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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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28 OCT 1970

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

28 OCTOBER 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 43)

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FBI'S TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

C O N T E N T S

Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . i

INDOCHINA

Comment on U.S. Plan Stresses Withdrawal, Self-Determination . . . . . 1  
Cambodia: "Partition" Concept, Idea of DRV-Lon Nol Talks Scored . . . . . 3  
Hanoi Signs Aid Agreements with Soviet Union, Albania . . . . . 4  
Stockholm Conference on "War Crimes" Publicized by DRV, USSR . . . . . 6  
DRV Protests Alleged B-52 Strikes in Demilitarized Zone . . . . . 7  
DRV Enacts Penalties for Crimes Against State, Private Property . . . . . 7  
Pathet Lao Scores Souvanna's Appointment of Plenipotentiary . . . . . 8

MIDDLE EAST

Soviet Middle East Policy Reiterated in UNGA Session . . . . . 9  
Moscow Gives Limited Attention to UNGA Middle East Debate . . . . . 12

UNITED NATIONS

Gromyko Presents Annual Foreign Policy Review at UNGA . . . . . 13  
Gromyko Touches on U.S.-Soviet Ties; TASS Cites Nixon Remarks . . . . . 16

U.S. AIR INTRUSION

USSR Registers Protest in Statements to United States, Turkey . . . . . 18

SOVIET PLANE HIJACKING

Moscow Continues to Press Turkish Government for Extradition . . . . . 21

CEAUSESCU IN U.S.

Bucharest Features, Moscow Virtually Ignores Washington Visit . . . . . 23

SINO-KOREAN RELATIONS

CPV Anniversary Marked with Fanfare in DPRK, PRC . . . . . 25  
Chinese Korean Comments Reflect Divergent Approaches . . . . . 25  
Chinese Snipe at Soviets; Moscow Recalls Soviet Aid . . . . . 28

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

New "Radio Peace and Progress" Service for Overseas Chinese . . . . . 30

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Shortcomings of Leading Groups Continue to be Highlighted . . . . . 33  
Rebuilt County Party Committees by Province . . . . . 35

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

C O N T E N T S (Continued)

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Appeal for Market Economy Published in NOVY MIR . . . . . 36

BOLIVIA

Cuban Media Increasingly Hostile to Torres Regime . . . . . 39

Moscow Largely Noncommittal in Comment on Torres . . . . . 42

CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- i -

## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 19 - 25 OCTOBER 1970

Moscow (3825 items)

October Revolution Anniversary Slogans	(1%)	7%
Middle East [New UAR Government]	(7%)	6%
Gromyko UN Speech	(4%)	3%]
Indochina	(--)	5%
China	(9%)	5%
Allende Elected President of Chile	(3%)	4%
USSR Plane Hijacked to Turkey	(0.1%)	4%
WFTU 25th Anniversary	(--)	3%
Zond 8	(10%)	2%
USAF Plane Downed in Armenia	(--)	1%
Warsaw Pact Maneuvers	(--)	1%

Peking (3349 items)

Korean Issues [20th CPV Anniversary]	(9%)	26%
[DPRK Government Delegation in PRC]	(--)	19%]
Domestic Issues	(5%)	7%]
Indochina [Nixon Speech]	(16%)	22%
[Sihanouk Statement on UN]	(43%)	14%
PRC-Equatorial Guinea Diplomatic Relations	(17%)	7%]
PRC-Canada Diplomatic Relations	(--)	3%]
	(1%)	5%
	(5%)	5%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 1 -

## INDOCHINA

Continuing Hanoi and Front propaganda on President Nixon's 7 October five-point proposal on Indochina compares it unfavorably with the PRG's 17 September eight-point elaboration of the NFLSV's May 1969 10-point solution. Particular stress in current comment is on the need for the United States to set a timetable for total withdrawal and to cease supporting the Thieu-Ky-Khiem regime. A series of articles in the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN analyzes the U.S. Vietnamization policy, with one on 23 October saying that the President's "so-called" peace initiative was intended to buttress Vietnamization, "now in its most crucial phase."

Moscow's continued criticism of the President's plan includes the pro forma charge, voiced by Gromyko in his 21 October UNGA address, that the proposal does not provide for the Vietnamese to settle their own problems. Gromyko reiterates support for the PRG proposals, and Moscow complains that the President said nothing about the PRG's "constructive initiative" in his UNGA address on the 23d.

Peking continues to publicize foreign criticism of the President's speech. There is no new Chinese comment on the proposal, although it was briefly mentioned in the course of an attack on U.S. policy by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng at a 24 October rally marking the 20th anniversary of the entry of Chinese "volunteers" into the Korean War.

## COMMENT ON U.S. PLAN STRESSES WITHDRAWAL, SELF-DETERMINATION

Criticism and "rejection" of the President's 7 October proposal are repeated in continuing Hanoi and Front propaganda as well as in the Vietnamese communist delegates' statements at the 89th session of the Paris talks on 22 October. Much of the comment obscures the nature of the President's proposals, and a NHAN DAN Commentator article--as reviewed by VNA on the 27th--goes so far as to ignore the substance of the five points entirely. Commentator "rejects" the President's plan and then presses for acceptance of the PRG eight-point "elaboration," specifying that it calls for U.S. agreement to withdraw by 30 June 1971 and for establishment of a Saigon administration without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem which in turn would participate in forming a provisional coalition government. A 28 October NHAN DAN commentary on the

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

President's UNGA address of the 23d says cryptically that the President's talk of "cease-fire, negotiations, and insuring the rights of prisoners" was an attempt to prove his good will.

As reported in the VNA account of the 22 October Paris session, PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh again called for a response to her eight-point plan, and the DRV's Xuan Thuy\* declared that the Vietnam problem can be settled "only" on the basis of that plan, which he said offers a "correct" solution to all the points raised by the President. Thuy stated again that the DRV "fully rejects" the President's proposals and "all the tortuous and fallacious justifications of the U.S. side." Consistent with standard practice, Vietnamese communist media have not publicized the post-session press briefing at which DRV spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le remarked, "Perhaps you remember that we have used many terms to reject Mr. Nixon's so-called initiative. If you wish, I shall recapitulate all the terms that have been used: we reject it entirely, totally, flatly and definitively."

**VIETNAMIZATION** A series of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN articles on 22, 23, and 26 October signed Chien Binh (Combatant)\*\* discusses the U.S. Vietnamization policy at length, typically pointing to setbacks and predicting its ultimate total failure. The first article says that the progress anticipated by the Administration is not being made. It argues that time is not on the side of the United States and that the President is being pressed by the time limit of his term in office while the Vietnamese will carry on the fight to the end, "no matter how long that may be."

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\* VNA reported on 25 October that Xuan Thuy had arrived in Budapest two days earlier on a friendship visit. Budapest media report that he is a guest of the Hungarian Government and has seen Foreign Minister Peter and Premier Fock.

\*\* Articles signed with the pseudonym Chien Binh appear periodically in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. His last known article was in the 2 July issue of the army paper. President Nixon's explanation of Vietnamization in his 3 November 1969 address was criticized by Chien Binh in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on 30 November.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 3 -

The article on the 22d does not mention the President's peace proposal, but the one on the 23d says it is aimed at buttressing and serving the U.S. Vietnamization program. The article echoes other comment in charging that the President's professed willingness to discuss a timetable for a complete withdrawal is a device to evade compliance with the popular demand that the United States announce a definite timetable for withdrawal. Chien Binh adds that the President's intention is to maintain an important part of U.S. troop strength for a long-term occupation of South Vietnam.

Chien Binh also observes that the President's proposals are closely associated with the "main political objective" of the Vietnamization plan--that is, to maintain the Saigon administration in power. He adds that "as everybody knows," President Nixon, in discussing the political settlement issue, did not refer to Thieu, Ky and Khiem by name but made remarks which "clearly reveal that he is bent on keeping this clique in power forever." Moreover, Chien Binh asserts, "it is obvious that the U.S. aggressors' diplomatic schemes and practical action on the battlefields are aimed at helping the puppet Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique organize and be able to control the political situation in South Vietnam when a political solution occurs."

In the article on the 26th, Chien Binh cites the internal situation in the United States among factors that will assure the defeat of the U.S. policy. He derides the Administration's view that a united front has been formed in support of the President's new peace initiative. Stressing the decisive importance of the "rear" in a war, he maintains that the prolongation of the war has caused the U.S. rear to become "the scene of insurmountable troubles and difficulties . . . which have created a tremendous pressure that Nixon cannot counteract."

**CAMBODIA: "PARTITION" CONCEPT, IDEA OF DRV-LON NOL TALKS SCORED**

FUNK-RGNU            A 22 October FUNK-RGNU joint statement, summarized  
STATEMENT            by VNA on the 26th and carried textually by NCNA  
                         on the 27th, denounces an alleged Washington-Phnom  
Penn "scheme" to partition Cambodia. Earlier comment from the  
Sihanouk regime had warned that partition would result from  
acceptance of the proposal in President Nixon's 7 October speech  
for an international conference on Indochina. But the President

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

is not mentioned directly in the joint statement's criticism of efforts "by any organization or individual" to plan or convene "an international conference" to camouflage aggression, legitimize the Lon Nol regime, and partition Cambodia. Saying that the FUNK and RGNU will not accept any "compromise solution," the statement reiterates demands spelled out in the 11 October RGNU statement on the President's speech: cessation of the bombings and shellings of Cambodian territory, withdrawal of "American advisers" and the armed forces of U.S. "henchmen," and a total end to "acts of war provocation and intervention."

