

21 OCT 1970

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

21 OCTOBER 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 42)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 12 - 18 OCTOBER 1970

Moscow (3958 items)

WFTU 25th Anniversary	(0.1%)	10%
[Brezhnev Greetings	(--)	4%]
Indochina	(7%)	9%
Middle East	(8%)	7%
[UAR Presidential	(--)	4%]
Referendum		
Pompidou in USSR	(7%)	6%
UNGA Session	(0.1%)	4%
[Gromyko Arrival	(--)	2%]
Statement		
China	(2%)	3%
TASS Denial of Cuba Base	(--)	2%

Peking (3206 items)

Indochina	(11%)	43%
[Nixon Speech	(2%)	17%
[Lao "Independence	(--)	13%
Anniversary"		
[Cambodian Republic	(3%)	10%
Domestic Topics	(44%)	16%
DPRK Workers Party	(--)	5%
Delegation in PRC		
PRC-Canadian Diplomatic	(--)	5%
Relations		
DPRK Workers Party	(3%)	3%
25th Anniversary		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy items—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

"Rejections" of President Nixon's five-point proposal on Indochina, voiced on 14 October in the DRV Foreign Ministry statement and by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, have been repeated by the communist delegates at the Paris session on the 15th and by propagandists. Both Hanoi and the Front ridicule White House "allegations" that the "rejection" is only the communists' bargaining trick and that the United States still hopes Hanoi will continue to consider this proposal.

Other followup Hanoi propaganda includes an article in the DRV party organ NHAN DAN on the 18th, an article most notable for its length--almost a full page in the newspaper--and for its authorship by "Observer" (Nguoi quan sat) rather than by the commonly used "Commentator" (Nguoi binh luan). Observer does not specifically reiterate Hanoi's rejection of the five points but sets out to demonstrate that the communist stand is correct and reasonable and that President Nixon's proposal is motivated by domestic political considerations and reflects no real desire for a political settlement.

Moscow radio and press comment continues to deprecate President Nixon's 7 October peace plan as an effort to placate public opinion in view of the forthcoming elections, and a 15 October IZVESTIYA article ridicules the President's statement that the proposal could lead to "a generation of peace." The IZVESTIYA article and a PRAVDA article the next day make a detailed comparison of the PRG's 17 September initiative with the five-point proposal and dismiss the President's plan as aimed not at peace but at continued aggression.

Peking originates no further authoritative comment on the President's proposal following the 13 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, but PRC media promptly publicize the "rejections" of the proposal in the 14 October DRV Foreign Ministry statement and in the LPA interview with PRG President Phat. In summarizing Vietnamese communist comment, NCNA excises references to the Paris talks; however, it includes references to the PRG's eight points, and for the first time it acknowledges some of their substance in the course of reporting Phat's remarks on the proposal for a three-party provisional coalition government.

DRV AND PRG CONTINUE CRITICISM OF PRESIDENT'S PEACE PROPOSAL

The statements by the communist delegates at the 88th session of the Paris talks on 15 October and other propaganda say again

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that President Nixon's 7 October five-point proposal is not a "serious response" to the PRG's "correct" position as outlined in Mme. Binh's 17 September eight-point "elaboration" of the 10-point position. The VNA account of the session notes that both the PRG and DRV delegates "sternly criticized and rejected" the President's proposal, quoting respectively from the LPA interview with PRG President Phat and from the DRV Foreign Ministry statement.

Propagandists insist that the President was forced into making his "so-called initiative" by the wide, favorable response in the United States as well as the rest of the world to the PRG's eight points. LPA's Paris correspondent, in an article carried by Liberation Radio on the 15th, questions the President's statements that his address had been in preparation since last summer. The NHAN DAN Observer article says the President's 7 October speech was not a serious peace initiative but was in fact a reaction to the 17 September PRG proposal just as the President's eight-point plan of 14 May 1969 had reacted to the NFLSV's 10-point initiative.

Administration statements that the communists' response to the President's proposals should not be treated as an absolute rejection are noted promptly in a Hanoi radio commentary on the 16th. It says that even after the foreign ministry statement "resolutely rejected" the proposals, "the White House still spread the ambiguous allegation that this is only the communists' bargaining trick and that the United States still hopes Hanoi will continue to consider this proposal." The commentary calls this "a most brazen maneuver to deceive public opinion in the face of a patently obvious truth," namely the "firm attitude" toward "Nixon's fraud" expressed in formal statements issued by the Pathet Lao and Sihanouk's government as well as by the DRV and the PRG.

Another Hanoi radio commentary on the 19th calls Administration refusal to acknowledge the "rejections" of the President's plan "a brazen psychological warfare trick in his campaign to gain votes for his Republican Party in the November elections." The broadcast says the Administration wants to distract U.S. public opinion and "confuse some people in the United States in face of the sharp analysis and criticism by world public opinion of Nixon's speech, which is full of tortuous and sophistic arguments." Liberation Radio on the 20th also notes that although the U.S. "so-called peace

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initiative" was "completely rejected" in formal statements by the PRG, the DRV, Laos, and Cambodia, "Nixon and his propaganda machinery have continued to brazenly and gratuitously claim that these statements are part of the communists' propaganda technique, that the United States has not yet considered them a definite rejection." The Liberation Radio commentary is typically abusive of both the Vice President and the President, and it concludes that perhaps the latter will understand the communists' response only "when the U.S.-puppet troops in Indochina are soundly beaten and Nixon himself is buried alive, like Johnson, by the U.S. people in a political tomb."

CEASE-FIRE The NHAN DAN Observer article on the 18th, like Xuan Thuy in his statement at the Paris session, repeats the line that agreement to a standstill cease-fire while more than 400,000 U.S. forces remain in Vietnam would be tantamount to legalizing U.S. "aggression," U.S. military "occupation" of South Vietnam, and the Saigon government's position. Observer declares that "as for the South Vietnamese people, they will not be allowed to strike at the country-invading and country-selling cliques" under the proposed cease-fire. Observer, Xuan Thuy, Mme. Binh, and routine comment invoke the usual rejoinder that the people's resistance to aggression is "legitimate right of self-defense."

Like the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 14th, Xuan Thuy recalled in Paris that in 1965 the United States had proposed a cease-fire and unconditional negotiations. He said that in 1965 it was a cover for the U.S. escalation in South Vietnam and that now the President's cease-fire call is a cover to serve the Vietnamization program, prolongation of the war, and occupation of the Indochinese countries "for a long time."

As was the case last week, there is no acknowledgment in the propaganda of the fact that President Nixon called for international supervision of the proposed standstill cease-fire.

INDOCHINA CONFERENCE NHAN DAN's Observer and the statements of the two communist delegates in Paris reiterate the charge that the President's proposal for an Indochina peace conference is "an ugly trick to deceive public opinion." Observer and Xuan Thuy assert that the crucial question is to change U.S. policy and end the aggression in Indochina, not the form of the conference. Observer also claims that the conference proposal was aimed at downgrading the Paris conference.

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TROOP WITHDRAWAL Xuan Thuy's statement and the Observer article echo the DRV Foreign Ministry statement in complaining that the President is linking a U.S. troop withdrawal with an Indochina-wide settlement and "is thus setting new conditions for the withdrawal of U.S. troops." And comment generally denounces the President's proposal as a renewed call for a mutual troop withdrawal. The communist delegates in Paris, reiterating their position on a total troop withdrawal, maintained that the 30 June 1971 deadline is "more than sufficient" for a troop pullout.

President Nixon's announcement in Hartford, Conn. on the 12th that the rate of withdrawal is being speeded up and that 40,000 more American troops would be withdrawn by the end of the year, as part of the planned withdrawal of 150,000 troops to be completed by spring 1971, is typically ridiculed by Hanoi and Liberation radios on the 14th and 16th, respectively. In addition, both note Secretary Rogers' recent statements that the U.S. combat role would be ended by spring 1971 and Secretary Laird's announcement regarding the termination of the draft by mid-1973. Both say these announcements were aimed at "fooling the U.S. voters" and at mollifying U.S. antiwar sentiment.

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT Xuan Thuy responded to each of the three principles on a political settlement enunciated by the President. Thuy said "it is understood" that the President was "speaking about elections in South Vietnam" when he said that the United States would respect the outcome of the political process agreed upon. "It should be noted here," Xuan Thuy commented, "that the NFLSV spoke about elections in South Vietnam long before Mr. Nixon. The crucial question is who will organize these elections?" Thuy's statement, like other comment, reiterates the proposal for elections organized by a provisional coalition government as spelled out in the PRG's eight points. And Observer in NHAN DAN scores President Nixon for rejecting the "reasonable, sensible" PRG proposal and for saying that it constituted an annexation by one side.

POW RELEASE Comment on the President's proposal on the release of prisoners says that the first of the PRG's eight points offers the correct way to solve that issue. Mme. Binh asked why, if the United States were really interested in the release of its prisoners, it refused to

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declare that it will withdraw its forces by 30 June 1971, so that the parties could enter into immediate discussions on this matter. She added that "we are prepared to release all captured American militarymen after agreements on this issue have been reached." The NHAN DAN Observer article says the President's refusal to accept the PRG's eight points demonstrates that he "does not care a whit about the fate of captive Americans, but only seeks to deceive public opinion and serve his party's interests in the current election campaign."

SIHANOUK "COMMUNIQUE" AGAIN ASSAILS NIXON INITIATIVE

A "communique" issued by Sihanouk's "office," dated 12 October and carried by NCNA on the 15th, comments on a number of passages in President Nixon's 7 October speech. It does not deal with the five points systematically, but it does comment to some extent on all except the troop-withdrawal proposal. An 11 October RGNU statement and Sihanouk at a 10 October press conference had discussed those points which particularly pertained to Cambodia--the standstill ceasefire and the international conference.

