agency "rumors" of an internal political crisis, eventually acknowledging unspecified "complications" and "differences of opinion" among the leadership.)

BA'TH Not until 5 November did TASS blandly report that
CONGRESS the Ba'th Congress had opened on 30 October and was
 continuing its work. TASS said that delegates were
discussing party strategy with "due account for the international situation and the need to strengthen the positions" of the party to oppose imperialist, Zionist, and reactionary plans. They stressed the importance of supporting the Palestinian resistance movement, according to TASS, and also discussed "the role played by the Syrian army in the country's life" and condemned "reactionary quarters in the Arab world."

On the 9th TASS reported Ba'th National Command member Malik al-Amin as telling a press conference that the delegates had approved a report and were formulating decisions. The TASS account quoted al-Amin, characterizing the report, as stating that "imperialism had always intended to disrupt party ranks, to use rightwing elements" to distort the Ba'th's political line, and to undermine the "mainstays of the revolutionary transformations" in Syria.

In a brief Paris-dated report on the 13th, on the conclusion of the congress, TASS reported that the participants mapped out measures to further strengthen Syrian cooperation with the UAR and other "progressive Arab forces," as well as socialist and other friendly states. In the domestic field, TASS added, the party plans social and economic reforms, an "extension of democracy in governing the state, and greater activity of public organizations."

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**TAKEOVER
BY AL-ASAD** In Moscow's first direct reference to the Syrian dissensions, a TASS report from Cairo on the 15th, citing AL-JUMHURIYAH, said that "differences on matters of foreign and domestic policy between a 'civilian' grouping headed by party deputy secretary general Salah Jadid and a 'military' grouping headed by Defense Minister Hafiz al-Asad came to the fore" at the party congress. TASS attributed to unspecified news agencies the report that al-Asad, using the army and security forces, had taken control of key points in Damascus, including communications centers and the offices of two official newspapers, AL-BA'TH and ATH-THAWRAH. Noting reports that "civilian" leaders Jadid and Zu'ayyin had been arrested and that al-Atasi was under house arrest, TASS pointed out that there were no official reports from Damascus yet on leadership changes.

On the 16th, in a Beirut-dated dispatch, TASS again cited news agency reports that al-Asad continued in control, that some arrested Ba'th Party members had been released, and that al-Asad was conferring with al-Atasi on the question of forming a new cabinet. Mentioning reports of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations by Jadid and al-Asad supporters, TASS cited AFP to the effect that not many people took part.

A Moscow domestic service commentary by Ryzhikov on the 16th, referring to talks on the new government in Cairo, "latest events" in Syria, and the Israeli cabinet session, observed that information about the three events "is not complete." He brushed off the Damascus developments with the remark that "the radio observes complete silence on these events," which are "in no way explained by the only paper that appeared in the capital today, AL-BA'TH." There is only the news of al-Atasi's release from home confinement, he added.

**STATEMENT BY BA'TH
PROVISIONAL COMMAND** TASS briefly reported on the 17th, without comment, the statement of the Provisional Regional Command" of the Syrian Ba'th broadcast the previous day by Damascus radio. TASS noted that the "interim leadership" said Syria will develop "in every way" its relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It cited the statement as pledging Syria to develop relations with "progressive Arab countries," above all the UAR, and as welcoming the UAR-Libyan-Sudanese initiative toward establishing a federation. But TASS failed to mention the stated aims, respectively, of working toward unity with "progressive Arab states," particularly the UAR,

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and of striving for Syria to "assume its natural place" in the steps toward union. The TASS account noted that in domestic policy the interim leadership will strive for "deepening socialist transformations" and "utmost" strengthening of the armed forces. It pointed out that within three months a people's council will be set up, including representatives of the Ba'th, the trade unions, and the "progressive public," to draft a Syrian constitution and that the interim leadership will discharge its functions pending a Ba'th Regional--Syrian--Congress. TASS made no mention of the leadership's aims with respect to backing the "Palestinian revolution" and developing relations with states "which maintain reasonable stands on our national issues, particularly the Palestine issue."

A brief TASS item from Cairo on the 18th attributes to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) the report that the "provisional leadership" nominated Ahmad al-Khatib, chairman of the Syrian teachers' trade union, as the new head of state, and asked al-Asad to form a new government.