NHAN DAN ON "PEACE TALKS" A NHAN DAN commentary on 24 October, as summarized by VNA, says the "Vietnamese people sternly denounce and categorically reject" a Phnom Penh proposal for peace talks with the DRV, reported by AP on the 17th. "This perfidious maneuver," NHAN DAN says, is an attempt to misrepresent the situation in Cambodia, where the FUNK "liberation forces" are recording "ever greater victories" against the Lon Nol-Matak regime. NHAN DAN adds that by declaring its willingness to hold peace talks with North Vietnam, the Cambodian "flunkeys" want to slander the Vietnamese people, "disown the just struggle of the Khmer people," and at the same time lend support to President Nixon's proposal for an Indochina peace conference.

#### HANOI SIGNS AID AGREEMENTS WITH SOVIET UNION, ALBANIA

SOVIET-DRV AGREEMENT Soviet and North Vietnamese media on 23 October announce that agreements on economic and military aid\* were signed in Moscow on the 22d. The DRV delegation headed by Vice Premier Nguyen Con, a member of the Party Secretariat, began its stay in Moscow on 7 October, arriving there from Peking where it had signed an aid agreement with the Chinese. The Soviet delegation in the talks was headed by Vice Premier N.A. Tikhonov. Premier Kosygin was present at the signing ceremonies and received the DRV delegation on the 22d. (Past DRV delegations--led by DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi since 1965--have been received by Kosygin or Brezhnev or by

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\* There were similar cryptic announcements of agreements signed in 1965, 1966, and July 1968. However, some of the types of materials were listed in the announcements of agreements reached in September 1967, November 1968, and October 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 5 -

both, but Kosygin is known to have attended the signing of agreements with Nghi only in September 1967. Vice Premier V. Novikov has previously headed the Soviet delegation.)

A trade agreement between the two countries, also signed on the 22d, is reported in a 26 October VNA item which notes that Vietnam will deliver to the Soviet Union bananas, coffee, tea, clothing, knitwear, handicraft articles, and other items and that the Soviet Union's exports to the DRV will include fertilizers, fuel and lubricants, machinery, transportation equipment, and raw materials.

The new aid accords are welcomed editorially in the DRV party paper NHAN DAN on the 24th with the standard comment that they constitute "another expression of the warm and vigorous support and great and all-sided assistance" of the Soviet Union. The editorial recalls past authoritative Soviet statements of support for Vietnam, including Brezhnev's remarks in his 2 October Baku speech endorsing the PRG's 17 September eight-point initiative.

Moscow comments on the agreements in a 24 October broadcast in Mandarin over Radio Peace and Progress. The broadcast says the agreements provide for economic and military assistance and "an enormous loan to the DRV." It reviews past Soviet aid to the DRV and scores "the present Chinese leaders" for trying to sabotage Soviet-DRV relations, vilifying Soviet aid to Vietnam, and refusing to join with the USSR in a united front in support of Vietnam.

ALBANIA North Vietnam's annual aid agreement with Albania was signed in Hanoi on 23 October, according to a VNA report on the 24th. The agreement on "non-refund economic aid" for 1971 was signed by DRV Minister of the Premier's Office Tran Huu Duc and Albanian Ambassador Jorgji Shuli. In November 1969 an Albanian aid agreement was signed by the head of a DRV economic delegation visiting Tirana; in 1967 and 1968, aid agreements were signed by ambassadors either in Tirana or Hanoi. An article in the 25 October NHAN DAN welcomes the agreement and says that the party, government, and people of Albania have "warmly supported and assisted" Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 OCTOBER 1970

- 6 -

## STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON "WAR CRIMES" PUBLICIZED BY DRV, USSR

The Conference of the International Commission to Investigate U.S. War Crimes, which met in Stockholm from 22 through 25 October,\* has to date occasioned routine reporting from Hanoi and Moscow media. TASS said on the 25th that the commission is composed of "prominent lawyers, scientists, and public figures of 15 countries" and that at its session that day it elected its "leading bodies and 14 permanent members" and chose Stockholm as its permanent seat. TASS noted that L.N. Smirnov, chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, was elected a permanent member of the commission from the Soviet Union.

The TASS report on the 25th also mentioned that a document was endorsed at the session that day which concludes that Vietnamization and the extension of the war throughout Indochina is a "pre-planned policy, the aim of which is to make Vietnamese kill the Vietnamese." A Moscow broadcast on the 22d had said the conference would be mainly devoted to the investigation of U.S. "crimes" perpetrated since President Nixon took office.

Vietnamese attention to the conference includes publicity for messages from DRV Premier Pham Van Dong and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, both carried in Hanoi media on the 23d. Dong's message calls President Nixon's 7 October peace package a "typical example" of U.S. "peace maneuvers." Hanoi radio reported on 23 October that the heads of the DRV, PRG, Cambodian, and Pathet Lao delegations addressed the conference's first session, "condemning U.S. crimes in each country" and "unmasking the crafty and stubborn nature of Nixon's so-called peace initiative and advancing the correct solutions to the Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos problems."

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\* This is the first conference held by the commission set up last March by the Fifth International Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, which was attended by representatives of some 50 countries. See the TRENDS of 1 April 1970, page 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 7 -

#### DRV PROTESTS ALLEGED B-52 STRIKES IN DEMILITARIZED ZONE

For the second time in two weeks, the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman has protested alleged B-52 strikes in the DMZ. According to Hanoi radio on 27 October, the United States sent "many warplanes, including B-52 bombers, to bomb and strafe Huong Lap village in the northern part of the demilitarized zone" on the 25th. The protest routinely "condemned these criminal acts" and demanded an end to all U.S. acts violating the DRV's sovereignty and security.

On the 28th, Hanoi radio alleged that an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane had been downed over Ha Tay Province that day. Hanoi's total of downed U.S. planes now stands at 3,363.

#### DRV ENACTS PENALTIES FOR CRIMES AGAINST STATE, PRIVATE PROPERTY

Current Hanoi propaganda publicizes two decrees on the punishment of crimes against socialist and private property, passed by the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee on 21 October. The decrees list various crimes along with various possible perpetrators and outline punishments--to be meted out according to the nature of the criminal as well as the crime.

According to a communique broadcast on the 22d, the committee, presided over by Truong Chinh, "discussed and approved" the two decrees. On the 23d President Ton Duc Thang signed the orders for their promulgation.

Hanoi radio on the 23d broadcast the text of the decree on punishment for crimes against state property and the text of Presidential Order No. 149/LCT for its promulgation. A NHAN DAN editorial the next day hailed the issuance of the decree. On the 25th, Hanoi radio broadcast the texts of the decree on punishing crimes against citizens' private property and the DRV President's Order No. 150/LCT promulgating it. A NHAN DAN editorial of the 25th greeted its passage.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 OCTOBER 1970

- 8 -

**PATHET LAO SCORES SOUVANNA'S APPOINTMENT OF PLENIPOTENTIARY**

The first NLHS acknowledgment of Souvanna Phouma's 27 September message to Souphanouvong, announcing the appointment of his plenipotentiary for talks with Souphanouvong's representative on a Lao settlement, comes in an interview with NLHS plenipotentiary Phoune Sipraseuth, carried by the Pathet Lao news agency on 27 October.

In messages of 30 August and 20 September, Souphanouvong had complained about Souvanna Phouma's failure to name a plenipotentiary. Phoune Sipraseuth now says that Souvanna appointed the plenipotentiary and also a "government delegation" in his capacity as Premier of the National Union Government; he repeats the NLHS charge that Souvanna's administration is illegal and a U.S. instrument and has no competence to negotiate. Souvanna, he says, is merely a representative of the "Vientiane party, one of the Lao parties concerned"; and as long as Souvanna does not "overcome the pressure of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen," there can be no meeting between plenipotentiaries "of the two princes."

On 28 October the Pathet Lao radio reported that Phoune Sipraseuth sent a message to Pheng Phongsavan, Souvanna Phouma's plenipotentiary, advising him that Timo Souk Vongsak would return to Vientiane "soon" and asking for cooperation in the latter's efforts to prepare for a meeting of the plenipotentiaries. Souk, Souphanouvong's "special envoy" in preparations for a plenipotentiaries' meeting, had returned to Sam Neua on 28 September after having been in Vientiane for some two months conducting contacts with Souvanna Phouma.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 OCTOBER 1970

- 9 -

## MIDDLE EAST

Gromyko in his remarks on the Middle East in his 21 October UNGA address hews to standard Soviet positions on long-standing issues in the Arab-Israeli dispute. He does not touch directly on the matter of a cease-fire extension, but implicitly acknowledges the problem of rectification of cease-fire standstill violations in advocating prompt resumption of the Jarring mission unhindered by "artificial" demands. He shows concern to set the record straight with regard to accusations of bad faith in international relations in rejecting charges of Soviet violation of the cease-fire agreement. But consistent with his general tone of moderation, he does not indulge in countercharges regarding U.S. actions.

Gromyko and other propagandists again note UAR denials of violations of the cease-fire agreement and commentators cite Cairo's explanation: that only redeployment of missiles has occurred. Limited comment on the UNGA Middle East debate, along with other propaganda, points to Egypt's readiness to extend the cease-fire "on condition" that the Security Council resolution is implemented and Jarring's mission resumed. Moscow contrasts this with Israel's refusal to return to the talks until the "breaches" of the cease-fire agreement by the UAR are "corrected."