The communique says that the cease-fire proposal is aimed merely at preserving the Lon Nol regime, since the military situation in Cambodia at present is unfavorable to the pro-American forces. The FUNK has "liberated" two-thirds of Cambodian territory, it says, and "it is likely that in a few months our FUNK will control four-fifths of Cambodia." The communique does not mention the question of international supervision of a cease-fire, although Sihanouk had rejected such a possibility in his earlier press conference statement.

On the issue of an international conference, the communique claims, as Sihanouk had done in his 10 October press conference, that the "partition" of Cambodia would result from such a conference. It also repeats the position that a conference is unacceptable if the Lon Nol regime rather than the RGNU is invited.

The communique does not directly acknowledge the President's argument that an Indochina conference is necessary because of DRV aggression throughout Indochina. But it goes on immediately to quote and rebut the President's statement that North Vietnamese troops are carrying out aggression in Cambodia. At the same time, it repeats the line that the "fighting solidarity" of the Cambodians is "absolutely legitimate" and that they have "the right to form a common front of struggle."

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The communique cites the President's statement that the release of all prisoners of war would be an act of humanity, but it does not mention his reference to captured journalists; it comments only that the United States is responsible for "genocide" in Indochina and is the one who should practice acts of humanity toward the Indochinese people--for example, by stopping the bombing. Earlier comment on the President's proposal had not mentioned the prisoner issue.

MOSCOW PRESS COMPARES NIXON, PRG PEACE PROPOSALS

Moscow publicizes Vietnamese communist comment rejecting the President's peace proposal, including the 14 October DRV Foreign Ministry statement and the interview with PRG President Phat on the same day, but it has not thus far noted the U.S. interpretation of the rejection as a bargaining move. However, a 21 October TASS report of the President's campaign tour says that "despite the fact" that the DRV and PRG representatives have rejected the plan, the President, speaking in Grand Forks, North Dakota, again contended that his initiative is "the most generous proposal in international diplomacy." A 16 October Moscow radio commentary in English notes briefly that even after the PRG and DRV rejected the plan, "American government spokesmen continued to praise it as a constructive step toward a peace settlement."

Continued Moscow radio and press criticism of the President's proposals is highlighted by articles in IZVESTIYA on 15 October and in PRAVDA on the 16th which discuss specific points in more detail than previous comment and compare them with the PRG's 17 September initiative. Both articles echo other propaganda in saying the U.S. proposal was motivated by political considerations. The IZVESTIYA article, by Yuriy Mikheyev, says that public pressure, "which the Republican Administration cannot fail to heed in view of the forthcoming congressional elections," has compelled the Administration to take a political action aimed at reducing criticism of the United States' continuing aggression and its "obstructionist" position at the Paris talks. Commenting in a similar vein, Ivan Shchedrov says in PRAVDA that one of the motives of the speech was to suppress, on the eve of the November elections, growing antiwar sentiment and demands for the withdrawal of American troops from Indochina.

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CEASE-FIRE The "crux" of President Nixon's program, says Mikheyev, is his proposal for a standstill cease-fire under international control." This is the only known Moscow acknowledgment of the international supervision aspect since the initial TASS report of the President's speech. The commentator observes that acceptance of the proposal would mean that U.S. and allied troops' "criminal actions" in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia would be "protected by the authority of international controllers." Earlier comment on the President's speeches had not spelled out the PRG position on a cease-fire, but Mikheyev now says this "realistic cease-fire program," unlike the U.S. proposal, would not be a screen for aggression since it provides for a cease-fire "after the signing of agreements on an end to the war and the restoring of peace in Vietnam."

TROOP WITHDRAWAL Shchedrov in PRAVDA, in referring to elaborations on the President's speech by Administration officials, says "the White House" explained that even if the cease-fire were adopted, the question of full withdrawal of American troops would depend on "the level of the enemy's combat activity." He adds that it was also "stated officially" that U.S. troops "may be withdrawn in 12 months, but only in the event of acceptance of all five points of the American plan."

Commenting on the troop withdrawal proposal itself, Shchedrov avoids--in keeping with past propaganda--any specific reference to the President's expression of readiness to negotiate a timetable on complete withdrawal as part of an overall settlement, although he does recall that the PRG initiative called for U.S. agreement to withdraw by 30 June 1971. Shchedrov acknowledges that the President expressed readiness to withdraw troops, but under a settlement based on principles set forth earlier. The article notes that "an official White House spokesman" explained that this is not a question of "unilateral withdrawal."

Like some earlier comment on the troop withdrawal issue, Mikheyev in IZVESTIYA complains that President Nixon failed to propose a concrete deadline for the withdrawal of troops. Mikheyev asserts that the President insists on withdrawal "only within the framework of a settlement based on those principles which he outlined earlier and advanced in his speech of 7 October." But the only "principle" Mikheyev recalls is on U.S. troops being withdrawn only as the South Vietnamese army becomes stronger.

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POLITICAL SETTLEMENT The Mikheyev article claims that the President's call for a political settlement that would reflect the "existing balance of political forces" means maintaining the present Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration in power. The article neglects to mention that the President also said the United States would abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon.

In noting that the President called for a political settlement that would meet the aspirations of the South Vietnamese people, Shchedrov in PRAVDA points to the President's statement that "the demand of those who seek 'the right to exclude whomever they wish from the government'" is "unreasonable and unacceptable" and calls it a "transparent allusion" to the PRG's call for an administration without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem. Shchedrov cites the "official White House representative" as stating that the United States "fully supports" the Thieu-Ky government.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE; POW'S The President's other points are discussed more briefly in both articles. Shchedrov asks if it makes sense to call for an Indochina conference at a time when the United States is obstructing the Paris talks, attempting to "torpedo" the preparations for the Laotian leaders' talks, and ignoring the FUNK's proposals.

Both articles contrast the President's proposal on unconditional release of prisoners of war on both sides with the "realistic" stand of the PRG, which says that it will begin a discussion of prisoner release only after the United States pledges a troop withdrawal. By refuting this proposal, Shchedrov says, the United States is "openly threatening" that there will still be no progress at the Paris talks. Mikheyev dismisses the President's proposal on prisoner release as an effort to play on the feelings of the American people.

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COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO DENOUNCE CAMBODIAN REPUBLIC

Government statements issued by the DRV and PRG, on the 15th and 17th respectively, endorse the joint Sihanouk-FUNK-RGNU statement of 10 October which had denounced the proclamation of the Cambodian republic the day before. The DRV and PRG statements, like the Chinese Government statement of the 10th, call the proclamation of the republic "deceitful and illegal" and claim that the RGNU is the sole legal Cambodian government.

UNITED NATIONS An attack on the republic also appears in a Sihanouk statement on the 25th anniversary of the United Nations, dated 14 October and carried by NCNA on the 19th.* Sihanouk denounces UN "crimes" and charges that the organization has become "an accomplice of the U.S. imperialists." Sihanouk scores U Thant for, among other things, "turning out" Cambodian Ambassador Huot Sambath and agreeing with Washington to accept the representative of the "Lon Nolite putschists." Sihanouk also decries the fact that Cheng Heng, "illegal head of state of the illegal 'republic,'" has been invited to participate in the UN anniversary celebrations.

* An earlier Sihanouk statement on the UN anniversary, dated 15 September, had criticized U Thant's decision to regard the Lon Nol regime as the government of Cambodia. See the 30 September TRENDS, page 7.

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DRV PROTESTS ALLEGED B-52 STRIKES IN DMZ

Hanoi media on 16 October note a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement issued that day charges the United States with dispatching B-52 planes* to bomb the northern part of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The protest says that on 13 October, U.S. B-52's and "several other types of aircraft" dropped "a great quantity of demolition and steel-pellet bombs onto Huong Lap village in the northern part of the DMZ."

The foreign ministry, as usual, "vehemently denounced and sternly condemned" the alleged "criminal" acts of the United States and reiterated the demand for an end to all U.S. encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security.

ALLIES ACCUSED OF "WAR CRIMES" IN CAMBODIA, SOUTH VIETNAM

CAMBODIA An alleged massacre of Vietnamese residents in Bak Preah village, Battambang Province, on 13-15 September, is denounced in PRG and DRV Foreign Ministry spokesmen's statements publicized on 13 and 14 October respectively. The statements claim that the villagers, mostly Vietnamese, were killed during bombing and strafing raids by aircraft sent by the United States and the Phnom Penh and Saigon "lackeys." The PRG statement--said to have been issued on the 10th--alleges that the Phnom Penh government has been repressing and massacring Vietnamese residents ever since last March and adds that the Bak Preah village incident reveals the hypocrisy of the claim that the Saigon administration defends the life and property of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia. The DRV statement charges that on U.S. orders the Lon Nol regime has been "colluding" more and more closely with the Saigon administration.

A flurry of DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry and Government statements from late March to early May had denounced alleged "massacres" of Vietnamese residents of Cambodia, but the issue has not been raised authoritatively since then.

* The most recent protests regarding B-52's were two foreign ministry spokesman's statements issued on 13 and 27 August. See the TRENDS of 19 August 1970, page 13 and 2 September, page 14.

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SOUTH VIETNAM Communist claims of allied war crimes in South Vietnam during the first nine months of this year are rounded up in a 13 October communique by the southern war crimes committee. The communique, carried by LPA on the 19th, first of all scores alleged "terror raids" and the "concentration and "massacre" of civilians under the allied pacification program, listing several specific examples. In decrying alleged repression of the urban population, the statement, as usual, cites the arrest and "torture" of students and "muzzling" of the press. In particular, it relates actions by the government against the paper TIN SANG. The "torture and imprisonment of patriots," use of "toxic chemicals and poison gas sprays," and B-52 raids against populated areas are also charged.