POLISH COMMENT A commentary in Warsaw's GLOS PRACY, reviewed by PAP on the 17th, expressed the opinion that if al-Asad succeeds in keeping the helm of state "this would undoubtedly be one of the greatest political events" in the Middle East since Nasir's death. The paper conceded that the current situation in Syria may appear "somewhat peculiar," since it has been the Ba'th civilian wing which has advocated "more radical" views including the idea of armed struggle as an appropriate means for regaining the occupied Arab territories. The military group around al-Asad, GLOS PRACY said, has been more in favor of a political solution of the Middle East conflict, closer to Cairo's views. The paper found it unlikely that al-Asad would be able to rule in such a "complicated country" as Syria without having achieved a compromise with the Ba'th Party "majority," notably its civilian wing.

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CUBA SUBMARINE BASE

TASS COMMENTARY DECRIES U.S. PRESS "RUMPUS," REITERATES DENIAL

Having kept the issue alive only in passing references for almost a month, Moscow again devotes a commentary to the charges of possible Soviet submarine base activity in Cienfuegos, Cuba in reaction to what is described as a renewed "rumpus" by some U.S. press organs over an alleged Soviet menace to the Western Hemisphere. The commentary, by TASS' Igor Orlov on 17 November, recalls the 13 October TASS statement's carefully worded denial that the USSR was building "its" base in Cuba, the statement's avowal that the USSR is doing nothing to contravene the 1962 U.S.-Soviet "understanding," and its exposition of Moscow's "well-known stand" on foreign military bases.* Orlov also reasserts the right of Soviet "ships and naval vessels" to call at foreign ports, including those of Cuba, "with the permission of the governments concerned"--a point also made in the TASS statement and in earlier Soviet comment.

Recalling that Soviet commentators last month had ascribed Washington's raising of the issue to "electoral considerations of the Republican Party" and to Congress' consideration of military appropriations, Orlov imputes the "new fabrications" to U.S. circles "who dislike the relaxation of tension, the normalization of international relations," and who oppose "improvement of Soviet-American relations." The commentary is characteristically vague in identifying the charges to which it responds, saying only that ill-intentioned U.S. circles are ready "to grasp at any excuse and, in particular, to interpret in a distorted light even the movements of some lonely barge."

Moscow media, like Havana's, have ignored the Defense Department's 10 November statement that a Soviet submarine tender and an accompanying tug returned to Cienfuegos on the 9th. Both Moscow and Havana had similarly ignored Defense Department statements last month on the vessels' departure from Cienfuegos on 10 October and arrival at the Cuban port of Mariel on the 15th. The announcement by U.S. officials on 15 October that two Soviet barges remained at Cienfuegos was likewise unmentioned.

* For an analysis of the 13 October TASS statement, see the TRENDS of 14 October 1970, pages 33-37.

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Passing references to the issue in Moscow media over the past month have normally appeared in the context of discussions of an alleged U.S. effort to revive the cold war. For example, a 29 October PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov entitled "Has Not Dulles Risen from the Dead?", complaining of an "intensification of anti-Soviet propaganda" in the United States, cited the "fantastic fabrications" about a Soviet nuclear submarine base in Cuba and added: "As is known, after a check it was made clear that no military base was being built there." Gromyko touched on the subject in his 21 October UN General Assembly speech, after decrying U.S. "fabrications" concerning violations of the Middle East cease-fire: "With no grounds whatsoever," he said, "a propaganda campaign has been mounted about some kind of invented Soviet arrangements in Cuba allegedly jeopardizing the security of the United States." He concluded that "this fabrication has fallen flat."

HAVANA SAYS U.S. FORCED TO DIVULGE "KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV PACT"

Havana media, silent on the submarine base issue for about a month, also revived it in mid-November--in a domestic radio talk on the 14th by Guido Garcia Inclan, the commentator who in two broadcasts last month authored Havana's only comment on the subject. He alleges now that the United States, appalled with terror lest Russia establish submarine bases on our island's southern coast, "has been compelled to "disclose the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement in the light of which they have to be very careful with Cuba, making certain that nobody lays a hand on her."* In his last previous reference to the issue on 14 October, Garcia Inclan said Moscow had reminded the United States of "the Kennedy-Khrushchev pact" (Moscow called it an "understanding" and did not name Khrushchev) and made what appeared to be a circuitous allusion to reciprocal commitments in the 1962 arrangement, including a no-invasion pledge by the United States.