Kosygin's widely publicized message of congratulations to UAR Premier Fawzi again underlines the themes of continuity of political course in the UAR, Arab anti-imperialist unity in a search for a Middle East political settlement, and strengthening of UAR-Soviet friendship and cooperation. TASS notes that the new UAR cabinet is unchanged with the exception of Haykal's resignation as guidance minister. TASS also reports new Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov's presentation of credentials to President as-Sadat on the 22d; MENA says that Vinogradov on the 25th met with Fawzi for an hour and also presented Brezhnev's congratulations to the new Arab Socialist Union secretary general, and was received by as-Sadat on the 27th.

## SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY REITERATED IN UNGA SESSION

GROMYKO ADDRESS Gromyko responds at some length, in the section of his speech on the Middle East, to charges of Soviet bad faith in international relations. He rejects "fabrications" that the Soviet Union violated the terms of the cease-fire agreement and observes, for the first time, that there was "never any attempt" on the part of the United States

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

"to discuss anything like cease-fire terms with the Soviet Union." He explains these "trumped-up allegations being disseminated in the United States" as an effort to cover up U.S. and Israeli actions which he says are "complicating" the search for a political settlement. Here he interjects a reference to "fabrications" about "some kind of invented Soviet arrangements in Cuba allegedly jeopardizing" U.S. security. If there really is a desire to build relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of confidence, he says, then there "must be no room for any falsity in foreign policy."

Prefacing these comments, Gromyko insists on Soviet orientation toward achieving peace in the Middle East in remarks that may have been an implicit response to Western speculation on Soviet complicity in, or support for, Syria's military intrusion into Jordan during the recent fighting. Thus he declares that no one should ascribe to the Soviet Union any intention of "prompting somebody in the Middle East in any direction other than that of peace." He stresses that "if we are doing any prompting, we are prompting the entire course of events toward peace and peace alone for all states."

Gromyko reiterates the standard Soviet positions on basic elements in the dispute, offering the usual support for the "legitimate rights" of the Arab peoples, "including the Arab people of Palestine," and again calling for Israeli troop withdrawal from all occupied territory. He repeats the Soviet formulation on the right of Israel to exist, calling for the establishment of peace within the context of recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all states of the region. At another point, noting that Israel says it is seeking a secure existence, Gromyko says that this is provided for in the November 1967 Security Council resolution and that the Arab states "directly interested" in eliminating the "aftermath of the Israeli aggression" are willing to do what is required by the resolution if Israel withdraws its troops.

Urging prompt resumption of the Jarring talks, Gromyko says that agreement on the related issues must be formalized in an "appropriate document," and that to promote such an agreement the Jarring mission should be reactivated forthwith, "without emburdening it with all kinds of artificial combinations and demands." While he does not call for Big Four recommendations to Jarring--such an idea has been advanced by Cairo, and

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 11 -

appeared in the Soviet-French declaration on Pompidou's recent visit to the USSR--he does juxtapose the remark that the four powers, as well as "other states" represented at the General Assembly, must contribute to the establishment of peace.

Gromyko routinely blames Israel for blocking the Jarring contacts because of its desire to retain the occupied territories. He mentions only in passing the matter of deliveries of "offensive weapons" to Israel by unspecified "patrons," although routine propaganda assails the United States for its arms aid.

NIXON ADDRESS TASS on the 23d, reporting President Nixon's speech at the United Nations, acknowledges his remark that it is essential that the United States and the Soviet Union join in efforts toward avoiding war in the Middle East and toward developing a climate in which the nations of the region can live in peace. TASS on the 24th and a Soltan foreign-language commentary on the 27th complain that the President said nothing about the need for Israel to implement Security Council Resolution 242 or about the resumption of contacts under Jarring. An Arabic-language commentary on the 24th asks the value of the President's call on the two powers to help consolidate the forces of peace when the United States has increased military and financial assistance to Israel.

MEETINGS OF BIG FOUR, SECURITY COUNCIL Moscow's domestic service on the 24th briefly reports the statement issued after the Big Four foreign ministers' meeting with U Thant. It cites the statement as saying the ministers had a "useful exchange of opinions" with U Thant and Ambassador Jarring, and that the four powers will strive for a peaceful settlement on the basis of Resolution 242 and the creation of conditions for the earliest renewal of Arab-Israeli contacts and an extension of the cease-fire. The broadcast also notes that the statement points out that the four powers will continue their consultations on the Middle East, holding another meeting on 28 October. (While TASS has almost invariably carried a standardized brief announcement of past four-power ambassadorial meetings at the United Nations, it curiously failed to report the 13 October meeting.)

TASS on the 22d reported the communique issued after the 21 October Security Council meeting in which foreign ministers of the Council member countries participated for the first time.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 OCTOBER 1970

- 12 -

In the communique, TASS said, the Council members reaffirmed their conviction that Resolution 242 must be supported and implemented in all its provisions, and that with this aim in view all parties concerned must cooperate to promote the establishment of a just and lasting peace. A Kurdyumov international review in PRAVDA on the 25th, citing the Council communique, called for the "speediest possible" renewal of the Jarring mission to achieve a peaceful political settlement.

#### MOSCOW GIVES LIMITED ATTENTION TO UNGA MIDDLE EAST DEBATE

Moscow gave the UNGA debate on the Middle East, which opened on the 26th, little advance publicity, with only a few passing references and TASS' brief report on the 25th that Gromyko, meeting with UAR Foreign Minister Riyadh the previous day, discussed questions regarding the debate. Noting the opening of the discussion, a broadcast in Arabic on the 26th says some "imperialist press organs" stress that the discussion is apt to bring about a deterioration of the situation, and claims that Israel and its "patrons" fear "new scandals" concerning their "criminal and dangerous policy." TASS the same day reports Riyadh's speech at the opening of the debate, noting that the question was included on the agenda at the UAR's demand.

The Soltan commentary on the 27th asserts that the initiative in raising the question in the General Assembly again shows the intention of UAR and other Arab leaders to obtain a peaceful settlement. Soltan makes one of the two available references to a possible UNGA resolution, remarking that Israeli leaders declared in advance that no matter what decision is taken by the General Assembly, Israel will not consider it compulsory. He charges the United States with trying to "torpedo" any Middle East discussion in UNGA in order to prevent the United Nations from undertaking any efforts toward the reestablishment of peace; when this proved impossible, he adds, Washington openly prompted Tel Aviv to take an intransigent position and announced the supply of more tanks and Phantoms to Israel. Earlier, a broadcast of the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, in English to Africa on the 25th, had pointed out that discussions in the UNGA First Committee showed that the "vast majority" of UN members favor withdrawal of foreign troops from all occupied lands. "If such sentiments were embodied in concrete decisions" by the General Assembly, the broadcast said, this would help move the Middle East conflict out of the deadlock.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 13 -

## UNITED NATIONS

### GROMYKO PRESENTS ANNUAL FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW AT UNGA

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's 21 October address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) pays the customary obeisance to the principles of peaceful coexistence--observing that the UN Charter contains those principles, advanced by Lenin--and stresses the importance of proposals of the socialist countries on disarmament, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the strengthening of international security.\* Regarding the last point, Gromyko recalls the Soviet initiative last year urging the United Nations to examine the problem of guaranteeing international security, and he hails the socialist countries' draft declaration on this problem now under consideration in the First Committee. In assessing the activities of the United Nations over the past 25 years, he says they are positive "on the whole," and he praises the part played by Secretary General U Thant.

**DISARMAMENT** Gromyko rejects "a pessimistic approach" to disarmament and declares that the USSR, for its part, is prepared to "go all the way, up to general and complete disarmament" despite the obstacles to achievement of this goal. Presumably with the French as well as the Chinese in mind, he says that as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, "we have emphasized more than once that participation in it of all nuclear powers is an indispensable condition." In his speech last year, Gromyko had similarly noted the importance of the participation in an agreement "by all the nuclear powers," then as now failing to name the FRG.\*\*

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\* The speech gets the customary wide publicity, with TASS and Moscow radio carrying excerpts and summaries and the text appearing in the press. The fullest version has appeared in the press consistently for the past seven years.

\*\* The notion of disarmament talks among the nuclear powers is repeated in the 13 October Soviet-French declaration issued following Pompidou's visit to the USSR. The suggestion for such talks had been advanced by the French in November 1965, during Couve de Murville's visit to Moscow, and the notion was endorsed in subsequent Soviet-French declarations including those following de Gaulle and Kosygin visits in 1966.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 14 -

As in last year's speech, Gromyko lists disarmament agreements reached--the partial test-ban treaty, the ban on the military use of outer space, and the nonproliferation treaty--and suggests that one of the current UNGA session's main tasks should be to insure that all the states of the world accede to the nonproliferation treaty.

In his review of other partial disarmament measures, Gromyko includes one--the liquidation of foreign military bases--which he did not mention last year. The revival of this long-standing proposal now may be part of an effort to draw attention to U.S. overseas bases in the wake of Washington's recent charges of Soviet construction of a submarine base in Cuba. Notably, the 26 October USSR Government statement to the United States on the violation of Soviet airspace near the Turkish border calls the maintenance of U.S. bases around the Soviet Union "a most serious source of danger" which does not square with statements by U.S. leaders favoring an improvement in Washington-Moscow relations.

As he did last year, Gromyko asks for approval of a treaty banning the deployment of mass-destruction weapons on the seabeds and for an agreement banning chemical and bacteriological weapons, drafts of which are before the Assembly. He also calls for the creation of nuclear-free zones "in different parts of the world" and for the cessation of underground nuclear tests. The one proposal he mentioned last year that he does not bring up this time is the call for a halt in the production of nuclear weapons and liquidation of stockpiles.