FRONT COMMENT REFLECTS ALLIED PACIFICATION GAINS IN VIETNAM

Liberation Radio touches indirectly on allied pacification successes in a 15 October commentary which takes note of the return of peasants to secure areas. The commentary is somewhat more open than most propaganda in acknowledging that the allies are allowing the return of the peasants to their land, but it typically obscures the significance of this policy by claiming that it was a "concession" prompted by the "people's strong struggle." The radio goes on to claim that this development is proof of allied failures and that "a new revolutionary spirit is prevailing in the countryside." But at the same time it acknowledges communist setbacks in the past by saying that this favorable situation is occurring "after nearly two years of see-saw battle between us and the enemy."

The commentary, which is pegged to the 6th anniversary of the death of the Viet Cong martyr Nguyen Van Troi, routinely calls for continued efforts to counter allied pacification efforts. Among other things, it declares that it is necessary to "mercilessly punish those betrayers of the revolution who have guided the enemy in his attacks on the revolutionary bases, the 'Swan' and 'Phoenix' spies, policemen, and secret agents."

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MIDDLE EAST

Moscow comment on Middle East developments is highlighted by the 15 October PRAVDA article by Ye. Primakov reviewing Soviet proposals for a peace settlement--the first extensive discussion of Soviet proposals in more than eight months. Primakov sustains the attack against Israel and the United States as the parties responsible for the continuing crisis in the Middle East. He also views as "completely groundless" the calculation that pressure on the USSR will succeed--"whether in regard to the so-called 'violations' of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal Zone or the meetings of the four powers' representatives on the Middle East crisis."

Other propaganda also continues Moscow's criticism of the Israeli boycott of the Jarring talks and the U.S. withdrawal from the Big Four deputies' talks at the United Nations. There are further rejections of U.S. and Israeli "allegations" about UAR violations of the stand-still aspects of the cease-fire. And TASS reports that UAR Foreign Minister Riyad, on the 18 October TV program "Issues and Answers," said U.S. photographs of the area did not prove violations since they showed missiles which were on site before 7 August. TASS also notes that Riyad countercharged the United States with violating the agreement by supplying "offensive weapons" to Israel during the cease-fire.

Earlier, Soviet media reported that Riyad, in his 16 October UNGA address, asserted that the "so-called initiative" on the Middle East "was actually thwarted by the United States itself" through its supplying of arms to Israel. Moscow has publicized the report in the 18 October Washington STAR on the "secret" delivery of Phantom aircraft to Israel.

Soviet media hail the election--in the 15 October referendum--of as-Sadat as the new UAR president. Stress is on his avowed intent to pursue Nasir's policies, including the maintenance of close ties with the USSR. The TASS report of as-Sadat's speech on the 19th notes his assertion of willingness to extend the cease-fire "if serious and effective contacts are held." On the other hand, Moscow obscures Israeli remarks on extending the cease-fire; a Moscow broadcast on the 17th contrasted Riyad's expression of UAR readiness to extend the cease-fire with Premier Golda Meir's warning, to the Israeli Labor Party, that "the country be ready for a new round in the Arab-Israeli war."

PRIMAKOV IN PRAVDA REVIEWS SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT

The 15 October Primakov PRAVDA article, entitled "The Path To a Just Peace," comes on the heels of a NOVOSTI handout last month

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which had also treated Soviet proposals; the NOVOSTI pamphlet, however, was not publicized in the mass media. Primakov had briefly touched on the Soviet proposals in a lengthy article on the Middle East in the monthly journal USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY (No. 9, signed to the press on 11 September 1970).

The current Primakov PRAVDA article has been broadcast by Radio Moscow to foreign audiences, including the Arab world, and has occasioned a spate of comment pointing to "favorable" world reaction to the Soviet proposals.* Primakov says the proposals have been formulated "with consideration being given to those involved in the conflict as well as to the bilateral and quadripartite consultations" on the questions of a Middle East settlement. The proposals, he says, are not in the form of an "ultimatum."

Urging Israeli acceptance of the proposals, Primakov says Tel Aviv can entertain no hope of Arab capitulation or the slackening of Soviet assistance, and he cites Brezhnev's 2 October Baku speech and the USSR-UAR communique following Kosygin's visit in the UAR, at the time of Nasir's funeral, for the assertion that the USSR offers "complete support" to the Arab cause. Primakov rejects the "empty" hope that the Soviet position will change following Nasir's death.

SUBSTANCE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS In its review of the Soviet proposals, the Primakov article seems particularly notable on three points: the interjection of the notion of a two-stage withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories; the suggestion that UN forces be introduced at "several points" along the frontiers; and the call for a "mutually binding agreement" between the two sides in the Middle East--language which had also appeared

* The title of the article is identical to that of the last previous article which discussed Soviet proposals in detail--by Ye. Maksimov in the 27 January 1970 PRAVDA. The substance of the December 1968 Soviet proposals had first been outlined in a 25 January 1969 PRAVDA article by Vasilyev. For a discussion see the TRENDS of 26 January 1970, pages 16-19.

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in the NOVOSTI pamphlet. (The Maksimov article last January had spoken of "a document agreed upon by both sides.")

Primakov says that Israel's withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a simultaneously just and stable peace in the Middle East are "organically interconnected and must be examined jointly." He notes that the Soviet proposals specify that as soon as the document agreed upon through Ambassador Jarring is handed over to the United Nations, the two sides will refrain from actions which contradict the cessation of the state of war. He adds that

legally, the cessation of the state of war and the establishment of the state of peace comes at the moment of completion of the Israeli forces' withdrawal (the evacuation can be implemented in two stages) from territories occupied in June 1967.

Primakov does not elaborate on the two stages; however the Vasilyev article in PRAVDA on 25 January 1969--which had first outlined the substance of the December 1968 Soviet proposals--had given some attention to a two-stage withdrawal covering a two-month period. In the first month, according to Vasilyev, Israeli forces would withdraw to "certain intermediate lines" and in the second month they would pull back to the lines they held before 5 June 1967. Neither Maksimov last January nor the NOVOSTI pamphlet had mentioned any such two-stage withdrawal.

Asserting that security of borders in the age of rapidly developing military technology is best guaranteed by their "universal recognition," Primakov says that Israel should concern itself with establishing frontiers corresponding to the lines existing on 4 June 1967. Maksimov had noted the need for Israeli troops to withdraw "behind the line" on which they were situated "up to 5 June 1967." The call for pre-5 June 1967 lines is of long standing.

The Primakov article recalls the obligations demanded of the two sides after settlement of the Middle East conflict under the terms of the 22 November 1967 Security Council Resolution (No. 242). The Soviet proposals, Primakov adds, provide for the establishment of demilitarized zones on both sides of the

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frontiers, the introduction of UN forces* "at several points," and "direct guarantees by the four permanent member states of the Security Council or UN Security Council guarantees." (In his article in USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY Primakov had also spoken of the introduction of UN forces "into a number of places" along the frontier.) Both Maksimov last January and NOVOSTI had included essentially the same elements, specifying, however, that the UN forces should be located in the Gaza strip and in the Sharm ash-Shayk area.

In the course of his review of the proposals, Primakov reaffirms, by implication, the Soviet conviction that Israel has the right to exist, observing that the USSR "has proceeded and continues to proceed from all the Middle East states' right to secure and independent national existence." Resolution of the Palestinian question, he says, is basic to any stable settlement in the Middle East. Like Maksimov and NOVOSTI, he recalls UN resolutions demanding the return of refugees to their homeland or the payment of compensation for their property. In Primakov's words, "we consider all the more inadmissible attempts to implement 'self-determination' for some by completely depriving others of their national rights."

MOSCOW WELCOMES JORDANIAN-PLO ACCORD, DOWNPLAYS CLASHES

Moscow welcomes the 13 October agreement between King Husayn and Arafat regulating the relations between the Jordanian Government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as "a new important step aimed at putting an end to the fratricide." Consistent with earlier comment on the situation in Jordan, a broadcast for Arab listeners on the 15th said that Tel Aviv had benefited most from the civil war in that country last month and "could not conceal its satisfaction over the fact

* A LIFE ABROAD article (No. 41, signed to the press 7 October 1970) scores the notion of possible U.S. and Soviet participation in a UN peacekeeping force. Drawing on Western press reports, the author says that "the U.S. military is dreaming" of such a force, hoping it will allow U.S. intervention in events in the Middle East and thus "seal forever Israeli occupation of Arab territory." For background see the TRENDS of 2 September 1970, page 21, and 12 August 1970, page 20.

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that the Arabs were fighting among themselves instead of directing their weapons against the common enemy."

Propaganda following the agreement has stressed that life in Amman and most other parts of Jordan has returned to normal, acknowledging, however, that there have been clashes. Thus Arab listeners were told on the 18th that "tension continues to exist in the north of the country, where armed clashes took place yesterday" between government troops and fedayeen. TASS on the 19th cited statements by spokesmen for both sides, each alleging that the other opened fire first. The same TASS item concluded with a quotation from the communique of the inter-Arab committee in Jordan to the effect that "the incident which occurred was of a limited nature and will have no effect on the progress in the cause of gradual normalization of the situation" in the country. According to a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 20th, the situation in the north has returned to normal. This broadcast went on to charge that Western news agencies in the Middle East sought "to cause a stir about the individual clashes that took place in four villages in the Irbid area, in an attempt to prove that the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement to settle the dispute had been violated."