* The TRENDS of 14 October 1970, pages 38-39, reviews Cuban leaders' past statements on the question of a 1962 U.S.-Soviet understanding. For a discussion of Garcia Inclan's comments in October of this year, see the TRENDS of 21 October, page 23.

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SALT

USSR CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC IN LIMITED COMMENT ON TALKS

In keeping with treatment of the first two rounds of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), Moscow media are devoting limited-- chiefly reportorial--attention to the current round in Helsinki. TASS has provided brief, straightforward reports on the meetings between the delegations at the U.S. and Soviet embassies, and its reportage on proceedings at the UN General Assembly has picked up general remarks by various representatives on the importance of the negotiations.

Moscow's most noteworthy current comment is an article in the weekly NEW TIMES (No. 46, dated 13 November) which is cautiously optimistic on the possibility of an agreement. The article notes the "businesslike atmosphere" in Helsinki and observes that past experience in disarmament negotiations "shows the possibility of real progress" if there is a constructive approach by the participants. Declaring that the USSR attaches "great significance" to SALT, the article recalls Gromyko's remarks last month before the UNGA in which he voiced hope that the talks would lead to positive results. At the same time, the article says the "prevailing international situation" exerts a considerable influence on any talks, adding that "U.S. imperialist circles have in a number of instances created additional obstacles to the liquidation of dangerous hotbeds of tension and for the resolution of acute problems which are poisoning the relations between states."

Soviet comment continues to air routine complaints about U.S. plans to move forward with new weapons systems, suggesting that such plans complicate the talks. A typical commentary, for Finnish listeners on 5 November, cited as one obstacle to progress toward limiting strategic arms the attempt of the "U.S. military-industrial complex" to make "new turns in the spiral of the arms race." An article in the October issue of the journal USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY by G. Trofimenko (signed to the press on 13 October) had discussed U.S. military and political strategy at some length, recalling a speech by Secretary Laird in New York in April 1970 in which he said the Administration had postponed "fundamental decisions" on strategic weaponry in order to create a more favorable

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atmosphere for SALT. Trofimenko commented that certain decisions had already been made, including the accelerated deployment of the Safeguard ABM and the development of MIRV's.

COMMENT IN MANDARIN For Chinese audiences, Moscow has used the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress to defend the USSR's participation in SALT--"an activity within the realm of the general strategy of the international communist movement"--and to assail Peking for its present silence and past criticism of SALT. A commentary on 14 November, calling attention to Peking's current silence, said that the PRC last November had branded Soviet participation in SALT "another step on the road of betraying the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle" and termed such a charge consistent with Peking's reaction to the partial nuclear test-ban treaty. In fact, the commentator said, if SALT produces an agreement it will have lessened the "imperialist nuclear threat," thereby marking "a new step in one of the important tasks of communists--the strengthening of peace."

Peking has not devoted a commentary to SALT since 4 November 1969, when an NCNA dispatch on the talks leveled charges similar to the one recalled in the Soviet commentary. It has, however, taken some passing swipes at the talks.

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CHILE

MOSCOW WELCOMES RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA

Soviet media have hailed President Allende's 12 November announcement of the restoration of Chilean-Cuban relations as portending the end of Cuba's isolation and as registering a trend among Latin American states toward liberation from U.S. tutelage. Latin American specialist Listov wrote in the 14 November PRAVDA that Allende's move accords with the strivings of a number of Latin American states to pursue foreign policies "without dependence on the 'wishes' of Washington." He noted increasing Latin American trade with Cuba in contravention of U.S. desires and alleged that there were increasing calls within the OAS for restoration of Cuba's "lawful rights" in that organization. "Realistic tendencies," he concluded, "are gaining the upper hand."