Gromyko takes brief note of the upcoming SALT round, observing that the USSR "would like to voice the hope that the talks will finally bring about positive results."

COLLECTIVE SECURITY      Treating European problems, Gromyko hails the 12 August FRG-Soviet treaty along standard lines, observing that both sides benefit from the accord and citing its importance for the strengthening of peace in Europe. He hails the FRG Government for showing "a more realistic approach" to outstanding problems but warns that there are forces active in Europe which "dislike detente" on the continent and "still cling to their rash plans of recarving the map of Europe."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 15 -

The Soviet Foreign Minister restates Moscow's long-standing call for an all-European conference, which he says would constitute an important step toward the strengthening of European security. He also reasserts bloc readiness to accept U.S. and Canadian participation--a position formalized in the memorandum issued following the 21-22 June 1970 meeting of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Budapest.

Gromyko mentions the continuing Big Four negotiations on the Berlin problem, observing that the USSR is earnest in its approach to them and declaring that an agreement "on the questions that arise there is possible." Consistent with Moscow's sparse propaganda on the talks, the last session of which was held on 9 October, he says that positive results depend on the good will of all the participants.

The idea of an Asian collective security system, advanced by Brezhnev in his 7 June 1969 speech at the Moscow conference, is touched on more briefly than in Gromyko's speech last year. He alleges that there is "general support" for the idea of creating a collective security system "providing for participation in Asian regional cooperation by all the Asian states."

**MEMBERSHIP ISSUE** Having omitted from his 1969 speech the customary call for admission of the FRG and the GDR to UN membership and restoration of the PRC's "legal rights" in the United Nations, Gromyko this year reverts to his earlier practice of urging admission for all three. He cites the United Nations' fundamental principle of universality and finds "no justification for the fact that to this day the PRC has been deprived of its legitimate place in the United Nations." The USSR, he says, is for "the full restoration of rights in the United Nations to the PRC." While not restating the specific demand of previous years for the expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese, Gromyko characterizes the PRC as "a power which alone can represent the Chinese people in the Security Council, at the General Assembly, and in other UN organs."

Subsequent comment pegged to Gromyko's speech in Radio Moscow's Mandarin broadcasts has stressed longstanding Soviet support for the seating of PRC representatives in the China seats in UN organs and Soviet opposition to "the notorious idea of 'two Chinas'"--a concept which constitutes "a violation of the sovereignty of the PRC." A 24 October IZVESTIYA editorial

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 16 -

marking United Nations Day says the "abnormal situation" in which the GDR and FRG are not represented and in which the PRC's "lawful rights" have not been restored "must be liquidated as soon as possible."

KOREA In brief, pro forma remarks on Korea, Gromyko demands the withdrawal of "all foreign troops stationed there under the UN flag" and the disbanding of UNCURK. He does not, however, repeat the charge--made in previous UN speeches since 1966--that U.S. "interference" in Korean affairs increases tension in Asia and prevents "peaceful unification" of Korea; and he does not mention the communist-sponsored UNGA item on the Korean question, which he had noted in past years except for 1968.

#### GROMYKO TOUCHES ON U.S.-SOVIET TIES; TASS CITES NIXON REMARKS

TASS reports on President Nixon's 23 October UNGA address highlight his remarks on U.S.-Soviet relations, citing his enumeration of "common interests": the avoidance of a nuclear confrontation, reduction of the arms burden, an increase in trade, and contribution to world economic progress. In both of its reports, an initial brief one on the 23d and a longer one the next day, TASS takes note of the President's hope that the spirit of cooperation will dominate the SALT round scheduled to open on 2 November in Helsinki. Moscow has otherwise given the President's speech little attention.

TASS quotes Gromyko as declaring, in a statement after his meeting with the President at the White House on the 22d, that bilateral relations as well as "a number of important international problems" were discussed. He hoped, he said, that the meeting "will have positive significance for the improvement and development of Soviet-American relations."

Gromyko's UNGA speech contains no direct characterization of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Following his remarks on Indochina, and in the course of his remarks on the Middle East--both of which are discussed in the corresponding sections of this TRENDS--Gromyko observes that "with no grounds whatsoever, a propaganda campaign" has been mounted in the United States about "some kind of invented

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 17 -

Soviet arrangements in Cuba allegedly jeopardizing the security of the United States." Gromyko goes on to observe that

if there really is a desire to build relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of confidence--and the Soviet state for over 50 years has advocated precisely this way of conducting international affairs--then there must be no room for any falsity in foreign policy.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 18 -

## U. S. AIR INTRUSION

## USSR REGISTERS PROTEST IN STATEMENTS TO UNITED STATES, TURKEY

Moscow has widely broadcast the 26 October Soviet Government statements to the governments of the United States and Turkey protesting the violation of Soviet airspace by a U.S. Air Force plane on the 21st.\* Subsequent radio and press comment has stressed in particular the passages in the statement on dangers inherent in U.S. maintenance of bases in other countries--especially along the Soviet border--and the effect that continued Turkish complicity in such activities could have on Soviet-Turkish relations. The only publicity for the incident prior to the release of the government protests was a 22 October TASS statement identifying the plane's occupants, pronouncing the plane "in good condition" and its passengers "in good health," and noting that "the competent Soviet authorities have been instructed to investigate the circumstances" of the violation.

PROTEST TO U.S.       The gist of the Soviet statement to the United States, carried by TASS on the 26th, is that the air violation was not an accident but a consequence of continuing "extensive military and intelligence activities" which the United States conducts "in direct proximity of the Soviet Union," which are "openly hostile to the USSR," and which "can only increase the possibility of very dangerous events fraught with most serious aftermaths." The statement alludes to U.S.-Soviet relations in asserting that the maintenance of U.S. bases on the Soviet border "does not accord in any way with the statements in favor of an improvement of Soviet-American relations repeatedly made by U.S. leaders." The stress on "American military bases on the territory of third countries"

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\* The last previous incident involving a U.S. intrusion into Soviet airspace to be publicized in Soviet media was the force-down over the Kurile Islands on 30 June 1968 of a DC-8 commercial airliner carrying U.S. servicemen for Vietnam duty. TASS reported on 4 July that the airliner had been released after the United States responded to a Soviet protest with an expression of regret and an assurance that efforts would be made to prevent a recurrence.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 19 -

may be designed in part to counter the impact of the recent U.S. publicity for alleged Soviet submarine base activities in Cuba.

Noting Soviet representations to the United States about "more than 10 unlawful violations" of Soviet airspace in the past three years, the statement also refers to unspecified "instances of the more distant past, notorious for their regrettable consequences"--an apparent allusion to the 1960 U-2 and RB-47 incidents.

STATEMENT           The shorter but similar Soviet statement to the  
TO TURKEY           Turkish Government specifically recalls the U-2  
                      incident\* after observing that this is not the  
first time U.S. planes based in Turkey have made flights along  
the Turkish-Soviet border for "provocational and intelligence  
purposes" and have intruded into Soviet airspace. Citing  
Turkish assurances following the U-2 incident, the statement  
alleges that Turkey is not abiding by those assurances but is  
countenancing a situation "fraught with dangerous consequences"  
which can "damage the good-neighborly relations between our  
countries." The Soviet Government, the statement says, expects  
the Turkish Government to "take the necessary measures to prevent  
such violations." Moscow has not so far acknowledged Turkey's  
27 October reply.

Followup comment on the protest is keynoted by a 28 October PRAVDA article, reviewed by TASS, which puts the onus on Turkish "circles" rather than the government, charging such "circles" with aiding U.S. "war hawks" in contravention of "all the efforts" of the Soviet and Turkish Governments to improve bilateral relations. Comparing the current overflight to the U-2 incident of 1960, the commentary asks: "How is one to explain the fact that Turkey has not yet shown these U.S. generals out?" A 27 October TASS roundup of world reaction to the Soviet statements underscores charges that the overflight was a consequence of "the general military activity of the United States in areas adjoining the Soviet Union"--activity

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\* Turkey, along with Norway and Pakistan, received a Soviet protest on 13 May 1960 in connection with the U-2 affair, threatening "proper retaliatory measures" in the event of further intrusions into Soviet airspace and making clear the nature of the measures by going on to recall that the USSR possessed means sufficient to render harmless any military bases used against it.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 20 -

"fraught with dangerous consequences" for "good-neighbor relations" between Turkey and the Soviet Union.

Soviet media have treated the incident as entirely separate from the hijacking of a Soviet airliner to Turkey on the 15th, which has produced admonitions that Turkish failure to extradite the hijackers could damage Soviet-Turkish relations. Moscow has mentioned neither incident in comment on the other, in keeping with remarks attributed to the Soviet ambassador by Ankara radio on the 27th to the effect that the incidents "are completely different." Ankara quoted the Soviet diplomat as adding that "there is no similarity and no link between the two situations."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 19 -

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STATEMENT TO TURKEY           The shorter but similar Soviet statement to the Turkish Government specifically recalls the U-2 incident\* after observing that this is not the first time U.S. planes based in Turkey have made flights along the Turkish-Soviet border for "provocational and intelligence purposes" and have intruded into Soviet airspace. Citing Turkish assurances following the U-2 incident, the statement alleges that Turkey is not abiding by those assurances but is countenancing a situation "fraught with dangerous consequences" which can "damage the good-neighborly relations between our countries." The Soviet Government, the statement says, expects the Turkish Government to "take the necessary measures to prevent such violations." Moscow has not so far acknowledged Turkey's 27 October reply.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 OCTOBER 1970

- 20 -

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 21 -

## SOVIET PLANE HIJACKING

## MOSCOW CONTINUES TO PRESS TURKISH GOVERNMENT FOR EXTRADITION

Soviet propaganda continues to press for extradition of the two Soviet citizens who hijacked a Soviet airliner to Trabzon, Turkey on 15 October, though in a reduced volume of comment broadcast chiefly to domestic and Turkish audiences.\* The central themes are that world public opinion and a number of international legal conventions, resolutions, and accords support the Soviet people's "just demand" for extradition.