In a related development, IZVESTIYA observer Matveyev, participating in the 18 October commentators' roundtable broadcast in the domestic service, defended the Soviet role in Jordan during last month's civil war. He rejected the allegation of "American propaganda" that the Soviet Union had adopted some sort of unclear position at the time of the events in that country, asking rhetorically: "Who does not remember that it was the Soviet Union itself which stated for all to hear that it opposed any outside interference in the internal affairs of Jordan?" The authors of this "American propaganda" are not identified. But it seems noteworthy that earlier in the same broadcast Matveyev took Max Frankel of the New York TIMES to task for speculating--in a 15 October article--on a "crisis of trust" between the United States and the USSR. (Matveyev, of course, did not acknowledge any such detail as Frankel's observation that Washington believes Moscow tolerated the Syrian thrust into Jordan if it did not actually collaborate in it.)

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HIJACK INCIDENT

SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGE FIRST HIJACKING, DEMAND EXTRADITION

TASS promptly reported the first publicly acknowledged successful hijacking of a Soviet airliner--to Trabzon, Turkey on 15 October-- and Soviet media have carried continuing reports on the return of the passengers and crew, the Turkish handling of the hijackers, and the demands of an "indignant" Soviet public and world public opinion for return of the culprits to the Soviet Union for trial.* Both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA have suggested that any further delay in Turkish extradition of the two hijackers will bode ill for Soviet-Turkish relations.

IZVESTIYA noted on the 17th that this was "not the first hijack attempt" on a Soviet plane, mentioning that an unsuccessful hijack attempt had been made "on a plane also from Batumi" four years ago. TASS on the 18th recalled a 1961 attempt by three armed bandits on a Soviet aircraft who demanded that the pilot "take the plane abroad." Moscow is not known to have publicized these incidents at the time, nor is it known to have reported hijack attempts on East European planes. When Soviet media have reported hijackings in the West, they have generally mentioned them well after the fact and with little detail.

Following a TASS announcement on the 16th of the return of the hijacked airliner's crew and passengers--but not of the two hijackers, a Soviet father and son--Moscow media initiated a low volume of comment designed to glorify the Soviet crew and particularly the slain stewardess, to blacken the character of the elder hijacker, and to generate a groundswell of Soviet public opinion demanding extradition.

* Although Belgrade's domestic service quoted "a spokesman of the Soviet Ministry of Civil Aviation" as denying reports on the hijacking of a Soviet passenger plane, TASS an hour later briefly detailed the incident and noted that the Soviet Government had asked for extradition of "the criminals-murderers" and return of the Soviet plane and citizens. The TASS acknowledgment on the 15th came approximately eight hours after REUTERS had reported the incident.

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The crew was credited with saving the lives of the passengers by following the hijackers' instructions to land in Turkey, although a domestic service broadcast on the 18th--giving "new details" about the event--quoted the wounded captain as saying he had thrown the aircraft "from side to side" but was finally compelled to land in Trabzon "to keep the passengers from being killed."

Moscow played up the heroism of the stewardess, who according to TASS was "shot dead pointblank" when she attempted to block the hijackers' entrance into the pilots' cabin. IZVESTIYA on the 17th reported her impending marriage and cited a commendation she had received in April for her conduct during an airborne fire. TASS reported that thousands of people attended her funeral on the 20th and that she has become "an example for Soviet young people." Her name "has been entered in the book of honor of the Komsomol Central Committee together with the names of other heroes of the Soviet youth," according to TASS, and the pupils of her school in Udmurtia "decided to name their Komsomol organization after her."

PRAVDA on the 18th characterized the elder hijacker as an embezzler, black marketeer, and domestic tyrant who had corrupted his son and "drawn him into the crime and murder." Although the initial REUTERS report of the incident said that the hijackers were "both of Jewish origin," no such statement has appeared in Soviet media.

EXTRADITION Initial Moscow reports that the Soviet Government had asked the Turkish authorities to extradite "the criminals-murderers" for trial in the Soviet Union have evolved into reports of "wrath and indignation among all Soviet people," who are "justly demanding extradition of the criminals and their severe punishment by a Soviet court." Moscow media report a continuing stream of letters and telegrams demanding extradition--from scientists, engineers, aviation officials, trade union functionaries, railway personnel, and so on.

Rounding up foreign support for the Soviet extradition demands, TASS on the 20th claimed that "the public and the press in many countries" stress the "absolute justness" of extradition. The roundup included GDR, Polish, and Czechoslovak press reactions and quoted the Warsaw central airport director as asserting that "the Turkish authorities cannot but understand the grave

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responsibility that will rest with them if they defend the air bandits who have blood on their hands."

Reacting to a Trabzon court's refusal to issue arrest warrants for the two hijackers, TASS on the 19th said the court's "more than strange" verdict contravened "generally known facts." TASS observed that the hijackers' fate will now be decided by the Turkish Ministry of Justice but stated that they "must face a Soviet court for their crimes and must be punished."

Allusions in both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA to possible detrimental consequences for Soviet-Turkish relations came only after the Trabzon court's decision. A PRAVDA dispatch from Turkey, carried by TASS on the 20th, pointed to "certain quarters in Turkey that systematically seek to wreck the development and strengthening of genuinely good-neighborly Soviet-Turkish relations" by arguing that extradition would "allegedly 'shake the dignity of Turkey.'" The correspondent said "all upright people in Turkey" are confident that the Turkish Government "will not cast aspersions on Turkish-Soviet relations because of two air pirates."

IZVESTIYA commentator Kudryavtsev, in an article reviewed by TASS on the 20th, suggested that "it would be madness" for Turkish officials to believe a further delay in extradition "would contribute to raising the country's prestige." He asked: "Is it worth casting a shadow over relations with a neighboring state just for the sake of two bandits?" The Soviet public, Kudryavtsev said, believes an "immediate solution" of the extradition question would show the desire of the Turkish side not to let relations between the two countries be "harmed."

Kudryavtsev said the Turkish criminal code "includes an article on the extradition of foreign criminals" but did not elaborate on its provisions. He recalled the 1969 incident when Bulgarian authorities extradited to Turkey the hijacker of a Turkish aircraft which had landed in Bulgaria, and he asserted that at the recent 58th conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in the Hague the Turkish delegation had "unanimously voted for a resolution which raised clearly and definitely the question of the extradition

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of criminals hijacking planes under the threat of the use of arms." But he did not indicate what the Soviet stand had been,* nor did he say how the issue was resolved.

* At variance with Moscow's current strong demands for extradition, a rare discussion of hijackings as a problem of international law-- in the 23 September LITERARY GAZETTE by candidates of juridical sciences Kolosov and Emin--claimed that the 1963 Tokyo convention envisaged with respect to hijackers "the administration of justice by states in accordance with their own national legislation."

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CUBA SUBMARINE BASE

MOSCOW SEES U.S. CHARGES AS SIGN OF RETURN TO COLD WAR

Soviet comment following up the 13 October TASS denial that the USSR was building "its military base" in Cuba has used the issue increasingly to charge the Nixon Administration with seeking a return to the cold war and the era of confrontation. This propaganda parallels allegations in Soviet propaganda, dating generally from the President's Mediterranean trip, to the effect that American actions in the Middle East are symptomatic of an intention to forego the search for bilateral agreements in favor of a return to cold war politics.

A 14 October Moscow radio commentary, broadcast widely to foreign audiences, opened on the note that had dominated initial Soviet comment on the U.S. reports of construction of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba, alleging that the U.S. reports have had the "short-term" aim of justifying increased military spending. It went on to develop the charge that the "long-term" goal is to "aggravate the world situation," saying the U.S. press is now "stating bluntly" that Washington plans "to return to the path of confrontation and give up the search for cooperation." The commentary cited the U.S. withdrawal from the four-power deputies' talks on the Middle East and--for the first time in Soviet media--"persistent rumors that the strategic arms limitation talks will be scaled down."

The notion that charges about construction of a Soviet base were conjured up, among other things, to impair the prospects for a successful outcome of SALT has recurred. For example, a NEW TIMES article summarized by Radio Moscow on the 15th assailed those who have used the "concoction" about the base to engender anti-Soviet hysteria, hoping thereby "to wreck the possibility of agreement on such questions as the stopping of the strategic arms race." And a 16 October TASS commentary alleged that in addition to the motives of promoting military spending and gaining votes "for representatives of the right wing of the Republican party" in November, a third underlying motive was that of "definite circles in the United States to use any pretext, any ruses and lies to throw the world back to the worst time of the 'cold war.'" The commentary imputed to a U.S. journalist the view that "knights of the cold war"

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are trying to promote the notion that "Russians are not to be trusted," with the aim of "torpedoing the strategic arms limitation talks" and blocking ratification of the FRG-USSR treaty.

A Radio Moscow commentary broadcast to Latin America on the 14th said U.S. accusations about a Soviet base were aimed at convincing Latin Americans that "danger emanates from the USSR and Cuba" and thus at blocking the trend in the hemisphere toward broadening relations with socialist countries and reestablishing ties with Cuba. Expounding on the threat allegedly posed by the existence of numerous U.S. military bases in Latin America, this commentary recalled--as the earlier Soviet press comment had done--that the USSR has "repeatedly" proposed the liquidation of foreign military bases in the United Nations. It added that the Soviet Union "has in general no military support points outside its national boundaries, including Cuba." The commentary also charged that one of the purposes of "Pentagon strategists" in spreading "such gross falsification" was "to poison the atmosphere of sincere friendship between the USSR and Cuba."