Other Moscow comment plays up favorable Latin American reactions to Allende's announcement. An Ecuadoran cabinet minister is cited as saying his country, too, must maintain relations with all Latin American states, including Cuba, and Chilean Communist Party Secretary General Luis Corvalan is quoted as calling Allende's move "the start of a process that will put an end to Cuba's isolation from other Latin American countries." A Radio Moscow commentary for Latin American audiences on the 16th coupled the renewal of Cuban-Chilean ties with Peruvian Government calls for a reassessment of the Cuban question as evidence of "a breach of the imperialist-imposed blockade of Cuba." The time has come, the commentator said, when "the policy of isolating Cuba is becoming the policy of isolating the United States from other countries in the Western hemisphere."

CUBA HAILS BLOW TO BLOCKADE, EVINCES INTEREST IN TIES WITH PERU

Havana's first comment on the reestablishment of Cuban-Chilean relations, in the domestic service on the 13th, forecast that other Latin American governments will follow suit with "the same courage and the same propriety" displayed by Allende. Another commentary the same day described the renewal of ties as of "utmost importance" not only to Chile and Cuba but to "Latin America and the world." Above all, the commentator said, it dealt "a hard blow to the U.S. policy of blockading and isolating the Cuban revolution."

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The renewal of ties was negotiated by Cuban minister without portfolio Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who headed the Cuban delegation to Allende's inauguration. While in Chile, Rodriguez proffered some advice which appeared to betray Cuban concern over the future course of the new Chilean government. At an 11 November press conference--reported in a dispatch from PRENSA LATINA's correspondent to the Havana home office--he remarked that Chile might well profit from some of Cuba's "negative experiences." Specifically, he warned against permitting "anguish or impatience over meeting the people's needs" to result in efforts "to accomplish more than the technical, political, and economic resources allow at a given moment." Suggesting concern lest Allende be overly tolerant of his political enemies, Rodriguez noted that the Cuban revolution "sinned in its early days not by excessive executions but by being too generous with certain elements that had attached themselves to the revolution."

In an interview on Chilean TV two days earlier, Rodriguez had been asked about a TIME magazine report that one of Allende's daughters had returned from Cuba with a letter from Fidel Castro advising Allende not to break relations with Washington, to maintain amicable relations with the army, and to restrain revolutionary rhetoric. Rodriguez temporized at first ("Look, I do not devote myself to violating correspondence"), then declared that the letter was "nonexistent" and that "Dr. Allende neither asks for nor needs advice, nor is Comrade Fidel up to giving advice to any leader like Dr. Allende, his personal friend whom he admires and trusts."

At the press conference in Chile Rodriguez reiterated that Cuba will not return to the OAS and excoriated the organization as "a corpse with some outgrowths still appearing." But he went on to express understanding of Allende's decision to remain within the OAS "because he believes Chile can fight from within for such international programs as those of Popular Unity." Allende's statement on the reestablishment of relations with Cuba, carried in full in Havana media, disputed the legality of the OAS sanctions against Cuba but was careful to specify that Chile will respect its obligations under international and regional treaties. PRENSA LATINA also carried the 15 November statement of a Chilean representative with the Andean Pact to the effect that the restoration of Cuban-Chilean relations "will in no way alter our participation" in the Pact.

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RELATIONS WITH PERU In a 1 August interview with Chilean newsmen in Havana, asserting high interest in relations with Chile,* Castro remarked that he was "not so interested in opening relations with Peru" because "imperialism" might use such a development "as a pretext to attack the present Peruvian Government." But there are signs that Havana entertains hopes for a Peruvian initiative to resume relations.

En route home from Chile after Allende's inauguration, Rodriguez stopped off at the Lima airport on 12 November and made a number of flattering statements--carried by PRENSA LATINA--about Peruvian foreign and domestic policies. Among other things, he lauded remarks by the Peruvian foreign minister calling for a dialogue between Cuba and other Latin American countries and suggesting Cuba's readmission to the OAS--manifestations, Rodriguez said, of Peru's "independent policy." While insisting again that Cuba does not want to return to the OAS; he professed understanding of the desires for member countries to use the organization as a platform for airing their views on Latin American problems. He recalled Castro's praise for President Velasco's reform measures, massive Cuban blood donations for Peruvian earthquake victims, and Cuba's proposal of an international aid fund for Peru in the aftermath of the earthquake. He had made many of the same points at Lima's airport on his previous stopover en route to Santiago.