Commentators have not pursued the line, introduced in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA articles on the 20th, that any further delay in extradition will bode ill for Soviet-Turkish relations. (In fact, a Soviet-Turkish transportation agreement was signed on the 21st.) But Moscow has objected to the Turkish Government's treatment of the issue as a "political question" and has professed surprise and indignation at procrastination over extradition procedures. Leaders of U.S.-based Lithuanian refugee organizations allegedly receiving financial support from the CIA are accused--for example, in a broadcast to Turkey on the 21st--of exerting pressure on the Turkish authorities to vindicate the "criminals" as "freedom fighters." And "sober-minded people in Turkey" are urged to resist whitewash efforts by "some Turkish circles" and to hasten the return of the hijackers for trial in a Soviet court.

Emphasizing that the hijacking and shooting took place in a Soviet plane over Soviet territory and were perpetrated by Soviet citizens, commentaries cite resolutions of the recent 58th Interparliamentary Union conference in The Hague and of the UN General Assembly, draft conventions of the ICAO, and Turkish criminal law to support the Soviet demand for extradition. TASS roundups of world reaction stress revulsion at the hijacking and shootings and portray a universal demand for extradition of the culprits.

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\* The volume of Soviet radio comment on the hijacking peaked at over five percent of total daily comment on 20 and 21 October, then dropped precipitately to less than two percent on the 22d--the day after the violation of Soviet airspace by a U.S. Air Force plane--and to less than one percent on the 23d.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 22 -

In a continuing, though diminished, campaign to extol the crew and glorify the slain stewardess, Moscow reports that the Order of Red Banner was awarded posthumously to the stewardess by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Soviet media have made only two oblique references to what may in fact be a prime concern behind the demand for extradition--the deterrence of future hijackings. Suggesting that "absolution of the criminals will encourage other possible hijackers," a 24 October IZVESTIYA article in effect put the Soviet Union on record in favor of at least bilateral agreements dealing with hijacking: "Only agreed actions of states may put an end to air piracy." TASS on the 25th quoted a letter to PRAVDA from "prominent Soviet lawyers" contending that extradition would be "a concrete contribution by the Turkish Government to the general struggle to prevent and eliminate air banditry."

Moscow media have yet to acknowledge the latest incident--the hijacking of a small Soviet plane to Sinop, Turkey by two Soviet university students on 27 October, reported by Ankara radio.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 23 -

## CEAUSESCU IN U. S.

## BUCHAREST FEATURES, MOSCOW VIRTUALLY IGNORES WASHINGTON VISIT

Romanian media gave extensive coverage to President Ceausescu's 26-27 October visit to Washington, depicting it as part of Bucharest's "consistent" policy of pursuing "unhampered collaboration" among states and as a contribution to peace and international security. Romanian television and radio stations carried live relays--heralded in the press the day before--of the arrival ceremony at the White House. AGERPRES, terming Ceausescu's White House visit "a special moment" in U.S.-Romanian relations, reported that the Bucharest press frontpaged the ceremony, carrying President Nixon's welcoming speech and President Ceausescu's reply.

The press, according to AGERPRES, also publicized reports on Secretary Rogers' luncheon for Ceausescu and quoted the Secretary's remark that "differences in social and political systems exist between the two countries, but there are also common points, first there is the wish to maintain national independence without outside interference." All the Romanian reports put sustained emphasis on the warmth of the public and official reception for the Romanian President and the open and cordial atmosphere of his talks with U.S. officials.

**SOVIET REPORTS** Moscow played down Ceausescu's entire visit to the United States and treated his White House reception as virtually a nonevent. Brief TASS reports on Ceausescu's activities placed them in the context of his attendance at the UN jubilee session. The Soviet news agency briefly reported his arrival "for the UN Assembly" on the 13th and subsequently carried brief reports of his meeting with U Thant and his attendance at a reception given by Gromyko for East European delegations. The Soviet central press through 27 October has carried no mention of the Washington visit except for a terse Washington-dated TASS report in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on the 27th, which said that the Romanian President, "who is here on an official [sic] visit, was this morning received in the White House by President Nixon."

Soviet broadcasts to Romania continue to underline Romania's indebtedness to its Warsaw Pact ally. Such comment includes a RED STAR article by Major General Postnikov, pointedly entitled

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

28 OCTOBER 1970

- 24 -

"Guarding the Gains of Socialism" and apparently pegged to the 25th anniversary of Romania's armed forces, which Radio Moscow broadcast to Romania on 25 October. The article attributed the development of Romania's "adequate combat capacity" to the successful development of its national economy, science, and technology and to "the permanent aid granted by the Soviet Union." It recalled that Romanian officers have been trained in Soviet military schools, and it concluded with a reminder that "the tasks of improving combat training are solved by the armed forces of Romania within the fraternal family of the armies of the socialist countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 25 -

## SINO-KOREAN RELATIONS

## CPV ANNIVERSARY MARKED WITH FANFARE IN DPRK, PRC

Pyongyang and Peking marked the 20th anniversary on 25 October of the entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) in the Korean War with voluminous propaganda testifying to the trend toward Sino-Korean solidarity over the past year. At the same time, however, Peking has exhibited caution in spelling out its commitment to the North Korean cause and in treating issues of mutual security. The North Koreans, on the other hand, have continued to play up themes linking the two countries' vital interests and portraying a common U.S. threat to the DPRK and the PRC.

The PRC sent a delegation to the DPRK led by Tseng Ssu-yu, CCP Central Committee member, commander of the PLA Wuhan Units, and Chairman of the Hupeh Provincial Revolutionary Committee. He addressed a Pyongyang city meeting at which KPA Chief of Staff O Chin-u also spoke, and he also addressed a DPRK Cabinet banquet at which Second Vice Premier Pak Song-chol was the Korean speaker. The PRC Ambassador held a banquet in Pyongyang which was attended by Kim Il-song, who also received the PRC delegation. The North Koreans, who did not send a delegation to the PRC, were represented in Peking by the DPRK Ambassador. He spoke at a Peking rally addressed by Huang Yung-sheng, the PLA Chief of Staff. The ambassador gave a banquet which was attended by Chou En-lai and addressed by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien.

Similar celebrations marked the 15th anniversary in 1965. In the intervening four years, when Sino-Korean relations were strained, the occasion received minimal attention. Pyongyang marked the occasion during that period with editorials and brief reports of wreath-laying ceremonies. Peking carried brief reports of the DPRK charge d'affaires' reception or banquet and of wreath-laying ceremonies in Pyongyang at which representatives of the Chinese embassy participated.

## CHINESE, KOREAN COMMENTS REFLECT DIVERGENT APPROACHES

Despite the extensive propaganda celebrating the current warmth of Sino-Korean relations, comment by the two sides on the CPV anniversary reflects divergent appraisals of their vital interests

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 26 -

and mutual security. While joining with the North Koreans in expressing militant opposition to the United States and Japan, the Chinese have been cautious in projecting their security interests and have been notably circumspect in indicating the circumstances that might lead them to repeat their intervention should new hostilities erupt in Korea. In contrast, the North Koreans have taken the occasion to stress issues of mutual security and to link the vital interests of the two sides. The same contrast was evident in comment surrounding the recent signing of an aid agreement.\*

As if to underscore their counsel of caution, the Chinese have departed from their standard practice by repeatedly calling for "peaceful unification" of Korea. Previously, Peking had failed to reciprocate Pyongyang's references to its program of peaceful unification, as during the voluminous propaganda on the anniversary last June of the outbreak of the Korean War when the DPRK Government issued a lengthy memorandum reaffirming its position on "peaceful" unification. In the only Chinese reference to the memorandum, Chou En-lai on 28 June expressed support for the Koreans' "struggle for the reunification of their fatherland"--without the characterization "peaceful." Other Chinese references to Korean unification had also avoided such a characterization, a point on which the Chinese diverged from Moscow's practice. (Inexplicably, Korean speakers on the CPV anniversary did not address themselves to the issue of unification. Pyongyang most recently officially reaffirmed its stand on peaceful unification in a 16 September Government memorandum on the UN discussion of the "Korean question.")

Huang Yung-sheng, speaking at the Peking rally, gave an unusually explicit explanation for the Chinese intervention in the Korean War that has significant implications for the present. Unlike Chinese statements at the time of the June anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, Huang clearly distinguished between the period when the Chinese "supported and assisted" the Koreans in "their fatherland liberation war" and the period of direct Chinese intervention after the United States had "flagrantly extended the flames of its aggressive war to the Yalu River in disregard of the repeated stern warnings of the Chinese people and gravely menaced the security of China."