Moscow and Havana media have continued to ignore U.S. reports on the movements of the ships remaining from the Soviet task force which arrived at Cienfuegos on 9 September. There has been no reaction to the 16 October U.S. Defense Department announcement that a Soviet submarine tender and an accompanying tug had moved from Cienfuegos to the Cuban port of Mariel, or to statements by U.S. officials on the 15th that two Soviet barges remain in Cienfuegos. But Moscow has made frequent reference to the 13 October statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense Daniel Z. Henkin that it now seemed "less likely" that the Soviet Union was planning a submarine base. Several commentaries have cited Henkin's statement in playing up the idea that the TASS statement put Washington in the embarrassing position of having to disavow its earlier allegations.

Typical comment along these lines appeared in an 18 October PRAVDA article by N. Bragin who said Washington politicians were "now maneuvering to escape somehow from a delicate situation" and cited the Henkin statement as evidence. Bragin concluded by recalling the proverb "a lie has short legs." The same proverb has been cited in other Soviet press articles, among them a front-page IZVESTIYA article on the 15th which

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noted that after the "lie" had been spread all over the world, "now even Pentagon and State Department official circles are hustening to disown it." U.S. officials, IZVESTIYA said, have now conceded that what was initially termed "a Soviet base" has turned out to be "two barrack-huts similar, according to the comparison used by official Washington sources, to hen-houses and also of a tennis court and a football pitch." The IZVESTIYA article noted that U.S. State Department spokesman McCloskey had described the TASS statement as "positive" but refused to comment when pressed by "spiteful reporters" to indicate whether this meant it was "truthful."

A PRAVDA article on the 15th, entitled "On Coc'roaches' Legs," alleged that "Washington falsifiers are now moving into reverse" and pointed to reports of White House and State Department "embarrassment." It concluded: "They can only blame themselves . . . By their own hands they have exacerbated even further the 'crisis of confidence' in the United States."

CUBAN COMMENTATOR NOTES SOVIET REMINDER OF MISSILE-CRISIS PACT

The first monitored Cuban acknowledgment of the Soviet reaction to the American reports came on 14 October in a domestic service commentary which mentioned the Soviet recollection of the 1962 Soviet-U.S. agreement but did not take note of the actual denials of construction of a Soviet military base. Charging that the United States has been trying "to create an uproar over the submarine base here in Cienfuegos, Cuba," the commentary said the Soviet Union "reminded them of the Kennedy-Khrushchev pact"--in fact described by Moscow as an "understanding," of course with no mention of Khrushchev personally--"so that they would be mindful of everything lest on account of one illusion they might have another with regard to Cuba." This appears to be a circuitous allusion to the notion that the 1962 agreement entailed commitments on both sides, including a no-invasion pledge.

The author of the commentary, Guido Garcia Inclan, was also the commentator who made Havana media's only prior reference to the submarine base issue--in a 1 October radio talk mentioning briefly that U.S. newspapers "have been giving wide play to the submarine base that they say the Soviets are building in Cienfuegos." Garcia Inclan's prose is often tortuous and less than coherent. His format on 1 October was a radio feature entitled "Letter From Freddy," which he uses sporadically; "Freddy" purports to be a former Cuban journalistic colleague now working for a Miami newspaper. Garcia Inclan usually devotes his talks to Cuban domestic problems, frequently taking up such subjects as red tape, labor indiscipline, and juvenile delinquency.

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PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

RELATIONS WITH CANADA ADD TO PEKING'S DIPLOMATIC MOMENTUM

Peking has sought to use the establishment of diplomatic relations with Canada to give new force to its diplomatic momentum and its campaign to erode the influence of the two superpowers. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 15 October, two days after the release of the joint communique announcing agreement to establish PRC-Canadian diplomatic relations, reaffirms Peking's commitment to the principles of peaceful coexistence and offers a reassurance that the Chinese do not interfere in other countries' affairs. Calling Canada a "big country" on the American continent, the editorial praises Canadian foreign policy as reflecting a desire to pursue an independent course and as demonstrating that attempts by "one or two 'superpowers'" to control other countries' policies have become "more and more unfeasible."

Peking thus in effect invites other countries to join it in finding common ground for securing leverage against superpower dominance. This has been a major ingredient of Peking's attitude toward such countries as France and Romania, which have been credited with following paths independent of the United States and the Soviet Union. Peking's agreement on diplomatic ties with Canada picks up and updates its line at the time when France recognized the PRC in January 1964, before the exigencies of the Vietnam war and the cultural revolution drove the Chinese into isolation. It may be recalled that Peking's doctrine of the intermediate zones between the United States and the socialist camp--which served at that time as an ideological rationale for the PRC's flirtation with Western countries--included Canada along with West Europe within the "second intermediate zone" comprising developed capitalist countries.

TAIWAN ISSUE The 13 October joint communique, in which Canada explicitly recognizes the PRC Government as "the sole legal government of China," contains a compromise formula for dealing with the Taiwan question. On the one hand, Peking was able to include its claim that Taiwan is a part of the PRC's territory. Canada, however, merely "takes note of this position" in the communique. Canada's noncommittal position was clarified in a statement by External Affairs Minister Sharp explaining that the Canadian Government does not consider it appropriate to either endorse or challenge Peking's stand on the status of Taiwan.

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In January 1964, a terse two-sentence joint communique had simply announced agreement between the PRC and France to establish diplomatic relations and to exchange ambassadors. At that time Peking issued a clarifying statement by a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman putting on record its claims that the PRC is the sole legal government of China and that Taiwan is part of China's territory. As in the present case, there was also a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial hailing the event as an example of peaceful coexistence.

In commenting on the PRC-French agreement to open diplomatic relations, the 29 January 1964 PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial was at pains to counter the view that Peking had relaxed its opposition to "two Chinas" and that establishment of diplomatic ties with France would unlock the door to such an arrangement. The current editorial, after confidently noting that the two-Chinas approach has been increasingly spurned, shifts attention to what it derides as "the new gimmick" of "one China, one Taiwan" advanced by the United States as a result of failure of the previous approach. Peking's shift in focus registers satisfaction--in contrast to the uncertainty after French recognition in 1964--over the immediate termination of Nationalist China's diplomatic mission in Canada. But it also reflects concern over the Taiwan independence movement and the possibility that Taiwan's status will be left indeterminate even as more countries enter into diplomatic relations with the PRC. The editorial repeats the standard pledge that the Chinese people "are determined to liberate" Taiwan.

The editorial refers to "some superficial changes" made by the United States in moving away from the two-Chinas approach. Peking has remained silent on the specific initiatives taken by the Nixon Administration to improve relations with mainland China, though there have been generalized attacks on Washington's professed desire to relax tensions. In the most authoritative recent statement on the Taiwan question as "the crucial issue" in Sino-U.S. relations, Huang Yung-sheng on 27 June this year--speaking on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan--declared that a relaxation of relations is "out of the question" unless the United States withdraws its armed forces from Taiwan. An NCNA commentary on the same occasion made much of the continuing U.S. commitment to the Chiang Kai-shek regime in documenting allegedly hostile actions by the United States despite the President's call for improved relations with the PRC.

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OTHER ISSUES Apart from the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, Peking has made no further comment in its own name on the establishment of diplomatic ties with Canada. Li Hsien-nien, speaking at a banquet for a DPRK delegation on the 15th, not only failed to mention it but also ignored the Taiwan question--a subject which has figured prominently in the Sino-Korean context this year and was raised by the North Korean speaker at the banquet. The question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, which was ignored in the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, has been raised by proxy in Peking's publicity for comment from Albania, the sponsor of the perennial resolution calling for the seating of the PRC. An 18 October NCNA summary of a BASHKIMI commentary on the establishment of PRC-Canadian diplomatic ties highlighted the Tirana paper's condemnation of the United States for obstructing recognition of the PRC's rights in the United Nations.

The implications of the event for Sino-Japanese relations are discussed in a 19 October NCNA roundup of Afro-Asian comment. Reflecting Peking's hopes for stimulating public pressure within Japan to move that country toward a position more favorable to the PRC, the NCNA report quoted a Japanese news agency as saying the news of the establishment of PRC-Canadian diplomatic relations has aroused "uneasiness within the Sato group." A Japanese paper was cited as saying that a trend within the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party aimed at establishing relations between Japan and the PRC has been strengthened by this development.

RELATIONS WITH EQUATORIAL GUINEA Peking's diplomatic momentum was given another boost with the release on 20 October of a joint communique announcing the decision of the PRC and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to establish diplomatic relations. In the communique Equatorial Guinea recognizes the PRC as "the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people," a formulation that accedes more fully to Peking's claims than in the case of Canada. The communique invokes the five principles of coexistence as the basis for developing relations between the PRC and Equatorial Guinea. The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on PRC-Canadian relations also cites the five principles, but the joint communique on those ties mentions only three of the principles, omitting the ones on nonaggression and peaceful coexistence itself.

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That Peking may be angling for a more favorable vote at the United Nations this session is suggested by its "discovery" of Equatorial Guinea, a country which it had previously ignored. An NCNA dispatch dated three days before the announcement of diplomatic relations reported at some length on the 12 October celebrations of the second anniversary of the country's independence. Peking's broadening effort to win good will is also reflected in Chou En-lai's 19 October message to Fiji's prime minister on the occasion of the proclamation of that country's independence.

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PRC NUCLEAR TEST

PEKING MEDIA SILENT ON REPORTED ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TEST

Peking media have not so far acknowledged the PRC's 11th nuclear test--its first in more than a year--reported by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to have been a three-megaton atmospheric explosion on 14 October in the Lop Nor testing area. The only other detected test not publicly acknowledged by the PRC was the seventh on 24 December 1967. Nearly a month after that test, a 19 January 1968 Tokyo broadcast quoted Chou En-lai as telling a visiting Japanese goodwill delegation that Peking had made announcements of its nuclear tests "whenever new properties were obtained."