Radio Havana reported on 13 November that Peruvian President Velasco, after commenting on the renewal of Cuban-Chilean relations, said the OAS resolution excluding Cuba "cannot remain an eternal and unchangeable condemnation." A broadcast on the 15th cited an article by a Peruvian newspaper editor as arguing that the issue of restoring relations with Cuba did not necessarily have to be resolved within the OAS and as alleging that the Peruvian president and his foreign minister both believed it was "possible to revise the legal terms on which Cuba was condemned."

* Discussed in the TRENDS of 19 August 1970, pages 38-41.

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FRG - POLAND

WARSAW HAILS TREATY, PRAISES BRANDT'S POLITICAL COURAGE

The treaty to normalize Polish-West German relations, concluded on 14 November and initialed by Foreign Ministers Scheel and Jedrychowski in Warsaw on the 18th, is hailed in Polish media as a product of Polish initiative and a tribute to the political courage and realism of Chancellor Brandt. A TRYBUNA LUDU article on the 15th says "diplomatic circles" expect the formal signing to take place before the end of the year and notes that Jedrychowski has invited Brandt to visit Warsaw, presumably for the signing ceremony.

Polish commentators call the treaty an important step in the improvement of bilateral ties and a vital factor in the development of European security. Tracing it to the initiative of PZPR First Secretary Gomulka in May 1969, they emphasize that the "point of departure" was the necessity for the FRG to confirm the "final nature" of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western frontier--a consistent theme of Polish comment since the negotiations for the treaty began in February.*

Praise for Brandt's "realism" in agreeing to the treaty appears in a commentary in the 15 November ZYCIE WARSZAWY, which remarks that the coalition SPD-FDP government under Brandt "has had the courage to revise Bonn's policy toward the socialist states and, in keeping with the spirit of the times, to seek a detente in relations with these countries." PAP on the 16th quotes the army daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI as asserting that Brandt, "whose antifascist past is generally known," has "soberly and realistically" appraised problems relating to Bonn's Ostpolitik.

* The seventh and final round of talks began on 3 November. For a review of comment on the sixth round, see the TRENDS of 14 October 1970, pages 42-43.

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At the same time, the propaganda takes cognizance as usual of opposition forces in the FRG allegedly bent on undercutting Brandt's policies. Thus the 15 November TRYBUNA LUDU article cautions that "nationalistic forces" and "revanchist groups" continue to oppose the normalization of relations with Poland. Commentators point to the existence of such sentiment in stressing the importance of developments in the post-treaty period.

Soviet media have reported the conclusion of the agreement, so far without comment. The only available East European comment apart from Warsaw's comes from Budapest, which has welcomed the agreement in NEPSZABADSAG and NEPSZAVA articles on the 15th. Both papers laud Brandt's role while taking note of a still vocal opposition. NEPSZAVA says that "a demagogic incitement of the chauvinist-militarist-revanchist chorus can be expected primarily in the matter of the final and irrevocable recognition of the Oder-Neisse border."

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ROMANIA - POLAND

NEW TREATY PATTERNED ON SOVIET-ROMANIAN PACT, WITH VARIATIONS

The Polish-Romanian treaty signed by Gomulka and Ceausescu in Bucharest on 12 November, available in full from AGERPRES, in general follows the pattern set in the Soviet-Romanian treaty of 7 July,* which cleared the way for Romania to go ahead on the renewal of treaties with other Soviet bloc countries. The Polish-Romanian pact, replacing the one of 26 January 1949, was initialed within a month of the conclusion of the Soviet-Romanian treaty after a long delay occasioned by the Czechoslovak events. On the model of the Soviet-Romanian treaty, the Polish-Romanian document broadens the commitment to mutual defense and avoids any allusion to the Brezhnev doctrine or any commitment to economic "integration" under CEMA, of which Poland is a foremost advocate. At the same time, variations between the two treaties reflect Romania's independent approach in its dealings with other members of the Soviet bloc, as well as an effort to achieve more flexibility in bloc relations by enshrining principles of autonomy in bilateral pacts.