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\* See the TRENDS Supplement, "DPRK Aid Agreements with PRC and USSR," 26 October.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 27 -

Lo'er in the speech, addressing himself to the present situation, Huang declared that the Chinese provide "a powerful backing" for the Koreans and pledged "all-out support and assistance"\* by the Chinese in case of a new war in Korea. In putting into this context the formula he used for describing the Chinese role in 1950, before the PRC's security was "gravely menaced" and intervention was decreed, he implied that the Chinese were not committed to intervention in a new Korean war until a high threshold of direct threat to their borders and security was reached. Moreover, in the same passage Huang pledged Chinese support for "peaceful" unification of Korea, thereby strengthening the impression that Peking--having recently signed the first known aid agreement with the DPRK since the one covering the period 1961-64--is advising Pyongyang to avoid belligerent moves that might lead to war.

TAIWAN QUESTION        While reciting a familiar indictment of U.S. policies in various areas of the world, Huang and other Chinese speakers on the anniversary avoided portraying an American threat to China itself and all but ignored the Taiwan question. In contrast, the North Koreans sought to draw a parallel between their situation and that of the Chinese vis-a-vis the United States, and they made a point of calling attention to Taiwan and Sino-U.S. tensions. Speaking from the same rostrum as Huang, the DPRK ambassador claimed that the United States has not given up its ambition "for invading Korea and China," that it has made Taiwan a base for aggression, and that it has intensified tension in the Taiwan Straits. Huang's counterpart, North Korean Chief of Staff O Chin-u, speaking at the Pyongyang rally, devoted a passage to depicting a hostile U.S. presence on Taiwan and continuing Sino-U.S. tensions.

It was left to a CPV representative and combat hero, speaking at the Peking rally, to voice themes of Sino-Korean solidarity more responsive to Pyongyang's line on mutual security. He said the "U.S.-Japanese reactionaries" are directing their spearhead of aggression against Korea and China, he quoted Kim on the two countries' mutual security links, and he warned that the Chinese will

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\* The pledge of "powerful backing" and "all-out support and assistance" has been standard in Chinese statements of support for the North Vietnamese and, more recently, for Sihanouk's forces. This is an essentially cautious formula in keeping with the Maoist policy of self-reliance and minimal Chinese risk-taking. A different approach was reflected during the policy debates of 1965 in statements--notably by the then chief of staff, Lo Jui-ching, who was purged late that year--playing up the dangers posed to Chinese security by the expanding Vietnam hostilities and referring to a possible Korea-type war involving China in that conflict.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 28 -

fight together with the Koreans if the United States should "impose a war on the people of Korea and China." He also expressed the Chinese determination to "liberate" Taiwan, a call which was sounded by the North Korean speakers but not by the more authoritative Chinese spokesmen.

**ASIAN UNITY** As in its treatment of Sino-Korean mutual security issues, Peking played down the theme of Asian unity which had been prominent in its comment after Chou En-lai's April visit to the DPRK and especially after the U.S. incursion into Cambodia. Chinese speakers referred in general terms to common interests and solidarity of the Asian peoples, observing that the United States, having been defeated in the past in China and Korea, has now unleashed aggression against the three Indochinese countries. They also evoked a specter of revived Japanese "militarism" threatening "Korea, China, Indochina, and other Asian countries." But though there were references to "united strength" and "militant unity," there was no mention of an Asian "united front." Picturing a torrent of revolutionary struggle engulfing the United States throughout the world, Chinese comment was keyed by the dictum in Mao's 20 May statement that revolution is the "main trend" in the world today.

O Chin-u at the Pyongyang meeting, on the other hand, declared that "the peoples of many Asian countries making revolution, including Korea, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, will firmly unite as one and form a common front and deal collective blows to U.S. imperialism." A joint editorial in NODONG SINMUN, MINJU CHOSON, and CHOSON INMUNGIN (the Korean army daily) similarly quoted Kim Il-song as referring to a "common front" of the "various Asian countries making revolution, including Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, China, and Korea." This statement, made by Kim at a 15 June banquet for the visiting Prince Sihanouk, had been cited repeatedly by both Korean and Chinese speakers on the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War.

#### CHINESE SNIPE AT SOVIETS; MOSCOW RECALLS SOVIET AID

A 24 October KCNA report of a ceremony at which the Chinese delegation laid wreaths at several monuments in Pyongyang in memory of fallen volunteers noted that staff members of the Soviet embassy participated at one monument, laying a wreath in memory of fallen heroes of the Red Army in the "antifascist war." As expected, the KCNA report of the wreath-laying ceremony did not mention the Soviets.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 29 -

Some Chinese speakers at the anniversary celebrations took passing swipes at the Soviets. Huang Yung-sheng at the Peking rally briefly mentioned the "collaborator who works hand in glove" with U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism, and Li Hsien-nien at the DPRK Ambassador's banquet asserted that the United States is "collaborating and colluding with the other superpower" to suppress revolutionary struggles in various countries and "redivide the world." Chinese comment on the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War had included sharper--though also oblique--attacks on Moscow.

The only available Soviet reference to the CPV anniversary came in a 27 October Mandarin-language radio commentary identified as the first in a series on Soviet military aid to China. Recalling Soviet aid to the CPV during the Korean War, the commentary claimed that the expansion of the war to China was checked by American fears of Soviet military aid to the Chinese. In this connection, it cited "an agreement providing for Soviet aid, mainly military aid, to China," but it avoided mentioning the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance as such.

In addition to detailing examples of Soviet military support during the Korean War, the commentary also played up Soviet efforts in the UN at that time aimed at attaining a "peaceful settlement" of the conflict. It pointed to draft resolutions introduced by the USSR in August 1950 calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea and Taiwan and denouncing U.S. bombing of the PRC and the advance of U.S. armed forces to the PRC frontier. The commentary gave the USSR credit for the first moves toward the armistice, saying that in the summer of 1951 the Soviet delegate in the United Nations proposed that all parties begin talks on a cease-fire, the withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel, and an armistice.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 30 -

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## NEW "RADIO PEACE AND PROGRESS" SERVICE FOR OVERSEAS CHINESE

The purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, which identifies itself as "the voice of Soviet public opinion" and attributes its sponsorship to Soviet "public organizations," began on 20 October to broadcast regular daily programs in Mandarin to Southeast Asia. In other changes introduced in the winter schedule of Soviet broadcasts to the Chinese, Radio Peace and Progress programming in Cantonese and Shanghai (Wu) has increased with the addition of a new half-hour transmission daily in each language, and the "official" Radio Moscow has added another half-hour program in its Mandarin service for China. Radio Moscow's Mandarin programs beamed to Southeast Asia remain unchanged at three daily half-hour transmissions.

Radio Peace and Progress first began broadcasting to the Chinese with the inauguration of its Mandarin-language service on 1 March 1967 and added programs in Cantonese and Shanghai on 17 October 1967. Programs in Mongolian were begun by the station on 14 August 1968. Counting the new programs for Southeast Asia, consisting of three half-hour transmissions a day, Peace and Progress broadcasts in Mandarin now total 17 daily half-hour transmissions; in Cantonese and Shanghai, three daily half-hour transmissions each; and in Mongolian, four daily half-hour transmissions.

Judging from the opening announcement and early commentaries carried in the new Peace and Progress service for Southeast Asia, the Soviets hope to counteract the traditional influence of the mainland on Overseas Chinese by stressing the adverse effects of Peking's policies on their interests and by seeking to foster an atmosphere favorable to Soviet policies in the area. One of the purposes in using Radio Peace and Progress is to enable Moscow to raise delicate issues involving other countries' affairs while disclaiming official responsibility for comment contained in the broadcasts.\*

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\* Despite the claims to an independent, unofficial status, Peace and Progress broadcasts have been found offensive in some countries--notably India--and have elicited protests against Soviet interference in internal affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 31 -

BROADCAST THEMES The inaugural announcement of the Mandarin service for Southeast Asia followed standard lines in saying the programs would acquaint listeners with developments in the Soviet Union and would discuss international questions. It also indicated, in typically tendentious style, that comment carried in the new Peace and Progress service would explain how current developments in China result from the Peking leadership's erroneous policies and how these have "seriously marred China's prestige on the international stage."

A two-part commentary broadcast in the first few days of the new service played on what promises to be a key theme in comment for the Overseas Chinese. Entitled "Pseudoprotectors of the Interests of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia," the commentary argued that Peking's claim to act in behalf of the Overseas Chinese is based on self-serving interests and has had inimical consequences for the Overseas Chinese. The first part attacked Peking's effort to acquire foreign exchange from among the Overseas Chinese, particularly in Singapore and Malaysia, as injurious to the host countries and a cause of resentment among other nationalities in the area. Tensions among the nationalities and mistrust of the Overseas Chinese in the area were also the subject of the second part of the commentary, which blamed Peking's "adventurist" revolutionary line for causing persecution of Chinese in Indonesia after the September 1965 uprising and during the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia in the early 1960's.