The first six Chinese tests were publicly announced on the day they were held, and the eighth was announced the following day. All were followed by publicity for nationwide celebrations. The last detected tests, on 23 and 29 September 1969, went unpublicized by Chinese media until 4 October and occasioned no followup comment or reports of celebrations.

There has been no mention of the AEC announcement of the 11th test in monitored Soviet or East European media. Moscow's normal practice is to wait for Peking's announcements, then to report the tests very briefly, citing NCNA.

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ROMANIA

MEDIA PLAY UP CEAUSESCU U.S. TOUR, DEFEND TIES WITH WEST

Romanian media are devoting extensive coverage to President Ceausescu's visit to the United States, which began on 13 October, playing up the warmth of his reception and pointing to the prospect--and propriety--of further Romanian-U.S. cooperation. While emphasizing that the UN jubilee session is the reason for the "unofficial" visit to the United States, Bucharest media also reported Ceausescu's statement upon arrival that he hoped to meet with President Nixon.

An article in the party daily SCINTEIA on 18 October by foreign affairs editor Caplescu, as reviewed by AGERPRES, said that wherever Ceausescu traveled, "the reception extended to him was marked by the selfsame warmth, esteem, and respect for the head of the Romanian state." It went on to underline "the real possibilities that exist for intensifying bilateral relations on an economic, commercial, and technical-scientific level, as well as for establishing forms of cooperation in production."

In a passage clearly designed to defend Romania's right to pursue such relations, Caplescu added: "These are obvious ideas since they express a vivid reality of our days--namely, that every country, big or small, has something to give or to get as part of the flow of material and spiritual assets, that this flow has to be freed of restrictive measures, amplified on the basis of equal rights and in the spirit of mutual advantage." Although Romania is "a socialist country that focuses its foreign policy on relations of close friendship and cooperation with the socialist countries," Caplescu argued, "Romania at the same time militates for expanded relations with all the world countries, regardless of their social and political systems, as a modality of the promotion of peaceful coexistence, of creating a climate of trust, security, and mutual regard."

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CEAUSESCU ADDRESS TO UNITED NATIONS The Bucharest domestic service carried a live relay of Ceausescu's speech before the UN General Assembly on 19 October, and the Romanian press the next day gave the address lavish publicity. Predictably, Ceausescu restated the fundamentals of Romanian foreign policy and made a strong plea for international detente and an end to the policy of intervention in the affairs of other states: "Events have shown that the time of the policy of domination and dictate has passed, that the peoples can no longer be forcefully brought to their knees. This demands the founding of interstate relations on new bases, on equality and mutual esteem; it demands that in the settlement of international issues the peoples' desires and national interests be considered." The "national state," he added pointedly, "will have an important role to play for a long time to come in the development of society."

MOSCOW LECTURES THOSE WHO PUT NATIONAL INTERESTS FIRST

Soviet media have not commented directly on Ceausescu's visit to the United States, but Radio Moscow's current broadcasts to Romania indirectly reflect Soviet concern over Romania's movement toward the West by a renewed emphasis on the duties imposed by proletarian internationalism and the evils of "narrow" nationalism. These themes are recurrent in Soviet propaganda for the Romanians but have not been featured prominently, in gratuitous lectures, since March when a series of talks by Vladimirov pointedly criticized those who shirked their "internationalist duties."

Most notably in the current period, a Radio Moscow commentary by Vladimir Menshikov broadcast only to Romania on 18 October underlined the notion that cooperation among the socialist countries is based on "proletarian internationalism"--the "main factor contributing to the development of each socialist country, enhancing its prestige in the international arena, and insuring its security." The main task of each communist party, Menshikov lectured, is to "observe consistently a true balance of unity between national and international duties; for the observance and the defense of national interests must not be to the detriment of the interests of socialism as a whole."

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Menshikov added that "to lean toward the national element and to forget the interests of the unity of the socialist camp inevitably leads to petit bourgeois nationalism." Invoking Lenin to drive home the point, the commentator recalled that Lenin was "implacable toward those who wanted to lock up socialism in their national house; and he vehemently criticized those who, for the sake of narrow national interests, betrayed the interests of the general struggle for socialism."

A commentary by Vladimir Ilyin broadcast to Romania on the same day, pegged to the anniversary of the entry of German troops into Romania during World War II, recalled how Western powers had used reactionary Romanian rulers as pawns in a game with Hitlerite Germany. By contrast, the commentator declared, the Soviet Union has stood consistently for Romanian independence, a fact demonstrated today by the close cooperation between the two countries and registered in the recently signed Romanian-Soviet treaty.

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YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR

MOSCOW PUBLICIZES GUS HALL ATTACK ON TITO, NONALINEMENT

An article by U.S. Communist Party chief Gus Hall reprinted in the 9-15 October issue of LIFE ABROAD (TANJUG reported that it first appeared in "the small American DAILY WORLD") uses President Nixon's 30 September-2 October visit to Yugoslavia as the takeoff point for the strongest public attack on Tito and his nonalignment policy to appear in Soviet media in recent years. Equating nonalignment with "opportunism" and accusing Yugoslavia of selling out the class struggle for future trade benefits from the United States, the article appears contrived both to discredit Tito within the nonaligned movement and to counteract the attractiveness Tito's nonbloc course might have for other countries as a means of obtaining economic and technological advantages. In dubbing nonalignment "a blind alley for the socialist countries," the article also seems to have implications for the Romanians, and its appearance in LIFE ABROAD came on the eve of Ceausescu's U.S. visit.

The same issue of LIFE ABROAD contains the first substantial Soviet reaction to President Nixon's Yugoslav visit, in the form of lengthy excerpts from the Yugoslav press calculated to portray a Yugoslav-U.S. rapprochement.

PROPAGANDA BACKDROP Moscow had last leveled a full-scale attack on nonalignment as practiced by Belgrade in two talks by IZVESTIYA political commentator Kudryavtsev broadcast by Radio Moscow to Africa on 5 and 8 February this year. The talks did not name Tito or Yugoslavia but were broadcast while Tito was touring Africa. Assailing the idea that "nonalignment should lead to the creation of a third force between socialism and capitalism," Kudryavtsev noted that "some" seemed to want to "create a special camp with membership confined to the nonaligned states, claiming that in so doing they are guided by the desire to increase the influence and power of the emerging states in the international field." Reiterating Moscow's definition of the kind of nonalignment it can live with, Kudryavtsev argued that true nonalignment "does not mean political neutrality" and "proves worthwhile only when it is anti-imperialist in both form and content."

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This consistent Soviet approach resurfaced on the eve of the 8-10 September nonaligned conference in Lusaka, when some Soviet comment briefly evinced concern that the meeting might be diverted from its proper "anti-imperialist course" by "Western" machinations. Comment after the meeting was over expressed gratification that the conference had not been "diverted from its anti-imperialist course," registering apparent satisfaction that Soviet policies had not come under attack in the conference documents and particularly that the documents did not allude to Czechoslovakia.

It was in the context of the polemics generated by Tito's public condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia that Moscow had leveled its last direct attacks on Yugoslavia for espousing nonalignment. The last specific Soviet attack on Yugoslavia's nonalignment policy appeared in PRAVDA UKRAINY on 4 October 1968: "As is known, the Yugoslav leaders fight for 'a policy of nonalignment.' But if one follows the position of the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, it becomes obvious that this is a position of alignment with the anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia and the whole anti-imperialist chorus." It was also during this period that Soviet propaganda last included comment directly critical of Tito.

The current use of LIFE ABROAD and of the proxy of the Soviet-lining CPUSA chief Gus Hall* to denigrate the Yugoslav leader's policy suggests a desire on Moscow's part to counter any impetus the nonalignment movement may have gained at the Lusaka meeting while sustaining the general restraint vis-a-vis Belgrade that has been observed in Soviet media since the fall of 1969, following Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Belgrade; direct polemics ceased at that time, although Moscow continued sporadically to level indirect attacks at unnamed "revisionists" which elicited reactions in Yugoslav media.

* Hall's address to the June 1969 international communist conference in Moscow, published in PRAVDA on 15 June, closely followed the Soviet line as enunciated by Brezhnev at the conference, indicting those who "negate internationalism" and denouncing "the Maoists." Hall also lectured those communists who would remain silent "in the struggle against the anti-Soviet campaign." Radio Moscow testified to Hall's standing with the Soviets by devoting a substantial three percent of its comment to his 60th birthday in the week of 5-11 October this year.

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GUS HALL In a manifest effort to lower Tito's stock in the
ON TITO Arab world, Gus Hall's article attacks the Yugoslav
 President "for not going to Egypt to pay his last
 respects to President Nasir" so that he could instead receive
 "the esteemed guest" from the United States--"the world head-
 quarters of the counterrevolutionary forces." Expanding on
 this theme, the article goes on to catalogue alleged U.S.
 "counterrevolutionary" efforts in the Middle East, Latin
 America, and Vietnam and to denigrate Tito's "guest" as "the
 commander and chief of the armed forces that are continuing
 to kill thousands of men, women, and children in Vietnam,
 Laos, and Cambodia." The article also takes Tito to task for
 "his speech about the great powers" which put the Soviet
 Union, "the most formidable enemy of imperialism," on the
 same level as "the imperialist power committing the most
 blatant aggression and exploiting the entire world"

Although the article says Tito's ostensible motives for welcoming the President were economic, it argues that the underlying reason was a Yugoslav policy of nonalignment which amounts to abandonment of the class struggle: "The basis of the whole problem is the nonclass policy, for it is impossible to adopt a resolute position against imperialism and continue to appear the champion of 'nonalignment.'"