MUTUAL DEFENSE Article 7, the mutual defense clause of the new treaty, commits the signators to assist each other militarily against armed attack "by any state or group of states," as in the counterpart clause of the Soviet-Romanian pact. It replaces the formula used in the January 1949 treaty, which delimited the commitment to repelling aggression by "Germany or any state associated with it." While the old formula is no longer appropriate in a period of rapprochement with West Germany, the new one--divested completely of geographical limitations--would presumably create some uneasiness on the part of Moscow's allies in the present-day context of potential Sino-Soviet confrontation. In the preamble, where the Soviet-Romanian treaty pledges observance of the "obligations envisaged in the 1955 Warsaw Treaty" and mentions that the Warsaw Pact was created in response to "the NATO threat," the counterpart passage in the Polish-Romanian preamble adds a phrase terming the Pact "an instrument for defending the security of the countries in the treaty membership and peace in Europe."

* See the TRENDS of 8 and 15 July for a discussion of the Soviet-Romanian pact.

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Thus while the mutual defense clause leaves the geographical boundaries of the commitment open-ended, the Romanians and Poles contrive in their preamble to reinforce the focus on the European theater.

UN ROLE Article 5, the "coexistence" clause, softens the anti-imperialist thrust of its counterpart in the Soviet-Romanian pact and cites the United Nations' role in peace-keeping operations, unmentioned in that context in the pact with the Soviets. Article 5 of the Soviet-Romanian pact pledges the signators to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence by taking measures against "encroachments by the aggressive forces of imperialism and reaction"; the Polish-Romanian counterpart article pledges that "in keeping with the aims and principles of the UN Charter," the two parties will "continue the endeavours for the defense of peace and security and the peaceful solving of international differences"

MUTUAL RELATIONS The principles governing relations between Romania and Poland are set out in Article 1, which states that "cooperation" between the two states will be based on "socialist internationalism, sovereignty, equal rights, reciprocal advantage, mutual assistance and noninterference in internal affairs." Article 2 pledges the "continuous development of cooperation within CEMA, as well as with other socialist states." Similar formulations appear in the Soviet-Romanian treaty.

But Article 8, the mutual "consultation" clause, is looser in form than the one in the Soviet-Romanian treaty, providing only that the two parties "will inform and consult" each other "on the expansion of cooperation between the two states as well as with major international questions concerning their interests." The 1949 treaty between the two countries had called for consultation on "all important international questions," whereas the new Soviet-Romanian pact provides that the two signatories will "consult one another on all important international problems affecting the interests of both countries in order to place in accord the positions." This in turn contrasts with the more disciplined treaty ties Moscow has established with Czechoslovakia: The new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty stipulates that after consultations, the two parties "shall act proceeding from their common position."

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CEAUSESCU, GOMULKA REMARKS MIRROR DIVERGENT APPROACHES

In his address at a friendship rally following the signing of the treaty, broadcast live by Radio Bucharest, Ceausescu made a strong defense of his own national course and his policy of pursuing good relations with "all" countries. "The will of the people to live freely, to strengthen and consolidate their national states, to develop independently their economic and social life in accordance with their vital interests," he emphasized, "asserts itself more strongly than even in our days." Noting that the new treaty puts both countries on record as resolved to "unswervingly pursue the policy of peaceful coexistence," he added that "Romania consistently strives to promote new relations between states based on sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage." Life proves, he concluded, that cooperation, the avoidance of armed clashes, and lasting peace can be insured "only on the basis of these principles inscribed in the UN Charter."

In contrast, Gomulka stressed a need to promote further cooperation within the framework of CEMA and argued that national security is linked to close ties with the Soviet bloc: "Insuring the rate of development and keeping in step with the worldwide technical progress is unthinkable without strengthening economic ties between the socialist countries," he said. And progress in "economic integration is based on a more effective contribution of our countries in the international division of labor and on efficient competition with capitalism; we must not underestimate the importance of the integrating processes taking place in the capitalist world." Gomulka also took the occasion to recall the "heroic" role of the Soviet army in helping to liberate the socialist countries in World War II. He reminded the Romanians that "the effective guarantee of their sovereignty and security, as well as the instrument of their thorough development," resides in their own efforts and in "the unity of the socialist states."