Programs in Radio Moscow's longstanding Mandarin service for Southeast Asia have similarly sought to discredit Peking and to appeal to the Overseas Chinese to turn away from Mao's regime as a source of identity and direction. Moscow's message has been that the Overseas Chinese should link their destiny with that of the host countries rather than with the mainland. Implicit in this message is an appeal to the Overseas Chinese to cooperate with the established governments in the region, thereby contributing to Soviet policies aimed at regional stability and containment of Peking's influence. It is in this interest that Soviet propaganda has persistently assailed Peking's insurrectionary line--a line followed by pro-Peking parties dominated by Overseas Chinese.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 32 -

Moscow has also used its Mandarin broadcasts to Southeast Asia as a channel for promoting the idea of an Asian collective security system, first advanced by Brezhnev at the June 1969 Moscow international communist conference. Thus, a Mandarin broadcast to Southeast Asia on 7 October claimed that the Soviet proposal has been made clearer through recent visits to the USSR of the Indian president and the Singapore prime minister and is receiving increasing support in Asia. An earlier broadcast, on 24 September, evoked the specter of revived Japanese militarism to argue the case for Asian collective security. Indicating Moscow's hope to cooperate with the area's governments, the commentary stressed the importance of regional security irrespective of different political systems and observed that "many" Asian governments have shown "an affirmative attitude" toward the Soviet proposal. Typically, both commentaries attacked Peking for taking a negative position.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 33 -

## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## SHORTCOMINGS OF LEADING GROUPS CONTINUE TO BE HIGHLIGHTED

PRC media continue to stress the ideological inadequacies of cadres at the leadership level and to prescribe more study of Mao's thought as the remedy. The deepening campaign was fueled by an authoritative article in RED FLAG No. 11, released on 19 October, which firmly argued that "each and every communist party member must further strengthen his proletarian party spirit" and criticized those cadres who think of themselves as "having done enough in this regard." Both veteran cadres and those who joined the party during the cultural revolution "must redouble their efforts to improve themselves" and eliminate "non-proletarian ideology." RED FLAG cautioned that while the remolding of one's world outlook is a long-term task, it may not be done "slowly, as some comrades think." The article condemned those cadres who use the protracted nature of ideological transformation as a stratagem to "slow it down" and warned them of the necessity to strengthen their party spirit before sinking "far below the demands of the party."

Recent Shanghai radio reports give some indication of the order-oriented methods to be used in overcoming the shortcomings of cadres at the leadership level. On 21 October Shanghai broadcast the text of a "big character poster," written by the Red Sentries of a local shipyard, criticizing the yard's leadership for refusing "to accept the task of producing important items assigned by the upper level." The poster, which was also frontpaged by WEN HUI PAO and LIBERATION DAILY, condemned the leading group for "saying that this year's production goals cannot be fulfilled" because of material shortages. The article clearly indicates that when the established leadership fails to perform, the mass leadership has the right to try rectifying the situation. In this case the Red Sentries' answer to the "foregone conclusion theory" that material factors decide production is the standard call for "a new upsurge" in Mao-study.

Earlier, on 17 October, Shanghai radio made clear, however, that although party members must consult with the masses they must also guard against "ultra-democracy" which "destroys discipline" and distinguish the correct ideas from some of the "definitely

CONFIDENTIAL

- 34 -

incorrect" opinions of the masses. The report urged that when incorrect ideas from the masses are encountered, party members should instruct the masses in how to correct their views "so that they can tell right from wrong."

Sian radio on 21 October, reporting on a provincial forum on the study of Mao's thoughts, echoed Shanghai's concern for stressing the controlled nature of the current campaign to improve local leadership. The forum concluded that merely possessing "proletarian feelings" and "frequently meeting with the masses" does not mean that one's ideological transformation is complete. Deeper study of Mao's thought is necessary, the report argued, to avoid interference from either the left or the right and to maintain a "correct political orientation."

Tsinan radio on 16 October, reporting on a provincial conference called to speed up party and Young Communist League (YCL) reconstruction, linked the current effort to improve local leadership with a call to quicken the drawn-out campaign to rebuild the party--no county party committees have yet been publicized in Shantung. The conference stressed that the key to progress in rebuilding the party and the YCL rests with "responsible comrades" within the basic-level party organizations who must first solve their own problems of "joining the party ideologically." The report declared that the success or failure of party rebuilding depends on how much attention "leading groups pay to it" and informed leading cadres that party building was now "the center of all work in our province today." The conference urged that party cadres "personally" take the lead in studying Mao's thought and build the YCL while consolidating the party. Party leaders should "pay attention to overcoming bourgeois factionalism" and follow a "prudent policy" of admitting those youths who emerged during the cultural revolution into the YCL in order to insure the League's "quality."

Central media also persist in publicizing exemplary accounts of rebuilt party committees at the county level which have strengthened their party spirit by intensifying their study of Mao's thought. NCNA on 22 October applauded the members of the Shaohsing county committee in Chekiang for ridding themselves of complacency and improving their style of leadership. The report first criticized "some people in the leading groups in the county" for not responding to advanced examples in other areas, then lauded their ideological advance after studying Mao's philosophical thought.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 OCTOBER 1970

- 35 -

Leading cadres of party committees within the army are not immune from the current propaganda effort to improve local leadership. Chengchow radio on 19 October hit leading members of a party committee within the PLA Wuhan units who, because they "were all old cadres" and "had been in the army for over 20 years," did not consider themselves "targets of revolution" and became complacent. To correct these mistaken ideas, the party committee of the Wuhan garrison held a symposium for leading cadres of regimental level and above and accepted their pledge to rid themselves of arrogance and complacency.

## REBUILT COUNTY PARTY COMMITTEES BY PROVINCE

Heilungkiang (14)	Kansu (2)
Hupei (4)	Kiangsi (5)
Kirin (3)	Kiangsu (4)
Kwangsi (1)	<u>Sinkiang</u> (4)
Kwangtung (13)	<u>Shanghai</u> (3)
Shensi (1)	<u>Honan</u> (2)
Anhwei (2)	<u>Liaoning</u> (1)
Chekiang (14)	
Fukien (4)	
Hunan (10)	

Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of county committees mentioned in monitored broadcasts. Heilungkiang, Kwangtung and Anhwei have in addition publicized one municipal CCP committee each. Recent additions to the list of provinces claiming committees, since July, are underlined. Heilungkiang, claiming a rebuilt county and city YCL committee, is the only province to report any progress in rebuilding the League above the basic level.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 36 -

## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## APPEAL FOR MARKET ECONOMY PUBLISHED IN NOVY MIR

The concept of "market socialism," though under heavy attack in recent years by the conservative wing of the Soviet economic establishment, continues to be advanced by reform-minded economists at the Central Mathematical Economics Institute (TsEMI) of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Writing in NOVY MIR No. 8, N. Petrakov, head of a laboratory at TsEMI, defends the market mechanism against its conservative critics and advocates the adoption of a price system responsive to market conditions. Although Petrakov's radical proposals lack the weight of authority and are unlikely to gain official acceptance, they promise to exacerbate the long-standing feud between reformists and reactionaries over the course and direction of the 1965 economic reforms.

Petrakov's article, entitled "Managing the Economy and Economic Interest," is the first of a series of articles to be published in NOVY MIR this year on current economic problems. According to the editors of the journal, representatives of different professions and different viewpoints will be invited to participate in the new series.

THE MARKET UNDER SOCIALISM      Armed with suitable quotations from Kosygin and Brezhnev, Petrakov emphasizes the dynamic nature of the Soviet economy and the resultant need for flexibility in economic management. Like other reform-minded economists, he turns to the experience of the Soviet economy under the NEP and seeks to demonstrate Lenin's preference for economic rather than administrative methods of regulation and Lenin's belief in the compatibility of the plan and the market in a socialist economy. Petrakov observes in this connection that "the problem of combining the methods of centralized planning and the elements of a market organization of the economy was very clearly formulated" in the official documents of Lenin's day.

Without inquiring in depth into what went wrong under Stalin, Petrakov examines some of the "contradictions" in the Soviet economic legacy that the 1965 reforms sought to correct. In particular, he focuses on the discrepancy between the rising purchasing power of the population and the growing stocks of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 37 -

unused and unmarketable goods. This discrepancy, he argues, could not be remedied by administrative means, as some economists believed, because the economy had become too large and too complex. Hence, the need for reform, for a return to Lenin's "fundamental economic ideas," which, in Petrakov's view, found expression in the 1965 reforms.

Arguing that the principle of economic interest--"pressure of the ruble"--was the mainspring of the 1965 reforms, Petrakov calls for the broad application of this principle at every level in the economic chain of command. Above all, he proposes the introduction of a flexible price system based on supply and demand as the means of remedying the endemic problem of queues and other allocative defects in the economy. He declares that the incorporation of the market mechanism in a socialist economy is "a fully natural act" and justifies this position as follows: "When we say that the planner must take into account the demands of the market, in the conditions of socialist ownership of the means of production, this is only another way of expressing the indisputable truth that any plan must be based on consideration of the objective regularities of production and consumption."

In advancing these proposals, Petrakov dismisses the notion that planning would be relegated to a "passive role" in a socialist market economy. At the same time, he counters the charge that the introduction of the market mechanism in the USSR would lead to a general rise in prices and a consequent decline in living standards with the assertion that his proposals would not relate to necessities. And he goes on to explain that the question of whether prices are "high" or "low" is relative, depending on such factors as individual taste and income.

**BACKGROUND** Petrakov's proposals are consistent with the reformist positions he and other members of TsEMI have taken in recent years in the face of mounting conservative resistance. At the May 1968 All-Union Economic Conference in Moscow, for example, Petrakov and a colleague, K. Gofman, criticized the traditional methods of price formation and advocated the introduction of prices based on supply and demand (ECONOMIC GAZETTE No. 27, for 1 July 1968). They also called for a speed-up in the conversion of producer goods from centralized allocation to wholesale trade.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 38 -

Although these and other reformist proposals were only moderately criticized at the 1968 conference, they were treated as anathema in the general campaign of vilification of "market socialism" initiated after the Czech crisis and the Soviet intervention. In an effort to intimidate the proponents of reform, the press was flooded with articles extolling the virtues of the command economy and excoriating the ideas of the Czech reformer Ota Sik and his Soviet counterparts. Implicitly included among the latter was no less a figure than the head of TsEMI, Academician N.P. Fedorenko (A. Bachurin in PLANNED ECONOMY No. 11, 1969).