Drawing a lesson for others who might wish to follow Tito's course, the article calls nonalignment "a blind alley for the socialist countries" because it leads to disunity, to divisions, and to the weakening of "progressive" forces. Gus Hall adds: "As with any policy based on opportunism, the advantages [of nonalignment] are very short-lived, because in return for a few handouts, imperialism wishes to obtain proper behavior in the future." The proper path for the socialist countries, the article lectures in conclusion, is the policy of "class duty which leads to unity and to the growing might of the forces which are struggling against capitalism."

SOVIET WEEKLY REPRINTS YUGOSLAV COMMENT WELCOMING NIXON VISIT

The same issue of LIFE ABROAD that carries the Gus Hall attack on Tito's nonalignment policy reprints undated articles on President Nixon's recent visit to Yugoslavia from the Belgrade dailies BORBA and POLITIKA. The Soviet weekly injects no comment of its own, but the reprints serve in effect to document a portrayal of Yugoslavia moving into the Western orbit.

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The excerpts from BORBA point to favorable prospects for the development of better U.S.-Yugoslav relations, cooperation, and mutual understanding deriving from the President's visit and from Tito's acceptance of an invitation to visit the United States. The excerpts from POLITIKA characterize the Tito-Nixon meeting as an embodiment of both leaders' aspirations to seek "bridges for negotiation and exchanges of opinion," rather than as an attempt to achieve "unanimity in their views." They conclude by calling the meeting "an important and weighty contribution to the development of bilateral relations." While LIFE ABROAD thus duly acknowledges, via the POLITIKA comments, the fact that President Nixon and Tito restated and recognized differing U.S. and Yugoslav views, the impact of the reprints as a whole is to project a picture of warming U.S.-Yugoslav relations and growing affinity.

There has been no direct Soviet comment on the Yugoslav leg of the President's European tour. Until the appearance of this issue of LIFE ABROAD, Soviet media had done no more than report the visit.

BELGRADE MEDIA ASSAIL SOVIET PUBLICATION OF HALL ATTACK

Belgrade media have reacted promptly and strongly to Moscow's publicity for Gus Hall's article. The most authoritative reaction came on 15 October in the party weekly KOMUNIST, which rejected "Hall's view that the right to a dialogue on terms of equality with one world power is the prerogative only of another world power." As quoted by TANYUG, the journal added that "evidently Hall does not care to know that during Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia the American President heard Yugoslavia's views about the developments in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean, and elsewhere, in addition to the understandable efforts that were made to seek ways of cooperation acceptable and useful to the two countries."

The Yugoslav journal took particular note of the fact that Hall's article was published in LIFE ABROAD, thus "giving it publicity which is in glaring disproportion to the influence which its author has on the workers and political life in his country and on events in the international workers movement." Because of this, TANYUG said, KOMUNIST "holds that the meaning and the very appearance of Hall's 'critique' must be interpreted in connection with this subsequent publicity."

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Zagreb's VJESNIK, the first to react to the Hall article, charged on the 10th that the CPUSA chief was "expressing opinions derived from other people"--views that "are easily recognizable." BORBA and VJESNIK on the 11th both carried a TANJUG report calling the Soviet reprint of the Hall article "a rude attack on Yugoslavia, on her nonaligned policy, and on President Tito."

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WARSAW PACT

YAKUBOVSKIY, ULBRICHT SPEECHES CLIMAX MANEUVERS IN GDR

Speeches by Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovskiy and the GDR's Walter Ulbricht, as leader of the host country, highlighted the 18 October Magdeburg rally at the windup of the "Brotherhood [or Comradeship] in Arms" exercises of the seven Pact members and exemplified the unusually heavy political emphasis of propaganda surrounding the 13-17 October military spectacular.

Both leaders asserted the firm unity of all the Pact member countries against U.S. backing of "revanchist" West German forces in the framework of NATO. "Together with their partners in the aggressive NATO bloc," Yakubovskiy declared, "the United States arranges military strength demonstrations in Europe near the borders of the socialist states, continues its dangerous arms race, and supports the forces of militarism and revenge in West Germany." Ulbricht, recalling that "Comrade Leonid Brezhnev emphatically called for vigilance" in his Baku speech of 2 October, prefaced a lengthy diatribe against the Bundeswehr with the claim that the just concluded exercises "leave no doubt that the unity and cohesion of the socialist military alliance is closer than ever."

The unusually pretentious slogan of the maneuvers, "Brothers in Arms--Class Brothers, Invincible When United, No Chance for the Enemy," was in keeping with the extensive propaganda fanfare surrounding the exercises, plans for which were first announced on 15 September. There were effusive reports of welcoming friendship rallies for the foreign troops arriving in the GDR in the first days of October and of preliminary joint training exercises prior to the start of the maneuvers on 13 October. A major segment of the foreign personnel, including Yakubovskiy and Pact Chief of Staff Shtemenko, left on the 19th, according to ADN. The Budapest MTI on the 20th said the total personnel involved in the exercises was "about 100,000."

A large part of ADN's 18 October report of the conclusion of the maneuvers is devoted to a detailed listing of the East German and foreign leaders in attendance. The GDR, Poland,

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Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria were represented by their defense ministers from the outset, while the USSR and Hungary were represented by lesser figures until the arrival of Grechko and Czinoge, respectively, during a later phase. Romania was represented throughout only by First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Staff Colonel General Gheorghe. Guests from outside of Europe included Mongolian Defense Minister Batin Dorj as well as Cuban Defense Minister and Deputy Premier Raul Castro and DRV Deputy Defense Minister Major General Tran Sam.

ROMANIAN ROLE Participating for the first time in maneuvers in a country of the northern "iron triangle" of the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, Romania has publicized in its media only the start and finish of the exercises in the GDR, with no comment. The first report, headlined "Military Exercises on the Territory of the GDR," appeared in SCINTEIA on the 7th, four days after East German media had reported the arrival of the Romanian military personnel in the country. SCINTEIA said only that the maneuvers were being held "in accordance with the battle training plan" of the Pact forces, listed the participating countries, and noted that the GDR's Hoffmann would be in charge. It added that "a divisional general staff from our country" would take part--suggesting a small contingent, while "Romanian troops" were mentioned repeatedly in the East German reports.

On the 18th, the Bucharest radio briefly reported the end of the maneuvers, listed the participating countries, and mentioned that "a festivity" at the windup was attended by Ulbricht.

East German media went out of their way to highlight Romanian participation in the exercises, while Soviet reports and commentary generally made no special point of Bucharest's role. On the 16th, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND quoted a Romanian Colonel Scrieciu, "chief of staff of a tank unit," to the effect that "his unit regards participation in the maneuvers as a great honor." The colonel allegedly "reaffirmed the friendship between the Romanian people and the people of the GDR and between the armies of the two countries and valued the GDR's successes in building socialism." During a relay of the Magdeburg festivities on the 18th, East Berlin radio commented that by its participation in the maneuvers "the Romanian People's Army proved to all the world its loyalty to the socialist military coalition."

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YUGOSLAV COMMENT Belgrade media commented generally along customary lines. TANJUG reported POLITIKA as remarking on the 18th that "big military maneuvers on the European continent involving powerful military forces of the bloc military alliances are arousing, with reason, interest and caution." The paper observed that "even when they are of a mostly routine nature, maneuvers of this kind, viewed in the long run, contain as a rule a certain dose of pressure on all sides" and "by this very fact are not a good omen for the further stabilization of European conditions."

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SOVIET SLOGANS

FEW CHANGES IN OCTOBER SLOGANS REGISTER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Following recent practice, the newest set of the CPSU's semi-annual slogans, appearing in PRAVDA on 18 October in anticipation of this year's October Revolution anniversary, confines specific mentions of foreign countries to the major world trouble spots and contains few substantive changes. Alterations in the foreign-affairs group reflect developments since the release of the last set of slogans for May Day--the widening of the war in Indochina, the problem of Arab unity in the wake of Nasir's death, and the August signing of the Soviet FRG-treaty.

INDOCHINA The May Day slogan greeting the Vietnamese people, described as struggling heroically against "the aggression of American imperialism" and for their "freedom and independence," broadens now into a greeting (No. 49) to "the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, who are waging a heroic struggle against American imperialism's intervention and for their countries' freedom and independence."

In the May Day list the second slogan on Vietnam had supplanted an earlier call for an end to aggression against the Vietnamese with a broadened call for an end to "U.S. aggressive designs in Southeast Asia and the barbarous war" against the Vietnamese. This slogan now (No. 50) calls for "an end to the barbarous war in Indochina." Correspondingly, where in the May Day version this slogan demanded complete and unconditional withdrawal of U.S. and "satellite" troops from South Vietnam, the current version calls for a complete and unconditional withdrawal "from South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." A final "Hands Off Indochina!" is added for good measure.

MIDDLE EAST The May Day call upon peoples of the world to demand an end to Israeli "aggression" in the Near East and "immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories" is retained (No. 51), but with the adjective "immediate" removed. The second and concluding sentence in the May Day version, "May the solidarity of the Soviet people with peoples in Arab countries grow stronger and develop!", is now moved to the end of a new, second slogan on the Middle East (No. 52) which reflects Soviet concern over the situation after Nasir's death in calling upon peoples of the Arab states to strengthen their "unity and cohesion in the struggle against imperialist aggression."

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EUROPE A previous slogan asking peoples of the world to struggle "against revanchism and neofascism in the Federal Republic of Germany" is deleted in tacit recognition of the signing of the Soviet-FRG treaty on 12 August. A general plea for vigilance against the intrigues of unidentified "forces of reaction and revanchism--the enemies of relaxation of tension" is injected into the slogan urging European peoples to develop cooperation. The slogans thus register the change in Soviet-FRG state relations while retaining, in indirect form, the thrust of continuing propaganda cautioning against "forces" in West Germany who oppose the goals of Brandt's Ostpolitik.