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COMMUNIQUE The 13 November joint communique issued at the
ON VISIT close of the four-day Bucharest visit of the
 Gomulka delegation, which also included Premier
Cyrankiewicz,* reports that the two sides signed a protocol
calling for "continued expansion of economic and technical-
scientific cooperation." The wide areas of difference between
the two party-state delegations, however, are reflected in
the communique's summary of the talks: "The two delegations
informed each other about the achievements and tasks in
building socialism in the two countries . . . and analyzed
the present state and possibilities for expanding bilateral
relations and exchanged views on international questions
and on problems of the international communist and workers
movement."

Presumably at Romania's behest, the communique echoes Ceausescu's
stress on observance of the principles of the UN Charter,
registering both sides' support for expanding relations "based
on the rules of international law . . . and intensified efforts
to promote peace and exclude the use of force or threats of
force from interstate relations."

* Cyrankiewicz and Romanian Premier Maurer signed the new
friendship treaty along with Gomulka and Ceausescu. Maurer,
still recuperating from an automobile accident, was not listed
as present at any of the ceremonies during the Polish visit.

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P R C - P A K I S T A N

COMMUNIQUE HAILING FRIENDSHIP ENDS YAHYA KHAN VISIT TO PRC

Peking has used the occasion of Pakistan President Yahya Khan's 10-14 November visit to reaffirm the warmth of PRC-Pakistan relations against the background of recent contacts between Yahya Khan and the two superpowers. As stressed in the 14 November joint communique, the visitor was accorded "a rousing welcome and a magnificent and enthusiastic reception" by the Chinese. Both sides are recorded as being "highly satisfied" with the results of talks between PRC Premier Chou En-lai and Yahya Khan, which took place in "a very sincere and friendly atmosphere." The visitor was also received by Mao. During the visit a new agreement on economic cooperation was signed.

The communique broaches contentious Indo-Pakistan issues and calls attention to themes reflecting Peking's resurgent diplomatic activity, notably the recently resurrected proposal for a world summit conference on disarmament and support for PRC membership in the United Nations. In stressing the value of peaceful coexistence, the communique cites the settlement of the boundary question between the two countries as exemplifying "strict adherence" to the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Presumably in deference to Pakistani sensitivities, the communique mentions neither the Soviet Union nor the United States.

Yahya Khan's visit to China, coming in the wake of a trip to the Soviet Union in June and a meeting with President Nixon in October, followed a series of exchanges of delegations between the PRC and Pakistan this year. Kuo Mo-jo and Fang Yi (head of the Chinese aid agency) visited Pakistan in March and April, respectively, and since then Peking has hosted Pakistani economic and friendship delegations and has entertained the commanders of the Pakistani air force and navy and the army's medical director. In the current communique Yahya Khan renewed the long-standing invitation for Chou En-lai to visit Pakistan, and Chou "indicated that he would visit Pakistan at the earliest possible opportunity."

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CHINESE AID Noting that the two sides "expressed full satisfaction at the deep, all-round development of the friendly relations between China and Pakistan," the communique registers Pakistan's acknowledgment of China's "generous help" in the past and Chinese "willingness to render to Pakistan further assistance within China's means and capacity to help make the economy of Pakistan self-reliant." Although NCNA's 14 November report on the signing of a PRC-Pakistan "agreement on economic and technical cooperation" does not disclose the terms of the aid, the Karachi press has described it as including a long-term interest-free loan of 500 million yuan for use during the first three years of Pakistan's fourth five-year plan, with the possibility of additional loans after a review of the situation at the end of the third year. That there is a military aspect of the aid agreement seems indicated by the participation in the talks of PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, Deputy Chief Chiu Hui-tso, and the head of the logistics equipment department.

INTERNATIONAL The Chinese seem to have hedged in their commitment
ISSUES to Pakistan's causes in its disputes with India. While expressing support for the Kashmiri people "in their just struggle for their right of self-determination"--a stand included in PRC-Pakistan communique since February 1964--the Chinese took a noncommittal position on other aspects of the Indo-Pakistan disputes. Thus, according to the communique, the Chinese side "noted with interest" and considered "worthy of support of the people of various countries" the Pakistani proposal on withdrawal of troops to enable the people of Kashmir to exercise self-determination. The communique also notes that Yahya Khan "apprised" the Chinese of "the dispute over the distribution of the Ganges waters" and that the Chinese side "appreciated Pakistan's stand for a peaceful solution" of this question and "hoped for an early settlement." Chinese reservations on the troop withdrawal proposal may have been made with an eye on the Sino-Indian territorial dispute, and on the Ganges question Peking may have been seeking to keep its options open rather being locked in on one side of the dispute. In managing to have these issues included in the communique the Pakistanis achieved more than they did during Yahya Khan's visit to Moscow; the communique on that visit failed to mention the Kashmir or Ganges questions. The Soviet-Pakistan communique spoke in generalities about Indo-Pakistani relations. The Sino-Pakistan communique does not mention India.