The failure of this campaign to enforce economic orthodoxy may be gauged both by the appearance of the recent Petrakov article and by the defiance of Academician Fedorenko in the face of criticism by a leader of the central planning hierarchy, USSR Gosplan Deputy Chairman A. Bachurin. Fedorenko not only rejected the criticism of Bachurin and others on a socialist market economy (PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS No. 3, 1970), but he even launched a counter attack (ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICAL METHODS No. 2 1970). He warned against certain proposals appearing in the press ostensibly designed to correct flaws in the 1965 reforms. He charged that "many" of the alleged "corrections are aimed not ahead, along the path of further developing the new economic system, but rather backward, to the former system, the shortcomings of which have been clearly shown by life and brought out in party decisions."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 39 -

## BOLIVIA

## CUBAN MEDIA INCREASINGLY HOSTILE TO TORRES REGIME

The accession to power of Bolivian General Juan Torres, who on 7 October unseated the short-lived rightist military junta that had replaced President Ovando, elicited an initially cautious reaction from Havana which soon gave way to increasingly hostile comment and reportage. Cuban media now censure the new regime in particular for failing to heed Bolivian leftists' demands for an amnesty for political prisoners--freedom for Regis Debray gets special mention--and for not purging the Bolivian armed forces of rightist elements. Heavy play has been given the pronouncements of the Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN), the guerrilla organization founded by Che Guevara, and of other leftist groups and individuals uniformly expressing serious reservations about President Torres and his revolutionary pretensions.

The evolution of Havana's attitude may be illustrated by a comparison of broadcasts on 7 and 22 October. On the 7th, expressing Havana's initial reaction to Torres' takeover, a radio commentary recalled that the new president had supported "the nationalistic policies" announced by Ovando when he took power in September 1969 and had tried to short-circuit a "reactionary" conspiracy against Ovando "encouraged by the CIA." The commentary noted that the same forces which had backed Ovando were now supporting Torres, but it concluded that the best course would be "to wait for developments and the announcement of the members of Torres' cabinet" before passing judgment on him. On 22 October, Radio Havana described Torres as "the new Bolivian gorilla" in reporting a press conference at which he expressed his intention to continue the fight against the guerrillas and "not tolerate any subversion, no matter where it comes from."

One of the first signs of Havana's disenchantment with the new regime came on the 10th when PRENSA LATINA carried a list of Torres' cabinet members and their political backgrounds, labelling most of them "rightists." The Torres government's refusal to consider former Bolivian Government minister Antonio Arguedas' 9 October request for an entry visa to return to Bolivia also evoked a hostile reaction.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 40 -

A PRENSA LATINA commentator remarked over Radio Havana that this "was indicative of what kind of government this new administration is." Arguedas, who arrived in Cuba on 26 June, had sent Guevara's Bolivian campaign diary to Havana, and Castro in his 26 July speech expressed appreciation to Arguedas for also delivering Che's death mask and hands. REUTERS on the 24th reported an ELN announcement--thus far not noted in available Havana output--that Arguedas had joined the organization.

General Torres' responses to a written questionnaire submitted by PRENSA LATINA, reported by the news agency on 14 October, apparently did little to improve Havana's impression of him. Asked about the possibility of resuming relations with Cuba, he said his approach to Cuba would be "part of a joint, coordinated, diplomatic policy," appearing to imply that he would not violate OAS agreements for the sake of ties with Havana. In response to a question about amnesty for Regis Debray, he stated that the matter was within the purview of the courts and "not the prerogative of the president." In its report of the interview PRENSA LATINA complained about Torres' "evasiveness."

Several Havana reports have focused on the instability of the new regime and ascribed it chiefly to the retention of rightist officers in key command posts in the armed forces. A domestic service commentator remarked on the 20th that left-right friction in the armed forces was continuing and concluded that "the Bolivian situation is critical," with no present prospects for "a sound solution." Havana commentators have also pictured U.S. concern over the Bolivian situation as allayed by "information that the rightwing military have retained their posts."

THE ELN ELN statements have been specially featured in Havana's wide publicity for statements by leftist groups critical of the Torres regime. These statements, while uniformly censuring Torres and expressing resolve to continue the guerrilla struggle, have also seemed to intimate that Torres might win ELN support if he were to declare an amnesty and institute reform measures. PRENSA LATINA's La Paz correspondent, in a dispatch to Havana on 27 October, reported an ELN communique asserting that "force, and not gorillas or political parties, is the only way to power" and pledging to continue the struggle, but also stating that if he wants to salvage "even a bit of his promise to the people," Torres should declare a general political amnesty, raise miners' wages, and promulgate other reforms.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 41 -

The PRENSA LATINA correspondent quoted the ELN communique as declaring that "the guerrillas have not been defeated," in evident response to press speculation about the situation created by the recent capture of ELN commander Osvaldo "Chato" Peredo and recent reverses suffered by the ELN guerrillas. Havana media have reported Peredo's capture and publicized allegations by Bolivian leftist groups that the Bolivian army has executed a number of ELN captives. Radio Havana reported on the 24th that Jorge Ruiz Paez had assumed command of the ELN.

Also on the 24th Cuban media carried an interview with an anonymous "important ELN leader" which it prefaced with comment of its own. Terming Peredo's capture "a reverse in a protracted struggle," Havana concluded that "the fact the ELN leader is alive can also be considered a partial victory for the revolutionary forces of Bolivia, since guerrilla prisoners were being systematically exterminated." In the interview the unnamed ELN spokesman described the organization's military and political objectives:

From the military viewpoint, the guerrilla movement's immediate objective is to attain sufficient combat experience, knowledge of the area, and ties with its population to become an irreversible national phenomenon. In the long term, we propose to expand our movement to other areas of the country and bordering states to create a true revolutionary army on a continental scale.

Significantly, Havana deleted the concluding portion of the interview--contained in the original version transmitted to Havana from the PRENSA LATINA office in Santiago, Chile on the 23d--in which the ELN spokesman applauded Allende's election victory in Chile but observed that "a true change of structures" would be impossible as long as "reaction" retains power through "its military sectors." He forecast an eventual "harsh and violent struggle to annihilate the right" in Chile. He also scored the Peruvian military regime for not providing a "final solution for any of Latin America's problems," for conducting an experiment limited by "the framework of capitalism," and for practicing "bourgeois reformism" of "very limited scope." The ELN leader went on to forecast "continentalization" of the armed struggle, encompassing Chile and Peru as well as Argentina and Brazil, in what he called an "irreversible"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 42 -

process. Havana chose not to disseminate any of these remarks, against the background of Castro's expressions of interest in reestablishing diplomatic relations with both Peru and Chile.

The ELN spokesman repeated earlier ELN criticisms of the Torres regime, expressing skepticism about its ability to "make a real structural change." He pointed to Torres' failure "to arm the people," the new regime's avoidance of "an armed confrontation with the gorillas," and the selection of a cabinet lacking "popular representation." The "process of deterioration followed by Ovando," he said, will "very probably be repeated under this government." Nevertheless, he appeared to hold out some slight hope that Torres might move to the left:

We refuse to harbor any illusions about a change of government resulting from a coup d'etat unless there is concrete proof that something is being done to fight imperialism and to eliminate the neocolonial structure of our country. Since, for the reasons we have stated, we consider such a turn unlikely, our struggle continues in the mountains . . . .

#### MOSCOW LARGELY NONCOMMITTAL IN COMMENT ON TORRES

Limited Moscow comment on the Torres regime has been noncommittal, in the main devoid of the hostile overtones evident in Havana's reaction. Stress so far has been on statements by General Torres announcing his intention to pursue an independent foreign policy and to develop diplomatic and trade relations with all countries, the socialist states in particular. Diplomatic relations between the USSR and Bolivia were "formalized" last December, and economic relations were in the process of expanding when the Torres takeover occurred.

On 18 October PRAVDA carried an interview with General Torres' in which he announced his desire to liberate Bolivia "from economic dependence on imperialism" and expressed an intention to "broaden relations with the socialist world." A 22 October IZVESTIYA article took note of the statement by the new Bolivian foreign minister that "we hope for extensive mutual understanding in the sphere of technical and trade relations with the Soviet Union, and we are convinced this will be the case."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 OCTOBER 1970

- 43 -

The IZVESTIYA article contained the only note of criticism of the new regime in available Moscow comment thus far. Observing that rightist military conspirators who had forced Ovando to step down "remain at their posts," the article said this has caused "many" Bolivians to point out that "it is dangerous that they have not been rendered harmless." IZVESTIYA added that "the rightists have not laid down their arms" and that Bolivian patriots are appealing for consolidation of the "victory" over "reactionary" military men.

U.S. ROLE        Moscow commentaries have alleged that the United States played a role in Ovando's ouster and in his short-lived replacement by a rightist junta. U.S. concern is said to relate to Bolivia's geographical position; with an IZVESTIYA article on the 21st implying that Washington is particularly concerned by "the growth of anti-imperialist attitudes" in Bolivia because it "lies next to Peru, where patriotic forces have come to power, and near Chile, where the candidate of the democratic coalition of popular unity was victorious in the recent presidential elections."

A Radio Peace and Progress commentary on 14 October was more direct, stating that "the Yankees" are discussing the possibility of setting up a "blockade" of Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. The Americans, the broadcast said, are "terrified" at the possibility of unity of the three countries--a unity which might "serve as the nucleus of the unification of all the Latin American peoples in their struggle against their common enemy, U.S. imperialism."

CONFIDENTIAL