Curiously, at the same time, a specific call for intensified struggle "to create an effective system of collective security" in Europe is deleted from the slogan on European cooperation, which now urges Europeans in general terms to "advocate more actively the transformation of Europe into a continent of stable peace and peaceful cooperation between states." Routine propaganda continues to advocate a conference looking toward a European "collective security system."

IMPERIALIST In the only other substantive change in the
AGGRESSION foreign-affairs group, a plea to working people everywhere to struggle for "peace, democracy, national independence, and socialism" now includes a call to struggle "more actively against imperialism's aggressive policy"--a reflection of current propaganda attacking the U.S. Administration for manifesting increased aggressiveness across the board.

DOMESTIC A number of new topical slogans refer to the
AFFAIRS forthcoming 24th CPSU Congress and the July CPSU plenum and reflect the regime's current concerns over industrial efficiency and agricultural production. In another innovation, the CPSU is defined (No. 11) as "the militant vanguard of the working class and all working people, political leader and organizer of the Soviet people in the struggle for communism." The previous formulation, dating from the May Day 1969 slogans, merely stated that the CPSU "confidently guides the Soviet people along the Leninist path to the victory of communism."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

DNEPROPETROVSK GAINS AS NEW UKRAINE CADRE CHIEF APPOINTED

MOLOD UKRAINY on 3 October identified Dnepropetrovsk City First Secretary A.A. Ulanov as the new head of the Ukrainian Central Committee organizational-party work section. Ulanov, a protege of Dnepropetrovsk Obkom First Secretary A.F. Vatchenko, replaces V.M. Tsybulko, a close protege of A.P. Lyashko, former Ukrainian Second Secretary and now chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

This is the second key republic-level organizational post awarded to a Dnepropetrovsk man this year. At the March 1970 Ukrainian Komsomol congress Komsomol Second Secretary I.I. Skiba, installed by Lyashko in May 1968, was replaced by Dnepropetrovsk Komsomol First Secretary A.M. Girenko (MOLOD UKRAINY, 28 March 1970). Subsequently Girenko, as cadre supervisor, presided over Komsomol personnel changes in Zhitomir in May and Vinnitsa in June and wrote an article on organizational work in the 22 August MOLOD UKRAINY.

These changes suggest that Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest has had to share with the rival Dnepropetrovsk faction the key posts in cadre and Komsomol work opened up by the eclipse of Lyashko. Lyashko was replaced by I.K. Lutak as Ukrainian second secretary in June 1969 and transferred to the honorific post of Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman-- thus removing a potential rival to Shelest. Lyashko's decline was confirmed by the subsequent demotion of several of his former subordinates. In January 1970 Central Committee chemical section head A.V. Avilov was transferred to the post of minister of chemical industry, a post abolished six months later. In April Kiev First Secretary F.P. Golovchenko was demoted to motor transport minister, and Central Committee cadre section head V.M. Tsybulko was transferred to Kiev where he became obkom first secretary. And in June Ukrainian Foreign Minister D.Z. Belokolos was removed and named ambassador to Zambia.

Ulanov played a leading role in the campaign against Oles Honchar's novel Sobor organized by his chief, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast First Secretary Vatchenko, assailing Honchar in the 4 June 1968 SOVIET CULTURE for "sinning against the truth."

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Shelest did not publicly participate in the anti-Honchar campaign, which failed to shake Honchar's position as writers union chairman. Ulanov was last identified as city first secretary on 12 March when he wrote an article in SOVIET CULTURE urging a crackdown on liberalism in theaters.

Vatchenko has had considerable success in promoting the careers of his proteges in recent years. Dneprodzerzhinsk City First Secretary V.F. Dobryk was elected Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast First secretary, and Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Second Secretary V.M. Chebrikov was appointed USSR KGB deputy chairman. In a September issue of PARTY LIFE (No. 17) Vatchenko bragged about his successes with cadres, noting in particular that the former Krivoy Rog City second secretary, V.S. Makarenko, "now works in the Ukrainian Central Committee apparatus."

The neighboring Zaporozhe hierarchy also appears to have benefited from these changes. G. Kryuchkov, cadre section head in the Zaporozhe obkom in 1965, was identified in RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 29 September as deputy head of the Ukrainian cadres section. Kryuchkov may well share the views of his superior, Ulanov, on literature, since the Zaporozhe newspapers (ZAPORIZKA PRAVDA and INDUSTRIALNOYE ZAPOROZHE) joined the 1968 Dnepropetrovsk attack on Honchar's novel about the Zaporozhe Cossacks.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SENIOR CADRES ENJOINED TO STUDY MAO MORE CAREFULLY

Since 9 September, when the second plenum of the Ninth CCP Central Committee was publicized, there has been increasing propaganda attention to the need for more study of Mao's thought at the leadership level. RED FLAG No. 10, released on 20 September, declared that "at this time we must pay special attention to the experience of the leading cadres in successfully studying philosophy." A few days later, the joint editorial for National Day stressed that the grave leadership responsibilities of leading cadres, "senior cadres in particular," make it all the more incumbent on them to constantly remold their thinking through the study of "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought." And both the editorial and an article in RED FLAG No. 11 dredge up an old Mao quotation enjoining "members of the Central Committee and senior cadres" to study more intensively.

Such injunctions, coupled with the unexplained nonappearance of two Politburo members at the National Day rally, may be intended to carry a warning to backsliders. Among the many provincial commentaries echoing the calls for improved study by cadres is a revealing HSINHUA DAILY editorial broadcast by Nanking radio on 13 October. Only through close study and conscious implementation of Mao's line--the editorial warns--can cadres "recognize in good time and resolutely repudiate any erroneous tendency that runs counter" to Mao's line. Exuding self-assurance, the editorial even references the Book of Odes in quoting the saying that "everyone can make a beginning but very few can persevere through to the end," and concludes that "it is the same in making revolution." Driving home the warning, the editorial continues: "It is just as Comrade Stalin said--'When a car cuts a corner, you will observe that someone is always thrown out of the car.' We must learn from this kind of lesson."

LEFTISTS
IN TROUBLE? A RED FLAG No. 10 article transmitted by NCNA on 7 October indicates that some of those who were "intellectual revolutionaries" during the early stages of the cultural revolution may again be in trouble. The article is by the writing group of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, an organization that once

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might have been considered a haven for literate leftism. But the Shanghai leaders have apparently said farewell to their past; the article highlights the struggle in the Shanghai high compression cylinder plant where "in the second half of 1967 leadership over mass criticism was largely usurped by some so-called writers with a highly questionable political background." That these literati were extreme leftists is made clear by the charge that they feel "we have to give differing consideration to those who are early and those who are late in making revolution or in rebelling"--a charge frequently made against the left as the revolution waned.

The tone of the article is almost entirely in support of the status quo insofar as power is concerned, although the need for continual criticism is stressed and there are warnings regarding the ever-present class enemy. In one instance a class enemy was blamed for corrupting the younger workers, who were loafing on duty and making the veteran workers angry. The cadres supported the veterans but were unsuccessful in checking the "evil trend" until they found an old capitalist who could be purged for inciting the youth.

AT THE COUNTY LEVEL Although the implications for higher-level cadres may be the more dramatic, propagandists are stressing the need for cadres at county level and below to deepen their study of Mao's thought and thereby strengthen their party spirit. An increase in central media publicity for rebuilt party committees at the county level may be designed to provide models for the cadres to emulate.

While provincial media reported the first rebuilt party committee in the nation last December, the central media did not mention any new county unit until last June. Then Peking began reporting on such units, at the modest rate of about one per month. During the first two weeks of October, however, five county committees have been publicized by central media. The reports uniformly portray the leadership of the county committees as overcoming initial arrogance and unwillingness to go to basic levels for work and study.

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Radio Peking on 6 October broadcast an article written by the secretary of the Lintien county party committee in Heilungkiang on the necessity for leadership cadres to do manual work. The party secretary, before he corrected his views through study, felt he "was too busy to handle routine work" and incorrectly believed it was not necessary for the party committee's "top leader" to go to lower levels to do manual work and study. An earlier 28 September NCNA report, publicizing the Wangkuei county committee, also in Heilungkiang, indicated that at one time "some leading members were arrogant and complacent" and when problems were discovered they "put the blame on the cadres at the commune and brigade levels." NCNA claimed that after study had been carried out within the committee the leaders were better able to solve problems by "first examining themselves" and then carrying out a "small rectification within the leading group."

NCNA on 9 October publicized for the first time the nation's first county committee set up after the Ninth Party Congress. NCNA reported that leading members of the Changte county committee in Hunan, formed 10 months ago, are actively conducting ideological revolution with the aid of the masses. The report praised the Changte leaders for carrying out "three open-door rectifications" since December and for taking part in collective labor. NCNA noted that, since August, 29 of the committee's leading members have worked an average of 43 days each in productive labor.

On 15 October NCNA lauded the Kaoho county committee in Kwangtung for always welcoming comments from the masses and "accepting supervision by them" in party consolidation. The report cautioned, however, that "in such a situation some people mistakenly regard relying on the masses as depending on them." The Kaoho party leaders correctly understood that it was necessary to gain the "help" of the masses without actually depending on them in order to carry out successfully "one's task of consciously making revolution." The report applauded the secretary of the Kaoho committee--NCNA was careful to point out that he had been secretary of a county party committee prior to the cultural revolution--for persuading members of the revolutionary committees in the county to pay attention to this problem. Thereby, the secretary enabled leading members at all levels to observe the "new trends of party committees in ideological revolutionization."

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