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On the UN membership question, a consistent theme in PRC-Pakistan communiques and in Chinese reportage on mutual visits, the communique cites Pakistan's view that the PRC Government is "the sole legal government of the Chinese people," that Taiwan is "an inalienable part of the territory" of the PRC, and "that the legitimate rights of the PRC in the United Nations should be restored forthwith." The Chinese side "expressed thanks for the friendly stand of Pakistan." The expulsion of the Nationalist regime is left implicit in the communique. In banquet speeches on the 11th Tung Pi-wu thanked Pakistan for "firmly opposing the scheme of creating 'two Chinas,'" and Yahya Khan asserted that Taiwan "is an integral part" of the PRC and that Pakistan "categorically rejected the myth of two Chinas and all that is attempted to be built around this myth."

The communique records both sides' "determination to work for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons." In addition, the Pakistan side takes note "with positive interest" of Peking's proposal for a world summit conference to discuss this objective. (This proposal was mentioned in the 7 March 1965 communique on Ayub Khan's visit to the PRC but was omitted from the 31 March 1966 communique concluding Liu Shao-chi's visit to Pakistan.) The Chinese proposal, first mentioned following the October 1964 PRC nuclear test but not reiterated at the elite level since July 1966, resurfaced in the 1 November 1970 joint statement of the China-Japan Friendship Association and the visiting Japanese Socialist Party delegation. However, the current communique, unlike the 1 November statement, does not go on to suggest that as a "first step" the conference reach an agreement that nuclear weapons would not be used.

Disagreement is reflected in the communique's statement that the two sides had "an exchange of views" on Indochina, though the Pakistanis joined their hosts in saying "the struggle of the three peoples of Indo-China for national liberation was just." A closer coincidence of views, based on a predictably pro-Arab position, is recorded on the Middle East, with the two sides calling for Israeli withdrawal from "all Arab lands . . . seized by aggression."

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CHINESE COVERAGE Voluminous Chinese propaganda surrounding the visit-- totalling over a quarter of Peking radio output during that week, compared with 15 percent of total output at the time of Ayub Khan's visit in March 1965--foreshadowed the communique in lauding the warm bilateral relations, supporting Kashmiri self-determination, and citing Pakistani backing for PRC membership in the United Nations. In addition, an NCNA correspondent's commentary on 10 November injected a sharp anti-Soviet note in hailing Pakistan for rejecting last year the proposal of "a super-power, flaunting the banner of 'regional economic cooperation,'" for creation of "a pernicious 'system of collective security in Asia' in a vain attempt to control the Asian countries, further push its aggression and expansion in Asia, and oppose China."

Peking's efforts to play up the warm welcome, the grand receptions, and the large crowds for Yahya Khan and his entourage began with an NCNA report of his arrival on the 10th and his welcome by "several hundred thousand revolutionary people" who "gathered at the airport and lined the streets" and "sang and danced and shouted slogans." NCNA also carried roundups of Pakistani press comments hailing the visit and praising the friendship between the two neighbors.

MOSCOW REPORTS YAHYA KHAN'S ARRIVAL, DISPLAYS SENSITIVITY

In a highly unusual Peking-dated report on Yahya Khan's arrival, TASS on 10 November noted that he had come on "an official visit" and had been met at the airport by Chou En-lai and Li Hsien-ni n. On the same day a Mandarin broadcast over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress stressed that Soviet-Pakistan relations are characterized by mutual understanding, friendship, and cooperation and recalled that President Yahya Khan during his visit to Moscow in June had said Pakistan and the USSR hold the same views on many international issues, citing particularly their close stands on Vietnam and the Middle East. The high degree of economic cooperation, the broadcast said, is illustrated by some 20 large joint industrial enterprises which will be the backbone of Pakistan's national economy.

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